source: Caselaw Access Project

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text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederico PABLO, Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal No. 3-15-0892
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Sharon Goott Nissim, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
    James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Thomas D. Arado, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Frederico Pablo, was found guilty of resisting a peace officer and sentenced to a 12-month term of conditional discharge. On appeal, he raises numerous contentions of error, including that the court erred in allowing the State to unilaterally withdraw from a stipulation on the day of trial. We vacate defendant's conviction and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The State charged defendant with the Class A misdemeanor offense of resisting a peace officer ( 720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2012) ). Defendant was initially found guilty following a bench trial; however, the circuit court granted his motion for a new trial after finding that he had never executed a valid jury waiver.

¶ 4 On September 22, 2015, defendant announced he was ready for trial. The State announced it was ready but noted that one of the officers it intended to call would be unavailable the next day. The State further explained that it had a civilian witness present that day, but the prosecutor expressed that he was disinclined to seek a continuance where a civilian witness was involved. The court rejected the State's suggestion that a jury be selected and then held until the officer was available. Instead, the court suggested the parties work toward a stipulation.

¶ 5 On the morning of November 2, 2015, the court asked the parties if they had reached a stipulation. Discussion on that topic ensued throughout the morning session. That afternoon, the court read the stipulation into the record:

"Okay. This is the stipulation of the parties. The parties hereby stipulate that if Danish H. Ali were called to testify, he would testify that his vehicle was struck by another vehicle with Illinois registration 5403474, and he gave the Bolingbrook Police Department a description of the driver of the fleeing vehicle as a male Hispanic and that he had a mustache and he arrived at 246 Caroline Street, Bolingbrook. Officer Jon [Costion] approached Frederico Pablo, was handcuffed and made the statement, 'that's him, but he shaved his mustache off[.]' [S]igned by all parties."

The court also entered a written order referencing the stipulation. The order clarified that the defense objected to the admission of Ali's statement, "that's him, but he shaved his mustache," but stipulated to the fact that he would nevertheless testify to that.

¶ 6 The State noted that a possibility remained that Ali would be available to testify in person, in which case the stipulation would be unnecessary. Defense counsel interjected, arguing that the stipulation included "testimony from Mr. Ali that we wanted in regardless of whether he is here to testify." The court responded: "Well, if he is not here, this is a stipulation signed by all parties." The court concluded: "If he is here, stipulation goes in the garbage." Defense counsel noted that, if Ali was present and the State did not call him, the defense would. The matter proceeded immediately from that point to jury selection.

¶ 7 The following morning, November 3, 2015, the State moved to bar the defense from introducing any evidence that the police officers investigating the car accident had arrested the wrong person, arguing that the lawfulness of the arrest was not relevant to a resisting charge. The court pointed out that Ali's stipulated testimony, which concerned only the car accident and Ali's identification of defendant as the driver, opened the door to allow defendant to pursue that topic. The court stated: "[Y]ou entered into a stipulation [in which] another person identifies the defendant as the one who committed the fleeing and the eluding. That brings into issue his credibility."

¶ 8 The State responded by stating that it would withdraw the stipulation "and not talk about [Ali] at all." The court allowed the State to withdraw the stipulation, telling the State, "You got [sic ] the perfect right to withdraw the stipulation." Defense counsel objected vociferously, taking exception to the State's waiting until the jury had been impaneled to withdraw from the stipulation. Further, counsel explained the importance of the stipulation, or Ali's personal testimony, to defendant's case:

"[O]ur entire theory of the case[ ] is that the officers are lying about [defendant] resisting at all.
* * *
We are also going to argue that [defendant] was injured in the process. And the officers knew that. And after injuring an innocent man for a charge they arrested him on, they are now trying to justify their actions by * * * claiming that he resisted."

The court reiterated that the State could withdraw the stipulation because "[i]t's a stipulation of their witness."

¶ 9 The court then granted the State's motion in limine , barring defendant from referencing in opening statements the fact that the police arrested the wrong person. The court noted that further objections could be raised during the evidentiary portion of the trial. After a discussion of jury instructions, the jury was brought into the courtroom, and the parties proceeded to opening statements.

¶ 10 The State called three Bolingbrook police officers in its case-in-chief, Steven Ficek, John Tuttle, and Jon Costion. The officers testified that they were investigating a hit and run accident, which led them to defendant's house, where they found the vehicle that had been involved in the accident. The officers called for a tow truck. As the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow truck, defendant exited the house through the garage. When Tuttle asked if the vehicle belonged to him, defendant told Tuttle that it did. Defendant then looked over his shoulder and began shuffling back toward the garage. Tuttle attempted to grab defendant's arm to prevent him from retreating into the house, but defendant jerked his hand away. Tuttle decided to arrest defendant and told him to put his hands behind his back. Defendant did not comply, and a struggle ensued. Costion observed the struggle, tackled both men, and then assisted in prying defendant's arms behind his back. Ficek assisted as well.

¶ 11 Throughout the cross-examination of the officers, the court sustained the State's objections when defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony regarding Ali or the car accident. The court also prevented defense counsel from asking the officers about injuries that defendant sustained in the altercation.

¶ 12 Defendant, his niece, his sister, and his brother testified during defendant's case-in-chief. The direct examination of each witness was riddled with sustained State's objections as well, all stemming from questions related to the car accident or the arrest of the incorrect person. The court rejected defense counsel's argument that the State had opened the door by asking the officers about their investigation and the vehicle they were looking for.

¶ 13 Defendant testified that he told the officers that the vehicle was not his but belonged to his brother. After he asked what was happening, the officers tackled him. Defendant testified that he never took a step back from the police officers and never looked over his shoulder. He testified that he was tackled immediately and would not have had time to accomplish those things. Defendant testified that he never struggled or resisted by moving his body when the officers were handcuffing him. Defendant testified that he went to the hospital some time thereafter, but the court prevented defense counsel from asking any further questions on the subject.

¶ 14 The jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to a 12-month term of conditional discharge.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to unilaterally withdraw the stipulation that the parties had agreed to the day before. We agree.

¶ 17 A stipulation is a conclusive agreement between the parties with respect to an issue before the court. People v. Woods , 214 Ill. 2d 455, 468, 293 Ill.Dec. 277, 828 N.E.2d 247 (2005). In that vein, parties may stipulate to the testimony of a witness in the event that the witness is not present at trial. E.g. , People v. Durgan , 346 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1127-28, 1132, 282 Ill.Dec. 645, 806 N.E.2d 1233 (2004). Courts look with favor upon stipulations because they "tend to promote disposition of cases, simplification of issues[,] and the saving of expense to litigants." In re Estate of Moss , 109 Ill. App. 2d 185, 192, 248 N.E.2d 513 (1969) ; People v. Calvert , 326 Ill. App. 3d 414, 419-20, 260 Ill.Dec. 251, 760 N.E.2d 1024 (2001). "Parties who agree to certain terms are estopped from later objecting to the terms of that agreement. Generally, neither can complain of evidence stipulated into the record [citations]." People v. Baynes , 88 Ill. 2d 225, 239, 58 Ill.Dec. 819, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1981).

¶ 18 A stipulation signed by attorneys for both parties is binding. Kazubowski v. Kazubowski , 93 Ill. App. 2d 126, 134, 235 N.E.2d 664 (1968) (per curiam ). "It is obvious that one of the parties to a stipulation cannot withdraw from the binding force of such stipulation unless he has the consent of the other party or leave of the court [citation]." Id. "The law in Illinois is well settled that: 'Parties will not be relieved from a stipulation in the absence of a clear showing that the matter stipulated is untrue, and then only when the application is seasonably made.' " People v. Polk , 115 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1013, 71 Ill.Dec. 611, 451 N.E.2d 579 (1983) (quoting Brink v. Industrial Comm'n , 368 Ill. 607, 609, 15 N.E.2d 491 (1938) ).

¶ 19 The policy favoring stipulations-and disfavoring the withdrawal from those stipulations-is well illustrated in People v. Siems , 170 Ill. App. 3d 894, 119 Ill.Dec. 971, 523 N.E.2d 727 (1988). In that case, the parties on appeal agreed to a stipulated statement of facts in lieu of a report of proceedings. Id. at 895, 119 Ill.Dec. 971, 523 N.E.2d 727. This included a stipulation that Kentucky was a member of the Driver License Compact. Id.

¶ 20 In fact, Kentucky was not a member of that compact. Id. at 896, 119 Ill.Dec. 971, 523 N.E.2d 727. After defendant had filed his brief, the State moved to withdraw the agreed statement of facts. Id. at 895-96, 119 Ill.Dec. 971, 523 N.E.2d 727. Defendant objected, arguing that his brief was filed in reliance on the stipulation. Id. at 896, 119 Ill.Dec. 971, 523 N.E.2d 727. The Siems court denied the State's request to withdraw the stipulation on the grounds that the request was not seasonably made, noting that "the State did not seek relief until seven months after the stipulation was entered into and filed and five months after defendant filed his brief based solely upon the stipulation in question." Id. at 897, 119 Ill.Dec. 971, 523 N.E.2d 727.

¶ 21 In the present case, the parties presented their signed stipulation to the circuit court, and the court accepted the stipulation, read it into the record, and entered a written order referencing it. When the State moved to withdraw the stipulation, it did not allege that the facts contained therein were untrue or incorrect. Nor does the State argue as much on appeal. Absent " 'a clear showing that the matter stipulated is untrue,' " the circuit court had no grounds on which it could allow the State to unilaterally withdraw the stipulation. Polk , 115 Ill. App. 3d at 1013, 71 Ill.Dec. 611, 451 N.E.2d 579 (quoting, Brink v. Industrial Comm'n , 368 Ill. 607, 609, 15 N.E.2d 491 (1938) ).

¶ 22 Furthermore, the State's request to withdraw the stipulation was not seasonably made. The request was made just moments before opening statements commenced, providing the defense with no time to react to the change in the case. Indeed, that change in the case was monumental, as much of the defense's theory of the case turned on Ali's stipulated testimony opening the door to evidence of the police arresting the wrong person. To be sure, the stipulation had been entered only a day earlier, a far cry from the seven months in Siems . However, the Siems court also considered the impact withdrawal would have on the opposing party. Here, just as in Siems , defendant was relying heavily on the stipulation.

¶ 23 In response, the State argues that it is not required to call any witness at trial and that from that well-settled rule it follows that it is also not required to use any stipulation at trial. While the State is plainly correct that it is not required to call a certain witness, that particular point of law has no bearing the stipulation issue. The State's argument that "there was no requirement that the People actually use the stipulation" relies on a flawed premise. While Ali was the State's witness, the stipulation to his testimony was a binding agreement between both parties. See Kazubowski , 93 Ill. App. 2d at 134, 235 N.E.2d 664. The stipulation did not belong to the State any more than it did to defendant, and the State did not retain any greater right to withdraw the stipulation than did defendant.

¶ 24 The State also asserts that its withdrawal of the stipulation "was timely made prior to it being entered into evidence." We reject the argument that a stipulation is not binding on the parties until it is read to the jury at trial. The parties here agreed to Ali's stipulated testimony and presented a copy signed by both parties to the circuit court. The circuit court accepted the stipulation, read it into the record, and issued a written order referencing the stipulation. Clearly the steps required for the formation of a binding stipulation were satisfied. Id.

¶ 25 Indeed, the facts of the present case illustrate precisely why the State's argument must fail. If a stipulation was not binding until executed at trial, a party could make any number of stipulations prior to trial-thus inducing certain strategic decisions from the opponent-only to withdraw from those stipulations on the eve of trial. Here, the State stipulated to Ali's testimony. From defendant's perspective, this stipulated testimony regarding the car accident and Ali's identification of the driver would open the door to those issues, allowing defendant to elicit further testimony from the other witnesses in the case. When the State was allowed to withdraw the stipulation at the eleventh hour in order to prevail on a motion to bar references to those issues, it undermined the defense's entire theory of the case, with mere moments before opening statements were to begin.

¶ 26 Finally, the State argues that the defense could have subpoenaed Ali and called him as a witness and that, "having failed to do so, defendant cannot now claim prejudice." However, the prejudice suffered by defendant in this case is clear. Initially, the very fact that a stipulation regarding Ali's testimony was agreed to obviated any need for the defense to subpoena Ali. The existence of the stipulation should have guaranteed that Ali's testimony would be presented, one way or another. Having reached that agreement, there was no reason for the defense to subpoena Ali.

¶ 27 Moreover, the trial record demonstrates the impact that the court's erroneous decision to allow the State to withdraw from the stipulation had on defendant's case. As referenced above, much of defendant's theory of the case turned on eliciting testimony regarding the officers' arrest of the wrong person for fleeing the scene of the car accident. Ali's stipulated testimony guaranteed that that door would be open to defendant. As a result of the late withdrawal of the stipulation, the defense was essentially left without a theory of the case, as it was not allowed to attack the officers' credibility. See supra ¶ 8. Defense counsel's cross-examinations and direct examinations were thus replete with constant sustained objections, and the trial had to be paused numerous times so the parties could argue on those objections. To say that the court's decision to allow the State to withdraw the stipulation just before trial did not impact defendant's case is patently incorrect.

¶ 28 In sum, the parties agreed to a binding and conclusive stipulation. When the State later wished to withdraw the stipulation, defendant did not consent. Nor did the State make a showing that the stipulation was untrue. Further, the request for withdrawal was not seasonably made, as it occurred just moments before defendant's trial was to begin. Accordingly, it was error for the circuit court to allow the State to withdraw the stipulation (see Polk , 115 Ill. App. 3d at 1013, 71 Ill.Dec. 611, 451 N.E.2d 579 ; Kazubowski , 93 Ill. App. 2d at 134, 235 N.E.2d 664 ), and the State cannot show that the withdrawal was harmless. We therefore vacate defendant's conviction for resisting a peace officer, order the reinstitution of the parties' previously agreed-upon stipulation, and remand for further proceedings. Because we find the stipulation issue dispositive, we need not address the remainder of defendant's arguments.

¶ 29 CONCLUSION

¶ 30 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 31 Vacated and remanded.

Justice O'Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Wright dissented, with opinion.

¶ 33 The issue, in my mind, is whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a party to remove a witness from a pretrial witness list before the jury selection process began. In this case, I conclude the trial court's ruling was entirely justified and correct as discussed below.

¶ 34 For purposes of clarification, I respectfully disagree that the agreed language that the court read into the record constitutes a binding "stipulation" in the first place. The document at issue does not admit facts necessary to prove the cause of action or agree to waive certain foundational requirements for documentary evidence to be submitted to the court. Instead, the document at issue in this appeal represents an agreed statement pertaining to a potential witness's testimony. For purposes of this dissent, for the most part, I will refer to the document at issue as "Ali's agreed testimony." At this juncture, a discussion of some additional procedural events may be helpful. After a jury trial in 2014, a new trial became necessary for reasons that are not relevant to this appeal. Interestingly, the State did present the testimony of the lay witness during the 2014 trial. However, during the 2014 trial, Ali told the jury he identified the vehicle involved in the collision by the paint on the bumper of that vehicle. There was no discussion of the facial appearance of the driver of that car during the 2014 trial.

¶ 35 As the court attempted to schedule a date for the second jury trial, the court encountered many scheduling difficulties. At various times the witnesses were present on the day scheduled for the second jury trial, and the trial was continued to another date. For example, after many continuances and delays, the court scheduled the second jury trial to begin on September 22, 2015. On that date, the State had four witnesses, a lay witness and three police officers, present and ready for trial. In fact, both the prosecutor and defense counsel announced they were ready to proceed with the jury trial on September 22, 2015.

¶ 36 When the State learned that the testimony would not begin until the next day, the State advised the court that one of the officers present on September 22, 2015, would not be available to testify the next day due to bereavement leave. The court discussed several alternatives with the parties. The court asked, "Is there any way you can stipulate to the officer's testimony?" (Emphasis added.) In spite of the court's suggestion, defense counsel advised the court that the defense was not prepared to stipulate to the content of the officer's testimony. However, the parties agreed to continue the jury trial to November 2, 2015.

¶ 37 When the parties reassembled on November 2, 2015, the unavailability of the police officer was no longer an issue. As the first order of business on November 2, 2015, the prosecutor advised the trial court that defense counsel wished to argue a verbal motion in limine before proceeding further. On that date, the State also requested a ruling on the State's verbal motion in limine . Before addressing the defense motion, the court asked, "Do we have a stipulation?" Without responding to the court's question, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel would like to argue the motion in limine "first."

¶ 38 The court asked, "What's the motion in limine ?" Defense counsel responded, "Judge, the motion in limine is to exclude part of the stipulation as being irrelevant." The defense motion requested a ruling preventing the State from introducing any evidence concerning Ali's statement "that's him, but he shaved his mustache." The court denied the defense's verbal motion in limine and then addressed both sides by stating, "Forget about the stipulation." The court explained this statement as follows: "[Y]ou are not going to read the stipulation because he wants this and you want to bar it."

¶ 39 Based purely on my own speculation based on prior experiences on the bench, it appears to me that the prosecution's lay witness may have been present on November 2, 2015, but would have been inconvenienced by returning to court the following day when testimony would begin. It also appears to me that for some reason that is not apparent of record, both sides attempted to reach an agreement pertaining to the content of the lay witness's testimony for purposes of the second trial. Before adjourning for lunch on November 2, 2015, the court asked, "What about the stipulation?" Defense counsel said, "I think we can come up with a stipulation." The court cautioned, if you do not have a stipulation, you may not have a trial. For purposes of this dissent, I have presumed the trial court was referring to a "stipulation" pertaining to the content of the lay witness's testimony, rather than an officer's testimony.

¶ 40 After the lunch break on November 2, 2015, the parties continued their debate over the relevance of Ali's agreed testimony pertaining to a shaved mustache. Following the spirited debate, the court seemingly reversed its previous ruling denying defense counsel's motion in limine. At this point in time, the court reserved ruling on defendant's motion in limine , seeking to exclude Ali's testimony about a shaved mustache, based on relevance. The court indicated the matter would be addressed by the court when the issue came up during the jury trial. Again, I believe the court's ruling mandated that Ali would have to testify before the court decided whether portions of Ali's testimony were irrelevant and inadmissible.

¶ 41 Thereafter, the court received each side's list of witnesses. The court also requested the "stipulation" that was finalized during the lunch recess. The court read the stipulation concerning Ali's agreed testimony into the record before jury selection began. Thereafter, defense counsel presented an order for the court's signature. This order documented the court's prior ruling in limine and defendant's continuing objection to Ali's agreed testimony about the shaved mustache. Importantly, the order presumably prepared by defense counsel stated, "The defense will stipulate that if called to testify witness Danish [sic ] Ali" would testify about a shaved mustache and this testimony would be over the defense's continuing objection. Thus, it appears to me that the parties were addressing a contingency that might arise if the State introduced the document containing Ali's agreed testimony, in lieu of requiring Ali to reappear the next day to testify in person.

¶ 42 At this point, the prosecutor stated for the record that the State might call Ali to testify in person. In response, the court observed, then the stipulation "goes in the garbage." Similarly, defense counsel replied that if Ali was in the courthouse on the next day, defense counsel would call Ali as a defense witness, even if the State did not. Following this discussion, jury selection began.

¶ 43 After the selection of a jury, the parties once again revisited the trial court's ruling on the defense's pretrial motion in limine and the State's motion to exclude any reference to defendant's false arrest. The court observed in the event that the State introduced Ali's agreed testimony as part of the State's case-in-chief, the court would allow the defense to introduce testimony pertaining to the false arrest based on Ali's mistaken identification. The court observed that Ali's agreed testimony, if offered, opened the door to this line of evidence from the defendant. Based on the court's preliminary pretrial observations, the prosecutor announced the State would not be offering either Ali's agreed testimony or Ali's live testimony.

¶ 44 The shift in the prosecution's strategy took place before jury selection took place and before the jury trial officially began. Over defense counsel's objection, the court allowed the State to control its own trial strategy by removing Ali's name from the State's witness list before the parties engaged in the process of selecting a fair-minded jury. I submit that the trial court's ruling was entirely correct because both sides were very much aware of the contingency that Ali's agreed testimony might not be used during the jury trial at all.

¶ 45 For example, the order signed by the court on November 2, 2015, contains language suggesting that "if" the State offers the testimony of Ali, then the defense will stipulate to the content of Ali's testimony. This language indicates to me that on November 2, 2015, the defendant knew the State might not offer any testimony from Ali. In addition, the court advised the parties that if Ali testified in person, the stipulation was "garbage." Finally, defendant addressed the contingency that, even if Ali returned to the courthouse for the evidentiary portion of the trial, the State might not call Ali to testify. In this event, the defense indicated Ali could become a defense witness. Based on these circumstances, I do not believe the trial court erred by refusing to require the State to produce Ali as a live witness or tender Ali's agreed testimony as part of the State's case-in-chief.

¶ 46 After the trial court's ruling, defense counsel did not request the court to continue Ali's subpoena so that Ali would be present to testify for the defense sometime after November 2, 2015. The court may have granted such a request. Perhaps, in spite of many false starts, if defendant requested a continuance the court would have postponed the testimonial portion of the trial. The defense did nothing after learning that the State's case-in-chief would not include any testimony, agreed or otherwise, from the lay witness, Ali.

¶ 47 Contrary to defendant's position on appeal, I would hold that either party may be allowed to strike a witness from the list of witnesses before or after a trial begins. In other words, I conclude that neither party can be compelled by the trial court to present each and every witness disclosed to the other party during pretrial proceedings. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. I believe the trial court made the correct decision in this case.

      The issue in Siems turned on whether the defendant's Kentucky driver's license stood as a defense to an Illinois prosecution for driving while his license was revoked.

      The State on appeal effectively concedes that it was a tactical error for the State to enter into the stipulation in the first place, noting that "the People withdrew the stipulation due to the misapprehension of the effect on its case." Of course, saving a party from its own blunder is not a legal grounds for allowing the unilateral withdrawal of a stipulation.


text:
    Kathy MEHALKO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jane DOE, Kathy Miller Whitney, a/k/a Opposing Voices of Kathy Mehalko Puppymill Agenda, and Matthew Caleb Williams, a/k/a Caleb Matthew Williams, a/k/a Caleb-Matthew Williams, a/k/a Pet Owners Beware, Defendants
    (Jane Doe, Defendant-Appellee).
    No. 2-17-0788
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed July 10, 2018
    Jeffrey P. Orduno, of Rockford, for appellant.
    Joel M. Huotari, of WilliamsMcCarthy, LLP, of Rockford, for appellee.
   JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Kathy Mehalko, appeals from the trial court's order imposing postjudgment sanctions on her under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219 (eff. July 1, 2002). Mehalko argues that Rule 219 sanctions were improper because (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose such sanctions as the case was already closed, (2) the sanctions' purpose was not to further discovery as required by the rule, and (3) no "abuse of discovery procedures" occurred. She further argues that the hearings did not include the procedural safeguards necessary for contempt proceedings.

¶ 2 We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to sanction Mehalko under both Rule 219 and its inherent authority to enforce its orders through contempt proceedings. However, although the trial court found Mehalko in indirect civil contempt, it failed to specify what Mehalko must do to purge herself of the contempt. We therefore remand the cause.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Mehalko is an animal rights activist. On July 29, 2016, she filed a three-count complaint against various defendants alleging defamation, violation of the Right of Publicity Act ( 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq. (West 2016) ), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims arose from photographs and comments about her that were posted on the Facebook pages "Opposing Voices of Kathy Mehalko Puppymill Agenda" (Opposing Voices) and "Pet Owners Beware." Mehalko did not know who was responsible for creating the Facebook pages or posting the comments, so she nominally filed the case against various Jane and John Does.

¶ 5 In a related action, Mehalko obtained an order requiring Facebook to disclose to Mehalko's attorney the individual(s) behind Opposing Voices. Jane Doe was named to counsel and then served in the instant case.

¶ 6 Mehalko was granted leave to file an amended complaint on September 1, 2016. On September 21, 2016, Doe filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

¶ 7 Mehalko thereafter sought to depose Doe. On November 8, 2016, the trial court granted Mehalko leave to conduct a limited deposition of Doe. Its order stated that Mehalko's attorney could reveal Doe's identity to Mehalko, who could attend the deposition. It further stated that Mehalko was "ordered not to disclose Doe's identity to anyone and may be subject to contempt of court if she [did]." (Emphasis in original.)

¶ 8 On January 19, 2017, the trial court allowed Mehalko leave to file a second amended complaint.

¶ 9 On February 22, 2017, the trial court granted Doe's motion to dismiss, and it dismissed all claims as to all parties with prejudice under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016) ). Shortly afterward, on March 2, 2017, Mehalko filed a motion to lift the November 8, 2016, protective order prohibiting her from disclosing Doe's identity. The trial court denied Mehalko's motion on March 23, 2017.

¶ 10 More than 30 days later, on May 4, 2017, Doe filed a petition for a rule to show cause and for reconsideration. She alleged that she had proceeded under a pseudonym in the case because Mehalko's Internet followers, who did not know Doe's identity, had made veiled threats against her. Doe alleged that Mehalko had violated the protective order by revealing Doe's identity to them, resulting in escalating "online taunts and menacing behavior." Doe alleged that Mehalko's conduct constituted contempt of court. Doe asked the court to order Mehalko to remove all Facebook posts referring to her and pay her attorney fees.

¶ 11 On June 20, 2017, the trial court granted Doe's petition for a rule to show cause. An evidentiary hearing took place on August 10, 2017. On August 14, 2017, Doe amended her petition "[p]ursuant to the direction of the" trial court to state that it was brought pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) and (d) (eff. July 1, 2002).

¶ 12 The trial court issued a written order on August 30, 2017, making the following findings. Mehalko did not know the person behind the Opposing Voices Facebook page before the entry of the November 8, 2016, protective order. That order allowed Mehalko to attend Doe's deposition and learn her identity, but it prohibited Mehalko from disclosing Doe's identity to anyone. Mehalko was present in court when the protective order was entered and knew its terms. Mehalko attended Doe's deposition on November 15, 2016, and learned her identity. On July 25, 2016, Mehalko and her Facebook friends had expressed that they were looking forward to the exposure of Doe's identity, which they thought could result in a class action lawsuit against her. Mehalko was present in court with her counsel on March 23, 2017, when she unsuccessfully moved to lift the protective order. On April 24, 2017, Mehalko alluded to Doe's identity on Mehalko's own Facebook page by describing the person behind Opposing Voice as a female resident of Belvidere who bred a certain type of dog. Within hours of that post, Mehalko used the alias "Justin Guy" to post comments on her Facebook page revealing Doe's first name, the name of her kennel, and her city of residence. Mehalko's disclosures directly led to online harassment, taunting, insults, and threats against Doe from third parties posting on Mehalko's Facebook page. On or about May 29, 2017, Mehalko created a new Facebook page that showed a photo of Doe's recently deceased mother-in-law, which Mehalko copied from her obituary. The page disclosed the name of Doe's kennel and associated Doe with bestiality.

¶ 13 The trial court quoted Rule 219(c) and (d) and stated that Mehalko knowingly and intentionally revealed Doe's identity to others in direct violation of the trial court's November 8, 2016, protective order. The trial court awarded Doe attorney fees and costs from the date the case was closed to the date of its current order, totaling $7,329.02. It stated that Mehalko was free to speak out about the issues addressed on the Opposing Voices Facebook page, but it enjoined Mehalko from referring to or identifying Doe in any manner.

¶ 14 This appeal followed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Mehalko's arguments on appeal involve the interpretation and application of an Illinois Supreme Court rule, which is a question of law that we review de novo . See People v. Cole , 2017 IL 120997, ¶ 20, 422 Ill.Dec. 758, 104 N.E.3d 325. Questions relating to a trial court's jurisdiction are similarly reviewed de novo . J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc. , 2016 IL 119870, ¶ 25, 409 Ill.Dec. 31, 67 N.E.3d 243. We construe Illinois Supreme Court rules according to the same principles that govern the interpretation of statutes. Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito , 2017 IL 121297, ¶ 22, 418 Ill.Dec. 242, 90 N.E.3d 400. Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters' intent, which is best indicated by the language used, when given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We will interpret the rule such that no part of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous, and we will not depart from the rule's plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the drafters' expressed intent. Id.

¶ 17 Rule 219 provides, in relevant part:

"(c) Failure to Comply with Order or Rules. If a party, or any person at the instance of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably fails to comply with any provision of part E of article II of the rules of this court (Discovery, Requests for Admission, and Pretrial Procedure) or fails to comply with any order entered under these rules , the court, on motion, may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders as are just, including, among others, the following:
* * *
In lieu of or in addition to the foregoing, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the offending party or his or her attorney, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including a reasonable attorney fee, and when the misconduct is wilful, a monetary penalty. When appropriate, the court may, by contempt proceedings, compel obedience by any party or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under these rules. Notwithstanding the entry of a judgment or an order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, any order imposing monetary sanctions, including such orders as may be entered on motions which were pending hereunder prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal.
Where a sanction is imposed under this paragraph (c), the judge shall set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order.
(d) Abuse of Discovery Procedures. The court may order that information obtained through abuse of discovery procedures be suppressed. If a party wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain information by an improper discovery method, wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain information to which that party is not entitled, or otherwise abuses these discovery rules, the court may enter any order provided for in paragraph (c) of this rule." (Emphases added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2002).

¶ 18 Mehalko's brief consists of less than three full pages of argument, so our summary of her arguments is likewise brief. Mehalko first contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Doe's petition and enter Rule 219 sanctions, because the case was closed before Doe even filed the petition. Mehalko cites Maggi v. RAS Development, Inc. , 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, 350 Ill.Dec. 939, 949 N.E.2d 731. In that case, the plaintiff learned, after a jury verdict in his favor, that the defendant had understated the amount of its available insurance coverage in discovery. Id. ¶ 75. The plaintiff sought leave to take depositions to confirm the exact amount of coverage and pursue possible sanctions. Id. The trial court initially granted the request on the basis that it had " 'ancillary' " or " 'auxiliary' " jurisdiction over discovery sanctions under Rule 219(c), but it later ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 76. On appeal, the appellate court stated that Rule 219(c) extends a trial court's jurisdiction to address sanctions after a final judgment is entered only if the motion for sanctions was pending before the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal. Id. ¶ 78. It stated that "the trial court would only retain residual jurisdiction if plaintiff had filed a motion for sanctions prior to the entry of judgment" and that, because the plaintiff had not done so, the trial court properly found that it did not have residual jurisdiction to address the matter under Rule 219(c). Id.

¶ 19 Mehalko further argues that Rule 219 is inapplicable because an order entered pursuant to the rule must provide for discovery and a trial on the merits (see Gallo v. Henke , 107 Ill. App. 3d 21, 27, 62 Ill.Dec. 766, 436 N.E.2d 1068 (1982) ), which is impossible for a postjudgment order.

¶ 20 Mehalko additionally contends that Rule 219(d) is inapplicable, as it relates to abuses of discovery procedures. Mehalko argues that the dispute at issue is whether she violated the trial court's order that she not disclose Doe's real identity, which is a contempt issue. Mehalko asserts that, because Doe's counsel followed the trial court's misguided lead and chose the route of Rule 219 proceedings, it would be "beyond unjust" to now subject her to time-consuming and costly contempt proceedings. She argues that we also should not allow testimony taken in Rule 219 proceedings to be considered in contempt proceedings, as contempt proceedings have their own procedural safeguards that the trial court and Doe expressly rejected.

¶ 21 Doe, for her part, cites Yow v. Jack Cooper Transport Co. , 2015 IL App (5th) 140006, ¶ 26, 398 Ill.Dec. 234, 43 N.E.3d 1144, for the proposition that a trial court has the inherent, common law authority to enforce its orders and impose sanctions for the failure to comply with its orders. She cites the same case in arguing that Rule 219 also vested the trial court with authority to enforce its protective order and sanction Mehalko for her unreasonable failure to comply. In Yow , the defendant concealed, until after the limitations period had run, the fact that its wholly owned subsidiary was potentially involved in the injury at issue. Id. ¶ 29. The plaintiffs learned of the concealment long after the case had been removed to federal court. Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. At issue was whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to impose sanctions. Id. ¶ 21. The appellate court stated that a trial court has the inherent authority to enforce its orders and that Rule 219 additionally vested the trial court with jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 23. That is, the appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court "retained residual jurisdiction to impose a sanction against [the] defendant pursuant to both Rule 219 and a court's inherent authority to enter a sanction." Id. ¶ 21. The appellate court stated that, although a state court could not take action on the merits of a case that had been removed to federal court, the state court could still sanction a party for preremoval conduct. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 22 Doe argues that the instant case is like Yow in that both involve situations where the underlying case was no longer pending. Doe maintains that we should follow Yow instead of Maggi because Yow is a newer case that accurately applied Rule 219's plain meaning. She also argues that Yow shows that sanctionable violations can occur after a case is no longer pending-in addition to during the pendency of the litigation, as in Gallo .

¶ 23 We begin by addressing Mehalko's argument that Rule 219 sanctions were inappropriate here because such sanctions must ensure discovery and a trial on the merits. Our supreme court has stated that a "just order of sanctions under Rule 219(c) is one which, to the degree possible , insures both discovery and a trial on the merits." (Emphasis added.) Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp. , 181 Ill. 2d 112, 123, 229 Ill.Dec. 513, 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998). Shimanovsky recognized that, as a last resort, a dismissal with prejudice or a sanction resulting in a default judgment is sometimes appropriate under Rule 219(c). Id. Therefore, we reject Mehalko's argument that Rule 219(c) sanctions must always be crafted to ensure a trial on the merits.

¶ 24 We also reject Mehalko's reliance on Maggi . There, the trial court imposed postjudgment sanctions for prejudgment misconduct that had recently been discovered, whereas here the issue is essentially the trial court's postjudgment authority to enforce a prejudgment order. Rule 219(c) explicitly provides that the trial court "may, by contempt proceedings, compel obedience by any party or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under these rules." Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). The order that Mehalko was found to have violated was a discovery order regarding Doe's deposition, which was "an order entered under these rules," so the trial court properly invoked its authority under Rule 219(c). We are not sure why the trial court also referenced Rule 219(d), as we agree with Mehalko that Rule 219(d) pertains to an abuse of discovery procedures and rules, not a violation of a discovery order. However, that reference to Rule 219(d) did not prejudice Mehalko in any way, so it provides no basis for reversal. This is especially true considering that subsection (d) provides that "the court may enter any order provided for in paragraph (c) of this rule." Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(d) (eff. July 1, 2002).

¶ 25 We have yet to fully resolve the question of jurisdiction. Generally, absent a timely filed postjudgment motion, the trial court loses jurisdiction 30 days after it enters the final judgment. In re Marriage of Heinrich , 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, ¶ 35, 380 Ill.Dec. 26, 7 N.E.3d 889. We recognize that Doe filed her petition for a rule to show cause after 30 days had passed. We further recognize that Rule 219(c) does not explicitly state that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its orders through contempt proceedings. However, our supreme court has stated that a "court is vested with the inherent power to enforce its orders and to preserve the dignity of the court by the use of contempt proceedings." Cole , 2017 IL 120997, ¶ 18, 422 Ill.Dec. 758, 104 N.E.3d 325. A court's contempt power does not depend on constitutional or legislative grant, and it may not be restricted by legislative enactment. In re L.W. , 2016 IL App (3d) 160092, ¶ 25, 405 Ill.Dec. 636, 58 N.E.3d 897. A court's inherent authority to enforce its orders gives it jurisdiction to enter a rule to show cause. Anderson Dundee 53, L.L.C. v. Terzakis , 363 Ill. App. 3d 145, 156, 298 Ill.Dec. 863, 841 N.E.2d 6 (2005). Therefore, here the trial court's contempt powers provided it with jurisdiction to hear Doe's petition and impose sanctions for Mehalko's violations of the discovery order.

¶ 26 Mehalko acknowledges that the trial court had the authority to enforce its orders through contempt proceedings, but she argues that the Rule 219 proceedings did not provide the procedural safeguards of contempt proceedings. However, Rule 219 allows a trial court to enforce its discovery orders through contempt proceedings, which is simply an explicit incorporation of a trial court's inherent authority to enforce all of its orders by way of contempt. See In re Marriage of Bonneau , 294 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723, 229 Ill.Dec. 187, 691 N.E.2d 123 (1998) (equating a trial court's contempt power under Rule 219(c) with its inherent power to enforce its orders through contempt); see also Yow , 2015 IL App (5th) 140006, ¶ 29, 398 Ill.Dec. 234, 43 N.E.3d 1144 (the trial court retained jurisdiction pursuant to both Rule 219(c) and its inherent authority to sanction a defendant). Thus, under the facts of this case, the proceedings would have been identical whether the trial court invoked Rule 219 or its inherent authority, or both.

¶ 27 The remaining question is whether the trial court followed the proper procedure for contempt proceedings. The proper procedure depends on the type of contempt at issue. In re Marriage of Weddigen , 2015 IL App (4th) 150044, ¶ 19, 397 Ill.Dec. 573, 42 N.E.3d 488. Contempt may be classified as either criminal or civil and either direct or indirect. In re Estate of Lee , 2017 IL App (3d) 150651, ¶ 39, 416 Ill.Dec. 72, 83 N.E.3d 570. Whether contempt is direct or indirect depends on where the contemptuous conduct occurred; if it occurred in the court's presence, the contempt is direct, and if it occurred outside the court's presence, it is indirect. Id. Mehalko's conduct occurred outside the court's presence, so it is indirect contempt.

¶ 28 To determine whether contempt is civil or criminal, we consider the purpose for which the sanction was imposed. In re Marriage of O'Malley , 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 26, 407 Ill.Dec. 930, 64 N.E.3d 729. Contempt is civil if the sanction's main purpose is to coerce future conduct, and the person held in civil contempt must have the ability to purge the contempt by complying with the court order. Id. That is, the civil contemnor must be provided with the proverbial keys to his cell. In re Marriage of Knoll , 2016 IL App (1st) 152494, ¶ 56, 408 Ill.Dec. 402, 65 N.E.3d 878. Therefore, contempt based on past actions that cannot be undone cannot be civil contempt. In re Marriage of O'Malley , 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 26, 407 Ill.Dec. 930, 64 N.E.3d 729. Contempt is criminal if the sanction is intended to punish past actions that cannot be undone, as opposed to coercing the party to comply with court orders. Id. ¶ 27.

¶ 29 Doe argues that she sought enforcement of the protective order to cease online harassment, rather than as punishment. We note that, in her reply in support of her petition for a rule to show cause, Doe argued that the rule to show cause was just the first step to determining how Mehalko's contemptuous behavior was best addressed, and "[w]hether the Court wants to hold her in civil contempt, and offer her a chance to purge herself by deleting the offensive comments and Facebook pages, or whether the Court wants to throw her in jail after having provided her with the Constitutional due process such a course of action would require, that is up to the Court." Mehalko argues that criminal contempt was at issue because the behavior had ceased and the Facebook posts had been deleted before the evidentiary hearing took place. However, in her reply, Doe disputed this point and alleged that Mehalko had in fact created a new Facebook page, ostensibly administered by Doe's deceased mother-in-law, that revealed Doe's identity as the person behind the Opposing Voices page. Additionally, at oral argument, Doe represented that the new Facebook page was still up at the time of the evidentiary hearing, whereas Mehalko stated that the trial court found that it had been removed. Mehalko failed to include a transcript of that hearing in the record, so we must resolve any doubts arising from the lack of a complete record against her. See Foutch v. O'Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984) (the appellant has the burden to provide a sufficiently complete record of trial proceedings to support his or her claims of error, and the reviewing court will resolve any doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record against the appellant).

¶ 30 In its written order, the trial court agreed with Doe that Mehalko was behind the new Facebook page showing Doe's mother-in-law and revealing Doe's identity, ruling that Mehalko created the page on or about May 29, 2017. That date was weeks after Doe filed her petition for a rule to show cause, belying Mehalko's argument that any alleged violations were purely historical and that she required no coercion to comply with the protective order. Further, as stated, because we lack a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, we cannot presume that the trial court found that the new Facebook page had been removed by the time of the hearing. The trial court ultimately sanctioned Mehalko by ordering her to pay attorney fees and enjoining her from referring to or identifying Doe. "It is appropriate in both civil and criminal contempt cases to require the contumacious party to bear the reasonable costs and attorney fees of a contempt proceeding * * *." Harper v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. , 282 Ill. App. 3d 19, 30, 217 Ill.Dec. 806, 667 N.E.2d 1382 (1996). Therefore, the imposition of attorney fees does not alone render the contempt action criminal. As the trial court did not impose any additional punishment, but rather sought to enforce its protective order, we conclude that the proceedings were civil. This corresponds to the trial court's invocation of Rule 219(c), which references compelling a party's obedience to a discovery order.

¶ 31 In indirect civil contempt proceedings, a respondent is entitled to minimal due process, which consists of notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re Marriage of Weddigen , 2015 IL App (4th) 150044, ¶ 34, 397 Ill.Dec. 573, 42 N.E.3d 488. The proceedings at issue explicitly began as contempt proceedings, with Doe filing a petition for a rule to show cause. The trial court granted that petition and held an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, Mehalko received the minimal due process required for indirect civil contempt proceedings. Still, as discussed, a person held in civil contempt must be able to purge himself of the contempt. In re Estate of Lee , 2017 IL App (3d) 150651, ¶ 40, 416 Ill.Dec. 72, 83 N.E.3d 570. The trial court's order here failed to include such a purge provision. Accordingly, we must remand the cause so that the trial court may hold a limited hearing on the issue and include a purge provision in its order. Cf. McGary v. Illinois Farmers Insurance , 2016 IL App (1st) 143190, ¶ 43, 405 Ill.Dec. 543, 58 N.E.3d 804 (remanding cause for trial court to, among other things, include a purge provision in its indirect civil contempt order imposed under Rule 219(c) ).

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we remand this cause to allow the Winnebago County circuit court to include a purge provision in its order. The order is otherwise affirmed.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

¶ 35 Cause remanded.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      This total was listed in a separate order entered the same day.

      Yow is distinguishable for this same reason, though we later cite some of its general language.


text:
    Steven STIMELING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEORIA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT 150, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal No. 3-17-0567
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Opinion filed July 27, 2018
    Shane M. Voyles, of Springfield, for appellant.
    Stanley B. Eisenhammer, Babak Bakhtiari, and Christopher L. Schaeffer, of Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, of Arlington Heights, for appellee.
   JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Steven Stimeling, suffered an on-the-job injury while working as a "security officer" or "school resource officer" for defendant, Peoria Public School District 150 (District). When he returned to work three days later, he performed only clerical and administrative tasks. He continued working in a clerical and administrative role until the District terminated his employment approximately two years later. After his termination, plaintiff filed suit seeking benefits under the Public Employee Disability Act (Disability Act) ( 5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2016) ) and Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Benefits Act) ( 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2016) ). The parties filed and argued cross-motions for summary judgment. The motions disputed whether the District employed plaintiff as a "law enforcement officer" entitled to Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in the District's favor. Plaintiff appeals this order. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 I. Plaintiff's Employment

¶ 4 The District hired plaintiff as a "security agent" in March 1994. Some of his job responsibilities included patrolling school hallways and restrooms, checking hall passes, clearing school buildings of unauthorized visitors, directing traffic in school parking lots, "assisting as directed by school authorities in stopping disturbances and undue distractions" on school grounds, and "assisting all law enforcement officers whenever possible."

¶ 5 The District arranged for plaintiff to receive police training and certification through the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (ILETSB). He became certified as a police officer for the "Peoria Public School Police Department." Plaintiff utilized his training and certification to work as a police officer for the Peoria Park District, the Eureka Police Department, and the Marquette Heights Police Department.

¶ 6 In August 2011, the District imposed a new policy, titled "Board Policy on School Resource Officers" (Board Policy 5:400), which changed the name of "campus police officers" or "security agents" to "school resource officers." The policy characterized resource officers as "district truant officers" under the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/26-5 (West 2016) ). The policy explicitly authorized resource officers to "arrest" students only for truancy violations; resource officers lacked authority to issue citations or investigate any nontruancy crime.

¶ 7 In 2012, the ILETSB informed the District that school resource officers could no longer receive police training unless the District demonstrated its legal authority to maintain a police department. The District eventually conceded that it lacked such authority. The ILETSB thereafter designated the "Peoria Public School Police Department" inactive and discontinued police training for the District's resource officers.

¶ 8 II. Plaintiff's Injury and Termination

¶ 9 On November 17, 2009, plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury when a student attacked him. The student elbowed plaintiff in the eye, which caused his neck to "snap back." Plaintiff returned to work on November 20, but he performed only clerical and administrative functions. He remained in this clerical and administrative role for the remainder of the 2009-10 school year and the entire 2010-11 school year.

¶ 10 Early in the 2011-12 school year, plaintiff took medical leave from the District pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2012) ). He never returned to work. After plaintiff exhausted his allotment of paid and unpaid leave, the District terminated his employment.

¶ 11 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit after his termination. He sought a declaratory judgment as to whether the Disability Act and Benefits Act entitled him to disability benefits awarded to "law enforcement officers" who sustain injuries in the line of duty. See 5 ILCS 345/1(a) (West 2016); 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2016). If so, the District would be responsible for funding these benefits. The parties disputed whether plaintiff ever worked as a law enforcement officer for the District-his eligibility for Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits depended on this determination.

¶ 12 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment to resolve this dispute. After the hearing on July 28, 2017, the trial court entered judgment in the District's favor. The court found that the District's legal authority to hire law enforcement officers served as a condition precedent to plaintiff's eligibility for Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits. Because the District lacked authority to employ plaintiff as a law enforcement officer, the court concluded that plaintiff was ineligible for benefits under either statute. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 Plaintiff challenges the court's summary judgment order regarding his eligibility for Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits; we must construe each statute's language to decide this case. We review summary judgment orders and questions of statutory construction de novo . Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rogers , 381 Ill. App. 3d 196, 198, 318 Ill.Dec. 877, 884 N.E.2d 845 (2008). Issues of statutory construction require courts to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent. See Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook , 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). The statute's language best reflects the legislature's intent-if the language is clear and unambiguous, then we must apply the statute as it is written.

Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills , 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 11, 354 Ill.Dec. 825, 958 N.E.2d 1021. However, if the statute's language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may look beyond the language to ascertain its meaning. In re D.D. , 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419, 256 Ill.Dec. 870, 752 N.E.2d 1112 (2001).

¶ 15 Plaintiff argues that the District employed him as a law enforcement officer; he is entitled to benefits regardless of the District's legal authority to do so. Alternatively, plaintiff claims that the District possesses authority to hire law enforcement officers under the School Code, which authorizes school districts to employ truant officers. 105 ILCS 5/26-5 (West 2016). According to plaintiff, truant officers qualify as law enforcement officers who are eligible for Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits. Plaintiff also raises an estoppel argument in which he contends that the District should not escape liability for his disability benefits merely because it exceeded its legal authority by hiring and training police officers to perform law enforcement functions-this result punishes plaintiff for the District's mistake. We address each argument separately below.

¶ 16 I. Employer Authority Requirement

¶ 17 The Disability Act defines an " 'eligible employee,' " in relevant part, as "any full-time law enforcement officer * * * who is employed by the State of Illinois, any unit of local government (including any home rule unit), any State supported college or university, or any other public entity granted the power to employ persons for such purposes by law ." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 345/1(a) (West 2016). Under the statute, employers must provide employees with up to one year of full-salary paid leave if they suffer disabling injuries "in the line of duty." Id. § 1(b).

¶ 18 Plaintiff argues that he qualifies for Disability Act benefits regardless of the District's authority to employ law enforcement officers. The District sent him to police training where he became a certified officer of the "Peoria Public School Police Department." Plaintiff also claims that the District required him to perform the duties of a law enforcement officer during his employment.

¶ 19 The Disability Act's plain language establishes a condition precedent to obtaining benefits; the final clause in section 1(a) requires that the employer must be "granted the power to employ persons for such purposes by law." Id. § 1(a). Because plaintiff sustained the relevant injury while working for the District, the District's authority to hire law enforcement officers determines his eligibility for Disability Act benefits. Plaintiff's training, certification, and job duties are irrelevant to this unambiguous condition.

¶ 20 Similar to the Disability Act, the Benefits Act requires employers "who employ[ ] a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who * * * suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty" to pay health insurance premiums for the injured employee and his or her family. 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2016). To be eligible for Benefits Act benefits, "the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer's response to fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter's response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act." Id. § 10(b).

¶ 21 Plaintiff contends that his Benefits Act claim is a "lesser-included count of his [Disability Act] claim" because the Benefits Act lacks an explicit condition that the employer must be authorized by law to employ law enforcement officers for an employee to obtain benefits. We disagree.

¶ 22 The legislature intended the Benefits Act to continue employer-sponsored health insurance coverage for "officers and the families of officers who, due to a line-of-duty injury, have been forced to take a line-of-duty disability pension." Nowak , 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 17, 354 Ill.Dec. 825, 958 N.E.2d 1021. The statute applies to employers "who employ[ ] a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who * * * suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty." 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2016).

¶ 23 Plaintiff's position would make everyone who completes law enforcement training and suffers a "catastrophic injury or is killed" on the job eligible for Benefits Act benefits, regardless of the employer or job title. Benefits Act benefit eligibility, like that of the Disability Act, must be contingent upon the employer's authority to employ people in the specific occupations contemplated in the statute-law enforcement officers in this case. Without such authority, the employer cannot "employ[ ] a full-time law enforcement * * * officer" as the statute requires.

¶ 24 We hold that plaintiff's eligibility for benefits under either the Disability Act or the Benefits Act depends on whether the District possessed legal authority to employ law enforcement officers.

¶ 25 II. The District's Authority

¶ 26 Plaintiff alternatively argues that the School Code authorizes the District to employ law enforcement officers. Section 3-13 of the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/3-13 (West 2016) ) authorizes school districts to employ truant officers; section 26-5 describes truant officers' powers and duties. Based on section 26-5's language, plaintiff argues that truant officers are eligible for Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits.

¶ 27 Plaintiff relies on Gibbs v. Madison County Sheriff's Department , 326 Ill. App. 3d 473, 260 Ill.Dec. 276, 760 N.E.2d 1049 (2001), where the court considered whether deputy sheriffs qualified as a "law enforcement officer" under the Disability Act. The sheriff assigned the deputies to work as corrections officers in the local jail; the sheriff never assigned either deputy to the patrol division. The court recognized that deputies possess "the common-law power to make warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace" and statutory powers that include acting as custodians of the courthouse and jail, serving and executing court documents, conserving the peace, preventing crime, arresting offenders and bringing them to the proper court, and executing warrants. Id. at 477-78, 260 Ill.Dec. 276, 760 N.E.2d 1049. The court concluded that these "crime-prevention and law enforcement duties" were similar to those of city police officers. Id. at 478, 260 Ill.Dec. 276, 760 N.E.2d 1049. Therefore, it held that the deputies qualified as "law enforcement officers" under the Disability Act, regardless of the division to which the sheriff assigned them.

¶ 28 Although we agree that job duties are relevant to whether an employee qualifies for Disability Act or Benefits Act benefits, the court's holding in Gibbs has no bearing on this case. The issue here is whether any truant officer qualifies as a law enforcement officer under either the Disability Act or the Benefits Act-a very different question than the one presented in Gibbs . The critical distinction is that the issue in Gibbs addressed deputies' assignments; the sheriff unquestionably possessed authority to employ law enforcement officers. Here, the issue is whether the District possessed the requisite authority to hire plaintiff as a law enforcement officer under the Disability Act and the Benefits Act. Plaintiff cites no District positions, other than truant officers, that demonstrate its authority to employ law enforcement officers. The dispositive question is whether section 26-5 of the School Code equates school districts' truant officers to "law enforcement officers" entitled to Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits. The answer is no.

¶ 29 The Illinois Police Training Act defines a " '[l]aw enforcement officer' " as "any police officer of a local governmental agency who is primarily responsible for prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal code, traffic, or highway laws of this State or any political subdivision of this State." 50 ILCS 705/2 (West 2016). Although this statute does not define the entire class of law enforcement officers-for example, it omits Illinois State Police officers governed by the State Police Act ( 20 ILCS 2610/9 (West 2016) )-it establishes the primary duties of law enforcement officers employed by "municipalities, counties, park districts, State controlled universities, colleges, and public community colleges, and other local governmental agencies." 50 ILCS 705/1 (West 2016). These duties include the "prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal code, traffic, or highway laws" in Illinois. Id. § 2.

¶ 30 According to the School Code, truant officers' primary responsibility is to "investigate all cases of truancy or non-attendance at school in their respective jurisdictions" whenever notified of a violation by "the Superintendent, teacher, or other person." 105 ILCS 5/26-5 (West 2016). Truancy is a violation of the School Code, not the Criminal Code of 2012. See 105 ILCS 5/art. 26 (West 2016). Truant officers also "shall in the exercise of their duties be conservators of the peace and shall keep the same, suppress riots, routs, affray, fighting, breaches of the peace, and prevent crime; and may arrest offenders on view and cause them to be brought before proper officials for trial or examination." Id. § 26-5.

¶ 31 Section 26-5 of the School Code lacks sufficient clarity on its face to answer the question presented. The statute's language, viewed in context with other sections of the School Code, creates a morass of speculation as to whether truant officers may investigate nontruancy crimes or enforce "the criminal code, traffic, or highway laws of this State" ( 50 ILCS 705/2 (West 2016) ). For example, principals and/or superintendents who receive a report from any school official or "school personnel" regarding firearms, drugs, or a battery committed against "teachers, teacher personnel, administrative personnel or educational support personnel" on school property must report the incident to "the local law enforcement authorities." 105 ILCS 5/10-21.7, 10-27.1A, 10-27.1B. (West 2016). Although section 26-5 of the School Code describes truant officers as "conservators of the peace" and grants them authority to "arrest offenders on view," these statutes fail to mention truant officers at all. Id. § 26-5 One could reasonably infer that these omissions suggest that truant officers lack authority to investigate criminal offenses involving drugs, firearms, or battery in schools. This interpretation certainly distinguishes truant officers from "local law enforcement authorities."

¶ 32 What is clear from the record is that the District's Board Policy 5:400 classified resource officers as truant officers. Although section 26-5 of the School Code uses language similar to that describing "peace officers" under the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/2-13 (West 2016) ) and police officers under the Illinois Municipal Code ( 65 ILCS 5/11-1-2 (West 2016) ), Board Policy 5:400 explicitly prohibited the newly-classified truant officers from investigating or issuing citations for nontruancy crimes. Although we are not bound to interpret section 26-5 in accordance with the District's policies, it is noteworthy in this case that the District's truant officers lack many "crime-prevention and law enforcement duties" similar to those of municipal police officers. See Gibbs , 326 Ill. App. 3d at 478, 260 Ill.Dec. 276, 760 N.E.2d 1049.

¶ 33 Aside from its failure to clearly define truant officers' authority, the School Code also lacks any language that explicitly equates truant officers to municipal police or other undisputed law enforcement officers. By contrast, higher education statutes explicitly state that campus police at public colleges or universities "shall * * * have all powers possessed by policemen in cities, and sheriffs, including the power to make arrests on view or warrants of violations of State statutes, University rules and regulations and city or county ordinances." See 110 ILCS 660/5-45(11), 670/15-45(11), 675/20-45(11), 685/30-45(11) (West 2016) ; see also 110 ILCS 305/7(a), 520/8(10) (West 2016).

¶ 34 The plain language of the higher education statutes comports with that in the Disability Act. The Disability Act unambiguously states that law enforcement officers employed by "any State supported college or university" are eligible for benefits. 5 ILCS 345/1(a) (West 2016). Section 1(a) does not explicitly list truant officers or any other employee of a public school district as an eligible employee. Because public colleges and universities unquestionably employ full-time law enforcement officers in their police departments, campus police officers are also eligible for Benefits Act benefits. See 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2016). In light of campus police officers' unquestionable entitlement to Benefits Act benefits and the explicit language in the higher education statutes and the Disability Act, the School Code's ambiguity suggests that legislature meant to distinguish truant officers from campus, municipal, and other types of police officers who are entitled to Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits.

¶ 35 Another significant omission in the School Code is its lack of training requirements for truant officers. Campus police applicants at colleges and universities must complete police training before becoming a full-time law enforcement officer for a college or university's police department, just like applicants at other public police departments. See, e.g. , 50 ILCS 705/1, 8.1 (West 2016); 20 ILCS 2610/9 (West 2016). Neither the School Code nor the Police Training Act set forth any police training or certification standards for truant officers.

¶ 36 Although we acknowledge that the question presented is a difficult one, we believe that the aforementioned language absent from the School Code blazes the trail through this thicket of statutory construction. Although section 25-6 of the School Code describes truant officers as "conservators of the peace" and grants them authority to "arrest offenders on view," the plain language does not explicitly state whether truant officers' powers and duties extend beyond investigating truancy cases. Read in context with the explicit language in other police statutes (i.e. , the Police Training Act, the higher education statutes, and the State Police Act), the School Code does not grant truant officers authority to investigate nontruancy crimes (such as any violation of the Criminal Code of 2012) or to issue citations for any traffic violation. Nor does the School Code explicitly convey legislative intent that truant officers must be treated like public police officers with regard to Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits. We hold that the powers and duties of truant officers distinguish them from law enforcement officers. The District, therefore, never possessed legal authority to employ law enforcement officers to perform law enforcement functions. Plaintiff was never a law enforcement officer for the District and is not entitled to Disability Act or Benefits Act benefits.

¶ 37 III. Estoppel Claim

¶ 38 Finally, plaintiff asserts an estoppel claim in which he argues that the District, regardless of the Disability Act and Benefits Act's statutory construction, should be liable for plaintiff's statutory benefits in this case. He claims that the District employed law enforcement officers to perform police functions despite lacking the requisite authority and denying plaintiff's benefits based on the District's error is unjust. However, plaintiff never alleged this claim in any version of his complaint. A complaint "fixes the issues in controversy and the theories upon which recovery is sought." Pagano v. Occidental Chemical Corp. , 257 Ill. App. 3d 905, 911, 196 Ill.Dec. 24, 629 N.E.2d 569 (1994). Plaintiff forfeited this claim by failing to plead it. Even if plaintiff properly raised and preserved his estoppel claim, it fails on its merits.

¶ 39 Plaintiff failed to present evidence in the record sufficient to satisfy the requisite elements for an estoppel claim. To prevail on either a promissory or equitable estoppel claim, plaintiff needed to prove that he reasonably relied on the District's promise or act to his own detriment. See Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville , 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 40, 364 Ill.Dec. 40, 976 N.E.2d 318 ; Newton Tractor Sales, Inc. v. Kubota Tractor Corp. , 233 Ill. 2d 46, 51, 329 Ill.Dec. 322, 906 N.E.2d 520 (2009). The record contains no indication that the District made any promise or acted in any way that caused plaintiff to rely on his entitlement to Disability Act or Benefits Act benefits to his detriment. In fact, the record does not indicate that plaintiff relied on his entitlement to these benefits at all. The record shows that, during his employment with the District, plaintiff worked as a law enforcement officer for two municipalities (Eureka and Marquette Heights) and the Peoria Park District. Plaintiff does not claim that he opted out of any benefit package or refused full-time positions with these law enforcement entities because he assumed that he would be entitled to Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits if he became disabled while working for the District. Without this evidence, plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of either estoppel claim.

¶ 40 Nonetheless, plaintiff cites East Peoria Community High School District No. 309 v. Grand Stage Lighting Co. , 235 Ill. App. 3d 756, 176 Ill.Dec. 274, 601 N.E.2d 972 (1992), for the proposition that estoppel may be applied against school districts if "under all the circumstances of the case, the affirmative acts of the district have created a situation where it would be inequitable and unjust to permit it to deny what it has done or permitted to be done." Id. at 762, 176 Ill.Dec. 274, 601 N.E.2d 972. East Peoria involved a construction contract dispute between the school district, the general contractor, and subcontractors. The school district argued that the contract was void because the district failed to follow certain statutory procedures in drafting it. Put another way, the district attempted to avoid paying the subcontractors for their work by arguing its own erroneous procedure voided the contract. A panel of this court correctly rejected the district's position.

¶ 41 Based on East Peoria 's holding, plaintiff claims that the District should not escape liability for benefits after it received the benefit of plaintiff performing police functions as a District employee. We disagree with plaintiff's reliance on East Peoria because this case presents very different circumstances. The most obvious distinction between East Peoria and this case is that the subcontractors performed the work because they reasonably relied on the contractual promise that either the district or the general contractor would pay the agreed price-these facts demonstrate the essential elements of an estoppel claim. In this case, on the other hand, the District paid plaintiff wages and provided him benefits for his work. There is no evidence that plaintiff ever relied on, or even considered, his entitlement to Disability Act and Benefits Act benefits when he chose to accept his job or continue his employment with the District.

¶ 42 Another important distinction between the two cases is that, in this case, the District lacked authority to make the alleged promise-it could not lawfully hire law enforcement officers. In East Peoria , the district had authority to draft the construction contract; it merely failed to follow the proper statutory procedures. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against a public body when the subject action or promise is ultra vires (beyond its legal authority) and void. Evans v. Benjamin School District No. 25 , 134 Ill. App. 3d 875, 883, 89 Ill.Dec. 637, 480 N.E.2d 1380 (1985).

¶ 43 CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County.

¶ 45 Affirmed.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.