author: McKEE, Chief Judge

text:
    CARPENTERS HEALTH and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity; Carpenters Pension and Annuity Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity; Carpenters Savings Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity; Carpenters Joint Apprentice Committee; Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; Carpenters Political Action Committee of Philadelphia & Vicinity; Edward Coryell; Interior Finish Contractors Association of Delaware Valley Industry Advancement Program; Carpenters International Training Fund, fka National Apprenticeship and Health and Safety Fund, Appellants v. MANAGEMENT RESOURCE SYSTEMS INC.; Douglas W. Marion
    No. 15-2508
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Argued: June 22, 2016
    (Opinion Filed: September 13, 2016)

      James E. Goodley, Esq., Stephen J. Hol-royd, Esq. [ARGUED], Jennings Sigmond, 1835 Market Street, Suite 2800, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Attorneys for Appellants
    Walter S. Zimolong, III, Esq. [ARGUED], Suite 1201, 1429 Walnut' Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, Attorney for Ap-pellees
    Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
   OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Chief Judge

Plaintiffs collectively appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims against Management Resource Systems (“MRS”). The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) obligated MRS to make employee benefit contributions and submit to audits pursuant to a separate “me-too” agreement between MRS and the Plaintiffs, The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), agreeing with MRS that the complaint did not sufficiently plead that MRS is bound by the CBA. Because we disagree, we will reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs are union and management sponsored trust funds and employee benefit plans that represent construction industry employees. MRS is a corporation that constructs commercial buildings. At least insofar as this dispute is concerned, the relationship between Plaintiffs and MRS began in the 1990s. In 1994 and again in 1997, MRS signed assent letters (or “me-too” agreements) binding it to CBAs bestowing various rights on Plaintiffs. Pursuant to the 1997 assent letter at issue here, MRS agreed to be bound by a more comprehensive agreement (“1997-2001 CBA”), which was then in force between the Interior Finish Contractors Association (“IFCA”), a multiemployer association, and the union (both Plaintiffs/Appellants).

According to Plaintiffs, by signing the 1997 letter, MRS also agreed to be bound by a later CBA' (“2012-2015 CBA”). They claim the 1997 letter contains an “evergreen clause” that empowers the union and IFCA to negotiate successor agreements that bind MRS. Plaintiffs assert that this delegation of negotiating authority remained in force because MRS never gave Plaintiffs the notice required to terminate the 1997 letter’s evergreen clause. MRS concedes that it never gave notice of termination. However, it disputes the Plaintiffs’ characterization of the letter agreement. MRS denies that the letter continuously granted bargaining rights. Thus, according to MRS, it is not bound by the 2012-2015 CBA.

Under the 2012-2015 CBA and its predecessor 1997-2001 CBA, employers must make specified contributions to various funds of the Plaintiffs and they must permit audits of records relevant to their obligations to employees. For instance, the contested 2012-2015, CBA states that the “Employer shall ... pay ... a sum ... for each hour worked for a Pension and Annuity contribution.” With respect to audits, the CBA provides that the

Employer shall ... permit such agent during regular business hours to inspect and make copies of any and all records of the Employer pertaining to compensation paid to employees, hours worked by employees, monies withheld from employees for taxes_The Parties hereto recognize and agree that the [union] has an obligation and right to collect monies owed the Fringe Benefit Funds by the Employer and/or owed to the [union],,,.

Plaintiffs sent MRS several requests for audits because they believed that MRS had failed to make contributions required by the 2012-2015 CBA. They filed this suit when MRS did not comply.-Plaintiffs askéd for (1) injunctive relief requiring MRS to submit to an audit; (2) a post-audit judgment for any amount due with liquidated damages, interest, and costs; (3) post-audit relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1145 for any unpaid ERISA contributions; and (4) a permanent injunction compelling MRS to comply with the 2012-2015 CBA and any subsequent CBAs.

MRS moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on its conclusion that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. MRS argued that it obviously did not sign the 2012-2015 CBA and claimed that the assent letter could not bridge the critical gap. MRS also challenged the complaint on the ground that it faffed under Luterbach, a test the NLRB created to determine when an employer that does not sign a CBA can nevertheless be bound by the results of multiemployer bargaining. The district court agreed with MRS on both fronts and. dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint. This appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal is de novo. Thus, we employ the same standard as the district court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) instructs us that a complaint need not amount to more than a “short and plain statement.” In turn, Rule .12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal guides our inquiry. Accordingly, we first outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief. We then “peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, we look for well-pled allegations, assume their veracity, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to a right to relief. This plausibility standard requires more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted, unlawfully,” but it is not akin to a “probability requirement.” In assessing plausibility, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

III. DISCUSSION

The resolution of our inquiry turns on the answers to two questions: (1) Did the complaint sufficiently plead that the letter’s evergreen clause binds MRS to the 2012-2016 CBA? (2) Does the NLRB’s holding in Luterbach nullify the 2012-2015 CBA with respect to MRS?

A. The Evergreen Clause

We think it is clear that the assent letter at issue here functions as a me-too agreement. Such agreements are “common and generally enforceable” contracts whereby an employer that is not a member of a multiemployer association agrees to be bound by the terms of CBAs entered into by the association. There is no distinction between actual and “me-too” signatories to a CBA. This allows individual employers to benefit from the terms of an association’s CBAs without actually having to get involved in the collective bargaining process.

MRS disputes the “me-too” characterization of the 1997 letter. But it does not offer any explanation as to why that label is a “misnomer,” and we can find none. The objection is meritless. There is no doubt that the 1997 me-too letter attached to the complaint bound MRS to CBAs between the IFCA multiemployer association and the union even though MRS was not a party to CBA negotiations. However, the question before us is which CBAs are covered'by the me-too letter. Put another way, we must decide how long the contractual obligations in that letter bound the signatories. Plaintiffs claim that the “evergreen clause” in the me-too letter extends the 1997-2001 CBA to the 2012-2015 CBA.

Courts generally regard evergreen clauses as creating a perpetual agreement that can only be terminated with notice. “[I]f neither party terminated] the contract, it w[ill] be renewed automatically.” Here, Plaintiffs point to the following language in the me-too letter that they claim triggers automatic renewal: '

This Agreement shall be effective as of the date set forth below and shall remain in full force and effect for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement between the [union] and [IFCA] that is effective on the date of this Agreement and for the duration of any addition, modification or renewal thereof until one party shall provide to the other written notice ... to terminate.

According to Plaintiffs, the commitment to be bound to “any addition, modification or renewal” is a prototypical evergreen clause that strictly binds MRS to all successor CBAs until MRS provides “written notice ... to terminate.” Plaintiffs claim that MRS’ failure to: give the required, notice of termination, allowed the evergreen clause to continue in effect and that clause operated to bind MRS to the 2012-2015 CBA.

MRS responds that, although Plaintiffs now rely on the fact that the me-too letter states that MRS is bound to “addition[s], modification[s], or renewals],” there are no allegations in the complaint' that the 2012-2015 CBA falls into any of these categories. Instead, Plaintiffs simply attached the CBA and assent letter to the complaint without explanation. MRS adds that even though Plaintiffs subsequently attempted to make such allegations in their briefing, it is simply too late for such claims. The district court agreed. It explained: “It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”

However, that mistakenly ignores the fact that although the complaint did not specifically allege the existence of the evergreen clause in so.many words, when the complaint is read in context with the attachments, the nature of the claim for relief is obvious. A complaint need only contain allegations to give “the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Here, the complaint states: “At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were party to, or otherwise bound by, [CBAs] with the Union.” In stating that MRS was “otherwise bound” to CBAs, Plaintiffs were clearly putting MRS on notice that the suit was based on the attached me-too agreement by the operation of the evergreen clause contained therein.

Ironically, MRS’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss illustrates the sufficiency of this notice. There, MRS argued that “attached to the CBA are .,. letter agreements ... which purportedly bind MRS ... to the CBA.” That is to say, MRS’, own motion establishes that it understood from the complaint that Plaintiffs were alleging that the me-too letter bound MRS to the 2012-2015 CBA. MRS could hardly have been prejudiced by any lack of specificity in the complaint.

The complaint also satisfies the demanding requirement of plausibility. As we mentioned at the outset, me-too letters and evergreen clauses of the kind at issue here are common contractual provisions in the construction industry. The allegations are therefore all the more credible because they are consistent with prevailing collective bargaining practices. Put simply, this is far from an improbable set of allegations.

Indeed, courts enforce such me-too agreements in the very manner the Plain? tiffs seek in their complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Carpenters Local Union No. 345 Health & Welfare Fund v. W.D. George Construction illustrates this point. W.D, George involved a dispute in which the employer entered into a me-too agreement, the pertinent terms of which mirror the terms in the agreement before us. The me-too agreement in W.D. George bound the employer to an initial CBA and to “any modifications, extensions or renewals thereof.” Ironically, a Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund in a different locale brought suit to enforce the agreement in W.D. George.

In agreeing with the union and concluding the employer was bound to. a subsequent CBA that it had not signed, the Sixth Circuit rejected the very arguments that MRS advances here. The court held that “[t]he [me-too] agreement does not merely bind a signatory employer to renewals of the same [CBA], but also binds it to modifications thereof.” In other words, me-too agreement evergreen clauses are to be interpreted broadly, to bind employers to successor CBAs even if key terms have changed or the prior CBA has expired. This reasoning undermines MRS’ position that its me-too agreement with Plaintiffs only applies, to the initial 1997-2001 CBA.

W.D. George also placed the onus of ending the contractual relationship on the employer. In fact, it was precisely because the'employer did not timely indicate its intent to withdraw from the bargaining relationship that the Sixth Circuit held that the me-too agreement extended the employer’s contractual obligations to the new CBA. In rejecting the employer’s arguments to the contrary, the Sixth Circuit repeatedly emphasized- that the employer “did not give any notice that that [multiemployer association] no longer had any authority to bargain on their behalf.” Neither did MRS here.

MRS incorrectly claims that W.D. George is of little value to our inquiry because the Sixth Circuit decided W.D. George years before the NLRB released its ruling in Luterbach. As we explain in more detail below, Luterbach is distinguishable. In Luterbach, the NLRB created a two-part test for determining when a non-signatory employer is bound to a CBA. However, the dispute in Luterbach did not involve an evergreen clause granting continuing bargaining authority, and the NLRB’s test does hot account for such an agreement. Indeed, the NLRB stressed that the Luterbach test only applies to resolve ambiguity about the employer’s commitment to be bound. No such ambiguity exists here.

MRS also argues that the, employer/union relationship in W.D. George was markedly different than the relationship here. However, the purported differences are simply insignificant for our purposes. Whether the employer in W.D. George was aware of successor agreements or received notice of negotiations was not dispositive. Rather, the contractual terms were determinative in W.D. George. As noted earlier, those terms are not only analogous to the pertinent terms here; they are nearly identical. Accordingly, we find W.D. George is very helpful to our analysis. The district court did not even consider W.D. George in its dismissal — apparently, the case was never brought to its attention.

W.D. Georgé is not only helpful because its reasoning is persuasive; we also note that the case is no anomaly. In Local 257, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Grimm, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a me-too letter’s evergreen clause bound the employer to successor CBAs. It found that the letter provided a “continuous delegation” of the employer’s bargaining rights until proper termination, and no such termination notice was given. That is precisely the situation here.

Undeterred by contrary precedent, MRS presses on and argues that the text of the 2012-2015 CBA controverts Plaintiffs’ claim. In MRS’ view, if the CBA included MRS, it would simply say so. MRS insists that by the express terms of the CBA, it only applies to the union and to the IFCA and its members who authorized it to bargain. MRS reminds us that it is not a member of the IFCA and claims it never delegated negotiating power to the association. However, MRS’ claim that the 2012-2015 CBA does not cover it because this CBA does not mention it by name is belied by the 1997-2001 CBA. That CBA contains nearly identical terms about the extent to which other parties are bound. It does not mention MRS by name either. Yet, MRS admits that it was bound by that earlier CBA.

Finally, MRS makes a policy argument about the importance of protecting employers’ rights to bargain on their own behalf. The argument rings hollow. The Supreme Court has explained that “[n]either party is compelled to enter into a [construction industry] agreement. But when such an agreement is voluntarily executed, both parties must abide by its terms until it is repudiated.” Nothing here suggests that MRS was somehow coerced or duped into entering into the me-too agreement clearly binding it to future CBAs. The agreement was voluntarily executed, and MRS does not argue to the contrary. MRS failed to terminate or properly repudiate the agreement according to its express terms. We are therefore confident that enforcement of the me-too agreement in no way vitiates MRS’ rights.

B. Luterbach

As we noted earlier, the district court swept aside the contractual language in the me-too agreement in the belief that Luterbach required that result. The NLRB created the Luterbach test in the context of “section 8(f) relationships.” That section of the NLRA regulates pre-hire agreements between construction industry employers and unions. Luterbach states that a non-signatory employer is bound by multiemployer bargaining with a union only if the employer: (1) was “part of the multiemployer unit prior to the dispute” and (2) “has, by a distinct affirmative action, recommitted to the union that it will be bound.” Failure to satisfy either element is dispositive. Here, the district court found that neither requirement was satisfied. That is not surprising since MRS was not a member of the multiem-ployer unit and it did not perform any “distinct affirmative action” demonstrating its recommitment to a later CBA.

Nevertheless, the district court’s reliance on Luterbach was misplaced. Though the district court may well be correct that the 2012-2015 CBA does not pass the Lu-terbach test, that does not resolve this dispute because Luterbach does not apply here.

First, Luterbach is hardly binding on us. As far as we can tell,-in the decades since the NLRB decided Luterbach, we have only cited Luterbach once, and did so then only in passing. In Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association Local 19 v. Herre Bros., we referenced Luterbach to distinguish 8(f) and- 9(a) relationships. But because we determined that the agreement at issue there did not result in an 8(f) relationship, we did not actually apply Luterbach. The jurisprudence of other circuit courts of appeals is not to the contrary. The few circuit courts that mention Luterbach place no more reliance on it than we now do.

Even if Luterbach were generally authoritative, it still would not decide this dispute because Luterbach is inapposite. The Luterbach test determines the' obligations of an employer “in a multiemployer unit,” whereas here, MRS was never a formal member of the IFCA. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs note, Luterbach itself expressly disclaims application to agreements supported by ongoing bargaining authority. To make this point, Luterbach singles out other NLRB cases where an employer “obligatefd] itself to abide by a successor agreement” and explains that such scenarios are beyond its scope. These other cases are analogous to the one at hand.

In K&phart Plumbing, an agreement was binding because an employer had previously authorized an association to negotiate with a union on its behalf. Here, the me-too letter provided that authority. Similarly, in Reliable Electric, an employer that had not withdrawn bargaining authority previously given to an association was bound to the association contract. Likewise, it is undisputed here that MRS did not revoke the negotiating power it had delegated through the me-too letter.

We appreciate that some of the particulars of the cases Luterbach distinguishes differ from the facts before us. These are distinctions without a difference. For instance, in Reliable Electric the contested CBA went into effect directly upon the expiration of the prior CBA. That supports characterization of the second CBA as a “renewal.” Here, in contrast, there was a gap of more than a decade between the first CBA (1997-2001) and the second (2012-2015). However, courts generally do not conclude that such an intervening interval undercuts an evergreen clause’s power of renewal. And rightly so; evergreen clauses keep agreements in force despite the passage of time. Ultimately, this dispute neatly fits Luterbach’s description of cases that fall outside its purview because they involve an employer “clearly and unmistakably [binding] itself to a successor contract.”

This limitation on Luterbach makes eminent sense. As the Plaintiffs point out, requiring a “distinct affirmative action” pursuant to Luterbach’s second prong in cases like this would void evergreen clauses. They would be transformed into mere surplusage because they are intended to bind parties into the future without additional acts. Indeed, Luterbach recognizes that applying the second part of its test to cases like this one would be like trying to fit a round peg into a square hole. Luter-bach explains that “[s]ome affirmative act is necessary to establish [the employer’s] consent” to be bound. In the same pronouncement, Luterbach recognizes that “there can be cases where the employer has expressly given continuing consent to bargain a successor contract on a multiem-ployer basis. ... However, there is no such consent here.” In contrast, in the dispute before us the evergreen clause was the consent. That is precisely why Luter-bach does not apply.

Subsequent NLRB cases confirm Luter-bach’s boundaries. As the Plaintiffs mention, Baker Electric, for instance, rejected application of Luterbach in circumstances much like theirs. Baker Electric held that an employer was bound to a successor CBA pursuant to a me-too letter with an evergreen clause. In doing so, Baker Electric rebuffed the employer’s assertion that Luterbach freed it from future obligations. On the contrary, the NLRB explained:

In Luterbach, the Board made clear that “there can be cases where the employer has expressly given continuing consent to bargain a successor contract on a multiemployer basis”_Here ... Respondent affirmatively bound itself to successor agreements ... by the express terms of the [me-too letter].

This classification of evergreen clauses as a dividing line between Luterbach and non-Luterbach cases illustrates why the district court erred in relying on Luter-bach here.

MRS urges us to reject Baker Electric for one reason: Whereas Baker Electric involved an absolute delegation of bargaining authority, there is no such provision here. MRS claims it simply agreed to join a particular, and now expired, CBA. There is no support for MRS’ position. Baker Electric described the grant of authority in terms that do not vary in any meaningful way from those in the me-too agreement here. Baker Electric portrayed its - me-too agreement as “authoriz[ing] the [multiem-ployer association] as the employer’s collective-bargaining representative for all matters pertaining to the current ‘Inside’ labor agreement..with-[the union.]” The me-too letter here reads: “The employer shall be and is hereby, bound by all of the terms and conditions of employment contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the [union] and the [mul-tiemployer association].” For present purposes, the effect of each of these provisions is the same: The employer is bound by agreements between the-multiemployer association and the union. Baker Electric thus applies squarely here.

Moreover, there is nothing novel about our reliance on Baker Electric's, logic. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enforced the NLRB’s order in Baker Electric without even mentioning Luterbach. In addition', as we noted earlier, even before Baker Electric the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit emphasized that an employer may-bind itself to future CBAs through an evergreen clause. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have likewise found that an evergreen clause persists in the absence of notice of termination!

MRS’ primary support for its claim that Luterbach applies — Iron Workers TriState Welfare Plan v. Carter Construction — does not make Luterbach relevant either. First, there is the obvious point that Iron Workers is a district court opinion and therefore not binding on us. Second, Iron Workers relied on Luterbach because the employer provided notice of termination, thereby freeing itself from its commitment to be bound. Without continuing consent, Luterbach poses the right question: Whether the employer signaled an intent to be bound through an additional act. But because cancellation of consent did not occur here, Iron Workers is irrelevant.

IV. PLAUSIBILITY

From the preceding it is clear that Lu-terbach does not stand for a rule that all me-too agreements must satisfy its two criteria in order to bind non-signatories to future CBAs. Rather, Luterbach is limited to cases that , do not involve evergreen clauses or other continuing grants of bargaining authority. Absent the conditions prescribed in Luterbach, we need only focus on the plausibility of the complaint under contract law principles. As we explained, the district court was correct that the complaint leaves something to be desired — it does not directly say why the 2012-2015 CBA is binding on MRS. However, we are not here to grade the complaint, but to determine if it survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). We have little trouble concluding that, taken together, the complaint’s allegations and attachments put MRS on notice and state a plausible claim for relief. This compels us to “unlock the doors of discovery.”

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On remand, the court can determine whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pled the personal liability of MRS’ Vice President, Marion. Because of its conclusion that the complaint did not state a claim for relief, the district court did not address whether Marion bore responsibility, as Plaintiffs allege. Accordingly, we will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion in the district court.

      . The district court identified the Plaintiffs as: "Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Annuity Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity, Carpenters Savings Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity, Carpenters Joint Apprentice Committee, Carpenters Political Action Committee of Philadelphia and Vicinity, Carpenters International Training Fund, Edward Coryell, Interior Finish Contractors Association of Delaware Valley Industry Ad- . vancement Program, and Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.” Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 2395152, at *1 n. 2 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015).

      . Id. at “l n. 1. Douglas Marion, Vice. President of MRS, is also charged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs claim that Marion assumed guarantor liability by signing the agreements on behalf of MRS.

      . App. atA61„

      . Id. at A74-75.

      . Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that they ■ar.e "without sufficient information or knowledge to plead the precise nature, extent and amount of the Defendants’ delinquency since the books, records and information necessary to determine this liability are in the exclusive possession, custody and control or knowledge of the Defendants.” Plaintiffs Complaint at 5 ¶17.

      . Id. at 6-10.

      . According to statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during oral argument, Plaintiffs did not request an opportunity to amend their complaint. In any event, as we explain below, even without amendment the complaint was sufficient.

      . James Luterbach Constr. Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976 (1994).

      . Because of its conclusion that the complaint could not proceed, the district court declined to reach the issue of Marion’s personal liability as Vice President of MRS. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v.

        Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 2395152, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015).

      . The district court had jurisdiction under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1145, and Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.-

      . See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.2008).

      . Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

      . Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

      . Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir.2012),

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

      . Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008).

      . Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, Local 5 v. Banta Tile & Marble Co., Inc., 344 Fed.Appx. 770, 772 (3d Cir.2009) (unpublished); see Constr. Teamsters Health & Welfare Tr. v. Con Fom Constr. Corp., 657 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.1981) ("It is clear that a signatory to a [me-too] Agreement can agree to be bound by future modifications, extensions and renewals of [a CBA].").

      . See Berwind Corp. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 307 F.3d 222, 237 n.18 (3d Cir.2002).

      . See Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 188 n.9 (3d Cir.2002).

      . See Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local 395 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Conquer Cartage Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir.1985) (noting that "the basic purpose of a 'me-too agreement’ is to allow ... employers to obtain all the benefits of the master collective bargaining agreement that is negotiated by the principal employers in the industry without having to participate in the industry negotiations”).

      . MRS Br. at vii n. 3.

      . See Holland v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 574 F.Supp.2d 116, 123 (D.D.C.2008) (interpreting an evergreen clause as creating a "perpetual obligation to contribute to the Trust at rates set forth in all ‘successor’ agreements”).

      . Operating Eng’rs Local 139 Health Benefit Fund v. Gustafson Constr. Corp., 258 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir.2001).

      . App. at A97 ¶2.

      . Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 2395152, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015) (quoting Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.1988)).

      . Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct, 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

      . App. at A23 1Í13 (emphasis added),

      . Id. at A97.

      . MRS Motion to Dismiss at 5 (emphasis added).

      . See, e.g., Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266, 103 S.Ct. 1753, 75 L.Ed.2d 830 (1983); NLRB v. Bos. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 80 F.3d 662, 664 (1st Cir.1996); Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local 395 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Conquer Cartage Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (9th Cir.1985).

      . 792 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.1986).

      .- Id. at 66.

      . Id. at 69.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 69-70.

      . Id. at 69; see also id: set 67.

      . We see no reason to interpret the termination requirement here any differently than the one the :Court enforced against the employer in W.D. George. In both cases, the agreements endure absent notice of cancellation. Id. at 66 (The W.D. George termination provision stated in relevant part: "This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect from June 17, 1974 to April 30, 1975, and shall continue in full force and effect from year to year thereafter unless written notice of a desire to negotiate a change is given by one party .... ”).

      . 315 N.L.R.B. 976 (1994).

      . Id. at 979-80.

      . Id. at 978.

      . See also Cowboy Scaffolding, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1051 (1998) ("Finally, that the Union did not notify the Respondent that successor agreements had been entered into, and did not furnish it with copies of those agreements, indicates only that the Union did not think it necessary to act as the Respondent’s agent in these matters.”).

      . 786 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir.1986).

      . Id.

      . App. atA107.

      . Id. at Al 05-37.

      . Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 271, 103 S.Ct. 1753, 75 L.Ed.2d 830 (1983).

      . 315 N.L.R.B. 976 (1994).

      . CBA relationships involving construction employers are presumed to fall under § 8(f). See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir.1999) (describing the 8(f) presumption). Neither party challenges this presumption.

      . 29 U.S.C. § 158(f); see Herre Bros., 201 F.3d at 239.

      . Luterbach, 315 N.L.R.B. at 980.

      . Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 2395152, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015).

      . Id.

      . Under § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), a union may Become the exclusive bargaining representative of a unit of employees if a majority of employees designate the union. An employer with a 9(a) relationship to a union has an obligation to negotiate a successor contract with the union in good faith. See Herre Bros., 201 F.3d at 239. No such duty exists in the § 8(f) context. There are no claims that the relationship underlying the CBA here arises under § 9(a).

      . Herre Bros., 201 F.3d at 239-40.

      . Id. at 242.

      . See, e.g., Haas Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 299 F.3d 23, 27 n.4 (1st Cir.2002) (noting but not reaching Luterbach); NLRB v. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Luterbach as background but not applying it); Local Union 48 Sheet Metal Workers v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 106 F.3d 970, 975 (11th Cir.1997) ("We decline to reach the issue of whether Luterbach [is] viable in this circuit.”).

      . James Luterbach Constr. Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 (1994) ("The issue posed here is whether an 8(f) employer, in a mul-tiemployer unit, is bound, by inaction, to the ' successor multiemployer contract.” (emphasis added)).

      . Id. at 978 (emphasis in original).

      . 285 N.L.R.B. 612, 612-13 (1987).

      . 286 N.L.R.B, 834, 836 (1987).

      . Id. at 834.

      . See, e.g., Cedar Valley Corp. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1211, 1220 (8th Cir.1992) (”[W]e find no link between periods of inactivity among the parties and the enforceability of the agreements, Rather, the decisive issue is whether Cedar Valley affirmatively, and in compliance with the terms of the 1978 agreements, revoked Associated Contractor’s authority to bind it to successive agreements.”).

      . To the extent that the in perpetuity nature of an evergreen clause may be a concern, the signatories can easily add language clearly stating that the continuing authority arising under the agreement will automatically cease after a defined time frame, with no need for formal notice of termination. No such language appears in the agreement between MRS and Plaintiffs. We will not judicially amend the agreement by adopting MRS' argument.

      . James Luterbach Constr, Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 (1994).

      . Id. at 981.

      . Id. at 981 n.l 1.

      . See, e.g., Taylor Ridge Paving & Constr. & Local Union No. 309, Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 25-CA-135372, 2015 WL 5564621 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 21, 2015) ("However, unlike in James Luterbach Construction, Respondent here agreed to bind itself to successor agreements by the operation of the [me-too letter]. Therefore, I find James Luterbach Construction distinguishable from this case.”); HCL, Inc. & Laborers Int'l Union of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 576, 343 N.L.R.B. 981, 982 (2004) ("Luterbach, relied on by the judge, is inapposite .... This is not a case in which the respondent was a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit. Nor is this a case of an employer who did nothing to bind itself to a successor 8(f) agreement.”); Cowboy Scaffolding, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1050 (1998) (basing its holding on a finding that a me-too agreement "clearly states that the 1990-1993 contract ... will automatically renew on a yearly basis thereafter unless either of the parties gives’ timely notice of an intent to modify or terminate" without reaching Lu-terbach).

      . 317 N.L.R.B. 335 (1995).

      . Id. at 335, 340-42.

      . Id. at 335 n.2.

      . Id. at 340.

      . App. at A97 ¶1.

      . NLRB v. Baker, 105 F.3d 647, 1997 WL 5771, at *4 (4th Cir.1997) (unpublished) ("Because the Company never effectively repudiated the § 8(f) agreement, it may be held liable for breaching its terms.”).

      . See Local 257, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Grimm, 786 F.2d 342, 345 (8th Cir.1986).

      . See NLRB v. Black, 709 F.2d 939, 940-41 (5th Cir.1983).

      . See Nelson Elec. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 965, 966-67 (6th Cir.1981).

      . See Constr. Teamsters Health & Welfare Tr. v. Con Form Constr. Corp., 657 F.2d 1101, 1103-04 (9th Cir.1981).

      . 530 F.Supp.2d 1021 (N.D.Ill.2008),

      . Id. at 1030 ("When the 2001 agreement was terminated, this being a section 8(f) relationship, Carter Construction had the option of refusing to bargain for a new contract.”).

        .Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DIAZ, Circuit Judge: DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Michael Edward TANKERSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James W. ALMAND, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Douglas M. Bregman, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Charles Bagley, IV, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Joseph B. Chazen, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Cecelia Ann Keller, in her official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Patrick A. Roberson, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Leonard H. Shapiro, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Donna Hill Stateon, in her official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; David Weiss, in his official capacity as Trustee of the Client Protection Fund; Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland; Honorable Mary Ellen Barbera, Chief Judge, in her official capacity; Honorable Sally D. Adkins, Judge, in her official capacity; Honorable Clayton Greene, Jr., Judge, in his official capacity; Honorable Michelle D. Hotten, in her official capacity as Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals; Honorable Robert N. McDonald, Judge, in his official capacity; Honorable Shirley Watts, Judge, in her official capacity; Bessie M. Decker, in her official capacity as Clerk of the Court of Appeals; Maryland Court of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-1081
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: May 12, 2016
    Decided: September 13, 2016

      ARGUED: Scott Matthew Michelman, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michele J. McDonald, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appel-lees. ON BRIEF: Julie A. Murray, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Alexis Rohde, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    Before KING and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Affirmed by published opinion. Judge DIAZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING joined. Senior Judge DAVIS wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

All attorneys licensed in Maryland who are not permanently retired must pay an annual fee to the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland. In addition to paying the fee, Maryland attorneys must also disclose their social security numbers to the Fund. Relying on federal law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland enacted this particular mandate in support- of the state’s efforts to collect back taxes and past-due child-support payments from attorneys.

The Court of Appeals suspended Michael Tankersley’s law license after he refused to provide his social security number to the Fund. In response, Tankersley sued the trustees of the Fund and the judges and the clerk of the Court of Appeals (the “Defendants”), all in their official capacities, seeking injunctive relief based on his claim that his suspension violated the federal Privacy Act. ' '

The district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because we find that federal law gives Maryland the power (acting through its agents) to compel the disclosure of social security numbers in this circumstance, we affirm.

I.

A.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland has the statutory power to “establish a Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland,” in order “to maintain the, integrity of the legal profession by paying money to reimburse losses caused by defalcations of lawyers.” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-311. As part of this principal mission, the Fund is also required by statute to “provide a list of lawyers who have paid an annual fee to the Fund during the previous fiscal year to ... the Comptroller, to assist the Comptroller in determining whether each lawyer on the list has paid all undisputed taxes.” Id. § 10-313(a). That list must include “the federal tax identification number of the person or, if the person does not have a federal tax identification number, the Social Security number of the person.” Id. § 10-313(b)(2)(ii).

In promulgating rules to enforce this statute, the Court of Appeals referenced the power given to the state by 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i). That provision was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and it allows states to collect social security numbers for certain enumerated purposes, including the administration of tax laws.

The Court of Appeals also uses the Fund to comply with the Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666, which Congress passed in 1996 to “increase the effectiveness of the [child support enforcement] program which the State administers.” Id. § 666(a). To that end, the Welfare Reform Act conditions federal funding on states’ having in effect “[procedures requiring that the social security number of ... any applicant for a professional license .... be recorded on the application.” Id. § 666(a)(13).

In 1997, the Maryland General Assembly passed a series of statutes to comply with the Welfare Reform Act, including Family Law section 10-119.3(b)(l), which compels each “licensing authority” to “(i) require each applicant for a license to disclose the Social Security number of the applicant; and (ii) record the applicant’s Social Security number on the application.” If Maryland’s Child Support Enforcement Administration notifies the licensing authority that a licensee is in arrears on a child support order, it can “request a licensing authority to suspend or deny an individual’s license.” Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 10-119.3(e)(l). The Court of Appeals of Maryland is such a licensing authority. Id. § 10-119.3(a)(3)(ii)(15).

In 2009, then-Chief Judge Robert M, Bell of the Court of Appeals notified all Maryland attorneys that they were required to provide their social security numbers to comply with sections 10-119.3 and 10-313. Most Maryland attorneys heeded the Chief Judge’s notice, but over nine thousand did not. When the General Assembly threatened to withhold $1 million from the judiciary’s budget if it did not move more- aggressively against the recalcitrant attorneys, the Court of Appeals amended its rules to provide for enforcement.

The resulting Rule 16-811.5 mandated that “each attorney admitted to practice before the Court of Appeals ... shall ... provide to the treasurer of the Fund the attorney’s Social Security number.” Md. Rules, Rule 16 — 811.5(a)(1) (2014) (current version at Md. Rules, Rule 19-605(a)(l) (2016)). In addition, Rule 16-811.6 provided that the Court could suspend the license of any attorney who fails to comply with Rule 16-811.5. Md. Rules, Rule 16-811.6 (current version at Md. Rules, Rule 19-606).

B.

Tankersley has been licensed to practice law in Maryland since 1986 and in the District of Columbia since 1987. He has practiced primarily in the District of Columbia, while living in either the District or Virginia. Outside of the suspension underlying this case, he has never been disciplined.

Tankersley was notified in February 2013 that the Fund had never received his social security number, as requested in 2009, and that he had until March 22, 2013 to provide it. Tankersley responded that he generally does not share his social security number unnecessarily because of concerns about identity theft. Tankersley also noted that Maryland state agencies have suffered cyberatt'acks,' resulting in the exposure of individuals’ private information.

Citing these concerns, Tankersley refused to provide his social security number to the Fund, and questioned the legality of Rule 16-811.5. He was thereafter notified that his license had been suspended because Of his failure to comply with the Court’s rule.

C.

Tankersley sued James Almand, the Chair of the Fund, the other trustees of the Fund, and the judges and clerk of the Court of Appeals, alleging that the suspension of his license to practice violated section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act. He sought injunctive relief.

Tankersley moved for summary judgment, and the Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment. The district court, relying on its decision in Greidinger v. Almand, 30 F.Supp.3d 413 (D. Md. 2014), granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The court in Greidinger held that the word “applicant” in § 666 was not limited to “those who are applying or reapplying for a license,” as “it is clear that under [the Welfare Act] the federal government intended to implement a system which required complete disclosure of [sociál security numbers] by every individual who is subject to a licensing authority,” and § 666 therefore superseded section 7(a)(1). 30 F.Supp.3d at 422, 424. The court also found that § 405 of the Tax Reform Act superseded section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, noting that although “the statutory language is less than clear, the legislative history provides ample evidence that the Senate Finance Committee believed the needs of State and local governments trumped individual privacy in [the tax administration] context.” Id. at 426.

Finding no basis for distinguishing the instant case from its holding in Greidinger, the district court dismissed Tankersley’s complaint. This appeal followed.

II.

A.

Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, in light of the government’s “increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology,” which “greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal information.” Id. §. 2(a)(2). To protect against such harms, section 7(a)(1) of the Act makes it “unlawful for any federal, state or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account number.” Important here, however, is section 7(a)(2), which makes section 7(a)(1) inapplicable to “any disclosure which is required by federal statute.” Id. § 7(a)(2)(A).

Both the Tax Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i), and the Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13)(A), allow states to collect individuals’ social security numbers in specific situations. This case turns on whether either provision applies to Maryland’s annual collection of social security numbers from attorneys it has already licensed to practice. If so, Tankersley may not rely on the Privacy Act to shield his social security number from the Fund.

B.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). “[W]e may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, notwithstanding the reasoning of the district court.” Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 75 n.13 (4th Cir. 2016).

We also review questions of.statutory interpretation de novo. Broughman v. Carver, 624 F.3d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 2010)..When interpreting a statute, our “objective ... is ‘to ascertain and implement the intent of Congress,’ and Congress’s intent ‘can most easily be seen in the text of the Acts it promulgates.’ ” Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Broughman, 624 F.3d at 674-75). Where Congress has not defined a term, we are “bound to give the word its ordinary meaning, unless the context suggests otherwise.” Id. at 392-93.

C.

We first address whether, as the district court determined, the Welfare Reform Act requires Tankersley to provide his social security number to the Fund.

The Welfare Reform Act compels states to have “[procedures requiring that the social security number of ... any applicant for a professional license ... be recorded on the application.” 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13) (emphasis added). We agree with Tankers-ley that “applicant” cannot properly be read to include a Maryland attorney who must pay an annual fee to maintain his license.

We are guided here by a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, which directs that we “presume that a legislature says in- a statute what it means and means in a ’statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.” Aziz, 658 F.3d at 392 (quoting Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d 130, 136 (4th Cir. 2011)). As Congress did not define “applicant,” we give the word its ordinary meaning. Id. at 392-93.

An applicant is “someone who formally asks for something (such as a job or admission to a college)” or “someone who applies for something.” Applicant, Merriam-Wébster Dictionary, http://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/applicant; see also Applicant, Webster’s Dictionary (2d ed. 2001) (defining “applicant” as “a person who applies- for or requests something; a candidate”). We think it plain that the ordinary meaning of the word does not réach someone like Tankersley who has already satisfied the requirements for a license to practice law in’ Maryland but must pay an annual fee to maintain that license. As Tankersley points out,- one would not say that a college sophomore who must pay the next semester’s tuition before being allowed to continue his studies is an “applicant.” See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5-6. So too here.

Moreover, the form the Fund uses to direct Maryland attorneys to provide their social security numbers underscores how poorly the word “applicant” fits in this context. It asks simply for the attorney’s name, address, and social security number. Seé J.A. 30. Such a bare-bones form can in no way be described as an “application,” arid, indeed, even the Fund does not refer to the form as such. See J.A. 29-30 (referring to the document as the “attached form” and the “completed form”).

Relying on Abramski v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014), the Defendants say that our understanding of “applicant” renders the provision absurd because it excludes the majority of Maryland attorneys, “alone among covered professions,” from the Welfare Act’s coverage. Appellees’ Br. at 24. Not so. In Abramski, the Supreme Court chose between two readings of an ambiguous provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968. The Court rejected the reading that would have allowed a straw purchaser of a firearm to present himself as the actual buyer, because it “would undermine — indeed, for all important purposes, would virtually repeal — the gun law’s core provisions,” including “an elaborate system to verify a would-be gun purchaser’s identity and check on his background.” 134. S.Ct. at 2267.

We do not face a similar consequence here. It is certainly true that our reading of § 666 is under-inclusive in that the Fund cannot compel disclosure of social security numbers from a subset of Maryland attorneys who were licensed before a certain date. But that is a far cry from saying 'that it wox-ks a “virtual repeal” of the statute’s core provisions, given that the Fund’s enforcement power nonetheless extends to a substantial portion of the Maryland Bar, and expands each year as new attorneys are admitted to practice. That the statute exempts some lawyers from the Fund’s enforcement reach merely reflects the reality that “[n]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 1710, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987)), and the final result “often involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions.” Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).

We hold that the district court erred in relying on § 666 of the Welfare Reform Act to‘dismiss Tankersley’s complaint. Accordingly, we turn to consider whether the Tax Reform Act provides the statutory hook necessary to support the district court’s judgment.

D.

Section 405(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Tax Reform Act allows “any State (or political subdivision thereof)” to use social security numbers “in the administration of any tax ... law within its jurisdiction, ... and may require any individual who is or appears to be [affected by the tax law] to furnish to such State (or political subdivision thereof) or any agency thereof haying administrative responsibility for the law involved, [his] social security account number.” See also Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The final version [of § 405(c)(2)(C)(i)] authorizes States to use [social security'numbers] only ‘in the administration of any, tax, general public assistance, driver’s license, or, motor vehicle registration.’ ”).

Recall that Tankersley’s claim is premised on the view that the Fund violated his right under the Privacy Act not to disclose his social security number. But as we noted earlier, the Privacy Act does not help Tankersley if the disclosure is required by federal law — in this case,- say the Defendants, § 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Tankersley resists this conclusion on three grounds. First, he says that Maryland’s statutory requirement' that the Fund furnish the Department of Assessments and Taxation and the Comptroller with a list of attorneys who paid the annual fee to the Fund does not amount to the use of social security numbers “in the administration of any tax.” Second, he posits that the Fund is not an entity that has administrative responsibility for taxes, as contemplated by § 405. Third, he argues that he is not an “individual who is or appears to be” affected by Maryland’s tax laws because he neither works nor lives in Maryland, and he has never owed taxes there.

We address these contentions in turn.

1.

As was the ease with the Welfare Reform Act, Congress did not define “administration” in § 405, thus we give it its ordinary meaning. Aziz, 658 F.3d at 392-93. The ordinary, meaning of “administration” is the process of “managing] the operation of’ something, or .putting something “into effect.” Administering, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/administering; see also Administration, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/administration (defining “administration” as “the act or process of administering”).

The breadth of the plain meaning of “administration” is consistent with Congress’s treatment of the term as part of the broader legislation that enacted § 405. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 §§ 1202, 1211, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103; 42 U.S.C. § 405). There, in a provision of the Act expanding the Internal ' Revenue Code’s regulation of the disclosure of tax returns and tax return information, Congress defined “tax administration” as “the administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision .of the execution and application of’ tax laws, including “assessment, collection, enforcement, litigation, publication, and statistical gathering functions under such laws.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(4); see also id. § 6103(h)(1) (“Returns and return information, shall ... be open to inspection by or disclosure to officers and employees of the Department of the Treasury whose official duties require such inspection or disclosure for tax administration- purposes.”).

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 is comprehensive in scope. In addition to making changes to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress also amended, for example, the Social Security . Act, the Tariff Act of 1930, and the Commodity Exchange Act. While the Act’s definition of “tax administration” as applied to the Internal Revenue Code does not speak directly to the definition of “administration” -in 42 U.S.C. § 405 (which was passed as part of the -changes Congress made to the Social Security Act), it does inform our analysis. It not only shows that the same Congress that enacted § 405 understood “administration” to be an expansive term, but it does so in the context of a provision balancing individual privacy — there, of tax return information— against the government’s need to use private information to administer taxes, just as § 405 does.

Given this, we are satisfied that the ordinary meaning of the term “administration” in § 405 is sufficiently expansive so as to allow the state of Maryland to compel lawyers licensed in Maryland to disclose their social security numbers. The practice “assist[s] the Department [of Assessments and Taxation] in identifying new businesses within the State” and “assist[s] the Comptroller in determining whether each lawyer on the list has paid all undisputed taxes,” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-313(a), which are functions of collection, enforcement, and statistical gathering required to enforce Maryland’s tax laws.

2.

We are also not persuaded by Tankers-lejfs contention that the Fund “is not an entity to which [social security number] disclosures may be required under § 405,” Appellant’s Br. at 26, in that it is not the “State (or political subdivision thereof) or [an] agency thereof having administrative responsibility for the law involved,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Tankersley would have us ignore that the “[s]tate [of Maryland] ‘can act only through its officers and agents,’ ” and thus the act of collecting social security numbers is necessarily carried out by an officer or agent of the state. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 365, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263, 25 L.Ed. 648 (1879)). Moreover, to allow only the state agency directly responsible for administering the tax laws to collect social security numbers would read the phrase “or political subdivision thereof’ out of the statute, because it would not allow the state of Maryland, acting through other agents or political subdivisions, to collect the numbers. See, e.g., TRW Inc, v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be- superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001))).

We also think it clear that the Court of Appeals of Maryland (as a subdivision of the state) and the Fund are — at least for these purposes — agents of the state. “A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way.” Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1879) (emphasis added). Maryland’s constitution vests judicial authority in the Court of Appeals, Md. Const., Art. TV, § 1, and the. Court of Appeals has understood that power to include “the regulation of the practice of law, the admittance of new members to the bar, and the discipline of attorneys who fail to conform to the established standards governing their professional conduct,” Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929, 934 (1981). The Court of Appeals of Maryland is thus an agent of the state.

So too is the Fund, as an agent of the Court of Appeals. The Court, through the rulemaking authority given to it by statute, see Md. Code Ann., Bus: Occ. & Prof. § 10-311(a) (“The Court of Appeals may adopt rules that ... provide for the operation of the Fund.”), has delegated to the Fund the power “[t]o perform all ... acts authorized by these Rules,” Md. Rules, Rule 19-604(a)(15). Of course, the Rules authorize the Fund’s collection of social security numbers. In this capacity, the Fund acts as an agent of the Court of Appeals, which is in turn an agent of the state. The Fund is therefore an entity under § 405 for purposes of requiring the disclosure of social security numbers.

3.

Tankersley’s final salvo with respect to the reach of § 405 is' that he is not a person who “is or appears to be” affected by Maryland’s tax laws, because in the twenty-eight years that- he has been licensed to practice law in Maryland, he has never lived in or owned property in Maryland, nor has he been required to pay taxes or make unemployment insurance contributions to the state.

We take Tankersley at his word when he says that he is someone who has not been affected by Maryland’s tax laws. But the statute reaches further to include individuals who “appear[] to be” affected by tax laws. Mindful of “our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,’ ” United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (quoting Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, 2 S.Ct. 391, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1883)), a fair reading of § 405(c)(2)(C)® extends to all attorneys licensed to practice law in Maryland. Why? Because even though lawyers who live and practice elsewhere are less likely to owe taxes to Maryland than those who live and work in the state, Tankers-ley’s ability to earn income in the state (by virtue of his license) is enough to make him someone who “appears to be” affected by Maryland tax laws for the purpose of § 405. See Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-401 (providing for nonresident allocation of income, losses, and adjustments for tax purposes).

Accordingly, § 405 of the Tax Reform Act applies to Tankersley, and the state of Maryland may lawfully compel him to provide his social security number' to the Fund on pain of suspension of his law license. The district court’s judgment dismissing Tankersley’s complaint is therefore

AFFIRMED.

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Maryland Rules of Procedure 16-811.5 and 16-811.6, adopted in 2014, require that each attorney admitted to practice as a member of the Maryland bar disclose her social security number (“SSN”) to the treasurer of the Client Protection Fund (“the Fund”) or face suspension of her license to practice law. Michael Tankers-ley, an attorney who has long been admitted to practice in Maryland but has apparently never actually lived, worked, or practiced in the state, contends that, as applied to him, these Maryland Rules violate the federal Privacy Act of 1974. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account number.” Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a note).

Upon suspension of his law license for refusing to provide his SSN,’ Tankersley brought this suit against all Maryland Court of Appeals judges, the Clerk of Court, and the trustees of the Fund (together, “Appellees”) in their official capacities. The district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on its determination in a previous case that both the Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666, and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 405, supersede the Privacy Act’s guarantee that an individual may not be denied any legal right, benefit, or privilege for failing to disclose her SSN, My friends in the majority affirm on the ground that § 405, but not § 666, supersedes section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act as applied in this case.

While I agree with the majority that § 666 does not supersede the Privacy Act as it pertains to Tankersley, I respectfully dissent from its holding that § 405 does supersede the Privacy Act. I would also hold that Tankersley has a private right of action to enforce his Privacy Act rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in my view, Tankersley’s suspension from practicing law for refusing to disclose his SSN violated his Privacy Act rights. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment for Tankersley.

I.

This Court reviews de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Kenney v. Indep. Order of Foresters, 744 F.3d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 2014), and we likewise review de novo a denial of summary judgment, Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2008). Because I agree with the majority that § 666 does not supersede Tankersley’s Privacy Act rights, as Tankersley is not an “applicant” for a professional license, I begin by considering whether § 405 supersedes Tankersley’s rights under the Privacy Act. Unlike the majority, I conclude that it does not.

II.

Under the Tax Reform Act,
any State (or political subdivision thereof) may, in the administration of any tax, general public assistance, driver’s license, or motor vehicle registration law within its jurisdiction, utilize the social security account numbers issued by the Commissioner of Social Security for the purpose of establishing the identification of individuals affected by such law, and may require any individual who is or appears to be so affected to furnish to such State (or political subdivision thereof) or any agency thereof having administrative responsibility for the law involved, the social security account number ... issued to him by the Commissioner of Social Security.

42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i). The Act also provides that, “[i]f and to the extent that any provision of Federal law heretofore enacted is inconsistent with the policy set forth in clause (i), such provision shall ... be null, void, and of no effect.” Id. § 405(c)(2)(C)(v). Appellees argue, and the majority agrees, that § 405 supersedes Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act to.the extent that it enables states to require individuals to furnish their SSNs in the administration of any tax law. See Appel-lees’ Br. 26. .

I would hold, however, that § 405 does not supersede the Privacy Act in this case for three reasons: First, the Fund’s collection of SSNs is not an effort undertaken by the state “in the administration of any tax” law. See §■ 405(c)(2)(C)(i). Second, the Fund is not an entity to which the state may require individuals to furnish their SSNs, as it is not a direct agent of the state itself or a .state “agency ... having administrative responsibility for” any tax law. See id. Third, Tankersley is not an “individual who is or appears to be ... affected” by any Maryland tax law. See id. Thus, § 405 does not authorize the Maryland Court of Appeals to penalize Tankersr ley for refusing to disclose his SSN, and it does not supersede section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act as applied here.

A.

The language of § 405 is fairly limiting. The statute specifies (1) who may require the disclosure of SSNs (a “State (or political subdivision thereof)”); (2) for what purpose (“in the administration of any tax ... law within [the State’s] jurisdiction”); (3) to whom an individual may be required to make the disclosure (“to such State (or political subdivision thereof) or any agency thereof having administrative responsibility for the law involved”); and, finally, (4) who may, be required to disclose her SSN (“any individual who is or appears to be ... affected [by the State tax law]”). § 405(c)(2)(C)(i). I begin by examining the first two requirements: whether the mandatory disclosure of SSNs at issue in this case is an effort undertaken by the state of Maryland “in the administration of any tax” law. See id.

Maryland law requires that, each year, the Fund must “provide a list -of lawyers who have paid an annual fee to the Fund during the previous fiscal year” to the State Department of Taxation “to assist the Department in identifying new businesses within the State” and to the Comptroller “to assist the Comptroller in determining whether each lawyer on the list has paid all undisputed taxes and unemployment insurance contributions.” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-313(a). For each person listed, the Fund must provide “the federal tax identification number of the person or, if the person does not have a federal tax identification number, the Social Security number of the person.” Id. § 10-313(b)(2)(ii). In an apparent effort to comply with this state law, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted Maryland Rules of Procedure 16-811.5 and 16-811.6 and amended the rules of admission to the Maryland bar, see Md. Admis. R. 2(b), to require that applicants and members of the bar supply their SSNs to the Fund.

The Fund’s stated purpose, however, is unrelated to the state’s administration of any tax law: “The' purpose of the Fund is to maintain the integrity of the legal profession by paying money to reimburse losses caused by defalcations of lawyers.”' Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-311(b). It is therefore dubious to conclude that Maryland has acted “in the administration of any tax” law by requiring the Fund, an entity that does not itself collect taxes and that exists for an entirely distinct purpose, to collect SSNs and supply them to the Comptroller for the Comptroller’s use in monitoring compliance with tax laws.

Relatedly, the Maryland Rules at issue in this case are not the state laws requiring the Fund to provide SSNs to state tax authorities; instead, the Rules under review are Maryland Rules 16-811.5 and 16-811.6, which the Court of Appeals promulgated to require bar members to furnish their SSNs to the Fund. The suggestion that the state (through its Court of Appeals) acted “in the administration of any tax” law in promulgating Rules requiring that the Fund collect SSNs from bar members so that the Fund can comply with a separate Maryland law that requires it to provide SSNs to Maryland tax authorities so that those authorities may check compliance with tax laws is thus all the more attenuated.' Accordingly, if does not appear that § 405 authorizes the Maryland Rules at issue.

B.

In any event, § 405 also specifies the type of entity to which a state may require individuals to supply their SSNs: a state may mandate SSN disclosure “to [a] State (or political subdivision thereof) or any agency thereof having administrative responsibility for the law involved.” § 405(c)(2)(C)(i). Appellees argue that the Fund, in collecting SSNs under the Maryland Rules, is acting as an agent of the state, and since § 405 authorizes “the State” as well as state agencies responsible for administering tax laws to collect SSNs, the Maryland Rules comply with § 405. See Appellees’ Br. 30-35. In other words, Appellees contend that two groups may collect SSNs under § 405 — the state, including its direct agents, and state agencies with “administrative responsibility for the law involved” — and that the Fund belongs in the former group. See id. at 32. The majority agrees.

The language of § 405 is not so expansive, however, as to allow us to consider the Fund a direct agent of the state of Maryland. In interpreting a statute, we must “give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous.” Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 2005). If the phrase “the State (or political subdivision thereof)” were to include any state agency, such as the Fund, then the next phrase in § 405, authorizing SSN collection by “any [state] agency ... having administrative responsibility for the law involved,” would be superfluous. See § 405(c)(2)(C)(i).

Likewise, by expressly providing that “any [state] agency ... having administrative responsibility for the law involved” may collect SSNs, Congress appears to have specifically excluded from § 405’s purview state ágencies, like the Fund, that are not responsible for administering tax laws. See id. If it intended otherwise, Congress could simply have established that a state may require SSN disclosure to “any state agency” and left it at that. See Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he doctrine of expressio un[ius] est exclusio alter-áis instructs that where a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.”); cf. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 913, 919, 190 L.Ed.2d 771 (2015) (“Thus, Congress’s choice to say ‘specifically prohibited by law’ rather than ‘specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation’ suggests that Congress meant to exclude rules and regulations.”).

Appellees argue, on the other hand, and the majority agrees, that the statutory canon requiring that we attempt to “give effect to every provision and word in a statute,” Discover Bank, 396 F.3d at 369, cuts the other direction. See Appellees’ Br. 32-33. They contend that the phrase “State (or political subdivision thereof)” must include the state’s direct agents for that term to have any meaning, as a state cannot act of its own accord. See id. at 32. Yet that proposition does nothing to demonstrate that the Fund in particular quali-fíes as a direct agent of the state. Although the Court of Appeals might meet this description, see Md. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (vesting Maryland’s judicial power in the Court of Appeals), I see no reason to conclude that the Fund, a subset of the Maryland Court of Appeals, may serve as a proxy for the state itself.

That Congress, in enacting § 405, did not intend for a state agency to qualify as a stand-in for the “State (or political subdivision thereof)” is again exemplified by § 405’s inclusion of a subsequent phrase specifically pertaining to state agencies — a statutory phrase that would more naturally describe the Fund, if only the Fund were a state agency with administrative responsibility for any Maryland tax law. See § 405(c)(2)(C)(i). Accordingly, the majority’s labored analysis, reasoning that the Maryland Court of Appeals is an agent of the state and the Fund is an agent of the Court of Appeals and thus the Fund is an agent of the state, forgets that the relevant question is whether the Fund is a direct agent of the state — the personification of the state itself — as opposed to a state agency organized and managed under the-auspices of the state. Because the Fund is neither a direct state agent nor an agency with administrative responsibility for any Maryland tax law, § 405 does not authorize the Maryland Rules at issue here, which require disclosure of SSNs to the Fund.

C.

Finally, even if § 405 does authorize the Fund’s collection of SSNs in some circumstances, it does not allow Maryland to require the collection of Tankersley’s SSN in particular, as Tankersley is not an “individual who is or appears to be” affected by any Maryland tax law. See id.

Although Tankersley has been licensed to practice law in Maryland since 1986, he has been a resident of Virginia or Washington, D.C., and -has worked in Washington, D.C., for the duration of that time, J.A. 114 — indeed, he has also been licensed to practice law in Washington, D.C., since 1987, J.A. 10. For the nearly three decades that Tankersley has been licensed in Maryland, he has not owned property in Maryland, and he has not owed Maryland any taxes or unemployment insurance contributions. JA. 114. Moreover, Tankersley has annually reported his home and work addresses to the Fund, which uses this information each year, along with information regarding Tankersley’s bar memberships outside of Maryland, to determine whether, he is subject to a mandatory assessment. See J.A. 114-15; Regs, of the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Md. Currently Effective, § (i)(l)-(3), http:// www.courts.state.md.us/cpfipdfs/ regulations.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2016).

Thus, not only does Tankersley not owe any taxes in Maryland (nor has he for nearly thirty years), but he also does not appear to owe any taxes in Maryland,-as is clear from the information that Tankersley provides the Fund on a yearly basis. Someone who fives in Virginia and works in Washington, D.C., where he is licensed to practice law, does not “appear[] to be affected” by Maryland tax laws simply because he is also licensed to practice law in Maryland, particularly when he has not practiced law there and has no other apparent connection to the state.

Appellees contend that a more individualized approach to SSN collection would “require an unworkable, burdensome, administrative mechanism to determine whether there was some basis for taxing the specific individual.” Appellees’ Br. 29. Perhaps so. Yet, as mentioned above, the Fund already uses individual bar members’ information to determine whether each attorney owes a mandatory assess-raent, so the requisite mechanism already exists. More to the point, § 405 is clear in specifying who may be required to disclose her SSN: “any individual who is or appears to be” affected by state tax law. Appellees cannot eschew this language due to policy concerns about inefficiency. Given that we must, to the extent possible, attempt to construe § 405 so as to preserve the Privacy Act, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”), Appellees’ argument concerning the relative ease and efficiency of a blanket mandatory collection of all licensed attorneys’ SSNs is unpersuasive.

Lastly, it is ironic that, upon acknowledging that we must be “mindful of our duty to give effect* if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,” ante at 399 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the majority ignores the precise wording of § 405 — which authorizes the mandatory collection of an SSN only from an “individual who is or appears to be” affected by Maryland tax laws, § 405(c)(2)(C)(i) — and instead declares that “a fair reading of § 405(c)(2)(C)© extends to all attorneys licensed to practice in Maryland,” ante at 399. Congress did not enact such an expansive statute, and we should not transform § 405 into one, particularly where we are obligated to give effect to every word in a statute and to interpret § 405 in a manner that preserves the federal Privacy Act (and the important protections it provides), to the extent possible.

Accordingly, I would hold that' § 405 does not authorize the Fund to penalize Tankersley for failing to supply his SSN, as Tankersley is not an individual “who is or appears to be affected” by any Maryland tax law.

III.

Having concluded that neither § 666 nor § 405 supersedes Tankersley’s rights under section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, the question remains whether Tankersley has a private right of action to enforce his rights. Tankersley argues that he may pursue his claim for declaratory and in-junctive relief under 42 U.S.G. § 1983. See Appellant’s Br. 36-43.1 agree.

. Section 1983 “imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law or regulation, deprives a person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ ” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). A plaintiff seeking redress under § 1983 “must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989)). We consider three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. Id. “First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)). The Supreme Court has clarified that the federal right must be “unambiguously conferred”; it is insufficient that “the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002). “Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not ‘so vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 766). “Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.” Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (citing cases).

However, “[e]ven if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983. Because our inquiry focuses on congressional intent, dismissal is proper if Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984)). Congress may do so expressly or impliedly, such as by “creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id. (citing Linvadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994)).

A.

While the question of whether section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act confers an individual right enforceable under § 1983 is an issue of first impression in this Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has answered this question in the affirmative. See Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit, the only other one of our sister circuits to resolve the issue, agreed that section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act creates an individual right, but it held that Congress intentionally foreclosed § 1983 as a remedy. See Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1999).

I would hold that, in enacting section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, Congress created an individual right enforceable under § 1983. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account number.” § 7(a)(1). Even though this provision proscribes the activity of a “Federal, State or local government agency,” the statute is unambiguously focused on the right of an individual to retain her legal. rights, benefits, and privileges when refusing to disclose her SSN. See Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1292 (“[T]he Privacy Act clearly confers a legal right on individuals: the right to refuse to disclose his or her ssn without suffering the loss ‘of any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law.’”). Moreover, Congress explained that it enacted the Privacy Act “to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy,” Pub. L..No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896, expressing an intent to create and preserve individual rights.

Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act differs in this way from the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act' of 1974. (“FER-PA”) at issue in Gonzaga University v. Doe. See 536 U.S. at 276, 122 S.Ct. 2268. The Supreme Court in Gonzaga determined that FERPA, which provides that “[n]o funds shall be made available ... to any educational agency ... which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records ... of students without the written consent of them parents,” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l), did not" contain the requisite “rights-ereating” language to allow for enforcement under § 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287, 122 S.Ct. 2268. The Court explained that the statute’s focus on funding for educational agencies “is two steps removed from the interests of individual studerits and parents and clearly does not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’ that is enforceable under § 1983.” Id. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, by contrast, establishes that individuals are entitled to decline to provide their SSNs while retaining their legal rights, benefits, and privileges. In doing so, section 7(a)(1) plainly confers an individual right and satisfies the first requirement for enforcement under § 1983. See Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1292; Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1028.

Further, the individual right created by section 7(a)(1) is not “ ‘so vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 766). An individual’s right to retain “any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law” is clearly defined. See Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1028 (“[T]he statutory obligation imposed on governmental bodies is clear: A governmental body may not deny any individual any right, benefit, or privilege because she refuses to disclose her social security number, unless otherwise permitted by law.”). Moreover, the Act unambiguously imposes a binding and mandatory obligation on the states by using the phrase “it shall be unlawful.” See § 7(a)(1). Tankersley has thus established a rebuttable presumption of enforceability of his Privacy Act rights under § 1983.

B.

Appellees have failed to counter this presumption by demonstrating that Congress “specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983,” see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1005 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 3457), as their argument rests primarily on their contention that the Privacy Act does not confer ah individual right, see Appellees’ Br. 39-45.

As it happens, Congress has not foreclosed a remedy under § 1983. In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, “[although the prohibitions of § 7(a)(1) apply to all governmental entities, including state and local governments, by limiting the scope of the Privacy Act’s civil remedy provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), Congress clearly intended to ‘foreclose private enforcement’ against any entity other than federal agencies.” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1029. The civil remedy provision to which the Ninth Circuit referred, however, applies only to section 3 of the Privacy Act, which concerns the maintenance of individuals’ records and which itself only regulates federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The civil remedy provision does not apply to section 7, the section at issue in this case. See Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1289 (“Pittman failed to recognize that the remedial scheme of section 3 applies only to section 3 and has no bearing on section 7.”). Appellees acknowledge as much in their brief. See Appellees’ Br. 38 (“The only private cause of action created under the Privacy Act exists under Section 3. of that Act, and is limited to claims against federal entities.”). As the Privacy Act establishes “no enforcement scheme at all” with respect to the individual rights that section 7 confers, Congress has not foreclosed enforcement of these rights under § 1983. Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1292.

IV.

Thus, neither 42 U.S.C. § 666 nor 42 U.S.C. § 405 supersedes section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act and authorizes the enforcement of Maryland Rules 16-811.5 and 16-811.6 against Tankersley. Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers a private right of action for. Tankersley to enforce his Privacy Act rights. Because this case involves no genuine issue of material fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,1 would reverse and remand to the district court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Tankersley.

      . The Court of Appeals has since reorganized the relevant rules. Though some parts of Rule 16-811.5 have changed, subsection (a)(1) is identical except for updated cross-references.

      . Like Tankersley, Greidinger is a licensed Maryland attorney who declined to provide his social security number to the Fund.

      . Tankersley characterizes the Fund’s duty to pass along SSNs to state tax authorities as a "game of telephone across state agencies,” Appellant’s Br. 31, that is part of a "patchwork” scheme, idL at 32, involving .a "hodgepodge of statutes through which SSNs wend their way from the [Fund] to state taxation authorities,” Reply'Br. 13. While the statutory scheme might not quite warrant this colorful description, the scheme is certainly complex, and the Maryland Rules' connection to the state’s administration of tax laws is tenuous at best.

      . Notably, Appellees expressly concede that the Fund does not qualify for the latter group. That is, they do not suggest that the Fund is a state agency with administrative responsibility for any tax law. See Appellees’ Br, 31 ("[F]or purposes of § 405, the Fund is not itself a state ‘agency’ that administers a tax, but rather an agent of the State housed in the judicial branch.”).

      . Indeed, even if it were necessary to look beyond the statutory text, the relevant legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended for § 405 to be limited in scope. When advocating the passage of § 405, the Senate Committee on Finance stated that it "believe[d] that State and local governments should have the authority to use social security numbers for identification purposes when they consider it necessary for administrative purposes.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 391 (1976) (emphasis added). Maryland cannot in good faith consider a more efficient system strictly necessary, especially when the state's current administrative system is already capable of the task at hand.

      . Because the district court below concluded that § 666 and § 405 supersede Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act, it did not reach this issue. See J.A. 123-24. The district court in Greidinger v. Almand, which served as the basis for the district court’s decision in this case, noted that this is "an open question in the Fourth Circuit,” but it also declined to resolve the issue. 30 F.Supp.3d 413, 426 (D. Md. 2014).

      . This issue has come before the Tenth Circuit as well, but that court acknowledged the existing circuit split and dismissed the plaintiffs Privacy Act claims for other reasons. See Gonzalez v. Vill. of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 662-63 (10th Cir. 2012).

      . Appellees also assert that Tankersley cannot pursue his Privacy Act rights under § 1983 because "Congress lacked authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states in the Privacy Act.” Appellees’ Br. 38. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized, however, that "official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10, 109 S.Ct 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). Accordingly, because Tankersley seeks injunc-tive relief, not damages, from state officials in their official capacity, this case does not implicate any Eleventh Amendment concerns. See id. (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983-”).

      . Tankersley argues in the alternative that a federal court may exercise its "inherent equitable power to enjoin violations of federal law.” Reply Br. 19. Because I conclude that ■Tankersley has a private right of action to enforce his section 7(a)(1) Privacy Act rights under § 1983, I do not address this issue.

      . The parties have sufficient notice that we may grant summary judgment, as Tankersley filed a motion seeking this relief and Appel-lees styled their dispositive motion as a "Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.” See J.A. 116.