author: Najam, Judge.

text:
    Michael D. GOODWIN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. David L. DEBOER, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-514
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 25, 2018 Rehearing denied November 29, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Carrie Castro, Law Office of Carrie Castro, Merrillville, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: David C. Jensen, Robert J. Feldt, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, Indiana
   Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Michael D. Goodwin sued his former attorney David L. DeBoer for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment after Goodwin pleaded guilty in a federal criminal cause of action in which DeBoer, along with two other attorneys, had represented Goodwin. The essence of Goodwin's civil claims against DeBoer are that, had DeBoer rendered competent representation to Goodwin in the federal action, Goodwin would not have pleaded guilty. But, after an evidentiary hearing before the federal district court in a post-conviction proceeding, the court rejected the factual and legal issues that Goodwin now relies on to support his theory that he would not have pleaded guilty had DeBoer acted differently. Accordingly, as a matter of law Goodwin is precluded from now arguing that DeBoer's alleged malpractice proximately caused Goodwin to plead guilty. As such, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for DeBoer.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2011, Goodwin hired Indiana attorneys Clark W. Holesinger and DeBoer and Texas attorney William E. Kelly III to represent him in a federal criminal action for alleged Medicaid fraud in Texas. In May of 2012, Holesinger and DeBoer retained a Medicaid expert, Christine Miller, who authored a draft report on Goodwin's alleged fraud.

[3] In December, Goodwin entered into a written plea agreement with the United States. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Goodwin agreed to plead guilty to one count of health care fraud, and, in exchange, the United States dismissed eleven other counts. At a hearing on Goodwin's guilty plea, Goodwin acknowledged as true a "factual resume" that established a factual basis for the offense. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 126-31, 177. On several occasions, the court asked Goodwin if he had reviewed his plea agreement and decision to plead guilty with his attorneys. Goodwin repeatedly affirmed that he had done so. With respect to the factual resume in particular, Goodwin stated that he had "gone over it completely" with his attorneys "[m]any times." Id. at 177-78. The court entered its judgment of conviction against Goodwin and sentenced him to fifty months with the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

[4] Thereafter, in April of 2014 the Porter County Prosecutor alleged that Holesinger "stole approximately $380,000.00 from Dr. Michael Goodwin and his wife ... during the time he represented Dr. Goodwin for Medicaid fraud." Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 76. Holesinger surrendered his Indiana law license and pleaded guilty to several federal and state crimes. However, despite the Porter County Prosecutor's allegation, none of Holesinger's convictions directly related to funds allegedly stolen from Goodwin.

[5] Shortly after learning of Holesinger's conduct, Goodwin moved to have the district court set aside his guilty plea on the basis that Holesinger had rendered ineffective assistance, which motion Goodwin later amended. In relevant part, Goodwin's amended motion argued that Holesinger had advised him to plead guilty, and Goodwin had acted on that advice, while Holesinger "was burdened by an actual conflict of interest ... due to his theft of approximately [$380,000] from Goodwin during his representation ...." Appellant's App. Vol. 11 at 135. Goodwin further alleged that Holesinger's advice was ineffective because Holesinger had "concealed the Miller Report" from Goodwin, which Goodwin argued was "favorable and necessary for Goodwin's defense." Id. at 142-43. In other words, Goodwin argued that, had he known of Holesinger's conduct and/or the Miller report, he would not have pleaded guilty. See Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 122.

[6] The district court set a hearing date on Goodwin's amended motion. Ten days before that hearing, in June of 2016, DeBoer sent to Goodwin's wife a draft statement for the court on Goodwin's behalf, which statement Goodwin's wife "immediately" surrendered to Goodwin's acting counsel. Id. at 96-97. In that statement, DeBoer said:

It seems almost [a] foregone conclusion to me that if Clark Holesinger was stealing from Michael Goodwin while representing him in the Medicaid case, Goodwin did not have the benefit of appropriate[,] competent representation.
Did Holesinger steal from Goodwin? In my opinion, it is far more probable than not that he did.
I come to that conclusion by recalling my observations of Holesinger during the months I helped him with the Goodwin case. The nature of the federal Medicaid fraud case meant not only did [Goodwin] face criminal penalties for [the] alleged violations, he also was at risk to lose all or a large part of his substantial net worth. Bank accounts were frozen, real estate was attached. During visits to his office, I overheard Holesinger's portion of phone conversations cutting deals with bankers in charge of Goodwin's holdings. There was also a stylish RV that was pursued by the government. I believe Holesinger sold this for cash ... before it was seized.
[Holesinger] appeared more motivated and energized to work on the civil/financial aspects of the government's case than the criminal case proper.

Id.

[7] Nearly eleven months after the evidentiary hearing, the district court's magistrate judge issued his report and recommendation to deny Goodwin's amended motion to set aside his guilty plea. In relevant part, the magistrate judge found as follows:

In this case, the criminal acts committed by GOODWIN's Indiana counsel, Mr. Holesinger, require the Court to carefully and stringently consider this claim and whether counsel's illegal activities affected GOODWIN's plea and whether such impacted GOODWIN's decision to accept a guilty plea. ...
* * *
GOODWIN's claim that his guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary is conclusory and does not set forth specific factual allegations to amount to a constitutional violation. His claims in his Amended Motion to Vacate ... are not supported by reliable evidence and these claims contradict the statements GOODWIN made in his plea agreement and in open court at his rearraignment....
GOODWIN also claimed Mr. Holesinger told him that he had insufficient funds to put forth a defense at trial, and it was this information that led GOODWIN to accept a plea of guilty. However, GOODWIN was advised of his right to have appointed counsel at any time throughout his proceedings if he could no longer afford retained counsel or if a conflict arose and he could not afford separate counsel. Additionally, the record reflects GOODWIN's decision to plead guilty was a result of the plea agreement deadline to dismiss charges against his wife and office manager, not because of a lack of funds to proceed to trial.
In a letter after his sentencing, GOODWIN stated that he accepted a guilty plea because he feared the prosecutor would proceed with charges against [Mrs. Goodwin] and [the office manager] and he wanted to "save them."
* * *
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and from documents of record in this case indicate that GOODWIN's attorney, Mr. Holesinger, was convicted of Wire Fraud and Theft from a pattern of stealing and/or embezzling from his clients. This is not disputed by the government and in fact, Mr. Holesinger appeared at the evidentiary hearing .... However, evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was inadequate to show what amount, if any, Mr. Holesinger might have stolen or embezzled from GOODWIN . Although GOODWIN testified and presented records that he paid Mr. Holesinger approximately $400,000 over the course of the representation, GOODWIN has not established what amounts of money did not go to legitimate representation fees. In fact, it appears GOODWIN is claiming Mr. Holesinger embezzled approximately $380,000, meaning that GOODWIN believes less than $20,000 was spent on the defense of a complicated Medicaid Fraud case spanning over a year and a half. The evidentiary hearing record shows Mr. Holesinger provided legitimate legal services to GOODWIN. He hired an expert, Ms. Miller, hired co-counsel, Mr. DeBoer, hired local counsel, William E. Kelly III, and traveled and investigated this case, and continued to provide representation from the date he was retained in mid-2012 through sentencing in April of 2013. Thus, GOODWIN has failed to show Mr. Holesinger actually embezzled from him, or, if he did, the amount Mr. Holesinger embezzled . GOODWIN certainly has established Mr. Holesinger's bad acts against other clients but at most, he has only shown Mr. Holesinger might have stolen from GOODWIN. In any event, GOODWIN has failed to meet his burden to show that such behavior resulted in deficient performance of counsel and has further failed to prove how the deficient performance prejudiced GOODWIN's criminal case . Mr. Holesinger's conduct in defrauding other clients undermines confidence in the legal system and calls into question the representation provided by Mr. Holesinger to GOODWIN. The Court considers Mr. Holesinger's behavior reprehensible and has nothing positive to say about it. However, the burden remains on GOODWIN to show both an actual deficient performance and resulting prejudice and the Court cannot impute the dishonesty of Mr. Holesinger in stealing from other clients to his representation of GOODWIN. It is GOODWIN's task to show prejudice by showing specific actions taken or not taken by Mr. Holesinger which would have altered the outcome or altered GOODWIN's decision to plead guilty. For example, GOODWIN did not show that the alleged embezzlement caused Mr. Holesinger to fail to hire an expert and that such failure would have changed the course of his case. This high burden falls on GOODWIN despite Mr. Holesinger's clearly egregious behavior that GOODWIN became aware of after-the-fact of the plea and sentencing and which has undermined GOODWIN's confidence in Mr. Holesinger's representation. GOODWIN, throughout his Motion to Vacate and his evidentiary hearing, argued that his attorney, Mr. Holesinger, was convicted of wrongdoing in the handling of client funds. GOODWIN then leaps to the conclusion that this wrongdoing resulted in per se deficient performance in GOODWIN's representation which also resulted in per se prejudice in GOODWIN's criminal case. This automatic leap from proving an attorney's wrongdoing or criminal behavior to proving deficient performance and prejudice is misguided. Proving breach of the standard of care owed to a client and proving deficient performance are not identical processes or findings, nor is proving actual prejudice identical.
* * *
... [D]espite his conclusory claims that he would have "insisted on a trial," he has failed to show such an insistence would have been rational. He testified at the evidentiary hearing that "he wouldn't continue with someone stealing from me" if he had known about the alleged theft/embezzlement during the representation. As set out above, however, he never established whether or what amount of funds were misappropriated . Mr. Holesinger's conviction documents ... did not include charges that Mr. Holesinger misappropriated funds from GOODWIN and to the Court's knowledge GOODWIN was never named as a victim in a criminal case filed against Mr. Holesinger. GOODWIN must offer more than he has to establish that he has met the prejudice showing required .... Furthermore, he has failed to meet his burden to show these alleged constitutional violations even occurred, because they are contradicted by earlier statements made by GOODWIN and no supporting documentary evidence or testimony corroborates GOODWIN's change of testimony.
* * *
GOODWIN gave conflicting testimony and statements regarding the Miller report. He acknowledged at one point that he had discussed it with [Holesinger] prior to his plea and was told the Miller report was not favorable to his case. He later claimed he did not know about the report until after his sentencing.... [T]o the extent that [the Miller report] relates generally to the claim that Mr. Holesinger failed to investigate possible defenses, GOODWIN has failed to show prejudice by articulating what defenses GOODWIN had to the allegations in the superseding indictment and how Mr. Holesinger's alleged deficient performance affected the outcome of his guilty plea. Furthermore, no argument was made as to what specific information was contained in the report that would have been a rational basis for GOODWIN to insist upon a trial , rather than pleading guilty. Ms. Miller could have been subpoenaed to testify at the evidentiary hearing if she had specific information regarding a viable defense for GOODWIN's case.

Id. at 116, 118-23, 129 (emphases added; citations omitted). The district court then adopted the magistrate's findings and entered judgment against Goodwin.

[8] In February of 2017, Goodwin filed suit against DeBoer in the Lake Superior Court. Goodwin's complaint alleged that DeBoer had committed legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment. According to his complaint, Goodwin learned of DeBoer's misconduct from DeBoer's June 2016 statement to the district court in support of Goodwin's amended motion to vacate his guilty plea. In particular, Goodwin alleged that DeBoer had breached his duty of care to Goodwin when:

a. During visits to Clark Holesinger's office, [DeBoer] "overheard Holesinger's portions of phone conversations cutting deals with bankers in charge of Goodwin's holdings."
b. [DeBoer] was aware [Goodwin] owned a stylish RV that was pursued by the government. [DeBoer] believes "Holesinger sold the RV for cash ... before it was seized."
c. [DeBoer] observed "Clark Holesinger appeared more motivated and energized to work on the civil/financial aspects of the government's case than the criminal case proper."

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 20. Goodwin further alleged that DeBoer failed to "disclose the Medicaid expert's draft report to [Goodwin]," which report he generically alleged "supported a very strong defense." Id. at 21. Because of DeBoer's alleged misconduct, Goodwin continued, Goodwin "was unable to make an informed decision regarding the outcome of his case" and he "would not have ple[aded] guilty ...." Id. at 19, 24. That is, Goodwin alleged only that, but for DeBoer's alleged malpractice, the outcome of the federal criminal action would have been different. In due course, DeBoer moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Goodwin appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment for DeBoer. As our Supreme Court has stated:

This Court reviews summary judgment orders de novo . Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to a particular issue or claim, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In viewing the matter through the same lens as the trial court, we construe all designated evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party. Legal questions, such as contract interpretation, are well-suited for summary judgment. The party appealing the trial court's summary judgment determination bears the burden of persuading us the ruling was erroneous. Nonetheless, we "carefully scrutinize[ ] the trial court's decision to assure that the party against whom summary judgment was entered was not improperly prevented from having its day in court."

Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc. , 72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted; alteration original to Ryan ). Further, "we may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence." Miller v. Danz , 36 N.E.3d 455, 456 (Ind. 2015).

[10] Although Goodwin's complaint alleges three claims, the essence of his complaint is that DeBoer committed legal malpractice when DeBoer did not inform Goodwin of Holesinger's purported misappropriation of funds and also when DeBoer did not share the Miller report with Goodwin. A claim of legal malpractice invokes the "trial-within-a-trial" doctrine, under which

a client alleging legal malpractice must prove not only that the lawyer's conduct fell below the governing duty of care but also that the client would have prevailed had the lawyer not been negligent ....
* * *
To prevail on [a] legal malpractice claim ..., [the client] has to prove three things: (1) She retained the firm to represent her legal interests, so that the firm owes her a duty of care; (2) the firm breached its duty of care by failing to exercise the ordinary skill and knowledge expected of lawyers; and (3) the firm's breach was the proximate cause of [the client's] injury....
... [U]nder the ["trial-within-a-trial"] doctrine, the client must show the outcome of the botched representation would have been more favorable to the client had the lawyer not been negligent. In other words, the client must prove the lawyer's negligence proximately caused her injury ....

Roumbos v. Vazanellis , 95 N.E.3d 63, 64-66 (Ind. 2018) (emphasis added). In legal malpractice actions, the proximate causation requirement is a "but for" requirement. See, e.g. , Richard H.W. Maloy, Proximate Cause: The Final Defense in Legal Malpractice Cases , 36 U. Mem. L. Rev. 655, 671-77 (2006). That is, the client-plaintiff must show that, had the attorney-defendant not acted as he did, the result of the underlying lawsuit would have been different. Id.

[11] In his complaint, Goodwin alleged that, but for DeBoer's alleged misconduct, he would not have pleaded guilty in the federal criminal action. In his motion for summary judgment, DeBoer argued that Goodwin in effect seeks to relitigate the ineffective assistance of counsel claim he made in the district court against Holesinger, which is not permitted. See, e.g. , Williams v. Maschmeyer , 870 N.E.2d 1069, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) ("under Indiana precedent, a post-conviction finding that counsel was not ineffective provides the necessary identity of issues to preclude a malpractice action stemming from the same proceedings.") (brackets and quotation marks omitted). That is, DeBoer argued that the district court had already heard and found that Goodwin had failed to show that Holesinger had rendered ineffective assistance to Goodwin with respect to Holesinger's misappropriation of funds and also with respect to informing Goodwin of the Miller report. DeBoer asserted that Goodwin's complaint here was ultimately about those same issues. The trial court agreed, and so do we.

[12] As we have explained:

Issue preclusion[, also known as collateral estoppel,] bars the subsequent litigation of a fact or issue that was necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit if the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit. If issue preclusion applies, the former adjudication is conclusive in the subsequent action, even if the actions are based on different claims. The former adjudication is conclusive only as to those issues that were actually litigated and determined therein. Thus, issue preclusion does not extend to matters that were not expressly adjudicated and can be inferred only by argument. In determining whether issue preclusion is applicable, a court must engage in a two-part analysis: (1) whether the party in the prior action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (2) whether it is otherwise unfair to apply issue preclusion given the facts of the particular case. The non-exhaustive factors to be considered by the trial court in deciding whether to apply issue preclusion include: (1) privity, (2) the [party's] incentive to litigate the prior action, and (3) the ability of the [party] to have joined the prior action.

Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos , 2 N.E.3d 688, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied .

[13] The district court's judgment against Goodwin on his motion to vacate his guilty plea conclusively established that Goodwin did not show that Holesinger's misappropriation of funds (against clients other than Goodwin) affected his representation of Goodwin or that Goodwin would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Holesinger's misconduct. It further conclusively established that Goodwin had failed to carry his burden to show that, had he known of the Miller report, he would not have pleaded guilty. The district court's judgment in both respects precludes Goodwin from relitigating those issues here. See id. ; Williams , 870 N.E.2d at 1070.

[14] Thus, the designated evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that Goodwin cannot show that DeBoer's alleged misconduct would have resulted in a different outcome. DeBoer's alleged misconduct is simply a failure to inform Goodwin of Holesinger's misconduct and the Miller report, but the district court has already expressly found that Goodwin did not adequately show that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Holesinger's misconduct or the Miller report. See Sullivan v. Am. Cas. Co. , 605 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind. 1992) (holding that "identity of parties" is not required "for the defensive use of collateral estoppel"). Goodwin's claim against DeBoer is derivative of his claim against Holesinger. Because his claim against Holesinger has been adjudicated, his collateral claim against DeBoer must also fail.

[15] Nonetheless, Goodwin argues that it would be unfair to apply issue preclusion against him because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has agreed to review part of the district court's denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea. But the Fifth Circuit's certificate of appealability is expressly limited to the issue of whether Holesinger rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to appear at Goodwin's guilty plea hearing. That issue is not relevant to our appeal. We reject Goodwin's argument that it would be unfair to apply issue preclusion on these facts.

[16] In sum, the designated evidence shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists on the question of proximate causation, which underlies each of Goodwin's claims against DeBoer. Thus, DeBoer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for DeBoer accordingly.

[17] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

      We agree with DeBoer that much of Goodwin's purported arguments on appeal are "so cursory [as] to defy the cogent argument rule." Appellee's Br. at 32; see Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

      We take judicial notice of the Fifth Circuit's order. We also note that Goodwin does not argue that the Fifth Circuit's decision to review part of the district court's judgment renders the remainder of that judgment nonfinal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Bailey, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Joseph B. FERNANDERS, III, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-812
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Donald J. Frew, Fort Wayne, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caryn N. Szyper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Joseph B. Fernanders, III ("Fernanders"), was convicted of Battery, as a Level 6 felony. He now appeals.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

[3] Fernanders raises two issues, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to refute his defense of parental privilege to discipline his child; and
II. Whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to timely disclose certain witnesses.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In early 2017, A.F. was six years old. Her first-grade teacher used a "color chart" system to keep track of student behavior. Under the system, each student's name was on a clip. Every day, the student started with the clip on "green." For good behavior, the student could move up to "blue" or "purple." If the student received a warning, the student would move to "yellow." If the student continued to misbehave, the student might move to "orange" for a visit to the office or "red" for a phone call home. At the end of the day, the teacher would record the student's color status on a paper that the student took home.

[5] Fernanders is A.F.'s father. Under an early-2017 arrangement, Fernanders and his ex-wife, Cassandra Ort ("Ort"), shared physical custody of A.F. and her older sister, R.F. On February 8, 2017, the girls stayed with Fernanders after school. Fernanders found out that A.F. was marked "yellow" that day for talking out of turn. A.F. received the warning for shouting an answer before the teacher had called on her. This was A.F.'s third "yellow," and she had received previous warnings for similar behavior. Fernanders told A.F. to go upstairs, which she did. A.F. then prepared to be punished, pulling her pants and underwear down, and leaning over a bed. Fernanders spanked A.F. on her buttocks multiple times with a belt. Afterward, he told A.F. to clean her room. Downstairs, R.F.-eight years old at the time-had heard A.F. screaming for a long time. R.F. noticed that A.F. seemed to limp when she came downstairs.

[6] Although A.F. usually slept on her back, she spent that night "going ... side to side" because "it was hurting." Tr. Vol. II at 115-16. The next morning, A.F. was still in pain, and was moving "back and forth a little bit" as she sat on the school bus to school. Id. at 116. After school that day, A.F. and R.F. went to Ort's residence. When A.F. bathed that evening and R.F. came in to give her a towel, R.F. froze when she saw bruises on A.F.'s buttocks and leg. R.F. summoned Ort, who took pictures of the bruising and called the police.

[7] The State charged Fernanders with Battery and Domestic Battery as Level 6 felonies. A jury trial was held on February 8, 2018, at which Fernanders admitted to spanking A.F., but claimed a privilege to discipline A.F. At trial, Fernanders sought to elicit testimony from two of his children "as it relates to discipline, that's it, no additional questions other than that." Id. at 182. The State objected because Fernanders had not timely disclosed the witnesses and because there was "no indication that these other children were present at the time" of the spanking. Id. The trial court ultimately excluded the testimony. Later, the jury found Fernanders guilty of Battery and not guilty of Domestic Battery. The court imposed a two-year sentence, fully suspended to probation.

[8] Fernanders now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Parental Discipline

[9] To obtain the instant conviction of Battery, the State was obligated to prove that Fernanders knowingly or intentionally touched A.F. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner when Fernanders was over the age of eighteen and A.F. was under the age of fourteen. See I.C. 35-42-2-1(c)(1), -1(e)(3). Fernanders does not dispute that there is sufficient evidence supporting these statutory elements. Rather, he argues that the State failed to refute his defense of parental privilege.

[10] Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-1, "[a] person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise prohibited if he has legal authority to do so." Moreover, a parent has legal authority-sometimes referred to as the "parental discipline privilege"-to "apply such reasonable force" upon his child as the parent "reasonably believes to be necessary for ... proper control, training, or education." Willis v. State , 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008) (quotation marks omitted) (adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) ). When a defendant claims this privilege, "the State must disprove at least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Thus, "the State must prove that either: (1) the force the parent used was unreasonable or (2) the parent's belief that such force was necessary to control [the] child and prevent misconduct was unreasonable." Id. The State may refute the defense "by direct rebuttal or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief." Id. Ultimately, "[t]he decision of whether a claim of parental privilege has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder." Id.

[11] Where-as here-the defendant alleges that the State failed to refute his claim of parental privilege, we apply "the same ... standard [as] for any sufficiency claim." Id. at 182-83. That is, "we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict" and "[w]e do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence." Love v. State , 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017). "Unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty, we affirm." Jones v. State , 87 N.E.3d 450, 454 (Ind. 2017).

[12] Fernanders spanked A.F. on her bare buttocks with a belt, multiple times, with sufficient force to leave large bruises and to cause A.F. to limp afterward. In the hours after the spanking, A.F. had difficulty sleeping on her back and sitting on the school bus. Fernanders spanked A.F. because she volunteered an answer in class before her first-grade teacher called on her, and because A.F. had spoken out of turn on prior occasions at school. On appeal, Fernanders argues that it was reasonable for him to spank A.F., and asserts that the "spanking was nothing more than a progressive response to a continuing behavior problem demonstrated by the child." Appellant's Br. at 14. However, in evaluating the reasonableness of the discipline, the jury is free to consider factors such as the age of the child, the nature of the disobedience, and whether the use of force is disproportionate to the "offense." Willis , 888 N.E.2d at 182. Ultimately, the evidence supports a reasonable conclusion that Fernanders used an unreasonable amount of force when disciplining six-year-old A.F. for her misbehavior. Thus, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to refute the defense of parental privilege.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[13] Fernanders alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. To prevail on this claim, Fernanders must establish both elements of the Strickland test: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Passwater v. State , 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013). As to the first element, Fernanders points out that trial counsel failed to timely disclose two witnesses. Assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient, Fernanders must nevertheless demonstrate resulting prejudice, which requires a showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

[14] Because of counsel's untimely disclosure, Fernanders could not question two of his children about disciplinary matters. Notably, however, Fernanders already had the opportunity to question two of his children: A.F. and R.F. Moreover, Fernanders testified about his approach to discipline as did his girlfriend, who was in the residence when Fernanders spanked A.F. It appears, then, that Fernanders is alleging prejudice from the inability to present merely cumulative testimony. Yet, this sort of prejudice "has not been shown to be great enough, standing alone, to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test." Smith v. State , 547 N.E.2d 817, 819 (Ind. 1989) (involving the exclusion of testimony that appeared to be "merely cumulative to that of the five alibi witnesses who did testify at trial"). Furthermore, as there is no indication that the potential witnesses were present when Fernanders spanked A.F., the testimony would have had little bearing on the key question before the jury-which is not whether Fernanders was usually a reasonable disciplinarian, but instead whether his discipline was reasonable on this occasion. We ultimately conclude that Fernanders has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had he been able to present the testimony, the result of the trial would have been different.

[15] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

      Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), -1(e)(3).

      I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3.


author: TAVITAS, J.

text:
    James P. LITTLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-666
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Mary ADAMOWICZ, individually and in her capacity as guardian for Lilly Adamowicz and Lilly Adamowicz, by next friend Mary Adamowicz, Appellants-Petitioners, v. ANONYMOUS, M.D. and Anonymous Organization, Inc. d/b/a Anonymous OB/GYN, LLC, Appellees-Petitioners, v. Anonymous Hospital d/b/a Anonymous Hospital, Defendant, v. Stephen W. Robertson, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance, Third-Party Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-742
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    Richard CLIFTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. James E. WRIGHT, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CC-88
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Alan R. BRILL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 82A04-1710-PL-2513
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Ericka Jeanne FOUCH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-907
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Mark H. SOTO, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 43A04-1710-CR-2388
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHEPARD, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: L.C. (Minor Child) and K.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-859
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    Charles C. HOPKINS II, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Desiree D. HOPKINS, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-202
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Marquis T. WILCOX, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1705-PC-1111
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    Christopher CARTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-765
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed and remanded.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.S., M.M., and T.S. (Minor Children) and J.M. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-585
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Corey S. MACK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-552
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brittany Erin HOAK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1094
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lisa LIVINGSTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-716
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Allen ALLMOND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-207
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J., Concurs.

text:
    Darius LEA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1004
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHARPNACK, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   NAJAM, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Louis G. COULTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-34
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: Altice, Judge.

text:
    Katie HANEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. SPACE WALK, Space Walk of Fishers, Shawn Burgess, Angie Burgess, Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-33
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 9, 2018
    Attorneys for Appellant: P. Gregory Cross, THE CROSS LAW FIRM, P.C., Muncie, Indiana, Danyel N. Struble, BEASLEY & GILKISON, LLP, Muncie, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellees: Michelle A. Spahr, Bradley J. Wombles, Cynthia E. Lasher, NORRIS CHOPLIN, SCHROEDER LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
    MEMORANDUM DECISION

      In her original complaint, Katie Haney misnamed defendants Space Walk and Space Walk of Fishers. The proper names for the defendants, now appellees, respectively, are Inflatable Zoo, Inc. d/b/a Space Walk and Angela Burgess d/b/a Space Walk of Fishers. For purposes of this appeal, we use the names set forth in Haney's original complaint, that is, "Space Walk" for Inflatable Zoo, Inc. d/b/a Space Walk and "Space Walk of Fishers" for Angela Burgess d/b/a Space Walk of Fishers. Collectively, the appellees will be referred to as "the Appellees."

   Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Katie Haney sustained a spinal fracture after going down an inflatable water slide. She sued, and the Appellees sought summary judgment. On appeal, Haney argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Space Walk, a Louisiana corporation headquartered in Kenner, Louisiana, owns hundreds of inflatable objects, such as bounce houses, slides, and obstacle courses that it distributes to its representatives or partners in geographical locations across the country. The partners, in turn, market and rent the inflatables to customers in their locales for parties and group events. In 2013, the Space Walk partner in the Indianapolis area was Angela Burgess, who, with the aid of her husband Shawn, conducted operations as Space Walk of Fishers.

[4] On Saturday, August 24, 2013, the Ball State University chapter of Theta Chi fraternity was the host of an annual philanthropic event known as "Waterdaze," which took place at LaFollette Field on Ball State's campus. The event involved teams of five players each, recruited by fraternity and sorority members, competing in a series of games and contests in an open field. Scores and/or times were noted, and the results were tabulated to determine the winners. Net proceeds raised from entry fees and company sponsorships were donated to charity. Traditionally, the Theta Chi members would invite a sorority to partner with them in hosting the event. In 2013, Alpha Gamma Delta (AGD sorority) was the co-host.

[5] Geoffrey Wolfe, a member of Theta Chi, was the organizer of the 2013 Waterdaze event. Wolfe contacted Space Walk of Fishers, via email, and arranged to rent an inflatable obstacle course and an inflatable wet/dry slide that was to be used as a water slide for the event. The obstacle course was part of the competition. The slide, however, was "just there for fun" and to allow the players to "cool down." Appellees' Brief at 10.

[6] At around 9:30 on Saturday morning, Shawn arrived at the site with his son, who assisted him in setting up the inflatables. The setup was completed sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. Waterdaze was scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m. The slide was approximately eighteen feet high and was inflated by an air compressor that was attached to the rear of the slide. There were two warning labels affixed to the front of the slide. The label located on the lower right-hand side of the slide contained the following pertinent warning: "CAUTION ! ... DO NOT ALLOW MORE THAN ONE PERSON AT A TIME TO SLIDE ON SLIDES !" Appellant's Appendix Vol. 3 at 27. The other label, located on the left side of the slide, next to the stairs, read:

DO NOT MIX SIZES
Safety
First!
CONSTANT ADULT
SUPERVISION REQUIRED
Do not exceed the maximum number of riders shown on your rental agreement.
All riders should be approximately the same weight and height to avoid injury.
DO NOT MIX SIZES

Id. at 28. The label included a pictogram illustrating the warning. The labels were designed, and their content composed, by individuals at Space Walk's corporate offices in Louisiana. The labels were affixed to the slide by the slide's manufacturer, a foreign entity.

[7] During his deposition, Shawn stated that, after setup was completed, he spoke to a person he thought was Wolfe about the inflatables. Specifically, he told Wolfe how to manage the traffic flow on the inflatables, what to do if an inflatable lost air, that only one person should be on the slide at a time, that someone should supervise the slide at all times, and that the bottom of the slide should be clear before the next person proceeded down the slide. Shawn also stated that he escorted Wolfe on an inspection of the inflatables during this discussion. Wolfe, in his deposition, denied receiving warnings or instructions about the inflatables or participating in an inspection.

[8] Shawn brought with him that morning an unsigned Space Walk of Fishers rental agreement that listed "Geoff Wolfe" and "[B]all [S]tate" as the "Lessee." Id. at 24. Matthias Dorau, Theta Chi's then-treasurer, signed the rental agreement and paid Space Walk of Fishers with a Theta Chi check. The rental agreement contained a section indicating that the signatory had read and understood Space Walk's safety rules and had been instructed on how to use the inflatables. The agreement specifically provided that "the Lessee or using party shall be in charge of operation, [sic] and is fully responsible for operation after receiving unit." Id. The maximum number of riders at one time for the water slide was listed as "1" on the rental agreement. Id. However, neither the warning labels nor the rental agreement contained a specific warning that the landing area of the slide should be clear before the next person proceeded down the slide. Space Walk of Fishers was not contracted to stay and supervise the use of the inflatables.

[9] Devan Sadler, a member of Theta Chi, was stationed at the inflatable obstacle course and was responsible for explaining the rules to the players and to record the time of each team. He was located between the obstacle course and the slide. Chandler Lawson, a member of AGD sorority, assisted him. No one was assigned to oversee the operation of the slide.

[10] Haney was a member of AGD sorority. She recruited a team of five men from the Sigma Chi fraternity for the Waterdaze event, including Mitch Good, Eric Hawk, and Chris Watson. Haney served as her team's leader. Around 11:30 a.m., Haney, Mitch, Eric, and Chris decided to use the slide. Haney stated in her deposition that before going on the slide, she saw the top of the slide deflate and then re-inflate before she and the others climbed the stairs to the top of the slide. Haney did not stop to read the warning labels affixed to the front of the slide before using it.

[11] Eric descended the slide first and exited the landing. Mitch then went down the slide, as Haney and Chris waited on the top. Haney and Chris then went down the slide together - Haney on the left, Chris on the right. Mitch, however, had not yet exited the landing area at the bottom of the slide and was directly in Haney's path. When Haney realized she was going to hit Mitch, she tried to turn away but could not avoid colliding with him.

[12] As a result of the collision, Haney sustained a "comminuted 'burst fracture' " of her first lumbar vertebra. Appellant's Brief at 8. She was eventually transported to Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis where she underwent extensive surgical stabilization and fracture repair the following day. Haney incurred in excess of $300,000 in medical expenses. She was also found to have permanent impairment.

[13] On August 11, 2015, Haney filed a complaint against Space Walk, Space Walk of Fishers, and Shawn Burgess, together with Theta Chi and AGD sorority. The complaint was in two counts. The first count, premised on claims of negligence, read specifically and in relevant part:

The Space Walk defendants negligently failed to provide instructions and/or train their partners, agents and employees as to how to adequately prepare, design and install its inflatable water slide so as to prevent the risk of severe injury occasioned by deflation of the slide while it was in use.
The Space Walk defendants negligently installed the inflatable water slide ....

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 37. The second count was a product liability claim. Theta Chi and AGD sorority were eventually dismissed from the case, and the case proceeded against the remaining defendants, now Appellees.

[14] On January 17, 2017, the Appellees moved for summary judgment, claiming entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the following bases: 1) the defendants owed no duty to Haney and therefore could not be responsible for her injury; 2) deflation of the slide was not a proximate cause of Haney's injury; and, 3) regarding Haney's product liability claim, the inflatable slide was not defective and was compliant with applicable standards and the industry state of art. Haney filed her response on October 2, 2017, asserting that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the "[Appellees] negligence in failing to [provide adequate training]" and "their placement into the stream of commerce a defective product." Id. at 105. The Appellees filed a reply on October 24, 2017.

[15] On November 16, 2017, the trial court heard arguments on the summary judgment motion. On December 8, 2017, the trial court entered its order granting the Appellees' motion, concluding in relevant part:

The [Space Walk] Defendants fulfilled the duty to warn required under Indiana Law. The slide contained clear warnings that only one person should go down the slide at one time, and the slide should be used under constant supervision.
* * * * *
As Defendants point out, the Indiana Supreme Court has held there is no duty to warn the user to read the warnings. Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford , 868 N.E.2d 806 ( [Ind.] 2007).

Id. at 30. Haney now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

Motion to Strike

[16] Initially, we address the Appellees' motion to strike all references to Joshua Rooney's deposition in Haney's brief and appendix. The Appellees allege that the deposition was not designated to the trial court during the summary judgment proceedings and, therefore, cannot be used to support a reversal. In her response, Haney argues that because the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees was an entry of summary judgment on a different issue than that presented by the Appellees, Trial Rule 56(H) is not implicated. Thus, according to Haney, references to Joshua Rooney's deposition should not be stricken. We find that, for reasons explained below, the trial court did not enter summary judgment on a different issue than that presented by the Appellees. Therefore, by separate order issued contemporaneously with this opinion, we grant the Appellees' motion to strike.

Entry of Summary Judgment on Issue Not Raised

[17] Haney first argues that the trial court erred because it "entered summary judgment on the basis of an issue not identified in the [Appellees'] Motion for Summary Judgment." Appellant's Brief at 24. According to Haney, the trial court did not address the issue presented by the Appellees in their summary judgment motion, that is, whether the Appellees owed Haney a duty. Haney maintains that the trial court addressed an issue not raised by the Appellees, that is, whether the Appellees discharged the duty they owed to Haney by providing adequate warnings and instructions regarding the use of the slide. Haney contends that she did not have a fair chance to prepare and present materials in opposition to the trial court's conclusion in this regard. She concedes that "there were hints that these issues were in play" but argues that "the defendants' motion and explicit arguments were focused on the issue of whether the duty existed at all, not whether it had been discharged, and it cannot be said that plaintiff got a fair opportunity to address the latter question before the court ruled on it adversely to her." Id. at 28.

[18] Haney correctly asserts that entering summary judgment on an issue that no party has moved for summary judgment is a practice discouraged by our precedent. See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Twp. , 418 N.E.2d 234, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (courts "should rarely enter summary judgment sua sponte on an issue upon which no party has moved for summary judgment"). However, we find that the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees was not entered on an issue different from that presented by the Appellees. In the Appellees' motion for summary judgment, they referenced the warning signs being permanently affixed to the slide and asserted that the warning signs were prominently displayed and were not altered, specifically:

Shawn Burgess testified that Deposition Exhibit 26 was a photograph of the inflatable water slide involved in this case. He stated that Exhibit 26 accurately depicted the way the slide looked on August 24, 2013. The warning signs depicted on Exhibit 26 were permanently affixed to the slide. The warnings were adhered to the inflatable slide the entire time that Space Walk of Fishers had the inflatable slide. (Shawn Burgess Depo., Exhibit F, pp. 64-65; Exhibit 26.)
The warning signs depicted on Deposition Exhibit 26 were on the slide when it came to Space Walk of Fishers in 2011 and remained on the slide until Space Walk of Fishers sent it back [to Space Walk]. (Shawn Burgess Depo., Exhibit F, pp. 67-68.)
* * * * *
The warnings were "[a]dequately prominent so that they could be read by persons who were using the slide." (Angela Burgess Depo., Exhibit E, p. 61; Exhibits 27 and 28.)

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 pp. 67-69. Thus, Haney had notice that the Appellees' argument that summary judgment should be granted in their favor was at least in part based upon their contention that adequate warnings had been provided to Haney. No error occurred here.

Summary Judgment - Duty to Warn

[19] We now turn to Haney's argument that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: "Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate 'if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Williams v. Tharp , 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C) ). "A fact is 'material' if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is 'genuine' if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences." Id. (internal citations omitted).

[20] The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to "demonstrate ... the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue," at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to "come forward with contrary evidence" showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). Where a trial court enters specific findings and conclusions, they offer insight into the rationale for the trial court's judgment and facilitate appellate review but are not binding upon this court. Henderson v. Reid Hosp. & Healthcare Servs. , 17 N.E.3d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied . We will affirm upon any theory or basis supported by the designated materials. Id. When a trial court grants summary judgment, we carefully scrutinize that determination to ensure that a party was not improperly prevented from having his or her day in court. Id.

[21] Indiana's Product Liability Act imposes liability upon sellers of a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer. Morgen v. Ford Motor Co. , 797 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. 2003). The Act "governs all actions that are: 1) brought by a user or consumer; 2) against a manufacturer or seller; and 3) for physical harm caused by a product ... regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought." Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1. " 'Seller', for purposes of I.C. 34-20, means a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing a product for resale, use, or consumption." Ind. Code § 34-6-2-136.

[22] Here, Haney proceeded against the Appellees under theories of both negligence and strict liability. To prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff is required to prove: 1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; 2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and 3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach. Benton v. City of Oakland City , 721 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ind. 1999). Similarly, with respect to strict liability actions, the plaintiff must prove that: 1) the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous; 2) the defective condition existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and 3) the defective condition was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc. , 815 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied .

[23] Under either theory, a product may be defective under the Act where the manufacturer or seller/renter fails in its duty to warn of a danger or instruct on the proper use of the product as to which the average consumer would not be aware. Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford , 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007) (citing Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co. , 448 N.E.2d 277, 281 (Ind. 1983). This duty is twofold: 1) to provide adequate instructions for safe use and 2) to provide a warning as to dangers inherent in improper use. Rushford , 868 N.E.2d at 810. "[I]n an action based on ... an alleged failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions regarding the use of the product, the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in ... providing the warnings or instructions." I.C. § 34-20-2-2. Although the adequacy of warnings, which implicates breach of duty, is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve, the nature of the duty to provide warnings is a question of law to be decided by the court. Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 232. Absent a duty, there can be no breach of duty and thus no negligence or liability based upon the breach. Peters v. Forster , 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind. 2004). Thus, when it is determined that no duty exists, summary judgment is appropriate. Reed v. Beachy Const. Corp. , 781 N.E.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied .

[24] Haney claims the Appellees had a "nondelegable duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions for [the] safe use of the inflatable slide to the person who would actually be using it." Appellant's Brief at 29. She maintains that:

If she had been warned that the nature of an inflatable slide might impede the ability of a user to exit as quickly as on the solid metal playground variety, especially if it was having difficulty remaining fully inflated and that it was important for users to wait until the bottom was clear, presumably she would have done so and this incident would not have occurred.

Id. at 30.

[25] Haney's claim is similar to that raised in Rushford , 868 N.E.2d 806. In Rushford , a duty-to-warn case, a seventy-two-year-old, four-foot-eleven-inches-tall woman was riding in the front seat of a Ford Focus when her husband collided with another car. The front-seat passenger-side air bag deployed, and the woman sustained injuries. She brought an action against the manufacturer and the dealer under theories of negligence and strict liability in tort, alleging failure to provide adequate warning as to the potential hazard of front-seat air bags to short adults. Our Supreme Court found that a retail merchant has a duty to warn a buyer of the danger posed by a product it sells. However, the Court held that, "absent special circumstances, if the manufacturer provides adequate warnings of the danger of its product and the seller passes this warning along to the buyer or consumer, then the seller has no obligation to provide additional warnings." Id. at 811.

[26] Haney claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees because "[i]n this case there are multiple questions of fact which should properly be resolved by a jury as to whether the plaintiff and the other students using the slide that day ever received anything in the way of instructions or warning with regard to the safe use of the slide." Appellant's Brief at 31. According to Haney:

It is also not enough to just point out a few cautionary instructions to someone who might be authorized to receive them on behalf of the organization renting the inflatable; paste a few confusing instructional signs at ground level; and insert a few incongruous "safety rules" in a rental agreement that the renters may never have read. The duty to warn extends to the people who need to be warned, the people who will actually be using the slide. In this instance, there are at the very least dramatic questions of fact as to whether those warnings ever were delivered to the students at Water Daze [sic], and no question at all that a warning to await disembarkation of the previous rider at peril of a broken spine was never given.

Id. at 32.

[27] A seller with knowledge that a product involves danger to users has a duty to give a warning of such danger at the time of sale and delivery. See Nat. Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs , 685 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he manufacturer, seller or distributor of a product has a duty to warn those persons it should reasonably foresee would be likely to use its product or who are likely to come into contact with the danger inherent in the product's use.") (citing 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 1188 (1997) ), trans. denied . In the absence of any evidence that the product has been modified in some fashion and that the seller knew or should have known of any such modification, its duty to warn is discharged where the seller provides the buyer with the manufacturer's warning of the danger at issue. Rushford , 868 N.E.2d at 811. "Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." See Dias v. Daisy-Heddon , 180 Ind. App. 657, 662, 390 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1979) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. J. (1976) ).

[28] Here, the manufacturer of the inflatable slide (the foreign entity) attached the warning labels to the slide. The slide was delivered to Space Walk of Fishers by Space Walk with the warning labels attached. When Space Walk of Fishers delivered the slide to Theta Chi at the Waterdaze event, the slide contained the warning labels. Space Walk of Fishers was not contracted to stay and supervise the use of the slide. The warnings regarding the use of the slide were placed in conspicuous locations on the front of the slide in varying letter types and fonts. One of the warning signs indicated that only one person at a time should descend the slide. Haney admits that she did not read the warnings and there is no designated evidence that Haney was unable to read and understand the warnings or that the warnings were not sufficiently specific to convey the general hazards associated with improper use of the slide.

[29] Haney argues essentially that the Appellees had a duty to warn her that she should wait until the landing area of the slide was clear before proceeding down the slide. We find, however, that under these circumstances, having provided Haney with the manufacturer's warnings, through the labels on the slides, regarding the hazards of using the slide, the Appellees were under no duty to advise Haney to read the manufacturer's warnings or to provide the specific warning that Haney argues was lacking. See Rushford , 868 N.E.2d at 811 ("we conclude that having provided Rushford with the manufacturer's warning, [the car dealer] was under no duty to give Rushford additional warnings, including advising Rushford to read the manufacturer's warnings based on [the car dealer's] knowledge of 'Rushford's peculiar characteristic' "). Also, no additional warnings need to be furnished where such warnings would not supplement the user's understanding of the nature and characteristics of the product. See Shanks v. A.F.E. Indus., Inc. , 275 Ind. 241, 249, 416 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1981) ; Birch v. Midwest Garage Door Sys. , 790 N.E.2d 504, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We agree with our Supreme Court in Rushford that to conclude otherwise under these circumstances would place sellers like the Appellees "in the position of attempting to determine which particular manufacturer warnings may be of unique importance to an individual consumer and then direct the consumer's attention to those warnings ... [which would be] an untenable position and an unnecessary burden." Rushford , 868 N.E.2d at 811-12 ; see also McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's argument that warning should have indicated that hot coffee can cause third-degree burns was rejected, and the court noted "[a]ny person severely injured by any product could make a claim, at least as plausible as the McMahons', that they did not recognize the risks ex ante as clearly as they do after the accident").

[30] Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J. and Robb, J., concur.

      Joshua Rooney was the president of Theta Chi at the time of the 2013 Waterdaze event.

      See Trial Rule 56(H) which provides: "No judgment rendered on the motion shall be reversed on the ground that there is a genuine issue of material fact unless the material fact and the evidence relevant thereto shall have been specifically designated to the trial court."

      Since our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we do not reach Haney's claim concerning whether the trial court improperly weighed evidence in reaching its conclusion that summary judgment should be awarded in favor of the Appellees and whether genuine issues of fact exist as to Haney's negligence claims.


author: CRONE, J., Concurs.

text:
    Clayton WRIGHT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-369
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHARPNACK, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.B. (Child) and C.B. (Mother);
    C.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1111
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Rusty Allen REESOR, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 10A01-1712-CR-2790
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Jacquese Andrew CHANEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-62
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

text:
    Christopher L. FIGGS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A05-1710-CR-2405
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARNES, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    John H. BATTERSHELL and Helen A. Battershell, Appellants-Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, v. Stuart C. SURFACE, Appellee-Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A01-1708-CC-1989
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: C.S. (Minor Child) and B.S. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1062
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J.

text:
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of A.L., Appellant, v. ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL and Health Care Center, Inc., St. Vincent Stress Center, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MH-1147
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brian FRANKLIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-966
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: KA.A., Ke.A., T.A., and L.K.
    D.A. (Father), Appellant-Defendant, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-860
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    John CLARK, Sr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1043
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.S.
    T.S. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1113
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Obed NYARENCHI, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-409
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Charles D. BURRAGE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A04-1712-CR-2877
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jesse CARTER, IV, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-899
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Henry ROBINSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-100
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    Jonathan M. FUCHS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-271
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: G.L. (Minor Child) and C.L. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-977
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: R.M. and A.S. (Minor Children) and R.J.M. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1096
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


author: CRONE, J.

text:
    David DRUMMOND, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-PC-3041
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Joseph MILLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-232
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.C., J.C., and K.H. (Minor Children), and S.C. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-781
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Terrell ROBERTS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1249
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jarvis Latwon MCNEAL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1298
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    William C. COX, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-956
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    P.P., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-867
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Abraham VARGAS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-333
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jimmy D. EDWARDS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-789
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Ralph J. JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1279
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    DEKALB COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Appellant-Petitioner, v. DEKALB COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, Speedway Sand & Gravel, Inc., Jeffrey Bauman, Custer Farms, Inc., and Ed Schneider, Appellees-Respondents.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-48
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs in part, and dissents in part with separate opinion.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF K.K.M., Minor Child, and K.M., Mother, Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and Child Advocates, Inc., Co-Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-760
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Rachelle (Purcell) LAMONDE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Gary PURCELL, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 34A02-1711-DC-2534
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: TAVITAS, J.

text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: N.R., A.R., and M.R. (Minor Children) and J.B., Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-634
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: BAILEY, J.

text:
    Ralph A. TAIT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-283
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Steven R. GROGAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-302
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Troy R. SHAW, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-1181
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mickey DIAZ, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1165
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: T.H., A.H., E.H., and M.H. (Minor Children), and S.F. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-898
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Alex BISE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 26A01-1711-PC-2747
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Greg MCCAULEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-663
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Matter of: V.R. Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-693
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Marquel WATTLEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-651
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF: AA.P., T.B., Aj.B., K.B., At.P., and Az.B., Children Alleged to be in Need of Services;
    S.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Co-Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JC-1168
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Charles W. WALLEN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Jeanne L. WALLEN, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-807
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Dissents with separate opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF D.S., et al. (Minor Children), and N.N. (Father) and R.N. (Mother), Appellants-Respondents, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-809
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Wendy T. BROADY, Appellant-Respondent, v. David W. BROADY, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-309
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.


text:
    D.B., Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-XP-352
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Johnny RIVERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-700
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lyndon C. DAVIS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1708-PC-1912
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    Christopher SYMONS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-775
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Antone L. HARRIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-906
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jason A. WHETSTONE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-685
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Sparko SPEARMAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1084
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the PATERNITY OF G.S.
    S.S., Appellant-Petitioner, v. C.S, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JP-1306
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Remanded.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Carylon YOUNG, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-845
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    James M. HARDIMAN, Jr., Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-317
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the ADOPTION OF B.A.B.N. and K.E.J.N.
    B.N., Appellant-Respondent, v. Q.S., Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-AD-978
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J.

text:
    Ronald ROSTOCHAK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 92A05-1710-CR-2316
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Dismissed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Shaun SOUTH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 10A01-1712-CR-2990
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Irwin McNeil SCOTT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-355
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Gramm Webster SMITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1105
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Glenny CORNWELL and James Cornwell, Appellants-Defendants, v. BLOOMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 53A01-1712-SC-2880
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.L., Mother, and E.L., Minor Child:
    A.L., Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1039
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Marlon JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-825
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Douglas M. GRIMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A05-1711-MI-2818
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    James E. ROSS, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-897
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Danny SHERROD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-434
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Rondell GOE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-850
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Ashley N. SEXTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1020
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Bradford M. CROWDER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1024
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Willie L. JOSEPH, Jr., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Jacob M. KELLEY, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-1059
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    John Dale PRGOMELJA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1300
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Erika WASHINGTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-385
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    Jason RIDDLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 39A04-1712-CR-2975
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Dissents with opinion.


author: SHEPARD, J.

text:
    Marvin J. PERKINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-692
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   SHEPARD, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    Michael Lamar JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-905
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    S.H., Appellant-Respondent, v. M.A., Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PO-526
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Reversed and remanded.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Nicholas CARTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 12A02-1711-CR-2770
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Tyler Wade BUSKIRK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-350
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Robert B. COFFEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-479
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 22, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael RAE and Amy M. Rae, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, d/b/a Christiana Trust, not individual but AS TRUSTEE FOR HILLDALE TRUST, et al., Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 37A03-1712-PL-2873
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Scott EHRLICH, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. FME, INC., Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-989
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the COMMITMENT OF: N.D.
    N.D., Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana University Health Bloomington Hospital, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MH-1328
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Dismissed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Keijuan RAMEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-CR-2699
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    James CARTER III, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05-1709-CR-2248
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Aaliyah S. CRAFT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1383
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Livan A. RUIBAL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-523
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    James E. MANLEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CP-1149
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.R. (Minor Child) and V.E., Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-901
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kayla OWENS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Amanda CAUDILLO and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Appellees-Plaintiffs
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A05-1712-CT-2934
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Granted.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Dissents with separate opinion.


text:
    Harold W. JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1556
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Keith W. FREEMAN, Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-818
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Nikolas SHANNON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-935
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Christopher A. REDDEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-450
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lee M. GLEAVES II, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-CR-3034
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed October 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.