text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew HABERKORN, Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal No. 3-16-0599
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 3, 2018
    Anand Swaminathan, of Loevy & Loevy, and Daniel J. Stohr, both of Chicago, for appellant.
    James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Justin A. Nicolosi, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Matthew Haberkorn, appeals from his conviction and sentence for unlawful presence at a facility providing services exclusively directed toward children by a child sex offender ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(c) (West 2014) ). Specifically, he argues that (1) the State's evidence failed to prove him guilty and (2) the trial court erred in denying his posttrial motion based on a defective indictment. We reverse.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 In July 2008, defendant, then a 17-year-old high school student, pled guilty to criminal sexual abuse, a Class A misdemeanor, after he and his 15-year-old high school girlfriend had sex ( 720 ILCS 5/12-15(c) (West 2006) ). As a result of that conviction, defendant is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) ( 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2014) ).

¶ 4 Eight years later, defendant accompanied his cousin and her three children onto a bus chartered by Easter Seals. A parent on the bus recognized defendant as a sex offender. Immediately thereafter, an Easter Seals employee asked defendant to exit the bus, which he did without incident.

¶ 5 In January 2016, the Will County State's Attorney charged defendant by criminal indictment with unlawful presence at a facility providing services exclusively directed toward children ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(c) (West 2014) ). Specifically, the indictment alleged that on or about November 4, 2015, "defendant, a child sex offender, was knowingly present on a school bus chartered by a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under the age of 18, namely Easter Seals, while children were present on said school bus."

¶ 6 Defendant's bench trial commenced in July 2016. At trial, the parties stipulated to a number of facts, including that (1) defendant was a registered sex offender having been convicted of criminal sexual abuse, a Class A misdemeanor, in 2008; (2) on November 4, 2015, Easter Seals chartered a bus as part of its Jump Start program to take a group of parents and children on a field trip to the Ball Factory in Naperville; (3) approximately 20 children and their 20 parents as well as parent educators for the program were on the bus; (4) defendant was on the bus with his cousin, who was enrolled in the program, and her three children; (5) the bus picked up defendant at Walmart in Joliet; (6) a parent on the bus recognized defendant as being a sex offender and notified one of the parent educators; and (7) Easter Seals' personnel asked defendant to exit the bus, which he did without incident.

¶ 7 I. The State's Evidence

¶ 8 Dana Christian, a parent educator with Easter Seals for 4½ years, testified for the State as follows. Easter Seals is a national organization that "provide[s] different services for people with disabilities." It offers services for adults, including an adult day services program, a residential home for adults with disabilities, and support groups for parents that have autistic children.

¶ 9 Easter Seals' Jump Start program is a parent-enrichment program that focuses on "helping parents be better parents." It "provide[s] parental support to families that * * * have children up to the age of three or [are] pregnant." The goals of the program include strengthening parent/child relationships, reinforcing parenting skills, and teaching parents how to manage the stress of parenting. The program also works with parents suspected of child abuse and parents involved with the correctional system. The program offers no classes for children and is not a school.

¶ 10 On November 4, 2015, Easter Seals chartered two buses for a field trip to the Ball Factory in Naperville as part of its Jump Start program. The event was "for the families and the children." The buses picked up families in the Walmart parking lot in Joliet. Shortly after the passengers boarded, one of the parents informed Christian that a sex offender, whom she identified as defendant, was on the bus. Defendant exited the bus upon being asked to do so.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:

"Q. Would you agree with me that Jump Start is a parent enrichment program?
A. Yes.
Q. And the focus of Jump Start is the parents, correct?
A. Is the family.
Q. Is the family, and helping parents be better parents?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. So by helping the family-by helping the children, you try to help the parents, and the title, parent educator, captures the essence of the program, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the goal of the program is to strengthen parent/child relationships, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Reinforce parenting skills, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And one of the things that the program teaches is how to help parents manage with stress-manage the stress of parenting, correct?
A. Correct.
* * *
Q. And another aspect of the program are what is known as group-parent meetings, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And those programs are for parents, that's where the parents meet, right?
* * *
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. [In addition to group-parent meetings], there are field trips that foster good will, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the visit to the Ball Factory is what you described as a field trip that fosters good will?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. And just so we are real clear, one does not have to be under the age of 18 to participate in a Jump Start program, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And Jump Start is not exclusively geared to children under the age of 18, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Excuse me?
A. Correct.
* * *
Q. Jump Start is involved with grandparents?
A. Yes.
Q. And Jump Start is also involved with parents of disabilities [sic ]?
A. Yes.
Q. Jump Start does not offer any classes for children, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Jump Start is not a school?
A. Correct.
Q. There are no classes of children in 12th grade or under for children that Jump Start offers, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And because it offers no classes, it's not a class or a school where children in 12th grade or under are enrolled, correct?
A. Correct."

¶ 12 On redirect-examination, the following discussion occurred:

"Q. And what is the Ball Factory?
A. It is a family-based activity center.
Q. Would you consider it geared towards children?
A. Yes."

¶ 13 On recross-examination, the following dialogue occurred:

"Q. You had parents and children on the bus, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. This visit was not directed exclusively to the children, correct?
A. Correct."

¶ 14 Thereafter, the State rested. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict.

¶ 15 II. Defense Evidence

¶ 16 Debra Condotti, the president and chief executive officer (CEO) for the Joliet region of Easter Seals, testified that Easter Seals provides services for adults, including adult day services, long-term care for adults with intellectual disabilities, caregiver support services, parent-training programs, support services to parents or children with disabilities, and services for veterans. The following dialogue then occurred:

"Q. I want to turn your attention to the Jump Start program for a moment. Is that one of the programs that is run out of the Easter Seals in Joliet?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And you understand that the field trip that Mr. Haberkorn, my client went on, was part of the Jump Start program, is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. So, can you explain for us what the Jump Start program is?
A. It's a service to parents who are in vulnerable environmental circumstances and have young children. So, it's the intention of the program to provide support and training to the parents and to network the family, including the child and the entire family with available resources in the community to sustain the family unit and to prepare, you know, the children to do well in school.
Q. Is it correct to say that there are programs that are part of the Jump Start initiative that are directed exclusively towards parents?
A. Yes.
Q. And would it be correct to say that there are some programs that are part of the Jump Start initiative where parents and children are involved, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Would it be correct to say that there are no programs that are part of the Jump Start initiative that are exclusively for children?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. What I am asking is, Easter Seals, as an organization, are its services only for children, or does it have services for groups, other than just children?
A. The organization serves children and adults with disabilities, those with special needs and their families. There are programming-there is programming that we provide that is geared towards children services. There is programming that we provide that are geared towards adults [sic ] services, and there is programming that's provided that's geared towards the entire family.
* * *
Q. And the Jump Start program, does the Jump Start program provide services only to children?
A. No."

¶ 17 Christine Sparks, the Jump Start program coordinator, testified that the Jump Start program is a "parenting enrichment program" that offers parent education and family support services. Grandparents, foster parents, and soon-to-be parents may also participate in the program. Some of the activities offered in the program are exclusively for parents and some are for families, but none are exclusively for children. The following colloquy then occurred:

"Q. I want to ask you about the trip that day, I want to get some of the context of the Jump Start program and put into context of the field trip on November 4th. The November 4th trip was part of this initiative, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that this was not a trip where parents are dropping off their kids and then heading home?
A. Correct.
Q. And instead, this is a program on November 4th, where the parents are coming specifically with their children?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that because that event on that day is part of the curriculum of helping teach parents and educate parents?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it fair to say that field trip like this have about as many parents as there are children?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I think you mentioned this before, but in addition to the parents who are there with their children, there are also a number of Easter Seals staff, parent educators, correct?
A. Correct.
* * *
Q. We have talked about the Jump Start program and its role as a parent education program, and I want to be clear, is Jump Start a nursery school?
A. No.
Q. Is Jump Start a daycare center?
A. No.
Q. Is Jump Start a daycare program of any kind?
A. No.
* * *
Q. So, the trip on November 4th, 2015, was that trip limited to parents or children who are enrolled in any particular school or nursery school?
A. No.
Q. Was the trip affiliated with any particular school?
A. No.
Q. Is the Jump Start program affiliated with any particular school?
A. No.
Q. Last question. Would it be fair to say that the Jump Start program does not provide services exclusively for children?
A. Correct."

¶ 18 III. The Judgment and Sentence

¶ 19 Based on the above evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to 24 months' probation, plus fines and costs.

¶ 20 Defendant appeals.

¶ 21 ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Defendant argues that (1) the State's evidence failed to prove him guilty and (2) the trial court erred in denying his posttrial motion based on a defective indictment.

¶ 23 I. Exclusivity Requirement and Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 24 Defendant's primary contention on appeal is twofold. First, he argues that the trial court failed to strictly construe the statute's exclusivity requirement. Second, he asserts that based on a proper interpretation of the exclusivity requirement, the evidence failed to support his conviction.

¶ 25 Before we consider the merits of defendant's claim, we must first resolve a dispute between the parties regarding the appropriate standard of review. Defendant asserts that a de novo standard of review is proper because no facts are in dispute and the ultimate issue involves a question of statutory interpretation. See People v. Hall , 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21, 252 Ill.Dec. 552, 743 N.E.2d 126 (2000). On the other hand, the State maintains that the crux of defendant's claims revolve around factual questions that should be reviewed under the traditional standard of review in cases concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, which is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Collins , 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). We find the issue here revolves around the construction of a statute, and thus, our review is de novo . However, defendant's conviction cannot stand under even a deferential standard of review as no rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the elements of the charged offense.

¶ 26 The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Perry , 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323, 309 Ill.Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196 (2007). The plain language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent. People v. Christopherson , 231 Ill. 2d 449, 454, 326 Ill.Dec. 40, 899 N.E.2d 257 (2008). "In determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. [Citation.] Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Giraud , 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6, 366 Ill.Dec. 748, 980 N.E.2d 1107. "This court will not depart from the statute's plain language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or conditions in conflict with the legislature's intent." In re Detention of Hardin , 238 Ill. 2d 33, 40, 342 Ill.Dec. 555, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (2010).

¶ 27 The State charged defendant under section 11-9.3(c) of the Criminal Code of 2012. That section provides, in relevant part:

"It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly operate, manage, be employed by, volunteer at, be associated with, or knowingly be present at any: (i) facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under the age of 18 ; (ii) day care center; (iii) part day child care facility; (iv) child care institution; (v) school providing before and after school programs for children * * *." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(c) (West 2014) ).

The issue before us revolves around the term "exclusively" as it used in the statute.

¶ 28 Defendant notes that the term "exclusively" is defined as "apart from all others," "solely," and "to the exclusion of all others." See Oxford Online Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/exclusively (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). Defendant then points to the evidence presented at trial, which established that Easter Seals is not a facility that provides programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under the age of 18. In fact, the record shows that the majority of services provided by Easter Seals are directed toward adults and the Jump Start program at issue here is a parent enrichment program offering support, training, and networking for parents, grandparents, and parents-to-be.

¶ 29 The State concedes that neither Easter Seals nor the Jump Start program, in particular, are directed exclusively toward children. The State maintains, however, "that the bus in question heading to the Ball Factory on November 4, 2015[,] was a facility providing a service exclusively directed toward persons under the age of 18."

¶ 30 The first problem with the State's argument is that it is clearly rebutted by the record; even the State's witness rebutted this allegation. Indeed, the statute itself specifically excludes a sex offender's presence at a day care center, part day child care facility, child care institution, or a school providing before and after school programs for children. See 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(c) (West 2014). In other words, the statute excludes a convicted sex offender from being present at a facility whose services are directed solely toward children. Had the legislature intended to exclude convicted sex offenders from a facility providing services directed toward children and adults, it would have omitted the term "exclusively." It did not.

¶ 31 The statute under which the State charged defendant does not attempt to prohibit convicted sex offenders from being present at venues where children together with their parents congregate. Pursuant to the plain meaning of the statute, the State must prove that defendant was knowingly present at a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward children. The State did not come close.

¶ 32 The State offered absolutely no evidence that defendant violated the statute. The evidence shows that neither Easter Seals, nor the Jump Start program, nor the bus transporting the group to the Ball Factory are facilities providing programs or services exclusively directed toward children. Further, the State's assertion that the Ball Factory is the type of place exclusively directed toward children, even if true, is irrelevant. Defendant never arrived at the Ball Factory. Thus, the State cannot and did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was knowingly present at a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward children. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction and sentence.

¶ 33 We note in passing that it seems unlikely that the legislature either intended or anticipated that prosecutors would use this statute to bird-dog those similarly situated with this defendant. Perhaps it is time to rethink lumping high school sweethearts together with dangerous child predators. Illinois law provides that "[a] person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person is under 17 years of age and commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age." (Emphasis added.) Id. § 11-1.50(b).

¶ 34 Illinois defines "sexual conduct" as "any knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus, or breast of the victim or the accused, * * * for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused." Id. § 11-0.1.

¶ 35 So, we have it that two 16-year-old high school kids involved in even a moderately heavy petting session most likely both violate the statute and are both guilty of criminal sexual abuse, a Class A misdemeanor. That seems contrary to anything that even resembles common sense. But, that is not the worst of it. As exhibited by this case, these kids are now not just criminals but "child sex offenders" under the law and can be hounded for years at the whim of prosecutors, à la Victor Hugo. The sex offender registration is mandatory ( 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2014) ). Who thinks this is a good idea? It seems that one reasonable alternative is to make sex offender registration discretionary. This would at least present the possibility of injecting some common sense into the equation. Under the current registration, two underage adolescents who fail to resist the mutual call of their hormones are lumped together as "child sex offenders" with those who violently rape children. Perhaps the legislature depended upon prosecutorial discretion. We find this case to be the poster child exhibiting that the law should not rely upon reasonable exercise of a prosecutor's discretion. There are child sex offenders and then there are child sex offenders. We suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with those who have sexual contact with minors is oppressive and contrary to accepted notions of crime and punishment. While two young people who willingly have sexual contact with each other are, as explained above, guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, they are nonetheless categorized as "child sex offenders" and subject to the same SORA restrictions as those who prey on children. We submit that there are reasonable ways in which the statutory scheme can be amended to make it more reasonable. One is to eliminate any SORA restrictions for misdemeanor offenders. Another is to make any registration discretionary.

¶ 36 II. Motion in Arrest of Judgment

¶ 37 Because we reverse defendant's conviction and sentence, we need not address whether his motion in arrest of judgment should have been granted due to a defective indictment.

¶ 38 CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 40 Reversed.

Presiding Justice Carter and Justice McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      We realize that this defendant was 17 when he had a "consensual" sexual relationship or encounter with his 15-year-old high school classmate. We use this as an illustration that the law allows results even more absurd than the one before us.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lenard A. SMOCK, Defendant-Appellant.
    NO. 5-14-0449
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.
    Opinion Filed: April 4, 2018
    Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, Warner S. Brockett, and Catherine Hart, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
    Michael Henshaw, State's Attorney, of Harrisburg (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Chelsea E. Kasten, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Saline County, the defendant, Lenard A. Smock, was convicted of methamphetamine possession ( 720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2014) ) and disorderly conduct ( 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2014) ). He was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine and 30 days in the Saline County jail for disorderly conduct to run concurrently with the 5-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained incident to a warrantless arrest in his home, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint substitute counsel from outside the public defender's office, (3) the circuit clerk erroneously assessed $124.80 in witness fees, and (4) he is entitled to a $5 per diem presentence credit against his eligible fines. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the defendant's convictions and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On November 27, 2013, the defendant was charged by criminal information with possession of methamphetamine (count I), possession of a hypodermic needle (count II), and disorderly conduct (count III). These charges arose from the investigation of a noise complaint that resulted in the warrantless arrest of the defendant inside of his trailer.

¶ 4 The trial court appointed Assistant Public Defender Lowell Tison to represent the defendant. On December 12, 2013, the defendant instructed Tison, via notarized letter, to file a motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the police had violated the defendant's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights when they entered his home to effectuate a warrantless arrest. Despite this letter, Tison did not move to suppress the evidence. On March 21, 2014, the defendant filed a pro se "Motion to Quash and Suppress." At a hearing held that same day, Tison declined to adopt the pro se motion on the defendant's behalf. The defendant then asked the trial court to appoint him an attorney from outside of the public defender's office. The defendant explained to the court that he had prior experience with having been represented by the assistant public defenders in Saline County and did not believe that they would adequately represent his interests. The court refused to appoint substitute counsel, and the defendant opted to proceed as his own attorney.

¶ 5 On April 1, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant's pro se motion to suppress. The defendant and the two arresting officers testified at the hearing. Generally, the testimony established that on November 23, 2013, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Detective Curt Hustedde and police officer Kenny Shires responded to a noise complaint from a resident in a trailer park. They proceeded to 28 West Park Street in Harrisburg, Saline County. The officers met with the complainant, Bradley Reed, who indicated that someone inside the trailer next door was banging on its walls, while yelling and cursing. As the officers were speaking with Reed, they too were able to hear the noise coming from inside the trailer. The officers asked Reed if he would like to file a complaint against the defendant for disorderly conduct. Reed indicated he would like to do so and filed a written statement with the officers alleging the defendant had committed the offense of disorderly conduct. The officers proceeded next door to the defendant's residence to arrest him for disorderly conduct.

¶ 6 The defendant testified that when the officers knocked on his front door, he told them three times not to enter his house without a warrant. He assured the police officers he "would cease and desist as far as the noise was concerned." The officers told the defendant they would not enter his home. Nevertheless, when he opened the door, Officer Shires informed the defendant that he was under arrest and reached out to grab the defendant by the hand.

¶ 7 On cross-examination, the defendant was asked by the State whether the officers asked him to come out of his home. The defendant responded, "Yes, sir, they did. And I told them I wasn't coming outside." The defendant then testified that when Officer Shires reached out to grab him, he ran inside his trailer. The defendant stated that when he ran, "They chased me from my porch into my living room." One of the officers tazed the defendant in his living room before placing him under arrest.

¶ 8 On direct examination, Detective Curt Hustedde testified that when he arrived at Reed's residence, Reed expressed his frustration that the officers had been there in the past because of the banging on the wall and other disturbances caused by the defendant, yet nothing had been done. Detective Hustedde indicated that if Reed were willing to file a complaint against the defendant for disorderly conduct, the officers would arrest the defendant. Reed signed the written statement, and the officers proceeded next door to arrest the defendant. The defendant refused to come outside when Detective Hustedde and Officer Shires knocked on the defendant's door. The officers assured the defendant that they just needed to talk to him. When asked whether the defendant came outside, Detective Hustedde responded, "He didn't come outside, he opened the door."

Detective Hustedde further testified that when the defendant retreated into the trailer, the officers pursued him through the open door, intending to place the defendant under arrest. When they entered the kitchen area, the defendant threatened Officer Shires with a two-liter plastic bottle. Detective Hustedde explained that this was his reason for tazing the defendant to subdue him. The officers then placed the defendant under arrest.

¶ 9 On cross-examination, Detective Hustedde testified that he had been to the defendant's trailer on other occasions because of complaints from the residents in the trailer park. On some of those prior occasions, the defendant had been outside of the trailer "wandering and banging." However, on the night in question, they were responding to "the noise from inside [the defendant's] residence." Detective Hustedde confirmed that the defendant told the officers to leave his property if they did not have a warrant. He also testified that he told the defendant that they just needed to talk with him and that they would not leave until he opened the door. On redirect, Detective Hustedde clarified that after the defendant opened the door, he was standing at the threshold of the door but that he never stepped outside of the residence.

¶ 10 Officer Kenny Shires testified that when the defendant opened the door, he stood in the doorway of the trailer but did not step outside. Officer Shires stated that at this point he explained to the defendant why the officers were there. Specifically, Officer Shires indicated that he was placing the defendant under arrest for disorderly conduct. The officer further testified that he tried to "get a hold of [the defendant]" prior to the defendant's retreat into the home. Officer Shires was not asked about the tazing incident. He did testify, however, that a search of the defendant's person incident to his arrest yielded a hypodermic needle and a wadded-up coffee filter that ultimately proved to contain a small amount of methamphetamine.

¶ 11 On cross-examination between the defendant and Officer Shires, the following colloquy took place:

"Q. When I ran down the hallway you were standing in the doorway where I couldn't shut the door; is that correct?
A. I was standing at the doorway.
Q. In the doorway. They swing-the door swings out?
A. Okay.
Q. Right? You were standing on my porch, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I was inside the trailer, correct?
A. Correct."

¶ 12 Following arguments, the trial court denied the defendant's pro se motion to suppress and made the following findings of fact:

"[T]he defendant opened the dwelling door in an outward position, placing Officer Shires between the opened door and the entrance to the trailer. As the defendant was standing on the porch in the open doorway, Officer Shires told the defendant that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct, and the defendant stated that he was not going to jail, and ran into the dwelling, at which time the officers pursued the defendant into the trailer, apprehending him in the kitchen or hallway area, and placed him under arrest. The officers removed the defendant from the dwelling, and before placing him in the squad car, patted the defendant down, and discovered alleged methamphetamine and a hypodermic needle in the defendant's pocket."

The court went on to make the following conclusions of law:

"[A]t the time Officer Shires told the defendant he was under arrest, the defendant was standing in the open doorway of his dwelling, and therefore was in a public place, and was subject to a warrantless arrest. Based upon the probable cause known to Officers Hustedde and Shires, his fleeing from the open doorway into the dwelling did not preclude the officers' warrantless entry into the home in 'hot pursuit' of the defendant so as to effectuate the arrest that initially was attempted while the defendant was standing in the open doorway."

¶ 13 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's denial of his pro se motion to suppress. The defendant argued that he told the officers three times not to come into his home without a warrant, that he never stepped outside onto his porch, that he did not flee from a public place, and that he did not commit a crime in a public place. On June 3, 2014, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider.

¶ 14 The case was set for jury trial on July 16, 2014. Before the jury was impaneled, the defendant advised the court that he wished to be tried in absentia . The court admonished the defendant regarding the consequences of proceeding in absentia , and despite these admonishments, the defendant indicated he wanted the proceedings to continue without him being present. The court found that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be present and participate in his trial. Therefore, the case proceeded to trial without the presence of the defendant. Consequently, there were no objections made during trial on the defendant's behalf, as he was not present, nor was he represented by counsel.

¶ 15 Just prior to delivering its opening statement to the jury, the State moved to dismiss count II (possession of a hypodermic needle), leaving count I and count III for consideration by the jury. The State called Detective Hustedde and Officer Shires to testify. Their testimony was substantially similar to the testimony they gave during the hearing on the defendant's pro se motion to suppress. The State also called Bradley Reed, who testified regarding the circumstances of having made the noise complaint. Reed further indicated that he signed the complaint against the defendant alleging disorderly conduct. Additionally, Thomas Sadowski, a forensic scientist, testified that he used a gas chromatograph spectrometer to confirm that the white powder found in the coffee filter taken from the defendant was methamphetamine. At the conclusion of argument, and after deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine (count I) and disorderly conduct (count III).

¶ 16 The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 26, 2014, which the defendant did not attend. Two security officers from the Saline County jail testified that the defendant told them that he wished to be absent from the sentencing hearing. Based on this testimony, the trial court found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at sentencing. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 5 years' imprisonment on count I, for possession of methamphetamine, to run concurrently with 30 days' incarceration in the Saline County jail for disorderly conduct (count III). The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay a number of fines and awarded him credit for time served from November 23, 2013, to August 26, 2014. The defendant did not file a posttrial motion, and this appeal followed.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The defendant claims that the officers' entry into his trailer to arrest him was unlawful because they lacked a warrant and the exigent circumstances necessary to justify a warrantless intrusion were not present. The State contends that the warrantless entry was justified because the officers were engaged in "hot pursuit" of the defendant at the time. We agree with the defendant.

¶ 19 In reviewing the trial court's determination on a motion to suppress, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d 530, 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006). A court's findings of fact are afforded great deference on review and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187. We remain free, however, to independently conduct our own analysis of the facts in relation to the issues and draw our own conclusions as to what relief should be granted. Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187. Therefore, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether to grant or deny the motion to suppress. Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187.

¶ 20 We first examine whether the officers' entry into the defendant's trailer was lawful. The chief evil against which the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is directed is the physical entry into the home. People v. Wear , 229 Ill.2d 545, 562, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631 (2008). To protect against the unjustified entry by law enforcement into the home, the fourth amendment has "drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ; People v. Davis , 398 Ill.App. 3d 940, 948, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67 (2010). Thus, the warrantless entry by police officers into a home and seizures inside the home are presumptively unreasonable under the fourth amendment, even with probable cause. Wear , 229 Ill.2d at 562, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631. Police may not reasonably cross the threshold of a private citizen's home without a warrant, unless exigent circumstances justify the intrusion. Payton , 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The State carries the burden of proving that exigent circumstances required a warrantless search or arrest. People v. Foskey , 136 Ill.2d 66, 75, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192 (1990).

¶ 21 "In reviewing the propriety of a warrantless entry into a private residence under claimed exigent circumstances, the guiding principle is reasonableness * * *." Davis , 398 Ill.App. 3d at 948, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67. The issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Foskey , 136 Ill.2d at 75-76, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192 ; Davis , 398 Ill.App. 3d at 948, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67. The following is a nonexhaustive list of factors that a reviewing court may consider to help determine whether the police acted reasonably, given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the warrantless entry:

"(1) whether the offense under investigation was recently committed; (2) whether there was any deliberate or unjustifiable delay by the officers during which time a warrant could have been obtained; (3) whether a grave offense is involved, particularly one of violence; (4) whether the suspect was reasonably believed to be armed; (5) whether the police officers were acting upon a clear showing of probable cause; (6) whether there was a likelihood that the suspect would have escaped if not swiftly apprehended; (7) whether there was strong reason to believe that the suspect was on the premises; and (8) whether the police entry, though nonconsensual, was made peaceably." Foskey , 136 Ill.2d at 75 [143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192].

¶ 22 As noted previously, the foregoing factors represent only some of the criteria to be considered by the court. Each case must be decided on its own facts, and the court should not apply these factors rigidly in its determination of the circumstances facing the officers at the time they decided to proceed into the defendant's home, without a warrant, to arrest him. The questions are whether the officers acted reasonably and whether the circumstances militated against delay such as to justify the intrusion into the defendant's trailer. Davis , 398 Ill.App. 3d at 948, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67.

¶ 23 In this case, the parties do not dispute that the officers lacked a warrant, and that the defendant did not consent to the warrantless entry into his trailer. While it is true that the defendant's arrest occurred in close proximity to the commission of the misdemeanor offense, that the officers did not engage in any unjustifiable delay in their arrest of the defendant, that the police officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, and that the officers knew the defendant was in his trailer, we are not persuaded that, without more, the officers' warrantless intrusion was justified. Rather than procuring a warrant, the officers proceeded directly from their meeting with Reed to the defendant's residence in order to arrest him for disorderly conduct. The Class C misdemeanor of disorderly conduct is neither a grave offense nor a crime of violence. See People v. Olson , 112 Ill.App.3d 20, 67 Ill.Dec. 663, 444 N.E.2d 1147 (1983) (concluding that a warrantless home entry was not justified to arrest a defendant for the nonviolent Class C misdemeanor offense of possession of cannabis). There was clearly reason to believe the defendant was on the premises, but there was no reason to believe that he possessed any weapons, posed a threat of current danger, or was a flight risk. Detective Hustedde testified he had been to the defendant's trailer before but did not indicate that the defendant had posed any particular problem in his encounters with the detective. The circumstances indicate that the defendant was not going to evade his arrest by leaving the area where he resided. There is simply nothing in the record that indicates why the slight delay involved in obtaining an arrest warrant for the defendant would have impeded the officers' investigation of the offense or the ultimate apprehension of the defendant.

¶ 24 This case is similar to Davis , 398 Ill.App.3d 940, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67. In Davis , the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for the crime of battery. The officers proceeded without a warrant to an apartment building where the defendant resided with his girlfriend. One officer entered the building and was standing in the common hallway in front of the defendant's apartment door. The defendant opened the door and, seeing that he was face-to-face with a police officer, immediately turned and fled into the apartment. The officer pursued the defendant through the open door and arrested him inside the dwelling, approximately four feet from the entryway. Davis , 398 Ill.App.3d at 942, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67. The Davis court held that the circumstances surrounding the warrantless entry into the defendant's home did not rise to the level of exigent circumstances. Davis , 398 Ill.App.3d at 949, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67. In doing so, the court observed that the officers acted quickly and without any unjustifiable delay. The court also determined that even though the alleged offense was battery, there was no evidence in the record that this offense was particularly grave or that the defendant was armed or otherwise posed a threat to the police or others. Davis , 398 Ill.App.3d at 949, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67.

¶ 25 In this case, the entry into the defendant's home was neither peaceable nor consensual. The State offered no evidence that the defendant had a violent criminal background or that he was likely to flee unless apprehended immediately. Likewise, at the time the officers entered the defendant's home, they did not know that there was a substantial risk that evidence, the methamphetamine, would be lost. They were at the defendant's trailer to arrest him for the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct. In fact, they could have simply handed him the ticket, with an appearance date, and left. Instead, the officers crossed the threshold of the defendant's home and chased him into his kitchen. The officers then arrested the defendant after using a taser gun to subdue him. Therefore, given the record before us, we find there was insufficient evidence to show the existence of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into the defendant's trailer to effectuate his arrest.

¶ 26 The State argues that the entry into the defendant's trailer was justified under the doctrine of "hot pursuit." "In addition to the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment discussed above, police also may enter a private residence without a warrant to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing suspect of whom the police are in 'hot pursuit.' " Davis , 398 Ill.App.3d at 951, 338 Ill.Dec. 207, 924 N.E.2d 67. Under the doctrine of "hot pursuit," police officers may enter a private home, without a warrant, to effectuate an arrest where the arrest has been set in motion in a "public place." United States v. Santana , 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976).

¶ 27 In Santana , the police had probable cause to arrest Santana immediately after a controlled heroin buy. Santana had allegedly sold the heroin to a police informant and was holding the purchase money. The serial numbers for the money used to purchase the heroin had been recorded by the police prior to the buy. Santana , 427 U.S. at 39-40, 96 S.Ct. 2406. As the police officers approached Santana's home to arrest her, they observed her standing directly in the front doorway such that one step forward would have put her outside of the home and one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence. Santana , 427 U.S. at 40 & n.1, 96 S.Ct. 2406. The officers could see that Santana was holding a brown paper bag in her hand. As the officers shouted "police" and displayed their identification, Santana retreated into the vestibule of her home. The officers followed her through the open door and arrested her in the vestibule area. When she was told to empty her pockets, she produced several bills, some of which displayed the serial numbers of the money used to buy the heroin. Santana , 427 U.S. at 40-41, 96 S.Ct. 2406. The United States Supreme Court held that a suspect may not defeat an arrest that was set in motion in a public place by escaping to a private place. Santana , 427 U.S. at 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406. The Court concluded that Santana had no expectation of privacy, as her presence at the doorway of the house was tantamount to being in a "public" place. The Court found that "[s]he was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house." Santana , 427 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406. The Court thus held that because Santana was in a public place when the police began to arrest her, she could not defeat an otherwise proper arrest by retreating into her home.

The Court also noted that there was a "realistic expectation" that had the officers not pursued Santana into her home, the evidence may have been lost. Santana , 427 U.S. at 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406.

¶ 28 In Wear , our supreme court had the opportunity to review the doctrine of "hot pursuit" and adopted the reasoning in Santana . In Wear , a police officer initiated a traffic stop on a public thoroughfare after having witnessed the defendant's car swerving and violating several traffic laws. The defendant refused to stop, despite the fact that he was being followed by the police car with its lights activated. Instead, the defendant drove several blocks to his home and began to walk toward his front door, despite the officer's verbal commands to halt and return to his vehicle. Wear , 229 Ill.2d at 550, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631. At the entry to the defendant's dwelling, he stated, " 'I made it home.' " Wear , 229 Ill.2d at 565, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631. The officer indicated that he believed the defendant's breath smelled of alcohol. The defendant then entered the home and the officer followed, ultimately placing the defendant under arrest. Our supreme court found that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant when he was on the public highway. Wear , 229 Ill.2d at 565-66, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631. Further, when the defendant was standing at his doorway, he was in a "public" place, as defined by the Santana Court. Wear , 229 Ill.2d at 568, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631. Therefore, the officer was already in "hot pursuit" as he entered the home without a warrant. Accordingly, the Wear court found the warrantless entry was excused by the doctrine of "hot pursuit." Wear , 229 Ill.2d at 571, 323 Ill.Dec. 359, 893 N.E.2d 631.

¶ 29 The case sub judice is distinguishable from both Santana and Wear . In this case, the pursuit of the defendant did not originate in a public place. The defendant and both of the officers testified that the defendant never left the confines of his home. There was no testimony that the defendant stepped out onto the porch or ever crossed the threshold of his doorway. In fact, when asked whether the defendant ever stepped out of his trailer, Officer Shires indicated that the defendant remained inside of his trailer. Additionally, there was no testimony describing the degree to which the defendant was exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch once he opened the door of his trailer. Unlike Wear , this is not a case where the officers were in "hot pursuit" when they knocked on the defendant's door. And there are no facts similar to Santana , where the suspect was in public view as the police were approaching the house and the officers saw that she was holding a brown bag suspected to contain heroin. In this case, the chase of the defendant began only after he was assured by the officers, as they spoke to the defendant through his closed door, that they were not there to arrest him. It is apparent that the officers only made these statements to convince the defendant to open his door. Once the door was opened, Officer Shires attempted to grab the defendant through the doorway to effectuate the arrest. Only then did the alleged "hot pursuit" begin. Therefore, we believe the State failed to meet its burden to show that the defendant was sufficiently exposed to the public to have been considered in a "public" place, without any expectation of privacy. We find that the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted. We therefore vacate the convictions of the defendant.

¶ 30 Having determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted, we must remand these proceedings to the trial court. Double jeopardy does not bar a new trial where, as in the present case, reversal is the result of an error in the proceedings leading to the conviction and not the result of evidence that is legally insufficient to sustain a jury's verdict. People v. Stofer , 180 Ill.App.3d 158, 171, 128 Ill.Dec. 682, 534 N.E.2d 1287 (1989). Having concluded that the defendant's convictions must be set aside because of error by the trial court, we find that double jeopardy does not prohibit a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's convictions for unlawful possession of methamphetamine (count I) and disorderly conduct (count III).

¶ 31 Having now reversed the convictions of the defendant, we need not decide the defendant's remaining issues. The defendant is free to renew his request for the appointment of private counsel, and we vacate the fees and fines assessed against the defendant. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Saline County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holdings herein.

¶ 32 Reversed and remanded.

Presiding Justice Barberis and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment and opinion.


text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric M. PENCE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 2-15-1102
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed April 6, 2018
    Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Fletcher P. Hamill, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
    Robert B. Berlin, State's Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman and Mary A. Fleming, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Eric M. Pence, appeals from his conviction of disorderly conduct ( 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2014) ), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 26, 2015, defendant was charged by information with one count of disorderly conduct. The information alleged that, on or about March 12, 2015, defendant "knowingly acted in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace in that he used Facebook to contact a minor child D.K. and send D.K. the message 'Hey. Long time no talk. How have you been?' causing D.K. to be alarmed and disturbed."

¶ 4 The following relevant testimony was presented at defendant's bench trial. D.K. testified that she was 16 years old and a sophomore in high school. D.K. first came in contact with defendant in 2012, when she was 12 years old, through text messages. At some point, the text messages became sexual, and defendant requested sexual pictures of her. When the text messaging began, D.K. thought that defendant was 12 years old, but defendant was actually 19 years old. D.K. eventually met defendant in person. She believed that defendant intended that meeting to be sexual. The police told her at that time to contact them if defendant ever attempted to contact her again.

¶ 5 D.K. testified that, on March 12, 2015, while at school, she received a Facebook message from a Facebook user account identified as belonging to "Eric Johnson." Eric Johnson's profile picture was a picture of defendant. When she received the message, she "was scared" and "felt unsafe." She texted her mom, K.K., and told her about the message. Later that day, D.K. and K.K. went to the police station and filed a complaint. D.K. blocked the account, because she did not want any contact with defendant.

¶ 6 K.K. testified that, on March 12, 2015, around lunchtime, she received a text from D.K. telling her that defendant had contacted her. K.K. asked D.K. if she was okay or if she was scared. K.K. told D.K. to stay at school, because she was safe there, and that they would talk about it when D.K. got home. K.K. called the police to ask them if she should come in and file a report. They told her that she should. K.K. was worried about D.K.'s safety, "[b]ecause of what had happened in the past." When D.K. got home, she "seemed okay." D.K. was "[a] little nervous" when she was talking about the Facebook message. They went to the police station and met with an officer.

¶ 7 Wheaton police officer Kimberly Loster-Rice testified that she met with D.K. and K.K. in the afternoon on March 12, 2015. They told her that defendant had sent D.K. a message through Facebook. Both D.K. and K.K. appeared upset about the message. On cross-examination, Loster-Rice agreed that she did not indicate in her police report that D.K. and K.K. appeared upset or scared. Loster-Rice asked D.K. to take screenshots of the message and of a friend request that D.K. received from Eric Johnson's Facebook account and to e-mail them to her.

¶ 8 Andrew Uhlir, a detective with the Wheaton Police Department, testified that, on March 17, 2015, he spoke with K.K. on the phone after reviewing the report prepared by Loster-Rice. K.K. "seemed concerned." On March 27, 2015, Uhlir met with defendant and Dave Sears, a detective with the Du Page County Sheriff's Office. Uhlir showed defendant printouts of the Facebook message and the friend request. Defendant identified Eric Johnson's Facebook page as his own. Defendant admitted that he sent the Facebook message to D.K. When Uhlir told defendant that both D.K. and K.K. did not want him to contact them, "he replied that he's no longer on probation and that he acknowledged that when he was on probation he had rules that he couldn't contact them but he's no longer on probation, so he can contact them any time he wants." Uhlir testified: "[Defendant] became extremely irate, began to get really loud in his tone using a lot of swear words, spit coming out of his mouth. He was enraged and he, basically, told me to fuck off and that he can contact them any time he wanted and there's no way that I could control him from saying 'hi' to anybody."

¶ 9 Uhlir met with D.K. and K.K. D.K. was "[e]xtremely upset" and "very concerned." According to Uhlir, "they asked for [the police] to place an extra watch on their residence while [defendant] was not in custody because they were in fear that he was going to come and try to make physical contact with [D.K.] or face-to-face contact with her. [K.K.] was very concerned and so was [D.K.]" Uhlir increased police presence in the area of their home.

¶ 10 The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the Facebook message and the friend request that D.K. received from Eric Johnson's Facebook account.

¶ 11 At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved for a directed finding. The trial court denied the motion. The defense rested.

¶ 12 Thereafter, the trial court found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct. The court stated:

"[B]ased on the unique circumstances in this case and in particular the fact that there was prior contact between the defendant and the victim who was a minor and that that contact also came through media, either-some electronic media and that contact in itself, it was the contact that was uniquely negative with respect to the victim and the defendant in the prior context being that it involved a sexual nature and the like. Because of that unique context, and the Court wants to focus or make sure that the parties understand the narrowness of the Court's ruling, because of that unique context, I think it is clear that the defendant communicated in this case in an unreasonable manner and communicated to the victim so as to alarm and disturb the victim and the Court feels that that is very clear from the record. And that it was a breach of the peace even though it was not in public, it was still a breach of the peace given the effect on the victim and the mother and given the unique circumstances that this communication in and of itself in light of the prior history was, indeed, having a threatening affect [sic ] on the victim."

¶ 13 The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 days in jail, with full credit for time served. Following the denial of his subsequent motion for a new trial, defendant timely appealed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Defendant contends that he was not proved guilty of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove defendant guilty of disorderly conduct, the State had to prove that defendant knowingly did any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace. Id. According to defendant, no rational trier of fact could find that he knowingly provoked a breach of the peace by sending an "innocuous greeting" to D.K. via Facebook. We disagree.

¶ 16 A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Collins , 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, " 'the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). The trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and determining what inferences to draw, and a reviewing court ordinarily will not substitute its judgment on these matters for that of the trier of fact. People v. Cooper , 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 252 Ill.Dec. 458, 743 N.E.2d 32 (2000).

¶ 17 The purpose of the disorderly-conduct statute is to protect against " 'an invasion of the right of others not to be molested or harassed, either mentally or physically, without justification.' " People v. Davis , 82 Ill. 2d 534, 538, 45 Ill.Dec. 935, 413 N.E.2d 413 (1980) (quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 26-1, Committee Comments-1961, at 149 (Smith-Hurd 1977) ). The types of conduct included within the scope of the offense of disorderly conduct " 'almost defy definition.' " Id. at 537, 45 Ill.Dec. 935, 413 N.E.2d 413 (quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 26-1, Committee Comments-1961, at 149 (Smith-Hurd 1977) ). "As a highly fact-specific inquiry, it 'embraces a wide variety of conduct serving to destroy or menace the public order and tranquility.' " People v. McLennon , 2011 IL App (2d) 091299, ¶ 30, 354 Ill.Dec. 448, 957 N.E.2d 1241 (quoting In re B.C. , 176 Ill. 2d 536, 552, 223 Ill.Dec. 919, 680 N.E.2d 1355 (1997) ). "[C]ulpability * * * revolves not only around the type of conduct, but is equally dependent upon the surrounding circumstances." Davis , 82 Ill. 2d at 537, 45 Ill.Dec. 935, 413 N.E.2d 413. "Generally, to breach the peace, a defendant's conduct must threaten another or have an effect on the surrounding crowd." McLennon , 2011 IL App (2d) 091299, ¶ 31, 354 Ill.Dec. 448, 957 N.E.2d 1241. "However, a breach of the peace can occur without overt threats or profane and abusive language." Id. In addition, it "need not occur in public." Id.

¶ 18 Defendant contends that his "innocuous greeting" to D.K. via Facebook cannot constitute disorderly conduct. We disagree. As the trial court noted, context was particularly relevant here. There was a history between D.K. and defendant, which involved text messaging between then-19-year-old defendant and then-12-year-old D.K. The text messages were inappropriately sexual and included requests from defendant that D.K. send him sexual pictures. Eventually they met in person. Defendant's conduct by that time was criminal-he was ultimately convicted of traveling to meet a minor and grooming-and D.K. was his victim. Accordingly, D.K. testified that, when defendant sent her the Facebook message, she was scared and immediately contacted K.K. K.K. testified that, when she learned about the message, she was worried about D.K.'s safety "[b]ecause of what had happened in the past." Uhlir testified that, when he met with D.K. and K.K., D.K. was "[e]xtremely upset" and "very concerned." They asked for extra police presence around their residence because they were afraid that defendant would try to make face-to-face contact with D.K. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant's attempt to reconnect with his victim was unreasonable and threatening to D.K.

and K.K. Without a doubt, defendant's conduct invaded the right of D.K. and K.K. to not be mentally harassed.

¶ 19 Defendant's reliance on People v. Trester , 96 Ill. App. 3d 553, 52 Ill.Dec. 96, 421 N.E.2d 959 (1981), and People v. Bradshaw , 116 Ill. App. 3d 421, 72 Ill.Dec. 209, 452 N.E.2d 141 (1983), cases where the courts reversed convictions of disorderly conduct, does not warrant a different conclusion. In Trester , the defendant, speaking in a normal tone of voice, swore at a police officer and told him that, if he would take off his gun and badge, the defendant would punch him in the nose and they would fight. Trester , 96 Ill. App. 3d at 554, 52 Ill.Dec. 96, 421 N.E.2d 959. Noting that "[a]n officer of the law must exercise the greatest degree of restraint in dealing with the public" (internal quotation marks omitted) ( id. at 555, 52 Ill.Dec. 96, 421 N.E.2d 959 ), the court found that, because the defendant's "words were couched in terms of what might happen if the officer removed his badge and guns, the words cannot be construed as an immediate threat." Id. at 556, 52 Ill.Dec. 96, 421 N.E.2d 959. First, we note that Trester 's holding-that no breach of the peace occurred, because the defendant's words could not be construed as an immediate threat-has been called into doubt because the court did not consider Davis , which found that an indirect threat was sufficient to support a conviction of disorderly conduct. See In re D.W. , 150 Ill. App. 3d 729, 732, 104 Ill.Dec. 156, 502 N.E.2d 419 (1986) (noting that Trester was of questionable validity because it cited the appellate court's decision in Davis and made no reference to the supreme court's subsequent decision). In any event, Trester is readily distinguishable, given that the victim was a police officer, trained in handling such encounters with the public. Here, as noted, the victim was a minor who had previously been defendant's victim.

¶ 20 In Bradshaw , the defendant left a tavern, stood outside, and called the manager a variety of obscene names for 10 or 15 minutes. No bar patrons left as a result. The appellate court concluded that the defendant's conduct was "nothing more than annoying." Bradshaw , 116 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 72 Ill.Dec. 209, 452 N.E.2d 141. Again, this case is readily distinguishable. In Bradshaw , there was nothing threatening about the defendant's conduct. Here, however, given the context of the parties' previous relationship, defendant's contact with D.K. was threatening to her and K.K. Indeed, D.K. and K.K. were scared enough to request increased police presence around their residence.

¶ 21 Defendant's attempt to analogize this case to a hypothetical discussed in People v. Redwood , 335 Ill. App. 3d 189, 269 Ill.Dec. 288, 780 N.E.2d 760 (2002), is similarly unpersuasive. In Redwood , the defendant (a white male) shouted, " ' "How long are you going to be a shoe-shine boy?" ' " across the street to his former attorney (a black male). Id. at 191, 269 Ill.Dec. 288, 780 N.E.2d 760. In considering whether such a statement was sufficient to constitute disorderly conduct, the court opined that "[a] charge simply that defendant committed disorderly conduct by saying 'good morning' would appear not to state an offense." Id. at 193, 269 Ill.Dec. 288, 780 N.E.2d 760. The court concluded that, because the defendant's words did not contain an implied threat, the charge was properly dismissed. Although defendant claims that this supports reversal in the present case, as defendant was simply greeting D.K., we disagree. In Redwood , there was no context within which to conclude that the defendant's words were threatening to his former attorney. But here, as the trial court found, given the circumstances, defendant's Facebook message was threatening to D.K. and K.K.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v. Nicholls , 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178, 15 Ill.Dec. 759, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978).

¶ 24 Affirmed.

Justices Zenoff and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      We note that defendant does not develop any explicit argument about his mental state. Indeed, he cites no authority specific to that issue. See People v. Raby , 40 Ill. 2d 392, 395-97, 240 N.E.2d 595 (1968) (the offense of disorderly conduct requires that the defendant knowingly did an act in an unreasonable manner, which he knew or should have known would tend to alarm, disturb, or provoke another). Rather, the argument that he develops is about whether his "innocuous greeting" provoked a breach of the peace. We thus address only that argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).


author: Rush, Chief Justice.

text:
    B.A., Appellant (Respondent), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Petitioner).
    Supreme Court Case No. 49S02-1709-JV-567
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Argued: October 30, 2017 Filed and Decided: June 20, 2018
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Amy E. Karozos, Greenwood, Indiana, Ruth A. Johnson, Indianapolis, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caryn N. Szyper, Angela N. Sanchez, Kelly A. Loy, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF YOUTH: Cara Schaefer, Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana, Laura Nirider, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, Chicago, Illinois
    Justices David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1606-JV-1474
   Rush, Chief Justice.

The vital mission of educating our youth requires schools to daily provide safety, security, and student discipline. In recent decades, schools have turned to resource officers for help. These officers protect students and staff, offer mentorship-and, yes, help with discipline and criminal investigations. As their presence has grown, so too have questions of students' constitutional rights. Today we address for the first time one of those questions: when are students entitled to Miranda warnings at school?

Here, in response to a bomb threat on a bathroom wall, thirteen-year-old B.A. was escorted from his bus and questioned in a vice-principal's office. Officers hovered over B.A. and encouraged him to confess, but no one gave him Miranda warnings.

We hold that B.A. was in police custody and under police interrogation, so he should have been Mirandized. We therefore reverse his delinquency adjudications.

Facts and Procedural History

Scribbled in pink marker in a Decatur Middle School boys' bathroom came the threat: "I will Got A bomb in the school Monday 8th 2016 not A Joke." School Resource Officer Tutsie "immediately went into investigative mode" and soon narrowed the suspects to two students-including thirteen-year-old B.A.

The next Monday, February 8, 2016, school resource officers and administrators walked through the school and found it safe. Then, when B.A.'s bus arrived, Vice-Principal Remaly and School Resource Officer Lyday removed B.A. from his bus and escorted him to Remaly's office.

B.A. sat in front of Remaly's desk while Officer Lyday stood a few feet away. Early in B.A.'s interview, Officer Tutsie came in and took Officer Lyday's spot while Officer Lyday moved to sit at a conference table behind B.A. Around that same time, a third school resource officer-Officer Wheeler-came in and sat at the conference table. All three officers wore police uniforms.

Vice-Principal Remaly led the interview, asking if B.A. knew why he was there. B.A. maintained that he did not. To see if B.A.'s handwriting matched the bomb threat, Officer Tutsie handed B.A. written sentences and told B.A. how to copy them.

After B.A. copied the sentences, Remaly decided that the handwriting sample matched the threat and asked B.A. why he did it. Then Officer Lyday interrupted to say, "Come on, man, just-just tell the truth." B.A. started crying, lowered his head, and said "I don't know. I'm sorry." Remaly then ended the interview-which had lasted fifteen minutes-and called B.A.'s mother. When she arrived and asked B.A. what happened, he told her, "I'm sorry mom, it was a joke" and admitted that it was a dumb thing to do.

With these admissions, Remaly suspended B.A. from school, pending expulsion. He then turned B.A. over to the school resource officers, who arrested him and took him to the Marion County Juvenile Detention Center.

The State alleged that B.A. was delinquent for committing false reporting, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, and institutional criminal mischief, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. B.A. moved to suppress the evidence from his interview, arguing that he was entitled to Miranda warnings since he was under custodial interrogation and that officers failed to secure waiver of his Miranda rights under Indiana's juvenile waiver statute. See Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1 (2017). After a hearing, the juvenile court denied the motion and found B.A. delinquent on both counts.

B.A. appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. B.A. v. State , 73 N.E.3d 720, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). It held that Miranda warnings were not required because a school administrator questioned B.A. for an educational purpose. Id. We granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

We review the admission of B.A.'s incriminating statements for an abuse of discretion. See Snow v. State , 77 N.E.3d 173, 176 (Ind. 2017). But the underlying issue-whether B.A. was under custodial interrogation-is purely legal and entitled to de novo review. See State v. Brown , 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017). We thus first address whether B.A. was in police custody and then whether he was under police interrogation.

Discussion and Decision

The parties agree that Miranda warnings protect students at school but disagree whether B.A. was entitled to the warnings. The critical inquiry is whether he was under custodial interrogation. B.A. argues that he was in custody under the totality of the circumstances and that he was interrogated because police officers participated in his interview. The State responds that the officers' presence was noncoercive and that they did not directly question B.A.

We start by exploring how Miranda ties into modern schools' efforts to stay safe and crime-free. We then explain the tests for police custody and police interrogation in a school setting and apply them to the undisputed facts here. We conclude that because B.A. was under custodial interrogation yet not Mirandized, his incriminating statements should have been suppressed. The juvenile court therefore abused its discretion.

I. Miranda warnings protect students under custodial interrogation.

A. The modern school setting.

Our schools face the monumental task of shielding students from an array of dangers in order to provide safe learning environments. Partnering with school resource officers is a key part of that effort; sworn law enforcement officers protect nearly half of the country's public schools.

These officers wear many hats. They ensure school safety and mentor and educate students, but they also investigate crimes and make arrests. See Ind. Code §§ 20-26-18.2-1, -3, -16-6(b) (2017). This means that school discipline sometimes falls under the watchful eye of the police. See generally Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse , 52 Loyola L. Rev. 39 (2006).

For students, the stakes of the disciplinary process are high. Students can be suspended and expelled, as B.A. was here. B.A. , 73 N.E.3d at 723. But those educational consequences are just the tip of the iceberg since school police officers' involvement can also lead to criminal charges. B.A., for example, was arrested and taken to the juvenile detention center at the end of his interview. Some students are sentenced to jail time. See, e.g. , N.C. v. Commonwealth , 396 S.W.3d 852, 854-55 (Ky. 2013). And others are waived into adult court, where they face years-long sentences. See, e.g. , Norris v. State , 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008).

Ultimately, as the law-enforcement presence grows in today's schools, so does the discussion of students' rights. See, e.g. , Holland, supra , at 39. One of those rights-the right against self-incrimination-"reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations," including "our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to ... self-accusation." Carter v. Kentucky , 450 U.S. 288, 299, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n , 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Balsys , 524 U.S. 666, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 141 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) ). Indeed, the right, "while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.' " Id. at 299-300, 101 S.Ct. 1112 (quoting Murphy , 378 U.S. at 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594 ). Because of that important role, as explained below, the right against self-incrimination is protected by Miranda warnings.

B. Miranda's history and application in schools.

The Supreme Court of the United States's groundbreaking Miranda v. Arizona decision adopted the now-famous " Miranda warnings." 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). They apply to suspects under custodial interrogation, who must be told that they have "a right to remain silent, that any statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. As the Miranda Court noted, "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals," id. at 455, 86 S.Ct. 1602, so they may be psychologically coerced into speaking, id. at 446-48, 86 S.Ct. 1602. These warnings thus safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by warding off police coercion. Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 507, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012).

Children are particularly vulnerable to that coercion, making Miranda warnings especially important when police place a student under custodial interrogation at school. J.D.B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 269, 276, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (citing Miranda , 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ) ("In the specific context of police interrogation, events that 'would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a' teen." (quoting Haley v. Ohio , 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948) ). In other words, students surely enjoy Miranda rights just as teachers, parents, janitors, cafeteria staff, or other adults at a school do. See J.D.B. , 564 U.S. at 276, 131 S.Ct. 2394. "It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children." In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 47, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). After all, students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U.S. 646, 655-56, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) ).

In J.D.B. the Supreme Court of the United States considered custodial interrogation in schools.

564 U.S. at 269, 276, 131 S.Ct. 2394. There, a police officer pulled a thirteen-year-old seventh grader out of class, took him to a conference room, and questioned him for at least half an hour. Id. at 265, 131 S.Ct. 2394. The Court held that a juvenile suspect's age is relevant to Miranda's custody analysis, as long as it's known by the interviewing officer or would be objectively apparent to a reasonable officer. Id. at 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394. Though the Court did not decide whether J.D.B. was under custodial interrogation, the implication is unmistakable: Miranda warnings protect students when they are placed under custodial interrogation at school.

Courts have understandably grappled with the custodial interrogation test in schools. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court applied J.D.B. and held that a seventh-grader was not entitled to Miranda warnings at school because he was not in custody. People v. N.A.S. , 329 P.3d 285, 290 (Colo. 2014). The Supreme Court of Kentucky similarly applied J.D.B. , finding that a student was entitled to Miranda warnings because he was under custodial interrogation, even in a school-discipline matter. N.C. , 396 S.W.3d at 862-63. And the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Miranda warnings were required when school police officers questioned a student at school. In re R.H. , 568 Pa. 1, 791 A.2d 331, 334 (2002). So, cases before and after J.D.B. reveal the challenge of determining custodial interrogation (and thus whether Miranda warnings are required) in schools.

These cases also show that there is no "educational purpose" exception to Miranda like the one our Court of Appeals applied. B.A. , 73 N.E.3d at 730. Instead, "confessions of juveniles require special caution." In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 45, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Rather than using special caution, that exception would swallow the Miranda rule, leaving less protection for students than for other suspects.

Also in keeping with special protections for juveniles, our legislature has crafted Indiana's juvenile waiver statute. See I.C. § 31-32-5-1. When Miranda applies to minor students, this statute does too. It allows an unemancipated juvenile to waive Miranda rights only through counsel or a custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem. Id. If the statute is not followed, the State cannot use any statements as evidence. D.M. v. State , 949 N.E.2d 327, 333-34 (Ind. 2011).

This background leads to two points worth emphasizing. First, Miranda's key exception-for public safety-will of course apply in schools in cases of imminent danger. See New York v. Quarles , 467 U.S. 649, 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) ; Bailey v. State , 763 N.E.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ind. 2002). So when police face the pressing need to secure the safety of students at school in light of present-day threats, Miranda warnings may be bypassed. See Quarles , 467 U.S. at 657-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626. Here though, as the parties agree, B.A.'s school was in no danger at the time of his interview.

And second, none of this is to say that schools and their resource officers must avoid placing students under custodial interrogation. Students sometimes commit crimes that school resource officers will have to investigate, often by interviewing suspects. This proper role of resource officers may place students in custody. When it does, officers must give Miranda warnings and follow Indiana's juvenile waiver statute before asking questions. See S.G. v. State , 956 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied ; I.C. § 31-32-5-1.

In sum, Miranda warnings and Indiana's juvenile waiver statute apply when minor students are placed under custodial interrogation. We now turn to the more complex discussion: the custodial interrogation test in schools.

C. The custodial interrogation test in schools.

1. Custody.

The initial step in the custody analysis asks whether a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would feel free to leave. Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). Of course, no student feels free to just walk out of the principal's office, so this step points toward custody. See Schall v. Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 265, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) ("[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody."). But that does not end the analysis.

For there to be custody, the suspect's situation must also present "the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda ." Howes , 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 ; Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 437-38, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). In schools, the extent of those pressures shifts along a spectrum based on how much coercive power of law enforcement is brought to bear against the student. See S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 676 (citing Holland, supra , at 41). Our Court of Appeals has already provided guidance for cases falling near the ends of this custody spectrum.

On one end of the spectrum lies traditional school discipline. Id. This discipline-handed down by school officials alone-does not place students in custody because police officers aren't involved. K.F. v. State , 961 N.E.2d 501, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied . So, as in today's companion opinion D.Z. v. State , when school officials are not agents of the police, a clear rule applies: they can question students without providing Miranda warnings. See D.Z. v. State , No. 18S-JV-295, --- N.E.3d ----, slip op. at 4, 2018 WL 3046310 (Ind. June 20, 2018) ; S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 680. And even if a police officer is present, a single officer's unintimidating presence is unlikely to create custody. See S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 679.

On the other end of the spectrum lie armed and uniformed police officers who pull students from class in handcuffs before questioning them. See id. at 676. And "even when a private party such as a school initiates an investigation," an officer's "pervasive presence" will probably create custody. Id. at 678-79. These fairly well-defined ends of the custody spectrum provide the clearest guidance.

Many cases, though, will fall in the spectrum's messy middle, posing "difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody." Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 441, 104 S.Ct. 3138. In schools, under Miranda's totality-of-the-circumstances test, myriad factors may be relevant:

• The number of officers present and how they are involved. See S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 679-80 (finding no custody from one officer's minimal involvement).
• Whether the setting is a traditional school-discipline environment or is police dominated. In re Tyler F. , 276 Neb. 527, 755 N.W.2d 360, 369 (2008).
• What the student is told about the interview. See In re C.H. , 277 Neb. 565, 763 N.W.2d 708, 715 (2009).
• The length of the interview. N.A.S. , 329 P.3d at 289.
• The student's age. J.D.B. , 564 U.S. at 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394.
• Whether the student is arrested after the interview. See Howes , 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181.
• The relationship between the parties, including whether police officers act as teachers, counselors, or law enforcement agents. See Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420, 459-60, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Holland, supra , at 74-75. Some schools embrace all three roles for their resource officers, while in other schools one role dominates. Holland, supra , at 75-77.

This list is not exhaustive given Miranda's totality-of-the-circumstances test, but it offers some factors that may be relevant in the school setting.

Of course, a bright-line rule for custody would be easier for schools, police, and courts to apply in these close cases. But despite its challenges, we cannot replace Miranda's custody spectrum with a simple, clear line. Such a line could not account for each case's nuances, as Miranda's totality-of-the-circumstances test requires. See Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 441, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (rejecting "a clearer, more easily administered line" as contrary to Miranda's custody test); Howes , 565 U.S. at 505-06, 132 S.Ct. 1181.

2. Interrogation.

Police custody alone does not trigger Miranda ; there must be police interrogation as well. Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). " '[I]nterrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The focus is the suspect's perceptions, not police intent. Id.

As with custody, when police officers aren't present, a bright-line rule applies: absent an agency relationship with police, words or actions from school officials are not interrogation. See Ritchie v. State , 875 N.E.2d 706, 717 (Ind. 2007) ; S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 680-81 ; G.J. v. State , 716 N.E.2d 475, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

But like the custody spectrum, the interrogation test may confound school administrators and resource officers when police are present. While a bright-line rule would thus be beneficial here too, the Miranda framework does not allow it. See Innis , 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The "interrogation" analysis instead turns on police knowledge and actions and the suspect's perceptions. Id.

What does this mean for B.A.? He should have been given Miranda warnings if police placed him under custodial interrogation. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. We turn to that analysis, addressing first whether B.A. was in police custody and second whether he was under police interrogation.

II. B.A. was under custodial interrogation.

A. B.A. was in police custody.

When B.A. arrived at school that Monday morning, a uniformed Officer Tutsie escorted him from his bus straight to Vice-Principal Remaly's office. As Remaly talked with B.A., at least one officer-and often three-stayed at all times between B.A. and the door. There's no indication that any of these officers had built a relationship with B.A., or that B.A. had any disciplinary history with them. In fact, only one officer, Officer Wheeler, typically worked at the middle school. The officers were aware, though, that B.A. was a young middle-schooler. So they knew that a reasonable person in B.A.'s shoes would be "more vulnerable or susceptible to ... outside pressures" than would adults or older teenagers. J.D.B. , 564 U.S. at 272, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (omission in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ).

Despite B.A.'s youth and the severity of the situation, no one called his mom until after his interview. This left him in an unfamiliar, police-overshadowed situation without parental or other support. See Lewis v. State , 259 Ind. 431, 437, 440, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141, 142 (1972), superseded by statute , Indiana's juvenile waiver statute, P.L. 1-1997. No one told B.A. that he was free to call his mother, leave the room, take a break, or go to class. See C.H. , 763 N.W.2d at 715 (finding it "crucial" whether juveniles are told they are free to leave). Instead, after the interview and, finally, a brief meeting with B.A.'s mother, officers arrested B.A. to take him "downtown" to the juvenile detention center. See Howes , 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (noting that whether the interviewee is released after questioning matters in the custody analysis).

As the State points out, no one yelled at or threatened B.A. Still, the consistent police presence would place considerable coercive pressure on a reasonable student in B.A.'s situation. So this case lies solidly on the "custody" end of the student-confinement spectrum. See S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 676.

B. B.A. was under police interrogation.

Officer Tutsie himself prepared a handwriting test, handed it to B.A., and explained to B.A. how to copy the sentences. As he testified, this test "was investigation material that only a police officer can probably have experience to do." And its aim was obtaining a sample to compare to the pink-marker bomb threat.

Then, Officer Lyday told B.A., "Come on, man, just-just tell the truth." In context, B.A. surely saw this for what it was: an order to fess up. This tag-team probe, though limited, was interrogation because the officers should have known that it was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response," Innis , 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. And it worked, finally prompting B.A.'s tearful confession and trip to juvenile detention.

Conclusion

Since B.A. was under custodial interrogation but was not Mirandized, his statements should have been suppressed under both Miranda and Indiana's juvenile waiver statute. The trial court thus abused its discretion in admitting the statements. We accordingly reverse his delinquency adjudications and remand this case to the juvenile court.

David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

      We held oral argument in Evansville at the University of Southern Indiana. We thank the university for its outstanding hospitality; the parties for their travel and excellent advocacy; and the students from the Academy for Innovative Studies, Benjamin Bosse High School, Boonville High School, Crawford County Junior-Senior High School, Evansville Day School, Early College High School, New Tech Institute, Randall T. Shepard Leadership and Law Academy, Signature School, St. Philip School, and Tecumseh High School for their respectful attention and insightful questions.

      In 2015-16, sworn law enforcement officers protected 39,900 out of 83,600 public schools. Melissa Diliberti et al., National Center for Education Statistics, Crime, Violence, Discipline, and Safety in U.S. Public Schools (July 2017).

      See generally D.J. Schoeff, Opinion, Properly select, train school resource officers , Indianapolis Star (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/opinion/readers/2015/10/23/properly-selecttrain-school-resource-officers/74504540/ (maintaining that while all school resource officers have arrest powers, their primary functions are education and mentoring).