text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gabriel BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
    NO. 5-14-0556
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.
    Opinion Filed April 4, 2018 Rehearing denied April 25, 2018
    Michael J. Pelletier, Ellen J. Curry, and Richard J. Whitney, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.
    Brendan F. Kelly, State's Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Kelly M. Stacey, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People
   JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that denied defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty to the offense of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/182(a)(1) (West 2012) ). In his motion, defendant argued his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his plea counsel was ineffective. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court's order denying defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty, vacate defendant's conviction and sentence, and remand this cause with directions to allow defendant to plead anew.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant, Gabriel Boyd, pled guilty to a single count of armed robbery, a Class X felony, on May 15, 2014, pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement in which defendant agreed to a sentence of 18 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, with 3 years of mandatory supervised release. See 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2012). In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the St. Clair County State's Attorney's Office (State) dismissed three other counts against him. After admonishing defendant and finding a factual basis for the plea, the court concluded there were no improper promises or inducements that caused defendant to plead guilty and accepted the plea as voluntary.

¶ 4 Defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider sentence on June 2, 2014, alleging that the sentence imposed was excessive and his plea counsel was ineffective. Because defendant's motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and defendant had already entered a guilty plea, the trial court construed defendant's motion as a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and appointed the public defender to represent defendant in all postplea proceedings. The appointed public defender filed a motion to withdraw plea of guilty on September 26, 2014, asserting (1) defendant's plea of guilty was not voluntary because defendant's plea counsel was ineffective, (2) defendant did not fully understand the potential sentence he faced, and (3) defendant did not understand the nature of the charges against him. The motion to withdraw plea of guilty further asserted defendant had a defense worthy of consideration.

¶ 5 A hearing on defendant's motion was held on October 1, 2014. At the hearing, defendant testified his plea counsel informed him that in exchange for a plea of guilty, defendant may be eligible to enter certain programs in prison which would allow him to receive credit for good time against his sentence. However, after he arrived at the Department of Corrections, defendant testified he discovered he was ineligible to receive any type of good time credit because his case involved a Class X felony. Defendant testified that if he had known he was ineligible to receive good time credit prior to pleading guilty, it would have "changed [his] mind on pleading guilty." On cross-examination, defendant testified the trial judge asked him a number of questions prior to defendant pleading guilty, including whether defendant had been promised anything other than the plea negotiations and whether anyone threatened him. Defendant testified he had not been promised anything and was not threatened.

¶ 6 Plea counsel also testified at the hearing. He testified that he and defendant had a number of conversations about the nature of the charges brought against defendant and the State's plea offers. Plea counsel testified he did not promise defendant that he would be eligible for good time credit, meritorious service credit, or credit obtained through programs in the Department of Corrections. He also testified he spoke with defendant about the potential for programs in the Department of Corrections but denied ever telling defendant he would be guaranteed acceptance into those programs or that the programs would reduce defendant's time. He testified that he "absolutely" never made any promises or used threats or coercion to convince defendant to plead guilty and that defendant knew trial was always an option up until the day he pled guilty.

¶ 7 On cross-examination, plea counsel testified that when talking to defendant about the amount of time he would have to serve, he told defendant his sentence may be cut in half if he received day for day good time credit. He testified he also discussed that defendant may receive an initial six-month credit. He further testified that he talked to defendant in general regarding educational programs that may result in a reduction of time, but nothing specific as to the amount of time or whether there would actually be a reduction of time. In rebuttal, defendant testified, "It was kind of absolutely a promise that I would be able to get into some programs and I would be able to get some good time if I completed the programs."

¶ 8 The court entered an order on October 9, 2014, denying defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty. The court noted the crux of the motion related to defendant's claim that his counsel promised him the opportunity to earn additional good time credits against his sentence after transfer to the Department of Corrections. However, based upon the testimony and a transcript of defendant's plea, the court found no improper promises relating to good time credit or any other matter were made to defendant that caused him to enter a guilty plea. The court concluded defendant's plea was voluntary.

¶ 9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The single issue raised by defendant on appeal alleges his plea counsel was ineffective, which in turn rendered his guilty plea not truly knowing and voluntary. Specifically, defendant contends his plea counsel was ineffective because counsel informed defendant that in exchange for his guilty plea, defendant may receive good time credit and a reduction in his sentence if he participated in certain educational programs provided by the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant also asserts his plea counsel was ineffective because counsel informed defendant he may be eligible for day for day good time credit and an initial six-month credit. However, defendant was statutorily ineligible for such credit due to the offense to which he pled guilty.

¶ 12 At the onset, we note the parties disagree as to the standard of review. The State contends the decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ordinarily rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Walston , 38 Ill.2d 39, 42, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967) ; People v. Delvillar , 235 Ill.2d 507, 520, 337 Ill.Dec. 207, 922 N.E.2d 330 (2009). Conversely, defendant argues that because the issue raised on appeal does not rely on any contested issue of fact and concerns the purely legal issue of whether the trial court properly followed the applicable law in reaching its decision, our standard of review should be de novo . In support of this proposition, defendant cites People v. Hale , 2013 IL 113140, 374 Ill.Dec. 912, 996 N.E.2d 607, and People v. Coleman , 2015 IL App (4th) 131045, 388 Ill.Dec. 799, 25 N.E.3d 82.

¶ 13 After careful consideration, we agree with the State. A thorough review of several Illinois Supreme Court decisions lends support to our conclusion that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Manning , 227 Ill.2d 403, 411-12, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492 (2008) ("[T]he decision whether or not to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion."); Delvillar , 235 Ill.2d at 519, 337 Ill.Dec. 207, 922 N.E.2d 330 ("The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court and, as such, is reviewed for abuse of discretion."); People v. Hughes , 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32, 368 Ill.Dec. 26, 983 N.E.2d 439 ("Generally, the decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court and, as such, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.").

¶ 14 Accordingly, we will review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs only where the court's ruling is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Delvillar , 235 Ill.2d at 519, 337 Ill.Dec. 207, 922 N.E.2d 330. Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we note that the two cases cited by defendant, Hale and Coleman , concern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. This appeal stems from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty. Therefore, we limit our inquiry to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion. However, regardless of what standard we apply, we find defendant's plea counsel was ineffective.

¶ 15 We now turn to defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw plea of guilty because the plea was not knowing and voluntary as a result of his plea counsel's ineffectiveness. It is well settled that a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his or her guilty plea. Manning , 227 Ill.2d at 411-12, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492. However, a defendant should be allowed to withdraw the plea where it was not constitutionally entered. Manning , 227 Ill.2d at 412, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492. Where a plea of guilty was entered as a result of misrepresentations by counsel, the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his or her plea of guilty and plead not guilty. Manning , 227 Ill.2d at 412, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492. A defendant may challenge the constitutionality of his or her guilty plea by asserting (1) he or she did not receive the benefit of the bargain made with the State or (2) the plea of guilty was not made voluntarily or with full knowledge of the consequences. Manning , 227 Ill.2d at 412, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492.

¶ 16 Here, as previously stated, defendant claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Whether a defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary depends upon whether the defendant was provided effective assistance of counsel.

Manning , 227 Ill.2d at 412, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492. Challenges to guilty pleas that allege ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese , 104 Ill.2d 504, 525-28, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (deficiency prong) and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceedings would have been different (prejudice prong). Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Albanese , 104 Ill.2d at 525, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 ; People v. Mack , 2016 IL App (5th) 130294, ¶ 26, 402 Ill.Dec. 851, 52 N.E.3d 772.

¶ 17 To establish deficiency under the first prong of the Strickland test, an individual must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction was the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Simms , 192 Ill.2d 348, 361, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000). It is well settled there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance. People v. Crutchfield , 2015 IL App (5th) 120371, ¶ 34, 393 Ill.Dec. 826, 35 N.E.3d 218. However, the decision regarding what plea to enter is a right that belongs to the defendant and is not a decision that counsel may make as a part of trial strategy. Manning , 227 Ill.2d at 416, 318 Ill.Dec. 261, 883 N.E.2d 492.

¶ 18 As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, namely that counsel's deficient performance caused the result of the trial to be unreliable or fundamentally unfair. Mack , 2016 IL App (5th) 130294, ¶ 27, 402 Ill.Dec. 851, 52 N.E.3d 772. To establish prejudice for purposes of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show there is a " 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' " People v. Rissley , 206 Ill.2d 403, 458, 276 Ill.Dec. 821, 795 N.E.2d 174 (2003) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ). A bare allegation that a defendant would have pled not guilty is insufficient to establish prejudice for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v. Brown , 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 26, 421 Ill.Dec. 924, 102 N.E.3d 205. Rather, the defendant must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea would have been rational under the circumstances. Brown , 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 41, 421 Ill.Dec. 924, 102 N.E.3d 205.

¶ 19 Both prongs under Strickland must be satisfied in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, and the failure to satisfy either prong will be fatal to the claim. Mack , 2016 IL App (5th) 130294, ¶ 27, 402 Ill.Dec. 851, 52 N.E.3d 772. Therefore, a court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. People v. Ramos , 339 Ill.App.3d 891, 900, 274 Ill.Dec. 500, 791 N.E.2d 592 (2003).

¶ 20 Relevant to this appeal, Illinois courts distinguish the direct consequences of a guilty plea from the collateral consequences of the plea and have consistently held that good time credit is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. People v. Williams , 188 Ill.2d 365, 371, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539 (1999) ; People v. La Pointe , 2015 IL App (2d) 130451, ¶ 46, 396 Ill.Dec. 419, 40 N.E.3d 72. It is well settled that plea counsel's failure to advise of a collateral consequence does not provide a basis to invalidate the plea. People v. Presley , 2012 IL App (2d) 100617, ¶¶ 27-28, 360 Ill.Dec. 907, 969 N.E.2d 952. However, if plea counsel gives wrong or incorrect advice, even as to a collateral consequence of the plea, and the defendant relies on that advice in making the decision to plead guilty, the counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and amounts to ineffective assistance. People v. Correa , 108 Ill.2d 541, 552, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985).

¶ 21 Here, the record shows defendant pled guilty on the basis of inaccurate information provided by his plea counsel-namely, that he would be eligible for good time credit against his sentence upon being incarcerated. The testimony of plea counsel and defendant supports this finding. At the hearing, in response to a question regarding what he discussed with defendant about the amount of time defendant would serve, and what his understanding was regarding what defendant would have to serve, counsel testified:

"Well, the main thing was that, yeah, the 18 years if he got the day for day good time would basically cut his time in half. He may get some initial credit, six-month credit. But other than that, you know, we talked about there may be additional programs available through Department of Corrections. Nothing specifically other than, you know-I think we talked in general that there may be educational programs that may result in reduction of time, but nothing specific as to * * * amount of time that would be-or whether there would actually be a reduction."

¶ 22 Contrary to plea counsel's suggestion that defendant may be eligible to receive credit against his sentence upon his incarceration, a review of the version of section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) in effect at the time defendant entered his plea shows defendant was ineligible to receive such credit. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2012). Regarding counsel's assertion that defendant may be eligible to receive day for day credit, section 3-63(a)(2)(iii) of the Code provides that a prisoner serving a sentence for armed robbery "shall receive no more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 2012). Thus, defendant was ineligible to receive day for day credit. Regarding counsel's assertion that defendant may receive an initial six-month credit, which would be awarded for good conduct, and additional credit through participation in educational programs, defendant was ineligible to receive such credit because he was convicted of armed robbery. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3), (4) (West 2012).

¶ 23 Based on the foregoing, we find defendant's plea of guilty was not truly knowing and voluntary. The record shows defendant pled guilty on the basis of inaccurate information provided by his plea counsel-namely, that he would be eligible for certain good time credit against his sentence upon his incarceration when, in fact, defendant was statutorily ineligible to receive such credit. Plea counsel's deficient performance satisfies the first prong under Strickland . Furthermore, at the hearing, defendant testified that if he had known he was ineligible to receive good time credit prior to pleading guilty, it would have "changed [his] mind on pleading guilty." Because there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, defendant would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, defendant has shown he suffered prejudice. Considering defendant has satisfied both prongs under Strickland , we find the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw plea of guilty.

¶ 24 Turning to the State's argument, we initially note that the fact defendant has already been afforded an evidentiary hearing to present his case about whether his plea was knowing and voluntary does not lend support to the State's position that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty. For the reasons discussed above, we find defendant has shown his plea counsel was ineffective in accordance with the requirements under Strickland . Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion.

¶ 25 The State next argues that defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, as a bare allegation that defendant would have pled not guilty and would have insisted on a trial if counsel had not been deficient is not enough to establish prejudice. People v. Hall , 217 Ill.2d 324, 335, 299 Ill.Dec. 181, 841 N.E.2d 913 (2005). The State argues that defendant's claim must include either a claim of innocence or the articulation of a plausible defense that could have been raised at trial and contends that defendant has failed to assert his innocence or a plausible defense. Hall , 217 Ill.2d at 335-36, 299 Ill.Dec. 181, 841 N.E.2d 913. The State further cites our supreme court decision in Correa , which observed the fact that a defendant enters a plea of guilty because of some erroneous advice by his counsel does not itself destroy the voluntary nature of the plea. Correa , 108 Ill.2d at 548-49, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307.

¶ 26 After careful consideration, we find defendant has presented more than a bare allegation that he would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial absent plea counsel's deficient performance. Here, defendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of 18 years with 3 years of mandatory supervised release, which is at the midpoint statutory range of 6 to 30 years for Class X offenders. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012). Plea counsel testified that when reviewing the terms of the plea agreement with defendant prior to defendant entering his guilty plea, he discussed the possibility of good time credit through participation in educational programs, day for day good time credit, and an initial six-month credit. Thus, considering this advice, it was possible for defendant to believe he could reduce his sentence by 50% when, in fact, defendant was required to serve 85% of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 2012). Plea counsel's testimony corroborates defendant's testimony that the possibility of a reduction in his sentence was a major factor in defendant's decision to enter his guilty plea.

¶ 27 We further note, as our supreme court has recently observed, that the requirement of a claim of innocence or a plausible defense does not apply to allegations of plea counsel's errors regarding defendant's understanding of the consequences of entering a guilty plea. Brown , 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 46, 421 Ill.Dec. 924, 102 N.E.3d 205. Rather, to succeed on a claim that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's erroneous advice about the consequences of pleading guilty, defendant must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea would have been rational under the circumstances. Brown , 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 48, 421 Ill.Dec. 924, 102 N.E.3d 205.

¶ 28 In Brown , the defendant argued he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when he entered into a fully negotiated guilty plea agreement in reliance on his plea counsel's advice that he would only have to serve 50% of his 18-year sentence. Brown , 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 23, 421 Ill.Dec. 924, 102 N.E.3d 205. The defendant alleged he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to correctly advise him that he was required to serve 85% of his sentence. Brown , 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 46, 421 Ill.Dec. 924, 102 N.E.3d 205. Our supreme court concluded the defendant's allegation, standing alone, was insufficient to establish prejudice.

¶ 29 Unlike the defendant in Brown , however, defendant in the instant case has presented more than a bare allegation that he would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial absent plea counsel's deficient advice that he may be eligible to receive good time credit. Again, plea counsel's testimony corroborates defendant's position that he entered his guilty plea under the false impression that he would be eligible to obtain credit against his sentence. Accordingly, we find defendant has shown that a decision to reject the guilty plea would have been rational if he had known he was ineligible to receive credit against his sentence, especially considering the floor of his sentencing range was 12 years less than the 18-year sentence to which he agreed.

¶ 30 As it pertains to Correa , the State correctly observes the fact that a defendant enters a plea of guilty because of some erroneous advice by his counsel does not itself destroy the voluntary nature of the plea. Correa , 108 Ill.2d at 548-49, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307. However, the State ignores our supreme court's further observation:

"If the defendant's pleas were made in reasonable reliance upon the advice or representation of his attorney, which advice or representation demonstrated incompetence, then it can be said that the defendant's pleas were not voluntary; that is, there was not a knowing and intelligent waiver of the fundamental rights which a plea of guilty entails." Correa , 108 Ill.2d at 549 [92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307].

¶ 31 Based on our findings of deficiency and prejudice, we cannot say defendant's plea of guilty was truly knowing and voluntary. Defendant entered his guilty plea under the ill-advised presumption he would be eligible to receive good time credit and a reduction in his sentence despite the fact that he was statutorily ineligible to receive good time credit. This satisfies the deficiency prong under Strickland . Moreover, if he had known he was ineligible to receive good time credit prior to pleading guilty, defendant testified it would have changed his mind regarding whether to plead guilty. This satisfies the prejudice prong under Strickland , as there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. We deem it important to stress that defendant has presented more than a bare allegation that he would have pled not guilty absent counsel's errors, as plea counsel's testimony corroborates defendant's testimony that the possibility of a reduction in his sentence was a major factor in defendant's decision to enter his guilty plea. We further note that even with enough evidence to support a conviction, a decision to reject the guilty plea and proceed to trial would have been rational under the circumstances considering defendant could have received a much lesser sentence than that to which he agreed in his guilty plea. In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty.

¶ 32 CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County denying defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty. We vacate defendant's plea of guilty and subsequent sentence and remand this cause with directions to allow defendant to plead anew.

¶ 34 Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.

Presiding Justice Barberis and Justice Chapman concurred in the judgment and opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Kenny COLLINS and Linda Richard, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Patricia NOLTENSMEIER, Defendant-Appellant.
    NO. 4-17-0443
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
    FILED April 5, 2018
    Luke A. Thomas, of McClure, Thomas & Thomas, of Beardstown, for appellant.
    Jerry Tice and Bill Siders, of Grosboll, Becker, Tice & Barr, of Petersburg, for appellees.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Patricia Noltensmeier, appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Kenny Collins and Linda Richard, who had sued defendant for a breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. Defendant claims she had the authority pursuant to a power of attorney for property to change decedent's beneficiaries from plaintiffs to herself. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant and Billy D. Collins were involved in a long-term romantic relationship when Billy died on January 23, 2011, at his home from a recently diagnosed terminal illness. Defendant had acted as Billy's caretaker. Approximately one week before he died, Billy executed a will and an Illinois Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney for Property. Each document was a preprinted form containing handwritten inserts in the blanks.

¶ 4 Billy's power of attorney, dated January 16, 2011, appointed defendant as his agent. Paragraph three of the document indicated the agent had the following powers, in addition to those listed previously: "power to make gifts, exercise powers of appointment, name or change beneficiaries under any beneficiary form or contractual arrangement."

¶ 5 Billy's will, also dated January 16, 2011, named defendant, his "domestic partner," as the sole beneficiary of his real property, personal property, and the "rest, residue, and remainder" of his estate. He also named defendant as his executor.

¶ 6 Defendant filed Billy's will with the Cass County circuit court in March 2011. In May 2011, plaintiff Kenny Collins, Billy's brother, filed a petition to contest the validity of Billy's will in Cass County case No. 11-P-15, alleging Billy was of unsound mind, subjected to undue influence from defendant, and not told the document he was signing was a will.

¶ 7 Kenny and plaintiff Linda Richard, Billy's niece, filed a three-count complaint in the cause before us, alleging defendant (1) breached her fiduciary duty owed to Billy, (2) wrongfully converted Billy's individual retirement account (IRA) funds to herself, and (3) did so intentionally, willfully and wantonly, and with malice, and therefore was responsible for punitive damages. The case sat dormant for approximately four years.

¶ 8 In April 2015, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, alleging the same causes of action with the exception of the claim for punitive damages, which plaintiffs abandoned. Plaintiffs alleged defendant wrongfully and without authorization changed the beneficiary of Billy's IRA, valued at approximately $45,000, from plaintiffs to herself. Defendant had completed the bank's change-of-beneficiary form by using her authority as the agent for Billy.

¶ 9 In May 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging defendant had engaged in fraudulent self-dealing. Plaintiffs claimed defendant breached her fiduciary duty because the added language in section three of the power of attorney did not authorize her to make the change of beneficiary to herself.

¶ 10 In July 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Both parties represented they had found no Illinois cases on point. Plaintiffs cited Bienash v. Moller , 721 N.W.2d 431 (S.D. 2006), a South Dakota case where, under similar factual circumstances, the court held that a power of attorney failed to specifically include language permitting the agent to name himself as a beneficiary. Therefore, the court held, the agent had breached his fiduciary duty to the principal by engaging in self-dealing. Bienash , 721 N.W.2d at 437.

¶ 11 In August 2016, the trial court entered a written order, granting plaintiffs' motion, finding no disputed facts remained, and holding, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment in their favor. The court held:

"The power of self-dealing, i.e. , to change the beneficiary to herself, was not included in paragraph [three] and defendant was therefore not entitled to make that change. The original designation of beneficiary form * * * remains valid and [plaintiffs] are each 50% beneficiaries of that [IRA] at Petefish, Skiles and Company Bank."

¶ 12 In September 2016, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, claiming the trial court had overlooked or failed to recognize the added language in paragraph three, which, according to her, specifically authorized her to change the beneficiary designation. In December 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees.

¶ 13 In January 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the pending motions. After considering the arguments of counsel, the court stated:

"Well, in regard to the motion to reconsider, I am going to deny the motion. There is a duty of someone acting under a power of attorney as agent there has to be a fiduciary duty. The presumption is that, if they are self-dealing, which this is [ ] in my opinion, based upon the cases cited from other jurisdictions, I think they do make sense. Of course, they are not totally on point, exactly on point, but the general tenor and principles of those cases are on point that if the recipient of a power of attorney is going to be able to self-deal, in other words, to make gifts and transfers to himself or herself, then there has to be specific authority, in my opinion, granted in the power of attorney. Here the authority was granted to make gifts and to change beneficiaries, but there was no specific authority for [defendant] to self-deal. In other words, to change beneficiaries under accounts to herself. The presumption is it's fraudulent and it has to be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. I don't think there is. I have not seen any evidence. I would have to assume there is evidence, and I don't think from what we discussed before a little earlier there is any extrinsic evidence that would come in, and I think the motion for summary judgment is appropriate, and I will confirm my ruling from last August."

¶ 14 On May 2, 2017, the trial court entered a written order, denying defendant's motion to reconsider and finding defendant had no authority pursuant to the power of attorney to designate herself as a beneficiary of Billy's IRA. The court awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount of one-third of the value of the IRA as of January 23, 2011, pursuant to their contingency fee agreement with counsel.

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The primary issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The answer to that question depends on whether the language included in the power of attorney granted defendant the authority to change the beneficiary on Billy's IRA to herself. If it did not, defendant presumably engaged in fraudulent self-dealing. Defendant's act of self-dealing then is invalid unless there is evidence to rebut the presumption of fraud. On appeal, defendant insists the answer lies within the four corners of the document and any analysis of fraudulent self-dealing is irrelevant.

¶ 18 The trial court, finding support from Bienash , held that, in order for defendant to have the authority to change a beneficiary designation to herself, the power of attorney document must have specifically stated such. See Bienash , 721 N.W.2d at 437. We find the trial court's reliance on Bienash was unnecessary. That is, to resolve this case, we need to look no further than the Illinois power-of-attorney statute and our common-law cases addressing an agent's fiduciary duty and the presumption of fraudulent self-dealing.

¶ 19 A. Standard of Review on Summary Judgment

¶ 20 "Summary judgment is appropriate where 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Ioerger v. Halverson Construction Co. , 232 Ill.2d 196, 201, 327 Ill.Dec. 524, 902 N.E.2d 645 (2008) (quoting 735 ILCS 5/21005(c) (West 2000) ). "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt." Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. , 191 Ill.2d 278, 291, 246 Ill.Dec. 654, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (2000). "Accordingly, where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed material facts or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact." Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc. , 185 Ill.2d 418, 424, 235 Ill.Dec. 905, 706 N.E.2d 460 (1998). "On appeal from a trial court's decision granting a motion for summary judgment, our review is de novo ." Bowles v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. , 2013 IL App (4th) 121072, ¶ 19, 375 Ill.Dec. 211, 996 N.E.2d 1267.

¶ 21 B. Illinois Power of Attorney Act

¶ 22 Defendant contends that the added language in paragraph three of the power of attorney document was sufficient to unequivocally authorize her to "name or change beneficiaries under any beneficiary form or contractual arrangement" to herself included. To the contrary, plaintiffs contend that defendant engaged in fraudulent self-dealing in violation of the fiduciary duty she owed to Billy.

¶ 23 In 1987, the legislature enacted the Illinois Power of Attorney Act (Act) ( 755 ILCS 45/1-1 to 4-12 (West 2010) ). The Act includes article III, the Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney for Property Law ( 755 ILCS 45/3-1 to 3-5 (West 2010) ), which provides a standardized short form power of attorney for individuals to use. The form sets forth optional powers and allows a principal to "design the power of attorney best suited to his or her needs in a simple fashion and be assured that the agent's authority will be honored by third parties with whom the agent deals, regardless of the physical or mental condition of the principal at the time the power is exercised." 755 ILCS 45/3-1 (West 2010).

¶ 24 Section 3-4 of the Act explains the powers listed in the form and states:

"[T]he agent will not have power under any of the statutory categories (a) through (o) to make gifts of the principal's property, to exercise powers to appoint to others or to change any beneficiary whom the principal has designated to take the principal's interests at death under any will, trust, joint tenancy, beneficiary form or contractual arrangement." 755 ILCS 45/3-4 (West 2010).

¶ 25 A power of attorney creates a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. In re Estate of Shelton , 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 22, 417 Ill.Dec. 743, 89 N.E.3d 391 ; 755 ILCS 45/2-7(a), (b) (West 2010) (codifying the agent's duty of care owed to the principal for purposes of the Act). The mere existence of a fiduciary relationship prohibits the agent from seeking or obtaining any selfish benefit for herself; if the agent seeks or obtains such benefit, the transaction is presumed to be fraudulent. See Shelton , 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 23, 417 Ill.Dec. 743, 89 N.E.3d 391. "Thus, any conveyance of the principal's property that either materially benefits the agent or is for the agent's own use is presumed to be fraudulent." Spring Valley Nursing Center, L.P. v. Allen , 2012 IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 12, 365 Ill.Dec. 131, 977 N.E.2d 1230. "Once a fraudulent transaction has been alleged, the burden then shifts to the agent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair and did not result from his undue influence over the principal." Shelton , 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 23, 417 Ill.Dec. 743, 89 N.E.3d 391 ¶ 26 In other words, the presumption of fraud is rebuttable if it can be shown that the agent exercised good faith and did not betray the confidence placed in her. Jones v. Washington , 412 Ill. 436, 441, 107 N.E.2d 672 (1952) ; Clark v. Clark , 398 Ill. 592, 601, 76 N.E.2d 446 (1947) ; Spring Valley Nursing Center, L.P. , 2012 IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 13, 365 Ill.Dec. 131, 977 N.E.2d 1230 ; In re Estate of DeJarnette , 286 Ill.App. 3d 1082, 1088, 222 Ill.Dec. 490, 677 N.E.2d 1024 (1997) ; Glass v. Burkett , 64 Ill.App.3d 676, 680-81, 21 Ill.Dec. 494, 381 N.E.2d 821 (1978). If the agent rebuts the presumption of fraud, the transaction in question will be upheld. See 755 ILCS 45/2-7(a) (West 2010) (agent who acts with due care for the benefit of the principal will not be held liable merely because the act also benefits the agent); Clark , 398 Ill. at 602, 76 N.E.2d 446 ("[i]f a conveyance was not procured through improper means attended with circumstances of oppression or overreaching, but was entered into by the grantor with full knowledge of its nature and effect and because of his or her deliberate, voluntary and intelligent desire, the existence of a fiduciary relation does not invalidate the transaction").

" 'A rebuttable presumption, such as exists here, is not evidence in itself, but arises as a rule of law or legal conclusion from the facts proved. [Citations.] These presumptions "do not shift the burden of proof. Their only effect is to create the necessity of evidence to meet the prima facie case created thereby, and which, if no proof to the contrary is offered, will prevail." [Citations.] Stated differently, the presence of a presumption in a case only has the effect of shifting to the party against whom it operates the burden of going forward and introducing evidence to meet the presumption. If evidence is introduced which is contrary to the presumption, the presumption will cease to operate. [Citations.]' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean , 95 Ill.2d 452, 461-62, 69 Ill.Dec. 960, 448 N.E.2d 872 (1983) (quoting McElroy v. Force , 38 Ill.2d 528, 532-33, 232 N.E.2d 708 (1967) ).

¶ 27 Section 2-7(a) of the Act provides, in part, as follows:

"Whenever a power is exercised, the agent shall act in good faith for the benefit of the principal using due care, competence, and diligence in accordance with the terms of the agency and shall be liable for negligent exercise. An agent who acts with due care for the benefit of the principal shall not be liable or limited merely because the agent also benefits from the act, has individual or conflicting interests in relation to the property, care or affairs of the principal or acts in a different manner with respect to the agency and the agent's individual interests." 755 ILCS 45/2-7(a) (West 2010).

¶ 28 Here, because the transaction in question is presumed to be an exercise of fraudulent self-dealing, defendant must demonstrate either (1) the language of the power of attorney itself authorized the act of self-dealing or (2) by some other evidence, Billy intended, without undue influence, to authorize defendant to so act.

¶ 29 C. Language of the Power of Attorney

¶ 30 "A written power of attorney must be strictly construed so as to reflect the 'clear and obvious intent of the parties.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton, 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 31, 417 Ill.Dec. 743, 89 N.E.3d 391 (quoting Fort Dearborn Life Insurance Co. v. Holcomb , 316 Ill.App. 3d 485, 499, 249 Ill.Dec. 384, 736 N.E.2d 578 (2000) ). As this court has previously stated: "We look to the words of the actual power of attorney to see what powers were granted to respondent." In re Estate of Nicholls , 2011 IL App (4th) 100871, ¶ 25, 355 Ill.Dec. 635, 960 N.E.2d 78.

¶ 31 Defendant relies on the inserted language in paragraph three, which stated she had the "power to make gifts, exercise powers of appointment, name or change beneficiaries under any beneficiary form or contractual arrangement" to argue she had been granted the power to change a designated beneficiary to herself. However, the general powers granted to defendant pursuant to paragraph three did not specifically include the power to change the beneficiary on Billy's IRA to herself, a presumed fraudulent act of self-dealing. Thus, we find no authorization for such transaction in the document itself.

¶ 32 D. Rebuttable Presumption of Fraudulent Transaction

¶ 33 Absent the expression of authority in the document itself to designate herself a beneficiary, it is presumed defendant engaged in an act of fraudulent self-dealing. As such, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this issue unless evidence exists to rebut the presumption of fraud. See Franciscan Sisters , 95 Ill.2d at 462, 69 Ill.Dec. 960, 448 N.E.2d 872 ("If evidence is introduced which is contrary to the presumption, the presumption will cease to operate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ).

¶ 34 "Some of the significant factors to be considered in determining if the presumption of fraud has been rebutted include whether the fiduciary made a frank disclosure to the principal of the information he had, whether the fiduciary paid adequate consideration, and whether the principal had competent and independent advice." Spring Valley Nursing Center, L.P. , 2012 IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 13, 365 Ill.Dec. 131, 977 N.E.2d 1230. No such evidence exists in the record before us.

¶ 35 There is no question that, under the law, defendant's act of changing the beneficiary of Billy's IRA from plaintiffs to herself gave rise to a presumption of fraud. See Clark , 398 Ill. at 601, 76 N.E.2d 446 ; Spring Valley Nursing Center, L.P. , 2012 IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 15, 365 Ill.Dec. 131, 977 N.E.2d 1230. The presumption is strengthened by the absence of (1) specific language in the power of attorney authorizing such transaction and (2) any other evidence of Billy's intent. Further, nothing in the record suggests defendant acted in a manner directed by Billy, that Billy received separate and independent advice on the matter, or that he intended to name defendant, while removing plaintiffs as beneficiaries on his IRA. See Spring Valley Nursing Center, L.P. , 2012 IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 16, 365 Ill.Dec. 131, 977 N.E.2d 1230.

¶ 36 Here, defendant is unable to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence she indeed had the authority as Billy's agent to self-deal. Defendant did not carry her burden of rebutting the presumption of fraud related to her self-dealing transaction. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.

¶ 37 E. Attorney Fees

¶ 38 Defendant next contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs pursuant to section 2-7(f) of the Act. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(f) (West 2010). That section provides as follows:

"An agent that violates this Act is liable to the principal or the principal's successors in interest for the amount required (i) to restore the value of the principal's property to what it would have been had the violation not occurred, and (ii) to reimburse the principal or the principal's successors in interest for the attorney's fees and costs paid on the agent's behalf. This subsection does not limit any other applicable legal or equitable remedies." 755 ILCS 45/2-7(f) (West 2010).

¶ 39 The legislative intent behind this section of the Act suggests that attorney fees should be awarded whenever a violation of the Act is proved in order to make the principal's estate whole. That is, an award of attorney fees under this section does not involve an attorney's right to recover payment from his client pursuant to the express terms of their contract. Instead, an award determination involves an attorney's right to statutory fees against his clients' tortfeasor. See Berlak v. Villa Scalabrini Home for the Aged, Inc. , 284 Ill.App.3d 231, 240, 219 Ill.Dec. 601, 671 N.E.2d 768 (1996). The existence of a contingent fee contract is a relevant factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. Berlak , 284 Ill.App.3d at 241, 219 Ill.Dec. 601, 671 N.E.2d 768.

¶ 40 The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees. Relying on the statutory intent of making plaintiffs whole, the court found "the costs and fees to correct the wrongdoing of the defendant should not fall on the plaintiffs in any way." Counsel for plaintiffs indicated to the court that they were retained by plaintiffs on a one-third contingency contract plus costs. After reviewing an affidavit from plaintiffs' counsel, the retainer agreement on the contingent fee, and the representation from the bank that the IRA had a value of $44,496.46 as of January 23, 2011 (the date of Billy's death), the court entered judgment against defendant for attorney fees in the amount of $14,832.15, representing one third of the value of the IRA, plus costs.

¶ 41 The general rule is that parties in a lawsuit are responsible for their own attorney fees. Myers v. Popp Enterprises, Inc. , 216 Ill.App. 3d 830, 838, 159 Ill.Dec. 783, 576 N.E.2d 452 (1991). However, a court may award attorney fees if they are expressly authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties. In re Marriage of Magnuson , 156 Ill.App. 3d 691, 700, 109 Ill.Dec. 569, 510 N.E.2d 437 (1987). Only those fees that are reasonable will be allowed. LaHood v. Couri , 236 Ill.App. 3d 641, 648, 177 Ill.Dec. 791, 603 N.E.2d 1165 (1992). "This court has held that, for purposes of determining statutory attorney fees, the term 'reasonable' applies regardless of the nature of the client's contractual relationship with his attorney." Blankenship v. Dialist International Corp. , 209 Ill.App. 3d 920, 927, 154 Ill.Dec. 503, 568 N.E.2d 503 (1991). The trial court's decision in awarding statutory attorney fees will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Blankenship , 209 Ill.App. 3d at 927, 154 Ill.Dec. 503, 568 N.E.2d 503.

¶ 42 However, "an attorney fee award cannot be based solely on an amount necessary to satisfy a contingent fee agreement existing between an attorney and a client." Collins v. Hurst , 316 Ill.App. 3d 171, 173, 249 Ill.Dec. 406, 736 N.E.2d 600 (2000). Though the trial court found the contingent fee agreement between plaintiffs and their attorney reasonable, defendant was not a party to that agreement. Further, the statute allowing for an award of attorney fees in this case did not provide for the payment of fees based on a contingent fee. While a court may consider the existence of a contingent fee agreement, it is only one factor of many to be examined to determine the reasonableness of the award. See Blankenship , 209 Ill.App. 3d at 927, 154 Ill.Dec. 503, 568 N.E.2d 503. Where a statute allows fees to be paid to the other party, the fee must be reasonable regardless of the agreement between the litigant and his attorney. Blankenship , 209 Ill.App. 3d at 927, 154 Ill.Dec. 503, 568 N.E.2d 503.

¶ 43 In this case, the trial court appropriately enforced the attorney fee provision contained in the statute after finding defendant had violated the Act. The court then determined the above-referenced contingent fee constituted a reasonable award in this case. Plaintiffs' counsel provided an affidavit in support of their motion for fees. Counsel averred that two attorneys worked a total of 134.5 hours between them on this case. At their respective hourly rates, their fees totaled $25,290. However, as noted, the fee due on the contingency contract equaled $14,832.15, as one-third of the value of the IRA at the time of Billy's death. The court found the contingency fee to be a reasonable award. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of plaintiffs' contingency-fee agreement and subsequent award of attorney fees in this case.

¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the reasons stated, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.

Justices Holder White and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.