author: MATHIAS, Judge.

text:
    David WISE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 49A02-1301-CR-1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Oct. 31, 2013.

      Elizabeth C. Milliken, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

MATHIAS, Judge.

David C. Wise (“Wise”) brings this interlocutory appeal from the order of the Marion Superior Court denying his pre-trial motion in limine which sought to exclude evidence regarding video recordings of video files found on Wise’s mobile phone. Concluding sua sponte that Wise’s motion to certify the trial court’s order for interlocutory appeal was deemed denied by operation of Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(e), we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 10, 2011, Wise’s wife, M.W., informed the police that she had discovered video files on Wise’s mobile phone that depicted a man she identified as Wise performing sexual acts on her while she was unconscious. She also suspected that Wise had been drugging her so that he could perform these sexual acts on her. Because she did not have the proper cable to connect Wise’s phone to a computer and did not otherwise know how to move the files off the phone, M.W. decided to use a camcorder to record video of these files playing on Wise’s telephone. M.W. also altered the names of the files on the phone to indicate to Wise that she had found the videos and considered Wise to be a rapist.

On August 25, 2011, the State charged Wise with one count of Class B felony rape and five counts of criminal deviate conduct. On September 6, 2012, Wise filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from evidence the video M.W. had taken of the video files playing on the phone. The trial court held a hearing on the motion in limine on September 26, 2012, after which it denied the motion. Wise filed a motion to reconsider on October 22, 2012, along with a motion requesting that the trial court certify its order for interlocutory appeal. On November 14, 2012, the trial court denied Wise’s motion to reconsider. But the trial court did not grant Wise’s motion to certify its earlier order for interlocutory appeal until December 4, 2012. On February 8, 2013, our motions panel accepted interlocutory jurisdiction of this case, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

All parties agree that this case is controlled by Appellate Rule 14(B), which governs discretionary interlocutory appeals. This rule generally provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from other interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal.” App. R. 14(B). The rule provides for a two-step process to initiate a discretionary interlocutory appeal: first the trial court must certify its order for interlocutory appeal; then, if the trial court does so, this court may accept interlocutory jurisdiction over the case. See App. R. 14(B); State v. Foy, 862 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007).

Appellate Rule 14(B)(1) sets forth the process involved in certifying a trial court’s order for interlocutory appeal. First, the party seeking certification must file a motion requesting certification within thirty days after the date the interlocutory order is noted in the Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”). App. R. 14(B)(1)(a). Here, the trial court’s order denying Wise’s motion in limine was noted in the CCS on September 26, 2012. Wise’s motion to certify was filed on October 22, 2012, within this thirty-day period. Next, any response to the motion to certify must be filed within fifteen days after service of the motion. App. R. 14(B)(1)(d). Here, the State filed its response on October 24, 2012, which was well within this time limit.

At issue here is Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(e), which provides:

Ruling on Motion by the Trial Court. In the event the trial court fails for thirty (30) days to set the motion for hearing or fails to rule on the motion within thirty (30) days after it was heard or thirty (30) days after it was filed, if no hearing is set, the motion requesting certification of an interlocutory order shall be deemed denied.

The CCS in the present case does not indicate that the trial court set a hearing on Wise’s motion to certify. Therefore, his motion was deemed denied thirty days after it was filed, i.e., November 22, 2012. Nevertheless, the trial court purported to grant the motion on December 4, 2012. Although Wise filed a motion with this court within thirty days of the trial court’s order purporting to grant certification, Wise’s motion had already been deemed denied by operation of Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(e).

We are unable to conclude that the trial court’s belated certification complies with Appellate Rule 14(B)’s time limitations. To hold otherwise would effectively nullify the “deemed denied” provision of Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(e), the clear purpose of which is to limit the amount of time a trial court has to rule on a motion to certify. We therefore conclude that, by operation of Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(e), Wise’s motion to certify was deemed denied, and the trial court could not resuscitate Wise’s motion by belatedly granting it after it had been deemed denied.

It is well established that we may reconsider a ruling by our motions panel. Treacy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 634, 636 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. More specifically, we have the authority to reconsider our motions panel’s initial ruling on a motion to accept interlocutory jurisdiction. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 854 N.E.2d 355, 358-59 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (holding that this court had authority to reconsider our motions panel’s initial refusal to accept interlocutory jurisdiction), summarily ajfd in relevant part, 878 N.E.2d 189, 191 n. 2 (Ind. 2007).

Here, our review of the record reveals that Wise’s motion to certify the trial court’s order for interlocutory appeal was deemed denied. Without proper certification, we have no jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal. Wesley v. State, 696 N.E.2d 882, 883 (Ind.CtApp.1998). Thus, our earlier decision to accept jurisdiction was improper, and we accordingly dismiss this appeal.

Dismissed.

NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.

      .The State argues that we should reconsider our motions panel's acceptance of discretionary interlocutory jurisdiction, but does not argue that the trial court's certification was improper. Regardless, without proper certification, we are without jurisdiction to consider a discretionary interlocutory appeal. Wesley v. State, 696 N.E.2d 882, 883 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). And jurisdiction is an issue that we can, and indeed must, consider sua sponte. See Tarrance v. State, 947 N.E.2d 494, 495 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

      . Judge Bailey and Senior Judge Barteau voted to accept jurisdiction, but Judge Barnes voted to deny jurisdiction.

      . There is no suggestion that the trial court's order on Wise’s motion in limine was an order from which an interlocutory appeal can be taken as of right pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(A).

      . The parties did discuss the possibility of an interlocutory appeal at a pretrial hearing on October 17, 2012, before Wise filed his motion to certify. The parties also briefly discussed the question of an interlocutory appeal at the pretrial hearing held on November 15, 2012. But the CCS does not indicate that the trial court ever set a hearing on the motion to certify.

      . The fact that Wise filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's denial of his motion in limine does not alter our analysis in any way. Indiana Trial Rule 53.4(A) plainly states that a motion to reconsider "shall not ... extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion, or proceeding under these rules," which includes the Appellate Rules. See Johnson v. Estate of Brazill, 917 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROBB, Chief Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. William GILBERT, Appellee-Defendant.
    No. 49A05-1303-CR-140.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Nov. 5, 2013.

      Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Brian Reitz, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
   OPINION

ROBB, Chief Judge.

Case Summary and Issue

The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s decision to grant William Gilbert’s motion to suppress, raising the following issue: whether Gilbert’s arrest and transportation to a roll call site without first conducting field sobriety tests or administering a portable breath test violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Concluding the arresting officer had probable cause to suspect Gilbert was operating a vehicle while intoxicated, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On December 11, 2012, Officer Jeremy Johnson of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was observing traffic when he witnessed a vehicle, driven by Gilbert, roll through a stop sign. Officer Johnson initiated a traffic stop, and when he approached Gilbert’s vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol. Upon request for his driver’s license, Gilbert gave Officer Johnson a work identification card but was able to produce a driver’s license after further prompting by Officer Johnson. Officer Johnson asked Gilbert to exit the vehicle, and Gilbert stumbled when he attempted to get out.

Officer Johnson detained Gilbert and radioed Officer Anthony Patz, who specializes in DUI investigation, for assistance. At Officer Patz’s request, Officer Johnson transported Gilbert to a roll call site for further investigation. Officer Johnson initiated the twenty minute observation period required before conducting a chemical breath test and ensured that nothing was placed in Gilbert’s mouth.

After Gilbert’s arrival at the roll call site, Officer Patz conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which Gilbert failed. Gilbert informed Officer Patz that he had bad knees, so additional field sobriety tests were not conducted. Officer Patz then administered a portable breath test, which tested positive for alcohol. Officer Patz read Gilbert the Indiana Implied Consent Law, and Gilbert agreed to take a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol level.

The State charged Gilbert with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor; operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to stop at an intersection, a Class C infraction. Gilbert filed a motion to suppress, and an evidentiary hearing was held on that motion. The trial court granted Gilbert’s motion to suppress, concluding there was not probable cause to arrest Gilbert and transport him to the roll call site. The State dismissed all charges against Gilbert following the suppression and now brings this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress, the reviewing court determines whether the record contains “substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court’s decision.” State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.2008) (citation omitted). We will not reweigh the evidence. Id. Because the State is appealing from a negative judgment, it must show that the trial court’s decision to suppress was contrary to law. Id. Determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are reviewed de novo. Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146,1150 (Ind.2005).

II. Seizure of a Person

The State argues on appeal that probable cause existed such that Officer Johnson’s decision to detain Gilbert and transport him to the roll call site did not violate Gilbert’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, the State maintains that the strong odor of alcohol along with Gilbert’s acts of running a stop sign and stumbling when exiting his car constituted probable cause that justified the officer’s decision to place Gilbert into custody.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures includes seizure of a person. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690(1991). Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has been seized if, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). An arrest qualifies as a “seizure” under the amendment. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). “[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537(2004). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed” Taylor v. State, 273 Ind. 558, 561, 406 N.E.2d 247, 249-50 (1980) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)) (quotation marks omitted).

It is well-settled that an officer’s detection of the odor of alcohol combined with other indicia of intoxication, like unsafe driving, constitutes probable cause to believe a person is driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind.1994); Dalton v. State, 773 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; State v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 431, 432 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied. Here, Officer Johnson smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from Gilbert and observed Gilbert run a stop sign and stumble while attempting to exit his vehicle. These observations are sufficient to constitute probable cause, and therefore, Gilbert’s arrest and transportation to the roll call site did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

A review of the suppression hearing transcript reveals that the trial court’s error was based on two misunderstandings of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the trial court believed that removing Gilbert from the scene of the traffic stop was improper without first conducting field sobriety tests or administering a portable breath test. This mistaken belief stems from a confusion between the reasonableness of an investigatory stop and an arrest. It is true that an investigatory stop on “less than probable cause” (i.e. reasonable suspicion) must be “temporary and last no longer than is necessary

to effectuate the purpose of the stop ... [and] should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 419-20, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (majority of Supreme Court citing Royer and recognizing limitations on investigatory stops). This limitation includes the length of a detention and the transfer of a suspect to a different location. See State v. McCaa, 963 N.E.2d 24, 29-33 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. However, once probable cause is established, an arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the duration and scope limitations of the investigatory stop analysis are no longer in play. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (stating that investigatory stops are narrow intrusions justifiable by reasonable suspicion, “but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149, 1158 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“The requirement that an officer use the least intrusive means of investigation during a Terry stop is necessary because the officer is making the stop without probable cause.”), trans. denied. Here, even without conducting field sobriety tests or administering a portable breath test, the officer had probable cause to suspect Gilbert was driving while intoxicated. Therefore, Gilbert’s seizure and removal from the scene did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Second, the trial court believed that cases such as Johnson, supra, were inapplicable because they dealt with probable cause justifying searches, not seizures. But the concept of probable cause is derived from the Fourth Amendment and is common among both searches and seizures. See Powers v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1096,1103 (Ind.1982) (“Although the above cited case dealt with probable cause for arrest, we feel the rationale is similar for probable cause in issuing a search warrant.”), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 1876, 76 L.Edüd 808 (1983). The probable cause necessary to offer a chemical breath test is the same probable cause that renders an arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, Gilbert argued at the suppression hearing that the officers’ failure to inquire about his false teeth makes the chemical breath test results inadmissible. Although the trial court did not grant Gilbert’s motion to suppress on this issue, such an argument could potentially be raised again at trial, and thus we will briefly address it here. In Guy v. State, our supreme court held that the presence of a tongue stud placed in the defendant’s mouth more than twenty minutes before a breath test did not render the test inadmissible. 823 N.E.2d 274, 275 (Ind.2005). The court examined the administrative code controlling the procedure for conducting a breath test and said “[t]he logical conclusion to draw from the department of toxicology’s use of the word ‘put’ is that any foreign substance placed in a person’s mouth more than twenty minutes prior to a breath test poses no problem for the reliability of the results.” Id. at 276 (referring to 260 Ind. Admin. Code l.l-4-8(l) (“The person to be tested must ... not have put any foreign substance into his or her mouth or respiratory tract ... within twenty (20) minutes before the time a breath sample is taken.”))- Moreover, Justice Boehm’s concurring opinion specifically stated that objects, including “dentures,” were not “foreign” within the meaning of the regulation “if ordinarily found in the person’s mouth.” Id. at 277 (Boehm, J., concurring). We believe our supreme court’s decision in Guy precludes Gilbert’s argument that his false teeth make the breath test results inadmissible.

Conclusion

Because Officer Johnson had probable cause to suspect Gilbert was operating a vehicle while intoxicated, we conclude that Gilbert’s arrest and transportation to the roll call site did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Reversed.

RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J. concur.

      . We note that Gilbert did not file an Appel-lee’s Brief in this case. When a defendant fails to file a brief in response, this court is not required to develop arguments on his behalf. State v. C.D., 947 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). We may reverse the trial court’s decision if the appellant establishes prima facie error — that is, error "at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it." Id. (citation omitted). But the burden remains on the State to establish the trial court’s decision was erroneous. Id.

      . We do not mean to suggest by our holding that police officers should routinely remove a suspect from the scene of a traffic stop before field sobriety tests are performed. We believe that best practice has been and continues to be the administration of field sobriety tests at the scene of a traffic stop, as this practice will either strengthen or dispel an officer's suspicions before subjecting a suspect to the inconvenience of an arrest.


text:
    Ritchie HODGES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 06A01-1210-CR-466.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Nov. 5, 2013.
    Mark Small, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

ROBB, Chief Judge.

Ritchie Hodges appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending the court erred in finding that post-conviction review was not available for his claim. The State, although having originally sought the dismissal, now agrees that Hodges’s claim is reviewable in post-conviction proceedings. Concluding that Hodges and the State are correct, we reverse the dismissal and remand for a hearing on Hodges’s post-conviction petition.

Following a guilty plea, Hodges was convicted of three counts of possession of child pornography and one count of voyeurism, all Class D felonies. He was ordered to serve a six-year sentence with a four-year direct commitment to community corrections and the final two years suspended to probation. After a hearing in September 2012, Hodges’s community corrections placement was revoked and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his executed sentence at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). In a separate proceeding at which the September 2012 hearing was incorporated, Hodges’s probation was also revoked and his probationary period was ordered served as executed time. Hodges’s appeals of both revocations were consolidated by this court. At Hodges’s request, this court subsequently dismissed his appeal without prejudice to allow him to pursue post-conviction relief.

Hodges filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his community corrections revocation hearing, and therefore, his placement was unlawfully revoked. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule l(l)(a)(5). The State filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the post-conviction rules did not provide Hodges an avenue for relief because his petition was a collateral attack on the change of his placement from community corrections to the DOC, rather than on his conviction or sentence. See PC.R. l(l)(a)(6). Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the post-conviction court found that “a sole claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at a change of placement hearing does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Post Conviction Rule 1(a)(6).” Appellant’s Appendix at 22. The post-conviction court therefore granted the State’s motion to dismiss and vacated the hearing set on the post-conviction petition.

Hodges appeals the dismissal, contending, as he did in the post-conviction court, that Post^Conviction Rule l(l)(a)(5) entitles him to pursue relief. We agree, as the State also does on appeal, that subsection (5) allows Hodges to pursue post-conviction relief.

Post-Conviction Rule 1 provides that [a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime ..., and who claims:
(5) that his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief.

As the State notes, placement in a community corrections program is a form of conditional release in that “the defendant is conditionally released from serving his sentence in the [DOC] if he obeys the rules of the community corrections program.” Brief of Appellee at 6. See also Jones v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1271, 1280 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (“As with probation, placement in a community corrections program is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), tram, denied. Moreover, a person serving a community corrections placement is entitled to certain due process protections before the placement is revoked, including the right to counsel. See Ind.Code § 35-38 — 2—3(f) (“The person [alleged to have violated probation] is entitled to confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.”); Million v. State, 646 N.E.2d 998, 1002-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding the due process protections required for probation revocations are also required for community corrections placement revocations). Thus, Hodges’s allegation that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing to revoke his community corrections placement is a claim that his conditional release was unlawfully revoked. The trial court’s order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that the post-conviction rules do not allow his claim is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the merits of Hodges’s petition for post-conviction relief.

Reversed and remanded.

RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.

      . The State of course does not concede that Hodges's post-conviction claim is meritorious.


author: RUCKER, Justice.

text:
    Julie KITCHELL, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Ted FRANKLIN, as The Mayor of the City of Logansport, and the Common Council of the City of Logansport, Appellees (Defendants below).
    No. 09S00-1307-PL-476.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Nov. 13, 2013.

      Jim Brugh, Logansport, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Mark J. Crandley, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Ap-pellee Ted Franklin, as Mayor of the City of Logansport.
    John R. Molitor, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee Common Council of the City of Logansport.
   RUCKER, Justice.

In this case we address whether Indiana’s Public-Private Agreements statute requires a local legislative body to first adopt the statute before it may issue a request for proposals or begin contract negotiations as provided for under the statute. We hold it does not.

Background

In the first half of the nineteenth century a number of federal, state, and local governmental entities entered into ventures with private businesses to build railroads and canals in an effort to promote economic growth. The public entities raised money to invest in private companies, not only by issuing bonds but by extending credit and guaranteeing loans with insufficient collateral as security. Many of these projects failed. When they did, the public entities suffered severe financial difficulties. In response, they adopted limitations on debt and restrictions on extensions of credit to private parties. Accordingly, public entities were no longer allowed to incur debt unless it was authorized by law with an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on the debt as it fell due, to be paid off within a specified number of years. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Constitutional and Statutory Aspects of Municipal Debt Finance: Recent Developments, Practicing Law Institute, Tenth Annual Institute on Municipal Finance: Financing State and Local Governments in the 1990’s, 377 PLI/REAL 9 (1991); Stewart E. Sterk and Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L.Rev. 1301 (1991).

Indeed Indiana’s second constitutional convention was partially a product of the overwhelming debt the State had incurred under its “internal improvement system,” which included the construction of canals, turnpikes, and railroads. N. Ind. Bank & Trust Co. v. State Bd. of Fin., 457 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind.1983). See also David J. Bodenhamer and Randall T. Shepard, The Narratives and Countemarratives of Indiana Legal History, in The History of Indiana Law 7, 9 (David J. Bodenhamer and Randall T. Shepard, eds., 2006). In consequence the 1850 convention passed, and the voters later ratified, a constitutional debt limit which provides in relevant part, “No political or municipal corporation in this State shall ever become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, in the aggregate, exceeding two per centum on the value of the taxable property within such corporation....’’ See Ind. Const, art. 13, § 1. A constitutional debt limit “placets] constraints on governmental borrowing power to protect present and future taxpayers from the excesses of legislative fiscal irresponsibility.” Reuven Mark Bisk, Note, State and Municipal Lease-Purchase Agreements: A Reassessment 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 521, 521 (1984). This means that government entities must struggle both to “fulfill their governmental responsibilities and avoid violating debt limitations.” Id.

The Indiana General Assembly has enacted various statutes that provide creative mechanisms allowing municipal corporations and political subdivisions to finance public projects in a manner that does not violate Indiana’s constitutional debt limitations. See Adolph H. Zwerner, Indiana Municipal Revenue Bond Financing, 12 Ind. L.J. 266, 274-78 (1937) (enumerating legislative enactments); cf. Bisk, supra, at 522 (recognizing lease-purchase agreements as a common mechanism employed by elected officials). One of these Indiana mechanisms is commonly referred to as the Public-Private Agreements Act (the “Act”). See Ind.Code §§ 5-23-1-1 through 5-23-7-2. Among other things the Act “permits agreements between a governmental body and a private operator to construct, operate, and maintain a public facility.” City of Gary Common Council v. White River Envtl. P’ship — Gary, 713 N.E.2d 893, 894 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

First enacted in 1995 the Act authorizes and provides guidelines for the implementation of what are known as “public-private partnerships” which can be described as:

“Contractual agreements] formed between public and private sector partners, which allow[ ] more private sector participation than is traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with a private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility or system.” [Public-private partnerships or “PPPs”] cover as many as a dozen types of innovative contracting, project delivery and financing arrangements between public and private sector partners. In PPPs, the private sector performs functions normally undertaken by the government, but the public sector remains ultimately accountable for the facility and the overall service to the public.

Jaime Rail, et al., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Public-Private Partnerships for Transportation: A Toolkit for Legislators 1 (2010) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Report to Congress on Public-Private Partnerships (2004)). Despite their name, public-private partnerships rarely take the legal form of a partnership but rather function as government procurement agreements. Dominique Custos & John Reitz, Public-Private Partnerships, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 555, 559-60 (2010) (footnote omitted). These arrangements are attractive to governmental entities because they enable the entities to “shift much of the financing, maintenance, and/or operating costs for public infrastructure to private contractors, who may then be allowed to recoup their costs through tolls or other user payments, thus enabling the government to use the market to accomplish its purposes and to relieve public budgets of the financial burden associated with infrastructure upgrading and maintenance.” Id. at 555.

In relevant part, Indiana’s Public-Private Agreements Act “applies to” among other entities “[a] political subdivision in a county where ... the legislative body of the political subdivision ... adopts the provisions of this article by resolution or ordinance.” I.C. § 5-23-1-1(3). The Act requires “the governmental body to request proposals under this chapter before entering into the public-private agreement,” I.C. § 5-23-5-1, and after receiving proposals to “negotiate the best and final offers of responsible offerors who submit proposals that are determined to be reasonably susceptible of being selected for a public-private agreement.” I.C. § 5-23-5-7. The Act further provides in pertinent part:

If a recommendation to award the public-private agreement is made to the board, the board shall schedule a public hearing on the recommendation and publish notice of the hearing one (1) time in accordance with IC 5-3-1 at least seven (7) days before the hearing. The notice shall include the following:
(1) The date, time, and place of the hearing.
(2) The subject matter of the hearing.
(3) A description of the public-private agreement to be awarded.
(4) The recommendation that has been made to award the public-private agreement to an identified offeror or offerors.
(5) The address and telephone number of the board.
(6) A statement indicating that the proposals and an explanation of the basis upon which the recommendation is being made are available for public inspection and copying at the principal office of the board during regular business hours.

1.C. § 5-23-5-9. Finally, the Act provides “[ajfter the procedures required in this chapter have been completed, the board shall make a determination as to the most appropriate response to the request for proposals and may award the public-private agreement to the successful offeror or offerors.” I.C. § 5-23-5-11.

Facts and Procedural History

The City of Logansport is exploring a means to replace an existing coal powered electric facility with one that will generate electricity primarily through refuse-derived fuels. This process uses recycled solid waste to produce energy. The replacement plant will also use natural gas as a backup fuel source. This modernized power plant will be more environmentally sound, provide more capacity to generate electricity, allow for potentially lower rates to the City’s ratepayers, and aid in economic development by providing affordable energy to potential new employers.

To determine how to employ this technology in the most cost-effective manner, the City studied the possibility of entering a public-private partnership with an entity that could construct, operate, and maintain a public facility and transfer it back to City at a future date. On November 28, 2012 the City — through its Utility Service Board (the “Board”) — issued a request for proposals (“RFP”) seeking:

[A] provider to enter into a public-private agreement ... with the City of Logansport ... through its Utility Service Board ... under the provisions of I.C. 5-23 ... for the purpose of design, construction, financing, maintenance and transfer to the City, [a project to] consist of ... converting the two existing coal-fired steam turbine generators ... to utilize refuse derived fuel pellets ... as their primary fuel, with natural gas backup.

App. at 12. The project also called for the expansion of the utility’s generating capacity. Id. After reviewing proposals submitted by six vendors in response to the RFP and after discussing and negotiating with the offerors, at a public hearing the Board recommended that the City execute a memorandum of understanding with Pyro-lyzer, LLC to undertake the project. The Logansport Common Council accepted the Board’s recommendation and on February 14, 2013 (after a first reading) and March 4, 2013 (after a second reading) passed Ordinance No.2013-07 authorizing the mayor to enter into a memorandum of understanding and negotiate an agreement with Pyrolyzer. Among other things the Ordinance declared:

Pursuant to Ind.Code § 5-23-5-11, the Executive is hereby authorized, on behalf of the City, to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Operator.... Upon execution of a Memorandum of Understanding with the Operator, the Executive is further authorized to negotiate a BOT Agreement with the Operator[], all in accordance with the provisions of Ind. Code §§ 5-23-1-1-5-23-7-2.

App. at 26. Also on March 4, 2013, the Council passed Resolution No.2013-08 adopting the Public-Private Agreement Act specifically declaring:

[T]he [Council] has pending before it a proposed ordinance that would accept the aforesaid recommendation of its Utilities Service Board [to pursue an agreement with Pyrolyzer], and accordingly the Council now desires, pursuant to Ind.Code § 5-23-1-1, to formally adopt the provisions of the PPA Law and, pursuant to Ind.Code § 36-1-4-16, to formally ratify [the utility’s] issuance of the RFP and all other acts heretofore taken by [the utility and the Board] in accordance with the PPA Law[.]

Id. at 29.

Julie Kitchell is a resident of the City of Logansport and is a ratepayer to the municipal utility that currently supplies her electricity. On March 15, 2013 Kitchell filed a petition in the Cass Superior Court against Logansport Mayor Ted Franklin and the Common Council (referred to collectively as “City”) seeking a declaration that Ordinance 2013-07 is invalid. The mayor filed a combined “Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Expedite and Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.” Id. at 31. The motion to dismiss was based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). A few days later on March 22, 2013 the Council filed its “Answer and Additional Defenses.” Id. at 46. As to defenses, the City alleged, among other things: “The Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [and the] Plaintiff lacks standing to file the Petition.” Id. at 50. The mayor filed a memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss and Kitchell responded with a memorandum in opposition. The record does not reflect that a hearing was held on the motion. In any event, on April 10, 2013, the trial court entered an order granting the City’s motion declaring in part: “Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” App. at 4. Kitchell appealed and the City filed a verified motion to transfer jurisdiction to this Court under Appellate Rule 56(A). After consideration, we granted the motion and assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Standard of Review

“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it.” Charter One Mortg. Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind.2007). Review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion based on Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is therefore de novo. Id. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, “we view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in the non-movant’s favor.” Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ind.2009). “[A] complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to relief.” City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind.2001).

Discussion

I.

In this case Kitchell contends that Ordinance 2013-07 is invalid because “the City did not have the authority to pass the ordinance.” Br. of Appellant at 17. Kitc-hell insists that the Public-Private Agreements Act dictates that before the City could issue an RFP to enter into a public-private agreement, the City was first required to have an ordinance in place empowering itself to enter into such agreements. Noting that the City issued the RFP on November 28, 2012 and the Ordinance was not passed until March 4, 2013, Kitchell argues, “[ljegislation enabling a city to use the statutory Public-Private Agreement Law must come first; any RFPs, negotiations, or legislation must follow.” Id. at 18. In essence, Kitchell complains about the sequence in which the Ordinance was passed. Kitchell continues, “the Ordinance is invalid because the City failed to take the mandatory first step in the multi-step procedure; that is, the City failed to empower itself to enter into a public-private agreement. Such ordinance or resolution of empowerment is a condition precedent to any effectiveness for the Ordinance.” Id. at 13-14. The City counters that the Act mandates no such “first step” but rather only requires that the City adopt the Act before actually entering into a public-private agreement. See Br. of Appellees at 8. And, according to the City as of the date of its Appellees’ Brief (July 5, 2013) no such agreement has been reached.

We note in passing that Kite-hell’s focus on the Ordinance is misplaced. The Ordinance merely gave Mayor Franklin the authority to enter into a memorandum of understanding and to negotiate an agreement with Pyrolyzer. It is the Resolution — not the Ordinance — that incorporated the Public-Private Agreement Act into local law. In any event when interpreting a statute our goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Porter Dev., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Valparaiso, 866 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ind.2007). In determining legislative intent, we “consider the objects and purposes of the statute as well as the effects and repercussions of’ our interpretation. Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind.2003). “The legislative intent as ascertained from the provision as a whole prevails over the strict literal meaning of any word or term.” Id. Further, Courts may not “engraft new words” onto a statute or add restrictions where none exist. See State ex rel. Monchecourt v. Vigo Cir. Ct., 240 Ind. 168, 162 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1959) (refusing to infer the guardianship statute contained an additional requirement not in the plain language).

Kitehell’s entire argument is premised on the tense of the verbs “applies” and “adopts.” More precisely, Indiana Code section 5-23-1-1 provides in relevant part: “This article applies to ... [a] political subdivision in a county where ... the legislative body of the political subdivision ... adopts the provisions of this article by resolution or ordinance.” (emphasis added). According to Kitchell, because this provision uses present tense verbs, the legislature “obviously mean[t] that the acts of application [of the Act] and adoption [of the Act] are simultaneous.” Br. of Appellant at 14. In support of her argument Kitchell cites authority for the proposition that:

It is not unusual for state legislatures, especially in the nonhome rule states, to provide that a statute expressed in terms of general application shall take effect in each local government only upon its acceptance by such entity, or by the governing body thereof. A vote of the designated body accepting the legislation for any particular local government is thus made a condition precedent to any effectiveness of the statute in that locality.

Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added and omitted) (quoting Antieau On Local Government Law § 25.21[1] (2d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted)).

Setting aside the fact that Indiana is a home rule state, see, e.g., Kole v. Faultless, 963 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind.2012), thus calling into question the persuasiveness of the authority on which Kitchell relies, we note the home rule statute provides in relevant part: “[i]f there is a constitutional or statutory provision requiring a specific manner for exercising a power, a unit wanting to exercise the power must do so in that manner.” I.C. § 36-1-3-6. The question in this case is whether the “specific manner” required before a City may exercise the power to enter a public-private agreement includes a sequencing requirement. We think not. And Kitchell puts more weight on the words “applies” and “adopts” than the Act can bear. It is certainly the case the legislature has set forth particular procedures that must be followed in order that a political subdivision may enter into a contract under the Act. For example, the RFP must contain certain language, offer-ors must be treated fairly and equally, and a public hearing must be held and notice of such hearing must be published in a particular way and contain particular language. I.C. §§ 5-23-5-2, -5, -9. But nowhere does the Act require a political subdivision to “adopt” the Act before taking any further action consistent with the Act. A reading of the Act as a whole indicates that it is designed to promote economic development which is executed in way that is transparent and open to public input and scrutiny. The record before us reflects that the City complied with the Act in every particular. Viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Kitchell, and with every inference construed in her favor, we conclude that as a matter of law Kitchell is not entitled to relief. Thus the trial court properly granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II.

The City requests an award of appellate attorneys’ fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E), which provides in part: “The Court may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court’s discretion and may include attorneys’ fees.” But the City makes no argument and cites no authority that would support such an award in these circumstances. We thus decline to exercise our authority to award appellate attorneys’ fees.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DICKSON, C.J., and DAVID, MASSA and RUSH, JJ., concur.

      . Originally codified as Indiana Code sections 36-1-14.3-1 to -12, the statute was repealed and replaced in 1998 by Indiana Code sections 5-23-1-1 through 5-23-7-2.

      . Because this case comes before us upon a motion to dismiss, the facts set forth herein are taken from the plaintiffs pleadings which include attached exhibits.

      . For purposes of the Act, " 'BOT agreement' means any agreement between a governmental body and an operator to construct, operate, and maintain a public facility and to transfer the public facility back to the governmental body at an established future date.” I.C. § 5-23-2-3. " ‘Operator’ means a person who has entered into either an operating agreement or a BOT agreement with a governmental body to provide services to or on behalf of the governmental body.” I.C. § 5-23-2-8.

      . In its written order the trial court also set forth additional reasons for granting the motion to dismiss:
      2.Logansport has adopted the provisions of Article 23, Title 5 of the Indiana Code.
      3. The pleadings do not allege that the plaintiff sustained, or was in imminent danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct of either the Mayor or Common Council of the City of Logansport.
      4. Logansport Ordinance No.2013-07 is a valid exercise of municipal authority.
      App. at 4. Contending that the issue of standing is implicated by the trial court’s reason number three, both sides argue its propriety. Because we conclude the trial court’s first asserted ground is dispositive, we decline to address any alternative rationale.

      .The Rule provides:
      Motion Before Consideration by the Court of Appeals. In rare cases, the Supreme Court may, upon verified motion of a party, accept jurisdiction over an appeal that would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals upon a showing that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists requiring a speedy determination. If the Supreme Court grants the motion, it will transfer the case to the Supreme Court, where the case shall proceed as if it had been originally filed there. If a filing fee has already been paid in the Court of Appeals, no additional filing fee is required.
      Ind. Appellate Rule 56(A) (emphasis omitted).

      . Kitchell also seems to imply the Ordinance is "deemed vetoed” because the Mayor failed to sign it "within ten (10) days after” its passage. See Br. of Appellant at 12; I.C. § 36-4-6-16(a), (b). In support of this claim Kitchell attached to her Appendix the affidavit of her attorney in this case which makes various bald assertions. This purported pleading, filed with the clerk of Cass Superior Court on June 6, 2013, was not a part of KitcheH's complaint for declaratory relief, which the trial court denied on April 10, 2013. Thus the affidavit is not a part of the record and played no part in the trial court’s decision. Nor does it factor into our decision today. We remind counsel "[t]he purpose of an Appendix in civil appeals ... is to present the Court with copies of only those parts of the record on appeal that are necessary for the Court to decide the issues presented.” App. Rule 50(A).


author: DAVID, Justice.

text:
    Patrick AUSTIN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
    No. 20S03-1303-CR-158.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.

      Latasha R. Roberts, Adam Lenkowsky, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   DAVID, Justice.

Today we examine the bounds of acceptable police procedure in attempting to interdict interstate narcotics shipments under the Indiana Constitution, and also elaborate on the application of Indiana’s Rules of Criminal Procedure providing for a speedy trial.

In this case, a truck driver was arrested after a deliberate operation conducted by the Indiana State Police uncovered a large quantity of cocaine in the truck driver’s cargo. He requested a speedy trial, and when the trial court was unable to bring him to trial within the time limit because of court congestion he sought to be discharged from pre-trial incarceration. We find no error in the police action or in the continuance of the defendant’s trial, and therefore affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 28, 2011, Indiana State Trooper Joseph White was patrolling the Indiana State Toll Road in Porter County when he observed a semi-truck, driven by Patrick Austin, towing a trailer that Trooper White believed would normally be towed by a pickup truck. Concerned by the configuration, Trooper White initiated a traffic stop to perform an inspection of Austin’s truck and credentials.

Austin produced his driver’s license, medical card, shipping papers, logbook, and permits for the truck and trailer. Upon inspecting the materials, Trooper White noted that Austin’s logbook indicated he had been off work for seven days prior to beginning his current assignment and also that his destination was in Illinois but he was travelling east through Indiana. Additionally, Austin’s logbook and bills of lading indicated that he had begun his trip in California, carrying three vehicles — a Ford Mustang, a Rolls-Royce, and a Mercedes Benz — but the shipping papers were incomplete, with incomplete shipper names and blanks for the dates on which he had picked up his cargo. And when Trooper White questioned Austin about the blank pick-up dates, Austin filled the blanks in with dates in the future. Trooper White then asked Austin where he was going, and Austin indicated that he was going to a trailer parts store in Elkhart, Indiana, but did not know the name or address of the store nor was the store noted as a destination in Austin’s logbook or bills of lading.

These collective discrepancies caused Trooper White some concern, based on his training in commercial vehicle interdiction. He then contacted the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), a national intelligence center run by the Drug Enforcement Administration that tracks data on narcotics trafficking, and ran Austin’s name through the EPIC system. EPIC informed Trooper White that in 2009, Austin had been involved in a bulk-cash seizure of a million dollars in Michigan, in which he was pulling the same trailer with the same semi-truck. Trooper White asked Austin for consent to search the semi-truck and trailer, and Austin refused. Trooper White then told Austin that he was free to leave and Austin continued east. The total stop took around forty-five minutes.

Trooper White relayed his concerns about Austin to Detective John Dupont of the Indiana State Police and then headed west to complete paperwork and finish his shift. Dupont called Indiana State Trooper Mick Dockery, a senior canine handler and Level III inspector, and asked him to wait for Austin farther east on the Toll Road. With Trooper Dockery at the time was his canine partner, Hondo.

Additional surveillance officers were following Austin from the first traffic stop and relaying updates to Trooper Dockery. When those surveillance officers told Trooper Dockery that Austin was moving past his location, Trooper Dockery pulled onto the Toll Road and began following Austin’s vehicle. He observed Austin commit two traffic violations — failing to signal for a full three hundred feet before changing lanes and following too closely — and initiated a traffic stop.

Trooper Dockery inspected Austin’s logbook and bills of lading. He noted that Trooper White’s traffic stop was not logged in the logbook. He also noted the seven-day absence from work prior to Austin beginning his trip, that the bills of lading were handwritten and indicated pick-up dates in the future, and that Austin’s Department of Transportation number was very high. Based on those concerns and the information he had received earlier, Trooper Dockery asked Austin to exit his vehicle so he could perform an exterior search of the truck and trailer using his canine. Hondo alerted to the driver’s side door of the truck cab and the rear door of the trailer, indicating the presence of narcotics.

Trooper Dockery then opened the rear gate of the trailer and deployed Hondo inside, where the Mercedes Benz and Rolls-Royce vehicles were stored. Hondo alerted at the rear bumper of the Rolls-Royce. Trooper Dockery and other officers on-scene then obtained a search warrant to search the semi-truck, trailer, and the two cars inside. Inside the truck cab and its sleeper berth, officers found a number of latex gloves, hotel room keycards, and about a half-dozen air fresheners. No narcotics were found inside the cab or sleeper berth, but in the trunk of the Mercedes — inside a hidden compartment— were twenty-nine bricks of cocaine. An additional eleven bricks of cocaine were found in a suitcase inside the Rolls-Royce. The aggregate amount was forty kilos, or roughly ninety pounds, of cocaine. Austin was charged with two counts of dealing in cocaine, both as class A felonies due to the amount of cocaine involved. Ind. Code § 35 — 48—4—1(a)(2)(c)—1 (b)(1) (2008).

On June 6, 2011, Austin filed a request for a speedy trial and the trial court scheduled Austin’s case for an August 8 trial date. The State later filed a motion to continue Austin’s trial because of court congestion. Over Austin’s objection, the trial court granted the State’s motion and reset Austin’s trial for September 26. Austin then filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B), which the trial court denied.

Austin also moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that it was obtained in violation of both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, concluding that Trooper Dock-ery’s stop was a separate and distinct stop from Trooper White’s, was lawful because it resulted from two traffic violations, and that the subsequent canine sweep did not change the character of that stop. Austin properly renewed his objection at trial when the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop was admitted. Ultimately, Austin was convicted on both counts and received a forty-year sentence for each, to be served concurrently.

Austin appealed on a number of fronts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Austin v. State, 980 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). We granted transfer to address the police actions leading to the discovery of the cocaine in Austin’s trailer and the application of Criminal Rule 4(B), and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals in all other respects. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).

I. The Search of Austin’s Vehicle

On appeal, Austin appears to have dropped his argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and presents only a violation of Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. While both provisions preserve the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, from unreasonable search and seizure, U.S. Const, amend. IV; Ind. Const, art. 1, § 11, they are analyzed independently and differently. Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind.2010); Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 785-86 (Ind.2001).

Fourth Amendment analysis keys on a criminal defendant’s expectation of privacy, but under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution “ ‘we focus on the actions of the police officer,’ and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.” Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 17 (quoting Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006)). In doing so we balance “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 17-18 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.2005)). It is the State’s burden to show that its intrusion into “those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private” was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 (Ind.2006).

It is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340. Moreover, Austin concedes that a reasonable narcotics dog sweep is not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, § 11. See Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citing Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.2005)). However, such a sweep is an unreasonable investigatory detention if the motorist is held for longer than necessary to complete the officer’s work related to the traffic violation and the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in criminal activity. See Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340; Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d at 788.

Austin does not contest that he failed to properly signal a lane change and followed a vehicle too closely. He therefore does not (and cannot) contest that Trooper Dockery had probable cause to pull him over for those traffic violations. Rather, Austin appears to present a multi-faceted claim: that Trooper Dockery lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Austin past citing him for the traffic violations, and that Trooper Dockery’s traffic stop was a pretextual continuation of a search that ended when Trooper White allowed Austin to drive away. Applying the Litchfield factors here tells us he is incorrect on both counts.

First, the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge was significant. Trooper Dockery noted that Austin was nervous. He also saw that Austin’s logbook did not reflect the prior traffic stop and appeared to indicate an out-of-the-ordinary gap in driving time, both things he found suspicious and potential indicators of illicit activity. He also was concerned because of Austin’s high DOT number and the handwritten, inaccurate bills of lading. All of these things, based on his training as a narcotics interdiction officer, were indicators of Austin’s potential participation in drug smuggling. Moreover, he was aware of Trooper White’s independent suspicions, and was also aware of the results of the EPIC query — specifically, that Austin had been involved in a bulk-cash seizure in Michigan while driving the same truck and trailer.

Though these indicators may pass unnoticed to the average person, and may in fact constitute innocent mistakes in some cases, “[w]e acknowledge that conduct, which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer, might acquire significance when viewed by an officer who is familiar with the practices of drug smugglers and the methods used to avoid detection.” Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 343.

Austin is correct that in Qidrk this Court looked at' somewhat similar facts and reached a different result. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340-41 (defendant demonstrated nervous behavior, had handwritten bill of lading, had used aliases in the past, had criminal history including transporting controlled substance, lied about his criminal history, and had driver’s license issued from narcotics-source state). Many of those facts, though, were not shown in the record to have aroused police suspicion or were not relied upon by the trial court. See id. at 338-39, 341. We therefore found that such a “combination of irrelevant conduct and innocent conduct, without more, cannot be transformed into a suspicious conglomeration.” Id. at 343 (emphasis added). But at least two things distinguish Austin’s case from Quirk.

For one thing, here we see the “more” that was lacking in Quirk. For example, it was not simply that Austin’s bills of lading were handwritten that was suspicious — it was that they were incomplete and, when completed, were done in a way that indicated Austin was simply filling in dates at random. There were also gaps in his travel time, and Trooper White’s stop was omitted entirely. Also, Austin claimed to be going to Elkhart to pick up truck parts but could not identify where the parts store was, what it was called, or whether it was open. See id. at 342 (“[A]n inconsistent answer regarding past conduct is less suspicious than an inconsistent answer regarding present destination or purpose .... the latter casts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy of the activity being investigated.”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 928 (8th Cir.2001)). And finally, the results of the EPIC query — the same driver, the same truck, and the same trailer, hauling a million dollars in cash two years earlier— is much more significant than Quirk’s criminal history, which was thirteen years or more in his past. Id. at 341 — 42.

And second, though we did not need to resolve Quirk with an explicit analysis of each of the Litchfield factors, it is clear that the second factor — the degree of the State intrusion on the citizen’s ordinary activity — was far greater in Quirk than here. In Quirk, the defendant was pulled over for a traffic violation, asked about his aliases and criminal history, and then received a ticket for the violation and was told he was free to leave. Immediately thereafter, however, he was called back to a patrol car and questioned about whether he was carrying illegal substances. Quirk answered that he was not and consented to a search of his trailer, which revealed only lettuce. Quirk was then allowed to leave and drove to a nearby rest area where he got out of his truck and went to use the restroom. Officers followed Quirk to the rest area and called for a narcotics dog. When Quirk exited the restroom the officers told him he was free to leave, but that they were detaining the truck. Twenty minutes later a canine officer arrived and conducted a sweep that revealed narcotics in the cabin of the truck.

So Quirk was detained for long enough to complete the officer’s work on the traffic violation, told he was free to go, then detained again for reasons unrelated to the traffic violation, then released again. He was then followed and effectively detained a third time for an additional twenty minutes while a canine was brought to the scene. That is a far cry from what we see here.

Here Austin’s initial traffic stop was forty-five minutes long, but that was consistent with Trooper White conducting his Level III DOT inspection. After that, he was told he was free to leave — and he was. He was not detained further at the initial stop; he was sent on his way. He was followed like Quirk, but Austin was not intercepted at a rest stop and blocked from returning to his truck while a canine officer was requested. Instead Trooper Dockery — accompanied by Hondo — waited farther up the Toll Road and did not pull Austin over until Austin committed not one, but two traffic violations. In the course of the stop for those violations, after independently confirming Trooper White’s suspicions, Trooper Dockery and Hondo conducted a sweep of the exterior of Austin’s truck that resulted in an alert for narcotics.

The State Police did not close the exits from the Toll Road; they did not bar Austin from leaving the initial traffic stop; nor did they prevent him from proceeding in any direction he pleased from that point forward. That he continued on the Toll Road past Trooper Dockery may or may not have been the predictable outcome, but his commission of the traffic violations was an act of his own doing. And given the near-immediacy of Hondo’s sweep from that point, we cannot say that the degree of police intrusion into Austin’s ordinary activities was anything but minimal.

Finally, we recognize that law enforcement needs in this arena are great. Intra- and international drug trafficking are significant issues facing law enforcement and public safety officials at the federal, state, and local levels. The individuals and organizations engaged in these criminal activities run the gamut from individual operators to large-scale, corporate-like organizations, and they are not stupid — they are sophisticated and adaptive to changes in law enforcement methods. And given that their stock-in-trade is inherently fungible and highly mobile, but their centers of organization are scattered and secretive, law enforcement’s best chance of uncovering the latter is to interdict the former as it moves about our nation’s highways. Nowhere, perhaps, is that more important than in a state known as “The Crossroads of America.”

We therefore conclude that neither Trooper White’s nor Trooper Dockery’s detentions of Austin — nor the collective police action — constituted an unreasonable search or seizure under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. In point of fact, whether by intention or by coincidence we think this particular police operation exemplifies the balance between pursuing the law enforcement aim and protecting the constitutional rights of the suspect that the Indiana Constitution compels. The officers here noticed things that their training told them were indicators of drug trafficking, but they did not indefinitely hold Austin while they confirmed those suspicions. Instead they let him go, while coordinating to put the assets they needed in a place where they would be useful, and waited until they had an independent — and constitutionally valid — reason to stop Austin again. And once he was stopped again they reconfirmed their earlier suspicions and promptly validated them by use of a trained narcotics dog. The end result was the discovery and seizure of nearly ninety pounds of cocaine hidden in a vehicle transiting our state, and also the proper admission of that evidence at Austin’s trial.

II. Austin’s Criminal Rule 4 Motions

The broad goal of Indiana’s Criminal Rule 4 is to provide functionality to a criminal defendant’s fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial. Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind.2012); see also U.S. Const, amend. VI; Ind. Const, art. 1, § 12. It places an affirmative duty on the State to bring the defendant to trial, but at the same time is not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution. Cundiff, 967 N.E.2d at 1028 (citing Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1151 (Ind.2011) and Loyd v. State, 272 Ind. 404, 410, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1266 (1980)).

Subsection B of Criminal Rule 4 provides that “[i]f any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion.” Ind.Crim. Rule 4(B)(1). Exceptions to this requirement include where the defendant seeks a continuance or the delay is otherwise the result of the defendant’s conduct, “or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.” Crim. R. 4(B)(1). This latter exception for court congestion generally requires a motion from the prosecutor, although “a trial court may take note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance.” Crim. R. 4(B)(1). “Any continuance granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be reduced to an order, which order shall also set the ease for trial within a reasonable time.” Crim. R. 4(B)(1).

Thus Criminal Rule 4(B) presents at least three hurdles at the trial court level: First, when a criminal defendant files a motion for a speedy trial, the trial court must set the defendant’s case for trial within seventy days — which might require, to an extent we discuss below — a re-prioritization of its current caseload. Second, if the trial court finds it cannot accomplish this prioritization and bring the defendant to trial within seventy days because of court congestion, it may order a continuance — and that finding of congestion is then subject to challenge by way of the defendant’s motion for discharge. And third, if the trial court orders such a continuance, it still must keep sight of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial — and Rule 4(B) therefore permits the continuance only to the extent that the defendant proceeds to trial within a reasonable time after the close of the seventy-day window.

Though this is not the first time we have addressed Criminal Rule 4, its precise operation continues to present evolving challenges for both appellate and trial courts. So before we proceed to the merits of Austin’s appeal, we first examine the standard of review used by appellate courts assessing denial of a motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(B) and the prioritization of civil and criminal cases when a criminal defendant requests a speedy trial.

A. Criminal Rule 4(B) Standard of Review

The Court of Appeals has noted some confusion about what the standard of review should be in reviewing appeals of Criminal Rule 4 motions. See Upshaw v. State, 934 N.E.2d 178, 181-82 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Some panels have reviewed these motions using a de novo standard, id. at 182 (citing Mork v. State, 912 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) and Bartley v. State, 800 N.E.2d 193, 195 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)), some have applied an abuse of discretion standard, id. (citing Bowman v. State, 884 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied), and some have applied a clearly erroneous standard, id. (citing Paul v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003)). And at least one panel has tried to resolve this apparent conflict by fashioning its own solution. Feuston v. State, 953 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (“factual findings made by the trial court are entitled to deference, but legal conclusions are to be reviewed de novo”).

For his part, Austin claims the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. The State, though, argues that the trial court’s finding of congestion was not clearly erroneous. We believe the State generally presents the correct standard of review.

The de novo approach seems to take its cue from Vaughan v. State, 470 N.E.2d 374 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). See Bartley, 800 N.E.2d at 195 (citing Kirby v. State, 774 N.E.2d 523, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied); Kirby, 774 N.E.2d at 530 (noting Vaughan “implicitly reviewed] an Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B) question about which party was responsible for a delay under a de novo standard”). The issue in Vaughan, though, was whether the defendant’s participation in plea negotiations constituted a delay attributable to him in determining the time limitation for Criminal Rule 4(B). Vaughan, 470 N.E.2d at 377. But that question had already been answered by this Court, and so the Vaughan panel was just applying our precedent as a matter of law. Id. (applying Mickens v. State, 439 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind.1982)); cf. Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind.2009) (resolving particular Rule 4(C) question “as one of law which we review de novo”). As such, Vaughan may not be the best foundation for extending de novo appellate review to all Criminal Rule 4 questions.

The abuse of discretion approach appears to flow at least in part from Johnson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). See Bowman, 884 N.E.2d at 919 (citing Werner v. State 818 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied); Werner, 818 N.E.2d at 28 (citing Johnson for the proposition that “we review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion”). Bowman and Werner, however, were appellate reviews of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under Criminal Rule 4(C), and not 4(B). Bowman, 884 N.E.2d at 919; Werner, 818 N.E.2d at 29. And while that particular distinction may not be terribly significant, Johnson did not involve Criminal Rule 4 at all — it was an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss based on an alleged double jeopardy violation. 774 N.E.2d at 1014.

But notwithstanding the relative merits of the de novo and abuse of discretion approaches in those particular cases, the clearly erroneous standard at least has as its origins a recent case from this Court. See Paul, 799 N.E.2d at 1197 (citing Lowrimore v. State, 728 N.E.2d 860 (Ind.2000)); see also Lowrimore, 728 N.E.2d at 864-65 (citing Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind.1995)). And as it turns out, that case — Clark—is a very good starting point. As then-Justice Dickson wrote:

Upon appellate review, a trial court’s finding of congestion will be presumed valid and need not be contemporaneously explained or documented by the trial court. However, a defendant may challenge that finding, by filing a Motion for Discharge and demonstrating that, at the time the trial court made its decision to postpone trial, the finding of congestion was factually or legally inaccurate. Such proof would be prima facie adequate for discharge, absent further trial court findings explaining the congestion and justifying the continuance. In the appellate review of such a case, the trial court’s explanations will be accorded reasonable deference, and a defendant must establish his entitlement to relief by showing that the trial court was clearly erroneous.

Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552. To an extent, we agree with the Court of Appeals in Feuston that much of the division amongst appellate courts has “arisen because sometimes the trial court must resolve disputed facts, but on other occasions simply applies the law to undisputed facts.” 953 N.E.2d at 548. And as the Feuston panel’s resolution then implies, in cases where the issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the standard of review — like for all questions of law — is de novo. See also Otte v. State, 967 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (adopting Feuston approach), trans. denied. And certainly, the ultimate reasonableness of the trial court’s findings depends very much upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied.

But at the same time we reiterate that in those cases where a trial court makes a factual finding of congestion (or emergency, see Lowrimore, 728 N.E.2d at 865) under Criminal Rule 4 based on disputed facts, the standard of review for appellate courts is not abuse of discretion — it is the clearly erroneous standard as we said in Clark This was the approach generally taken by the Court of Appeals below. See Austin, 980 N.E.2d at 434.

And under this standard, after according the trial court’s findings reasonable deference, appellate review is for clear error. State v. Oney, 993 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind.2013). “We neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment and reverse only on a showing of clear error. Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

B. Prioritizing Cases Under Criminal Rule 4(B)

The constitutional protections embodied by Criminal Rule 4 necessitate a prioritized treatment when a defendant files a motion pursuant to Rule 4(B) — a treatment beyond simply assigning that defendant’s case to the next presently vacant trial setting on the calendar.

Rather, it must be assigned a meaningful trial date within the time prescribed by the rule, if necessary superseding trial dates previously designated for civil cases and even criminal cases in which Criminal Rule 4 deadlines are not imminent. We recognize, however, that emergencies in either criminal or civil matters may occasionally interfere with this scheme. Similarly, there may be major, complex trials that have long been scheduled or that pose significant extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses, which will, on rare occasions, justify application of the court congestion or exigent circumstances exceptions.

Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551-52. Thus, courts recognize that Rule 4(B) does not necessarily present a bright-line approach whereby all other cases must yield to the defendant who files a speedy trial motion. McKay v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

For example, in the criminal arena speedy trial motions are subject to their own internal prioritization. Where a longer-incarcerated defendant moves for a speedy trial, his or her request should generally take priority over a more recently charged movant. But this would not necessarily be the case if, say, the more recently charged defendant’s Criminal Rule 4 deadline was significantly more imminent and there remained time after that deadline to hold the trial of the longer-incarcerated defendant before his or her deadline. See James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ind.1999). Where the trial court’s calendar can satisfy both Rule 4 deadlines, the longer-incarcerated defendant need not necessarily go first. After all, Rule 4 effectuates a “speedy” trial— not necessarily the “next” trial. But at the same time, and absent extenuating circumstances, a defendant seeking a speedy trial would almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.

Similarly, “[although the right of the accused to a speedy trial stands higher than similar rights of civil litigants, civil settings need not always give way to criminal settings required by the time limitations in Crim. R.4.” Baker v. State, 590 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (citing Gill v. State, 267 Ind. 160, 165, 368 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (1977)). In addition to prioritizing the long-scheduled, complex civil matters or those with extenuating circumstances we referenced in Clark, civil settings must give way to speedy trial motions only “where the continuance of the civil trial will result in sufficient time to fully prepare for and accommodate the criminal trial.” Gill, 267 Ind. at 165, 368 N.E.2d at 1162.

Nevertheless, “in order for the meaning of the rule not to be eviscerated, it is essential that courts honor requests made for speedy trials by scheduling trial dates within the time prescribed by the rule.” McKay, 714 N.E.2d at 1188. And we therefore have referred to this as a requirement that speedy trial motions receive “particularized priority treatment.” Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551. But we do not intend to suggest that a trial judge must necessarily wipe his or her calendar clean, or jam a trial into an opening in a schedule or courtroom that lacks the space, time, and resources to accommodate it. They must, however, be mindful of their calendar and the seventy-day window and exercise all reasonable diligence to preserve the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

But at the same time, the aim of providing a speedy trial should never risk an unfair or incomplete trial. Rather, the trial judge should set the defendant’s trial for the first setting not already occupied by a superseding speedy trial request or exceptional civil matter, or, if need be, create a new trial setting if time allows for the availability of a courtroom, witnesses, jury pool, and other necessary resources.

C. Austin’s Motions

There can be a number of reasons why a criminal defendant might request a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4, ranging from solely vindicating his or her constitutional rights to a tactical move designed to force the State’s hand and prompt a trial (or plea) before the evidence is fully developed. Both are equally legitimate, and justify the effort trial judges must take in reviewing — and rearranging — their calendars in light of a speedy trial motion. And we expect that criminal defendants in such cases would actively work with the trial court to ensure their trial moved along in an orderly and judicious fashion.

But what the rule does not contemplate, as we have said, is pursuit of a technical means to escape prosecution by, post-hoc, pot-shotting the trial court’s calendar. This is why we reject a bright-line approach to its application. A criminal defendant may not, for example, after moving for a speedy trial and at the conclusion of his or her seventy days, simply present the trial court’s past calendar and point to every gap, every day off, every non-trial use of the courtroom, and say “Gotcha! I must be discharged!” Not successfully, at least.

Here, Austin filed his motion for a speedy trial on June 6. Ten days later, his trial was set for August 8 — roughly a week inside his seventy-day window. On July 27, the State moved to continue his trial due to congestion, arguing first that criminal defendant Eldon Harmon, who had a cause pre-dating Austin’s, had also moved for a speedy trial — and Harmon had been in custody for nearly two years at that point. It also argued that there were fourteen additional criminal cases pending, involving twelve separate defendants, all of which pre-dated Austin’s case — but it did not allege that any of those twelve defendants had filed motions for a speedy trial. Without a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion for a continuance a few days later, setting a pre-trial conference for August 11.

Austin then requested that this pre-trial conference be moved forward a week, to August 4, and objected to any continuance of his trial. Austin said that he had a number of witnesses and family members who had booked plane flights from California and reserved hotel rooms and rental cars in Indiana, and would — if anything, apparently — need a trial date earlier than August 8 in order to transfer those tickets and reservations.

At the August 4 pre-trial conference, the trial court noted Harmon’s speedy trial motion as the basis for a finding of congestion and rescheduled Austin’s trial for September 26. Austin objected for the record, and on August 17 — after his seventy-day window closed — filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4.

Austin did not claim that the prior defendant’s trial should not have taken precedence over his, but instead argued that no trials were scheduled for the week of August 15 — the Monday of which was the last day of his speedy trial window — and that his case could therefore have proceeded that day. In support of this he attached the trial court’s August schedule and an affidavit from his counsel’s secretary, attesting that she had been in the courtroom on the morning of August 15 and observed that no trials or judicial proceedings of any kind were taking place.

The trial court held a hearing on Austin’s motion on September 1. Austin again argued that his trial could have occurred on August 15. In response, the trial judge clarified that a custody and child support hearing that had been scheduled for that Monday morning had been moved to Monday afternoon and did, in fact, occur.

The State also pointed out that no jury had been called for the week of August 15, that the trial court was not prepared to hear a jury trial that week, and that the State could not have subpoenaed witnesses for that week on such short notice. The trial court maintained Austin’s September 26 trial date (and in doing so implicitly denied Austin’s motion for discharge).

So in accordance with the standard of review we discussed above, the trial court’s initial finding of congestion requiring Austin’s trial to be continued from August 8 is presumed valid. It then became Austin’s responsibility to come forward with proof that the finding was factually or legally inaccurate. This we think he did by way of his motion for discharge and attached exhibits highlighting the trial calendar and apparent scheduling vacancy on August 15. Absent the further findings from the trial court to explain the congestion, this would have been prima facie adequate for discharge. But once the trial court made further findings, the burden shifted back to Austin to show that those findings were clearly erroneous. See James, 716 N.E.2d at 939.

On appeal, Austin argues that the trial court justified congestion based on the August 15 custody hearing. But he says that hearing was not an emergency hearing nor was it a particularly complex matter. Therefore, he claims he could have — and should have — been tried on August 15 and it was clear error for the trial court to decide otherwise.

But a variety of things could constitute congestion. Loyd, 272 Ind. at 409, 398 N.E.2d at 1265. And although the trial court here did not issue a written order further explaining its finding of congestion, the transcript of the pre-trial conference indicates that several circumstances supported its determination.

The starting point was of course the court’s initial decision to try the prior criminal case on August 8 instead of Austin’s case. And though not necessarily always required, we find nothing wrong with the decision to prioritize the speedy trial request of a defendant who had been in custody for nearly two years over the request of one who had been in custody for a few months. But not setting a trial date for the following week was also based on the unavailability of the courtroom on August 15, as well as the unavailability of a jury that week and the unlikely availability of witnesses on short notice.

In light of the deference we show to a trial court’s decision in these cases, we think this combination of concerns is sufficient to support a finding of congestion. While a trial court cannot blindly adhere to a calendar management process that, for example, by default only schedules criminal trials (and juries) on a biweekly basis, and then use that process as an excuse to refuse to acknowledge a speedy trial motion even when the trial court has enough time to call a jury, that is not what happened here. Here, the State filed its motion for a continuance on July 27 and the trial court initially approved it on July 29 (a Friday). Even if the trial court had immediately drawn names for prospective jurors and mailed those jurors a notice and summons, it is unlikely that such notice would have reached its recipients in time to comply with our jury rules — to say nothing of the other logistical requirements involved in holding a multi-day criminal trial on short notice.

The availability of witnesses presented a similar concern. The State argued that its witnesses could not have been subpoenaed in time for an August 15 trial, and Austin himself expressed a like view with respect to his own witnesses. This case involved a number of out-of-state individuals traveling to testify, and it was reasonable to find that sliding their travel plans back a week — with only a week’s notice — was an unnecessarily burdensome requirement on those individuals where the trial could instead be reasonably reset to a later date. Simply put, as the State said, “[s]ome of the logistics surrounding this trial lend it to a more complex environment, [and] it doesn’t lend to a quick continuance and a quick resetting.” (Tr. at 287.)

And this makes it largely irrelevant whether the courtroom was already in use for another matter and whether that matter was deemed an “emergency.” Continuance of the contested custody and child support hearing would still “not necessarily have accommodated the trial of [Austin’s] case” because it still “would not guarantee a courtroom and a jury.” Gill, 267 Ind. at 165, 368 N.E.2d at 1162. Finding otherwise would have accomplished nothing but providing the inefficient administration of justice in both the civil and the criminal cases.

In sum, we do not find the trial court’s decision to continue Austin’s trial beyond his seventy-day speedy trial window to be clearly erroneous.

However, we caution that “court congestion” is not a blank check for poor judicial administration. A defendant with adequate proof may successfully challenge a declaration of “court congestion” on appeal. The protections afforded a defendant under Criminal Rule 4 are not to be trampled upon and trial courts must remain vigilant in its enforcement.

Conclusion

We affirm the admission of cocaine evidence at Austin’s trial and the denial of his motion for discharge, and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals in all other respects.

DICKSON, C.J., RUCKER, MASSA, and RUSH, JJ., concur.

      . Trooper White was certified as a Level III inspector by the Department of Transportation, authorizing him to inspect commercial motor vehicle logbooks and shipping paperwork. Discrepancies in these materials can be relevant in commercial vehicle interdiction operations.

      .According to Trooper Dockery, the Department of Transportation assigns a number to companies involved in commercial motor vehicle transportation. Based on his experience and training in commercial vehicle interdiction, Trooper Dockery knew that a legitimate, successful company would not change their DOT number and it would therefore be low— a higher number, though, might be an indicator that the company had been involved in illegal activity in the past, changed names, and been assigned a new (and higher) number.

      . Because of how the cars were parked inside the trailer, Hondo was unable to reach the back of the Mercedes until it was unloaded. Later, when the cars had been taken off the trailer as part of an extensive search, he alerted at the rear bumper of the Mercedes as well.

      . He claimed he had been denied his right to a speedy trial; that the cocaine seized from the Rolls-Royce and Mercedes was obtained as a result of a constitutionally defective search; that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Austin had been travelling previously with the same Rolls-Royce; that the jury was improperly instructed as to the burden of proof; and that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by considering improper factors and not properly weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors.

      . Nor does he contest the assertion that as a Level III DOT inspector, Trooper Dockery could pull Austin over to inspect his shipping paperwork absent any traffic violations at all.

      . It is irrelevant whether Trooper Dockery’s stop was also motivated by the State Police’s suspicions concerning Austin. As we said in Mitchell, ”[w]e find nothing unreasonable in permitting an officer, who may have knowledge or suspicion of unrelated criminal activity by the motorist, to nevertheless respond to an observed traffic violation. It is likewise not unreasonable for a motorist who commits a traffic law violation to be subject to accountability for said violation even if the officer may have an ulterior motive of furthering an unrelated criminal investigation.” 745 N.E.2d at 787.

      . Though commonly referred to as the “speedy trial rule,” and motions filed thereunder as “motions for a speedy trial,” we point out that the rule technically guarantees an "early” trial. Ind.Crim. Rule 4(B). And though Rule 4(B)'s intent is to effectuate the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, we emphasize that reviewing Rule 4(B) challenges is separate and distinct from reviewing claimed violations of those constitutional provisions. See Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 n. 2 (Ind.2012).

      . Both Criminal Rules 4(A) and 4(C) also contain language providing for continuances due to a congested calendar or emergency, and for then setting the trial within a reasonable time. We see no reason why the analysis for those issues arising under those rules would— or should — be any different than the analysis under Rule 4(B). Thus, our view is that this opinion's analysis in the context of Criminal Rule 4(B) should apply with equal force to Criminal Rules 4(A) and 4(C).

      . Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) provides that "[n]o person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later.”

      . For practical purposes, it may appear that the two standards will often produce the same results or operate so similarly as to be interchangeable. Certainly this Court has not been immune to using one in lieu of the other — even in the context of Criminal Rule 4 review. Nevertheless, we have previously noted that the "clearly erroneous” standard is more appropriate — semantically and jurispru-dentially — when reviewing a trial court’s factual findings. See Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 104 (Ind.2005), reh'g denied, cert. denied; Candler v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1100, 1103-04 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

      . Austin does not appeal a second continuance of his trial from September 26 to October 24. Nor does he challenge whether the initial resetting of his trial date to five weeks after his seventy-day window closed constituted "a reasonable time” under Criminal Rule 4.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Gersh ZAVODNIK, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Michela RINALDI, et al., Appellees (Defendants below).
    No. 49S05-1311-CT-759.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Nov. 18, 2013.
    Mark S. O’Hara, Brownsburg, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Gersh Zavodnik filed a complaint against Michela Rinaldi and entities that are either related or aliases (together “Rinaldi”). The issue in this appeal is whether Zavod-nik has shown he has made successful service of his complaint on Rinaldi, who is a resident of Italy.

On August 29, 2012, the trial court held a hearing and issued an order stating:

2. There are various documents in the file which the Plaintiff purports to be proof of service but they are apparently in Italian, without translation.
3. At the hearing the Plaintiff failed to show to the Court’s satisfaction that service has been perfected on the Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this matter is dismissed per Trial Rule 41(E).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Zavodnik that the forms were in both Italian and English, contrary to the trial court’s finding. The Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, citing Zavodnik’s failure to support his argument that he had served Rinaldi with sufficient citations to or quotations from relevant law. Zavodnik seeks transfer.

Under the unique circumstances presented, the Court concludes that the trial court’s order of dismissal should be reversed. We grant transfer of jurisdiction, reverse the order of dismissal, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings, without prejudice to dismissal under Trial Rule 41(E) if warranted after further consideration.

All Justices concur.