author: TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Steven NOLTE, a/k/a George France, Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 15-1848
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    December 20, 2016

      Elizabeth L. Prevett, Federal Public Defender Office, Cambridge, MA, on brief for appellant.
    Robert E. Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney, and Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, on brief for appel-lee.
    Before HOWARD, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Steven Nolte of making false statements in a passport application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (Count I), aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Count II), and use of a falsely-obtained Social Security account number to -obtain benefits, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A) (Count III). At sentencing, the district court enhanced by four levels the .Sentencing Guidelines range for Nolte’s conviction for Count I pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A) and ultimately sentenced him to twelve months for Counts I and III, and to the mandatory consecutive twenty-four months imprisonment term for his conviction for Count II, resulting in an aggregated sentence of thirty-six months of imprisonment. Nolte challenges the application of the four-level enhancement as to Count I, as well as his conviction for aggravated identity theft. Because we find that the four-level enhancement was correctly applied, and Nolte’s argument challenging his conviction for aggravated identity theft is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Nolte was born in 1963 in Arizona, and lived there through approximately 1997. He worked in real estate in Arizona during the early 1990s, where he befriended Steve France. Steve France had, in addition to other siblings, a brother named George who passed away in 1966, at the age of four days.

After his time working in real estate, Nolte set up a business for computer consulting named Etlon Communications. Nolte, through Etlon Communications, worked as an information technology consultant to a company named Fulton Homes in the mid-1990s. In 1997, approximately $571,000 was drawn from Fulton Homes’ bank account through five checks addressed to Etlon Communications. These checks featured Fulton Homes’ president’s forged signature. Most of these funds were transferred to a bank located in Costa Rica, to the receipt of Nolte.

On May 13, 1997, Nolte obtained an Arizona driver’s license using the name of George France and a birth date in 1966. Nolte maintained this identity for nearly two decades. On May 15, 1997, Nolte used that license to apply for a United States Passport, under the name George France. In that application, he stated that he was born in 1966 in Phoenix, Arizona, and he provided a Social Security number ending in 7622. This Social Security number actually belonged to a different person, who was from Arizona. The United States issued the passport on May 16, 1997. The issuance of this passport was expedited, due to travel plans to San José, Costa Rica.

Shortly afterwards, on May 30, 1997, Nolte—under the identity of George France—applied for a replacement passport at the United States embassy in Cos-ta Rica, stating that his passport had been stolen. In the application, he provided a Social Security number that differed by one number—but that also ended in 7622—which actually belonged to a different person, who was from Hawaii. The application also listed 1966 as his year of birth, and was obtained by using the George France Arizona license and by referencing the other, ' recently-obtained George France passport.

On June 9, 1999, Nolte—as George France—submitted an application for a Social Security number, indicating that he had never received one. He listed his birth year as 1966, and identified himself using the May 30, 1997 passport and a birth certificate he had acquired for George France, which had been issued on May 13, 1997. He was subsequently issued a Social Security number for George France, which ended in 8253. On April 19, 2007, Nolte filed for a renewal of the May 30, 1997 George France passport. In the renewal application, he provided the Social Security number for George France ending in 8253. The renewed passport issued on April 30, 2007.

On May 11, 2012, Nolte went to the office of the Boston Passport Agency seeking a replacement passport. He claimed that he had accidentally put his April 30, 2007 passport through the washer and dryer, which had damaged it. He completed an application for a replacement in which he again listed his name as George France and provided personal information for George France, including the Social Security number ending in 8253. He provided the Arizona driver’s license, the birth certifícate, and the damaged 2007 passport as proof of his identity.

.The application was approved by the first passport specialist,- who dealt with Nolte in person, but required further vetting before the passport was actually issued. During that process, the application was flagged and sent to a fraud prevention manager because the Social Security number used—the one ending in 8253, issued in 1999—had been assigned when the applicant was thirty-three years old, which is an unusually late age for receiving a Social Security number. The fraud prevention manager called Nolte (as George France) and inquired why his Social Security number had been issued so late in his life; he responded that his mother had given her sons the same Social Security number, that he had mistakenly used his brother’s Social Security number earlier in life, and that he had applied for a new number after learning of the issue.

Shortly thereafter, special agents in the Department of State began an investigation into the application. During that investigation, on May 22, 2012, Nolte returned to the Boston Passport Agency to inquire about the status of the replacement passport. While there, two agents advised him of his rights and conducted an interview. As he had listed in the passport application, he told the agents that his name was George France; he was born in Phoenix, Arizona in 1966;- both of his parents had passed away; his Social Security number was the one ending in 8253; and other personal details relating to the France family. He provided the agents with the-same explanation about his use of varying Social Security numbers that he had given to the fraud prevention specialist—that he and his brothers had been issued the same Social Security numbers, and that he had used that number until he learned of the mistake after his brother Steve died in 1997. Much of this information was incorrect, however; for example, as testified at trial, the actual George France had two sisters, and his mother, Anna France, was indeed alive.

B. Procedural Background

On August 20,2013, a federal grand jury indicted Nolte on Counts I, II, and III. He was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada on September 3, 2013, and the case went to trial on March 2, 2015. The evidence presented at trial included fingerprint matches, DNA evidence, and the testimony of two witnesses who knew Nolte from Arizona to show that the defendant was in fact Steven Nolte. On March 6, 2015, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts.

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Nolte’s total offense level as 12; this included a four-level enhancement because of the fraudulent use of a United States passport pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3). Nolte objected to this enhancement, claiming that he did not “use” a passport since the 2007 passport was damaged, and that Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 precluded applying an enhancement to Count I for using a means of identification because he was also charged with a count of aggravated identity theft related to that means of identification. The probation officer rejected this contention and maintained the accuracy of the PSR’s Guidelines calculation.

Nolte reiterated his objections in his sentencing memo and at the June 29, 2015 sentencing hearing. The district court rejected these objections at the sentencing hearing, and adopted the base offense level of 12 recommended in the PSR. The district court ruled that Nolte did “use” a passport when applying for the replacement, and that the enhancement did apply because numerous means of identification were used and the reliance on the prior passport could be considered separately. The district court sentenced Nolte to a total sentence of 36 months imprisonment: 12 months for Counts I and III,, and 24 months for Count II. His sentence also included two years of supervised release and a $3,000 fine. This appeal ensued.

II. Discussion

A. Four-Level Enhancement Under U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)

Nolte contends that the district court’s Guidelines calculation was erroneous inasmuch as it applied the four-level enhancement for the use of a United States passport pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A), even though Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 (“Application Note 2”) prohibits application of an enhancement for use of a “means of identification” when the defendant is also convicted of aggravated identity theft., Nolte argues that the imposition of the enhancement amounts to impermissible double counting.

The government, in contrast, argues that the enhancement is applicable because Application Note 2 prohibits the enhancement only for the use of a “means of identification” and a passport is not a “means of identification,” but rather an “identification document.”

We review the sentencing court’s factfinding for clear error and its construction and application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Souza, 749 F.3d 74, 85 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Ihenacho, 716 F.3d 266, 276 (1st Cir. 2013)). We use conventional methods of statutory .construction .both to determine the meaning the Sentencing Commission intended to give to a Guidelines term, United States v. Damon, 595 F.3d 395, 400 (1st Cir. 2010), and to interpret the meaning of Guidelines commentary, id. at 400 n.3 (citing United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009)).

Nolte’s conviction on Count II for aggravated identity theft had a violation of 18 U.S.C; § -1542 as an underlying offense. The guideline for 18 U.S.C. § 1028A is found in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6, which provides that the guideline sentence is the statutory two-year term of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6(a). Application Note 2 states that:

If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification when determining the sentence for the underlying offense. A sentence under this guideline, accounts for this factor for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). “Means of identification” has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7).

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added).

In turn, the guideline for an 18 U.S.C. § 1542 violation is found in U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2. It establishes a base offense level of eight, U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(a), and, in relation to specific offense characteristics, provides for a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant fraudulently obtained or used ... a United States passport.” U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A).

Because the sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 was imposed in conjunction with a sentence for the underlying offense of 18 U.S.C. § 1542,- we must ascertain the meaning of the term “means of identification” in Application Note 2 in order to determine whether the four-level enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A) applies for the 18 U.S.C. § 1542 violation.

We start our inquiry by examining the plain text of the guideline. See United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) (“When interpreting a statute, we begin with its text”). Because Application Note 2 states that “ ‘[m]eans of identification’ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7),” we turn to that statute.

The statute defines “means of identification” as:

any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any—
(A)name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;
(B) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation;
(C) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or
(D) telecommunication identifying information or access device (as defined in section 1029(e));

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).

The statute separately defines “identification document” as:

a document made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a State, political subdivision of a State, a sponsoring entity of an event designated as a special event of national significance, a foreign government, political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.

Id. § 1028(d)(3).

Nolte contends that because a passport contains a means of identification (a passport number), it also qualifies as a “means of identification” and, thus, Application Note 2 precludes application of the enhancement. In support of his proposition, Nolte cites United States v. Zheng, 762 F.3d 605, 610-11 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that a passport is both an “identification document” and a “means of identification” under § 1028(d)(7) and, accordingly, Application Note 2 precludes application of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(5)(B) for defendant’s fraudulent use of a foreign passport). The government counters that while a passport number is a “means of identification,” a passport itself is not.;Rather, the government claims, it constitutes an “identification document,” a separately defined term in the same statute and, accordingly, Application Note 2 does not preclude the enhancement. See United States v. Dehaney, 455 Fed.Appx. 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between “means of identification” and “identification documents” and holding that “[b]ecause a United States passport is not a ‘means of identification/ as defined in the statute,” Application Note 2 does not apply (citing United States v. Melendrez, 389 F.3d 829, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2004))).

We believe that the plain language supports the government’s argument. We note that 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d) distinguishes between “means of identification” and “identification documents.” While it lists a passport number as a means of identification, it does not list a passport itself. And Application Note 2 prohibits applying the four-level enhancement only for the use of a means of identification, not of an identification document. See United States v. Sharapka, 526 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) (limiting Application Note 2 to its plain language and rejecting the defendant’s argument that-a two-level enhancement for the possession of. “device-making equipment” resulted in impermissible double counting).

This distinction does not appear to be unintended or inconsequential,' as the statute explicitly contemplates when an “identification document” will also be considered a “means of identification.” For instance, the statute specifically states'as a “[r]ule of construction” that “[f]or purposes of subsection (a)(7), a single identification document or false identification document that contains 1 or more means of identification shall be construed to be 1 means of identification.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(i). Because the statute specifically limited this rule of construction to subsection (a)(7), we decline Nolte’s invitation to further expand its application to subsection (d).

This distinction is not nonsensical, as Nolte contends, because fraudulently obtaining or using a United States passport may give rise to additional or different harms than misusing only a passport number. For instance, someone attempting to enter the country illegally (including a terrorist) would not be able to get into the country with just a passport number, but having the passport itself would increase his or her chances of doing so.

Nolte complains that construing the Guidelines this way would amount to double counting because the underlying offense involved use of a passport.' We note, however, that “with regard^ to the guidelines generally, ‘double counting is often perfectly proper.’ ” United States v. Stella, 591 F.3d 23, 30 n.9 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Lilly, 13 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)). “Double counting in the sentencing context ‘is a phenomenon that is less sinister than the name implies.’” Lilly, 13 F.3d at 19 (quoting United States v. Zapata, 1 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1993)). “We believe the [Sentencing] Commission’s ready resort to explicitly stated prohibitions against double counting [under certain circumstances of some guidelines] signals that courts should go quite slowly in implying further such prohibitions where none are written.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, we decline Nolte’s invitation to expand a prohibition where it is not explicitly stated. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the four-level enhancement in this case.

B. Aggravated Identity Theft

Nolte also argues he cannot be guilty of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) because the word “person” in the statutory phrase “means of identification of another person” refers only to a living person. He contends that because the means of identification he used referred to George France, a deceased, the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Nolte acknowledges, however, that his argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Jiménez, 507 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007), and he does not argue any exception to the rule of stare decisis, but rather raises his argument in order to preserve it for potential further appellate review. We need not tarry on this issue.

In Jiménez, this Court considered and rejected the essence of Nolte’s arguments. There, after examining the statutory text, the surrounding language, and the statute’s structure and purpose,'we concluded that the term “person” refers to persons both living and dead. Id. at 22. As a panel, “we are bound to follow this circuit’s currently controlling precedent.” United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2016)). That precedent requires that we reject Nolte’s challenge and affirm his conviction for aggravated identity theft.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons élucidated above, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying. the four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2(b)(3)(A). In addition, Nolte’s challenge to his conviction of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) fails as the term “person” within the statute covers both living and deceased persons. Thus, his sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . Counts I and III were grouped for sentencing purposes.

      . Aggravated identity theft is an independent offense but is tied to the commission of an underlying crime of fraud or deceit enumerated in the statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A provides that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). In turn, subsection (c) establishes that "the term ‘felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)’ means any offense that is a felony violation of ... (7) any provision contained in chapter 75 (relating to passports and visas),” id. § 1028A(c), which includes 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (making false- statements in a passport application).

      . 18 U.S.C. § 1542 states, in relevant part,
      Whoever willfully and knowingly makes any false statement in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary to the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws ... [s]hall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than ... 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both.
      18 U.S.C. § 1542.

      . The statute makes clear that this definition applies in “section [1028] and section 1028A.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d).

      . In Melendrez, the court cautioned against confusing the term “means of identification” with "identification document.” 389 F.3d at 833. It stated that "[a]n identification document is 'a document ... intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification,’ ” while "[a] means of identification, in contrast, is the name or number that may often be associated with such a document.” Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, “Social Security cards ... are identification documents, but the means of identification are the Social Security -numbers that [were] placed on the documents.” Id. at 833-34. Although Melendrez dealt with Social Security cards and Social Security numbers, instead of passports, the same reasoning applies.

      . In fact, the default rule is that the same conduct may determine the base offense level and also trigger the cumulative application of enhancements and adjustments unless a specific guideline instructs otherwise. See U.S.S.G. § IB 1.1 cmt. n.4,

      . In light of the circuit split on this issue, the Sentencing Commission could usefully address the situation in due course,

      . Because we are able to grasp the meaning of the term "means of identification" from the text of the statute, and it provides the answer to the Guidelines construction, "our ‘inquiry ends,’ " United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 716 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir. 2006)).

      . Other circuits have also concluded that § 1028A covers the use of the identity of both living and deceased persons. See United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. LaFaive, 618 F.3d 613, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Maciel-Alcala, 612 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kowal, 527 F.3d 741, 746-47 (8th Cir 2008).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Edwin MALDONADO-BURGOS, Defendant, Appellee.
    No. 15-2145
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    December 21, 2016
    John Patrick Taddei, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Rosa E. Rodríguez-Vé-lez, United States Attorney, Nelson J. Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauza Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellant.
    Eleonora C. Marranzini, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Vi-vianne M. Marrero, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, and Liza L. Rosado-Rodriguez, Research and Writing Specialist, were on brief, for appellee.
    Before THOMPSON, DYK, and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.

       Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

   THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, we are tasked with deciding whether 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a)—which prohibits transportation of an individual “in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States” for purposes of prostitution or other unlawful sexual activity—applies to transportation that- occurs solely within Puerto Rico. Long ago, we answered this question in the affirmative. See Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 45 (1st Cir. 1945). In a typical case, this would end our inquiry.

But this case—arising in the wake of Puerto Rico’s post-Crespo transformation from a United States territory to the “self-governing Commonwealth” that it is today, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 1874, 195 L.Ed.2d 179 (2016)—is far from typical. And, despite the government’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that our post-Crespo decision in Cordova & Simonpietri Insurance Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981), blazed a trail that we must follow in this case. Applying Cordova ⅛ analytical framework, we hold that § 2421(a) does not apply to transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the indictment.

How the Case Got Here

The two-count indictment in this case alleges that, on two separate occasions, the defendant, Edwin Maldonado-Burgos (Maldonado), transported an eighteen-year-old woman with a severe mental disability within Puerto Rico with the intent to engage in sexual activity that was criminal under Puerto Rico law. Maldonado moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that transportation occurring solely within Puerto Rico does not violate § 2421(a). The district court agreed and dismissed the indictment. The government timely appealed.

Setting the Stage

This case presents us with a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir. 2012). We start with the statutory text. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008). Section 2421(a) punishes “[wjhoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual- engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so.” Because neither § 2421(a) nor any other provision of the Mann Act explicitly mentions Puerto Rico, we are called upon to decide whether Puerto Rico is a “Territory or Possession of the United States” under § 2421(a).

Before tackling the merits of this interpretation controversy, we first briefly recount the evolution of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. In 1898, following the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico became a territory of the United States, Sánchez Valle, 136 S.Ct. at 1868. Over the years, Congress. gradually increased Puerto Rico’s autonomy over its local affairs, id. but “Congress retained major elements of sovereignty” over the island, Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39.

Then, in 1950, Congress passed legislation—which later became part of the Federal Relations Act (FRA), see Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. 81-600, § 4, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-731e)—that authorized the people of Puerto Rico to adopt a constitution. See Sánchez Valle, 136 S.Ct. at 1868; Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects, & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 592-94, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). Two years later, the Puerto Rico Constitution became-law when it received congressional approval. Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327; see Cordova, 649 F.2d at 40. The clear congressional purpose behind “the 1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union.” Examining Bd., 426 U.S. at 594, 96 S.Ct. 2264. Reflecting this purpose, the Puerto Rico Constitution “created a new political entity, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,” Sánchez Valle, 136 S.Ct. at 1869—“a distinctive, indeed exceptional, status,” id. at 1874. See id (“Congress in 1952 ‘relinquished its control over [the Commonwealth’s] local affairs[,] granting] Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States.’ ” (quoting Examining Bd., 426 U.S. at 597, 96 S.Ct. 2264)).

The parties dispute the role that this history should play in our analysis of whether § 2421(a) applies to transportation that occurs wholly within Puerto Rico. We begin by discussing the competing precedent that each side urges ⅛ applicable to our analysis.

The government insists that our decision in Crespo controls. In that case, the defendant-was charged with violating the predecessor to § 2421(a) by transporting women “from one place to another in Puerto Rico” for purposes of prostitution. Crespo, 151 F.2d at 45. The defendant argued that Congress could-not have intended to reach intra-Puerto Rico transportation and thereby “intervene in matters of interest only to the people of Puerto Rico.” Id, We disagreed, holding that § 2421(a)’s predecessor “applie[d] to transportation wholly within Puerto Rico.” Id. This result, we reasoned, was compelled by both the “express terms” of the statute—which covered “transportation ‘in any territory’ ”— and the clear statement of congressional purpose reflected in the committee reports accompanying the passage of the Mann Act,'which provided that the Act was

applicable to the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Panama Canal Zone, without regard to the crossing of district, territorial, or state lines, and applied] within the territories to the same extent as [it] applied] in cases outside of the territories in interstate or foreign commerce.

Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 61-886, at 2 (1910); H.R. Rep. No. 61-47, at 2 (1909)).

Maldonado counters that Crespo—which was decided several years before the adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution—does not govern the. analysis. Instead, he argues that our later decision in Cordova sets forth the legal framework that controls this case. In that case, the plaintiffs were an insurance broker and its president who arranged the procurement of insurance policies for automobile dealers in Puerto Rico. Cordova, 649 F.2d at 37. In an attempt to cut out the middlemen, the insurance company that issued the policies agreed with a bank that was the ultimate beneficiary of the policies to cancel the policies and reissue them without using the plaintiffs’ brokerage services. Id. The plaintiffs responded by filing an antitrust action against the insurance company and the bank. Id. at 37-88.

On appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, we were confronted with the issue of whether, for purposes of the Sherman Act, we must-'treat Puerto Rico like a state or a territory. Id. at 38. The Sherman Act treats territories differently- than states: section 3 of that Act reaches agreements “in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States,” 15 U.S.C. § 3(a); however, the' Act’s reach is less expansive when it comes to the states, covering only agreements “in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states,” id. § 1, See Cordova, 649 F.2d at 36. In 1937, prior to the adoption of the Puei’to Rico Constitution, the Supreme Court had held that the term territory in § 3 of the Act did include Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 259, 58 S.Ct. 167, 82 L.Ed. 235 (1937).

Yet, notwithstanding Shell Co., we held in Cordova that § 3 no longer applied to Puerto Rico. 649 F.2d at 42, 44. In an opinion authored by then-Judge Breyer, we framed the particularized inquiry as follows: “whether the Sherman Act’s framers, if aware of Puerto Rico’s current constitutional status, would have intended it to be treated as a ‘state’ or ‘territory’ under the' Act.” Id. at 39; And, after reviewing the events culminating in the adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution and explaining that this history evidenced “a general [congressional intent to grant Puerto Rico state-like autonomy,” we announced that, in order for a statute to treat Puerto Rico as a territory after the island adopted its constitution, “there would have to be specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in a particular statute to demonstrate a statutory intent to intervene more extensively into the local affairs of post-Constitutional Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state.” Id. at 42. Seeing no such evidence or policy reasons, we concluded that “it is fair to assume that the framers of the Sherman Act, had they been aware of the FRA and subsequent Constitutional developments, would have intended that Puerto Rico be treated as a ‘state’ under the Act, once Commonwealth status was achieved.” Id.

Having sketched the contours of the historical and legal landscape, we now turn to the question of whether § 2421(a) treats Puerto Rico as a state or a territory.

Analysis

The government argues that Crespo controls this case and that Cordova is in-apposite. As a fallback, it maintains that, even under the Cordova test, Puerto Rico should still be deemed a “Territory or Possession of the United States.” Maldonado, by contrast, argues that the Cordova framework dictates that post-constitutional Puerto Rico be treated like a state for purposes of § 2421(a).

A. The Cordova Framework Governs

The government offers several reasons why we need not employ Cordova’s analytical framework. First, it insists that we are bound to follow Crespo and its progeny, Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1946), under the law-of-the-cireuit doctrine. To bolster this argument, the government points us to our decision in United States v. Carrasquillo-Peñaloza, 826 F.3d 590, 591 (1st Cir. 2016), where the defendant argued that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), another provision of the Mann Act, “to conduct wholly within Puerto Rico exceeds Congress’s legislative authority.” Seizing upon our characterization of that argument as “an uphill battle in light of precedent,” id. at 592, the government argues that this decision supports its position that “Crespo and its progeny impose ... an insurmountable obstacle for [Maldonado’s] arguments on appeal.” We think not.

At the outset, Cordova itself demonstrates that Crespo and its progeny cannot alone carry the day. In Cordova, we were confronted with a pre-1952 decision of the Supreme Court that was directly on point, see Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 259, 58 S.Ct. 167, but we nonetheless proceeded tó ask whether the events culminating in the adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution— events that "occurred after Shell Co. was decided—“so changefd] the legal status of Puerto Rico that the Shell decision no longer ha[d] effect.” Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39. Likewise, the pre-1952 decisions of this court that the government trumpets do not prohibit us from reexamining the question we decided in Crespo in light of these subsequent events.

The government’s reliance on Carrasquillo-Peñaloza is equally misplaced. We held in that' case that the defendant “waived her right to bring' [her] challenge [to the scope of § 2423(a)] when she entered an unconditional guilty plea and executed a waiver-of-appeal clause.” Carrasquillo-Peñaloza, 826 F.3d at 591. Because of this holding, we expressly declined to reach the merits of her argument. Id. at 592, Thus, our gratuitous characterization of the defendant’s argument as “an uphill battle in light of precedent,” id. was textbook dictum, see Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 459 (1st Cir. 1992), and we therefore are not bound by it, see United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 2010).

The government’s second argument relies on Crespo to distinguish Cordova. According to the government, Cordova “turned on” the “[critical” ‘fact that, as a general matter, the Sherman Act ceases to apply to purely local matters once territories become states, leaving state governments free to enact various local antitrust laws broadly consistent with general federal policy, but occasionally divergent as to details.’” (Quoting Cordova, 649 F.2d at 41.) The government insists that this critical feature of the Sherman Act is absent from the Mann Act. We know this, the government tells us, because this court in Crespo rejected the defendant’s argument that “it could not have been the intent of Congress to intervene in matters of interest only to the people of Puerto Rico, that is to say, regulating immorality in general which is within the proper and exclusive domain of the legislature of Puerto Rico.” 151 F.2d at 45. We are not persuaded.

For one thing, the Sherman Act and the Mann Act are similar—not different—with respect to Congress’s hesitancy to intervene in the local, affairs of a state: both statutes reach activity that occurs wholly within a territory, see 15 U.S.C. § 3(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a), while simultaneously reaching state conduct only when it occurs “among the several States,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, or “in interstate or foreign commerce,” 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). Thus, the sentence from Cordova on which the government so heavily relies merely explains how a territory’s achievement of statehood affects application of the Sherman Act. Indeed, in support of this passage, Cordova cited Moore v. United States, 85 F. 465 (8th Cir. 1898), which dealt with that exact scenario. See Cordova, 649 F.2d at 41 n.29. In Moore, the court held that an indictment alleging a violation of the predecessor to § 3 of the Sherman Act with respect to an agreement in restraint of trade in the then-territory of Utah had no continued effect once Utah achieved statehood because § 3 no longer applied to Utah after that point. 85 F. at 467-68. The same is true in the Mann Act context. For example, the Act was understood to reach transportation that occurred solely within Hawaii when it was a territory. See Lee v. United States, 125 F.2d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 1942). Once Hawaii achieved statehood, however, that same conduct could no longer violate the Mann Act.

For another thing, the government overstates the significance of our characterization of the Sherman Act to our holding in Cordova. It was not “[cjritical” to our decision. Instead, the critical fact in Cordova was the absence of “specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in [the Sherman Act] to demonstrate a statutory intent to intervene more extensively into the, local affairs of post-Constitutional Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state.” 649 F.2d at 42. Only in the absence of such evidence could we conclude that “it is fair to assume that the framers of the Sherman Act, had they been aware of the FRA and subsequent Constitutional developments, would have intended that Puerto Rico be treated as a ‘state’ under the [Sherman] Act, once Commonwealth status was achieved.” Id.

In its third attempt to avoid Cordova, the government cites Sánchez Valle in support of the position that “Puerto Rico remains a territory under the U.S. Constitution,” such that Crespo remains controlling. But neither Sánchez Valle nor Puerto Rico’s status under the Constitution forecloses application of the Cordova framework. In Sánchez Valle, the Supreme Court took pains to acknowledge the “distinctive, indeed exceptional, status as a self-governing Commonwealth” that Puer-to Rico occupies today, but the issue presented in that case—-whether Puerto Rico and the United States are different sovereigns for purposes of the dual-sovereignty doctrine—compelled the Court to look not to the present but to the distant past to ascertain “the ‘ultimate source’ of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial power.” 136 S.Ct. at 1874 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978)); see also id. at 1876. And, although we recently reiterated that Puerto Rico “is ‘constitutionally a territory,’” Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 344 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1172 (1st Cir. 1987) (Torruella, J., concurring)), that observation is beside the point. This case requires us to answer a question of congressional intent, see Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39, not one of the constitutional relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. See Jusino Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 214 F.3d 34, 40-44 (1st Cir. 2000) (acknowledging Congress’s constitutional authority to legislate for Puerto Rico differently than for the states but nonetheless applying the Cordova framework to the question of whether Congress intended a particular statute to treat Puerto Rico as a state or a territory).

Undeterred, the government offers a fourth. and final variant of the Crespo-is-controlling argument. This version is multifaceted. Here’s how it works: (1) Crespo held that § 2421(a) applies to transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico. (2) The FRA’s savings clause, 48 U.S.C. § 734, (in the government’s words) “gives rise to a presumption that [a pre-1952] statute continues to apply to Puerto Rico in exactly the same way it did before 1952, unless or until Congress demonstrates the intent to change the statute’s application.” (3) The wicked one-two punch of Crespo’s holding and § 734’s presumption preserving that holding topples Maldonado’s Cordova argument. We are unconvinced.

The critical flaw in this argument is the government’s misunderstanding of § 734. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 734. The import of this language is clear: federal laws—with an exception, which need not concern us, for those that are “locally inapplicable”—apply in Puerto Rico just as they do in the United States. The text does not support the government’s position that the interpretation of a particular statute’s application to Puerto Rico is frozen in time—notwithstanding the evolution of Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States—until Congress says otherwise.

Moreover, the government’s interpretation of § 734 is not merely textually baseless; it is also entirely unsupported by our case law. Section 734 is most often invoked when a federal statute is silent on whether it applies to Puerto Rico; in these circumstances, reliance on § 734 solidifies the conclusion that Puerto Rico is within the statute’s reach. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 18, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining the “default rule ... that, as a general-matter,- a federal statute does apply to Puerto Rico pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 734” and holding that the Federal Death Penalty Act applies to Puerto Rico); United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723, 724-26 (1st Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument that 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not apply to Puerto Rico); Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 1958) (holding that the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act—which applied to “the several States and Territories, and the District of Columbia”—applied to Puerto Rico and continued to do so after 1952). In this case, however, we are not confronted with the question of whether § 2421(a) applies to Puerto Rico in the first place (it indisputably does), but rather with the more nuanced question, of whether, in light of the events that culminated in the adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution, it continues to apply to Puerto Rico as a territory or instead treats it as a state. Neither § 734 nor our case law interpreting that statute aids us in answering that question.

.The government doubles down on its interpretation of § 734 by relying on a single sentence from our decision in United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1985): “The congressional intent behind the approval of the Puerto Rico Constitution was that the Constitution would operate to organize a local government and its adoption would in no way alter the applicability of United States laws and federal jurisdiction in Puerto Rico.” But Quinones, like all of the other cases citing § 734, does not support the government’s reading of that statute. .

. The defendant in Quinones argued that the wiretap provision in the Omnibus Crime Control Act did not apply to Puerto Rico because a provision of the Puerto Rico Constitution prohibited wiretapping in the commonwealth. Id. at 41. The linchpin-of this argument was the defendant’s belief that the Puerto Rico Constitution had the force of federal law because it was approved by Congress. Id. , We rejected that argument and, in doing so, explained that, “[wjhile the creation of the Commonwealth granted Puerto Rico authority over its own local affairs, Congress maintains similar powers over Puerto Rico as it possesses over the federal states.” Id. at 43. We then explained, using the language that the government seizes on in this case, that Congress did not intend the Puerto Rico Constitution to “alter the applicability of United States law and federal jurisdiction in Puerto Rico.” Id.

Properly understood, then, Quinones stands for the unremarkable proposition that a provision of the Puerto Rico Constitution cannot prevail where it conflicts with applicable federal law—a proposition that applies equally to state constitutions. See Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 18 (relying on Quinones to reject the argument that the Federal Death Penalty Act should not apply to Puerto Rico because a provision of the Puerto Rico Constitution banned the death penalty; “a provision of the Constitution of Puerto Rico does not trump a federal criminal statute, where Congress intends to apply the statute to Puerto Rico”; “[T]he Constitution of Puerto Rico governs proceedings in the Commonwealth courts; this is true of state constitutions and proceedings in state courts. Those constitutions do not govern the definitions' or the penalties Congress intends for federal crimes.” (citation omitted)). Nothing in Quinones (or any other decision) supports the government’s view that § 734 freezes in time a pre-1952 interpretation of a statute’s application to Puerto Rico. As was true in Cordova, we remain free to reexamine our pre-1952 decision in Crespo in light of the evolution of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.

For these reasons, we conclude that Crespo no longer settles the question of whether § 2421(a) covers transportation that occurs entirely within Puerto Rico. Instead, as Maldonado argues, the Cordova analytical framework must guide our analysis of whether we should treat Puerto Rico as a state or a territory for purposes of § 2421(a). We now turn to this inquiry.

B. Applying Cordova

As a general matter, “[w]hether Puerto Rico is to be treated as a state or a territory for purposes of a particular statute that does not mention it specifically ‘depends upon the character and aim of the act.’ ” Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 40 (quoting Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 258, 58 S.Ct. 167). This inquiry entails construing the text of the statute “to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers” and considering, in addition to the words in the statute, “the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed.” Cordova, 649 F.2d at 38 (quoting Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 258, 58 S.Ct. 167). As we have noted, “[i]n certain circumstances, Puerto Rico’s changing status complicates this task,” Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 40, and our attempt to discern congressional intent behind the statute under review comes with a unique twist: an assumption that, when enacting the statute, Congress was aware of how the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States would develop in the decades to come. See id.; Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39. This is such a case.

Thus, we ask “whether the [Mann] Act’s framers, if aware of Puerto Rico’s current constitutional status, would have intended it to be treated as a ‘state’ or ‘territory’ under the Act.” Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39. There are “two possible avenues” by which we might reach the conclusion that Congress intended to treat Puerto Rico differently than the states: “an express direction in the statutory text or some other compelling reason.” Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 42. The first avenue is closed to us because the Mann Act does riot expressly indicate that: Puerto Rico is to be treated as a territory or that transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico .suffices. Cf. Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310, 320-23 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument, based on Cordova, that the Buy American Act (BAA) did not apply to Puerto Rico—just as it did not apply to the states—because, among other reasons, the BAA explicitly encompassed construction projects occurring in Puerto Rico; court distinguished Cordova on this basis).

All that remains for the government, therefore, is the second avenue—“some other compelling reason”—which requires “ ‘specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in a particular statute to demonstrate a statutory intent to intervene more extensively- into the local affairs of post-Constitutional Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state.’ ” Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 42-43 (quoting Cordova, 649 F.2d at 42). The government- argues that the committee reports that accompanied the passage of the Mann Act in 1910 satisfy this requirement. We disagree.

The committee reports merely discuss application of the Mann Act to transportation within territories as a general matter without mentioning Puerto Rico, and they do not suggest any reason why Congress might have intended to regulate transportation in Puerto Rico in particular. Cf. Dávila-Pérez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 467-68 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that the Defense Base Act (DBA)—which covered military bases “in any Territory or possession outside of the continental United States”—continued to apply to Puerto Rico after 1952 because, among other reasons, the legislative history of the DBA “specifically indicated] that Puerto Rico is within the reach of the Act” (citing H.R. Rep. 77-1070, at 4 (1941))). The most that can be said about the committee reports in this case is that they indicate (as the government argues) that Congress intended to exercise its regulatory authority to the fullest extent permissible under the Constitution when it passed the Mann Act.

But this alone is not enough for the government to prevail under the Cordova test. In Shell Co., the Supreme Court explained that, in passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended “to exercise all the power it possessed.” 302 U.S. at 259, 58 S.Ct. 167 (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932)). In Cordova, we recognized Congress’s intent to legislate as broadly as possible, 649 F.2d at 39, but we nonetheless determined that there was no specific evidence or clear policy reason embedded in the Sherman Act from which to conclude that Congress intended the Act to intervene more extensively into the local affairs of Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state, see id. at 41-42. So too here. The fact that Congress in 1910 intended to legislate to the full extent of its powers in passing the Mann Act fails in and of itself “to demonstrate a .statutory intent to intervene more extensively into the local affairs of post-Constitutional Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of a state.” Id. at 42 (emphasis added).

The government, though, has a fallback: the post-1952 amendments to the Mann Act. It postulates that, because none of these amendments “excluded Puerto Rico from the definition of ‘Territory or Possession of the United States’ ” and because we must presume that Congress was aware of our holding in Crespo when it subsequently amended the Mann Act, these amendments demonstrate Congress’s intent for Puerto Rico to remain a territory under § 2421(a). Once again, however, we are unpersuaded that this evidence satisfies Cordova’s compelling-reasons hurdle.

For starters, the Mann Act does not provide a definition of “Territory or Possession of the United States.” In this respect, this case is unlike Dávila-Pérez, upon which the government relies. That case involved the DBA, which applies to United States military and naval bases “in any Territory or possession outside the continental United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(2), and defines “continental United States” as “the States and the District of Columbia,” id. § 1651(b)(4). In concluding that the DBA applied to United States military bases located in Puerto Rico in Dávila-Pérez, we deemed it significant that Congress added the definition of “continental United States” seven years after the Puerto Rico Constitution went into effect, while simultaneously making it explicit that the DBA did not apply to Alaska, which had recently achieved statehood. See Dávila-Pérez, 202 F.3d at 469 (“Most important, the definition of ‘continental United States’ was added to the [DBA] only seven years after the alleged change in Puerto Rico’s status without any reference to that fact. In sharp contrast, in response to Alaska’s transition from a territory to a state, Congress immediately deleted the reference to Alaska in the [DBA] and added the definition of ‘continental United States’ to ensure that Alaska was excluded from the scope of the Act.” (citation omitted)). The same cannot be said for the Mann Act; none of the post-1952 amendments to § 2421 indicate a congressional intent to treat Puerto Rico as a territory under that section.

Moreover, with the exception of the elimination of the District of Columbia— which was, unlike Puerto Rico, specifically enumerated in the text of § 2421 (and its predecessors) until 1986—none of the post-1952 amendments to the Mann Act have altered . the territory-or-possession language in § 2421. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (reaching illicit transportation “in any Territory or Possession of the United States”); Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114— 22, § 303, 129 Stat. 227, 255-56 (enacting § 2421(a) with this same language); Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b), 100 Stat. at 3511 (1986. reenactment of § 2421 with this same language); Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. at 812 (1948 codification of § 2421 with this same language); see also Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 106, 112 Stat. 2974, 2977 (amending other language of § 2421 in a manner not relevant here). This post-1952 legislative history does not constitute the sort of specific evidence or clear policy reasons that Cordova requires; instead, it stands in stark contrast to the post-constitutional legislative history with which we have been confronted in other cases.

For example, in Antilles Cement, we concluded that two aspects of the post-1952 legislative history of the BAA supported our conclusion that the Act continued to apply to Puerto Rico even though it did not apply to the states. 670 F.3d at 321. First, we noted that Congress overhauled and reenacted the BAA in 2011, leaving the explicit statutory reference to Puerto Rico intact. Id We explained that “[w]e [could] think of no better indicator of Congress’s intent to include Puerto Rico within the reach of the BAA than its overhauling the BAA yet preserving the law’s explicit application to the Commonwealth.” Id. Second, we deemed Congress’s decision to retain the explicit reference to Puerto Rico all the more significant when juxtaposed with Congress’s. diligence “in amending the BAA to remove entities that, it no longer intends to cover”; Congress promptly amended the BAA to remove the explicit references to Alaska and Hawaii once those former territories achieved statehood. Id. Similarly, in Dávila-Pérez, we contrasted Congress’s immediate deletion of the explicit reference to Alaska in the DBA once the former territory obtained statehood with the post-1952 addition of a definition of the “‘continental United States’ ... without any reference” to the Puerto Rico Constitution or Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status. 202 F.3d at 469.

Unlike the post-1952 legislative history that we examined in Antilles Cement and Dávila-Pérez, the post-1952 amendments to the Mann Act do not indicate that Congress intended § 2421(a) to intervene more extensively into the local affairs of Puerto Rico than into the local affairs of the states. See Cordova, 649 F.2d at 42. Therefore, these amendments cannot satisfy the Cordova test.

Finally, the government insists that there are clear policy reasons for applying § 2421(a) to transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico, Offering two documents—a research paper on human trafficking in Puerto Rico and the United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report from 2014—the government argues that “[transportation of sex-crime victims within Puerto Rico is a pervasive problem, and the federal government’s'prosecutorial authority under Section 2421 is a significant bulwark.”

We do not doubt the seriousness of the human-trafficking situation in Puerto Rico that is. relayed in the government-cited documents. But Cordova requires that the “clear policy reasons” be “embedded in [the] .particular statute,” and the “specific evidence” that Cordova discusses similarly must “demonstrate a statutory intent” to. treat Puerto Rico as a territory instead of a state. 649 F.2d at 42 (emphasis added). In short, the specific evidence or clear policy reasons must be responsive to the key congressional-intent question that we must address: “whether the [Mann] Act’s framers, if aware of Puerto Rico’s current constitutional status, would have intended it to be treated as a ‘state’ or ‘territory’ under the Act.” Id. at 39. Because the government’s documents tell us nothing about what Congress intended, they do not help us answer this critical question.

In sum, against the backdrop of clear congressional intent to grant Puerto Rico state-like autonomy, see Examining Bd., 426 U.S. at 594, 96 S.Ct. 2264; Cordova, 649 F.2d at 42, we have not found specific evidence or clear policy reasons embedded in § 2421(a) to suggest that, had the framers of that section known of the evolution of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States that took place in the decades since the passage of the Mann Act, they would have intended § 2421(a) to intervene in Puerto Rico’s local affairs more' extensively than it intervenes in the states’ local affairs! We therefore must conclude that, had- the framers foreseen these developments, they would have intended that § 2421(a) treat Puerto Rico similarly to the states! Accordingly, we hold that § 2421(a) does not extend to illicit transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico; instead, it reaches only transportation “in interstate' or foreign commerce” with respect to the island.

We emphasize that our holding today is a narrow one: it applies only to the scope of § 2421(a), and not to the other provisions of the Mann Act, We therefore need not and do not express an opinion on whether those other provisions . cover transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. '

      . In this appeal from the district court’s dismissal of an indictment, we glean the factual background from tire well-pleaded facts in the indictment itself. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997).

      . Meanwhile, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico charged Maldonado in connection with this conduct. At oral argument, his attorney represented to us that Maldonado has since pled guilty to the Puerto Rico charges and was awaiting sentencing as of that date.

      .Congress originally enacted this prohibition as part of the Mann Act on June 25, 1910. See White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424). At that time, the Mann Act reached illicit transportation “in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or in the District of Columbia,” id., 36 Stat. at 825, and a different provision provided that "the term 'Territory,' as used in this Act, shall include the district of Alaska, the insular possessions of the United States, and the Canal Zone,” id § 7, 36 Stat. at 827, In 1948, Congress added the term "Possession,” such that the'Mann Act covered transportation "in any Territory or Possession of the United States,” Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683, 812—a phrase that § 2421(a) contains today. Congress also scrapped the definition of territory in 1948 because it concluded that "[n]o definition of ‘Territory’ [was] necessary to the revised section as it is phrased.” H.R. No. 80-304, at A150 (1947); see also Pub. L. No. 80-722, 62 Stat. at 812. Since then, the Mann Act has not defined the terms "Territory” or "Possession.”

      . This brief history lesson is heavily abridged. For a more robust backstory, we refer the interested reader to our opinion in Cordova, 649 F.2d at 39-41.

      . The events giving rise to this prosecution occurred prior to the enactment of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241, and the government makes no argument that that legislation should bear on our analysis.

      . In addition, the waived argument in Carrasquillo-Peñaloza concerned Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate intra-Puerto Rico conduct. 826 F.3d at 591. In this case, we deal with a very different question of congressional intent.

      . The Mann Act’s failure to include Puerto Rico explicitly also distinguishes this case from United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 195, 65 S.Ct. 602, 89 L.Ed. 865 (1945) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court held that the Act covered transportation that occurs solely within the District of Columbia. When Beach was decided, the Mann Act prohibited illicit transportation "in the District of Columbia.” Pub. L. No. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. at 825; see also Beach, 324 U.S. at 195, 65 S.Ct. 602.

      . Compare Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. at 812 (prior version of § 2421 reaching illicit transportation "in the District of Columbia”), and Pub. L. No. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. at 825 (same in predecessor to § 2421), with Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 3510, 3511 (omitting District of Columbia in § 2421).

      . As we explain below, see infra note 10, another provision of the Mann Act, § 2423(a), has a more eventful history than its counterpart in § 2421. The "in any Territory or Possession of the United States” language in § 2421, by contrast, has remained unchanged since 1948. See supra note 3 (explaining addition of the term "Possession” in 1948).

      . In reaching the same conclusion, the district court also relied on the 1998 amendment to § 2423(a), another provision of the Mann Act, and the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2426, In 1998, Congress amended § 2423(a) to increase the maximum penalty for that offense. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-557, at 22 (1998). Before the bill was enacted, a floor amendment proposed adding' the word "commonwealth” to the phrase "in any territory or possession of the United States” in § 2423(a); the floor amendment passed without explanation. 144 Cong. Rec. S12.262 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen, Coats), The enacted amendment to § 2423(a) therefore reached illicit transportation "in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States.” Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 103, 112 Stat. at 2976; see also id. § 104(a), 112 Stat. at 2976 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 2426, which provided the following definition of "State” for the. purposes of that section: “a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States”). The "commonwealth, territory or possession” language has remained in § 2423(a) ever since. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see also id. § 2426 (containing same definition of “State” for purposes of that section as was contained in Pub. L. No. 105-314).
      Like the district court, Maldonado stresses to us the importance of the addition of . the commonwealth language in §§ 2423(a) and 2426. But because Cordova is alone sufficient to support our conclusion in this case, we need not—and therefore do not—express any opinion on this issue.

      . Proceeding under the assumption that § 2423(a) covers illicit transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico—a matter on which we express no opinion—the government argues that our conclusion’ that § 2421(a) does not apply to such transportation creates an absurd result. We are unmoved. Even if the government is correct that the two provisions diverge in scope with respect to intra-Puerto Rico transportation (and we emphasize “if”), we are not convinced that such a result is absurd; the two provisions employ different language to identify the transportation covered, they specify separate crimes against separate classes of victims, and they have not been amended in lockstep with one .another. In short, it is not at all .clear .to us that Congress intended the .two provisions to have the same, scope. In this case, we are called upon to decide only whether § 2421(a), not § 2423(a), reaches illicit transportation that occurs solely within Puerto Rico. For reasons already explained, Cordova provides the appropriate analytical framework for deciding that question and leads us to the conclusion that we reach. The government has not explained—and we cannot discern—-why the assumed scope of a different statutory section should alter our Cordova analysis of the scope of § 2421(a).


author: KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Erasmo RODRÍGUEZ-VÁZQUEZ, Interested Party, Appellant, José Luis Díaz-Colón, on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor son J.L.D.R.; Linda Delgado, on behalf of her minor daughter D.M.D.D.; Zoraida Colón-Cartagena; Pedro Diaz; Pedro Luis Díaz-Colón; Yahaira Enid Diaz-Cólón; Lourdes De Jesus-Velazquez, on her own and on behalf of her minor children J.L.S.D.; J.L.L.S.D. and L.S.D., on their own and as legal heirs of Leopoldo Sanabria-Díaz; Albaela Diaz-Caraballo; Leonardo Sanabria-Díaz; Jennifer Piris-Jusino, on her own and on behalf of her minor daughter G.R.P.; Lucy Guzmán-Borréro; Carmelo Velázquez-Colóri; Carmelo Colón-Rivera; Orlando Colón-Velázquez; Orlando Ramos-Félix; Josefa Félix; José Antonio Félix; Elíseo Ramos-Félix; Juan Marcos Merced-Gómez; Héctor Merced-Rodríguez; María E. Gómez-Velázquez; Leopoldo Sanabria-Morales; Maribel Ortiz-Vázquez, on behalf of minor, J.M.S.O.; Ana Luisa Diaz-Rivera; Yolanda Ortiz-Díaz; Evelyn Ortiz-Díaz; Luis Daniel Ortiz-Díaz; Digno Ortiz-Díaz; Francis I. López-Díaz; Chelsea Luz Merced, Plaintiffs, v. Aníbal Solivan SOLIVAN; Héctor Tirado; Daniel Colón; Francisco Báez-Quiñones; Jesús Figueroa-Cruz; Jesús Figueroa De Jesús; José Fuentes Agostini; District Attorney Gabriel Redondo; District Attorney José Figueroa-Zayas; District Attorney José Capó; Juan José Toledo-Bayouth; José Toledo-Bayouth; Fernando Toledo-Bayouth; Pedro J. Toledo-Bayouth, Defendants, Appellees, FNU Candelaria; Unknown Police Officers A to J; District Attorney Ulpiano-Crespo; Estate of Ulpiano Crespo, comprised of unknown individuals K through S; Unknown District Attorneys T through Z; Zoé Díaz-Colón; Conjugal Partnership Báez-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Capo-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Colón-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Diaz-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Figueroa-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Fuentes-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Redondo-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Solivan-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Tirado-Doe; Conjugal Partnership Toledo-Doe; Jane Doe; John Does, unknown District Attorneys, Police and Penal Officers, Defendants.
    No. 16-1192
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    December 23, 2016

      Guillermo Ramos Luifia, San Juan, PR, for appellant.
    Susana I. Pefiagaricano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with whom Margarita L. Mercado-Echega-ray, Solicitor General, Department of Justice for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, was on brief, for appellees.
    Before TORRUELLA, THOMPSON, and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
   KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.

In settling a civil lawsuit against public officials, the parties in this case convinced the district court to issue a report that the parties and the district court have treated as a gag order barring the parties from disclosing the terms and conditions of the settlement. In short order, Erasmo Rodriguez-Vázquez (“Rodríguez”), a lawyer assisting one of the parties, made statements about the settlement to the local press. Unhappy with the press coverage of their secretive settlement, the public officials who were parties to the settlement obtained an order from the district court holding Rodriguez in contempt and referring him to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Supreme Judicial Court for disciplinary review. Finding no basis in the record to support the contention that Rodriguez violated any court order, we reverse.

I. .

In 1999, several people were wrongfully convicted of murder based in large part on the allegedly false testimony of one key witness. See Díaz-Colón v. Fuentes-Agostini, 786 F.3d 144, 145 (1st Cir. 2015). After one of those people committed suicide in prison, the witness “came forward to recant her testimony, claiming that law enforcement personnel had coerced and bribed her into giving fabricated testimony.” Id. The criminal defendants appealed to Puerto Rico’s Supreme Judicial Court, their convictions were vacated, and the charges against them were dropped. Rodriguez was appointed to represent one group of the criminal defendants in that appeal; he successfully worked to obtain the reversal of their criminal convictions.

The wrongfully convicted’ individuals and/or their heirs or assigns brought two suits,' consolidated into this single case, against the police officers and prosecutors who had been involved in their prosecutions. Various defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on thfe basis of absolute or qualified immunity, which the district court denied. On interlocutory appeal, we affirmed the district court’s ruling as to all but one defendant, and we sént the case back to the district court in anticipation of trial. See id.

At that juncture, the parties to the civil lawsuit reached a settlement following discussions mediated by a magistrate judge. At the parties’ request, the magistrate judge memorialized the settlemeni&wkey;which had not yet been reduced to writing—in a “Fourth Settlement Conference Report.” The aptly named “Report” did just that: it reported the terms and conditions of the parties’ as-yet-unwritten agreement, including three terms relevant to this - appeal: (1) “The settlement agreement shall not signify acceptance of liability regarding the facts alleged in the complaint”; (2) “The parties shall maintain in strict confidentiality all the terms and conditions of the. settlement agreement”; and (3) “The court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce all the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement.”

The parties to this appeal, including Rodriguez, treat the Report as if it actually ordered compliance with the terms and conditions it reported. While that reading could be questioned, in the absence of any argument by anyone that the Report was not an order to comply with the terms of the reported settlement, we will assume the parties’ shared understanding to be correct. The parties also all assume that the magistrate judge had the power to issue an order enjoining certain prospective conduct, but see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), so we shall as well, given the parties’ apparent unanimous consent, id. § 636(c). Finally, Rodriguez waives any argument that he was not subject to the. assumed order.

Four days after the magistrate judge entered the Report, a regional weekly newspaper called El Regional published an article titled, “The circle is closed.” The article stated that the plaintiffs achieved victory against the Puerto Rican government by way of settlement, but they were going to receive much less than the ten million dollars they initially sought. The precise amount the plaintiffs would be paid under the settlement was not stated “because of the court’s confidentiality agreements,” but the paper noted that it would be a small fraction of their claimed damages and it might take several years for the amount to be paid out. The article then quoted Rodriguez as saying:

It was inconvenient for them (the government), to fight it because of the Circuit’s (of Boston) decision and because of the implications made by both the feder7 al and Circuit courts.... This case.is a vindication of the plaintiffs’ rights. It is never payment for the damages suffered, because that will not cover the loss of the lives of Manuel Ortiz and Leopoldo Sanabria; that has no price. Or the death of Hector Merced; that has no price, and the damage will never be compensated,, but at least there is that implicit recognition of the violation of the plaintiffs’ civil rights.

No plaintiffs were quoted in the piece, nor were any of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

The defendants claimed “breach,” or more precisely “violation,” triggering civil contempt proceedings that eventually targeted Rodriguez. After conducting an evi-dentiary hearing, the district court found that Rodriguez made only the quoted statement directly attributed to him. The district court further found that the quoted statement violated the order because it revealed a term or condition of the settlement agreement.

II.

A.

Rodriguez’s first argument on appeal is that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he made even the statement directly attributed to him. We easily reject this argument. The article itself was entered into evidence at the contempt hearing without objection or restriction. It expressly identified Rodriguez as the source of the quoted statement. Rodriguez, in turn, never testified otherwise. Such a record provides ample support for the district court’s fact finding in a civil contempt proceeding. See Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1218-19 (1st Cir. 1991).

This brings us to Rodriguez’s second, and better, argument: that the statement he was found to have made did not violate the court’s order. As a preliminary matter, we eschew any broad reading of the court’s order when determining whether Rodriguez’s statement violated it. As construed by the district court and the parties, the order constituted a prior restraint on speech. Such restraints bear “a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional validity,” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)), and even when valid are narrowly construed, cf. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-56, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (exceptions to the doctrine of prior restraint are few and narrow). Principles of contempt similarly counsel against any broad reading of the presumed order: a finding of contempt for violating a court order should issue only “when there is clear and convincing proof of a violation of a court decree.” Burke v. Guiney, 700 F.2d 767, 769 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting Erhardt v. Prudential Grp., Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 545 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A] complainant must prove civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence ... [and] the putative contemnor ‘must have violated a clear and unambiguous order that left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior was expected and who was expected to behave in the indicated fashion.’ ” (quoting Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1991))). Finally, while we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its ultimate decision to impose a contempt sanction for abuse of discretion, United States v. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2005), “our review will proceed more searchingly when, as here, we are confronted with a finding .of. contempt than when we are called upon to consider a finding exonerating a putative contemnor from a charged contempt,” Project B.A.S.I.C., 947 F.2d at 16.

Employing these principles of law, we cannot agree with the district court that Rodriguez violated the order! In finding a violation, the district court pointed to the Repdrt’s summary of the portion of the parties’ settlement agreement disavowing-any concession of liability. The Report’s summary states: “The settlement agreement shall not signify acceptance of liability regarding the facts alleged in the complaint.” The district court found that Rodriguez revealed the substance of this clause. It reasoned that by saying the settlement was “a vindication of the plaintiffs’ rights” and “[b]y stating that the settlement agreement was an ‘implicit recognition of the violation of plaintiffs’, civil rights,’ [Rodriguez] [was] indicating that defendants [were] liable to plaintiffs.” For two reason's, wé disagree.

First, Rodriguez’s statement to the press was silent on-the matter of liability. Rodriguez instead addressed the rights of the plaintiffs. Defendants and the district court seem to assume that a-recognition of the violation or vindication of plaintiffs’ rights clearly equals a concession of liability by the defendants. As we ourselves have previously recognized, however, in the context of an order that a plaintiff not state that a settlement was “evidence of [or] an admission of liability,” a statement that “the settlement vindicated [plaintiffs] contention that his firing was illegal” is “ambiguous in itself.” Burke, 700 F.2d at 769-70. That ambiguity becomes inescapable in a civil rights suit like the one settled in this instance,, where a violation of rights does not establish liability. Rather, in a civil rights suit such as the underlying action here seeking damages from individual government officials, a plaintiff must also defeat defenses of absolute or qualified immunity. See Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829 (1st Cir. 1987) (liability in a suit brought under § 1983 implicates questions not only of culpability, but also of immunity and causation); see also Solis-Alarcón v. United States, 662 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2011) (observing that government officials are liable in tort under Commonwealth law only where attaching liability would strike a balance between citizens’ rights to be compensated when injured by the government officials’ wrongful or negligent acts and those government officials’ duty to vigorously investigate alleged criminal activity, the same “view that animates federal qualified immunity doctrine”). In the past year alone, courts in this circuit have decided at least eighteen cases in which the Commonwealth and/or its officials have argued that there is no liability even if a plaintiffs rights were violated. It therefore follows that one could imply, or even state, that a plaintiffs rights were violated and vindicated without revealing whether the defendants bore any liability.

Second, even if Rodriguez’s statement could be construed as a statement that defendants were liable, such a statement would not have revealed any of the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement which, after all, contained only a disavowal of liability. A statement that defendants were liable would have been a false description, rather than a disclosure, of a settlement term. It might perhaps have subjected Rodriguez to a libel claim, but it would not have subjected him to a claim that he violated the court’s order.

For these reasons, the district court’s contempt order was clearly erroneous and cannot stand. The concomitant monetary sanction the court imposed falls with it.

B.

Rodriguez also challenges the district court’s decision to refer him for ethical review before the Puerto Rico Supreme Judicial Court. It is not clear what kind of remedy he seeks from us, but he argues on appeal that the district court “abused its discretion when it referred [him] to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court for ethical review” because his conduct comported with the ethical rules applicable in the district court. Defendants contend that the district court’s referral was not a judicial decision and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review it, and that, in any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion because Rodriguez acted unethically.

We see no need to order any “un-refer-ral.” The district court was clear that it made a referral to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth only because the district court viewed Rodriguez as having violated a court order. Our holding in this appeal eliminates the basis for the referral. Rodriguez may certainly send our opinion to the Puerto Rico Supreme Judicial Court, and he offers no reason to think that some order reversing the referral would have any different effect.

III.

Finally, we offer a note of caution concerning the parties’ apparent presumption that a federal court should order compliance with settlement agreements. It is often helpful and most certainly proper for a judicial officer who is not adjudicating a case to conduct mediation. See, e.g., P.R. Local R. 83J. In the normal successful event, the mediation may result in a private contract between the parties, followed by dismissal. Occasionally, there may be a reason for the court to retain jurisdiction to hear a later claim that a party has breached the contract. Sometimes, too, at least where a principal form of relief sought in the underlying action is injunc-tive, it may be appropriate to go further and turn the settlement agreement into a' court order. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. for N.H., Comm’r, 665 F.3d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2012) (settlement resulted in consent decree that could be enforced by seeking a contempt citation for a violation). Taking such a step, though, calls for restraint and careful consideration by the court because it has duties and interests that may well differ from those of the parties. Here, for example, in a case that did not in any way center on a request for an injunctive remedy, the district court nevertheless found itself issuing what all involved treated as a prior restraint on speech aimed at preventing the public from knowing what public officials were doing in a matter of well-warranted public interest. And when the parties then claimed breach, the district court found itself with the more difficult task of defending the sanctity of its own order rather than deciding a breach of contract dispute.

IV.

Rodriguez did not violate what the parties all treat as a confidentiality order issued by the district court. The court’s contempt finding and sanction were therefore based on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and vacate the contempt and sanctions order. Costs are assessed against the appellees.

      . The article was written in Spanish; this title, along with the excerpted language that follows, is taken from the certified translation to which the district court referred during the contempt hearing.

      . See, e.g., López-Erquicia v. Weyne-Roig, No. 15-2278, — F.3d -, 2016 WL 758201, dkt. no. 33, at 6 (1st Cir. Feb. 23, 2016); Marrero-Méndez v. Calixto-Rodríguez, 830 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2016); Guadalupe-Báez v. Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 517 (1st Cir. 2016); Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Dávila, 813 F.3d 64, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2016); Román v. Oliveras, 637 Fed.Appx. 616, 618 (1st Cir. 2016); Escalera-Salgado v. United States, No. 14-1352, 2016 WL 5374095, at *3 (D.P.R. Sept. 26, 2016); García-Melendez v. Rodríguez Gonzalez, No. 14-1560, 2016 WL 5173240, at *8 (D.P.R. Sept. 21, 2016); Pagán González v. Moreno, No. 14-1899, — F.Supp.3d -, -, 2016 WL 4384715, at *3 (D.P.R. Aug. 16, 2016); Aviles v. Figueroa, No. 12-1200, 195 F.Supp.3d 435, 448, 2016 WL 3920171, at *9 (D.P.R. July 15, 2016); Ramos-Torres v. Municipality of Caguas, No. 12-1706, 2016 WL 3676201, at *2 (D.P.R. July 5, 2016); Gómez-Cruz v. Fernández-Pabellón, No. 13-1711, 2016 WL 3511557, at *7-8 (D.P.R. Mar. 31, 2016); Gonzalez v. Otero, 172 F.Supp.3d 477, 494 (D.P.R. 2016); Mercado-Ruiz, v. Carazo, No. 14-1372, 2016 WL 1171508, at *3 (D.P.R. Mar. 23, 2016); Diaz-Morales v. Rubio-Paredes, 170 F.Supp.3d 276, 287-88 (D.P.R. 2016); Díaz Rodríguez v. Figueroa-Sancha, No. 12-1243, 2016 WL 1247208, at *1 (D.P.R. Feb. 24, 2016); Sánchez v. McClintock, No. 11-1542, 2016 WL 344528, at *5-6 (D.P.R. Jan. 27, 2016); García-Matos v. Bhatia-Gautier, 156 F.Supp.3d 245, 256-57 (D.P.R. 2016); Torres-Rivera v. Garcia-Padilla, 156 F.Supp.3d 237, 244 (D.P.R. 2016).