author: MATHIAS, Judge.

text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Melanie DAVIS, Appellant-Petitioner, and Angela SUMMERS, Appellee-Respondent.
    No. 53A01-1305-DR-221.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Dec. 20, 2013.

      Stephen Sanders, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, IN, Earl R.C. Singleton, Cormunity Legal Clinic, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
   OPINION

MATHIAS, Judge.

Melanie Davis f/k/a David Paul Summers ("Davis") appeals the order of the Momoe Cireuit Court dismissing Davis's petition to dissolve her marriage with Angela Summers ("Summers"). On appeal, Davis claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Davis and Summers's marriage was void under Indiana Code section 31-11-1-1, which generally prohibits same-sex marriages in Indiana. Concluding that the parties' marriage was not automatically voided when the trial court granted Davis's petition to change her name and be identified as a female instead of a male, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

On October 30, 1999, Davis, then known as David Paul Summers, and Summers were married in Brown County, Indiana. The marriage produced one child, K.S., who was born in July 2005. At some point, Davis was diagnosed with "gender dysphoria." According to the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-5"), a diagnosis of "gender dysphoria," formerly known as "gender identity disorder," is a disorder of "people whose gender at birth is contrary to the one they identify with." See American Psychiatric Association, "Fact Sheet on Gender Dysphoria," available at http:// www.dsm5.org/Documents/Gender% 20Dysphoria% 20F act% 20Sheet.pdf.

Thereafter, on May 31, 2005, Davis filed a petition in Marion Cireuit Court to change his name from David Paul Summers to Melanie Lauren Artemisia Davis. His petition also requested that the gender on his birth certificate be changed from male to female. The Marion Cireuit Court granted the change of name on September 12, 2005. However, that court did not order Davis's gender to be changed on the birth certificate until it issued an amended order in his case three years later, on October 21, 2008. In this amended order, the court directed that the gender designation on Davis's birth certificate "be amended from Male to Female in order to conform to her identity, legal name and appearance." Appellant's App. p. 9.

After this legal change of gender, Davis and Summers remained married until they separated later in 2008. Approximately four years after the parties separated, on October 25, 2012, Davis filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Monroe Cireuit Court. Summers did not oppose the petition. On January 28, 2013, the trial court approved of the parties' agreed provisional order. Pursuant to the provisional order, Davis was granted custody of K.S. and Summers was ordered to pay child support.

However, on March 8, 2018, the trial court, acting sua sponte, issued the order at issue in this appeal, which provides in relevant part:

The Court having reviewed the file herein and pertinent matters of law now FINDS:
a. Indiana Code 31-11-1-1 states: Same sex marriages are prohibited.
i. See. 1(a) Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female.
ii.(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it was solemnized.
7. When the order amending the Petitioner's gender was issued on October 21, 2008, Petitioner's gender designation was legally changed to female. Pursuant to I.C. 31-11-1-1, Melanie Lauren Artem{iJsia Davis (formally David Paul Summers) a female was prohibited from being married to Angela Summers, also a female. The marriage became void on October 21, 2008.
8. On October 25, 2012, Melanie Davis filed a Verified Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, believing the marriage of the parties to be valid. Said belief could have been construed to constitute a common-law marriage prior to January 1, 1958. However, since January 1, 1958, common-law marriages in Indiana are prohibited by the repeal of the provision allowing common-law marriage in Acts 1957, Ch. 78 § 2, effective January 1, 1958, and the adoption of the statute prohibiting common-law marriages-I.C. 31-1-6-1.
9. The parties cannot assert that theirs is a common-law marriage, which is prohibited by statute. They were legally married prior to Petitioner's gender reassignment, but the marriage was voided when both parties became female, as such marriages are also prohibited by Indiana statute.
10. "A trial court cannot dissolve a marriage that is not a marriage because it is already void." Williams vs Williams, 460 N.E.2d 1226; 1984 Ind.App.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties' marriage was void as of October 21, 2008. Because the Court lacks the jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage because no marriage exists, Petitioner's Verified Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is hereby DENIED.

Appellant's App. pp. 5-6. Davis filed a motion to correct error on April 8, 2013, which the trial court denied on March 15, 20183. Davis then filed a notice of appeal on April 15, 2013, and this appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

Davis claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Indiana Code seetion 31-11-1-1 acted to void her marriage with Summers as of the date her birth certificate was amended to show her change of gender. This claim requires us to construe section 31-11-1-1. The interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law and is reviewed under a de novo standard. Demming v. Underwood, 943 N.E.2d 878, 888 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trams. denied. Our supreme court has summarized the rules of statutory construction as follows:

The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for judicial construction. However when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation it is deemed ambiguous and thus open to judicial construction. And when faced with an ambiguous statute, other well-established rules of statutory construction are applicable. One such rule is that our primary goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the Legislature. To effectuate legislative intent, we read the sections of an act together in order that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. We also examine the statute as a whole. And we do not presume that the Legislature intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.

City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg'l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ind.2005) (citations omitted).

Discussion and Decision

Davis claims that the trial court erred in construing Indiana Code section 31-11-1-1, which provides:

(a) Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female.
(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.

Ind.Code § 31-11-1-1.

It is clear that subsections (a) and (b) of the statute have both disjunctive and conjunctive meaning in the case before us. When the parties were married, Davis was a male and Summers was a female, and their marriage produced a child, K.S. This marriage complied with the requirement of subsection (a). The question then, is what effect subsection (b) of the statute had on the parties' marriage, years after it had been validly entered into under Indiana law. The trial court, focusing exclusively on the first part of subsection (b), concluded that the parties' 1999 marriage was void. This is not an unreasonable reading of the first part of subsection (b) if read alone, as it states, "A marriage between persons of the same gender is void...." But, as set forth in City of North Vernon, supra, we must read subsection (b) not only in the context of the rest of the statute, but also in the context of the other statutes governing marriage in Indiana.

The whole of subsection (b) provides that "[a] marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it was solemmiged." I.C. § 31-11-1-1(b) (emphasis added). Davis argues that seetion 31-11-1-1(a) was meant to prevent the marriage of persons of the same sex from being considered as married in Indiana and that subsection (b) simply states that a marriage between those of the same sex is invalid in Indiana even if it was solemnized in a state where same-sex marriages are permitted but does not automatically void a marriage that was initially valid in Indiana simply because one of the parties to the marriage has changed his or her gender. We agree.

Indiana Code clearly addresses marriages that are void. Specifically, Chapter 8 of Indiana Code 31-11 is titled "Void Marriages." Section 1 of this chapter voids ab initio, and without legal proceedings, the types of marriage described in sections 2-5 that follow. Section 2 of the chapter declares that "[a] marriage is void if either party to the marriage had a wife or husband who was living when the marriage was solemnized." I.C. § 31-11-8-2. Section 3 declares a marriage void if it is between people more closely related than second cousins, with certain exceptions. I.C. § 31-11-8-8. Section 4 declares a marriage void if "either party to the marriage was mentally incompetent when the marriage was solemnized." I.C. § 31-11-8-4. And Section 5 states that a common-law marriage is void if it is entered into after January 1, 1958. I.C. § 81-11-8-5.

Lastly, Section 6, added in 1997, states:

A marriage is void if the parties to the marriage:
(1) are residents of Indiana;
(2) had their marriage solemnized in another state with the intent to:
(A) evade IC 831-11-4-4 or IC 31-11-4-11 (or IC 31-7-3-3 or IC 31-7-3-10 before their repeal); and
(B) subsequently return to Indiana and reside in Indiana; and
(8) without having established residence in another state in good faith, return to Indiana and reside in Indiana after the marriage is solemnized.

I.C. § 31-11-8-6.

Thus, Section 6 declares marriages void if they are simply an attempt to cireum-vent the restrictions of certain other statutory restrictions on marriage, namely Indiana Code sections 31-11-4-4 and 31-11-4-11 and their predecessor statutes. Section 31-11-4-4 sets forth the requirements of an application for marriage, and the section 31-11-4-11 prohibits a court clerk from issuing a marriage to a person who has been adjudged to be mentally incompetent or who is under the influence of aleohol or a nareotic drug.

Simply said, there is nothing in the Indiana Code chapter dealing with void marriages that declares that a marriage that was valid when it was entered into becomes void when one of the parties to that marriage has since changed his or her gender. And the section that deals with marriages between Indiana residents solemnized in other states to avoid the application of certain Indiana marital regulations does not mention same-sex marriages. Nor does it need to do so, as these marriages are already void under Indiana Code section 31-11-1-1(b) even if they were solemnized in another state.

The trial court's reasoning in the present case has the effect of adding the type of marriage at issue, a marriage between a male and female solemnized pursuant to Indiana law, to that Section 1 marriages that are void ab initio, along with polygamous, polyandrous, cousins' and incompetents' marriages To read this into the current statutory framework is beyond the purview of our constitutional authority to interpret statutes.

The trial court's reasoning would also result in an untenable situation regarding the parties' child, who is a legitimate child born to a legally-married man and woman during their marriage. To conclude that the parties marriage somehow became void when the gender was changed on Davis's birth certificate would permit Davis to effectively abandon her own child, even though the parties were validly married at the time of the child's birth and even though Davis is the child's father. It would also leave the parties' child without the protection afforded by Indiana's dissolution statutes with regard to parenting time and child support. We do not think that our General Assembly intended such a result.

In summary, under the specific facts and cireumstances before us in this case, a marriage between a man and a woman that was valid when it was entered into does not automatically become void when one of the parties has his or her birth certificate amended to indicate a change of gender. The statute prohibiting same-sex marriages does not apply to the particular set of cireumstances in this case because the parties did not enter into a same-sex marriage in Indiana or into a same-sex marriage that was solemnized in another state. In addition, a marriage such as the one at issue here is not listed among those marriages declared void ab imitio under applicable Indiana statutes, and would be improper to interpret the statute otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

BRADFORD, J., and PYLE, J., concur.

      . The question of whether the trial court properly amended Davis's birth certificate to show a change of gender is not before us.

      . Summers has not filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, the appellant may prevail by making a prima facie case of error. Mikel v. Johnston, 907 N.E.2d 547, 551 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). This prima facie error rule protects this court and takes from us the burden of controverting arguments advanced for reversal, a duty which remains with the appellee. Id. But even under the prima facie error rule, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required. Id.

      . It is important to emphasize that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Davis actually wishes to abandon her child. To the contrary, Davis claims that the trial court's ruling could have the undesired effect of terminating her parental rights. And the ruling could indeed have that effect.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: NAJAM, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Dayron BELL, Appellant-Contemnor, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 82A01-1306-CR-271.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Dec. 31, 2013.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Joseph Y. Ho, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
    Yvette M. LaPlante, Keating & La-Plante, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
   OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dayron Bell appeals the trial court's order finding him in contempt. Bell raises four issues for our review, but we consider only the following dispositive issue: whether this appeal is moot because Bell has served his sentence and none of Bell's issues on appeal justify our review under the public interest exception. We dismiss.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 28, 2013, Bell attended the murder trial of his brother, Christopher. During the trial, Bell threatened at least one of the witnesses. The trial court promptly brought the trial to a halt and instructed the State to call "whoever heard the statements" to the witness stand. Transcript at 4.

The State first called Ricky Hill. Hill testified as follows:

Q [Dlid you hear certain threats made by a person whofis] in the courtroom now?.
A Yes I did.
Q What were the substance of those threats?
A _... a young man out there in the audience ... turned to look [at the witnesses in the hallway] and told them "I'm ten (10) times worse than my brother."
Q Okay. Did he make any mention about their testimony?
A He had said something before that and I didn't hear that.

Id. at 5-6. Hill then identified Bell as the person who had made that statement.

The State then called Darryl Meriweather. According to Meriweather:

Q Were you out in the hallway about ten (10) minutes ago?
A Yes.
Q And did you have an opportunity to .. hear what Mr. Bell said out there?
A Yes.
Q And what did he say?
A He said, "Better not nobody testify against his brother or it will be three (8) times worse."
Q Who did he say that to?
A Well I think he was directing it towards [an eyewitness's mother].
Q Okay, okay. There's several people standing out there is that right.
A Yeah, because we were all standing there together, so it could had been all of us. But, it looked more like to me it was her.

Id. at 11.

The court then ordered Bell to the witness stand. Bell denied that he had threatened any of the witnesses. The court then found as follows:

[HJere's the problem I got. We got a witness called by the State, an eyewitness to a murder, whose home was broken into last night, and was beaten, and obviously someone is trying to intimidate her. And I hear you're out there shooting your mouth off which is a polite way of putting it. [This is a Court of Law, Mr. Bell, we decide things not the way we do in the street or in the alley. We don't bully people, we don't try to get over on people, we don't intimidate people. This is contempt of court and I'm finding you in Contempt of Court.... I believe these folks are telling me the truth and say what you said.

Id. at 17-18. The court ordered Bell to jail for the remainder of the trial.

Following the trial, on June 3 the court appointed a public defender for Bell, and on June 7 the court held a sentencing hearing. At that hearing, the court rejected Bell's argument that the contempt order was for indirect contempt and instead found that the order was for direct contempt, stating that "it occurred in or very near the actual trial itself, it directly impacted the trial at the time the trial was ... in ... progress. It happened literally right outside the door of the courtroom." Id. at 27. The court then restated its rationale for finding Bell in contempt and ordered him to serve ninety days in the Vanderburgh County Jail with no good time credit. This appeal ensued. Bell was released from his sentence on August 25.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

On appeal, Bell asserts that the trial court erroneously determined him to be in direct contempt, rather than indirect contempt, and that, because of this mistake, the trial court denied him certain due process protections normally available for indirect contempt proceedings. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5. Bell alternatively asserts that, even if the trial court's determination that he was in direct contempt was correct, the court still denied him certain statutory safeguards. See I.C. § 34-47-2-4.

But the parties agree that this appeal is moot because Bell has served his contempt sentence and has been released. As we have explained:

where the principal questions at issue cease to be of real controversy between the parties, the errors assigned become moot questions and this court will not retain jurisdiction to decide them. Stated differently, when we are unable to provide effective relief upon an issue, the issue is deemed moot, and we will not reverse the trial court's determination where absolutely no change in the status quo will result.

Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 200 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. There is no question that any decision we were to render on Bell's claims would result in "no change in the status quo." Id. As such, Bell's appeal is moot.

Nonetheless:

"Although moot cases are usually dismissed, Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may be decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions of 'great public interest'" [In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind.1991)]. Typically, cases falling in the "great public interest" exception contain issues likely to recur. Id.

In re Commitment of J.B., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Here, Bell asserts that the "public interest exception" applies to his case for the following four reasons:

[First, this court has previously held that "the question of whether good-time credit applies to a sentence for criminal contempt, and further, whether a con-temnor's sentence is reasonable are ones of significant import which may continue to evade review." [Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 200-01]. [Second, and slimilarly, the question of whether or not the perceived intimidation of a witness outside the presence of a judge, but inside the courthouse, during a murder trial is direct or indirect contempt[{ ] may continue to evade review due to the short nature of contempt sentences. [Third], due process rights and the violation thereof are matters of great public importance. [Fourth], for as long as there are trials and witnesses, these types of situations are likely to occur.

Appellant's Br. at 6.

The only one of Bell's four rationales that might merit invoking the public interest exception is his concern that the trial court here improperly held him in direct contempt rather than indirect contempt. But there is an established body of law on the differences between these two types of contempt. See, e.g., In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93, 95-96 (Ind.1994) (clarifying the distinction between direct and indirect attempt and discussing numerous authorities). Any review we gave to this issue here would not add to this body of law, but would merely apply existing law.

We also reject the other grounds alleged by Bell for why we should not dismiss his appeal. Since the end of 2011, this court has applied the public interest exception to consider only the following issues: "the proof necessary for [an] involuntary commitment," In re Commitment of T.K., 993 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. decision pending; "what suffices as 'reasonably particular in a request for public records submitted under the Access to Public Records Act," Anderson v. Huntington Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 983 N.E.2d 613, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied; and "whether a residency restriction can be a condition of a convicted child molester's parole[ ] when the statute authorizing the imposition of that condition was not in effect at the time he committed the offense," Gaither v. Ind. Dep't of Correction, 971 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Nothing in the facts of Bell's case persuades this court that the issues raised by Bell are of "great public importance." See In re Commitment of J.B., 766 N.E.2d at 798.

In essence, Bell's argument for applying the public interest exception conflates an exception reserved for "questions of great public importance" with mere error review. See id. That is not the purpose of this limited exception, and we will not deviate from our general rule of not deciding moot cases based on these facts. Accordingly, we decline Bell's invitation to apply the public interest exception to this appeal, and we dismiss Bell's appeal as moot.

Dismissed.

BAKER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.

      . The exact spelling of Meriweather's name is not clear based on the record on appeal. We follow the spelling used by the State in its brief, which the State represents is based on the spelling Meriweather gave during a deposition.

      . Both parties cite Jones for the definition of the public interest exception, but in Jones this court stated that the public interest exception applies when "the issue arises in a context which will continue to evade review." Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 200. Our Supreme Court has rejected the "additional element ... that the case must be likely to evade review." In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37 n. 2.

      . In a fourth opinion, a divided panel of this court considered an appeal involving "issues of competitive bidding and the expenditure of taxpayer money." Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 984 N.E.2d 668, 676-77 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. granted. However, our Supreme Court has granted transfer in that opinion, thereby vacating it. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).


author: CRONE, Judge.

text:
    Freddie L. McKNIGHT, III, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    No. 20A03-1109-CR-454.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Dec. 31, 2013.

      Freddie L. McKnight, III, New Castle, IN, pro se.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McClean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

Freddie L. McKnight, III, pro se, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, On appeal, McKnight contends that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he was not denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. He also claims that he was denied a procedurally fair post-convietion hearing because his appointed public defender withdrew his appearance prior to the hearing and McKnight proceeded pro se. In addition, McKnight alleges that he is entitled to a new trial because the State withheld favorable evidence in violation of his due process rights. Finding that the post-conviction court did not clearly err when it denied McKnight's petition, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The relevant facts indicate that on May 31, 2006, "a cooperating source working with Officer Shawn Turner of the Elkhart County Interdiction and Covert Enforcement Unit purchased 8.709 grams of cocaine freebase or crack from McKnight." McKnight v. State, No. 20A05-0708-CR-469, slip op. at 1, 2008 WL 383689 (Ind.Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2008), trans. denied. Specifically, under the direction of Officer Turner, cooperating source Mickie Rhymer called McKnight and arranged to buy a quarter ounce or "quad" of cocaine from McKnight. Trial Tr. at 90. Officers searched Rhymer, gave her $500 of photocopied cash to cover the drug purchase and a debt owed by Rhymer to McKnight, and wired her with a recording device. Rhymer and an undercover officer traveled to a residence in Rhymer's vehicle. Rhymer entered the kitchen of the residence, where she saw McKnight and scales with a bag of cocaine on it. Rhymer spoke with McKnight, and he indicated that he was giving her a little "extra" cocaine. Id. at 97. Rhymer gave McKnight $500 in cash, and he gave her the bag later found to contain over eight grams of cocaine. Rhymer left the residence, was again searched by officers, and was found to only have the cocaine that she purchased from McKnight. As a result, the State charged McKnight with class A felony dealing in cocaine weighing three grams or more. Following a trial held on November 13 and 14, 2006, a jury found McKnight guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty-eight years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed MceKnight's con-viection. McKnight, slip. op at 4.

McKnight subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief The State answered, and on July 15, 2010, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. The hearing was continued to February 24, 2011. Before that hearing, McKnight filed a first and a second amended petition for post-conviction relief. Evidentiary hearings were again held on February 24 and 25 and March 10, 2011. On May 18, 2011, the post-conviction court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment denying post-conviction relief.

Thereafter, on June 17, 2011, McKnight delivered a pro se motion to correct error to prison officials for mailing to the Elk-hart Circuit Court. The motion to correct error was file-stamped by the clerk of the Elkhart Cireuit Court when it was received on June 20, 2011. The post-convietion court later held a hearing on the motion to correct error. At the outset of the hearing, the post-conviction court noted that McKnight's motion was untimely filed but proceeded with the hearing. The post-conviction court entered its order denying the motion to correct error on August 29, 2011. McKnight delivered a pro se notice of appeal to prison officials for mailing on September 28, 2011. That notice was deemed filed by this Court on September 30, 2011.

Several months later, after numerous defective filings and McKnight's failure to timely file an appellant's brief, on May 21, 2012, this Court dismissed the appeal with prejudice pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 45(D). However, on June 4, 2012, our motions panel granted McKnight's motion to file a belated brief and reinstated the appeal. Following numerous additional filings and extensions of time granted to both parties by this Court, the appeal became ready for our review.

We note that, in addition to responding to the arguments raised by McKnight in his appellant's brief, the State cross-appealed, arguing that McKnight's appeal should be dismissed because his motion to correct error was untimely, and thus this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider his appeal,. Agreeing with the State that we lack jurisdiction, we issued a memorandum decision dismissing the appeal. See McKnight v. State, No. 20A03-1109-CR-454, 2013 WL 2253891 (Ind.Ct. App. May 22, 2013), trans, granted. McKnight filed a petition to transfer, and, by order of our supreme court, transfer was granted and our memorandum decision was vacated. We have been directed by our supreme court that our jurisdiction has been invoked, and therefore we now consider McKnight's appeal on the merits.

Standard of Review

The appellate standard of review regarding post-conviction proceedings is well settled. Recently, in Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind.2013), our supreme court reiterated,

Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which the defendant must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Post-convietion proceedings do not offer a super appeal, rather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Those grounds are limited to issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or that were not available on direct appeal. Issues available but not raised on direct appeal are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and juror misconduct maybe proper grounds for post-conviction proceedings.
Because the defendant is appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, he is appealing from a negative judgment and bears the burden of proof. Thus, the defendant must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision. In other words, the defendant must convinee this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did. We review the post-conviction court's factual findings for clear error, but do not defer to its conclusions of law.

Id. at 1240 (citations and quotation marks omitted). We will not reweigh the evi-denee or judge the credibility of witnesses, and will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court's decision. Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), aff'd on reh'g, 947 N.E.2d 962.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

McKnight argues that the post-convietion court erred in finding that he was not denied the effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind.1997), cert. denied (1998). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind.2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052), cert. denied (2001). A counsel's performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind.2002). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance. Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind.1996), cert. denied (1997). When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we strongly presume "that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind.2001). "[Clounsel's performance is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption." Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 783 (Ind.2002).

We must initially acknowledge that the judge who presided over McKnight's original trial is also the judge who presided over the post-conviction proceedings. This Court has stated that a post-conviction court's findings and judgment should be entitled to "greater than usual deference" when the post-conviction judge is the same judge who conducted the original trial. See McCullough v. State, 973 N.E.2d 62, 75 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied (2018). In such a case, the judge is uniquely situated to assess whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether, but for counsel's unprofessional conduct, there was a reasonable probability that a different verdict would have been reached. Id. (citing State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 476 (Ind.2003) (noting that because judge presided both at original trial and post-convietion hearing, judge was in "an exceptional position" to assess weight and credibility of factual evidence and whether defendant was deprived of fair trial)). With this in mind, we turn to McKnight's claims of ineffective assistance.

I. Trial Counsel

A. Adequacy of Pretrial Investigation and Resulting Cross-Examination

McKnight first asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly investigate and then to cross-examine the State's main witness, Rhymer. Specifically, McKnight contends that had counsel properly investigated Rhymer, counsel would have discovered and cross-examined Rhymer regarding any benefit the State may have given Rhymer in exchange for her testimony, her impeachable criminal history, her alleged mental health problems, and her alleged drug problems. While it is undisputed that effective representation requires adequate pretrial investigation and preparation, it is well settled that we should resist judging an attorney's performance with the benefit of hindsight. Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 538 (Ind. Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Accordingly, when deciding a claim of ineffective assistance for failure to investigate, we apply a great deal of deference to counsel's judgments. Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Ind.2002). Indeed,

[Strategie choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitation on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

In addition, establishing failure to investigate as a ground for ineffective assistance of counsel requires going beyond the trial record to show what investigation, if undertaken, would have produced. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1214 (Ind.1998), cert. denied (1999). "This is necessary because success on the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim requires a showing of a reasonable probability of affecting the result." Id.

McKnight has failed to establish that his trial counsel's pretrial investigation of Rhymer and the resulting cross-examination fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he knew some information about cooperating source Rhymer because McKnight had informed counsel that she had been working as his drug courier or "mule" for him prior to the controlled buy and that MeKnight and Rhymer had a sexual relationship. PCR Tr. at 139, 206. Counsel subpoenaed Rhymer for a deposition in order to question her regarding all areas of possible impeachment. The Friday before the scheduled trial date, Rhymer was present in the courthouse with a court reporter and was ready for the deposition. However, prior to the deposition starting, McKnight agreed to plead guilty to the instant charges as well as another outstanding charge in exchange for the dismissal of three additional pending charges. McKnight signed the plea agreement, and Rhymer's deposition was canceled. Because the judge was not present on that date to conduct a plea hearing, the parties agreed to submit the agreement to the court on the morning of the scheduled trial, the following Monday. The morning of trial, however, McKnight changed his mind and decided that he no longer wished to plead guilty. Although counsel made an oral motion for a continuance of trial, the motion was denied by the trial court and the trial proceeded as scheduled.

Under the cireumstances, we agree with the post-conviction court that McKnight's argument that counsel performed defi-ciently in failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation and resulting cross-examination of Rhymer rings hollow in light of his decision to plead guilty, which obviated counsel's need to obtain the alleged impeachment information. The record reveals that counsel attempted to conduct a reasonable investigation, and it was only after McKnight decided to plead guilty that counsel determined that further investigation was unnecessary. As the post-conviction court pointedly asked McKnight, "How is it that your counsel was ineffective in that regard because he canceled the deposition which would have revealed the information because you signed a plea agreement?" Id. at 248. A party may not invite error on the part of counsel and then later argue that the error supports an ineffective assistance claim, because error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error. Hardy v. State, 786 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. Under the circumstances, McKnight invited counsel's failure to further investigate Rhymer, and he cannot now complain that counsel was ineffective for such failure. MeKnight has not met his burden to show that his counsel performed deficiently in this regard.

Moreover, McKnight has similarly not established that he suffered prejudice such that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. As to Rhymer's motivation for testifying against McKnight, the evidence indicates that trial counsel "was fully aware that [Rhymer] had pending charges against her, and had made a deal with the State in exchange for her cooperation such that she had something to gain by testifying against [McKnight.] Appellant's App. at 197. Contrary to McKnight's claims, the record reveals that counsel indeed cross-examined Rhymer in this regard. Trial Tr. at 104-05. Regarding counsel's failure to discover and cross-examine Rhymer about her criminal history, as we will discuss more fully below, McKnight has not demonstrated that the impeaching value of Rhymer's minor and remote criminal history was such that he was prejudiced by such failure.

The remainder of McKnight's claims as to what information further investigation of Rhymer would have uncovered and the relevance of that information amounts to sheer speculation and innuendo. Accordingly, McKnight has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

B. Failure to Object

McKnight next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to: (1) the admission of State's Exhibit 3, the audio recording of the controlled buy, and (2) the accuracy of the seales used to weigh the cocaine. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object, a defendant must prove that an objection would have been sustained if made and that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to make an objection. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind.2001), cert. denied (2002).

Regarding the admissibility of State's Exhibit 3, McKnight claims that counsel should have interposed an objection because the audio recording was only partially intelligible. Appellant's Br. at 48. However, for a tape recording to be properly admissible, "every word of a recording need not be intelligible. Rather, the tape recording, taken as a whole, must be of such clarity and completeness to preempt speculation in the minds of jurors as to its content." Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ind.2001). "[Tlhe standard of quality expected of a recording in an interrogation room cannot be used to judge a recording of a person wearing a 'bug.'" Fassoth v. State, 525 N.E.2d 318, 324 (Ind.1988). Moreover, a trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to admit a tape recording into evidence. Dearman, 743 N.E.2d at 762.

Trial counsel testified that he believed that the audio recording was sufficiently intelligible that an objection, even if made, would not have been sustained by the trial court. He further explained, "If the jury thinks that you're objecting to something and they hear the objection then they think well, there's more there to hide." PCR Tr. at 184. Therefore, he determined that the best strategy was to let the recording come in and to use it to McKnight's advantage by arguing to the jury, as he did during closing arguments, that the recording did not really supply them with any useful information. "A decision to not object to evidence when the objection may be more damaging than the evidence is within the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 789, 746-47 (Ind.2002), cert. denied (2003).

As noted by the post-conviction court, McKnight himself conceded at the post-conviction hearing that the recording was sufficiently intelligible for him to identify the voices on the recording, including his own. Also, the content of the recording was merely cumulative of Officer Turner's and Rhymer's direct testimony. Under the circumstances, McKnight has failed to demonstrate that an objection would have been sustained or that counsel's decision to not object to the admission of State's Exhibit 3 was unreasonable. The post-conviction court did not err when it determined that counsel's failure to object to the admission of the exhibit did not constitute ineffective assistance.

Regarding counsel's failure to lodge a specific objection challenging the accuracy of the seales used to measure the weight of the cocaine, McKnight has similarly failed to demonstrate that a proper objection would have been sustained or that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to lodge such objection. Wanda Sheppler, the chemist who analyzed the cocaine, testified that the laboratory seales she used to weigh the cocaine are "periodically" calibrated by running "the Spiro standard weight and measure units through the balance." Trial Tr. at 143. Sheppler further testified that the scales are extremely accurate and that the accuracy of the weights obtained using the scales had never varied by more than a millionth of a gram. Id. at 143-44.

We agree with McKnight that the State bears the burden to show that the scale used to measure the weight of the cocaine was properly calibrated. Turner v. State, 878 N.E.2d 286, 294 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trams. denied (2008). However, contrary to McKnight's implication, the State was not required to prove exact dates or that the scale was checked immediately before and after the cocaine here was weighed. See Smith v. State, 829 N.E.2d 64, 77 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (State not required to prove scale was checked immediately before and after each use). Indeed, the scale's accuracy is foundational evidence, not an element of the crime. Guadian v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Although the defense may rebut the State's evidence regarding accuracy, the question of accuracy is ultimately a question for the trier of fact. Smith, 829 N.E.2d at 77. Thus, an objection to the accuracy of the scales would have gone to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. See id. In light of Sheppler's testimony regarding the periodic and specific calibration of the scales and their established accuracy, McKnight has not shown that an objection on foundational grounds would have necessarily been sustained by the trial court.

Significantly, upon eross-examination of Sheppler, McKnight's counsel questioned her extensively regarding the lack of evidence of the exact calibration dates for the scales used to weigh the cocaine. Trial Tr. at 145-46. Again, during closing arguments, counsel highlighted the lack of evidence of the calibration dates. Id. at 209. Thus, trial counsel made the precise argument that McKnight claims the jury needed to hear in order to make the ultimate determination of accuracy. Accordingly, McKnight cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to make a foundational objection.

We further note that the actual weight of the cocaine was important because the State was required to prove that McKnight delivered cocaine weighing three grams or more in order to convict him of a class A felony. See Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1. McKnight makes no argument that there is a reasonable possibility that the scale used here to weigh the cocaine was so inaccurate that it measured less than three grams of cocaine as weighing over eight grams. In sum, the post-conviction court determined that McKnight failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance on this issue, and McKnight has not met his burden on appeal to show that the evidence conclusively points to a contrary conclusion.

II. Appellate Counsel

We next address McKnight's claim that the post-conviction court clearly erred when it determined that he was not denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. The standard for gauging appellate counsel's performance is the same as that for trial counsel. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 75 (Ind.2012). "Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (8) failure to present issues well." Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind.2006). Judicial scrutiny is highly deferential regarding a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for collateral review, and the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance. Id. We rarely find ineffective assistance in cases where a defendant asserts that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal. Id. at 1196. "One reason for this is that the decision of what issues to raise is one of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate counsel." Id.

Similar to his arguments that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admissibility of the audio recording and the accuracy of the scales used to measure the weight of the cocaine, McKnight asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the admissibility of that evidence on appeal. We reject his claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness based on our above-stated conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective on those same issues. See Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 76 (Ind.2012) (rejecting appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim based on prior finding of no trial counsel ineffectiveness on same issue). Where a petitioner has not established ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he can neither show deficient performance nor resulting prejudice as a result of his appellate counsel's failure to raise the same arguments on appeal. See Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 863, 870 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied (2005). The post-conviction court did not clearly err when it concluded that McKnight failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

III. Post-Conviction Counsel

MeKnight also asserts that he was deprived of a procedurally fair post-conviction hearing because his appointed post-conviction counsel withdrew prior to the evidentiary hearing and he was "forced" to proceed pro se. Appellant's Br. at 6. McKnight concedes that there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings under either the federal or the state constitution. Hill v. State, 960 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind.2012). Moreover, Indiana Post-Conviection Rule 1(9) gives the State Public Defender discretion in selecting the cases it will pursue by specifically providing in relevant part as follows:

(a) Upon receiving a copy of the petition, including an affidavit of indigenecy, from the clerk of the court, the Public Defender may represent any petitioner committed to the Indiana Department of Correction in all proceedings under this Rule, including appeal, if meritorious and in the interests of justice. The Public Defender may refuse representation in any case where the conviction or sentence being challenged has no present penal consequences. Petitioner retains the right to employ his own counsel or to proceed pro se, but the court is not required to appoint counsel for a petitioner other than the Public Defender.
(c) Counsel shall confer with petition, er and ascertain all grounds for relief under this rule, amending the petition if necessary to include any grounds not included by petitioner in the original petition. In the event that counsel determines the proceeding is not meritorious or in the interests of justice, before or after an evidentiary hearing is held, counsel shall file with the court counsel's withdrawal of appearance, accompanied by counsel's certification that 1) the petitioner has been consulted regarding grounds for relief in his pro se petition and any other possible grounds and 2) appropriate investigation, including but not limited to review of the guilty plea or trial and sentencing records, has been conducted. Petitioner shall be provided personally with an explanation of the reasons for withdrawal. Petitioner retains the right to proceed pro se, in forma pauperis if indigent, after counsel withdraws.

See Ford v. State, 540 N.E.2d 84, 87 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (holding that inmate petitioners do not have the right to continued representation if, after review and investigation, the State Public Defender finds the proceeding is not meritorious and in the interests of justice), trans. denied (1992).

Here, the record reveals that after filing his first pro-se petition for post-conviction relief, McKnight requested the appointment of counsel, and the post-conviction court appointed the State Public Defender. Deputy Public Defender Kevin Hewlate entered an appearance on McKnight's behalf, and the court subsequently held a status conference and set an evidentiary hearing date. Four months prior to the hearing date, Hewlate filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and certification pursuant to Post-Conviection Rule 1(9)(c), which the trial court granted. MceKnight then retained the right to employ his own counsel or to proceed pro se, and he chose to proceed pro se.

McKnight makes no claim that the post-conviction court or his post-conviction counsel failed to comply with the procedures mandated by the rules. Rather, he simply urges that he should be granted a new post-conviction hearing with another appointed attorney. Given that the right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is not guaranteed and that he was represented by appointed counsel until counsel properly withdrew as provided by our post-conviction rules, McKnight has stated no viable claim of error.

Brady Claim

As a final matter, McKnight argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because the State withheld impeaching information regarding the fact that Rhymer had a prior conviction for theft in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). At the post-conviction hearing, Rhymer testified that she had been convicted of theft in 1996, ten years before McKnight sold her cocaine. We note that the State has an affirmative duty to disclose material evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. Brady applies to evidence impeaching the credibility of the State's witnesses. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). To prevail on a Brady claim,

a defendant must establish: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (8) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial. Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 153 (Ind.2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375.

Here, neither of the two deputy prosecutors who testified during the post-convietion proceedings could recall anything about Rhymer's eriminal history. They stated that it was their practice, however, to disclose impeachable offenses and that they provided twenty-three pages of requested discovery to McKnight's trial counsel. Trial counsel testified that he had no information regarding Rhymer's criminal history in his file but that he had never had a problem with the State withholding criminal history information regarding cooperating sources. Counsel stated that he believed he would have likely obtained that information at Rhymer's scheduled deposition that was canceled due to McKnight's signing of the plea agreement. Counsel indicated that, even had he known that Rhymer had a prior theft conviction, he may not have used it to impeach her testimony due to the erime's minor nature.

Even assuming, as McKnight argues, that the State failed to disclose Rhymer's criminal history to trial counsel, to prevail on a Brady claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that the evidence in question was material to an issue at trial such that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. See id. Upon review, in light of all of the evidence presented at trial, the impeaching value of Rhymer's ten-year-old theft conviction was negligible, at best. See Carroll v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (impeaching value of six-year-old misdemeanor conviction for false informing was negligible in light of all the evidence presented), trans. denied (2001); see also Reid v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1264, 1271-72 (Ind.Ct.App.2018) (impeaching value of twenty-four-year-old robbery conviction was negligible in light of independent evidence of guilt), trans. denied. Here, the jury was not exposed to someone portrayed as "a highly credible witness or an otherwise upstanding citizen." See Carroll, 740 N.E.2d at 1230. On cross-examination, Rhymer admitted that she was serving as a cooperating source with police and participated in the controlled buy because she was "in trouble" and was trying to avoid possible eriminal charges that would be brought against her. Trial Tr. at 104-05.

In addition to Rhymer's testimony, the State presented ample independent evidence of MceKnight's guilt. The record demonstrates that Rhymer's testimony was cumulative of the testimony of several undercover officers as well as the audio recording of the controlled buy. Under the circumstances, McKnight has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel known about the theft conviction and attempted to impeach Rhymer with questions about that remote conviction. Accordingly, his Brady claim fails. In sum, McKnight has failed to convince us "that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did." Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1236. The post-conviction court's denial of McKnight's petition for post-convietion relief is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.

      . On the same date that the State filed its appellee's brief, McKnight filed an amended appellant's brief. The State did not, in turn, file an amended appellee's brief Consequently, we note that many of the State's arguments are nonresponsive to McKnight's amended contentions of error.

      . We acknowledge and regret that some dates that were not crucial to our disposition were incorrect in our memorandum decision. However, it is undisputed that the post-conviction court denied McKnight's post-conviction petition on May 18, 2011, and, on Friday, June 17, 2011, McKnight delivered his motion to correct error to prison officials for mailing by regular mail to the Elkhart Circuit Court. The Elkhart Circuit Court properly deemed the motion filed upon receipt on June 20, 2011, more than thirty days after the entry of final judgment. When an appellant files a motion to correct error that is not mandatory under the rules, such as McKnight's motion in this case, the motion must be filed within thirty days after the judgment in order to preserve the appellant's right to appeal. See Dixon v. State, 566 N.E.2d 594, 596 (Ind.Ct. App.1991), trans. denied; Ind. Trial Rule 59(C). In Dowell v. State, 922 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.2010), our supreme court specifically noted the particularity with which the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure define what constitutes filing and when filings are deemed to have occurred depending on the mode of delivery. Id. at 609; see Ind. Trial Rule 5(F) (filing of documents sent to the clerk by regular mail occurs upon delivery of the documents to the clerk). Indeed, when a motion to correct error is not timely filed, the right to appeal is not preserved. Dowell, 922 N.E.2d at 609. In its order declaring that our appellate jurisdiction has, in fact, been invoked, our supreme court stated that the timeliness of the motion to correct error had not been raised prior to the State's appellee's brief. However, the State did raise the issue in its appellee's brief and it is well settled that lack of appellate jurisdiction can be raised by a party at any time. Bergstrom v. State, 933 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind.2003)), trans. denied.
      In Dowell, our supreme court recognized application of the "prison mailbox rule" to the filing of a notice of appeal and documents under our appellate rules, stating that a pro se prisoner need only provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting a claim that a document was timely submitted to prison officials for mailing. Dowell, 922 N.E.2d at 608. The court emphasized, however, that the timing for motions to correct error is different than for notices of appeal and that, if independently verifiable means like registered mail or third-party carrier are not used, filing of a motion to correct error occurs on the date the filing is in the hands of the clerk. Id. at 609. Similar to the «prisoner in Dowell, McKnight delivered his motion to correct error to prison officials for mailing on the last possible day, and he paid for the use of only regular mail rather than certified mail return receipt requested or third-party commercial carrier. McKnight's untimely filing of his motion to correct error has resulted in the failure to preserve his right to appeal. Because our supreme court's order directs us that our jurisdiction has been invoked, we must presume that the court has extended application of the prison mailbox rule to the filing of motions to correct error and to regular mail. We therefore address McKnight's claims on the merits.

      . We note that McKnight dedicates a significant portion of his appellant's brief to arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for improperly advising and coercing him to sign the plea agreement. We note that this claim of ineffective assistance was not raised in McKnight's petition for post-conviction relief, and therefore the issue is waived. "Issues not raised in a petition for post-conviction relief may not be raised for the first time on post-conviction appeal." Walker v. State, 843 N.E.2d 50, 58 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied, cert. denied (2007). Waiver notwithstanding, we observe that the post-conviction court did consider the issue when McKnight briefly alluded to this claim during the evi-dentiary hearing. After the post-conviction court pointed out how McKnight's decision to plead guilty was the cause of counsel's decision to cease further investigation of Rhymer, McKnight asserted that his decision to sign the plea was involuntary and that counsel coerced him. Counsel denied such claims. The post-conviction court did not find McKnight's assertion credible, and we will not second-guess that determination on appeal. See Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind.2004) (post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses).

      . Indeed, during post-conviction proceedings, McKnight essentially admitted on the record that the cocaine weighed more than seven grams. PCR Tr. at 291, 310-11. As did the post-conviction court, we find McKnight's challenge to the accuracy of the scales through an ineffective assistance claim incongruous with his statements during the post-conviction hearing.

      . McKnight also contends that he was deprived of a procedurally fair post-conviction hearing because the post-conviction court denied his request to obtain Rhymer's mental health records. As specifically noted by the post-conviction court, there is no evidence that Rhymer's mental health was relevant other than speculation by McKnight. Appellant's App. at 195-96.

      . We note that McKnight did not raise his Brady claim on direct appeal. "Issues available to the defendant on direct appeal which are not raised are generally forfeited." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ind.1998). However, because it is unclear when McKnight became aware of Rhymer's prior conviction and to the extent that he has intertwined this claim with his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for failure to investigate and cross-examine Rhymer, we will exercise the abundance of caution and address his claim.

      . McKnight asserts that Rhymer may have had two prior criminal convictions at the time she testified. The post-conviction record, however, does not support that assertion.


author: ROBB, Judge.

text:
    FLOYD COUNTY and Floyd County Plan Commission, Appellant-Defendant, v. CITY OF NEW ALBANY and New Albany City Plan Commission, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 22A05-1303-MI-139.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Jan. 16, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 9, 2014.

      Richard R. Fox, Steven A. Gustafson, The Law Office of Richard R. Fox, New Albany, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
    C. Gregory Fifer, Applegate Fifer Pul-liam LLC, Jeffersonville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
   OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

The City of New Albany and the New Albany City Plan Commission (collectively, the "City") sought a declaratory judgment regarding whether it or Floyd County and the Floyd County Plan Commission (collectively, the "County") has zoning jurisdiction over an unincorporated area (the "fringe area") outside the City limits. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City. The County appeals, raising several issues for our review which we consolidate and restate as two: 1) whether the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that the County is not entitled to claim zoning jurisdiction over the fringe area pursuant to Indiana Code section 36-7-4-205(e), and 2) if the trial court did not err, whether the County's consent is required for the City to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Code section 36-7-4-205(f). The City eross-appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in striking a supplemental affidavit it submitted after the summary judgment hearing.

Concluding the supplemental affidavit could be, and in fact was, considered by the trial court, and that as a matter of law, the County is not entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the fringe area, nor is it required to consent to the City's exercise of jurisdiction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

From mid-1965 to 1967, the City and County jointly participated in an area plan commission. In 1968, the County opted out of the joint commission and adopted its own zoning ordinance, which stated that the zoning regulations therein were "made with regard to a comprehensive Master Plan now being made. . .." Appellant's Appendix at 44. A comprehensive plan was not adopted by the County until 2006, however.

Pursuant to statute, when adopting a comprehensive plan, a municipal plan commission may provide for the development of an unincorporated area up to two miles outside the corporate boundaries of the municipality. See Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205. In 1972, the City Council adopted a resolution of the City Plan Commission establishing as part of the City's comprehensive plan a "Zoning Fringe Area" outside the municipal boundaries, and a map showing the designated fringe area was recorded in September of that year. The City thereafter exercised zoning jurisdiction in the fringe area and provided municipal services, specifically sanitary sewer services, to the fringe area. In 1999, the City amended and replaced its previous comprehensive plan, but continued to assert jurisdiction over the fringe area. In 2001, 2002, and 2007, the City adopted resolutions designating additional unincorporated areas to which it provided sanitary sewer service as part of the fringe area.

As mentioned above, the County adopted a comprehensive plan in 2006, and in 2012, the County Board of Commissioners adopted an ordinance purporting to amend the County's zoning map to terminate the City's zoning jurisdiction over the fringe area and instead include it within the County's jurisdiction. In response to the County ordinance, the City adopted a resolution in February 2013 which "asserts and reaffirms its exclusive territorial zoning jurisdiction over and within the Zoning Fringe Area," which resolution was forwarded to the County and recorded. Appellant's App. at 230-38. The City also filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the County ordinance was invalid as contrary to statute. On February 22, 2013, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the County filed a motion for summary judgment, designating evidence in support of its own motion and in opposition to the City's motion. A hearing was held on March 8, 2018, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. On March 12, 2018, the City moved for leave to supplement its designated evidence with an additional affidavit regarding the City's provision of building code and enforcement services in the fringe area. The County moved to strike the supplemental affidavit as untimely. On March 18, 2013, the trial court entered an order granting the County's motion to strike the supplemental affidavit, but ultimately granting summary judgment for the City. The order reads in relevant part:

15. At the summary judgment hearing, the County raised for the first time its assertion that the City's provision of municipal sanitary sewer service is insufficient to satisfy the provisions of Ind. Code § 836-7-4-205(f), pursuant to 1999 amendment, regarding the necessity of County consent unless the City is providing "municipal services" (pl.).
16. -On March 12, 2013, the City then filed a motion for leave to supplement its designated evidence with the affidavit of City Building Commissioner David Brewer demonstrating that the City was also providing building code inspection and enforcement services at all material times with the Zoning Fringe Area as of the date that the County adopted its ordinance purporting to revoke the City's jurisdiction over the Zoning Fringe Area.
17. The County has moved to strike the Brewer affidavit as untimely, but has not designated any additional evidence that would refute the City's claim that it is also providing building code inspection and enforcement services within the Zoning Fringe Area.
18. The court grants the motion to strike the Brewer affidavit as untimely and not consistent with the agreement of the parties at the hearing.
19. There is no genuine issue of material fact that the City Plan Commission has filed notice with the County Recorder and the County Plan Commission of its exercise of territorial zoning jurisdiction over the Zoning Fringe Area as required by the provisions of Ind. Code § 36-7-4-205(F).
20. There is no genuine issue of material fact that the City has been exercising zoning authority over the Zoning Fringe Area continuously for forty (40) years.
21. The County's claim that the provisions of Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(e) enable the County to revoke or terminate the City's territorial jurisdiction over the Zoning Fringe Area would vitiate the clear provisions of Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(f). Statutes must be read in pari materia and in harmony with related statutes.
22. The provisions of identified see-tions of the Indiana Code, both as currently enacted and previous statutes, evidence a clear legislative intent to allow municipalities within counties of a certain size to exercise zoning authority over land adjoin[ing] the municipal boundaries without first obtaining permission of the county executive body where the municipality is also offering municipal services.
28. Municipal services are not defined in Title 36 of the Indiana Code or in case law. The offering of sanitary sewer services is not insignificant when considering the nature and extent of such a capital investment by a municipality. This court will not replace its judgment for that of the Indiana Legislature and limit the zoning authority that has been extended to a municipality by that branch of government by defining the quality and/or quantity of municipal services that must be provided before a municipality may exercise Fringe Zoning Area authority. The City is providing municipal services, if the nature and extent of those services are to be defined or limited, it is better done in the Indiana Legislature.
24. The City is accordingly entitled to the award of summary judgment as a matter of law based on the following:
a. The City has, and continues to, exercise territorial jurisdiction within the Zoning Fringe Area pursuant to the provisions of Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(a) and (F).
b. The County's consent to the City's exercise of such jurisdiction is not required as the City is providing municipal sanitary sewer service and building code inspection and enforcement services within the Zoning Fringe Area.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
A. [County] Ordinance No. FCO 2012-IX adopted by the Board of Commissioners of the County on September 4, 2012, is hereby declared as void and of no effect to the extent it was intended to terminate or revoke the City's territorial zoning jurisdiction over the Zoning Fringe Area.
B. The County and the County Plan Commission are ordered to revise the County comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance to reflect the City Plan Commission's decision to exercise territorial zoning jurisdiction within the entirety of the Zoning Fringe Area as required by the provisions of Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(f) within sixty (60) days following entry of this judgment.
C. It is further ordered that the County and the County Plan Commission are permanently enjoined from exercising, or attempting to exercise, territorial zoning jurisdiction within the Zoning Fringe Area, as such area may be amended from time-to-time by the City, for so long as (1) the delegation of statutory authority to the City in accordance with the provisions of Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(f) remains in effect, (M) the population of Floyd County remains less than that established by the statute to require the County's consent, (iii) the City continues to provide municipal sanitary sewer service, building code inspection and enforcement services, and/or other municipal services within the Zoning Fringe Area, and (iv) the City Plan Commission continues to exercise territorial zoning jurisdiction over the Zoning Fringe Area.
D. The County's eross-motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.

Appellant's App. at 7-10 (citations omitted). The County now appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City; the City cross-appeals the trial court's grant of the County's motion to strike the supplemental affidavit they offered.

Discussion and Decision

I. The City's Cross-Appeal: Supplemental Affidavit

We begin by addressing the City's cross-appeal, as the trial court's exclusion of the supplemental affidavit has bearing on the merits of the summary judgment itself.

In moving for leave to file the supplemental affidavit, the City contended that the County raised for the first time at the summary judgment hearing the necessity for the City to provide multiple municipal services to the fringe area. The trial court in its order also stated that the County raised the insufficiency of the City's provision of municipal services to the fringe area for the first time at the hearing. However, our review of the record shows that the County's designation of evidence and memorandum in opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment and its cross-motion for summary judgment is primarily addressed to its assertion that "the City does not provide municipal services to the fringe area." Appellant's App. at 246. Moreover, the City's response to the County's motion for summary judgment asserts that the County has "seemingly abandon[ed] the County's claim that the adoption of the County's comprehensive plan in 2006 vested it with authority pursuant to Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(e) to veto or revoke the City's prior exercise of territorial zoning jurisdiction" and "apparently now focuses on the fact that the City provides some municipal services (Le., municipal sanitary sewers) ... but not all municipal services (Le., fire protection, solid waste collection, and police protection)." Id. at 251-52. Thus, the County's argument was not newly raised at the hearing.

Nonetheless, Trial Rule 56(E) provides that "[the court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits" It is within the trial court's discretion to do so. See Tom-Wat, Inc. v. Fink, 741 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ind.2001). Although the County's argument was not sprung on the City at the hearing such that the City had xo opportunity to respond, the timeline for summary judgment in this case was accelerated such that it had little opportunity to respond: a hearing was held just days after the County filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. Under these circumstances we would be inclined to say the trial court abused its discretion in striking the affidavit. Cf. Tannehill by Podgorski v. Reddy, 633 N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (noting that granting permission to file a supplemental affidavit is within the trial court's discretion and the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's in part because the plaintiff "had ample opportunity to have timely filed her affidavit ...."), trams. denied. Although the trial court's order states that the County's motion to strike the City's affidavit as untimely is granted, the trial court also clearly relied on the content of that affidavit when it concluded in paragraph 24 of its order that the City was entitled to summary judgment in part because the County's consent was not required due to the City's provision of "municipal sanitary sewer service and building code inspection and enforcement services within the Zoning Fringe Area." Appellant's App. at 9. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in striking the affidavit or merely misspoke and did not intend to strike the affidavit, the result is the same: the supplemental affidavit was properly considered by the trial court and is before this court as well.

II. The County's Appeal: Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper if the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind.2009). We will affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment if it is sustainable on any theory or basis in the record. Beck v. City of Evansville, 842 N.E.2d 856, 860 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. The fact that parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. T-3 Martinsville, LLC v. U.S. Holding, LLC, 911 N.E.2d 100, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. Questions of statutory construction are particularly appropriate for resolution by summary judgment, as they are pure questions of law. HDNet LLC v. N. Am. Boxing Council, 972 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. We review questions of law de novo and owe no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Id. The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this court on appeal that the trial court's ruling was improper. Bd. of Comm'rs. of Hendricks Cnty. v. Town of Plainfield, 909 N.E.2d 480, 485-86 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).

B. Indiana Code section 36-7-4-205

The parties agree about the underlying facts; they dispute only which seetion of Indiana Code section 36-7-4-205 is applicable to their situation. We begin by noting the history of the relevant "local planning and zoning" statute concerning territorial authority as between counties and cities: prior to 1971, if a county had a plan commission which had adopted a comprehensive plan covering the unincorporated areas of the county, a city could exercise fringe jurisdiction over contiguous unincorporated areas only with the consent of the county board of commissioners, and onee authorized, the city's jurisdiction could thereafter be terminated at the dis-eretion of the county board of commissioners. See Ind.Code § 18-7-5-34 (1971). Effective February 17, 1972, the statute was amended so that consent of the county board of commissioners was not required for a city to exercise fringe jurisdiction if the population of the county was less than 84,000. In such a case, the city could at any time file notice with the county plan commission that it was exercising or rejecting jurisdiction over all or part of the fringe area and the county was required to revise its comprehensive plan to reflect the city's decision within sixty days of receiving the notice. See P.L. 141, SEC. 1 (1972), P.L. 271, SEC. 1 (1971). In 1981, the relevant provision was recodified at Indiana Code section 36-7-4-205 but remained largely the same in substance. In 1982, the statute was amended to state that the city could exercise or reject jurisdiction in the fringe area if the county population was less than 95,000. Acts 1982, P.L. 1, SEC. 61. In 1999, the statute was amended to allow cities adopting a comprehensive plan after July 1, 1999, to provide for the development of a fringe area if the city was providing municipal services to the fringe area or if the city obtained the county's approval. PL. 216-1999, SEC. 1.

In 2011, the statute was amended to its current form, which states in relevant part:

(a) ADVISORY. A municipal plan commission shall adopt a comprehensive plan, as provided for under the 500 series of the advisory planning law, for the development of the municipality. For comprehensive plans adopted after July 1, 1999, if;
(1) the municipality provides municipal services to the contiguous unineor-porated area; or
(2) the municipal plan commission obtains the approval of the county legislative body of each affected county;
the municipal plan commission may provide in the comprehensive plan for the development of the contiguous unineor-porated area, designated by the commission, that is outside the corporate boundaries of the municipality, and that, in the judgment of the commission, bears reasonable relation to the development of the municipality. For purposes of this section, participation of a municipality in a fire protection territory established under IC 36-8-19 that includes unincorporated areas contiguous to the municipality may not be treated as providing municipal services to the contiguous unincorporated areas.
(b) ADVISORY. Except as limited by the boundaries of unincorporated areas subject to the jurisdiction of other municipal plan commissions, an area designated under this section may include any part of the contiguous unineorporat-ed area within two (2) miles from the corporate boundaries of the municipality....
(c) ADVISORY. Before exercising their rights, powers, and duties of the advisory planning law with respect to an area designated under this section, a municipal plan commission must file, with the recorder of the county in which the municipality is located, a description or map defining the limits of that area. If the commission revises the limits, it shall file, with the recorder, a revised description or map defining those revised limits. # ose oak
(e) ADVISORY. If the legislative body of a county adopts a comprehensive plan and ordinance covering the unineorpo-rated areas of the county, a municipal plan commission may not exercise jurisdiction, as provided in this section, over any part of that unincorporated area unless it is authorized by ordinance of the legislative body of the county. This ordinance may be initiated by the county legislative body or by petition duly signed and presented to the county auditor by:
(1) not less than fifty (50) property owners residing in the area involved in the petition;
(2) the county plan commission; or
(8) the municipal plan commission.
Before final action on the ordinance by the county legislative body, the county plan commission must hold an advertised public hearing as required for other actions of the county plan commission under the advisory planning law. Upon the passage of the ordinance by the county legislative body and the subsequent acceptance of jurisdiction by the municipal plan commission, the municipal plan commission shall exercise the same rights, powers, and duties conferred in this section exclusively with respect to the contiguous unincorporated area. The jurisdiction of a municipal plan commission, as authorized under this subsection, may be terminated by ordinance at the discretion of the legislative body of the county, but only if the county has adopted a comprehensive plan for that area that is as comprehensive in seope and subject matter as that in effect by municipal ordinance.
(f) ADVISORY. Each municipal plan commission in a municipality located in a county having:
(1) a population of less than ninety-five thousand (95,000); and
(2) a county plan commission that has adopted, in accord with the advisory planning law, a comprehensive plan and ordinance covering the unineorpo-rated areas of the county;
may, at any time, after filing notice with the county recorder and the county plan commission, exercise or reject territorial jurisdiction over any part of the area within two (2) miles of the corporate boundaries of that municipality and within that county, whether or not that commission has previously exercised that jurisdiction, if the municipality is providing municipal services to the area. Within sixty (60) days after receipt of that notice, the county plan commission and the county legislative body shall have the county comprehensive plan and ordinance revised to reflect the decision of the municipal plan commission exercising the option provided for in this subsection. If the municipality is not providing municipal services to the area, the municipal plan commission must obtain the approval of the county legislative body of each affected county before exercising jurisdiction. # shok

Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205 (2011).

"The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question." City of Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind.2007). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Id. Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for judicial construction. Id. However, when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation it is deemed ambiguous and, thus, open to judicial construction. Id. When faced with an ambiguous statute, we apply other well-established rules of statutory construction. Id. One such rule is that our primary goal is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the Legislature. Id. To effectuate legislative intent, we read the sections of an act together in order that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. Id. A statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words. Mayes v. Second Injury Fund, 888 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ind.2008). We presume that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Id.

The City contends that subsection (f) applies in this situation because Floyd County has fewer than 95,000 residents as shown by the 2010 census and the City has elected to exercise jurisdiction in the fringe area and has given notice to the County. The County contends that subsection (e) applies because the County has now adopted a comprehensive plan and has adopted an ordinance to terminate the city's jurisdiction over the fringe area.

In Bd. of Comm'rs. of Howard Cnty. v. Kokomo City Plan Comm'n, 263 Ind. 282, 330 N.E.2d 92 (1975), our supreme court considered a constitutional challenge to the version of the statute that first established the population classification. Ultimately, the court held the county had no standing to raise the constitutional claims. Id. at 295, 330 N.E.2d at 101. For our purposes, however, it is important to note how the court described the classifications of the statute:

[It] places cities in two categories and provides two different procedures for a city's assumption of extra-territorial planning and zoning authority. In the first category are all cities located in counties in which there exists no county master plan and those cities in counties having a county master plan but having less than 84,000 population. In the see-ond category are those cities located in counties having more than 84,000 population and a county master plan. A city in the first category is vested with sole discretion to decide whether it will exercise such extraterritorial authority. In the second category, a city may not exercise authority outside its boundaries unless approved by ordinance of the county.

Id. at 291, 330 N.E.2d at 98 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although the statute has been amended since this case was decided, the amendments have not altered this basic structure: cities are still placed in two categories: 1) those cities located in counties having a county comprehensive plan covering the fringe area and population less than 95,000 (subsection £), and 2) those cities located in counties having a county comprehensive plan covering the fringe area and, although unstated, population more than 95,000 (subsection e). The County's position, that the "statute says, very simply, that once the legislative body of a county adopts a comprehensive plan and ordinance covering the unineorporated areas of the county, a municipal plan commission simply may not continue to exercise jurisdiction over the fringe unless it is authorized to do so by a county ordinancel,]" Brief of the Appellant at 22, fails to take into account the two-category structure of the statute and would render subsection (£) meaningless, because the existence of a county comprehensive plan is a part of both subsections (e) and (£), making the population classification the differentiating factor. We agree with the trial court that the County's position is untenable, and because Floyd County has fewer than 95,000 residents, subsection (f) is the applicable seetion in this case.

The County also contends that, if subsection (f) is the applicable section, County approval is still required because the City "is not providing municipal services to the area ..." Ind.Code § 36-7-4-205(F). The City first contends that it is not required to provide municipal services because it was exercising jurisdiction over the fringe area prior to the 1999 amendment adding that requirement. See Brief and Cross-Appeal of the Appellees at 15 (arguing the 1999 amendment "neither operated in any manner to revoke or impair the prior exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by any municipality, nor conferred on counties the authority to retroactively revoke extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction previously asserted by municipalities (even where the subsequently requisite 'municipal services' were not then being provided to the area). Instead, the amendment merely established that in any newly proposed exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the municipality would be required to either provide undefined municipal services to the area or obtain the county's prior consent."). We need not decide whether the City is correct in this regard, however, because the City also asserts that it is providing municipal services to the fringe area as required by subsection (F).

As the trial court noted, "municipal services" as a term is not defined by the statute or by caselaw. We begin by acknowledging that section 36-7-4-205(f) uses the term in its plural form. Indiana Code section 1-1-4-1(3), setting forth general rules for the construction of Indiana statutes, states that "[wlords importing the singular number only may be also applied to the plural of persons and things[,]" but it does not state the opposite is true. In Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wegmiller Bender Lumber Co., Inc., 402 N.E.2d 41 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), it was noted that

[clommon usage in the English language does not serupulously observe a discrete difference between singular and plural word forms, especially when speaking in the abstract, not referring to identified subjects or objects, as in legislation prescribing a general rule for future application. In recognition of this, it is well established, by statute as well as by judicial decision, that legislative terms which are singular in form may apply to multiple subjects or objects and those which are plural in form may apply to single subjects or objects if that is the intended or reasonably understood and effect.

Id. at 49 n. 3 (Young, J., dissenting) (quoting Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.34 (Sands 4th ed. (1973)). However, other statutes within the Indiana Code specifically provide that "Itlhe singular number includes the plural and the plural number includes the singular." Ind.Code § 29-1-1-38(b)(1) (rules of construction applying throughout the probate code). See also Ind.Code § 5-10.3-1-8(b) (for the article concerning the Public Employees' Retirement Fund: "The singular form of any noun used in this article includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular, as appropriate."); Ind.Code § 6-6-1.1-104(b) (same, in rules of construction for the chapter on gasoline tax); Ind.Code § 27-7-2-2(g) (same, in definitions for purposes of worker's compensation). No such provision is included within Title 36. Therefore, taking section 4-205 in its plainest terms, "municipal services" implies that more than one service must be provided..

Other than setting forth the basic proposition that more than one municipal service must be provided by a city by its use of the plural in section 36-7-4-205, the legislature has not indicated the nature, kind, or extent of municipal services it intended a city to provide in order to dispense with county approval of its exercise of jurisdiction over a fringe area. The County directs us to the annexation statutes found in Title 36 which describe two categories of services that an annexing municipality must make a commitment to provide to the annexed area: "noncapital" services, in-eluding police protection, fire protection, and street and road maintenance, and services of a "capital improvement nature," including street construction, street lighting, sewer facilities, water facilities, and stormwater drainage facilities. Ind.Code § 86-4-3-13(d)(4), (5). The County contends that this defines "municipal services" for Title 36, and that the term therefore "includes all, or at least substantially all," of these services. Brief of the Appellant at 25. Even assuming those are the "municipal services" with which we are concerned for purposes of section 36-7-4-205, we note that annexation is a highly formalized, legislatively prescribed process, whereas the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over an unincorporated area, though also granted by the legislature, is considerably more informal. We cannot say that the requirements for annexation are directly applicable to this situation.

We ean say, though, that the legislature has set a minimum standard for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by requiring a city to provide "municipal services," plural. But it has not set a specific standard by requiring the provision of all or of certain municipal services. The County asks this court to set a standard beyond that clearly set in the statute itself, and that is a job reserved to the legislature. The City has been providing sanitary sewer services in the fringe area for decades. That is clearly the largest and most substantial of the services provided to the fringe area by the City, but the evidence in the record and considered by the trial court shows that the City is also providing building code inspection and en- . forcement services. The County asserts that by adding the requirement that a city provide municipal services, the legislature's intent was to ensure that a municipality has a stake in the fringe area over which it purports to exercise jurisdiction. The provision of sanitary sewer services in this case accomplishes that intent because it is, as the trial court noted, not insignificant due to the capital investment the City has made in offering those services outside its municipal boundaries. We conclude the City meets the requirements of section 36-7-4-205(F) for exercising jurisdiction over the fringe area.

Conclusion

The City's supplemental affidavit was properly considered by the trial court and is therefore before this court, as well, in considering the summary judgment motions. Because the County has a population of less than 95,000, Indiana Code seetion 36-7-4-205(f) determines which entity is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the fringe area, and because the City is providing municipal services to the fringe area, it is entitled to the exercise of jurisdiction without the necessity of County approval. The judgment of the trial court in favor of the City is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.

      . Sometimes also referred to interchangeably as a "master plan."

      . At the time the City plan commission designated the fringe area at issue in this appeal, the statute was found at Ind.Code § 18-7-5-34 (1972).

      . The County's motion for summary judgment is file-stamped March 6, 2013, although the certificate of service states it was served on February 28, 2013. See Appellant's App. at 240-41. The actual date it was filed is not of particular significance, but we do note that the City filed a response to the County's motion for summary judgment that is file-stamped March 4, 2013. See id. at 251. Overall, it is important only to note that by apparent agreement of the parties, the time-line for consideration of the summary judgment motions was shortened, which is relevant to our consideration of the City's cross-appeal.

      . Although the County moved to strike the affidavit and the trial court ruled on that motion, it appears the affidavit was never actually filed, as the City moved for leave to file the affidavit.

      . Although asserting at the start of the summary judgment hearing that the sanitary sewer service was "the most substantial service that the City has provided in [the fringe] area and it is the sole service we have designated into evidence," transcript at 28, the City's counsel later noted that "we're now issuing building permits, we're issuing zoning approvals, so it [is] a service in addition to, to municipal sanitary sewer service," id. at 52. The notion that the City was providing additional services was therefore offered at the hearing, but the affidavit is the only evidence that it was doing so.

      , Not having a comprehensive plan as in Bd. of Comm'rs. of Howard Cnty., is apparently no longer an option. See Ind.Code § 36-7-4-501 ("A comprehensive plan shall be approved by resolution in accordance with the 500 series for the promotion of public health, safety, morals, convenience, order, or the general welfare and for the sake of efficiency and economy in the process of development.").