text:
    AMERICAN ACCESS CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kelly NOVIT; Ciprian Tanase; and Eileen Conway, Defendants
    (Eileen Conway, Defendant-Appellant).
    No. 1-17-1048
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.
    March 30, 2018
    Pfaff, Gill & Ports, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael T. Gill, of counsel), for appellant.
    James P. Newman & Associates, LLC, of St. Charles (William H. Ransom, of counsel), for appellee.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this declaratory judgment action, defendant Eileen Conway appeals from the circuit court's judgment finding that plaintiff American Access Casualty Company (American Access) had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, defendant Kelly Novit, in connection with an underlying personal injury action (the underlying action). In the underlying action, Conway sued to recover damages for injuries she sustained when she was struck by Novit's vehicle, which was driven by defendant Ciprian Tanase. Conway asserted that Tanase was negligent when he struck Conway with Novit's vehicle and that Novit negligently entrusted her vehicle to Tanase because Novit knew or should have known that Tanase was intoxicated. Novit's automobile insurer, American Access, filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of rights regarding its duties to defend and indemnify Tanase and Novit in the underlying action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of American Access, finding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either Tanase or Novit. Conway appeals from the portion of the circuit court's judgment finding that American Access had no duty to defend or indemnify Novit. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The following facts are set forth in Conway's two-count amended complaint in the underlying action. On March 29, 2014, at around noon, Novit and Tanase were together at a forest preserve where Novit observed Tanase "consume an alcoholic beverage." Novit then allowed Tanase to drive her 2012 Dodge Avenger, with her as a passenger, to a 7-Eleven. While at the 7-Eleven, Novit observed Tanase consume "multiple alcoholic beverages." Novit then again allowed Tanase to drive her vehicle, with her as a passenger, to a pizza restaurant. While there, Novit observed Tanase "consume at least one alcoholic beverage." Novit then again allowed Tanase to drive her vehicle, again with her as a passenger, to a gyros restaurant where Novit exited the vehicle and then gave Tanase "express or implied permission" to continue using her vehicle. Novit "knew or should have known that [Tanase] was intoxicated, incompetent, or reckless" and "knew or should have known that her [vehicle] would likely be used in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others." After leaving the gyros restaurant alone in Novit's vehicle, Tanase struck Conway at around 7 p.m. as she crossed the street, resulting in Conway's injuries. Conway alleged that Tanase's "intoxication, incompetency, or recklessness" was a proximate cause of her injuries.

¶ 4 After Conway initiated the underlying action, American Access filed this declaratory judgment action and filed a three-count amended complaint. American Access acknowledged that it issued Novit an auto insurance policy and that she is the named insured under the policy. In count I, American Access asserted that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Tanase because he was not an insured under Novit's policy and was operating the vehicle without Novit's express or implied permission. American Access asserted in count II that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either Novit or Tanase under the "reasonable belief" exclusion to the auto policy, which excluded coverage for "any person operating the vehicle without a reasonable belief that he or she is entitled to do so." American Access contended that Tanase was not the named insured under the policy and that he did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident, and therefore he had no reasonable belief that he was entitled to operate Novit's vehicle. Count III asserted that American Access had no duty to defend or indemnify Novit against Conway's negligent entrustment claim because the policy did not provide coverage for bodily injuries caused by the separate tort of negligent entrustment.

¶ 5 American Access moved for summary judgment on its "reasonable belief" exclusion claims in count II. The motion was fully briefed, and on July 26, 2016, the circuit court entered a written order granting American Access's motion with respect to Tanase but denying the motion with respect to Novit. The circuit court examined the policy, which contained an exclusion that provided, "This policy does not apply to and does not provide coverage [for bodily injury liability and property damage liability] for: * * * (q) any person operating an automobile without a reasonable belief that he or she is entitled to do so, however, this exclusion does not apply to operation of the owned automobile by the named insured or relative." The circuit found that American Access had no duty to defend or indemnify Tanase because he could not have had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to operate Novit's vehicle since he did not have a driver's license. The circuit court further found that the reasonable belief exclusion did not apply to Novit because she was not driving the automobile at the time of the accident and, even if she had been, the exclusion would not apply to her because she was the named insured under the policy. The circuit court's written order states "that the [reasonable belief] exclusion does not exclude Novit from coverage under the [p]olicy based on the allegations of the underlying complaint," and concluded that "based on the allegations of the [u]nderlying complaint, the reasonable belief exclusion does not apply to Novit." We note that the circuit court did not conclude that American Access had a duty to defend Novit based on the inapplicability of the reasonable belief exclusion; the circuit court found that the reasonable belief exclusion did not apply and therefore was not a basis from which it could conclude that the American Access had no duty to defend under the policy.

¶ 6 American Access then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its claim in count III that the policy did not provide coverage for claims of negligent entrustment and a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's summary judgment order on the "reasonable belief" exclusion claim in count II as it pertained to Novit. On March 9, 2017, the circuit court denied American Access's motion to reconsider. After briefing on American Access's motion for summary judgment on count III, the circuit court entered a handwritten order on March 23, 2017, drafted by counsel for American Access, granting summary judgment in favor of American Access, finding "there is no coverage for [d]efendant Novit on the claim of negligent entrustment." The order also stated that the circuit court previously resolved American Access's "reasonable belief" exclusion claims. The order further stated that American Access voluntarily dismissed its claim in count I that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Tanase on the grounds that he was not a named insured. The circuit court's March 23, 2017, order states that it is "a final order with all claims of all parties now being disposed of."

¶ 7 Conway filed her notice of appeal on April 21, 2017, from the March 23, 2017, order. American Access moved to dismiss Conway's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, arguing that its "reasonable belief" claim against Novit had not been fully resolved. A panel of this court originally dismissed this appeal but later vacated the dismissal order on Conway's motion.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, Conway argues that the circuit court effectively concluded that, as a matter of law, a negligent entrustment claim is not an "accident" and that the circuit court misapplied our holding in General Agents Insurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co. , 328 Ill. App. 3d 482, 262 Ill.Dec. 544, 765 N.E.2d 1152 (2002). She contends that General Agents stands for the proposition that insurance coverage is unavailable for a negligent entrustment claim only where the underlying complaint "is based purely on deliberate actions." She further argues that the "substantial probability" test from General Agents is not met here. Finally, she contends that public policy favors coverage for her negligent entrustment claim. We need not resolve this issue, however, because we find that American Access has a duty to defend Novit under the plain language of the policy.

¶ 10 Before we reach the merits of this appeal, we must consider American Access's argument that we lack appellate jurisdiction. It contends that the circuit court never entered a final judgment with respect to the "reasonable belief" exclusion claim in count II of the amended complaint. American Access argues that the circuit court granted summary judgment on the "reasonable belief" exclusion claim as to Tanase but denied summary judgment as to Novit, and therefore count II has not been fully adjudicated. American Access further argues that it has been deprived of "its opportunity to cross-appeal on an issue which it may have lost had the order been final." We disagree.

¶ 11 Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution, our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final judgments. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 ; Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Absent a supreme court rule, we lack jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not final. Blumenthal v. Brewer , 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 22, 410 Ill.Dec. 289, 69 N.E.3d 834 (citing EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp , 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 9, 367 Ill.Dec. 474, 982 N.E.2d 152). A "final judgment" for the purposes of appeal is one that fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in a lawsuit and determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment. Indiana Insurance Co. v. Powerscreen of Chicago, Ltd. , 2012 IL App (1st) 103667, ¶ 22, 363 Ill.Dec. 339, 975 N.E.2d 141 ; see also In re Detention of Hardin , 238 Ill. 2d 33, 42-43, 342 Ill.Dec. 555, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (2010).

¶ 12 Here, American Access sought, in relevant part, a declaration of its rights with respect to its duties to defend and indemnify Novit in the underlying action. It presented two alternative theories as to why Novit was not entitled to coverage under the policy: (1) the policy's "reasonable belief" exclusion applied and (2) the policy provided coverage for bodily injuries caused by automobile accidents but did not provide coverage for the separate tort of negligent entrustment. Both claims sought the same relief: an order declaring that American Access had no duty to defend or indemnify Novit in the underlying action. The circuit court found that the "reasonable belief" exclusion did not apply to Novit because she was the named insured. In doing so, the circuit court concluded that American Access could not rely on the "reasonable belief" exclusion in order to avoid its duty to defend or indemnify Novit in the underlying action. The circuit court did not conclude that inapplicability of the "reasonable belief" exclusion gave rise to a duty to defend but did conclude that the exclusion was inapplicable and was therefore not determinative of American Access's duty to defend. In doing so, and by subsequently denying American Access's motion to reconsider, the circuit court conclusively resolved count II of American Access's declaratory judgment complaint in favor of defendants.

¶ 13 The circuit court subsequently agreed with American Access that Novit was not entitled to coverage under the policy because the policy only applied to accidents and not to a separate tort claim for negligent entrustment. By granting summary judgment in favor of American Access on its claim that the policy did not provide coverage for claims of negligent entrustment, the circuit court granted American Access all of the relief it sought in its complaint with respect to Novit: an order declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Novit in the underlying action.

¶ 14 We also reject American Access's contention that it has been deprived of "its opportunity to cross-appeal on an issue which it may have lost had the order been final." When a judgment grants a party all of the relief that it sought and the judgment has no prejudicial effect on the prevailing party, that party has no right to an appeal. Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue , 98 Ill. 2d 382, 386, 75 Ill.Dec. 219, 457 N.E.2d 9 (1983). American Access had no right to cross-appeal from the circuit court's denial of summary judgment on its "reasonable belief" exclusion claim because no portion of the circuit court's judgment-that American Access had no duty to defend or indemnify Novit in the underlying action-was adverse to American Access. American Access could have advanced its "reasonable belief" exclusion arguments on appeal as an alternative basis for affirming the circuit court's judgment (see Beacham v. Walker , 231 Ill. 2d 51, 61, 324 Ill.Dec. 541, 896 N.E.2d 327 (2008) (explaining that we may affirm the circuit court's judgment on any grounds called for by the record, regardless of whether the circuit court relied on those grounds)), but it has not done so. We find that the circuit court's March 23, 2017, order was a final and appealable order.

¶ 15 Turning to the merits, the sole issue on appeal as framed by the parties is whether Conway's claim for negligent entrustment alleges an "accident" covered by the policy such that American Access has a duty to defend Novit against Conway's negligent entrustment claim and potentially indemnify Novit for any damages for which she was found liable. We need not reach the question of whether a claim for negligent entrustment amounts to an "accident" under the policy, however, because the plain language of the policy provides that American Access will pay compensatory damages for accidents resulting in bodily injury that arise out of Novit's use or ownership of the vehicle.

¶ 16 To determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, a court must look to the allegations of the underlying complaint and compare those allegations to the relevant portions of the insurance policy. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. , 154 Ill. 2d 90, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 10708 (1992). If the underlying complaint alleges facts that fall or potentially fall within the policy's coverage, the insurer's duty to defend arises, even if the allegations in the underlying complaint are groundless, false, or fraudulent. Northbrook Property & Casualty Co. v. Transportation Joint Agreement , 194 Ill. 2d 96, 98, 251 Ill.Dec. 659, 741 N.E.2d 253 (2000). The insurer must defend "unless the allegations of the underlying complaint demonstrate that the plaintiff in the underlying suit will not be able to prove the insured liable, under any theory supported by the complaint, without also proving facts that show the loss falls outside the coverage of the insurance policy."

Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National Casualty Co. , 337 Ill. App. 3d 356, 361, 271 Ill.Dec. 711, 785 N.E.2d 905 (2003). Insurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor of coverage, and any doubt as to the insurer's duty to defend is resolved in favor of the insured. United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Dare , 357 Ill. App. 3d 955, 963, 294 Ill.Dec. 258, 830 N.E.2d 670 (2005).

¶ 17 Under the relevant portion of Novit's policy, American Access agreed to "pay on behalf of [Novit] * * * compensatory damages * * * because of (1) bodily injury, or (2) property damage caused by accident [sic ] arising out of the ownership , maintenance or use of the owned automobile * * *." (Emphases added.) The policy does not contain an exclusion for negligent entrustment and does not define "accident." Where a term in an insurance policy is not defined, we afford that term its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz , 237 Ill. 2d 424, 436, 341 Ill.Dec. 485, 930 N.E.2d 999 (2010). We have recognized that for purposes of insurance coverage claims, an "accident" is " 'an unforseen [sic ] occurrence, usually * * * an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character.' " State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Young , 2012 IL App (1st) 103736, ¶ 26, 360 Ill.Dec. 266, 968 N.E.2d 759 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Freyer , 89 Ill. App. 3d 617, 619, 44 Ill.Dec. 791, 411 N.E.2d 1157 (1980) ; see also West American Insurance Co. v. Midwest Open MRI, Inc. , 2013 IL App (1st) 121034, ¶ 22, 370 Ill.Dec. 864, 989 N.E.2d 252. Furthermore, "the words 'arising out of' have been interpreted broadly to mean originating from, incident to, or having a causal connection with the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle." Aryainejad v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. , 278 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1051, 215 Ill.Dec. 593, 663 N.E.2d 1107 (1996) (citing 6B John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4317, at 360-63 (1979) ).

¶ 18 There is no dispute that Conway's underlying complaint alleges an accident: she plainly alleges that Tanase negligently struck her with Novit's car and that she suffered injuries as a result. The dispositive question then, for purposes of determining whether American Access has a duty to defend Novit, is whether the complaint alleges that the accident arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of Novit's insured vehicle. We find that it does.

¶ 19 A claim for negligent entrustment asserts that the defendant gave another person express or implied permission to use or possess a dangerous article or instrumentality which the defendant knew or should have known would likely be used in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Evans v. Shannon , 201 Ill. 2d 424, 434, 267 Ill.Dec. 533, 776 N.E.2d 1184 (2002). In the context of automobiles, "There are two primary considerations in negligent-entrustment analysis: (1) whether the owner of the vehicle entrusted the car to an incompetent or unfit driver, and (2) whether the incompetency was a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury." Id. (citing Taitt v. Robinson , 266 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132, 203 Ill.Dec. 334, 639 N.E.2d 893 (1994) ). The general rule is that "the alleged incompetence of the driver must be a proximate cause of the negligent act that caused the injury [citation], and the entrustor is liable, but only if his conduct is the legal cause of the complained-of bodily harm." Watson v. Enterprise Leasing Co. , 325 Ill. App. 3d 914, 922, 258 Ill.Dec. 915, 757 N.E.2d 604 (2001). "Legal cause" is a component of proximate cause and is "largely a question of foreseeability." Abrams v. City of Chicago , 211 Ill. 2d 251, 258, 285 Ill.Dec. 183, 811 N.E.2d 670 (2004). "The relevant inquiry is whether 'the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.' " (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman , 188 Ill. 2d 252, 260, 242 Ill.Dec. 113, 720 N.E.2d 1068 (1999) ).

¶ 20 Here, the allegations in Conway's complaint fall within or potentially within the coverage of American Access's policy. The complaint alleged that (1) Novit gave Tanase express or implied permission to use her vehicle, (2) Novit knew or should have known that Tanase was intoxicated, and (3) Tanase struck Conway with the vehicle, resulting in bodily harm. It can be inferred from the allegations in the underlying complaint that Conway is alleging that Novit's negligent entrustment was a legal cause of Conway's injuries because Novit knew or should have known that Tanase was intoxicated, incompetent, or reckless and that Tanase's intoxication, incompetence, or recklessness was a proximate cause of the accident and Conway's injuries. Conway's underlying complaint alleges a causal connection between Novit's alleged entrustment of her insured vehicle-which she owned-to Tanase with actual or constructive knowledge that Tanase was intoxicated and that the accident caused Conway's injuries. In other words, Conway has alleged that the injury "arises out of" Novit's use or ownership of the insured vehicle and her negligent entrustment of that vehicle was a proximate cause of Conway's injuries. Therefore, the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of American Access with respect to its duty to defend Novit in the underlying action is reversed.

¶ 21 We remand for further proceedings so that, following a determination of liability in the underlying action, the parties may address whether American Access has a duty under the policy to indemnify Novit. We express no opinion as to whether American Access has a duty to indemnify Novit under the policy.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 24 Reversed and remanded.

Justices Harris and Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, BY Kimberly M. FOXX, State's Attorney of Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roger AGPAWA, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Markham, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 1-17-1976
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.
    March 30, 2018
    Odelson & Sterk, Ltd., of Evergreen Park (Burton S. Odelson and Ross D. Secler, of counsel), for appellant.
    Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Chaka M. Patterson, Sisavanh B. Baker, and Hailey M. Golds, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Roger Agpawa was elected Mayor of the City of Markham at the April 4, 2017, consolidated election. Plaintiff Kimberly Foxx, in her capacity as State's Attorney of Cook County, filed a complaint for quo warranto , declaratory judgment, and a permanent injunction, alleging that defendant was ineligible to serve as mayor or to take the oath of office due to his 1999 federal felony conviction for mail fraud. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, and the circuit court of Cook County granted judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In August 1999, defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of felony mail fraud. He was sentenced to 36 months' probation, was required to perform 200 hours of community service, and was ordered to make restitution. Defendant completed all the terms of his sentence. Defendant has not received a pardon from the President of the United States. It is undisputed that defendant has engaged in numerous civic-minded activities since his conviction, including, among others, serving as the Fire Chief of the City of County Club Hills, a Code Court Administrator for the Markham Municipal Court, and a Deputy Fire Chief and 911 coordinator for the City of Markham. He is an active member of his church, is the president of the booster club for a local high school, and has participated in numerous community-based improvement programs.

¶ 4 Defendant filed nominating petitions for the office of Mayor of the City of Markham for the April 4, 2017, consolidated election. No preelection challenges were made to his petitions and defendant's name appeared on the ballot. Prior to the election, on March 23, 2017, the plaintiff sent defendant a letter informing him that he was ineligible to serve as mayor due to his prior felony conviction and, if elected, he would be ineligible to take the oath of office. Defendant won the election. The Cook County Clerk certified the election results and declared defendant the winner of the election for Mayor of the City of Markham.

¶ 5 On April 24, 2017, plaintiff filed a verified complaint for quo warranto , declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Plaintiff's complaint contended that defendant, pursuant to section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) ( 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2016) ), was not eligible to take the oath of office for a municipal office because of his felony conviction. Furthermore, plaintiff asserted that, pursuant to section 29-15 of the Illinois Election Code (Election Code) ( 10 ILCS 5/29-15 (West 2016) ), defendant had been convicted of an "infamous crime" and was therefore prohibited from "holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, unless such person is again restored to such right by the terms of a pardon for the offense or otherwise according to law." It is uncontested that defendant has not received a presidential pardon. Plaintiff, therefore, asserted that defendant was ineligible to take the oath of office for Mayor of the City of Markham.

¶ 6 Also on April 24, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On April 25, 2017, the Cook County Clerk certified the results of the April 4, 2017, consolidated election. On April 28, 2017, the circuit court granted plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, enjoining defendant from taking the oath of office until further order of court.

¶ 7 Defendant filed an answer and affirmative defenses to plaintiff's complaint. He asserted, in relevant part, that pursuant to sections 5-5-5(a) and (b) of the Uniform Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) ( 730 ILCS 5/5-5-5(a), (b) (West 2016) ), his civil rights, including the right to run for and hold elected municipal office, "remain intact." He further asserted that section 3.110-5 of the Municipal Code and section 29-15 of the Election Code (collectively, the Conviction Statutes), violate his rights and the rights of all "similarly situated" voters of the City of Markham under the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution ( U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV ), and article I, sections 2 and 4 of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, §§ 2, 4 ).

¶ 8 The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. The cross-motions were fully briefed and after oral argument on August 8, 2017, the circuit court took the matter under advisement. On August 9, 2017, the circuit court entered a written order granting plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying defendant's motion. Defendant was therefore barred from taking the oath and holding the office of Mayor of the City of Markham. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant advances two principal arguments. First, he contends that under the relevant statutory scheme, when the Election Code, the Municipal Code, and the Code of Corrections are read in pari materia , his "right" to seek municipal office is a "civil right" that was restored under section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections following his completion of all of the terms of his federal sentence. Second, he advances constitutional arguments, arguing that the application of the Conviction Statutes operates to deprive him and all other similarly situated voters of the City of Markham of their constitutionally protected voting rights, and deprives defendant of his "right" to hold municipal office. We address these arguments in turn.

¶ 11 A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2016) ) "concedes the truth of the well-pleaded facts in the nonmovant's pleadings." Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Trujillo , 2014 IL App (1st) 123419, ¶ 16, 379 Ill.Dec. 684, 7 N.E.3d 110. Where the parties file cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, they generally acknowledge that there are no questions of fact and that the issues involved are questions of law. See Zipf v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 54 Ill. App. 3d 103, 108, 11 Ill.Dec. 798, 369 N.E.2d 252 (1977). We review a circuit court's order granting judgment on the pleadings de novo . Trujillo , 2014 IL App (1st) 123419, ¶ 16, 379 Ill.Dec. 684, 7 N.E.3d 110.

¶ 12 I. Statutory Challenges

¶ 13 We first set forth the constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to defendant's arguments.

¶ 14 Article XIII, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution states, "A person convicted of a felony, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime shall be ineligible to hold an office created by this Constitution. Eligibility may be restored as provided by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 1.

¶ 15 Section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections states, "Conviction and disposition shall not entail the loss by the defendant of any civil rights, except under this Section and Sections 29-6 and 29-10 of The Election Code, as now or hereafter amended." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-5(a) (West 2016). Subsection (b) provides, "A person convicted of a felony shall be ineligible to hold an office created by the Constitution of this State until the completion of his sentence." Id. § 5-55(b).

¶ 16 The Election Code provides that a person convicted under either section 29-6 (mutilation of election materials, a Class 4 felony), or section 29-10 (perjury, a Class 3 felony), is ineligible for public employment for a period of five years immediately following completion of his or her sentence. 10 ILCS 5/29-6, 29-10(b) (West 2016). Section 29-10 of the Election Code further provides that public employment includes "any elected or appointed office created by the Constitution or laws of this State, or any ordinance of a unit of local government," and "any position as an employee of the State of Illinois, or a unit of local government or school district." Id. § 29-10(b).

¶ 17 Section 29-15 of the Election Code provides, "Any person convicted of an infamous crime as such term is defined in Section 124-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, as amended,[ ] shall thereafter be prohibited from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, unless such person is again restored to such rights by the terms of a pardon for the offense or otherwise according to law." Id. § 29-15.

¶ 18 Finally, section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Municipal Code provides, "A person is not eligible to take the oath of office for a municipal office if that person * * * has been convicted in any court located in the United States of any infamous crime, bribery, perjury, or other felony." 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2016).

¶ 19 Defendant argues that his right to hold municipal office is a "civil right" that was restored under section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections following the completion of all of the terms of his federal sentence. He relies on Tully v. Edgar , 171 Ill. 2d 297, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43 (1996), and East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel , 178 Ill. 2d 399, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050 (1997), to argue that Illinois courts recognize the "right" to hold office. He also relies on decisions from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to assert that the right to hold public office is an important "civil right" that is restored to convicted felons after completion of their sentences. See United States v. Gillaum , 372 F.3d 848, 861 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Under Illinois law * * * a criminal defendant's rights to vote and hold office are automatically restored to him at the completion of his prison sentence.").

¶ 20 Defendant further contends that a convicted felon's loss of civil rights is a collateral consequence of the conviction and not the punishment itself. He claims that section 5-5-5 of the Code of Corrections "sets the limit to the collateral deprivation of civil rights of a conviction." He argues that section 29-15 of the Election Code imposes a stricter collateral consequence than section 5-5-5 of the Code of Corrections because the Election Code renders an individual ineligible to hold any office as a result of being convicted for an "infamous crime," whereas the Code of Corrections allows for a convicted felon's eligibility to hold any elected office to be restored upon completion of his sentence. He argues that the Code of Corrections, the Election Code, and the Municipal Code must be read in pari materia to avoid "negation of at least one of these statutes." We disagree.

¶ 21 Defendant acknowledges that this court has rejected similar challenges to section 29-15 of the Election Code based on section 5-5-5 of the Code of Corrections. This court has previously held that the source of a convicted felon's disqualification from holding municipal office is not article XIII, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution because public municipal offices are not "created by" the Illinois Constitution; public municipal offices are created by legislative enactment. People ex rel. Ryan v. Coles , 64 Ill. App. 3d 807, 811, 21 Ill.Dec. 543, 381 N.E.2d 990 (1978). We have also previously held that there is no ambiguity in section 29-15 of the Election Code's prohibition on felons holding municipal office, and that there is no conflict between section 5-5-5(b) of the Corrections Code and section 29-15 of the Election Code. Pappas v. Calumet City Municipal Officers' Electoral Board , 288 Ill. App. 3d 787, 790, 224 Ill.Dec. 274, 681 N.E.2d 589 (1997) (rejecting a mayoral candidate's claim that his right to run for municipal office was restored upon completion of his felony sentences).

¶ 22 Defendant contends, however, that our supreme court in Tully and East St. Louis , and numerous Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases, recognized that the "right" to hold an elective municipal office is "an important civil right." He contends that holding public office is a "civil right," and that we have never addressed whether section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of the Corrections causes a person to lose or restores the "right" to run for municipal elective office. We disagree with defendant's conclusion that Tully and East St. Louis recognize such a "right."

¶ 23 In Tully , the plaintiff voter challenged the constitutionality of Public Act 89-5 (Pub. Act 89-5, eff. Jan. 1, 1996), which purported to change the position of trustee of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois from an elective to an appointive office. Tully , 171 Ill. 2d at 300, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43. The plaintiff contended that Public Act 89-5 violated his fundamental voting rights under article III, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 1 ), because it shortened the term of elected trustees after the election occurred and operated as a "post-hoc" negation of the plaintiff's right to vote. Tully , 171 Ill. 2d at 301, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43. Our supreme court observed that "legislation that affects any stage of the election process implicates the right to vote," (emphasis in original) ( id. at 307, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43 ), and that "the constitutional right to vote is implicated by legislation that gives some votes cast greater or lesser weight than others" ( id. (citing Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education , 142 Ill.2d 54, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283 (1990) ). The supreme court found that Public Act 89-5 "establishe[d] a mechanism for total disregard of all votes cast by citizens in a particular election," and "voids the votes cast by citizens in a valid election and authorizes the Governor to select the candidates of his choice." (Emphases in original) Tully , 171 Ill. 2d at 307, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43. Our supreme court concluded that Public Act 89-5 could not withstand strict scrutiny, concluding in part that, "Legislation that nullifies the votes cast in a valid election and removes the elected trustees from office midterm is not necessary to or narrowly tailored to achieve the legislature's presumed goal" of advancing the State's compelling interest in education. Id. at 311-12, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43.

¶ 24 In East St. Louis , a school district and its superintendent challenged section 1B-20 of the School District Financial Oversight Panel and Emergency Financial Assistance Law (Emergency Financial Assistance Law) ( 105 ILCS 5/1B-20 (West 1994) ). Upon certification that a local school district was in financial difficulty, the Emergency Financial Assistance Law in part allowed the State Board of Education to convene a panel to approve or reject local school board contracts. East St. Louis , 178 Ill. 2d at 404, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050. The panel also had the authority to remove locally elected school board members if they refused to comply with a valid order from the panel. Id. at 405, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050. The school board voted to approve the renewal of the superintendent's contract, but the panel ordered the school district not to renew the contract. Id. When the school board members refused to comply, the panel removed the elected school board members. Id. The circuit court ruled that section 1B-20 of the Emergency Financial Assistance Law was unconstitutional because it "violated substantive and procedural due process and that it impinged on the right to vote." Id. at 406-07, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050. Our supreme court reversed. The court rejected the superintendent's reliance on Tully that section 1B-20 unconstitutionally infringed on the right to vote because section 1B20 was enacted before the current school board members were elected. Id. at 414-15, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050.

¶ 25 Here, defendant reads Tully and East St. Louis too broadly when he asserts that those cases recognize a "right" to run for elective office that might be preserved or restored by section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections because neither case acknowledges such a right. Both of those cases considered whether legislation infringed on voters' fundamental right to vote by removing validly elected officials from office, and examined, in part, a validly elected official's right to maintain office once elected. Tully stands for the proposition that "post-hoc" legislation that attempts to remove elected officials from office by changing an elective office to an appointive office infringes on the voters' fundamental and constitutionally protected suffrage rights. East St. Louis refused to extend the rationale in Tully to situations where the complained-of legislation was in effect at the time that the officials were elected. East St. Louis also acknowledged that, "The legislature has the discretion to formulate the character, function, and duties of school boards," ( East St. Louis , 178 Ill. 2d at 413-14, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050 ), and that "the powers of municipal corporations 'may be enlarged, diminished, modified or revoked * * * at the pleasure of the legislature' " ( id. at 414, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050 (citing People ex rel. Taylor v. Camargo School District , 313 Ill. 321, 324, 145 N.E. 154 (1924) ). Neither Tully nor East St. Louis addressed whether the legislature may properly limit an individual's eligibility for elective municipal office. Nor does either case stand for the proposition that there is a "right" to run for municipal office that is not lost by or is restored to convicted felons by operation of section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections.

¶ 26 Defendant's reliance on United States v. McKinley , 23 F.3d 181 (7th Cir. 1994), United States v. Williams , 128 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 1997), and Gillaum , 372 F.3d 848, is also misplaced. He reads those cases out of context, and none of those federal cases conclude that Illinois recognizes a "right" to run for elective municipal office that is neither lost by, nor is restored to, all persons with felony convictions. In McKinley , Williams , and Gillaum , the defendants had prior state felony convictions that they argued should not be considered for the purposes of either federal prosecution as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, ( McKinley , 23 F.3d at 183-84 ), or sentencing as an "armed career criminal," ( Williams , 128 F.3d at 1134-35 ; Gillaum , 372 F.3d at 859-62 ). In each case, the court of appeals examined whether there were state laws that "substantially restored" the defendants' preconviction rights, or whether the state continued to withhold some preconviction rights, and examined the interplay between state laws and a federal law that provided, "Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter * * *." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (1994). McKinley concluded that Indiana law precluded a felon from holding elective office and used prior felony convictions for the purposes of state recidivist statutes, ( McKinley , 23 F.3d at 183-84 ); Williams concluded that Missouri law prohibited convicted felons from holding the office of sheriff or serving as highway patrolmen, ( Williams , 128 F.3d at 1135 ); and Gillaum concluded that Illinois law contained a prohibition on the possession of a firearm by a felon, ( Gillaum , 372 F.3d at 861 (citing 735 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2004) ). The federal court of appeals therefore reasoned that, in each case, the defendants' civil rights were not substantially restored for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).

¶ 27 Nothing in these federal decisions amounts to a holding that a convicted felon's restoration of civil rights under section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections prohibits the legislature from establishing qualifications for holding a municipal office. Gillaum acknowledged that in Illinois, "a criminal defendant's rights to vote and hold office are automatically restored to him at the completion of his prison sentence." 372 F.3d at 861 (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-5-5(b), (c) (West 2004) ). Gillaum also noted that, "by virtue of his conviction, a criminal defendant loses no other civil rights, with the exception to hold licenses to engage in certain occupations and the right to hold public employment after conviction of certain election-related offenses." Id. (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-5-5(b) (West 2004) ). But as the discussion above makes clear, Gillaum considered whether Illinois law substantially restored the criminal defendant's rights under Illinois law for the purpose of avoiding an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), not whether a convicted felon has the "right" to hold elective municipal office. We find that here, the federal case law cited does not adequately support defendant's argument that there is a "civil right" to hold elective municipal office that is not lost by or is restored to a convicted felon by operation of section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections.

¶ 28 Furthermore, defendant does not advance any argument that section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code is ambiguous such that we must construe section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code in pari materia with section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections. See Pappas , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 790, 224 Ill.Dec. 274, 681 N.E.2d 589 (finding that section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code is not ambiguous). We conclude, as we did in Pappas , that there is no conflict between section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections and section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Municipal Code. We note that our legislature has amended section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code on eight occasions since our decision in Pappas , and it has not amended the language of section 3.1-10-5(b) to allow persons "convicted in any court located in the United States of any infamous crime, bribery, perjury, of other felony" to be eligible for elective municipal office. We conclude that the circuit court properly found that the plain language of section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code controls whether defendant was ineligible to take the oath of office for the office of Mayor of the City of Markham.

¶ 29 In sum, we are not persuaded by defendant's arguments that our supreme court's decisions in Tully and East St. Louis , together with the decisions in McKinley , Williams , and Gillaum , establish that, by operation of section 5-5-5(a) of the Code of Corrections, a convicted felon's "right" to hold municipal elective office is not lost or is restored.

¶ 30 II. Constitutional Challenges

¶ 31 Defendant next contends that the Conviction Statutes, "as applied to [him] and those similarly situated [v]oters of the City of Markham," violates article III, sections 1, 3, and 4 of the Illinois Constitution. He contends that the Conviction Statutes violate voters' voting rights, and violate the principles that elections must be free and equal and that laws governing voter registration and the conduct of elections must be general and uniform under article III, sections 1, 3, and 4 of the Illinois constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, §§ 1, 3, 4 ). He further argues that the Conviction Statutes, as applied to him, violate his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, ( U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV ), as well as article I, sections 2 and 4 of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 4 ).

¶ 32 "An 'as-applied' challenge requires a party to show that the statute violates the constitution as the statute applies to him." In re Deshawn G. , 2015 IL App (1st) 143316, ¶ 59, 396 Ill.Dec. 877, 40 N.E.3d 762 (citing People v. Brady , 369 Ill. App. 3d 836, 847, 308 Ill.Dec. 356, 861 N.E.2d 687 (2007) ). "Reviewing courts have a duty to construe a statute to preserve its constitutionality whenever reasonably possible." Bartlow v. Costigan , 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 18, 383 Ill.Dec. 95, 13 N.E.3d 1216 (citing People v. Masterson , 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 23, 354 Ill.Dec. 754, 958 N.E.2d 686 ). Statutes "are presumed constitutional, and the challenging party has the burden to prove the statute is unconstitutional." Bartlow , 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 18, 383 Ill.Dec. 95, 13 N.E.3d 1216. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo . Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 22, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570.

¶ 33 A. The Right to Vote

¶ 34 First, defendant argues that voters of the City of Markham were given "significant, widespread, and nearly constant opportunity to scrutinize all candidates * * * including [d]efendant's record." He argues that plaintiff's challenge to his ability to hold office "nullif[ies] the votes cast by the people of Markham," which affects their voting rights. He relies on Tully to argue that this case involves "the 'post-hoc' nullification of votes and disqualification of the duly elected Mayor of the City of Markham * * * after the ballots have been cast." Defendant further relies on Tully to assert that the Conviction Statutes operate to impair his and similarly situated voters' fundamental right to vote and that we must therefore apply strict scrutiny.

¶ 35 First, we reject defendant's contention that this case involves the disqualification of a "duly elected" municipal official. As discussed above, defendant's felony conviction of an infamous crime rendered him ineligible to hold municipal office, and his eligibility did not change simply because he received more votes than anyone else. Defendant cites no authority to support the proposition that receiving more votes than any other candidate somehow made him eligible to hold municipal office.

¶ 36 Furthermore, defendant's characterization of the circuit court's order as a "post-hoc" nullification of the voters' right to vote is incorrect. While it is true that plaintiff's complaint, and the circuit court's determination that defendant was ineligible to hold elective municipal office, occurred after the election-or "postelection"-the bases of defendant's ineligibility are the Conviction Statutes, which were in effect well before defendant decided to run for office and well before defendant pleaded guilty to felony mail fraud. Tully 's discussion of "post-hoc" nullification related to the Governor's attempt to remove elected officials through legislation that was enacted during the elected officials' terms. In other words, the legislation-not the removal of the official-was "post-hoc," and the legislation unconstitutionally impaired the voters' fundamental rights to vote. Tully , 171 Ill. 2d at 307, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43 ("The vote cast by a citizen is not simply diluted, but is totally nullified by the statutory scheme."). But as our supreme court made clear in East St. Louis -which defendant fails to meaningfully acknowledge-the fundamental right to vote is not implicated when the legislative provisions relied on to remove an elected municipal official were in effect at the time the official took office. East St. Louis , 178 Ill. 2d at 414-15, 227 Ill.Dec. 568, 687 N.E.2d 1050. The situation before us is more analogous to East St. Louis than it is to Tully because the Conviction Statutes were in effect before and at the time of the April 4, 2017, consolidated election and operate to bar convicted felons from holding municipal office. Therefore, defendant's "as applied" challenge to the Conviction Statutes on the basis that the statutes deprived voters of their fundamental right to vote fails.

¶ 37 B. Uniformity of Election Laws

¶ 38 Defendant next argues that laws that "apply to invalidate and quash the election of a mayoral candidate but would have no effect on a gubernatorial or state senate election" violate article III, section 4 of the Illinois constitution, which provides:

"The General Assembly by law shall define permanent residence for voting purposes, insure secrecy of voting and the integrity of the election process, and facilitate registration and voting by all qualified persons. Laws governing voter registration and conduct of elections shall be general and uniform." Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 4.

Defendant, however, fails to cite to any authority to support his contention that statutes regulating eligibility for municipal office somehow affect the uniformity of how elections are conducted. Defendant has therefore forfeited this argument and it warrants no further consideration. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2017) (an appellant's brief must contain "the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. * * * Points not argued are waived * * *.").

¶ 39 C. Free and Equal Elections

¶ 40 Defendant does not advance any argument in support of his nominal contention that the Conviction Statutes violate article III, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution's guarantee that "All elections shall be free and equal." Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 3. He has therefore forfeited any such argument. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7).

¶ 41 D. Equal Protection

¶ 42 Defendant next argues the Conviction Statutes violate his and the similarly situated voters of Markham's rights by imposing different restrictions on constitutional officers than on municipal officers in violation of the equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment under the federal constitution ( U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ), and article I, section 2 of the Illinois constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ). Defendant relies on our supreme court's statement in Tully that "legislation that affects any stage of the election process implicates the right to vote." (Emphasis in original.) Tully , 171 Ill. 2d at 307, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43.

¶ 43 In People v. Hofer , 363 Ill. App. 3d 719, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460 (2006), we considered and rejected a similar equal protection challenge. There, the defendant was elected to the office of president of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Sorrento. Id. at 720, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460. The State filed a quo warranto complaint seeking the defendant's removal pursuant to section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code based on his prior felony conviction for driving while license revoked. Id. The defendant argued that section 3.1-10-5 violated his equal protection rights and the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. Id. On appeal, we examined the defendant's equal protection challenge under the rational basis standard because

"the right to run for a statutorily created office and the right to serve in that office have not been found to be absolute or fundamental rights, [citations], and because this case does not fall within the types of cases where the challenged classification imposes burdens on new political parties or where ballot access is dependent on a person's economic means." Id. at 722, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460.

We found that the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions, as well as the Conviction Statutes, "were established to ensure public confidence in the honesty and integrity of those serving in state and local offices." Id. at 723, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460 (citing People ex rel. Ryan , 64 Ill. App. 3d at 811-12, 21 Ill.Dec. 543, 381 N.E.2d 990 ). We observed "that the opportunities and the means to scrutinize candidates for municipal offices and to oversee the activities of those elected are significantly less than the opportunities for scrutiny and oversight of those who run for and serve in constitutional offices." Id. at 724, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460. Elected officials make important fiscal and policy decisions impacting the residents of a municipality. Id. We concluded that "the provision requiring a convicted felon who wants to run for a statutorily created office to establish to the Governor's[ ] satisfaction that he has rehabilitated himself and is worthy of the public trust is neither arbitrary nor irrational." Id.

¶ 44 In Parker v. Lyons , 757 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2014), the federal court of appeals addressed a similar equal protection challenge to section 29-15 of the Election Code. There, the Peoria State's Attorney filed a quo warranto complaint in state court to block Parker's candidacy for a seat on a local school board. Id. at 704. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the State and Parker appealed. Id. at 705. While his appeal was pending in state court, Parker filed suit in federal district court, asserting in part that the State's quo warranto action violated his equal protection rights. Id. The district court dismissed all of Parker's claims and he appealed. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction over Parker's claims, but rejected his facial challenge to section 29-15 of the Election Code on equal protection grounds, observing that the right to run for or hold public office is neither a fundamental right nor are convicted felons a suspect class. Id. at 707. The federal court of appeals cited Hofer in support of its finding that Illinois has an interest in "ensuring public confidence in the honesty and integrity of those serving in state and local offices." Id. (citing Hofer , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 723, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460 ). Furthermore, even assuming that heightened scrutiny applied to Parker's equal protection claim, it would still fail because the Supreme Court had held that states may deprive convicted felons of their fundamental right to vote. Id. (citing Richardson v. Ramirez , 418 U.S. 24, 56, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974), and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board , 553 U.S. 181, 210, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) ).

¶ 45 Here, defendant contends that Hofer and Parker both involved facial challenges as opposed to an "as applied" challenge, and that the State's proffered government interests in Hofer are not present here. He argues that his felony conviction was not a secret, that he was heavily attacked by his opponents in the election, and that the voters of Markham had ample opportunity to scrutinize his record. In effect, he argues that local voters can overcome established law and elect otherwise ineligible candidates to a municipal office, a novel but unsupported contention. But even accepting defendant's contention that the State's legitimate interests here were somewhat diminished where the voters of Markham were fully apprised of defendant's felony conviction, he offers nothing to counter Hofer 's finding that municipal officers are subject to less oversight while in office than constitutional officers. The State still has an important interest in protecting the integrity of elective municipal offices and may do so by enacting legislation that prohibits convicted felons from holding such offices.

¶ 46 We also find instructive our supreme court's decisions in Bryant v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago , 224 Ill. 2d 473, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 (2007), and Delgado v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago , 224 Ill. 2d 481, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183 (2007). In those cases, candidates with felony convictions filed nomination petitions for election as aldermen in Chicago. Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 474, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 482, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183. Objectors challenged the nomination petitions, arguing that section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code barred the candidates from holding municipal office. Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 475, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 484, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183. The electoral board declared section 3.110-5 unconstitutional, ( Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 475, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 484, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183 ), and the Cook County circuit court affirmed ( Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 473, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 481, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183 ). Objectors filed direct appeals to the supreme court. The supreme court observed that the electoral board had no authority to declare section 3.1-10-5 unconstitutional and explained that, on that basis, the circuit court should have declared the electoral board decision to be void. Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 476-77, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 485-86, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183. Additionally, the supreme court observed that the circuit court was bound to follow the decision in Hofer , which had rejected similar equal protection challenges to section 3.1-10-5, and therefore the circuit court had no proper basis for finding equal protection violations. Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 478-79, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 487-88, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183. The supreme court dismissed the direct appeals and entered supervisory orders directing the circuit court to vacate the electoral board's decisions and declare the candidates ineligible for municipal office under section 3.1-10-5 of the Municipal Code. Bryant , 224 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 309 Ill.Dec. 826, 865 N.E.2d 189 ; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 489, 309 Ill.Dec. 820, 865 N.E.2d 183. Our supreme court's recognition of Hofer lends additional credibility to Hofer 's finding that the State has an important interest in protecting the integrity of elective municipal offices by declaring convicted felons ineligible to hold elective municipal office.

¶ 47 Here, we find that defendant's equal protection claims must fail because there is a rational relationship between section 29-15 of the Election Code and the State's interest in protecting the integrity of elective municipal offices.

¶ 48 E. Free Speech

¶ 49 Finally, defendant contends that the Conviction Statutes violate his and the voters of Markham's rights to free speech under the first amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution. He argues that the Conviction Statutes operate "to deny [him] ballot access and his * * * rights to freely associate with potential voters * * * for the purposes of advancing ideas and political expression." Defendant characterizes the application of the Conviction Statutes as an " 'after the fact' attempt to freeze [his] ability to participate in municipal politics." Defendant relies primarily on Lee v. Keith , 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006), Krislov v. Rednour , 226 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2000), and Dempsey v. Johnson , 2016 IL App (1st) 153377, 410 Ill.Dec. 11, 69 N.E.3d 236, in support of his arguments.

¶ 50 Defendant's free speech arguments are poorly developed and he cites no authority to support his contention that the Conviction Statutes act as a "hurdle" to his exercise of his right to engage in political association. Instead, he relies on cases involving procedural requirements for getting on the ballot. See Lee , 463 F.3d at 772 (finding that the combined effect of filing deadlines and signature requirements for independent General Assembly candidates severely burdened the candidates' rights to access the ballot); see also Krislov , 226 F.3d at 862 (finding that an Illinois law requiring signature gatherers to be registered voters and to be registered in the political subdivision violated the first amendment because it made it more difficult for the candidates to disseminate their political views, associate with prospective solicitors for the purpose of eliciting political change, to gain access to the ballot, and to utilize endorsements of their candidacy).

¶ 51 Here, defendant's challenge to the Conviction Statutes bears no resemblance to the ballot access barriers addressed in Lee and Krislov . Those cases involve state statutes regulating the manner in which a candidate seeks a place on the ballot, but did not involve an examination of whether a state law affecting a candidate's eligibility to hold an elective municipal office implicates the right to free association.

¶ 52 Defendant's reliance on Dempsey is similarly misplaced. He relies on Dempsey for the principle that signature gathering, associating as an independent candidate, and engaging in political activity by running for public office are constitutionally protected activities. Dempsey , 2016 IL App (1st) 153377, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 11, 69 N.E.3d 236. But Dempsey had nothing to do with candidate eligibility, and instead involved a first amendment retaliation claim. There, the plaintiff was an independent candidate for the office of the village president, and alleged that the defendant village clerk assisted the plaintiff's opponent in formulating a challenge to the plaintiff's candidacy. Id. ¶¶ 23. That challenge came before an electoral board-on which the defendant sat-and the plaintiff's name was removed from the ballot. Id. ¶ 4. The circuit court, however, reversed the electoral board and reinstated the plaintiff's name to the ballot. Id. ¶ 5. The night before the election, the defendant allegedly disseminated a prerecorded message-in which she identified herself as the village clerk-to all of the registered voters in the village, falsely stating that the plaintiff was not a legitimate candidate, that she had been officially removed from the ballot, and that any votes cast in her favor would be a lost vote. Id. ¶ 6. The plaintiff lost the election and sued the defendant asserting that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of her right to freedom of association by retaliating against the plaintiff due to her political affiliation. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. We reversed the circuit court's section 2-615 dismissal of the plaintiff's retaliation claim, finding in part that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that she was engaged in freedom of association activities by associating as an independent candidate and running for public office. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

¶ 53 Here, defendant makes no effort to analogize his situation to Lee , Krislov , or Dempsey . He simply advances our statement in Dempsey that signature gathering, associating as an independent candidate, and engaging in political activity by running for public office are constitutionally protected activities, and he relies on federal cases involving procedural ballot access issues to make the sweeping claim that barring convicted felons from holding municipal office impairs their right to free association. This undeveloped argument does not persuade us that defendant has met his burden to clearly show that the application of the Conviction Statutes "as applied" to him unconstitutionally impairs his right to freely associate. See People v. Wilson , 214 Ill. 2d 394, 398-99, 292 Ill.Dec. 887, 827 N.E.2d 416 (2005) ("All statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation."). We therefore reject defendant's argument that the Conviction Statutes infringe on his constitutional right to free association.

¶ 54 CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 56 Affirmed.

Justices Harris and Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Under section 124-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure), an infamous crime was defined as:
      "the offenses of arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary, deviate sexual assault, forgery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent liberties with a child, kidnaping or aggravated kidnaping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sale of narcotic drugs, subornation of perjury, and theft if the punishment imposed is imprisonment in the penitentiary."Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, ¶ 124-1 (repealed by Pub. Act 84-1047, § 2 (eff. July 1, 1986) ).
      "[C]ourts reviewing section 29-15 of the Election Code subsequent to the repeal of section 124-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have continued to apply its definition of the term 'infamous crime.' " Alvarez v. Williams , 2014 IL App (1st) 133443, ¶ 10 [387 Ill.Dec. 852, 23 N.E.3d 544]. Here, defendant does not argue on appeal that felony mail fraud is not an "infamous crime." As the circuit court noted in its written order, "Felony fraud offenses clearly implicate issues of common honesty and decency, and therefore constitute 'infamous crimes' as long defined under Illinois law." See People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane , 13 Ill. 2d 520, 534 [150 N.E.2d 168] (1958) ; People ex rel. Symonds v. Gualano , 97 Ill. App. 2d 248 [240 N.E.2d 467] (1968).

      The defendant in People ex rel. Ryan had a state felony conviction, and the Governor of Illinois has the power to pardon persons convicted of state crimes. Here, defendant has a federal felony conviction, and only the President of the United States has the power to pardon persons convicted of federal crimes. See U.S. Const., art. II, § 3.