author: PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip Lamont MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-5015
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    FILED May 2, 2017

      Julia L. O’Connell, Federal Public Defender, and Barry L. Derryberry, Research and Writing Specialist, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Danny C. Williams, Sr., United States Attorney, and Neal C. Hong, Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
   PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

The Fourth Amendment protects the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure but is “reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). After a lawful traffic stop, an officer has authority to order the driver and passengers from the car. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). Here, we consider whether an officer has authority to order a person to step off his bicycle after a lawful traffic stop. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the officer had that authority.

BACKGROUND

On September 28, 2013 at about 10:30 p.m., Officer Brent Barnhart was patrolling a high-crime area in Tulsa, Oklahoma, when he saw a man riding a bicycle against traffic and not using a bicycle headlight, in violation of Tulsa’s traffic law. Unknown to Officer Barnhart, the bicyclist was Phillip Lamont Morgan, who had a string of felony convictions: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, (2) accessory after the fact to first-degree murder, (3)' unlawful possession of a controlled drug, and (4) unlawful possession with intent to distribute a controlled drug.

Upon approaching Morgan, Officer Barnhart saw him “making movements towards his pant pockets.” R. Vol. 2 at 44. Officer Barnhart told Morgan to keep his hands out of his pockets. Then Officer Barnhart asked Morgan for identification. Morgan replied that he had done nothing wrong and had no identification. Officer Barnhart asked for Morgan’s personal identifiers, and Morgan gave a name (Stanford Wallace), a birthdate, and a social security number. Before returning to his patrol car to run Morgan’s personal identifiers through databases, Officer Barnhart again told Morgan to keep his hands outside his pockets.

After Officer Barnhart ran the name Stanford Wallace, the birthdate, and the social security number through the databases, he received back a “no result” response, which led him to suspect that Morgan had lied about his identity. Id. at 23. A “no result” response means that no match exists for the information entered. Id. In contrast, a “negative result” response means that a traceable record exists (such as an ID card or a driver’s license) and that the suspect had no outstanding warrants or criminal history.

From the outset, Officer Barnhart believed that Morgan was acting evasively. In particular, he noted that as Morgan sat on his bicycle, he kept his head and body straight forward, not making eye contact. Based on the way Morgan kept moving his head back and forth, Officer Barnhart feared that Morgan might flee. Based on all he had seen and heard, Officer Barn-hart believed that Morgan was trying “to hide criminal activity.” Id. at 23-24.

After Morgan’s information produced no results, Officer Barnhart called for backup, reapproached Morgan, and asked him to step off his bicycle. After Morgan refused, Officer Barnhart warned him that “if he didn’t step off the bicycle, ... he would be tased.” Id. at 25. Morgan responded that “he had been tased before and he was currently in a lawsuit with the City of Tulsa over that incident.” Id. This strengthened Officer Barnhart’s suspicion that Morgan had provided false information, because he believed that the record check would have revealed this earlier incident.

Officer Barnhart’s backups arrived quickly. Officer Barnhart told Morgan to step off his bicycle, and again, Morgan refused. But this time, Morgan reached toward and inside his left front pants pocket. Officer Barnhart immediately grabbed Morgan’s left arm, fearing that Morgan might grab a concealed weapon. In trying to control Morgan’s hands, Officer Barn-hart and other officers forced Morgan to the ground. Once on the ground, Morgan planted his arms under his stomach, preventing the officers from handcuffing him. After Morgan ignored the officers’ commands to show his hands, an officer ta-sered him, enabling the officers to handcuff him.

After the officers handcuffed Morgan, Officer Barnhart frisked him for weapons and found a loaded .38-caliber revolver in Morgan’s left front pants pocket. Officers transported Morgan to the station, where they identified him by his fingerprints as Phillip Lamont Morgan.

A grand jury sitting in the Northern District of Oklahoma returned an indictment charging Morgan with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, Morgan moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that Officer Barnhart had exceeded the scope of the traffic stop by ordering him off his bicycle and by taking him to the ground and ta-sering him. After a hearing, a magistrate judge recommended denying Morgan’s suppression motion. Over Morgan’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation.

A jury convicted Morgan of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Morgan to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment. Morgan now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.

DISCUSSION

When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732, 741 (10th Cir. 2011). “[T]he ultimate determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id.

“Although traffic stops are often brief, they are nonetheless ‘seizures’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 945 (10th Cir. 2009). But because a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, such stops are analyzed under the standards announced for investigative detentions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005). Under these standards, we first ask whether Officer Barnhart’s actions were “justified at ... inception.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, we consider whether Officer Barnhart’s actions were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the traffic stop was justified at its inception. “[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articula-ble suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995). And Morgan doesn’t dispute that Officer Barnhart saw him violate Tulsa’s traffic laws by riding his bicycle against traffic and failing to use a headlight in the dark.

This leaves Morgan the second part of the analysis. Morgan argues that the officers exceeded the scope of the stop by doing more than issuing a citation and checking for outstanding arrest warrants. In particular, he complains that the officers ordered him to get off his bicycle and ended up taking him to the ground and then tasering him. For the reasons given below, we hold that the officers acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment.

A

Morgan concedes that in an ordinary traffic stop, officers may issue a citation, request a driver’s license, and determine whether outstanding warrants exist. But because Oklahoma law does not require Morgan to have a driver’s license to ride his bicycle, Morgan argues that Officer Barnhart could not ask to see identification. From this, Morgan claims that Officer Barnhart exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop, which, he says, is limited to issuing a citation and running a background check. He contends that Officer Barnhart exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by asking for identification and by ordering him to get off his bicycle. We disagree.

First, Officer Barnhart’s request for identification didn’t exceed the scope of the traffic stop. See United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 2007). Courts have long recognized that “questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part” of police investigations. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004). “Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.” Id. Thus, as part of the lawful stop, the Fourth Amendment authorized Officer Barnhart to determine Morgan’s identity, to run a background check, and to issue a citation.

Here, Morgan doesn’t dispute that Officer Barnhart could detain him as long as necessary to write a citation and.run a background check. But to do so, Officer Barnhart needed to determine Morgan’s identity. When Morgan gave a false name, he delayed the officer’s ability to learn his true identity. In that situation, Officer Barnhart could not immediately write a citation and complete the stop. Thus, Morgan himself extended the stop. Officer Barnhart didn’t exceed its scope by trying to determine Morgan’s identity.

Second, Morgan argues that Officer Barnhart exceeded the scope of the traffic stop by ordering him to get off his bicycle. At the outset, we note one significant difference between Morgan and the defendants in the cases he cites. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) and Wilson, the defendants complied with the officers’ orders to get out of the car, resulting in an incremental increase in their seizures. In contrast, Morgan disobeyed Officer Barn-hart’s order to get off his bicycle. Morgan cites no cases concluding that officers violate the Fourth Amendment during an otherwise-lawful seizure when they order a suspect to do something, and the suspect does not comply.

Further, even had Morgan complied and stepped off his bicycle, he still could not show that Officer Barnhart violated his Fourth Amendment rights. “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Reasonableness depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may, as a matter of course, order a driver of a lawfully stopped car to get out of it. Id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330. The Court explained that this additional intrusion is “de minimis” because “[t]he driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed.” Id. In Wilson, the Supreme Court extended Mimms to passengers in lawfully stopped automobiles. 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 882.

Here, we see little difference between Officer Barnhart’s ordering Morgan off his bicycle and an officer’s asking a driver to step out of an automobile. In fact, in our view, stepping off a bicycle is less intrusive than stepping out of a car. Morgan argues that Officer Barnhart was unjustified in ordering him off the bicycle because Officer Barnhart could already see him. But consistent with Mimms, Officer Barnhart’s ordering Morgan off his bicycle was “at most a mere inconvenience.” Id. And we conclude that public-interest concerns outweighed any personal-liberty intrusion or inconvenience. After all, Officer Barnhart had reason to believe Morgan posed a flight risk on his bicycle. We cannot fault the police for trying to minimize flight risks and the safety concerns that flight and pursuit would entail. Thus, we conclude that after lawfully stopping Morgan, Officer Barnhart did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ordering him to get off the bicycle.

Next, Morgan argues that the officers exceeded the scope of the stop by grabbing him, forcing him to the ground, and tasering him. Morgan argues that these acts transformed his seizure into an arrest without probable cause. But after making lawful stops, officers can use force “to the extent that ‘such steps are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo.’ ” United States v. Mosley, 743 F.3d 1317, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007)). In view of the circumstances, once Morgan disobeyed earlier commands and reached inside his left front pants pocket, the officers acted reasonably to protect their personal safety. In analyzing whether the officers acted reasonably, we apply an objective standard and ask whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... ‘[would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996)). If so, officers may protect their safety with appropriate force, including “drawing their weapons, placing a suspect in handcuffs, or forcing a suspect to the ground.” Mosley, 743 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Novitsky, 491 F.3d at 1254) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In United States v. Hood, 774 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2014), we rejected a defendant’s argument that a stop became an arrest without probable cause when officers handcuffed and frisked him. Id. at 642-43. Officers encountered Hood at an apartment complex while they were investigating a string of burglaries. Id. at 641. As the officers walked back toward the apartment complex from the parking lot, a resident shouted to them that someone, later identified as Hood, was running from the apartment they were investigating. Id. Officers chased Hood until they found him in the complex. Id. Though it was unseasonably warm, Hood was wearing a winter jacket. Id. As Hood frantically fumbled for something in his jacket, the officers drew their firearms and ordered him to the ground. Id. Once lying on the ground, Hood appeared to be grasping for something beneath him. Id. The officers handcuffed and frisked him. Id. During the frisk, they found a 9mm pistol in his jacket pocket. Id. at 641-42. Like Morgan, Hood sought to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that by ordering him to the ground, the officers exceeded the scope of the stop and transformed the stop into an arrest without probable cause. Id. at 642.

We rejected Hood’s argument after concluding that safety concerns fully justified the officers in drawing their firearms, ordering Hood to the ground, and handcuffing and frisking him to protect their safety. Id. at 643-44. Here, Officer Barnhart stopped Morgan in a high-crime area. When asked to get off his bicycle, Morgan refused twice. And despite Officer Barn-hart’s orders to keep his hands out of his pockets, Morgan reached inside his left front pants pocket. These actions reasonably caused the officers to believe he might be reaching for a weapon.

Under these circumstances, and consistent with Hood, we conclude that the officers were justified in physically forcing Morgan to the ground to protect their own safety. And once Morgan refused to comply with the officers’ orders to remove his hands from beneath him, the officers were justified in tasering Morgan to handcuff him. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Morgan’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Morgan’s motion to suppress.

       After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is 'therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

      . See Tulsa Revised Traffic Code, tit. 37, § 1003(A) ("Every person operating a bicycle ... upon a roadway ... shall ride as close as is safe to the right-hand curb or edge... Tulsa Revised Traffic Code, tit. 37, § 1010 ("Every bicycle ... or person operating a bicycle ... which is used at night shall be equipped with a lamp on the front which shall emit a white light ... to be visible from a distance of at least five hundred (500) feet to the front....”).

      . Though we overruled a separate holding in Hood in United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2017), Hood remains in force for the proposition cited.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LUCERO, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    David F. BANDIMERE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent. Ironridge Global IV, Ltd; Ironridge Global Partners, LLC, Amici Curiae.
    No. 15-9586
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    FILED May 3, 2017
    David A. Zisser, Jones & Keller, Denver, CO, for Petitioner.
    Daniel J. Aguilar, Megan Barbero, Mark R. Freeman, Melissa N. Patterson, Mark B. Stern, Tyce R. Walters, U.S. Department of Justice, Michael Andrew Conley, Brent J. Fields, Dominick V. Freda, Esq., Lisa Kinney Helvin, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Paul D. Clement, Jeffrey Matthew Harris, Christopher George Michel, Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae Ironridge Global IV, Ltd and Ironridge Global Partners, LLC.
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, KELLY, BRISCOE, LUCERO, HARTZ, HOLMES, MATHESON, BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, MCHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER

This matter is before the court on the Security and Exchange Commission’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc. We also have a response from the petitioner. Upon consideration, the request for panel rehearing is denied by a majority of the original panel members.

The petition and response were also transmitted to all the judges of the court who are in regular active service. Upon that circulation, a poll was called. A majority voted to deny en banc reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). Consequently, the en banc request is likewise denied.

Judges Lucero and Moritz voted to grant en banc rehearing. Judge Lucero has written separately in dissent, in which Judge Moritz joins.

LUCERO, J.,

joined by MORITZ, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc.

Because this request for rehearing en banc presents numerous questions of constitutional importance, it is my view that we should rehear the matter. First, the panel majority opinion fails to accord proper deference to the constitutional structure of checks and balances and agency separation of functions that flow from that fundamental construct. Second, the panel decision needlessly and improvidently expands the reach of Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991), which involved judges on the Tax Court, to the unrelated issue of agency administrative law judges (“ALJs”). In light of the significant consequences of this decision, it is not our office to expand the holding in Freytag, to the contrary, any such expansion should remain in the sole discretion of the Supreme Court. Third, the impact of this opinion will be substantial, and it presents a threat of disruption throughout our government. Finally, the majority opinion fails to respect the carefully crafted procedural protections that are incorporated in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), an essential condition of the congressional delegation of authority to administrative agencies.

For each of these reasons, en banc review is not only appropriate, but necessary. That the Supreme Court may ultimately review this case does not relieve us of our independent obligation to rehear it. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial of en banc review.

I

As James Madison observed, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). To prevent the tyranny against which Madison admonished, the founders crafted a constitutional division of authority among three co-equal branches of government, controlled by a series of checks and balances. The panel opinion in this ease not only veers away from that constitutional structure, it aggregates power in administrative agency officials contrary to this Madisonian principle.

In the face of a rapidly growing and largely unregulated body of administrative law during the first half of the twentieth century, and concerns about the commingling of functions within administrative agencies, Congress enacted the APA, which provides governing principles. As observed by Senator Pat McCarran in the foreword to the APA’s compiled legislative history, the Act was celebrated as “a comprehensive charter of private liberty and a solemn undertaking of official fairness” that “enunciates and emphasizes the tripartite form of our democracy.” Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History, at iii (1946).

The need to maintain separation of functions was felt particularly in the area of agency adjudication, and a significant concern motivating the drafters of the APA was the perceived bias of administrative adjudicators. “Many complaints were voiced against the actions of the hearing examiners, it being charged that they were mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations.” Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131, 73 S.Ct. 570, 97 L.Ed. 872 (1953). Prior to the APA, hearing examiners were “employees of an agency, their classification was determined by the ratings given them by the agency, and their compensation and promotion depended upon their classification.” Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 130, 73 S.Ct. 570. Accordingly, “[t]he examiners were in a dependent status.” Id As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935).

A 1937 Report of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management cogently articulates the concerns:

There is a conflict of principle involved in [the agencies’] make-up and functions. They are vested with duties of administration and at the same time they are given important judicial work. The evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious and far reaching. Pressures and influences properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these subversive influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings with the Commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself.

S. Rep. No. 79-752 (1945), as reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History 189 (quotation and ellipses omitted). In light of these concerns, the APA authors adopted the view that the “commingling of functions of investigation or advocacy with the function of deciding [was] plainly undesirable” and should be remedied by “isolating those who engage in the activity” of adjudication via independent hearing officers. S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., Rep. on Admin. Procedure Act (Comm. Print 1945), as reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History 25 (quotation and ellipses omitted).

The majority opinion undermines this well-established structure of ALJ independence, and places the legitimacy of our administrative agencies in serious doubt. Whether SEC ALJs exercise the “significant authority” necessary to constitute inferior officers, Bandimere v. U.S. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2016), should be informed not just by their daily duties, but by the independent guardrails of our constitutional structure, to wit, the separation of functions within administrative agencies. The majority opinion notes that the Appointments Clause reflects “both separation of powers and checks and balances” concerns, and “promotes public accountability.” Id. at 1172. But my respected colleagues in the majority fail to appreciate that these are the very principles embodied in the current structure and process governing selection of ALJs.

II

In light of the very real and substantial consequences, labeling SEC ALJs “inferior officers” for the first time in the near-century of their existence should not be done without a clear mandate from the Supreme Court. As demonstrated by the dissenting panel opinion, any such mandate is far from clear.

The Supreme Court case at the heart of this dispute involved special trial judges of the Tax Court, an Article I court, and it did not consider administrative agencies or ALJs. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870, 111 S.Ct. 2631. Thus, the majority opinion greatly expands the reach of that decision by equating those Article I judges with ALJs, intermediate hearing officers adjudicating cases for further agency disposition. The many specific bases for distinguishing SEC ALJs from the special trial judges in Freytag are outlined in detail in the dissenting panel opinion. See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1194-98 (McKay, J., dissenting). I will not repeat them here, but I emphatically agree with the dissent that it is far from clear Freytag compels a conclusion that SEC ALJs are inferior officers.

Countless cases have been decided in the decades since the structure of regulatory agencies and commissions was first established. Many more have been decided since the Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag. Each of these cases has been decided in the context of the very constitutional provisions at issue in this case, and none has concluded that Freytag should be extended in this manner. As the Supreme Court has advised, “long settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions.” N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2559, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) (alteration omitted). Giving little regard to the longstanding practices implicated in this case, the majority opinion places the legitimacy of our administrative agencies in serious doubt, based on little more than three sentences in a decades-old Supreme Court decision. See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1175-76 (majority opinion) (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82, 111 S.Ct. 2631). I must agree with the dissent that, without a clearer mandate from the Supreme Court, we should “prefer the outcome that does the least mischief.” Id at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting).

Ill

In addition to undermining the constitutional foundations and structure of the SEC, the majority opinion “risks throwing much into confusion,” id. at 1200, and is likely to have a substantial and disruptive impact on the daily functioning of administrative agencies. There are currently over 1,500 ALJs working in at least 28 different federal agencies, presiding over hundreds of thousands of agency adjudications each year. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 586-87, app. C, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 799 (2013). Despite the majority’s best efforts to cabin its decision to SEC ALJs alone, see Bandi-mere, 844 F.3d at 1188 (majority opinion), the majority opinion will undoubtedly cause the legitimacy of all federal ALJs to come under attack. Since the issuance of this decision, we have already seen one emergency request for relief from an SEC administrative enforcement proceeding. Kon v. SEC, No. 17-3066 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (unpublished). It is only a matter of time before we see broader challenges to the validity of agency action.

Consequently, I share the dissent’s concern that the majority opinion will be used to conduct a broader assault on our time-tested administrative system. ALJ insulation from agency control and coercion was a primary goal of the APA. However, a probable consequence of the majority opinion is the loss of ALJ independence and political insulation on multiple levels. In particular, the majority ruling threatens to endanger ALJs’ double for-cause protection. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court determined that “dual for-cause limitations on the removal” of certain inferior officers is unconstitutional. 561 U.S. at 492, 130 S.Ct. 3138. Justice Breyer warned in his dissent that the decision could be extended to ALJs, potentially giving “every losing party before an ALJ ... grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered against him is unconstitutional.” Id. at 536, 542-43, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Free Enterprise Fund majority responded that ALJs are not necessarily inferior officers, thereby providing courts with a clear path to avoid extending its holding to ALJs. See id. at 507 n.10, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (majority opinion). The panel majority opinion eliminates that path and brings us one step closer to realizing Justice Breyer’s concern.

The panel concurrence suggests other potential avenues that courts might use to avoid making ALJs fully subject to the political pressure of agency heads. See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1191 (Briscoe, J., concurring). But on a fundamental level, the consequence of this decision — providing agency heads with the sole power to appoint ALJs of their choosing — threatens the integrity of the ALJ office. Further agency control over ALJs may create an unconstitutional appearance of partiality and implicate serious due process concerns. By pulling on the Appointments Clause thread, the majority opinion threatens to unravel much of our modern regulatory framework. This unraveling is justified on the basis of the discretion enjoyed by ALJs in their day-to-day decisional work. But this fails to recognize that any discretion of the ALJs is subject to final acceptance or review by the agency itself. Any administrative agency discretion exercised by any employee of the agency is always subject to the final decisional discretion vested in the members and heads of agencies.

IV

As described supra, the APA was thoughtfully constructed to ensure maximum independence for ALJs during their decision-making process, thereby providing an administrative separation of functions that mirrors the constitutional separation of powers. To achieve ALJ impartiality and maintain an intra-agency separation of functions, the APA affirmatively separates the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the agency from its formal adjudicatory functions. It provides that “[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). Further, an ALJ may not “be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.” § 554(d)(2). To this end, ALJs are hired through a merit-selection process administered by the Office of Personnel Management, 5 U.S.C. § 1302; 5 C.F.R. § 930.201, and they may be fired only by the Merit Systems Protection Board for good cause, 5 U.S.C. § 7521. Congress enacted these provisions with the express purpose of “rendering] examiners independent and secure in their tenure and compensation.” S. Rep. No. 79-752 (1945), as reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History 215.

At the same time, the Act vests ultimate decisional authority and discretion in the agencies themselves, thereby promoting public accountability. See § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”). In the apt words of the panel dissent, “it is quite clear where the buck stops.” Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1198 (McKay, J., dissenting). The discretion exercised by the governing head of an agency unquestionably trumps any authority exercised by the ALJs, satisfying the policy concerns that motivated the Appointments Clause. Congress’ carefully crafted framework thus neatly threads the needle, ensuring integrity in the decision-making process and political accountability as to its outcome.

The majority opinion undoes much of this constitutional structure by failing to respect Congress’ delegation of authority to agencies, as contemplated by the agencies’ organic acts and the APA, and by scuttling the statutory requirements based on a misreading of Freytag. The APA was a thoughtfully crafted and hard-fought compromise. It-was under consideration for more than ten years, and “no measure of like character has had the painstaking and detailed study and drafting.” H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980 (1946), as reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History 241. Congress considered multiple different and competing proposals before ultimately adopting the procedure now codified in the APA, id., a procedure that has mandated a specific process for the appointment of ALJs for more than seventy years.

That procedure is observed by the securities laws governing the operations of the SEC, which provide that final adjudicative power rests exclusively in the five members of the Commission itself. See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1197 (summarizing the role of SEC ALJs as mandated by 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.360(a)(1), 201.411(a), & 201.400(a)). The role of ALJs within the SEC thus exemplifies the model of administrative adjudication that Congress selected and memorialized in the APA. As discussed supra, Congress made specific and deliberate choices to structure the appointment of ALJs in a constitutionally sound manner. The panel majority pays too little deference to those congressional dictates.

V

The majority opinion will have an overwhelming impact on the fundamental structure of administrative agencies and the administrative process. A case that grapples with such substantial questions of constitutional law and realigns separation of function principles deserves the consideration of our full court.

      . ALJs were previously referred to as "hearing examiners.” See Eifler v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 926 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1991).