source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROTH, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE: LINEAR ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., Debtor Cooper Electric Supply Co. and Samson Electrical Supply Co., Inc., Appellants
    No. 16-1477
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on October 7, 2016
    (Opinion filed: March 30, 2017)

      Michael Nord, Esquire, Michael J. Stafford, Esquire, Nord & DeMaio, 190 State Highway 18, Turnpike Metroplex, Suite 201, East Brunswick, NJ 08816, Counsel for Appellants
    Leonard C. Walczyk, Esquire, Wasser-man, Jurista & Stolz, 110 Allen Road, Suite 304, Basking Ridge, NJ 07920, Counsel for Appellee
    Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
   OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

This ease concerns the relationship between the New Jersey Construction Lien Law and federal bankruptcy law. Under New Jersey law, if a supplier sells materials on credit to a construction contractor and the contractor incorporates those materials into property owned by a third party without paying the supplier, the supplier can file for a lien on the third-party property. In essence, the supplier can step into the shoes of the contractor and collect a debt owed to the contractor from the third-party property owner in order to recoup what the contractor owes to the supplier.

The question this case presents is whether a supplier can file a construction lien under New Jersey law when the contractor has filed a petition for bankruptcy, which automatically stays any act to create or perfect any lien against the contractor’s property. •

The suppliers here argue that the. construction liens did not attach to the eon-tractor’s accounts receivable but attached to the interests of the owners of the third-party properties; thus, creating the liens was not an act against the property of the bankruptcy estate. On the other hand, the contractor contends that the creation of the liens was intended to collect the portion of the accounts receivable owed by the owners of the third-party properties to the contractor so that the creation of the liens was an act against the property of the bankruptcy estate.

The District Court set out in its opinion how, under New Jersey law, the value of the liens depended on the amount that the contractor owed’ to the suppliers under their contracts and on the value of the contractor’s accounts receivable. The District Court then affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that the accounts receivable were part of the bankruptcy estate because they complied with the definition of property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and because the ability of a supplier to create a construction lien depended on the existence of the bankrupt contractor’s accounts receivable. For that reason, the Bankruptcy Court held that the automatic stay prevented filing the liens. Thfe District Court affirmed We agree and will also affirm.

I. Background

A. Statutory Background

In order to understand the events in this case, some review of the New Jersey Construction Lien Law and of bankruptcy law is helpful.

1. New Jersey Construction Lien Law

Under New Jersey law, in general, “[a]ny contractor, subcontractor or supplier who provides work, services, material or equipment pursuant to a contract, shall be entitled to a lien for the value of the work or services performed, or materials or equipment furnished in accordance with the contract and based upon the contract price.... ” As relevant here, “[t]he lien shall attach to the interest of the owner or unit owner of the real property development. .. ,” The lien itself is “limited to the amount that [the owner] agreed in writing to pay, less payments made by or on behalf of that person in good faith prior to the filing of the lien.”

In general, an owner discharges a lien by paying into a lien fund, from which claimants recover what they are owed. A “claimant” is “a person having the right to file a lien claim on real property pursuant to [the Construction Lien Law].” The claimants themselves are split into different tiers. A “first tier claimant” is “a claimant who is a contractor.” A “second tier claimant” is “a claimant who is, in relation to a contractor: (1) a subcontractor; or (2) a supplier.”

Numerous limitations on the lien fund and lien claims exist. As relevant here, “the hen fund shall not exceed: in the case of a first tier lien claimant or second tier lien claimant, the earned amount of the contract between the owner and the contractor minus any payments made prior to service of a copy of the lien claim. In addition, generally, “no lien fund exists, if, at the time of service of a copy of the lien claim, the owner or community association has fully paid the contractor for the work performed or for services, material or equipment provided.” Finally, each claimant’s claim is limited to “the unpaid portion of the contract price of the claimant’s contract for the work, services, material or equipment provided.”

In the allocation process, if there are both first and second tier claimants, the lien fund is allocated to first tier claimants “in amounts equal to their valid claims.” Thereafter, “[flrom the allocation to each first tier lien claimant, amounts shall be allocated equal to the valid claims of second tier lien claimants whose claims derive from contracts with that first tier lien claimant.” If money is left over in a first tier claimant’s allocation after the second tier claimants within that allocation are paid, then the first tier claimant receives the rest. However, if there are only second tier claimants, “the lien fund for second tier lien claimants shall be allocated in amounts equal to that second tier’s valid claims.” In any event, if the total claims exceed the maximum liability of the owner or the maximum allocation to a tier, the allocations are reduced pro rata to the allowable maximum.

2. Bankruptcy Law

A debtor in need of relief may file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, which commences a bankruptcy case. “The commencement of a [bankruptcy] case ... creates [a bankruptcy] estate” that generally consists of all of the property of the debt- or. Filing the petition also automatically stays, among other things, “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate....” In general, we interpret the breadth of the stay broadly.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

Cooper Electrical Supply Co. and Samson Electrical Supply Co., Inc., sold electrical materials to Linear Electric Co., Inc., which Linear Electric incorporated into several construction projects. As of July 1, 2015, the development owners had not fully paid Linear Electric for its work on these projects, and Linear Electric had not fully paid Cooper and Samson for their materials.

On July 1, 2015, Linear Electric filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Two weeks later, on July 15, Cooper and Samson filed construction liens on the developments into which Linear Electric had incorporated the materials that it had purchased from Cooper and Samson. On July 20, Linear Electric filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to discharge the liens as violating the automatic stay that resulted from the bankruptcy petition. On July 31, after hearing argument, the Bankruptcy Court granted the motion. Linear Electric then collected the full amounts owed to it by the development owners. On August 13, the Bankruptcy Court held that the construction liens were void ab initio for violation of the automatic stay. Linear Electric has continued to operate as a debtor-in-possession.

Cooper and Samson appealed the Or- ■ ders of the Bankruptcy Court of July 31 and August 13, 2015. The District Court affirmed. Cooper and Samson then appealed to this Court.

II. Discussion

Both parties raise 'procedural issues for the first time in this Court. Linear Electric argues that the case is moot, and Cooper and Samson argue that the Bankruptcy Court could not constitutionally resolve the issue in this case in the first instance. We will address those issues before proceeding to the merits of this appeal.

A. Mootness

When the Bankruptcy Court issued an order to discharge the construction liens, Cooper and Samson requested a stay but were not granted one. Linear Electric then collected full payment from the development owners. Linear Electric argues that, as a result, the value of the constructions liens is zero. Hence, Linear Electric concludes that this case is moot and subject to dismissal.

Linear Electric is correct that we generally cannot resolve a dispute once the dispute has become moot, even if mootness was not raised below (as it was not here). “In general a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Here, Cooper and Samson would have no cognizable interest in the liens if no money could be collected through them.

Furthermore, Linear Electric is correct that, under New Jersey law, payments from the development owners to Linear Electric could potentially redüce or eliminate the value that could be collected under the constructions liens. However, such payments do not always do so, and they do not do so here. In general, the value of the lien, the lien fund, and any claimant’s claim are all determined at the time of filing the lien or service of a copy of the lien claim. Thus, payments from the development owners after the filing of the lien and the service of a copy of the hen claim do not reduce the value of the hen, the hen fund, or the hen claims.

Here, Linear Electric was paid in full after the Bankruptcy Court decision, which came after filing and service occurred. Thus, the payments to Linear Electric do not affect the amounts that Cooper and Samson would recover if the hens were proper. As we discuss supra, Cooper and Samson, as creditors of Linear Electric, may recover some amount in relation to the hen amounts under the approved plan of liquidation. Moreover, in its Order of August 13, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court, while discharging the hens, recognized that the “filing of the Liens shall be deemed .to have occurred on the date of each such filing and treated as notices under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) for the purposes of determining whether (a) such Lien was timely filed under applicable state law and (b) any such Supplier is entitled to the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) or other applicable law.” As a result, Cooper and Samson still have an interest in the outcome of this bankruptcy proceeding. The case is not moot.

B. Constitutionality

Cooper and Samson argue that the Bankruptcy Court could not constitutionally enter an order invalidating the construction liens. Their argument is based on the limitations imposed by Article III of the .Constitution. Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” in the judicial branch, the judges of which “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their. Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” Because of this clause, “in general, Congress may not withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Hence, courts outside the scope of Article III — that is, courts, such as bankruptcy courts, whose judges do not have the life tenure and salary protection guaranteed tó Article III judges — cannot conclusively resolve certain state common law claims between private parties without the consent of both parties. However, Congress may assign cases involving “public rights” to non-Article III courts. Public rights cases include “cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”

Cooper and Samson argue that the Bankruptcy Court here, as a non-Article III court, could not resolve any claim regarding their construction liens, because Cooper and Samson describe the rights at issue with regard to the construction liens as private rights that are entrusted to Article III courts. However, Linear Electric brought claims alleging violations of the automatic stay imposed by the filing of its bankruptcy. Those claims arise under the federal bankruptcy laws. As such, any rights at issue are rights created by Congress, and such rights are public rights. Article III does' not prevent a non-Article III court from resolving cases regarding public rights; thus, the Bankruptcy Court could constitutionally determine whether the liens violated the automatic stay.

C. The Construction Lien and the Automatic Stay

With regard to the ultimate question, whether the filing of the construction liens violated the automatic stay, we review de novo the legal conclusions of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court.

Linear Electric filed for bankruptcy on July 1, 2015, which stayed any act to create or perfect a lien on Linear Electric’s property. On July 15, Cooper and Samson filed their construction liens — an act to perfect the liens that, before then, were “inchoate merely.” The question we decide here is whether filing those liens violated the automatic stay. „We hold that it did. As we will explain, the lien claim payment process allows Cooper and Samson to collect their recovery by subtracting it from Linear Electric’s accounts receivable which are due for the value of the materials provided under the contracts. Thus, Cooper and Samson’s lien was against Linear Electric’s property. This analysis is consistent with the reasoning in numerous prior cases, in this Court and elsewhere, as well as with the purpose of the automatic stay. Cooper and Samson’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

1. The Lien Claim Payment Process and Linear Electric’s Accounts Receivable

The lien claim payment process makes clear that Cooper and Samson’s liens were against Linear Electric’s property — specifically, its accounts receivable. Under New Jersey law, if Linear Electric did not file its own lien claims alongside Cooper and Samson’s, the lien allocation would be as follows. Cooper and Samson would be second tier claimants, and the lien fund would be allocated in amounts equal to their valid claims. Thus, Cooper and Samson would be fully paid, and the amount that Linear Electric is owed by the development owners would be reduced accordingly. That is, on its balance sheet, Linear Electric’s accounts receivable — which are an asset of Linear Electric — would be reduced by the amount paid to Cooper and Samson. In effect, the lien claim payment process would transfer a portion of an asset of Linear Electric to Cooper and Samson. Where, as here, a lien will be paid by transferring part or all of an asset from the bankruptcy estate to the lienholder, the lien is against the property of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, Cooper and Samson’s filing to perfect their liens violated the automatic stay.

2. Prior Cases and Statutory Purpose

Both prior cases and the purpose of the automatic stay support the conclusion that we reach here. In In re Yobe Electric, Inc., the pertinent facts were analogous: A subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien, similar to the construction lien here, after a general contractor declared bankruptcy. However, in Yobe, the subcontractor filed the lien under Pennsylvania law, under which the date of filing the mechanic’s lien related back to “the date of visible commencement upon the ground of the work of erecting or constructing the improvement.” Hence, the post-petition lien related back to a time before the petition and fell within an exception to the automatic stay.

The bankruptcy court in Yobe, in analysis that we approved, distinguished two New Jersey cases in which filing a mechanic’s lien did violate the stay. New Jersey mechanic’s liens were effective as of filing, and no relation back applied, so the liens in those two cases were post-petition liens and violated the stay. The bankruptcy court'distinguished those cases on the basis of the different state laws: Pennsylvania liens relate back, and New Jersey liens do not. This distinction would have been unnecessary, however, if the liens were not against property of the bankruptcy estate, because liens that are not against property of the bankruptcy estate are not subject to the automatic stay. If the liens were not against property of the bankruptcy estate, the New Jersey cases would have been wrong, not merely distinguishable, and the entire discussion of relation back would have been irrelevant.

Thus, Yobe supports the conclusion that we draw here. Its discussion implies that the liens were against the property of the bankruptcy estate, and it suggests that construction or mechanic’s liens that do not fall within an exception to the automatic stay by, for example, relating back to a pre-petition time — as the liens here do not — violate the automatic stay.

Also supporting our conclusion are numerous cases from other courts that have considered enforcement (rather than creation or perfection) of mechanic’s liens in similar factual circumstances. In all of these cases, courts have either held or assumed that the liens are against the bankruptcy estate’s property interests. We agree: The liens here were against Linear Electric’s interests in property.

Finally, the purpose of the automatic stay supports our conclusion. In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy such as Linear Electric’s, a debtor proposes a plan of repayment “which divides claims against the debtor into separate ‘classes’ and specifies the treatment each class will receive.” A plan typically specifies that at least some creditors will receive less than the full value that they were originally owed, because a bankrupt entity generally has inadequate assets to cover its liabilities. A court will approve such a plan, even over the objections of the creditors, “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.” The purpose of the automatic stay is to give breathing room for the development of such a plan.

Here, if Cooper and Samson were allowed to receive full repayment via New Jersey’s Construction Lien Law, they would be fully repaid, and Linear Electric would receive less as a result. Thus, there would be less total money to go into the plan of repayment, and other creditors of Linear Electric would suffer. Cooper and Samson would be effectively circumventing the bankruptcy case in order to unfairly advantage themselves at the expense of other creditors. For better or for worse, the automatic stay requires that Cooper and Samson wait as Linear Electric’s bankruptcy ease proceeds and receive whatever they will receive under bankruptcy law without resort to other mechanisms to claim greater payments.

3. Cooper and Samson’s Arguments

Cooper and Samson argue that their liens did not violate the automatic stay because the liens attached to the property interests of the development owners and did not attach to the interests of Linear Electric. Therefore, they conclude, the liens were proper. However, their argument is not persuasive. First of all, we agree with the cogent reasoning of the District Court that liens were against Linear Electric’s accounts receivable. Furthermore, the stay applies to any lien “against” Linear Electric’s interests in property, not solely those that “attach” to Linear Electric’s interests in property, and the Construction Lien Law expressly contemplates that a hen may be against something to which it does not attach. For example, it refers to “the contractor or subcontractor against whose account the lien is filed....” Hence, the text of the Construction Lien Law provides no reason to believe that the liens are not also against Linear Electric’s accounts receivable (in addition to attaching to the development owners’ real property interests).

Cooper and Samson also argue that their liens may not have been against Linear Electric’s interests in property because Linear Electric may have had no interests in the debts from the development owners. Cooper and Samson suggest that the contracts between Linear Electric and the development owners, which were never submitted into evidence, may have provided that Linear Electric’s paying its suppliers was a condition precedent to Linear Electric’s right to repayment for its construction work. Cooper and Samson allege that such a provision is standard throughout the industry. They argue that if this provision were part of the contract, then Linear Electric would have no property interest in anything from the development owners, so the liens would not violate the automatic stay. Hence, they request a remand for contract interpretation. However, their argument is mistaken on a crucial point of law. New Jersey’s Construction Lien Law provides that the value of the lien fund cannot exceed the amount that the owner actually owed the contractor at the time of filing or service. Thus, if the contract provides as Cooper and Samson have suggested and if, as a result, Linear Electric has no right to repayment from the development owners, then the value of the lien fund is zero. In such circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court would have been correct to order the liens discharged. Cooper and Samson therefore have provided no reason to remand this ease.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

      . This lien is called a "construction lien” under current New Jersey law, but in the past, New Jersey — like many other states — referred to this kind of lien as a "mechanic's lien.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:44A-1 et seq. (describing the New Jersey Construction Lien Law). See generally 56 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 1 et seq. (describing mechanic’s liens).

      . See N.J.S.A. § 2A:44A-9.

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(a).

      . Id.

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(f).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(a) ("All lien claims established by judgment are valid claims that shall be concurrent and shall be paid as provided in subsection c. of this section.”).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-2.

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(b)(l).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(d).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(a).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(l).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(2).

      . Id.

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(4).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(l), (2), (4).

      . 11 U.S.C. § 301.

      . 11 U.S.C. § 541; accord Law v. Siegel, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1192, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014).

      . 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

      . Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2001) ("§ 541(a)'s legislative history demonstrates that the language of this provision was intended to sweep broadly...."); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) ("The House and Senate Reports on the Bankruptcy Code indicate that § 541(a)(l)'s scope is broad.”).

      . Specifically, Linear Electric owed Cooper $1,234,100.48 and Samson $142,980.17 for electrical materials that Linear Electric had purchased. Since that time, Cooper has been paid $257,026.63, and Samson has been paid $15,755.54. They have reduced their claims accordingly.

      . The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and (b)(1). The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

      . See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2007).

      . Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980)).

      . See NJ. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(b)(l) (providing that the lien fund shall not exceed "the earned amount of the contract between the owner and the contractor minus any payments made prior to service of a copy of the

        lien claim”) (emphasis added); N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(d) ("[N]o lien fund exists, if, at the time of service of a copy of the lien claim, the owner or community association has fully paid the contractor for the work performed or for services, material or equipment provided.”) (emphasis added); N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(f) (providing that the lien is "limited to the amount that [the owner] agreed in writing to pay, less payments made by or on behalf of that person in good faith prior to the filing of the lien”) (emphasis added); N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-8 (providing that the lien claim form subtracts "Amount Paid to Date” to find the "TOTAL LIEN CLAIM AMOUNT”); see also Craig v. Smith, 37 N.J.L. 549, 550-51 (N.J. 1875) ("to entitle the workman or mate-rialman to an action against the owner, under the [New Jersey Mechanic’s Lien Law], there must be a debt due from the owner to the contractor at the time the notice is given”) (emphasis added).

      . U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1.

      . Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 18 How. 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      . Id. at 493, 131 S.Ct. 2594; N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (holding that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was unconstitutional in part because it allowed bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state common law claims); Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1942, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (“Our precedents make clear that litigants may validly consent to adjudication by bankruptcy courts.”)

      . Stern, 564 U.S. at 485, 131 S.Ct. 2594.

      . Id. at 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594.

      . Linear Electric argues that this argument is waived because Cooper and Samson did not raise this issue below. However, waiver does not apply; we must consider this issue because it implicates the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and therefore our appellate jurisdiction. See Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding sua sponte that, because the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction, the case should be remanded to the bankruptcy court for dismissal); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ("defects in subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in district court”).

      . Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 2015) ("A claim under § 362(k) for violation of the automatic stay is a cause of action arising under Title 11, and as such, a district court has jurisdiction over it.”); see also In re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Enjoining litigation to protect bankruptcy estates during the pen-dency of bankruptcy proceedings, unlike the entry of the final tort judgment at issue in Stem, has historically been the province of the bankruptcy courts.”).

      . See Stern, 564 U.S. at 489, 131 S.Ct. 2594 ("Congress may set the terms of adjudicating a suit when the suit could not otherwise proceed at all.”).

      . In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2011) ("We exercise plenary review of an order from a district court sitting as an appellate court in review of a bankruptcy court and we will review both courts' legal conclusions de novo.")

      . See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

      . Friedman v. Stein, 4 N.J. 34, 71 A.2d 346, 349 (1950).

      . If Linear Electric did file its own lien claims alongside Cooper and Samson's, the effect would be much the same, with Linear Electric as a first tier claimant and Cooper and Samson as second tier claimants. See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(l)-(2).

      . N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-23(c)(4).

      . See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-12 ("Any ... payment [of the amount of a lien claim to a lien claimant] made by the owner ... shall constitute a payment made on account of the contract price of the contract with the contractor ... against whose account the lien is filed.”).

      . 728 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1984).

      . Matter of Yobe Elec., Inc., 30 B.R. 114, 117 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (quoting 49 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1508(a)).

      . See 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A) ("[The automatic stay is] subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of perfection....”).

      . We affirmed in a short opinion "on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the bankruptcy judge.” Yobe, 728 F.2d at 208.

      . See Matter of Valairco, Inc., 9 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); In re Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 18 B.R. 643 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).

      . Yobe, 30 B.R. at 117-18.

      . Since Yobe, New Jersey has repealed the Mechanic's Lien Law and replaced it with the Construction Lien Law. However, no party has suggested, and we cannot find any reason to believe, that any of the changes in the statute affect the outcome of the case. For example, none of the changes would make the liens relate back to a time before their filing.

      . The exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1) is broader than relation back, see In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P’ship, 262 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2001), but the exception does not apply here in any event. The exception generally provides that "if an interest holder against whom the trustee would have rights still has, under applicable non-bankruptcy law, and as of the date of the petition, the opportunity to perfect his lien against an intervening interest holder, then he may perfect his interest against the trustee." In re Grede Foundries, Inc., 651 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Makoroff v. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). New Jersey law gives no such opportunity to Cooper and Samson.

        .See, e.g., In re Hunters Run Ltd. P’ship, 875 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the argument that a mechanic’s lien "is not 'against the debtor’ but is instead ‘against the realty or security for the debt' ”); In re Baldwin Builders, 232 B.R. 406, 412-13 (9th Cir. BAP 1999) (holding that post-petition commencement of a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action by a subcontractor violates the automatic stay from a general contractor’s bankruptcy petition); In re Concrete Structures, Inc., 261 B.R. 627, 643 (E.D. Va. 2001) (rejecting the argument that "a suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien is an action in rem" rather than "against the debtor"); In re Richardson Builders, Inc., 123 B.R. 736, 741 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990) ("[Wjhen a general contractor files a bankruptcy petition, [§ ] 362(a) stays the filing and prosecution of mechanic’s lien enforcement actions by subcontractors.”).

      . RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 2069, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012).

      . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).

      . In re VistaCare Grp., LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[The automatic stay's] primary purpose was to give the debtor a ‘breathing spell' from creditors, to allow the debtor to begin the process of discharging his debts, and where applicable, to develop a repayment or reorganization plan”).

      . See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-3(a) (providing that a construction lien “shall attach to the interest of the owner or unit owner of the real property development”). Cooper and Samson contrast this wording with New Jersey’s Municipal Mechanic's Lien Law, which allows public contractors to file a lien upon "moneys” of the public agency that hired the contractor under circumstances similar to those in which a private contractor could file a construction lien. See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44-128(a).

      . "Attach” and "against” are not synonyms. Compare Black’s Law Dictionary 152 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “attach”) with Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.), available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/ dictionary/against (defining "against”).

      . N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:44A-12 (emphasis added).

      . See N.J. S. A. § 2A:44A-9(b)(l) (providing that the lien fund shall not exceed "the earned amount of the contract between the owner and the contractor”).


author: VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Melissa RAMIREZ, et al. v. VINTAGE PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC; Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc; Endo Health Solutions, Inc., f/k/o Endo Pharmaceuticals Holdings, Inc.; Patheon, Inc. Patheon, Inc.; Appellant in 17-1121 Vintage Pharmaceuticals, LLC; Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Endo Health Solutions, Inc., Appellants in 17-1126
    Nos. 17-1221 & 17-1226
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Argued February 22, 2017
    (Opinion Filed: March 28, 2017)

      Barbara R. Binis, REED SMITH LLP, 1717 Arch Street, Three Logan Square, Suite 3100, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Angela R. Vicari [Argued], ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, 250 West 55th Street, New York, NY 10019, Counsel for Appellants Vintage Pharmaceuticals, LLC, Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. <& Endo Health Solutions, Inc.
    Christopher R. Carton, Loly G. Tor, K & L GATES LLP, One Newark Center, 10th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102, Amy L. Groff, K & L GATES LLP, 17 North Second Street, 18th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Counsel for Appellant Patheon Inc.
    Steven L. Beard, STEVEN L. BEARD, P.C., Suite 2100, 1380 West Paces Ferry Road, N.W., Atlanta, GA 30327, Keith D. Bodoh [Argued], ROBERTSON, BODOH & NASRALLAH, LLP, 990 Cobb Parkway North, Suite 205A, Marietta, GA 30062, Walter Z. Steinman, LAW OFFICES OF WALTER Z. STEINMAN, 400 Greenwood Avenue, Wyncote, PA 19095, Counsel for Appellees, Melissa Ramirez, et al.
    Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
   OPINION OF THE COURT

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), extends federal jurisdiction to “mass actions.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll). One mandatory characteristic of a mass action is a proposal by more than one hundred persons to try their claims jointly. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). However, cases that are consolidated or coordinated only for pretrial purposes are explicitly exempted from CAFA’s mass action provision, and thus are not removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii)(IV). The question before us on appeal is whether the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff-Appellees in state court proposed a joint trial such that their action was properly removed to federal court.

Plaintiff-Appellees are a group of 113 birth control users affected by a packaging error on certain brands of Qualitest birth control pills. These affected users filed a products liability action against the Defendant-Appellant manufacturers in Pennsylvania state court that was subsequently removed. Plaintiffs now argue this removal was improper because they did not propose to try their claims jointly, but their Complaint sends mixed signals. Weighing in favor of federal jurisdiction under CAFA, Plaintiffs filed a single complaint which joins the claims of 113 persons and contains numerous instances of language that indicates a single trial was contemplated. Cutting against federal jurisdiction, the Complaint specifies that the Plaintiffs’ “claims have been filed together ... for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis.” (Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139.) Plaintiffs characterize this language as seeking to limit the coordination of their claims to pretrial matters. They also point to a motion filed in the state court requesting admission to the Mass Tort Program, which allegedly prevents their claims from being tried jointly.

After the District Court ordered the action be remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we accepted the manufacturers’ request for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). Upon careful consideration, we will reverse the Order of the District Court and find federal jurisdiction to be proper under CAFA. Importantly, we determine that the language Plaintiffs hold out as disclaiming their intent to seek a joint trial is not sufficiently definite to prevent removal as a mass action. Where, as here, more than 100 plaintiffs file a single complaint containing claims involving common questions of law and fact, a proposal for a joint trial will be presumed unless an explicit and unambiguous disclaimer is included.

I.

The consumer products liability case before us begins, like many others, with a recall. A packaging error affecting a brand of Qualitest birth control pills was discovered in the wake of a consumer product complaint. This error reversed the sequence of pills contained within each birth control package, which precipitated an unintended and less effective dosage program. Eight brands of Qualitest birth control pills — each of which shared a common packaging process and were at risk for the same error — executed nationwide recalls reaching more than 3.2 million blister packs of birth control.

Plaintiffs, alleging that they were harmed by the packaging error, launched this products liability action against the Defendant-Appellant manufacturers of the birth control pills and packaging in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. The Complaint alleges that the similarly-situated plaintiffs are residents of 28 different states “whose claims arise out of a common set of operative facts ... and which claims have been filed together ... for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis.” (Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139.)

The Complaint contains a section devoted to “FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS” and a “DAMAGES” section that divides the 113 plaintiffs into three categories based on their state residency. After each count in the Complaint, Plaintiffs collectively “request a jury trial.” (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 25, 29, 37, 41; J.A. 145-50.) In the Prayer for Relief, Plaintiffs, again collectively, seek “an award of damages in such amount to be determined at trial.” (Compl. ¶ 41; J.A. 150.) Similarly, the Complaint’s Notice to Defend warns the manufacturers that if they fail to defend, “the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the court.” (J.A. 137.)

One week after filing their Complaint, Plaintiffs submitted a motion to assign their action to the Court of Common Pleas’ Mass Tort Program. The captions of that motion and the accompanying memorandum in support state “JURY TRIAL DEMANDED.” Before that motion was briefed or ruled upon, the manufacturers removed the action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a “mass action” under CAFA. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(U). Plaintiffs sought to remand the action to the Court of Common Pleas on the ground that they have not presented a “mass action” within the purview of CAFA. The District Court held oral argument after receiving briefs and other material submissions. The District Court ultimately granted the Motion to Remand, concluding that “CAFA precludes federal jurisdiction in this matter because Plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims jointly.” Ramirez v. Vintage Pharm., LLC, No. 15-cv-6162 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2016); (J.A. 2.) After the manufacturers’ emergency motion for a stay pending appeal in the District Court was denied, they requested this appeal.

II.

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll). After the District Court ordered remand, we opted to accept the manufacturers’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). We apply plenary review to issues of subject matter jurisdiction, including the determination of whether to properly regard a case as a mass action under CAFA. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007).

III.

CAFA gives the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over “mass actions,” a term that includes “any civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact,” and which meet the specified jurisdictional amount requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). CAFA also requires that a mass action have an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 and minimal diversity among parties. Id. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(ll)(A). Importantly, “claims [that] have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings” will not qualify as a mass action under CAFA. Id. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii)(IV).

The manufacturers’ appeal rests entirely on whether Plaintiffs have proposed to try their claims jointly. Id. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). In their quest for remand to the Court of Common Pleas, Plaintiffs insist that they made no such proposal for a joint trial of all 113 claims included in their Complaint. The District Court agreed and granted their request for remand.

For purposes of determining whether an action qualifies as a mass action, a proposal for a joint trial may be either explicit or implicit. Atwell v. Boston Sci. Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 2013); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2012). An explicit proposal encompasses a clear textual request for a joint trial contained within the complaint, a motion, or some other filing by a group of plaintiffs. An explicit proposal can also be made orally at some point during the litigation. By comparison, an implicit proposal may be found when all of the circumstances of the action, including the language of the complaint and the structure of the action, lead to the assumption that the claims will be tried jointly. See Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 573 (“a proposal for a joint trial can be implicit, particularly where ‘the assumption would be that a single trial was intended’ ”) (quoting Koral v. Boeing Co., 628 F.3d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 2011)).

There are at least three explicit indications that Plaintiffs proposed a joint trial in this action, all of which are plain from the text of their initial filings. In fact, the language that they chose to incorporate into their Complaint and Notice to Defend contains many references to a single trial. First, after each count in the Complaint, Plaintiffs “respectfully request a jury trial” — never multiple or separate trials. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 25, 29, 37, 41; J.A. 145-50.) Next, they continue this singular language in their Prayer for Relief, which seeks “an award of damages in such amount to be determined at trial.” (Compl. ¶ 41; J.A. 150.) Finally, the Notice to Defend warns the manufacturers that if they fail to enter an appearance and file their defenses and objections to Plaintiffs’ claims, “a judgment” may be entered against them. (J.A. 137.) Plaintiffs also specify that their “claims arise out of a common set of operative facts” and that these facts are “common to all counts.” (Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139, 141-42.) These instances of singular language, taken together, provide strong evidence of a proposal for joint trial.

The structure of Plaintiffs’ Complaint also implies that they have proposed to try all 113 of their claims jointly. Where a single complaint joins more than 100 separate claims involving common questions of law and fact, there is a presumption that those plaintiffs have implicitly proposed a joint trial. See, e.g., Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2013) (“plaintiffs can propose a joint trial, ... by naming 100 or more plaintiffs in a single complaint”); Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 572 (“one complaint implicitly proposes one trial”); Koral, 628 F.3d at 947 (“[W]here a single complaint joins more than 100 plaintiffs’ claims without proposing a joint trial, ... the assumption would be that a single trial was intended — one complaint, one trial, is the norm.”).

Were this the end of our inquiry, we would have no difficulty finding that Plaintiffs had, at the very least, implied that they were seeking a joint trial on their claims. However, Plaintiffs have included some rather ambiguous language in their Complaint that they argue should be read as a disclaimer that a joint trial had been proposed. Specifically, ' the Complaint states that their “claims have been filed together ... for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis.” (Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139.) Because CAFA explicitly exempts “claims [that] have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii)(IV), Plaintiffs assert that this language evinces their intent to limit coordination of their claims to “case management,” which they characterize as referring strictly to a pretrial phase of the litigation. The District Court agreed that the term “case management” extended only to pretrial procedures and deadlines, and explained that “by stating the filing of their claims together was for case management purposes, Plaintiffs have ... made their intent clear.” Ramirez, No. 15-cv-6162; (J.A. 3.)

Plaintiffs’ contention that they intentionally worded their Complaint to avoid proposing a joint trial of all their claims is constructed on a solid legal foundation. As masters of their Complaint, Plaintiffs may structure their action in such a way that intentionally avoids removal under CAFA. See Scimone, 720 F.Bd at 883-84. For example, courts have repeatedly held “that plaintiffs have the ability to avoid § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) jurisdiction by filing separate complaints naming less than 100 plaintiffs.” Id. at 884. The same principle applies where plaintiffs “expressly seek[ ] to limit [their] request for coordination to pre-trial matters, and thereby align with the mass action provision’s exception for ‘any civil action in which ... the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.’” Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii)(rV)). This principle was applied in Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, where the Tenth Circuit found that a group of plaintiffs had expressly disclaimed the intention to try their claims jointly when the complaint made clear that “[j]oinder of Plaintiffs’ claims is for the purpose of pretrial discovery and proceedings only and is not for trial.” 749 F.3d 879, 888 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014).

In accordance with these decisions, a clear and express statement in the Complaint evincing an intent to limit coordination of claims to some subset of pretrial proceedings would effectively shield this action from removal under CAFA. But the language Plaintiffs ultimately chose to include in their Complaint is far from precise or definitive enough to signal their intent to limit coordination to pretrial matters. The phrase upon which Plaintiffs rely — that the “claims have been filed together ... for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis” — provides no indication that they seek coordination only for pretrial proceedings. Even if Plaintiffs had included the word “only” in this context, we would still need to determine whether “case management” does, in fact, reference only pretrial phases of the litigation.

Despite this ambiguity, Plaintiffs contend that the burden of proof falls on the manufacturers, and that the language they have included in their Complaint is enough to prevent the manufacturers from satisfying that burden. While the burden of proof does indeed belong to the manufacturers as the side seeking removal, Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2006), we hold that they have met that burden under these circumstances. With the exception of the language regarding case management, the entirety of the Complaint and the Notice to Defend — the documents by which Plaintiffs initiated this action— contemplate a single joint trial. Similarly, no effort was made to structure the action in a way that would preclude CAFA jurisdiction, which would have been as easy as filing two actions — each with less than 100 claims — instead of a single action with all 113 claims. Critically, had Plaintiffs made a definitive and explicit statement limiting coordination of their claims to pretrial matters, removal would have been prevented. Instead, we are left with a litany of indications that a joint trial was proposed and no conclusive countervailing indication to serve as a rebuttal.

Plaintiffs are provided with a great deal of power in the CAFA removal context. They have the ability to effectively insulate themselves from CAFA jurisdiction simply by taking the correct steps in structuring their action. Plaintiffs must carefully consider how they craft their complaints and other initial filings, and any intentional efforts to avoid CAFA jurisdiction should be clear and unambiguous. Where they opt to file a single complaint containing the claims of more than 100 plaintiffs, they must be even more explicit to overcome the presumption that those claims will be tried jointly. This is especially true where, as in Pennsylvania, the state’s permissive joinder rules explicitly presume that persons who join as plaintiffs in a single action based upon a common question of fact or law will have their claims tried jointly. Pa. R. Civ. P. 2229, 2231(c); see also Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 535 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2008) (examining how Illinois procedural rules treat joined claims). Ultimately, plaintiffs bear the burden of clarity in this context.

IV.

Plaintiffs also put forth a non-textual argument asserting that their motion for admission to the Mass Tort Program is evidence of their intent to try their claims separately. Plaintiffs’ conduct undertaken after filing the Complaint is certainly relevant, as long as .that conduct occurred prior to removal. See Scimone, 720 F.3d at 881 (“what is clear from [CAFA’s] text and structure is that the plaintiffs can propose a joint trial, either by naming 100 or more plaintiffs in a single complaint or by their litigation conduct at any time prior to defendants’ removal of their action to federal court”). Even so, the face of the Complaint and the structure of the action are the best indicators of whether a joint trial is being sought. A group of plaintiffs may implicitly or explicitly propose a joint trial later in the litigation; however, a group of plaintiffs cannot similarly file a complaint that explicitly or implicitly proposes a joint trial, only to then rely on their later conduct as evidence that they had not initially made such a proposal. Applying this principle, Plaintiffs’ motion for admission to the Mass Tort Program cannot save them from removal — regardless of its content or effect — where the structure of their action and initial filings imply a proposal for a joint trial.

But even if we suspend this principle, Plaintiffs’ motion and potential admission to the Mass Tort Program do not evince an intention that their claims be tried separately. Their reliance on admission to the Mass Tort Program to prove their intent to try the claims separately hinges on their assertion that they would be unable to try their claims jointly under the rules of the program. See In re: Mass TORT and Asbestos Programs, General Court Reg. No. 2012-01, 2011 WL 8771684 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2011) (“Trial Order”). Intent is certainly pertinent to determining whether Plaintiffs have proposed a joint trial. See Parson, 749 F.3d at 888 (“[T]he common usage of the word ‘propose’ involves an intentional act.”); Scimone, 720 F.3d at 884 (“The more natural reading of the [mass action] provision is that the plaintiffs must actually want, or at least intend to bring about, what they are proposing.”). And a proposal for a joint trial cannot be made to a court that is unable to effectuate a joint trial under the circumstances. Briggs v. Merck Sharp & Dohme, 796 F.3d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f a court lacks the authority to grant a request for a joint trial, then plaintiffs cannot ‘propose’ a joint trial by making a request to that court.”). But the Mass Tort Program does not necessarily prevent Plaintiffs from trying their claims in a fashion that would constitute a “joint trial.”

The Trial Order governing the Mass Tort Program, at least for asbestos cases, does not permit cases involving the application of law from different states to be tried together, and it also limits the number of cases that can be jointly tried. In re: Mass TORT and Asbestos Programs, 2011 WL 8771684. Comparatively, Plaintiffs’ Complaint presents 113 claims with plaintiffs from 28 different states. They emphasize that they divided the damages portion of their Complaint into three categories to account for the various state laws at play. But a joint trial can take a variety of other forms that would not be precluded by acceptance into the Mass Tort Program. The Seventh Circuit has succinctly explained that a joint trial may exist even where less than 100 claims have proceeded to trial or where issue preclusion might extend to the other claims that have yet to be tried:

[A] joint trial does not have to encompass relief. For example, a trial on liability could be limited to a few plaintiffs, after which a separate trial on damages could be held. Similarly, we have said that a trial that involved only “10 exemplary plaintiffs, followed by application of issue or claim preclusion to 134 more plaintiffs without another trial, is one in which the claims of 100 or more persons are being tried jointly.” In short, a joint trial can take different forms as long as the plaintiffs’ claims are being determined jointly.

Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 573 (citations omitted).

Several circuits have also held that a “bellwether trial” is a form of a joint trial. See, e.g., Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1165-66; but cf. Briggs, 796 F.3d at 1051 (“a bellwether trial is not, without more, a joint trial within the meaning of CAFA”). Bellwether trials appear to be contemplated under the Mass Tort Program, which is consistent with the way most states treat mass tort cases. Moreover, while Plaintiffs have divided their damage claims into categories by state, they make no such differentiation in terms of liability. Thus, a decision at trial regarding the manufacturers’ liability may well be preclusive as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims, even if tried in a group the size of those permitted under the Mass Tort Program. See Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 573 (a joint trial may exist where “a trial on liability [is] limited to a few plaintiffs” and is followed by “a separate trial on damages”). Such a sequence of events would be regarded as a joint trial, and because a joint trial is still possible under the rules of the Mass Tort Program, we do not find Plaintiffs’ motion for admission to that program to evince an intent to try their claims separately.

y.

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s Order dated September 21, 2016, remanding this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County will be reversed and this matter will be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.

      . A separate action had been filed in the state of Georgia that was then removed to the Northern District of Georgia. The district court judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on November 4, 2015. Shepherd v. Vintage Pharm., LLC, 310 F.R.D. 691, 701 (N.D. Ga. 2015). This action followed the very next day.

      . Notably, a Court of Common Pleas local rule indicates that "case management” can encompass trial management. See Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. Civ. R. 215(A)(2) ("All jury cases ... shall be listed for trial ... in accordance with the pertinent Case Management Order.”).

      . Of course, we ordinarily examine the case at the time the complaint was filed, see Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1349, 185 L.Ed.2d 439 (2013), unless subsequent developments aré what triggered removal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Such is not the case here.

      . "A bellwether trial is a test case that is typically used to facilitate settlement in similar cases by demonstrating the likely value of a claim or by aiding in predicting the outcome of tricky questions of causation or liability.” Briggs, 796 F.3d at 1051.