author: M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

text:
    NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL; Santa Monica Baykeeper, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Los Angeles County Flood Control District; Michael Antonovich, in his official capacity as Supervisor; Don Knabe, in his official capacity as Supervisor; Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as Supervisor; Mark Ridley-Thomas, in his official capacity as Supervisor; Sheila Kuehl, in her official capacity as Supervisor; Gail Farber, in her official capacity as Director of Los Angeles County Department of Public Works, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-55562
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted October 13, 2016 Pasadena, California
    Filed October 31, 2016

      Before: HARRY PREGERSON and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges, and H. RUSSEL HOLLAND, Senior District Judge.

      The Honorable H. Russel Holland, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

   OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants Natural Resources Defense Council and Santa Monica Bay-keeper (collectively, the Plaintiffs) file this interlocutory appeal .from the district court’s dismissal of their- claims for injunc-tive relief as moot. We hold that we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and that the Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are-not moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District (collectively, the County Defendants) alleging that the County Defendants were discharging polluted stormwater in violation of the terms of their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, issued pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act), 86 Stat. 816, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seq. In 2013, we held that as a matter of law, the County Defendants had violated their permit because their monitoring stations recorded levels of pollution that exceeded the receiving water limitations in the 2001 Permit. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2013). We remanded the case to the district court -for a remedies determination. Id. at 1197.

In 2012, during the pendency of appellate proceedings, the County Defendants sought and received a new NPDES permit from the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (the Regional Board), which now governs the County Defendants’ stormwater discharges. Id. at 1199 n.7. Both permits have substantially the same baseline receiving watér limitations, which are the crux of the Plaintiffs’ claims.

However, the 2012 Permit made significant changes concerning how the receiving water limitations requirement could be met. In the 2001 Permit, the prohibition against pollution exceedances was specific and straightforward: “[discharges from the MS4 that cause or contribute to the violation of Water Quality Standards or water quality objectives are prohibited.” If the pollution levels exceeded the limitations as detected by a relevant monitoring station, the permittees were in violation of the 2001 Permit. Id. at 1206-07.

The 2012 Permit is more complicated. First, the 2012 Permit establishes total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for impaired water bodies. This is a measure of the maximum quantity of a pollutant that can be sustained by a water body that is already impaired, and it is used to calculate effluent limitations specific to the already-polluted area. The 2012 Permit contains interim requirements to ensure that permittees are making progress toward achieving water quality standards in those areas, as well as final deadlines for permit-tees to actually meet TMDL targets. Failing to meet an interim or final TMDL requirement is a violation of the permit. Conversely, if a permittee meets the TMDL standards, it is deemed to be in compliance with baseline receiving water limitations. The 2012 Permit has thirty-three TMDLs for different bodies of water and pollutants. Where no TMDL is assigned to a certain body of water, the baseline receiving water limitations apply.

Second, the 2012 Permit creates a safe harbor program for permittees that initiate, develop, revise, and implement a voluntary watershed management program (WMP) or enhanced watershed management program (EWMP). If a permittee initiates a WMP and timely meets the requirements of the program, the permit-tee is deemed to be in compliance with both baseline receiving water limitations (where there is no overriding TMDL requirement) and interim TMDL requirements, but must still meet final TMDL requirements. If a permittee successfully completes an EWMP, it is exempt from all receiving water limitations and TMDL requirements, including the final deadlines. The “deemed compliance” begins as soon as a permittee “[provides timely notice of its intent to develop a WMP or EWMP.” This declaration of intent triggers a schedule requiring the permittee to keep up with implementation requirements ahd deadlines. But this safe harbor is not guaranteed to last. “If a [permittee fails to meet any requirement or date for its achievement in an approved [WMP] or EWMP,” the permittee shall be immediately subject to the receiving water limitations for the waterbody at issue.

The County Defendants have initiated a total of seven WMPs and twenty-three EWMPs, covering all the watershed areas for which they have responsibility. After declaring their intent to develop their WMPs and EWMPs, the County Defendants submitted their initial plans to the Regional Board in June 2014. The Regional Board returned “Comments and Necessary Revisions” to the WMP drafts in October 2014. The County Defendants submitted revised drafts in January 2015, and the Board returned “conditional approvals” of the drafts in April 2015, requiring the permittees to make additional revisions. The County Defendants ultimately obtained final approval for at least three WMPs.

As for the EWMPs, work plans were submitted in June 2014, and initial drafts were due in June 2015. The County Defendants obtained final approval from the Regional Board for at least one EWMP.

But even with the approved WMPs and EWMPs, the permittees ■ must actually comply with the requirements in those plans, and the Regional Board will review the implementation efforts every two years thereafter. Implementing WMPs will, require “new programs and new construction that address water quality on a watershed basis[,]” and implementing EWMPs will require “construction of large-scale regional projects....” At this point in time, the record does not reflect whether the County Defendants have taken any actual steps to implement the requirements of the WMPs or EWMPs. The County Defendants concede that compliance is voluntary, and that the WMPs and EMPs will “require substantial new resources and time for implementation.”

. In January 2015, the County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit on mootness grounds, arguing that the 2012 Permit supplanted the 2001 Permit and therefore relief was not available to the Plaintiffs. The district court denied the motion with regard to the claims for civil penalties for past violations. However, the district court granted the motion with regard to injunctive relief, on the basis that the County Defendants were currently in compliance with the 2012 Permit, combined with the fact that “the Court has been provided with no evidence that Defendants will not comply to the fullest extent.” The district court noted that the County Defendants’ recently-submitted revised plans in response to the Regional Board’s comments on the initial draft “suggest[] (even if [they do] not establish)- a commitment' to compliance more than a likelihood of falling out of compliance.” On this basis, the district court concluded that “it is absolutely clear that Defendants cannot reasonably be expected to fall out of compliance,” and “[a]s a result, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ remaining claims for injunctive relief to be moot.” On April 14, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a timely interlocutory appeal of the district court’s dismissal of injunctive relief. .

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether jurisdiction exists over- this appeal. “As a general rule, appellate jurisdiction is limited to ‘final decisions of the district courts of the United States.’ ” In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). But pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we have appellate jurisdiction over “[ifrterloc-utory orders of the district courts of the United States ... .granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injune-tions[.]’’ The Plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order as one “refusing ... [an] injunction[ ]” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The County Defendants argue that the district court’s order was not a denial of an injunction on its face, but only had the “practical effect” of denying an injunction. The County Defendants maintain that under the test in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Plaintiffs cannot show the irreparable harm necessary to make -the district court’s order immediately appealable.

In Shee Atika v. Sealaska Corp, 39 F.3d 247 (9th Cir. 1994), we held that when a district court “specifically denie[s] [a] request for an injunction,” the “appeal ... falls squarely within the language of section 1292(a)(1).” Id. at 248. In contrast, we noted that when an order only has the “ ‘practical .effect? of denying an injunction,” Carson requires “that the would-be appellant show[] that the order ‘might have a serious, perhaps irreparable consequence’” in order to invoke jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Id. at 249 (quoting Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. 993). However, we clarified that Carson’ s “requirement of irreparable injury” does not apply to “appeals from the direct denial of a request for an injunction.” Id.

A straightforward application of Shee Atika compels the conclusion that we have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal. The district court expressly stated that it was eliminating the claims for injunctive relief: “Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are moot, but the Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary civil penalties remain active[.]” The Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal therefore “falls squarely within the language of section 1292(a)(1),” and Carson’s additional requirement of irreparable injury does not apply. Shee Atika, 39F.3d at 248-49.

Our conclusion that the district court’s dismissal of the claims for injunctive relief on the basis of miootness confers jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) is consistent with the persuasive reasoning of a sister-circuit case, Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1988). In Holmes, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim after being detained by police for eight days before his probable cause and bail hearings, and sought both injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 230. The district court dismissed the injunction case as moot, on the ground that Holmes had since been arraigned and there was no reasonable prospect that he would again be subject to prolonged detention. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the order was immediately appealable because the district court had “stripped the case of its equitable component,” and “[tjhis denies the request-for an injunction, activating the right to seek interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C: § 1292(a)(1).” Id. Because the plaintiff had “suffered total defeat on his request for an injunction,” the Seventh Circuit held that “§ 1292(a)(1) allows him an immediate appeal.” Id. at 231. The Holmes court specified that “a conclusive denial of all equitable relief is appealable even though a request for damages lives on.” Id. at 230 (emphasis added).

The district court’s order is indistinguishable from the order in Holmes. The district court’s mootness determination conclusively denied the Plaintiffs all chance of an injunction, directly “stripping] the case of its equitable component.” Id. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal falls directly under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we therefore have jurisdiction in this appeal.

II. Mootness

a. Standard of Review

A district court’s mootness determination is reviewed de novo, while the underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 970 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014).

b. Application

The Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are not moot because the County Defendants are still subject to receiving water limitations, which are substantially the same as the limitations in the 2001 Permit. Although the County Defendants are significantly less likely to violate those limitations under the 2012 Permit, because of the delay and partial exemption afforded by the safe harbor of WMPs and EWMPs, it is not “absolutely clear” that their violations will not recur,

“In seeking to have a case dismissed as moot ... the defendant’s burden is a heavy one.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987) (citation omitted). “The defendant must demonstrate that it is absolutely clear that the -allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). The County Defendants defend the district court’s mootness determination on two grounds. First, they argue that the 2012 Permit superseded the 2001 Permit by drastically changing compliance requirements. Second, they argue that the evidence of their current compliance with the 2012 Permit is undisputed.

1. The Permits

A new permit, in and of itself, does not moot a case for injunctive, relief. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 992, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding injunctive relief on the basis of three stormwater permits issued during the pendency of the litigation where the provisions at issue remained consistent across the permits); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 719 F.Supp. 281, 290 (D. Del. 1989) (“[W]here the limits contained in a super-ceded permit are incorporated into or made more strict in the new permit, there is no reason to allow a defendant to avoid enforcement of those limits”), vacated on other grounds, 906 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1990). The relevant inquiry is whether the 2012 Permit maintains the receiving water limitations from the 2001 Permit such that an injunction could still provide effective relief. Jerron West, Inc. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 129 F.3d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that in a mootness inquiry, “[t]he question is not whether the precise relief sought at the time the application for an injunction was filed is still available ... [but] whether there can be any effective relief.” (quotation marks omitted)); Vill. of Gambell v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The basic question is whether there exists a present controversy to which effective relief can be granted.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Given the purpose of the mootness inquiry, the district court was in error when it broadly stated that if the standards of an NPDES permit are relaxed, “a plaintiffs claims for violations of the superceded permit do indeed become moot.” Other than this broad language from Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group. v. ICI Americas Inc., 777 F.Supp. 1032, 1035 (D. Mass 1991), neither the County Defendants nor the district court has- cited authority for this proposition. It may be that if the standards of the permit are relaxed to such an extent that injunctive relief would no longer be effective (in other words, the activity is no longer a violation), the case is moot. But it is not the law that any relaxation of NPDES permit standards, no matter how de minimis, necessarily moots the case.

Viewed through this lens, both the facts and law of Massachusetts Public are distinguishable. In that ease, the defendants had continuously violated the flow limitations of a 1976 permit, but were issued a new permit in 1990. Id. at 1034. Under the more lenient standárds of the 1990 Permit, no flow violations had been detected for over four and a half years, and even over the entire life of the 1976 Permit, “only a handful of violations” would have violated the new permit. Id. In short, the new standards had been relaxed to such an extent that in essence, “conduct that was impermissible before is now permissible.” Id. at 1035.

The 2012 Permit substantially retains the baseline receiving water limitations from the 2001 Permit. However, impermissible violations of the 2001 Permit are now permissible under the 2012 Permit, but only if the County Defendants qualify for the safe harbor program by “keepfing] up with all requirements and deadlines” for the WMPs and EWMPs. Whether or not their actions are enjoina-ble violations of the 2012 Permit depends on their- continuing to voluntarily participate in (and meet the requirements of) the WMP and EWMP process. Because compliance is conditional on the success of these programs, the County Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that it is “absolutely clear” the violations will not recur, either through the use of the safe harbor of the WMPs and EWMPs or through actual pollution reduction measures.

2. Likelihood of Future Violations

The County Defendants’ theory of mootness based on current compliance with the 2012 Permit is. best described as “voluntary cessation” of illegal activity. “[M]ere cessation of illegal activity in response to pending litigation does not moot a case, unless the party alleging mootness can show that the ‘allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)).

Under this standard, the district court also erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ in-junctive claims. Although it cited the appropriate legal standard from Gwaltney, which requires a defendant to demonstrate that it is “absolutely clear” that no violations will recur, the district court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard and impermissibly shifted the evidentiary burden to the Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the district court’s factual determination that “Defendants cannot reasonably be expected to fall out of compliance” is not based on evidence in the record, and is therefore clearly erroneous.

First, the district court erroneously implied that the Plaintiffs bore the burden of proof. After finding that the County Defendants were committed to compliance, the district court stated that “the Court has been provided with no evidence that Defendants will not comply to the fullest extent.” Such analysis “impermissibly attempts to shift the burden to [the Plaintiffs] to defeat mootness[,]” when it is the Defendants “that bear[] the ‘heavy burden’ in this case.” Rosemere, 581 F.3d at 1173 (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693). A defendant “cannot meet this burden solely by claiming that [the Plaintiff! has not done enough to show the likelihood of further [violations].” Id.

Second, the district court’s order did not cite any positive evidence that the County Defendants would not violate the receiving water limitations in the future. Instead, the district court found that “[the] Defendants are currently deemed to be in compliance with the 2012 Permit at least based on their participation in WMP and EWMP work plans.” But Gwaltney makes clear that the relevant consideration is the likelihood of future violations, not current cessation. 484 U.S. at 66-67,108 S.Ct. 376. As to this point, the district court reasoned that because the “Defendants at least revised their programs in response to the Regional Board’s comments and revisions,” this “suggests (even if it does not establish) a commitment to compliance more than a likelihood of falling out of compliance.” Under Gwaltney, the County Defendants must present evidence to show that there is “no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated,” and that it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” 484 U.S. at 66, 108 S.Ct. 376 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted), not just “more likely than not.” In other words, they must.actually establish, not merely suggest, that they will be in compliance into the future. This heavy burden “protects plaintiffs from defendants who seek to evade sanction by predictable protestations of repentance and reform.” Id. at 67, 108 S.Ct. 376 (quotation marks omitted).

The County Defendants cannot satisfy this heavy burden in light of the .potential invalidation of the 2012 Permit’s safe harbor program. The County Defendants’ evidence of current and future compliance with the 2012 Permit consists of their continuing compliance with their WMPs and EWMPs; in other words, the County Defendants’ compliance with the 2012 Permit is dependent on the safe harbor program. However, the Plaintiffs have filed a writ of mandate in California Superior Court, alleging that the safe harbor program of the 2012 Permit violates the anti-backsliding provision of the Clean Water Act. The anti-backsliding provision of the Clean Water Act prohibits permits from being “renewed, reissued, or modified ... to contain effluent limitations which are less' stringent than the comparable effluent limitations in the previous permit.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(g)(1); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(2) (EPA regulation imposing identical restrictions). The Plaintiffs allege that the 2012 Permit is “less stringent” than the 2001 Permit because the safe harbor provision “excuse[s] violations ... as long as permitees are developing or implementing WMPs or EWMPs,” whereas the 2001 Permit “imposed an absolute prohibition on discharges....” In contrast, the County Defendants argue that the 2012 Permit’s terms are no less stringent, as the effluent limitations remain the same. As such, the safe harbor provision merely provides a system whereby ■ the County Defendants can gradually move toward compliance. Whatever the merits of this dispute, the Plaintiffs’ legal challenge to the safe harbor provision creates a significant possibility that County Defendants will be forced to demonstrate strict compliance with the baseline receiving water limitations.

But even if the safe harbor program is upheld, the County Defendants still must actually implement the complicated and expensive watershed management plans. The Plaintiffs have cited to evidence in the • record suggesting that the success of the WMPs and EWMPs is not likely. For example, the Lower Los Angeles River Watershed Group, of which the District is a part, stated in a publication that “[financing the implementation of the Lower LAR WMP is the greatest challenge confronting the Watershed Group. In the absence of stormwater utility fees, the Participating Agencies [including the District] have no dedicated revenue stream to pay for implementation of the WMP.” Until the County Defendants have finished the process of financing and implementing the WMPs, there is a significant likelihood that they will be subject to and violate the baseline receiving water limitations. Initiation of a reform process cannot, - standing alone, make it “absolutely clear” that the reformation will last.

Even with the substantial changes of the WMPs and EWMPs in the 2012 Permit, the baseline receiving water limitations may still apply, and thus it'is still possible for the district court to award ■ effective injunctive relief to the ■ Plaintiffs. The County Defendants have not met their burden of making it “absolutely clear” that no violation will recur in the future., Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ injunctive claims are not moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief as moot., is REVERSED.

No petition for rehearing will be entertained and the mandate shall issue forthwith. See Fed. R. App. P. 2.

      . The Clean Water Act provides for three exceptions to its general prohibition on backsliding. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2). However, the County Defendants conceded at oral argument that none apply to the 2012 Permit,


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    SIERRA CLUB; Friends of the West Shore, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, Defendant-Appellee.
    Nos. 14-15998
    14-16513
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted April 12, 2016, San Francisco, California
    Filed November 2, 2016

      Trent W. Orr (argued) and Wendy S. Park, Earthjustiee, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Whitman F. Manley (argued) and Howard F. Wilkins III, Remy Moose Manley LLP, Sacramento, California; John L. Marshall, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, Stateline, Nevada; for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Daniel L. Siegel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Nicole U. Rinke, Deputy Attorney General; Sacramento, California; for Amicus Curiae California Resources Agency.
    Cassandra P. Joseph, Senior Deputy Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, Nevada; for Amicus Curiae Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources.
    Thomas Watson, City Attorney; Nira Doherty, Assistant City Attorney; City of South Lake Tahoe, South Lake Tahoe, Nevada; for Amici Curiae City of South Lake Tahoe, California; El Dorado County, California; Placer County, California; Douglas County, Nevada; Carson City and County, Nevada; and Washoe County, Nevada.
    Lewis S. Feldman and Kara L. Thiel, Feldman McLaughlin Thiel LLP, Zephyr Cove, Nevada, for Amici Curiae Lake Tahoe Community College, South Shore Chamber of Commerce, North Lake Tahoe Chamber of Commerce, Sierra Nevada Association of Realtors, Incline Village Board of Realtors, Lake Tahoe Visitors Authority, Tahoe Douglas Visitors Authority, South Tahoe Alliance of Resorts, and Barton Health.
    Before: J. CLIFFORD WALLACE, ' MARY M. SCHROEDER, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

The Lake Tahoe Region is an area of unmatched beauty surrounding the largest alpine lake in North America. It first caught the world’s attention with the 1960 Winter Olympics at Squaw Valley, when the area became a recreation destination and home to a rapidly expanding population. It has since become the focus not only of admiration for the lake’s beauty and clarity, but of litigation over the efforts to preserve them. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997); People v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 916 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

This case concerns the Regional Plan Update (“RPU”) that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”) adopted in 2012 after more than ten years of work. Plaintiffs, The Sierra Club and Friends of the West Shore, are environmentalist organizations that challenged the environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for the RPU. They now appeal the district court’s summary judgment in favor of TRPA.

The RPU generally restricts future development to areas that are already developed, and sets forth the amount of further development that' will be permitted in those areas in the future. The precise nature of that development is to be determined in Area Plans to be adopted later.

Plaintiffs’ principal contentions in this appeal are that the RPU fails adequately to address the localized effects of the runoff created by the amount of development permitted, and that the RPU improperly assumes that best management practices (“BMP”s) ..can be utilized to achieve the planning goals, in light of TRPA’s poor record of enforcing BMPs in the past.

We also must consider TRPA’s challenge to standing and ripeness; While there will doubtless be more litigation concerning subsequent Area Plans, Plaintiffs’ interests in the lake are affected by the RPU, and they will have no future opportunity to challenge the policies the RPU adopts. We therefore hold that Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims that are ripe.

On the merits, however, we conclude that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of TRPA. The draft EIS drew criticisms that necessitated substantial revisions, but the final EIS for the RPU adequately addressed localized impacts on soil conservation and water quality. Notably, while California had strenuously objected to certain aspects of the draft EIS, particularly with respect to the localized impacts of runoff, both California and Nevada now urge approval of the plan, as evaluated in the final EIS. We also hold that TRPA reasonably concluded that, in light of anticipated improvements in BMP maintenance, the development permitted in the RPU would have less than a significant effect on water quality.

Our analysis must take place against the background of past efforts to maintain the pristine quality of the lake, so wé begin with an historical summary.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TRPA’S 2012 REGIONAL PLAN UPDATE

Lake Tahoe is located in the northern Sierra Nevada Mountains, and covers 191 square miles. The' Lake Tahoe Region comprises 501 square miles, including the lake. The Region encompasses the Lake Tahoe basin, a watershed situated between the main crest of the Sierra Nevada .and the Carson mountain ranges. The lake’s outlet is the Truckee River, running from the north end of Lake Tahoe to Pyramid Lake in Nevada. The basin was acquired by the United States in the mid-1800s, but later in the century, private owners acquired much of the land and converted it to agricultural use, as well as beginning the resort industry at the south end of the lake. See Richard J. Fink,, Public Land Acquisition for Environmental Protection: Structuring a Program for the Lake Tahoe Basin, 18 Ecology L.Q. 485, 493, 498-99 (1991).

Two-thirds of the region is in California and one-third is in Nevada- In the late twentieth century, the population of the region expanded by more than 70%, with the most rapid expansion, as described in the draft EIS, occurring in the 1970s.

The attraction is the lake’s size, depth, and distinctive blue color. The lake’s clarity is the result of the lack of algae. See League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 739 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1264 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 469 Fed.Appx. 621 (9th Cir. 2012). In the region’s natural state, its poorly developed soils contribute'relatively small amounts of sediment to the lake', and biological communities, known as stream environment zones (“SEZ”s), remove sediments and nutrients. See Fink, 18 Ecology L.Q. at 494.

Human activity in the late twentieth century, however, began increasing nutrients and sediments in the lake, bringing about a decline in clarity. Deposits tied to human activity were to blame. See Holly Doremus, Reinvigorating the Union of Wonder and Power, 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 281, 285 (2005). According to scientists, the loss of clarity was tied to nitrogen and phosphorous related to soil erosion, sewage discharge, and runoff from impervious developments. Id. More recently,, scientists added to the list of threats atmospheric deposits' caused by rain washing nitrogén from automobile exhaust down into the lake. Id. at 285-86; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the process of “eutrophi-cation,” by which nutrients encourage the growth of algae, which makes the water greener and less clear and depletes oxygen ■ in the water, to the detriment, of fish, and other animals). As this court has explained, artificial disturbance of the land, especially in steeper areas and areas near streams and other wetlands, greatly increases soil erosion and the flow of nutrients into the lake. Tahoe-Sierra, 322 ,F.3d at .1070. There have been other problems as well. As one district court put it, “[t]he Lake Tahoe Basin has also suffered from degradation of other, measures of water and air quality,. Many of the aesthetic and recreational values of the region have been impaired, including scenery, noise, and the ability to use the lake for recreational purposes.” League, 739 -F.Supp.2d at 1265. These declines have been caused by onshore development, piers and other structures in the lake, and emissions from motorized watercraft. Id.. ,

The visible decline in water clarity led to efforts to reduce discharges into the lake, beginning with prohibition of sewage into any waters of the Tahoe basin. See Fink, 18 Ecology L.Q. at 504, In 1968, California and Nevada entered into the first Regional Planning Compact, which Congress approved in 1969. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 729, 117 S.Ct. 1659. The Compact created TRPA to serve as a bi-state land use and environmental resource planning agency for the Lake Tahoe Region. See id.-, Compact art. 1(b). TRPA’s governing board includes a California delegation and a Nevada delegation, with delegation members appointed by various state, county, and city entities. Compact art. III(a)-(g). TRPA appoints an advisory planning commission and employs an executive officer and other staff and legal counsel. Compact arts. 111(h), IV(a).

The original Compact also adopted a system, known as the “Bailey- system,” for classifying the environmental sensitivity of the lands, with limits for the amount of development on each type. See Tahoe-Si erra, 322 F.3d at 1070. That system remains as part of TRPA’s regulatory Scheme, but was not enforced with sufficient strictness to protect the lake and its environment. As this .court explained, TRPA’s regulatory scheme, incorporating the Bailey system, “was diluted in its implementation by numerous exceptions permitting development on sensitive lands.” Id. at 1070-71. In other words, some people thought the 1969 Compact was not sufficiently anti-growth. See People, 766 F.2d at 1310.

In 1980, Congress therefore approved Compact amendments, requiring TRPA to adopt a Regional Plan, and barring any development exceeding environmental threshold carrying capacities. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 729, 117 S.Ct. 1659. The Compact, as amended, requires that the Regional Plan include a land use transportation plan, a conservation plan, a recreation plan, and a.public services and facilities plan. Compact art. V(c). Pursuant to the 1980 Compact, TRPA has adopted multiple threshold standards for, inter alia, water and air quality, fisheries, and vegetation.

TRPA adopted its first Regional Plan in 1984, but that was challenged in court by the State of California, leading to a reissuance of the Plan, adding a land classification system that rated individual land parcels on their suitability for development. The Individual Parcel Evaluation System, or “IPES,” rated the land on a scale of 0 to 1150, and only those above= an “IPES Pass-Fail Line” were eligible to apply for permission to develop parcels.'

Between 1987 and 2010, the 1987 Regional Plan was both amended and litigated. See Tahoe-Sierra, 322 F.3d at 1073-74. In 1997, TRPA adopted the “Environmental Improvement Program” as part of the Regional Plan to improve water quality, yet, according to the 2012 RPU, the primary pollutants affecting water clarity and quality remained sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorous.

’ The draft EIS for the RPU now before us concluded that the 1987 Plan was largely successful in slowing growth and making new development more environmentally compatible by “tightly controlling” what could be built on vacant land. It concluded that “the Tahoe region is now virtually at full build-out, with less than 10% of the region’s development rights remaining.”

Unfortunately, as the draft EIS explained, buildings and other uses put into place before the 1987 plan continue to cause environmental problems. Hence, the 2012 RPU was intended to address these issues. As described in the draft EIS, the 2012 RPU was intended to “repair damage of the past, while also promoting redevelopment of Tahoe’s localized town centers to accelerate obtainment of threshold standards with more environmentally appropriate and attractive structures.”

The RPU was developed by the Regional Plan Update Committee of the TRPA governing board over a period of nearly ten years. Indeed, the process took so long that Nevada passed a bill calling for the state’s withdrawal from TRPA if the plan were not updated in a timely manner. Nev. Senate Bill 271 (2011).

The RPU, adopted by TRPA’s board on December 12, 2012, and effective February 9, 2013, was meant to be a general governing document for development and environmental protection in the region, leaving more local governance to Area Plans. Such Area Plans must conform to the RPU.

. The RPU provided for the concentration of new and existing development into “community centers.” It encouraged concentrated development by allowing TRPA itself, or local governments, through the “Area Plans,” to raise density, height, and coverage limits in community centers. “Coverage” refers to the coverage of land with impervious material such as asphalt and concrete. The RPU emphasized the Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) model, which aims to reduce the total flow of certain pollutants into the lake.

REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE RPU AND ITS EIS

The events that occurred during the regulatory process following the release of the draft EIS and draft RPU, and leading to the issuance of the final EIS and final RPU, are critical to the proper understanding of the issues in this case.

The draft EIS and draft RPU were released in April 2012, with a public comment period open for 63 days, from April 26 to June 28, 2012. The draft RPU and the draft EIS were' released for public comment on April 25, 2012, followed by a series of meetings conducted by both California and Nevada to make recommendations for amendments. TRPA’s governing board voted to incorporate the revisions recommended by the RPU Committee in August 2012, and the final EIS was issued October 24, 2012.

The RPU was undertaken concurrently with two related planning efforts, a Regional Transportation Plan and a Sustainable Communities Strategy. A separate EIS was produced for these two projects. In addition, in 2011, California,' Nevada, and the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) approved the TMDL model, a water quality restoration plan that aims to reduce the total flow of certain pollutants into the lake. None of these efforts are affected directly by this litigation, but they are central to TRPA’s analysis in the RPU and EIS.

During the public comment period on the draft RPU and EIS, TRPA received comments that fill a large volume of the final EIS. The California Attorney General submitted extended comments. She expressed concerns about delegation of project approval via Area Plans, weakening of coverage requirements, and allowance-of potentially significant amounts of new development. With regard to land coverage, the . Attorney General criticized the draft EIS’s assumption that coverage could be calculated on a Basin-wide basis without regard to location and concentration of coverage. California was worried about concentrated localized pollution in the lake. The Attorney General also questioned TRPA’s allowance of coverage transfers and mitigation across the boundaries of hydrológically related areas, ie., across different watersheds. With respect to the effects of concentrated development, she stated that watershed-level or even parcel-level analysis, rather than region-wide analysis, was more consistent with the Bailey system and with available science. The Attorney General also questioned the draft EIS’s reliance on BMPs. She stated that because the track record for maintaining BMPs at Lake Tahoe was poor, the EIS “should disclose the history of neglected BMP maintenance and disclose the impacts of its alternatives assuming that past patterns of neglect continue into the future.”

Plaintiffs also submitted extensive comments addressing many of the same issues. They expressed concerns that the draft EIS, while analyzing impacts of coverage transfer on Lake Tahoe itself, did not consider “soils, vegetation, streams, fisheries and invertebrates within streams, and sensitive habitat.” They pointed out that non-degraded soils perform many functions, including “infiltration, erosion prevention, vegetation growth, and nutrient cycling.” Plaintiffs complained that the draft EIS, in considering coverage in developed areas, failed to analyze the effects on streams and the nearshore of concentrating coverage. According to Plaintiffs, the draft EIS “fails to acknowledge studies that show that urban coverage is the most detrimental coverage and fails to analyze the impact of increased and concentrated urban coverage in the Basin.”

Several commenters, including the California Tahoe Conservancy and representatives' of the EPA, expressed concern about “the consistency between and coordinated implementation of’ the TMDL, the proposed RPU, and water quality management.

The final EIS included TRPA’s responses to all of the comments received during the public comment period. While generally concluding that the draft EIS was adequate, TRPA made several significant changes to the draft RPU in response to comments.

TRPA’s “Master Response 3” addressed the California Attorney General’s and Plaintiffs’ comments criticizing the coverage standards established on a Region-wide basis and permitting transfers of coverage allowances between hydrologically related areas. TRPA’s response described the relevant comments as expressing

concern about the programmatic approach to coverage assessment presented in the Draft EIS, including the application of coverage standards on a Region-wide versus a parcel-by-parcel basis; potential undercounting of coverage by excluding consideration-.of some ‘soft’ coverage in the Basin; and the differences in impact between hard and soft coverage,

TRPA explained that in response to these comments, it had decided, among other things, to continue to prohibit coverage transfers between hydrologically related areas, rather than to start allowing such transfers in the RPU. TRPA pointed out, however, that Region-wide, rather than pareel-by~parcel or sub-watershed scale analysis was appropriate because the RPU was regional in scope, and the Bailey method did not require parcél-by-parcel analysis.

In “Master Response 4,” addressing comments on coordination between the RPU and the TMDL, TRPA explained that it had made changes. The final RPU “includes important new features that address the relationship between the Regional Plan and the TMDL, specifically in the use of the TMDL water quality improvement plan and TMDL reporting information in the re-certification of Area Plans ... and revisions that create alignment in reporting requirements.”

In other Master Responses, TRPA addressed the comments expressing concern about the effects of more concentrated development on water quality.

[C]omments suggest that policies incen-tivizing additional concentration of development in community centers could have localized adverse impacts on water quality, including on nearshore and tributary conditions. Concerns are expressed that the Draft EIS analysis does not adequately account for the fact that community centers are near, the Lake, pollutant loading may be higher in community centers than in outlying areas, and BMPs may not be adequate to mitigate the impact,

TRPA stated its conclusion that the concerns were not warranted, describing the draft EIS as “adequate as presented,” and stating that “policies that incentivize transfers of development and additional concentration of coverage in specific areas would not result in significant impacts to water quality.” Nevertheless, TRPA made modifications to the draft RPU, which- it said were required in order to “narrow the scope of changes to coverage policies.” In addition, TRPA prepared a “Pollutant Load Reduction Model” (“PLRM”) storm-water modeling simulation, used to estimate localized water quality impacts of concentrating development within community centers. It added the PLRM to the final EIS in order to better gauge the effect of concentrated development on the lake.

TRPA made other significant changes to the draft RPU as well. In response to comments on the impact of revised height and density allowances for community centers, the final RPU included more scenic protections. In response to comments about the feasibility of a program of incentives for the transfer of development rights from sensitive and outlying areas into designated community centers, the final RPU retained the transfer incentive ratios set forth in the draft RPU, but made revisions such as limiting allowances for alternative transfer ratios for Stream Restoration Plan-Areas. TRPA also revised RPU provisions regarding banked assets such as development rights in order to strengthen regulation of their use. In response to comments about development on recreation-designated lands, TRPA revised the draft RPU to reduce the areas to be re-designated and to require additional planning and regulatory approvals through Area Plan conformance review prior to any development on land designated “Resort Recreation.” In connection with concerns about exhaust emissions caused by vehicles traveling additional'miles because of additional development, the draft RPU was revised in several ways, including the establishment of additional limitations for the future expansion of community centers.

The California Attorney General had made significant critical comments about the draft EIS’s reliance on BMPs that had failed to be effective in the past. The final EIS included a description of numerous efforts that were to be made to improve the situation. It concluded that “[biased on the current maintenance requirements and practices, education efforts, and enforcement requirements ..., it is valid to assume that implementation of BMPs would be effective.”

In response to comments about the approval process for Area Plans, TRPA made some changes to the draft RPU’s provisions regarding approval of Area Plans. TRPA added an appeals process for all delegated projects, and' it reduced the maximum size of projects that could be reviewed and approved by other agencies through an Area Plan.

In summary, in response to negative comments, particularly from the State of California and Plaintiffs, TRPA made material revisions to the draft RPU and the draft EIS. It retained the prohibition against coverage transfers between hydro-logieally related areas. It coordinated the RPU more closely with the TMDL. It cut back the proposed increases in maximum allowable coverage for redevelopment projects in community centers. It added more scenic protections, and it cut back draft RPU provisions regarding development on recreation-designated land. It strengthened the process for revising Area Plans. TRPA, specifically in response to concerns about the concentrated effects of increased runoff, added the PLRM stormwater modeling simulation to the final EIS.

TRPA issued the final EIS on October 24, 2012. The final RPU was adopted by TRPA’s governing board on December 12, 2012, and took effect on February 9, 2013. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the federal district court on February 11, 2013. The district court granted TRPA’s motion for summary judgment, in April 2014, and these appeals by plaintiff environmentalist organizations followed.

This court has received amicus briefs in support of affirming the district court by (1) City of Lake Tahoe, El Dorado County, Placer County, California, Douglas County, Carson City and County, and Washoe County, Nevada; and (2) Lake Tahoe Community College, South Shore Chamber of Commerce, North Lake Tahoe Chamber of Commerce, Sierra Nevada Association of Realtors, Lake Tahoe Visitors Authority, Tahoe Douglas Visitors Authority, South Tahoe Alliance of Resorts and Barton Health. Perhaps most significantly, the California Natural Resources Agency and Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources have filed a joint ami-cus brief in support of TRPA.

STANDING AND RIPENESS

TRPA contends that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this challenge to the impacts from the concentration of development, and that their claims are unripe, because no increase in coverage had yet been approved pursuant to any Area Plan. We disagree. Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing to challenge the EIS because they have concrete interests in the Lake Tahoe Region. See W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 485 (9th Cir. 2010). Their .challenge is ripe because any violation of the Compact or applicable environmental laws resulting from the RPU and EIS has already taken place; Plaintiffs did not need to wait for Area Plans to be approved before bringing this suit. See id. at 486.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 2016). Since TRPA is not a federal agency, the Compact, and not the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), provides the applicable standard of review of TRPA actions.

Under the Compact, “judicial inquiry shall extend only to the questions of whether [TRPA’s legislative] act or decision has been arbitrary, capricious or lacking substantial evidentiary support or whether the agency has failed to proceed in a manner required by law.” Compact art. VI(j)(5). This standard is similar to review under the APA, which provides that a federal agency action must be upheld unless it is “‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ ” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 601 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 948 & 950, 190 L.Ed.2d 830 (2015); League, 739 F.Supp.2d at 1267.

ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFFS’ CONTENTIONS

I. Localized Effects of Concentrated Development

Plaintiffs contend that the EIS violated Compact article VII(a)(2)(A) by failing to take a hard look at impacts on soil conservation and water quality in the localized “community center” areas where concentrated development is directed. We conclude that the EIS’s analysis of the effects of concentrating development was not arbitrary or capricious, and sufficiently addressed significant environmental impacts of the RPU.

TRPA may not amend the Regional Plan unless it finds that the Plan, “as amended, achieves and maintains the [threshold standards].” TRPA Code § 4.5; Sierra Club, 916 F.Supp.2d at 1105. Article VII of the Compact requires that “when acting upon matters that have a significant effect on the environment,” TRPA must “[p]repare and consider a detailed environmental impact statement.” Compact art. VII(a)(2). This EIS must include, among other things: “(A) The significant environmental impacts of the proposed project; [and] (B) Any significant adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the project be implemented.” Compact art. VH(a)(2)(A)-(B). The EIS required by the Compact is similar to the EIS required by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), and to the reporting required by the California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21100. Decisions under NEPA are authoritative. League, 739 F.Supp.2d at 1266, 1274; see also Glenbrook Homeowners Ass’n v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 425 F.3d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that NEPA does not directly apply to TRPA). An EIS is a procedural requirement with two purposes: (1) ensuring that agencies carefully consider information about significant environmental impacts, and (2) informing the public of relevant information. Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n v. Vilsack, 816 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016); Lands Council v. McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010).

The draft EIS conducted a region-wide analysis of the impacts of increased coverage (meaning coverage of land with concrete, asphalt, etc.). The draft EIS stated:

Incentivizing coverage transfers and redevelopment by allowing up to 70 percent coverage, on high-capacity developed parcels in [community centers] would increase coverage in these target areas. However, the additional coverage allowed on [these lands] would be directly offset by coverage transferred from sensitive land or more than offset on an acre-for-acre basis by transfers from high-capability land, resulting in an overall reduction of coverage in the Region and, importantly, reduction of coverage from SEZs [Stream Environment Zones] and other sensitive lands.

The draft EIS concluded that the proposed RPU (“Alternative 3” of the five alternative actions analyzed by TRPA) would comply with the total allowable coverage for the Region as determined by the Bailey system and would have a “less-than-significant impact on coverage in the Region.” The draft EIS also concluded that Alternative 3 would have a “less than significant” impact on water quality.

In response to comments on the importance of soil conservation at the local scale, TRPA explained that more localized analysis would be too speculative- at that stage. The final EIS stated: “The Draft EIS evaluates coverage from a programmatic policy perspective, with a level of detail and degree of specificity appropriate to analysis of a Regional Plan; a parcel-by-parcel analysis would be neither feasible nor necessary.” TRPA further explained that even sub-watershed analysis was infeasible because the agency would be “forced to speculate where specific future projects would be proposed and where coverage would be removed.”

As the district court concluded, the RPU’s general shift from the Bailey system, addressing coverage, to the TMDL model, aimed at water quality restoration, was within TRPA’s discretion. See Native Ecosystems Council v. Weldon, 697 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding, in a NEPA case, that a court must be at its most deferential in reviewing an agency’s scientific determinations).

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the EIS violated Compact article VII(a)(2)(A)’s requirement of environmental analysis by addressing only the general region-wide impacts of coverage changes, and failing to address the effects of concentrated development on local watersheds in community centers, where coverage is already high, even though Plaintiffs, as well as the California Attorney General, presented extensive evidence of these effects. Plaintiffs argue that they did not seek study of site-specific project impacts, but instead sought an analysis of the cumulative impacts of many projects over larger areas, such as watersheds or sub-watersheds. They contend that the public and decision makers had no opportunity to weigh tradeoffs between cumulative impacts of local soil loss and any environmental benefits of concentrated development.

We can reject TRPA’s analysis of the effects of concentrating development in community centers 'only if it is arbitrary or capricious. See Compact art. VRj)(5). It was not. The final EIS adequately addressed concerns raised about the draft EIS., As to water quality, the PLRM stormwater modeling simulation, which was included in the final EIS, addressed localized effects on those parts of the lake near community centers. As described in the final EIS, the PLRM simulation developed for the TMDL, part of the water quality restoration plan approved by California, Nevada, and the EPA, took into account available information. It incorporated data “on land use types, impervious coverage, and BMP implementation to generate estimates of fine sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus loading and stormwa-ter runoff’ in order to “estimate the relative changes in pollutant loading that could occur within community centers.” With regard to water quality, the final EIS addressed effects of concentrated development on a localized scale similar to the one advocated by Plaintiffs. The final EIS adequately explained the basis for its conclusion that concentrating development in community centers would not result in more concentrated runoff. The final RPU also maintained the prohibition of transfers of coverage across watersheds. Under the TRPA Code and the final RPU, all transferred coverage must come from the same hydrologically related area. TRPA Code § 30.4.3.E.

The final EIS also adequately addressed effects on soil conservation. In studying the proposed RPU, a region-wide plan, TRPA was not required to perform site-specific analysis of impacts on soil conservation. As TRPA stated in response to comments, evaluation of coverage at a more localized scale would occur, as part of the Area Plan process, prior to development taking place. See Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that agency must balance need' for comprehensive analysis against considerations of practicality); Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that deferral of site-specific analysis was proper under NEPA for program-wide EIS), clarified by 366 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition, as TRPA argues, the PLRM simulation includes soil conservation components.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the draft EIS addressed cumulative effects on biological resources. With regard to biological resources, the draft EIS also stated that Alternative 3, the RPU, “would result in increased permeability, reduced urban runoff, and commensurate improvements in water quality, soil conditions; and habitat for vegetation and wildlife.” TRPA acted within its discretion in its choice of scientific methodology, see Alaska Survival v. Surface Transp. Bd., 705 F.3d 1073, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013), and its organization and presentation of information in the EIS, see Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Connell, 725 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2013). TRPA was not required to conduct additional scientific studies to determine an environmental threshold for conservation of soil at a local or watershed level before analyzing the impacts of region-wide coverage changes. See N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that an agency is not required to address every possible scientific uncertainty). The EIS’s analysis of the effects of concentrating development was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not violate Compact article VII(a)(2)(A) by failing to address significant environmental impacts of the RPU. See Compact art. VRj)(5); Protect Our Gmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 578.

II. Best Management Practices

Plaintiffs contend that TRPA improperly assumed, without adequate analysis and hence in violation of Compact article VII(a)(2)(A), that BMPs would reduce water quality impacts of concentrated development under the RPU even though TRPA has a poor track record of enforcing BMPs. We conclude that the EIS’s assumptions regarding BMPs were not arbitrary or capricious, and were supported by substantial evidence. See Compact art. VRj)(5).

The TRPA Code provides that BMPs “shall be applied to all public and privately owned lands.” TRPA Code § 60.4.2. BMPs are described in the 2012 Handbook of Best Management Practices, found in volume II of the Lake Tahoe Basin Water Quality Management Plan. TRPA Code § 60.4.2. The RPU requires the installation and maintenance of BMPs in accordance with the Handbook. The Handbook states that BMPs are -practices “that reduce or prevent the pollutants of concern identified in the Lake Tahoe Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) and other pollutants from entering surface and ground waters.” The TRPA Code provides for temporary BMPs for construction sites, permanent BMPs for construction projects (as a condition of project approval), and retrofit BMPs. TRPA Code §§ 60.4.3, 60.4.4.

The TRPA Code and Handbook have several provisions relating to maintenance and enforcement. The Code requires that “BMPs shall be maintained to ensure their continued effectiveness.” TRPA Code § 60.4.9. The Code provides that TRPA shall enforce BMP project compliance programs, including the implementation and maintenance of temporary BMPs on construction sites and the application of permanent BMPs on projects. TRPA Code § 60.4.3. The Handbook provides that BMPs “are designed to reduce the impacts of stormwater pollutants and increased runoff on Lake Tahoe’s famed clarity. Without regular maintenance, BMPs lose their -effectiveness, resulting in increased runoff and discharge of pollutants to Lake Tahoe.” The Handbook acknowledges, however, that maintenance of BMPs is “frequently neglected.” Accordingly, the Handbook states that building permits will require a BMP inspection and maintenance plan as a condition of approval, and land owners and managers will be required to keep inspection and maintenance logs.

In its analysis of the effects of the RPU on water quality, the draft EIS concluded that the effects of increased coverage in community centers would be “less than significant” because the additional coverage “would be required to meet existing BMP standards to control potential increases in stormwater runoff and pollutant loading ..., including maintenance requirements.” The draft EIS summarized .existing policies regarding BMP requirements and stated that 34% of land parcels in the Tahoe Region had obtained a BMP Certificate by installing BMPs that met TRPA requirements.

The reliance on BMPs in the draft EIS drew critical comments. The California Attorney General commented that the EIS “should disclose [the Region’s] history of neglected BMP maintenance and disclose the impacts of its alternatives assuming that past patterns of neglect continue into the future.” Plaintiffs commented that for “longer term impacts related to increased coverage—more runoff and the increased pollutant loads from new construction—the alternatives that allow more coverage need to have increased regulatory authority (and stable, funding) for inspections and enforcement of coverage and BMP maintenance and operation requirements for ... new projects.”

The final EIS responded that steps had been taken to improve the situation and went on to explain what they were. The final EIS stated: “Based on the current maintenance requirements and practices, education efforts, and enforcement requirements summarized below, it is valid to assume that implementation of BMPs would be effective.” The final EIS then listed TRPA Code § 60.4.9, BMP Handbook Chapter 6, a Home Landscaping Guide for. Lake Tahoe and Vicinity, and a contractor’s manual that is included-in the curriculum of an annual BMP contractors workshop conducted by TRPA. The final EIS also stated that TRPA had received grant funding for BMP inspection, TRPA inspectors enforce temporary BMP maintenance during construction projects, TRPA had received grant funding for a residential BMP maintenance video, TRPA had received grant funding for the sending of BMP maintenance reminders, and there were pending grant proposals related to the enhancement of maintenance tracking. The final EIS further explained that the RPU encouraged the use of area-wide water quality treatment facilities, which could “lead to more efficient maintenance practices relative to conducting maintenance activities on many smaller and widely distributed parcels and sites.”

TRPA thus contends on appeal that the EIS properly relied on BMPs and their effective implementation in support of its conclusion that concentrated development would have a less than significant impact on water quality. As TRPA points out, the 2012 BMP Handbook acknowledges past failures in maintenance and incorporates that experience into updated BMP guidelines. For example,- according to the Handbook, project permits require a BMP inspection and maintenance plan, and land owners and managers are required to keep inspection and maintenance logs. TRPA also cites the public outreach programs listed in the final EIS as part of the agency’s efforts to improve BMP maintenance. See San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 817 F.3d 653, 660 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that courts may consider responses to comments for confirmation that an agency has taken a “hard look” at an issue). We must conclude that TRPA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on its plan to better implement and maintain BMPs. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding an environmental assessment for a timber sale under NEPA); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a planned monitoring program for grazing under the National Forest Management Act because it was rational for the Forest Service to conclude that despite past failures, monitoring should continue).

Plaintiffs cite statistics regarding the relative lack of past success of TRPA’s BMP retrofit program. As TRPA argues, however, the RPU provides incentives for redevelopment and thus is designed to move properties from TRPA’s retrofit program into its mandatory permitting program for new development, which requires BMP maintenance plans and logs. TRPA reasonably relied on data in the record in concluding that despite the agency’s imperfect past enforcement of BMP maintenance, the RPU would have a less-than-significant effect on water quality. See Lands Council, 629 F.3d at 1076-77 (upholding a forest plan under the National Forest Management Act). Plaintiffs cite Friends of Back Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 681 F.3d 581, 589 (4th Cir. 2012), where the court invalidated an environmental assessment under NEPA because a boat speed limit that an agency had not enforced was - insufficient assur-anee that a project’s boating impacts on wildlife would be mitigated. In this case, TRPA provided significant assurances of future enforcement. TRPA’s assumptions regarding BMPs were supported by substantial evidence and are entitled to deference. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 833 F.3d 1136, 1148-49 (9th Cir.2016).

III. Costs

The district court awarded costs pursuant to TRPA Rule 10.6.2, which provides that any agency costs in the preparation of the administrative record for a legal action be borne by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that the rule unfairly makes them responsible for such costs even if they prevail. Plaintiffs, however, did not prevail before the district court, nor have they prevailed on appeal. Accordingly, we do not need to address whether TRPA Rule 10.6.2 is a statutorily-authorized exception to the general rule, set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), that costs should be allowed to the prevailing party. Whether Rule 10.6.2 was authorized by Compact art. VIII is a question for another day. Because we affirm the district court’s decision in favor of TRPA, the district court did not err in imposing costs, nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs reimbursement for certain costs. See Kalitta Air L.L.C. v. Cent. Tex. Airborne Sys. Inc., 741 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.


author: WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Hannah FREDRICKSON; Ashley Krening; Maurialee Bracke, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a Washington corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-36067
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted March 9, 2016, Portland, Oregon
    Filed November 3, 2016

      Jon M. Egan (argued), Jon M. Egan PC, Lake Oswego, Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.-
    Pratik A, Shah (argued), Daniel L. Nash, James E. Tysse, and Z.W. Julius Chen, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, D.C.; Gregory W, Knopp and Rex S. Heinke, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles, California; Carol J. Bernick, Christopher F. McCracken, and Derek D. Green, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, Oregon; for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: RAYMOND C. FISHER and PAUL J. WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and DONALD E. WALTER, Senior District Judge.

       The Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior District Judge for the U.S, District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

   OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

' This is a class action brought against Starbucks by three baristas who used to work at the company’s coffee shops in Oregon. They challenge the legality of Starbucks’ practice of withholding state and federal toes from baristas’ paychecks based on the cash tips they receive. We must decide whether the district court-may hear this case given the constraints imposed by the Tax Injunction Act, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the federal-state comity doctrine.

I

A familiar sight at any neighborhood Starbucks is the tip jar near the cash register inviting customers to leave tips for the baristas. According to the plaintiffs (and what follows is drawn entirely from their complaint), the baristas pool the tips left by customers and divide them up at the end of each week. As a general practice, the baristas do not report to Starbucks how much they receive in tips. Instead, for tax withholding purposes, the company simply imputes 50 cents per hour in estimated tip income to each barista and withholds state and federal taxes from the baristas’ paychecks based on that amount.

The plaintiffs allege that neither state nor federal tax law allows Starbucks to withhold taxes in this fashion. They contend that federal law permits employers to withhold federal taxes based on estimated tip income only in certain circumstances not met here, and that Oregon law does not treat the baristas’ tips as wages subject to withholding of state taxes at all.

The plaintiffs filed a class action against Starbucks in Oregon state court on behalf of all current and former baristas employed at the company’s- coffee shops in Oregon. Their complaint asserts five state-law causes of action, each predicated on the alleged- violation of an Oregon wage- and-hour statute. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 652.120, 652.140, 652.610, 653.025, 653.261. Each claim alleges that Starbucks violated state wage-and-hour laws by deducting taxes from the baristas’ paychecks in a manner not authorized by state or federal law, thereby failing to pay the bar-istas their full wages when due.

The plaintiffs do not seek actual damages; they have been able to recover any taxes wrongfully withheld by filing their annual tax returns and obtaining refunds for any over-withholding that occurred. They instead seek statutory damages, which differ depending on the statute in-, voked. As to some of the claims, Oregon law allows an employee who was not paid her full wages when due to recover up to 30 days of wages as a penalty. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 652.150, 653.055. The plaintiffs seek 30 days of wages per barista for each of those claims. As to the remaining claim, Oregon law authorizes an employee to recover a $200 statutory penalty for any wrongful deduction from wages. § 652.615. The plaintiffs seek a penalty of $200 per paycheck for each barista, on their view that the wrongful deduction provision applies to each paycheck and allows for only one violation based on the total amount wrongfully deducted.

The complaint also requests declaratory and injunctive relief barring Starbucks from continuing to withhold state and federal taxes based on the imputed 50 cents per hour in tip income. (Because nothing ultimately turns on it, we need not decide whether the -three named plaintiffs, who are no longer employed by Starbucks, have Article III standing to seek prospective relief.)

Starbucks removed the case to federal court, and the plaintiffs now concede that the Class Action Fairness Act provides a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Shortly after removing the case, Starbucks moved to dismiss the complaint-with prejudice on the ground that all of the plaintiffs’ claims are either preempted by federal tax law or barred under Oregon law. The plaintiffs opposed Starbucks’ motion and filed their own motion requesting that the case' be remanded to state court. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion, granted Starbucks’ motion, and entered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.

II

Before we can address the merits of the district court’s ruling, we must decide whether the district court had the authority to hear this case. That requires us to unpack the plaintiffs’ claims, both m terms of the relief they seek and -the-theories of liability they assert. The plaintiffs seek two distinct forms of relief: declaratory and injunctive relief on the one hand, and statutory damages on the other. And their claims under Oregon’s wage-and-hpur statutes are predicated on alleged violations of both state and federal tax law:. They -contend that Oregon law does not authorize Starbucks to withhold the state taxes at issue, and that federal law does not authorize Starbucks to withhold the federal taxes at issue.

We explain first why the district court lacks the authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to either the state-tax component or the federal-tax component of the plaintiffs’ claims. We then explain why the district court is also foreclosed from awarding statutory damages, which requires that the entire case be remanded to state court.

A

We begin with the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Starbucks’ withholding of state taxes. Congress has sharply curtailed the authority of federal courts to issue declaratory or injunctive relief that impedes the administration of state tax laws. The Tax Injunction Act provides: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. No one disputes that a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy is available to the plaintiffs in Oregon’s courts, and it is well settled that the Tax Injunction Act bars the entry of declaratory judgments to the same extent that it bars the issuance of injunctions. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-11, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982). Thus, the only question is whether the declaratory and injunctive relief the plaintiffs seek would “enjoin, suspend or restrain”—that is, stop—the collection of state taxes within the meaning of the Act. Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 1132-33, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015).

We think the plaintiffs’ requested relief would do just that. The plaintiffs want the district court to declare that Starbucks’ withholding of state taxes on the basis of imputed tip income is illegal under Oregon law and to enjoin Starbucks from continuing to engage in that practice. The Supreme Court has held that an employer’s withholding of tax payments from wages constitutes a method of tax “collection,” and that an order enjoining employer withholding therefore stops collection of the tax. United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7, 10, 95 S.Ct. 13, 42 L.Ed.2d 7 (1974) (per curiam). (American Friends involved the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), which bars actions seeking to restrain the collection of federal taxes, but the Court construes the two Acts in tandem. See Direct Marketing, 135 S.Ct. at 1129.) The Third Circuit has squarely held that the Tax Injunction Act bars actions, like this one, seeking to enjoin an employer’s withholding of state taxes from wages. Sipe v. Amerada Hess Corp., 689 F.2d 396, 401-03 (3d Cir. 1982). And the Fourth Circuit has held that withholding state taxes from lottery winnings is part of a State’s collection of taxes and therefore may not be enjoined under the Act. International Lotto Fund v. Virginia State Lottery Department, 20 F.3d 589, 591-93 (4th Cir. 1994). We agree with the Third and Fourth Circuits and hold that the Tax Injunction Act bars the district court from enjoining Starbucks’ withholding of state taxes from the baris-tas’ paychecks.

Our holding is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004), which explained that the Tax Injunction Act serves “state-revenue-protective objectives” and accordingly applies only if the requested relief would “reduce the flow of state tax revenue.” Id. at 104, 106, 124 S.Ct. 2276; see May Trucking Co. v. Oregon Department of Transportation, 388 F.3d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court concluded that the Act did not bar a challenge to state tax credits because granting the relief the plaintiffs sought (invalidation of the credits) would actually have increased, not reduced, the flow of state tax revenue. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 96, 124 S.Ct. 2276. Granting the declaratory and injunctive relief requested here, by contrast, would reduce the flow of state tax revenue: If the relief were granted, Starbucks would no longer collect the state taxes in question and would no longer remit those funds to Oregon’s treasury.

It is true that the plaintiffs are not challenging the amount in taxes ultimately owed, but that was also true in American Friends and Sipe yet did not change the outcome. See American Friends, 419 U.S. at 8, 95 S.Ct. 13; Sipe, 689 F.2d at 402. That the plaintiffs concede the baristas’ tips are taxable income under Oregon law does not alter the revenue-reducing effect of the relief they seek. Even though the plaintiffs may owe the same amount in taxes at the end of the year regardless of whether Starbucks collects those taxes through withholding, that does not mean Oregon’s tax revenue would remain the same in the absence of withholding. If withholding were enjoined, Oregon would no longer receive taxes on the baristas’ tip income unless the baristas report that income on their tax returns and have the money to pay the taxes owed when it comes time to file their returns. There is no basis for us to assume that would happen. Indeed, it is for this very reason that States collect taxes through paycheck withholding in the first place. Because the requested declaratory and injunctive relief would stop, not merely inhibit, the flow of tax revenue into Oregon’s coffers, the Tax Injunction Act strips the district court of jurisdiction to award such relief. See Direct Marketing, 135 S.Ct. at 1133.

Our holding is also consistent with the scope of the Tax Injunction Act outlined by the Supreme Court in Direct Marketing. The plaintiffs there challenged the constitutionality of certain notice and reporting requirements designed to facilitate Colorado’s collection of sales and use taxes. Id. at 1128. The Court held that, although the notice and reporting requirements “may improve Colorado’s ability to assess and ultimately collect its sales and use taxes,” the Tax Injunction Act is “not keyed to all activities that may improve a State’s ability to assess and collect taxes.” Id. at 1131. Instead, the Court held, the Act is “keyed to the acts of assessment, levy, and collection themselves, and enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements is none of these.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the plaintiffs challenge their employer’s withholding practices. As explained above, an employer’s withholding of taxes constitutes a method of tax “collection,” and an order enjoining that withholding stops collection of the tax. American Friends, 419 U.S. at 10, 95 S.Ct. 13. Accordingly, this case falls within the scope of the Tax Injunction Act contemplated by Direct Marketing.

For similar reasons, we conclude that the district court lacks jurisdiction to issue declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to Starbucks’ withholding of federal taxes. The Anti-Injunction Act—the counterpart to the Tax Injunction Act applicable to federal taxes—provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,” subject to several exceptions that do not apply here. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Like the Tax Injunction Act, the Anti-Injunction Act applies to claims for declaratory as well as injunctive relief. See Hansen v. Department of Treasury, 528 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2007). As noted above, the Supreme Court has squarely held that the Anti-Injunction Act bars actions against an employer’s withholding of federal taxes from wages. American Friends, 419 U.S. at 10, 95 S.Ct. 13; see Maxfield v. U.S. Postal Service, 752 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1984). Our analysis of the' bar imposed by the Tax Injunction Act with respect to the state-tax component of the plaintiffs’ claims applies equally under the Anti-Injunction Act to the federal-tax component of their claims. The district court therefore lacks jurisdiction to issue declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Starbucks’ withholding of state or federal taxes.

B

We next consider whether the district court had the authority to entertain -the plaintiffs’ claims for statutory damages. Those claims are again predicated on Starbucks’ alleged violation of both state and federal tax law.

As to the state-tax component of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the Tax Injunction Act bars claims for damages. That is a question we need not resolve because an award of statutory damages is precluded here by the federal-state comity doctrine.

In cases involving state taxes, the comity doctrine establishes an even “[m]ore embracive” prudential rule that federal courts should refrain from hearing “claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration.” Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417, 130 S.Ct. 2323, 176 L.Ed.2d 1131 (2010). The comity doctrine extends to claims seeking damages based on the same federalism'concerns animating the Tax Injunction Act’s limits on declaratory and injunctive relief. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107, 115-16, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981); Marvin F. Poer & Co. v. Counties of Alameda, 725 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984); Sipe, 689 F.2d at 403-04. That the plaintiffs seek to recover only statutory damages, and not the tax amounts said to be improperly collected, does not matter. Fair Assessment itself involved a claim for punitive damages in addition to actual damages, 454 U.S. at 106, 102 S.Ct. 177, and the alleged damages in Sipe included statutory penalties, 689 F.2d at 399-400.

Any award of statutory damages here would have the same disruptive effect as entry of a declaratory judgment or issuance of an injunction, thereby undermining the state-revenue-protective objectives of the Tax Injunction Act. See May Trucking Co., 388 F.3d at 1274. To award statutory damages, the district court would first have to declare that Oregon law prohibits Starbucks’ practice of withholding state taxes on the basis of imputed tip income, and Starbucks would of course cease doing so in order to avoid future liability. See Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 113, 102 S.Ct. 177. The impermissible end result, as with declaratory or injunctive relief, would be to stop the flow of tax revenue into Oregon’s coffers.

As Starbucks notes, the plaintiffs do not aim to invalidate Oregon’s tax laws as unconstitutional or to drag state officers into federal court to defend those laws, factors that contributed to the comity concerns in Fair Assessment. Id. at 115-16, 102 S.Ct. 177. But the damages relief sought by thé plaintiffs would nonetheless “halt” a part of Oregon’s tax scheme. Id. at 115, 102 S.Ct. 177. The fact that the plaintiffs seek to disrupt this scheme by attempting to enforce their own interpretation of state tax law rather than asserting a federal constitutional challenge actually strengthens the case for comity. Precisely because the plaintiffs’ claims turn solely on the proper interpretation of state law, there is no federal interest involved in the dispute, which Oregon’s courts are better equipped to resolve given their greater familiarity with the nuances of state tax law. Nor does the fact that the plaintiffs have sued a private employer rather than state officials change the analysis, for Starbucks has been sued—and is before the court defending its tax withholding practices—only in its role as the State’s “private collection agent[].” Brennan v. Southwest Airlines Co., 134, F.3d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir. 1998) (alteration omitted).

Starbucks’ reliance on Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1986), is again unavailing. There, an employee alleged that his employer’s withholding of state and federal taxes breached his employment contract, and we refused to remand his claim challenging the withholding of state taxes to state court. We declined to invoke the comity doctrine because the “state income taxation system [was] not at issue” in the case. Id. at 771. Resolution of the plaintiffs challenge to the withholding of state taxes turned entirely on the validity of his challenge to the withholding of federal taxes, because a state regulation directed the plaintiffs employer to withhold state taxes from his paycheck if the employer was required-to withhold federal taxes. We first determined that the plaintiffs federal withholding challenge was utterly frivolous. We then held that, to conserve judicial resources, the district court properly disposed of the plaintiffs equally frivolous challenge to state-tax withholding without remanding that portion of the case to state court. Id. Bright did not involve a dispute, like this one, over the proper interpretation of state law—a dispute, as we have said, that is best left to the Oregon courts to resolve.

What remains is the federal-tax component of the plaintiffs’ claims for statutory-damages. We need not decide whether the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act extends to. the plaintiffs’ requested damages relief because the plaintiffs may not pursue the federal-tax component of their claims on a standalone basis. The plaintiffs have pleaded each of their claims in a unitary fashion such that the improper withholding of either state or federal taxes would entitle each class member to the same indivisible statutory penalty. For some of their claims, the plaintiffs seek a single statutory penalty of 30 days’ wages for each barista, which each' barista may recover only once regardless of whether their wages were subject to improper deductions for state taxes, federal taxes, or both. The same is true for the $200 statutory penalty per paycheck, which the plaintiffs assert may be recovered only once for the total amount wrongfully deducted. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claims for damages cannot be severed into separate state-tax and federal-tax components; for each claim, the plaintiffs have pleaded two theories of liability for the same relief to cure the same wrong. Starbucks concedes this point in its brief, acknowledging that “each of the five counts alleged in the complaint weaves predicate federal- and state-law theories into a unitary state-law claim that must be heard in either state or federal court, but not both.”

Under the Tax Injunction Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The federal-state comity doctrine bars the district court from awarding statutory damages on the state-tax component of the plaintiffs’ claims, from which the federal-tax component cannot be severed. Because all of the claims are jurisdictionally barred or foreclosed by the comity doctrine, the entire action must be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Hawthorne Savings F.S.B. v. Reliance Insurance Co. of Illinois, 421 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2005).

We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to remand the case to state court.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

      , Starbucks contends that Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1986), compels a different result because the court there did not hold that the Tax Injunction Act barred an employee’s breach-of-contract action against his employer for withholding state taxes from his paychecks. Bright does not control the outcome in this case. Although Bright mentioned the Tax Injunction Act in a footnote, the court engaged in no analysis as to whether it applied there, while at the same time holding that the Anti-Injunction Act did
        apply with respect to the analogous claim against the withholding of federal taxes. See id. at 770, 771 n.6.