author: HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge:

text:
    Charles BRIDGES, Appellant, v. Sharon Pratt KELLY, et al., Appellees.
    No. 95-7038.
    United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
    Argued April 22, 1996.
    Decided May 31, 1996.

      Charles Bridges, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant'.
    Martin B. White, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellees, with whom Charles F. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Lutz A Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief. Garland Pinkston, Jr., Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.
    Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
   Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge:

Appellant Charles Bridges was terminated from his position as an attorney-advisor in the District of Columbia’s Department of Administrative Services (“DAS”) pursuant to a 1993 reduction-in-force (“RIF”) action. Appellant brought suit in federal court against the District of Columbia (“D.C.” or “the District”) and various D.C. officials, alleging that his 1993 termination was the last in a series of actions taken against him in retaliation for his filing of a lawsuit challenging a 1991 RIF notice that was canceled before it took effect. In his complaint, which alleges violations of rights protected under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), the Veterans Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021. (1988) (“VRA”), and the United States Constitution, appellant requests reinstatement with associated benefits, a total of $8 million in compensatory damages, and a total of $20 million in punitive damages.

Prior to filing his action in District Court, appellant exercised his right under D.C. law to appeal his 1993 termination to the District’s Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”). Although this administrative appeal was filed on or about August 13,1993, and the statutory deadlines for OEA action have long passed, appellant’s OEA claim has not yet been adjudicated and remains pending before the local agency. On the assumption that the matters in issue in the federal court action could be pursued before the OEA, the District Court applied the doctrine of equitable restraint, set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny, and dismissed appellant’s complaint.

Appellees concede in their brief before this court that a Younger-grounded dismissal was improper as to certain of appellant’s claims, but not as to all. Brief for Appellees at 6, 8, 14. We find that, even assuming, arguendo, that the Younger doctrine may be employed in lawsuits involving the District of Columbia, Younger clearly has no application here. This is because, in the instant case, appellant has raised federal claims and sought relief that are beyond the compass of the D.C. administrative/judicial system. In particular, it is conceded that appellant could not receive from the D.C. system the full panoply of remedies available to him from the District Court in connection with his federal claims. On this record, we hold that there was no basis for a dismissal of appellant’s' lawsuit pursuant to Younger. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.BacKground

A. The Complaint Allegations and Prayer for Relief

According to Ms complaint, appellant held a position of attorney-advisor and functioned as a claims officer in the District’s DAS for five years prior to his termination in 1993. Appellant’s troubles with the District began in the Fall of 1991, shortly after Ms return from active service .with, the Urnted States Army Reserves in the Persian Gulf War. By letter dated October 1, 1991, the District notified appellant that, pursuant to a RIF being undertaken pursuant to the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978 Emergency Amend-, ment Act of 1991, 38 D.C.Reg. 4935 (1991), he would be terminated effective November 8,1991.

Appellant filed a lawsuit challenging the separation notice as violative of, inter alia, his retention rights under the VRA, wMch mandates that reservists returning to their old jobs following a period of active duty cannot be discharged, except for cause, for a period of one year. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)(1) & 2024(b) (1988). The complaint states that the Urnted States Department of Labor (“DOL”) also intervened on appellant’s behalf in contesting the separation notice. Complaint ¶ 5, reprinted in Appellant’s Appendix (“App.”) Section B; see also 38 U.S.C. § 2025 (1988) (The VRA directs DOL to assist veterans in resuming their former positions upon returning from active duty.). In recogmtion of appellant’s retention protection, the District canceled the October 1 separation notice on October 28, 1991.

Appellant alleges in his complaint that, following the District’s rescission of the October 1991 separation notice, Ms supervisors “subjected [him] to a continuous pattern of harassment for nearly two years ... in retaliation for [Ms] law suit” challenging the separation notice. Complaint ¶¶ 5, 17, reprinted in App. Section B. According to appellant, tMs harassment entailed a variety of adverse personnel actions and culminated in the issuance of a second RIF-based separation notice on June 18,1993, pursuant to wMch appellant was terminated from employment with the District on July 23,1993.

Appellant exercised Ms right under D.C. law to appeal Ms 1993 termination to the District’s OEA, with a subsequent right to judicial review in the D.C. Superior Court. Section 1-606.3 of the D.C.Code provides that the OEA Hearing Examiner shall render a decision “within 120 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, from the date of the appellant’s filing of the appeal with the [OEA],” the only exception being that the OEA “may promulgate rules to allow a Hearing Examiner a reasonable extension of time if extraordinary, circumstances dictate that an appeal cannot be decided within the 120-day period.” D.C.Code Ann. § 1-606.3(c) (1992). However, although appellant filed his administrative appeal on or about August 13,1993, Brief of the Appellant at 26, and although the OEA apparently failed to ' extend the statutory time frame for adjudication of the case, id. at 16, appellant’s OEA appeal has not yet been adjudicated and remains pending before the OEA. Appellant alleges in his complaint that his OEA appeal “has been unreasonably delayed beyond the required statutory 120 day time frame for adjudication, depriving [appellant] of due process of law[ ]. OEA has failed to address three ... consecutive defaults by the District in that case; and the administrative process does not provide complete and adequate relief to [appellant]_” Complaint ¶5, reprinted in App. Section B.

In Counts One through Three, the complaint further alleges that the manner in which the District effected appellant’s 1993 termination, the pattern of harassment preceding the termination, and the District’s motive for subjecting appellant to termination all represent conduct actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint ¶¶ 10-42, reprinted in App. Section B. . In particular, appellant alleges that his discharge was “a sham, an illegal scheme/deviee to oust him from his job ... in obvious reprisal for a pending lawsuit and subsequent appeal, as well as for other illegal reasons.” Id. ¶42, reprinted in App. Section B. Finally, Count Four of the complaint alleges a section 1983 claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 43-44, reprinted in App. Section B.

Appellant’s prayer for relief states as follows:

(1) All compensatory damages in the sum of $8,000,000■ [$2 million for each of the four counts of the complaint], or as the Court believes just and due, and it is requested that the court grant [appel--lant] reinstatement to his job with full seniority rights, back pay with accumulated raises, restoration of annual leave, accumulated sick leave, pension entitlements, and other benefits [appellant] is entitled to by his employment and damages for humiliation, pain, suffering, embarrassment, loss of reputation, nervous condition, the intentional and/or negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress, anxiety, and harassment.
(2) Punitive Damages in the amount of $20,000.00 [intended to read “$20,000,000.00 ].
(3) The cost of this action and [appellant’s] expenses incurred in this matter, including reasonable attorney fees. (42 U.S.C; § 1988)
(4) And such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper in law and equity.

Id. at 19-20, reprinted in App. Section B.

B. Proceedings Before the District Court

Appellant filed his complaint before the District Court on July 15, 1994. One week later, on July 22, 1994, the District Court ordered Corporation Counsel for the District to respond by August 22, 1994, regarding whether the complaint should be dismissed. On August 22, Corporation Counsel filed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing that, in light of the pending OEA appeal concerning appellant’s termination, the District Court should dismiss appellant’s complaint both under the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint and for failure to exhaust local administrative remedies. In support of its dismissal arguments, Corporation Counsel characterized appellant’s complaint as follows:

In essence, [appellant] merely seeks to have this Court review his employment termination from the District. While the complaint attempts to set forth allegations to give rise to federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint sets forth allegations which amount to no more than [appellant] seeking to have this Court take the place of the OEA and its authority to review [appellant’s] termination.

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 5.

At a scheduled status hearing held on January 17,1995, the trial judge decided to hear oral argument from the parties concerning the issues presented by the pending motion to dismiss. Corporation Counsel, in addition to the equitable restraint and exhaustion arguments raised in its filings, also presented yet a third ground for dismissing appellant’s complaint. According to Corporation Counsel, appellant’s federal constitutional claims boiled down to due process arguments, which could be asserted before the OEA (and on appeal to the D.C. Superior Court) along with “any other rights that [appellant] may wish to bring up.” Transcript of Status Hearing (“Tr.”) at 5, reprinted in App. Section C. Thus, Corporation Counsel argued that appellant had “not been deprived of any substantive due process rights;” rather, according to Corporation Counsel, appellant already was pursuing under the D.C. administrative/judicial system “all the rights that he is entitled to.” Id.

At the conclusion of the parties’ arguments, the trial judge stated as follows:

Now, the best thing that I can do for you, Mr. Bridges, is this. I am going to dismiss these claims in view of the pendency of the claim before the District of Columbia Board, pursuant to the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, without prejudice if you lose, to assertion of these claims in the Superior Court.
In other words, I am not going to be the Judge that throws you out of court. I am not going to do that to a lawyer. I am just not going to do it. I could dismiss it with prejudice, I think, but I am not going to do that. I am going to do you a favor and dismiss it without prejudice after this administrative adjudication takes place, so that you will not be impaired.
I have written a brief memorandum to that effect.

Id. at 11, reprinted in App. Section C.

On January 18, 1995, the District Court filed a four-page Order disposing of the case. Bridges v. Kelly, Civ. Action No. 94-1559 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 1995) (“Order”), reprinted in App. Section D. The court accepted the view espoused by Corporation Counsel that, “[a]l-though [appellant] has filed several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at bottom [appellant] seeks reinstatement of his former position.” Order at 2, reprinted in App. Section D. Without mention of Corporation Counsel’s arguments regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies or the due process nature of the complaint’s federal allegations, the District Court proceeded to apply the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint to dismiss appellant’s complaint based on the following findings:

First, there is an ongoing state proceeding because [appellant’s] appeal of his employment termination is now pending before the [OEA], By statute, the OEA is the proper entity to hear such an appeal. See D.C.Code § l-606.3(d).
Second, [appellant’s] assertion of improper removal from his employment position pursuant to the District’s official reduction-in-force implicates an important state interest, due to the District’s need to manage and supervise its public employee labor force.
Last, there is an adequate opportunity for [appellant] to raise federal questions in the pending administrative action. Pursuant to the statute that [appellant’s] administrative action is now proceeding under, a public employee has the right to judicial review of an adverse ruling by the D.C.Superior Court, then the D.C.Court of Appeals, and if necessary, the United States Supreme Court. See D.C.Code, §§ 1-606.3(d), 11-102 and 11-721.

Id. at 3 — 4, reprinted in App. Section D. The court dismissed appellant’s complaint “without prejudice, from the dockets of this Court, subject to [appellant’s] alleged right to later bring an appropriate claim in the District of Columbia Superior Court.” Id. at 4, reprinted in App. Section D.

II. Analysis

“[T]he doctrine of Younger v. Harris ... and its progeny restrains federal courts from interfering in ongoing state judicial proceedings.” District Properties Assocs. v. District of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 27 (D.C.Cir.1984). The Supreme Court’s espousal of the restraint doctrine “was based partly on traditional principles of equity, but rested primarily on the ‘even more vital consideration’ of comity.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2516, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (“NOPSI ”) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750-51) (citation omitted); see also Hoai v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515, 1517 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“Under the Younger ... doctrine of ... equitable restraint, a federal court may dismiss an action when there is a direct conflict between the exercise of federal and state jurisdiction and considerations of comity and federalism dictate that the federal court should defer to the state proceedings.”).

Nevertheless, because of “the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), the appropriateness of refraining “from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule,” id. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244; see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 2215-16, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) (The Court observed that doctrines permitting federal courts to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction “rarely should be invoked.”); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244 (“ ‘[A] doctrine of abstention ... is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.’” (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 186, 188, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1062, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959))). Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Younger doctrine must be applied in accordance with “the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368, 109 S.Ct. at 2618. We find no such circumstances present in the instant case and therefore reverse the District Court’s ruling that Younger requires dismissal of appellant’s federal complaint.

For the Younger doctrine to apply, a rigid three-prong test must be satisfied: first, a federal court may dismiss a federal claim only when there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; second, the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; third, the proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity in which to raise the federal claims.

Hoai, 866 F.2d at 1518 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)). We note at the outset that appellees concede in their brief that it was error for the trial court to apply Younger to appellant’s claims regarding “retaliatory” actions other than appellant’s actual employment termination, because the record is inadequate to establish that the other adverse personnel actions allegedly taken against appellant are the subject of any ongoing District proceeding, as required under the first prong of Younger analysis. See Brief for Appellees at 6, 8,14. However, we also find that dismissal was inappropriate as to appellant’s termination-related claims as well.

We agree with appellees that the OEA appeal process, with the attendant review in the D.C. Superior Court and D.C. Court of Appeals, is judicial in nature, and that the District has an important interest in its own ability to implement reductions in the size of its workforce. However, we find that the District Court erred in concluding that the OEA proceeding, together with the availability of judicial review in the D.C. courts, presents an adequate forum in which appellant can fully and fairly pursue his federal claims. The most obvious basis for our finding on this issue, and the one on which we rest, is the inability of the D.C. system to grant appellant the full relief requested in connection with his federal claims.

Contrary to the District Court’s assertion, appellant seeks much more than simply reinstatement to his former position, with associated back pay and benefits. In connection with the termination-related claims stated in Counts One and Three of his complaint, appellant seeks a total of $4 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages; and appellant’s 1993 termination is part of the basis for Count Four’s allegation of intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, pursuant to which appellant seeks an additional $2 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitives. See Complaint at 10-11, 15-18, reprinted in App. Section B. We find nothing in the D.C.Code, and appellees cite nothing, authorizing the OEA to grant relief such as punitive damages and compensatory damages (in excess of back pay and benefits) for harms flowing from tortious conduct. Nor have-we found anything suggesting that, on appeal from the OEA, the D.C. Superior Court or Court of Appeals could entertain requests for relief that were not cognizable before the OEA. Indeed, counsel for the District con-eeded at oral argument that the OEA and reviewing D.C. courts could not provide appellant the full relief he seeks under his section 1983 claims.

Following our decision in District Properties, we hold here that the inability of the D.C. system to afford appellant the full relief he seeks in connection with his federal claims is sufficient to preclude dismissal under Younger. In'District Properties — where appellant landlords challenged the operation of the District agency responsible for administering local rent control laws — we observed that the landlords’ charges, if proven true, might well entitle them “to broader ... forms of relief’ than were available from the agency or under the judicial review procedures authorized by D.C. law. 743 F.2d at 26. Therefore, we rejected the District Court’s application of Younger equitable restraint:

Younger principles do not require dismissal of appellants’ complaint, for there are no ongoing proceedings in the local [system] in which appellants could raise their federal ... claims_ [Appellants’ claims are in a number of respects considerably broader than the claims they were able to assert in the proceedings in local courts or before [the agency] itself. And the relief they seek in this case is far broader than that which the local court could have granted in the administrative review proceeding. Therefore, the District Court erred in its ... holding that this case should be dismissed on Younger grounds. There being no pending state ... proceedings that would have afforded appellants a full and fair opportunity to litigate their [federal] claims, the predicate for Younger abstention was simply absent in this case.

Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The same reasoning applies here. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s decision dismissing appellant’s complaint on grounds of equitable restraint.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the District Court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

      . We find no merit in appellant’s claim of bias on the part of the District Court, and we reject his request to reassign this case to another judge.
      In addition, apart from a warning, which we hereby issue, we decline to take further disciplinary action against appellees' counsel for his failure to comply with filing deadlines established by the court. Although counsel’s conduct was careless, it was not attributable to any willful conduct .and it caused no prejudice to appellant, so no sanction other than a warning is warranted in this instance.

      . An appeal of appellant's lawsuit challenging the 1991 RIF action remained pending before this court until April 26, 1994, when the case was dismissed as moot, because “[alppellant's employment with the D.C. government was never terminated, and appellant failed to amend his complaint to allege any injury resulting from mere notice of termination.” Bridges v. District of Columbia, No. 92-7224 (D.C.Cir.1994) ("Judgment”).

      . The D.C. Court of Appeals has described the creation and role of the OEA as follows:
      The Merit Personnel Act was enacted to establish a comprehensive merit-based personnel system for employees of the District of Columbia. In order to ensure compliance with the merit system principles set forth in the Act, its drafters created the OEA, a quasi-judicial body empowered to review final agency decisions affecting, inter alia, performance ratings, adverse actions, and employee grievances. Although the Act does not define the standards by which the OEA is to review these decisions, it is self-evident from both the statute and its legislative history that the OEA is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency and that its role ... is simply to ensure that managerial discretion has been legitimately invoked and properly exercised. Indeed, the OEA’s own regulations state that it will uphold an agency decision unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) there was harmful procedural error, or (3) it was not in accordance with law or applicable regulations.

        Stokes v. District of Columbia, 502 A.2d 1006, 1009-10 (D.C.1985) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

      . D.C.Code Ann. § 1-606.3 (1992) states, in part, as follows:
      (a) Any employee may appeal a final agency decision affecting ... a reduction-in-force ... to the Office [of Employee Appeals] upon the record and under such other rules and regulations which the Office may issue.
      (d) Any employee or agency may appeal the decision of the Office to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a review of the record and such Court may affirm, reverse, remove, or modify such decision, or take any other appropriate action the Court may deem necessary.

      . At oral argument, appellant suggested that he had received authorization from the D.C. Court of Appeals to withdraw his OEA appeal and that he had in fact voluntarily dismissed the agency case during the pendency of his appeal before this court. Our review of the parties’ post-argument filings, however, indicates that the OEA has yet to rule on appellant’s request for voluntary dismissal, and, as near as we can tell, the D.C. Court of Appeals has offered no opinion on the matter other than to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the OEA to rule on his pending motions. Thus, appellant’s administrative appeal is apparently still pending before the OEA.

      . Two weeks after filing his complaint, appellant submitted a notice of typographical errors stating, in part, as follows: "Page 20, Item 2, DAMAGES, the cumulative damages total from Counts 1 — 4 should read $20,000,000.00 in lieu of $20,000.00.” PRAECIPE ¶ 2. This correction was made in accordance with the $5 million appellant requested as punitive damages for each of the four counts of the complaint.

      . The District Court referred to its dismissal of appellant's complaint as an application of the “abstention doctrine” set forth in Younger v. Harris. Order at 2-3, reprinted in App. Section D. However, in the interest of clarity, this opinion will refer to the doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris as the doctrine of "equitable restraint," pursuant to which a federal case is dismissed (i.e., removed from the federal court’s jurisdiction) on considerations of comity and federalism; equitable restraint is distinct from the "abstention" doctrine set forth in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), which does not result in dismissal, but rather serves to delay federal adjudication while a local forum resolves pertinent issues of local law. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) ("Unlike those situations where a federal court merely abstains from decision on federal questions until the resolution of underlying or related state law issues ... Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts.” (footnote omitted)); Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 207 n. 11 (6th Cir.1986) (.‘‘Younger ... requires dismissal of the complaint rather than retention of jurisdiction as is the case under Pullman abstention."); see also Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477-81, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1902-05, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977), for a discussion of the differing considerations underlying Younger equitable restraint and Pullman abstention. See also Hoai v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515 (D.C.Cir.1989).
      Despite the District Court’s curious statement that appellant’s complaint was being dismissed "without prejudice,” it seems clear that the intention of the court and the understanding of the parties was that appellant's complaint was being fully removed from the District Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to the teachings of Younger and its progeny. We assume that what the District Court meant to say is that, in dismissing, the federal court was rendering no judgment on the merits. In any event, this opinion will analyze the court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint as an application of the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint.

      . Because we find the facts of this case outside the scope of Younger’s equitable restraint doctrine, we need not, and do not, confront the still-open question avoided by previous panels of this court regarding the extent to which Younger applies at all in situations where the ongoing, non-federal proceeding is before an am of the District of Columbia. In LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 659 (1994), we recently stated as follows:
      This Court has never decided whether the District of Columbia is a state for Younger abstention purposes. Instead, every time the question has arisen, we have assumed that the doctrine applies to the District and nonetheless determined, in light of the facts of each particular case, that Younger abstention has not been appropriate. See, e.g., District Properties Assocs. v. Dist. of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 28 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1984); Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 701 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1984). In the present case, we again find it unnecessary to reach the issue, because Younger abstention would not be required here even if the doctrine applied to the District with full force.

        But cf. Hoai, 866 F.2d at 1517, 1519 (In a case where the District Court stayed proceedings in an attempt to avoid "questions arguably posed by Younger," the court found that an ongoing action in D.C.Superior Court satisfied the "ongoing state proceedings” prong of Younger analysis.). Like the panels before us, we merely assume, arguendo, but do not decide, that the Younger doctrine applies to the District.

      . On the other hand, we are not at all certain that the OEA proceeding in this case can be considered "ongoing” for Younger purposes. Appellant makes a powerful argument that the District agency has defaulted on its statutory directive to issue a decision "within 120 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, from the date of the appellant’s filing of the appeal with the Office.” D.C.Code Ann. § 1-606.3(c) (1992). Far from being resolved within the 120-day period mandated by the statute, appellant’s OEA appeal has languished for almost three years. According to appellant, and the District has stated nothing to the contrary, OEA did not even.assign a judge until a year after appellant filed his administrative appeal, disposi-tive motions filed before the agency years ago still have not been ruled upon, and the agency never exercised its statutory option to promulgate rules allowing "a reasonable extension of time if extraordinary circumstances dictate that an appeal cannot be decided within the 120-day period.” Id.; see also Brief of the Appellant at 25; Reply Brief for Appellant at 11-12. Under these circumstances, it is questionable whether a Younger-based dismissal of appellant’s federal complaint was appropriate because there simply is no "ongoing” local proceeding. However, we need not decide this issue, because we find the inadequacy of the relief available to appellant through the D.C. system to be a more apparent basis for reversal.

      . The D.C.Code simply states that "[i]n any appeal taken pursuant to this section [including an appeal of a finál agency decision affecting a reduction-in-force], the [OEA] shall review the record and uphold, reverse, or modify the decision of the agency.” D.C.Code Ann. § l-606.3(a), (b) (1992). Although there is case law to support appellees’ contention that the OEA is empowered to order reinstatement with back pay and some associated benefits, Brief for Appellees at 11; see also District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 & n.25 (D.C.) (The court observed that an employee who files an appeal before the OEA is "able to seek reinstatement, and perhaps back pay.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 380, 116 L.Ed.2d 331 (1991), such relief is far narrower than the remedies appellant requests from the District Court.

      . To the contrary, it appears that D.C. courts reviewing decisions of the OEA apply the "arbitrary and capricious” standard typical for judicial review of agency action. See Office of the Dist. of Columbia Controller v. Frost, 638 A.2d 657, 660 (D.C.1994) (“[W]e examine the agency record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support OEA’s findings of fact, or whether OEA’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation omitted)). It would seem that, as a necessary corollary of this standard of review, a D.C. court hearing an appeal from the OEA would not entertain claims arid arguments not raised, or not eligible to be raised, before the agency. Cf. Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 568 & n. 9 (D.C.1992) (The court noted that the language of section l-606.3(d) authorizing "appeal” of an OEA decision to the Superior Court was to be contrasted with the language of a different D.C.Code section deemed to authorize an "original proceeding” in which the court could exercise de novo review and address matters not considered by the agency.).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SELYA, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Paula WERME, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Stephen MERRILL, Governor of New Hampshire, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
    No. 95-1982.
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    Submitted May 6, 1996.
    Decided May 23, 1996.

      Barnes, Bender & Boehm, Martin Bender, Concord, NH, and Paula Werme, pro se, on brief for appellants.
    Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General, and Christopher P. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.
    Before SELYA and CUMMINGS Circuit Judges, and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

       Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

   SELYA, Circuit Judge.

We must determine in the course of this appeal whether New Hampshire overstepped constitutional bounds by denying a recognized third party the right, enjoyed by the state’s two most popular political parties, to have election inspectors and ballot clerks present at the polls on Election Day. We conclude, as did the district court, that the state’s statutory scheme passes constitutional muster.

I. BACKGROUND

The material facts are not in genuine dispute. In New Hampshire, as elsewhere, the Democratic and Republican parties dominate the political scene. Nevertheless, third parties can make their mark. In the 1990 gubernatorial election one such group, the Libertarian Party, garnered over 3% of the votes cast statewide. This level of achievement earned it the right to hold party primaries and to have its anointed candidates appear under the party label on the official ballot. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 652:11 & 655:14 (1986). The Libertarian Party retained that status by virtue of the number of votes its candidates garnered in subsequent elections.

Despite party recognition and ballot status, the Libertarian Party claims that it has been hampered by a series of seemingly unconnected mishaps. Goaded by these incidents, Paula Werme, a registered Libertarian, requested that the selectmen in Mount Vernon appoint her to represent her party as a ballot clerk at the March 1994 municipal election. The selectmen denied her request. In rapid succession Werme then brought her campaign to the Secretary of State and, failing to obtain redress, sought a judicial anodyne.

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Werme sued the Governor and the Secretary of State in New Hampshire’s federal district court. She alleged that the statutes governing appointment of election inspectors and ballot clerks abridged her constitutional rights to free association, due process, and equal protection; she prayed that the court enjoin their enforcement; and she sought an order commanding the appointment of Libertarians to the indicated positions on the same basis as members of the Democratic and Republican parties. The Libertarian Party intervened as an additional plaintiff. The district court, after mulling cross-motions for summary judgment, concluded that the defendants’ interest in the efficient management of election activities justified the small restriction on the plaintiffs’ rights that the challenged statutes entañed, and upheld New Hampshire’s statutory scheme. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The summary judgment standard is both prosaic and familiar, see, e.g., McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995) (collecting eases), and we see no need to rehearse it here. We simply restate two basic verities. First, the district court may enter summary judgment only if the record reveals no genuine issue of material fact and the movant demonstrates an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Second, the court of appeals reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal principles that held sway in the nisi prius court. See Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir.1996).

III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME

New Hampshire’s electoral machinery is pretty standard stuff. A town moderator supervises Election Day activities. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 659:9. The moderator commands a cadre of other election officials, including inspectors appointed by the two political parties that received “the largest number of votes [cast] for governor in the state at the last previous general election-” Id. § 658:2. Each such political party may appoint two inspectors per polling place, and one additional inspector for every 1,500 qualified voters in excess of 2,000 quali-fled voters registered at that polling place. See id. If a political party fañs to appoint inspectors, the town’s selectmen fill the lacuna by naming inspectors from the ranks of that party. See id. In turn, the moderator designates two election inspectors, one from each of the two parties, to serve‘as ballot clerks. See id. § 658:25.

Ballot clerks exercise no discretion. Their purely ministerial duties include distributing ballots at the polls and keeping an official checklist containing the names of persons who in fact vote. See id. §§ 658:25 & 659:13. In principle, a voter presents herself to the ballot clerk; if the voter’s name appears on an official list of registered voters, the ballot clerk provides her with a ballot. BaHot clerks are not empowered to register voters, and do not have authority to modify the official voting list. WMle voters may declare or change their party affiliation on Election Day under certain circumstances, see N.H. Stat. Ann. §§ 654:7-a & 654:7-b (Supp.1994), election supervisors or town clerks (who are themselves elected officials) handle such matters. See N.H. Stat. Ann. § 654:8 (1986). Every recognized political party, regardless of size or previous electoral success, may appoint a “challenger of voters” at any polling place who may stand within the guardrail to “see and hear each voter as he offers to vote.” Id. § 666:4.

After the polls close, the town moderator oversees the counting of votes. See id. §§ 659:60 & 659:61. Although the palsgrave is held in public, see id. § 659:63, only persons holding official positions may take part in tañying ballots. See id. § 659:60. Election inspectors sometimes participate in this process. Once the votes have been talked, the moderator announces the final results, see id. § 659:70, and a formal election return is prepared by the town clerk and forwarded to the Secretary of State. See id. §§ 659:74 & 659:75. Members of the public may inspect the return. Candidates may call for recounts, see id. §§ 660:1-6 & 665:6(11), and the New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission has jurisdiction to “hear and determine all disputes involving alleged violations of New Hampshire election laws of a non-criminal nature for which no specific statutory appeal procedure has already been provided.” Id. § 665:7. Moreover, election officials are subject to criminal penalties for ballot tampering, falsifying returns, or the like. See, e.g., id. § 666:1-3.

IV. ANALYSIS

We subdivide our analysis into four segments.

A

It is apodictic that the right to vote is a right that helps to preserve all other rights. As Chief Justice Warren put it: “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”). Nonetheless, the right to vote is not absolute. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-34, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). “[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). To that end, each state retains the authority to regulate state and local elections and to prescribe the duties and qualifications of persons who work at the polls, and the manner in which they will be selected. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973); see also U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (directing that states shall prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives”).

To be sure, this authority to regulate elections is not unfettered. At a minimum, states cannot wield their regulatory power in ways that contravene the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of their citizens. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217, 107 S.Ct. 544, 550, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). As courts review states’ regulatory efforts and strive to distinguish between permissible regulation and impermissible abridgment of voters’ rights, the level of scrutiny looms large. The plaintiffs insist that a law imposing any burden (however modest) upon the right to vote is always subject to strict scrutiny. We do not agree.

The Supreme Court has eschewed a hard-and-fast rule, and instead has adopted a flexible framework for testing the validity of election regulations. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432-34, 112 S.Ct. at 2063; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); Storer, 415 U.S. at 730, 94 S.Ct. at 1279. Under the prescribed framework, the level of scrutiny to be applied corresponds roughly to the degree to which a challenged regulation encumbers First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Consequently, a court weighing a challenge to a state election law must start by assessing “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury” to the plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights and then “evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570; accord Libertarian Party of Me. v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365, 370 (1st Cir.1993) (explaining that the court must attempt to achieve a sort of “constitutional equilibrium”). In this process the court must take into account, among other things, “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Id. The Burdick Court crystallized the applicable standard of inquiry:

Under this standard, the rigorousness of [the] inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subject to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063-64 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). .

B

Against this backdrop, we proceed to consider the specifics of the plaintiffs’ challenge. In performing this tamisage, we are cognizant that their claim is not that the state misapplied New Hampshire law, but, rather, that the method of staffing the polls dictated by that law is itself constitutionally infirm. Thus, we regard the plaintiffs’ challenge as a facial attack on the statutory scheme (and, indeed, they have conceded this point).

The plaintiffs’ facial challenge is susceptible to further refinement. They do not contend that the statutory scheme directly prevents members of less successful political parties, like the Libertarians, from ballot access either as candidates or as voters. Instead, their claim is on a more sophisticated level; they say that restricting the right to appoint election inspectors and ballot clerks to the two most popular parties deprives members of recognized third parties of their right to free political association, and invidiously discriminates against them on the basis of their political affiliation. Stripped of its rhetorical trappings, this argument amounts to nothing less than a declaration that Libertarians have a constitutional right to be represented at the polls by election inspectors and ballot clerks of their own party to ensure that Libertarian votes are counted. In the plaintiffs’ view, Democrats and Republicans are not to be trusted in this regard because they are unconcerned with the protection of Libertarian interests and, if left alone, they will likely overlook Libertarian ballots through lassitude, misfeasance, incompetence, and the like.

In addressing this claim we must first set to rest a straw man. There is simply no abstract constitutional right to be appointed to serve as an election inspector or ballot clerk. See, e.g., Rhode Island Minority Caucus, Inc., v. Baronian, 590 F.2d 372, 376 (1st Cir.1979). Although the right to vote certainly includes the right to have one’s vote counted, see United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 35 S.Ct. 904, 905, 59 L.Ed. 1355 (1915), nothing on the face of the New Hampshire statutes deprives Libertarian Party members of that right.

We turn next to an assessment of the extent to which the challenged statutes burden the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Libertarians. We find the burden to be slight.

In the first place, New Hampshire’s regulation is nondiscriminatory, that is, it does not differentiate among Republicans, Democrats, and Libertarians. Instead, the regulation conditions the right to appoint election inspectors and ballot clerks on a certain degree of success at the polls. Distinguishing between recognized political parties based on past electoral accomplishment is not per se invidiously discriminatory. See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1306, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974) (holding that it is not invidious discrimination for a state to grant minor parties official recognition, but deny them the right to hold primaries even though the main political parties are so entitled). So here: the Libertarian Party has exactly the same opportunity to qualify as a source of election inspectors and ballot clerks under New Hampshire law as does any other party. Equality of opportunity exists, and equality of opportunity — not equality of outcomes — is the linchpin of what the Constitution requires in this type of situation. As the Court explained:

The fact is that there are obvious differences in kind between the needs and potentials of a political party with historically established broad support, on the one hand, and a new or small political organization on the other.... Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.

Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 441-42, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).

In the second place, the New Hampshire law has no direct impact on ballot access, on the right to vote, or on the right to have one’s vote tallied. It is generally thought that indirect effects are less burdensome than direct restraints, cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 2798, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (discussing, in connection with Congress’ spending powers, “the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly”), and that generalization holds true here.

In the third place, even these indirect effects are not discernible here. The record evidence offers no reason to believe that minority parties are at special or undue risk because they have no right to appoint election inspectors and ballot clerks. The law affords a panoply of other safeguards for minority parties (e.g., appointing a challenger of voters, see N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 666:4), and ultimate control over voting places rests with elected officials. To cinch matters, there is no showing of systematic discrimination against minority parties in the casting and tallying of votes, and mere suspicion or paranoia is too flimsy a foundation on which to rest a claim of incipient fraud or mistake.

In fine, the “burden” to which the plaintiffs allude — that Libertarian ballots will not be counted unless Libertarian election inspectors and ballot clerks are on the prowl — is purely conjectural. To hold otherwise would require us to conclude, without a shred of competent evidence, that election officials in New Hampshire are unscrupulous individuals who will breach the public trust in order to serve the interests of a political party, and, moreover, that Democrats and Republicans will put aside their historic enmity so that, together, they may repress third parties. We refuse to indulge so cynical a view of the electoral process.

C

Having analyzed the nature of the burdens imposed, we now proceed to ascertain the level of scrutiny that we must apply. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-36, 112 S.Ct. at 2064; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. We recognize, of course, that every provision of an election code, even those that govern the voting process as opposed to those that govern ballot access or eligibility of candidates, “inevitably affects — at least to some degree — the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. But different provisions of an election code may burden rights unequally, and we believe that the impediment which New Hampshire law imposes in respect to the selection of election inspectors and ballot clerks is relatively minor. Given the character and magnitude (or, more aptly put, lack of magnitude) of the alleged injury to the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, we conclude that the defendants need-only show that the enactment of the regulation had a rational basis. See, e.g., Coalition for Sensible and Humane Solutions v. Wamser, 771 F.2d 395, 399 (8th Cir.1985); Baer v. Meyer, 728 F.2d 471, 476 (10th Cir.1984) (per curiam); Pirincin v. Board of Elections,368 F.Supp. 64, 71 (N.D.Ohio) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 990, 94 S.Ct. 345, 38 L.Ed.2d 231 (1973).

Our decision in Rhode Island Minority Caucus, 590 F.2d 372, is not to the contrary. There the plaintiffs alleged that the Board of Canvassers of the City of Providence unconstitutionally conditioned appointment as a voter registrar upon membership in or affiliation with one of three political organizations. See id. at 376. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction mainly on the ground that the plaintiffs had no probability of success on the merits. See id. at 373-74. We affirmed on a different ground — that there was no showing of irreparable harm, see id. at 374 — and added:

[The state] may not abridge fundamental First Amendment rights of speech and association without establishing that such an infringement is necessary to achieve a vital state interest_
So viewed, but without prejudging the issue, it appears that plaintiffs raise a substantial first amendment question.

Id. at 376-77. The panel made clear, however, that it was for the district court to determine “the extent to which plaintiffs’ assoeia-tional rights have been abridged, the burden, if any, the Board must bear in justifying that abridgment, and whether in fact the Board can meet that burden.” Id. at 377. Fairly read, Rhode Island Minority Caucus is not inconsistent with our holding today.

D

Using rationality review we conclude that the state has justified the regulation. The defendants rely principally on New Hampshire’s interest in limiting the number of election officials to manageable proportions in order to enhance administrative efficiency and thereby safeguard against mistakes and fraud. Too many cooks, the defendants say, will spoil the broth. The assertion makes good sense.

The state has a valid interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. See, e.g., American Party, 415 U.S. at 782 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1307 n. 14; Coalition for Sensible and Humane Solutions, 771 F.2d at 399. It is certainly reasonable to assume that, at some point, “more” is not “better.” Common sense suggests that if election inspectors and ballot clerks become too numerous, they will merely get in each other’s way and thus frustrate the moderator’s ability to afford close supervision. Cf. Rudyard Kipling, Rewards & Fairies 73 (1910) (suggesting that one should keep no more cats than will catch mice). Within wide margins the place at which to draw the line— in other words, the ideal size of the complement — is for the state to determine. See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1570 n. 9 (observing that states have broad discretion to set minimum requirements restricting the number of candidates appearing on the ballot).

The plaintiffs’ riposte is to suggest that New Hampshire must demonstrate that adding Libertarians as election inspectors and ballot clerks would actually cause confusion, or, put another way, that this increment would be the straw that broke the back of the dromedary of administrative efficacy. That suggestion vastly exaggerates the state’s burden. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96, 107 S.Ct. 533, 537, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (rejecting a similar claim on the basis that “[s]uch a requirement would necessitate that a State’s political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action”). States are free to head off potential problems in the electoral system before they materialize, as long as the solutions that the state devises are reasonable and do not significantly intrude on constitutionally protected rights. See id. New Hampshire’s solution — which involves restricting the number of persons behind the rail at polling places, and puts the responsibility for appointing those persons in the hands of the two political parties that have proven most successful in the recent past at earning the electorate’s trust — is a reasonable response to an authentic problem.

We hold that New Hampshire’s method of selecting election inspectors and ballot clerks is a rational means of advancing the state’s interest in dispelling confusion, warding off fraud, and ensuring administrative efficiency at the polls. See Baer, 728 F.2d at 476 (applying rational basis review and upholding regulation that did not uniformly allow all political parties to appoint poll observers); Pirincin, 368 F.Supp. at 71 (applying rational basis review and upholding regulation permitting membership of boards of elections to be drawn solely from parties gamering the two highest vote totals); see also Bishop v. Lomenzo, 350 F.Supp. 576, 588-89 (E.D.N.Y.1972) (three-judge court) (suggesting that regulation requiring volunteer deputy registrars to be enrolled members of the Republican or Democratic parties merited only rational basis review, but concluding that law survived strict scrutiny on basis that regulation reduced risk of “fraud or irregularity that might exist if registration by [only] one party or by an independent were permitted”). While other methods of selecting these officials, or a somewhat different numerical formula, might also serve, the state is free to choose from among the universe of constitutionally acceptable alternatives.

V. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. Since New Hampshire’s grant of a monopoly over the appointment of election inspectors and ballot clerks to the two most popular political parties is justified by legitimate state interests and imposes only a modest burden on the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, it is constitutional. Nothing succeeds like success, and the Libertarian Party has the same opportunity as its better-known competitors to attract voters to its standard, finish in one of the top two spots in a gubernatorial election, and thereafter play a more active role in the mechanics of the electoral process. But under New Hampshire law that success is to be won at the polls rather than in a federal court.

Affirmed.

      . To cite a few of the more bruited examples, the party claims that one town neglected to forward the count of Libertarian votes cast in the 1990 gubernatorial election to the Secretary of State; that, in another town, election officials, contrary to then-existing state law, see N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 659:14 (1986), since amended, see id. § 659:14(1) (1994 Supp.), refused to permit a registered Democrat to change her party registration and affiliate with the Libertarian Party; and that on occasion voters discovered that unauthorized changes had been made in their listed party affiliations. No complaints were filed with the Secretary of State in connection with any of these incidents.

      . While procedures are slightly different in cities than in towns, the differences are irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal. Consequently, we refer throughout to the election procedures in towns, omitting particularized references to counterpart procedures that apply in urban settings.

      . In primary elections, a ballot clerk must give a voter who has declared her party affiliation the ballot of that party. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 659:14(1) (1994 Supp.). Exceptions are made only when a declared voter wishes to support a party that did not have official existence when the voter declared her party loyalty (and then only in the primary election immediately following the party's official recognition) or when the voter is undeclared and the party’s rules allow such a voter to participate in its primary. See id.

      . In conducting our evaluation, we do not distinguish between the burdens placed on the rights of the Libertarian Party and those placed on the rights of voters who wish to cast their ballots for that party’s candidates. As a general matter, political parties purport to represent the interests of their supporters, and "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438, 112 S.Ct. at 2065-66 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972)).

      . The plaintiffs conceded below that none of the mishaps to which they alluded,, see supra note 1, were part of a concerted plan to deprive Libertarians of the right to vote. There is, moreover, no showing that similar gaffes have not afflicted Republican and/or Democratic voters from time to time.

      . We note that one district court apparently disagrees. In Iowa Socialist Party v. Slockett, 604 F.Supp. 1391 (D.Iowa 1985), a handful of minor third parties contended that appointing mobile deputy registrars solely from persons nominated by the county chairmen of the two major political parties violated their constitutional rights. See id. at 1392. As we do here, the district court concluded that the burden imposed by the regulation was "relatively minor.” Id. at 1397. The court nonetheless proceeded to apply strict scrutiny and invalidated the law. See id. at 1396-98. We find this aspect of the court's reasoning unpersuasive.

      . A fair parallel can be drawn to ballot access cases in which the Court has acknowledged that the "important state interest ... in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process” can be served by' limiting ballot access based on "some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support.” Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442, 91 S.Ct. at 1976. We believe that this reasoning extends to the state's strivings to promote efficiency and orderliness at the polls through limitations on the number of persons who are permitted to work inside the rail.

      . The plaintiffs’ Equal Protection argument is unworthy of separate discussion. This argument does not rest on a challenge to New Hampshire's requirements for achieving official recognition as a political party, but, rather, on the thesis that once a party attains official status under state law, the state may not draw distinctions between it and other recognized political parties. The thesis is untenable. See American Party, 415 U.S. at 781, 94 S.Ct. at 1306.


author: TORRUELLA Chief Judge.

text:
    Eliezer BARRIOS-VELAZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASOCIACION DE EMPLEADOS DEL ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 95-2170.
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    Heard Feb. 28, 1996.
    Decided May 24, 1996.

      Francisco R. González-Colón, with whom Francisco R. Gonzalez Law Firm, was on brief, Guaynabo, PR, for appellants.
    Lino J. Saldaña, Hato Rey, PR, with whom Carmen M. Domínguez, San Juan, PR, was on brief, for appellees.
    Before TORRUELLA Chief Judge, and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.
   TORRUELLA Chief Judge.

Appellants Eliezer Barrios-Velázquez (“Barrios”), Myrta Nieves-Vega (“Nieves”) and Isidro Collazo (“Collazo”), in their personal capacity and as representatives of the “Comité de Delegados y Miembros Pro Sana Administración de AEELA” (“SAAEELA”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appeal the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of their complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Asocia-ción de Empleados del Estado Libre Asocia-do de Puerto Rico (“AEELA”) and Isaac Neftalí Rojas-Nater (“Rojas”), Roberto Aquino-García (“Aquino”) and Miguel Mar-tíneZf-Williams (“Martínez”), in their personal and official capacities (collectively, “Defendants”). We affirm the decision of the district court.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.” Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 256 (1st Cir.1994); see Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of E. Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir.1992). “We must liberally construe [Plaintiffs’] complaint and affirm its dismissal only if [they] cannot prove any set of facts entitling [them] to relief.” Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 255.

Although it does not affect the outcome, it would appear that the motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment since the district court plainly considered “matters outside the pleadings.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(c). Plaintiffs in fact argue in their brief that due to representations made to them by defendants’ attorney, they postponed filing an opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, and they were therefore not afforded a “reasonable opportunity” to present Rule 56 material. See Br. for Appellants at 12. The answer to this argument, of course, is clear: even considering this Rule 56 material, see supra note 1, we conclude that plaintiffs demonstrated no genuine issue of material fact.

II. BACKGROUND

The instant case stems from a dispute over the circumstances under which a Quadrennial Assembly (the “Assembly”) of the AEELA was held on July 8, 1995. The AEELA has approximately 180,000 members, all of whom are regular or former employees of the government of Puerto Rico. Of these members, 75% are required by law to participate in and be members of the AEELA, and are required to provide 3% of their salary to be administered by the AEELA. Only employees of public corporations and municipalities may participate in the AEELA

Plaintiffs contend, and this court must assume, given our procedural posture, that Defendants have exercised control over the AEELA since 1987, and used this control to handpick delegates to the Assembly in question in order to maintain their control, and that of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”), over the AEELA. We must further infer that Defendants impermissibly notified only those delegates who shared their political beliefs that the Assembly would be held, and refused to take the necessary measures to notify or confirm the membership of delegates who do not support the PDP. Furthermore, we infer that Defendants denied Plaintiff-Appellant Nieves a list of the certified delegates, thus hindering her candidacy for President of the AEELA’s Board of Directors.

Plaintiffs charge that these actions amount to illegal political discrimination in violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the enabling law of the Commonwealth Employees Association, 3 L.P.R.A § 862(b). They also contend, contrary to the district court opinion dismissing their claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, that the acts of Defendants are state action.

III. DISCUSSION

“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory_’” Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 256 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2746-47, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must make two showings: the existence of a federal or statutory right; and a deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of state law. See id.; Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1993).

The district court addressed only the second showing, dismissing this action on the ground that Defendants did not act under color of state law when they scheduled the general assembly for July 8, 1995. We note in passing that at least two courts have already concluded that the AEELA is not an agency, department or instrumentality of the Government of Puerto Rico, suggesting that the AEELA’s actions and those of its members cannot be labeled state action. Morales v. Chaves, No. 75-1087, slip op. at 2 (D.P.R. Dec. 9, 1975) (noting that while “[i]t is true that the Association was created by statute and only government employees may be members ... there all relation with the Commonwealth ceases”); Association of Employees of Puerto Rico v. Vásquez-Pérez, 92 JTS 52, slip op. at 26 (P.R.1992) (official trans.) (stating, in the context of deciding whether the AEELA was subject to the Truth in Lending Act, that “although the Association is a highly regulated entity created by the government, whose objective is to implement the government policy of ... encouraging saving among public employees ... it cannot be considered as a government agency, department, instrumentality or public corporation”). While persuasive as to certain points, these eases do not represent binding authority for this court. As a result, like the district court before us, we conduct our own inquiry into the issue.

Because section 1983 does not reach private actions, the key issue before us is whether the conduct at issue in this ease may be “ ‘fairly attributable to the State,’ ” Rodríguez-García v. Dávila, 904 F.2d 90, 94 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54); see Ponce v. Basketball Fed’n of Puerto Rico, 760 F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir.1985). The state action inquiry is “ ‘necessarily fact-bound.’ ” Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54). “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2769-70, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982). “The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’ ” Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54).

. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the AEELA is an extension of the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and that the conduct at issue may be fairly attributed to the state on that basis as direct state action. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that even if the AEELA is a private organization, the actions that give rise to the instant ease may still be fairly attributed to the state as indirect state action. Ultimately, a finding of either direct or indirect state action would suffice to sustain Plaintiffs’ section 1983 action. See Rodríguez-García, 904 F.2d at 95.

A. Direct State Action

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ actions may be fairly attributed to the state because, they claim, the AEELA is a public corporation and therefore, an “arm of the state.” Although “[t]he Act which creates the Association does not define whether it is an agency, a department, an instrumentality or a public corporation,” Vásquez-Pérez, slip op. at 24, both federal and state courts have held that the AEELA is not a governmental agency, see Morales, slip op. at 2 (noting that “the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has, since 1932, consistently ruled that the Employees Association is not a part of the Government”); Vásquez-Pérez, slip op. at 26.

Admittedly, technical labels are not dispositive. In Lebrón v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 961, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed direct state action and technical labels, ruling that, despite a statutory disclaimer of agency status, the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (“Amtrak”) was nonetheless a government entity. In deciding that Amtrak was a state actor when it refused to lease advertising space to an artist’s display because it was “political,” the Court stated that “it is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s status as a government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions.” Id. at -—, 115 S.Ct. at 971. The Court, in dicta, indicated that the issue of state action and technical labels that it was addressing also had relevance to the states, stating that “it cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form [since] [o]n that thesis, Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896)] can be resurrected by the simple device of having the State of Louisiana operate segregated trains through a state-owned Amtrak.” Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 972 (citations omitted).

While the logic of Lebrón applies to the present case, we conclude that it does not avail Plaintiffs. The Court held that where

the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.

Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 974-75. The Supreme Court in Lebrón focused on the degree of control that the federal government had over Amtrak. In contrast, neither party in the instant ease has contended that the Government of Puerto Rico has retained permanent authority over the directors of the AEELA. This distinction becomes clearer when we compare the facts surrounding Amtrak and the AEELA. The President appoints the majority of Amtrak’s directors, the federal government owns all of Amtrak’s voting stock, and the government subsidizes Amtrak’s “perennial losses.” Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 967. By contrast, the government of Puerto Rico does not retain the power to appoint any of the AEELA’s directors. Instead, the directors are elected by delegates who themselves are elected by the AEELA’s membership at large. Furthermore, the AEELA’s losses, if any, are not regularly subsidized by the government of Puerto Rico. As a result of these facts, we conclude that the AEELA does not constitute an extension of the government of Puerto Rico, and so Defendants must be treated as private parties. Thus, direct state action is not present in this case.

B. Indirect State Action

We therefore turn to the question of whether the conduct at issue, while not that of the government of Puerto Rico directly, may be nonetheless fairly attributed to the state. A private entity’s conduct is not actionable under section 1983 if the challenged action results from the exercise of private choice and not from state influence or coercion. See id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 980 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that Lebrón did not involve direct state action, and therefore, unlike the majority, inquiring as to indirect state action); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (stating that “[t]here is no evidence that the Federal Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise of its right [to deny use of its copyright]”); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841, 102 S.Ct. at 2771 (holding that discharge decisions of largely publicly-funded private school for troubled students were not subject to constitutional challenge because those actions “were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation”).

As a result, this court must determine whether the conduct of Defendants, as private parties, rises to the level of state action. As this court has previously spelled out, the relevant inquiries consist of whether there was

(1) ... an elaborate financial or regulatory nexus between [Defendants] and the government of Puerto Rico which compelled [Defendants] to act as they did, (2) an assumption by [Defendants] of a traditional public function, or (3) a symbiotic relationship involving the sharing of profits.

Rodríguez-García, 904 F.2d at 96; see Ponce, 760 F.2d at 377. We examine each test in turn, as satisfaction of any one of the three tests requires that we find indirect state action.

1. Nexus Analysis

As both parties acknowledge, “the challenged action of the regulated entity ... may be fairly treated as that of the State itself ... only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2786, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982), cited in Rodríguez-García, 904 F.2d at 97. The test is whether the government exercised coercive power or provided such significant encouragement that the complained-of misconduct surrounding the Assembly and the Board elections must be deemed to be the conduct of the government. Id., 904 F.2d at 90.

We emphasize that our examination focuses on the government’s connection to the complained-of action, not the government’s connection to the AEELA itself. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2785-86. As a result, we find extraneous Plaintiffs’ arguments highlighting the facts that the AEE-LA was created by law, that its members and Directors are public employees, and that the elective process is regulated by law, except to the degree that these facts demonstrate government coercion or encouragement of the complained-of conduct.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants derived their authority to schedule the Assembly and election from a Puerto Rico law, 3 L.P.R.A. § 862(d), and that Defendants were government employees who performed their duties during working time and using government equipment and materials. However, Plaintiffs have hung their claim on the proposition that state-granted authority suffices to find state action, since they have failed to allege that the government coerced or encouraged the specific election rigging that gives rise to their complaint. We believe that the state’s grant of authority alone cannot justify a conclusion of state action in this case.

We draw this conclusion by comparing two of our previous cases. First, like the district court, we are persuaded by our holding in Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258, that state-granted authority making possible a private party’s actions does not, without more, sufficiently show that the specific action taken under that authority constitutes state action. Id. In Rockwell, we concluded that the fact that a Massachusetts statute authorized public health professionals to hospitalize persons believed to present a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness, did not suffice to create a sufficient link between the state and the' plaintiff’s own detention to classify the hospital as a state actor. Id. By contrast, in Rodríques v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 814 (1st Cir.1991), we held that a physician “functioned as a state actor” where he performed a body cavity search of the plaintiff pursuant to a search warrant. We justified our conclusion on the ground that the scope and motivation for the specific conduct occasioning the complaint “were established solely by the state’s investigatory goals and justified solely by the search warrant.” Id. at 814.

We conclude that to the extent that state-granted authority can justify a finding of state action, that authority must be connected to the aim of encouraging or compelling the specific complained-of conduct. Because we conclude that the district court, correctly found that no state-linked financial or regulatory nexus compelled Defendants to act as they did, we find no state action under the nexus test.

2. Traditional Public Function Analysis

“[F]or a private actor to be deemed to have acted under color of state law, it is not enough to show that the private actor performed a public function.” Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258. Rather, “[t]he plaintiff must show that the private entity assumed powers ‘traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.’” Id. (quoting Rodrigues, 950 F.2d at 813). The exclusive function test screens for situations “where a state tries to escape its responsibilities by delegating them to private parties.” Id. at 258; see Johnson v. Pinkerton Academy, 861 F.2d 335, 338 (1st Cir.1988). If the convening of the AEELA’s assembly or the election of its board are traditional, exclusively sovereign functions which have merely been delegated to private actors, then the state cannot escape responsibility for constitutional deprivations caused by private parties acting pursuant to the delegation. Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258.

In Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 852, 102 S.Ct. at 2777, the Supreme Court discussed the “public function” analysis of state action. The Court concluded that although the education of maladjusted high school students is a public function for which the state intends to provide services at public expense, that “legislative policy choice in no way makes these services the exclusive province of the State.... That a private entity performs a function which serves the public does not makes its acts state action.” Id.; see also Ponce, 760 F.2d at 381.

Plaintiffs contend that for public interest purposes, the government of Puerto Rico has delegated to the AEELA the traditional activity of promoting savings among government employees, and providing them benefits such as loans, insurance and medical services. We agree with Plaintiffs that providing such benefits to public employees probably does promote the public interest. However, these services cannot reasonably be characterized as the exclusive province of the State, since banks, credit 'unions, savings and loans associations, brokerage firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies traditionally have existed to promote savings, loans and health and other insurance. As a result, we conclude that Defendants cannot be found to have engaged in state action under the “traditional public function” test.

3. Symbiotic Relationship

State action can be found by way of a symbiotic relationship. Under this test, a private party’s acts “are attributable to the state only if the government ‘has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity_’” Ponce, 760 F.2d at 381 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 861-62, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961)). While “one of the key factors in determining whether a symbiotic relationship exists is certainly whether the state shared in any profits made,” the lack of a financial partnership is not necessarily dis-positive. Rodríguez-García, 904 F.2d at 98-99 (listing several factors relevant to finding “symbiotic relationship”).

In Burton, the Court found state action where the state leased public property to a private restaurant owner, who maintained a racially discriminatory policy, acknowledged to be indispensable to the success of the venture. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24, 81 S.Ct. at 860-61. In contrast, there is no evidence that the government of Puerto Rico somehow profited from the allegedly discriminatory actions of Defendants. Even though the AEELA receives legally mandated funds from public employees, no contention has been made that this money becomes the property of the AEELA or the government. In fact, Plaintiffs have not disputed that, upon termination of employment, public employees receive back their funds. While the Puerto Rico Secretary of the Treasury does approve the investments made by the AEELA with these funds, Plaintiffs have not contended that these funds are somehow used to the benefit of the government of Puerto Rico, rather than invested at a market rate of return. Aso, Plaintiffs have not even attempted to link the alleged election rigging to some financial gain to the government of Puerto Rico, in the way that the discrimination in Burton was linked to the state’s returns from the venture. Thus, whatever financial success the AEELA may achieve is not shared with the government of Puerto Rico.

Similarly, while the lack of financial enrichment is not dispositive, and “[t]he test is one of interdependence and joint participation,” we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have failed to contest the proposition that the AEELA is essentially independent in the conduct of its daily affairs. And no attempt has been made to link the government of Puerto Rico to the decisions of when to hold the Assembly and how to conduct Board elections. As a result, we conclude that no symbiotic relationship exists between the government of Puerto Rico and the AEELA.

In passing, we observe that in the instant case, Plaintiffs have not premised their claim on a private party’s specific act, directed by the government of Puerto Rico, which somehow benefits the government via a symbiotic relationship with the private actor. This point can be illustrated by comparison with the symbiotic relationship that led to a finding of state action in Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F.Supp. 963, 974, stay denied, 572 F.Supp. 957 (D.P.R.1983), vacated on other grounds Romany v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.1984) (holding that the district court should have abstained from reaching the merits of the First Amendment claims until the Puerto Rico Supreme Court decided a pending controversy). In Schneider, the plaintiffs charged that Puerto Rico laws forcing them to be members of Puerto Rico’s integrated bar association violated their rights to free speech and free association, since those laws forced them to belong to, and financially support, an organization (the Colegio) which promoted ideological and political causes contrary to their personal beliefs. Id. at 965-66. The court found state action, noting not only that Puerto Rico law required attorneys to maintain membership in the Colegio, but also emphasizing that required membership aided the Colegio’s public function of regulating lawyers, from which the government was found to benefit. Id. at 973-74. Essentially, the government of Puerto Rico was found to be advantaged by the specific act on which the complaint was grounded, namely, forced membership in the Colegio.

By contrast, plaintiffs in the instant case do not mount a facial challenge to the laws that create the AEELA or require that it hold elections. Instead, they argue that the AEELA’s leadership committed discretionary acts of discrimination, and did so while exercising authority granted by the government of Puerto Rico. But plaintiffs fall short of Schneider in at least two ways. First, the conduct they complain of — discrimination—is not specifically mandated by Puerto Rico law, as forced membership in the Colegio was for lawyers in Schneider. Unlike the plaintiffs in Schneider, Plaintiffs do not challenge conduct specifically directed by Puerto Rico law; for example, their forced membership in the AEELA or the requirement that the AEE-LA hold assemblies and elections. Instead, Plaintiffs complain of the manner in which the assembly and the elections were held— this manner is not directed by statute. Second, Plaintiffs have failed to link these specific acts of discrimination in the holding of AEELA’s assembly and elections to any symbiotic relationship by which the government profits from these specific discriminatory acts. No allegation has been made that the government of Puerto Rico is somehow advantaged by the alleged misconduct in AEELA’s assembly or elections. By contrast, in Schneider, bar membership required by Puerto Rico law constituted the conduct complained of, and also was alleged to benefit the government of Puerto Rico, since compulsory membership made possible the Cole-gio’s regulatory functions. As a result of these distinctions, we conclude that Schneider does not avail Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

To maintain a Section 1983 action, state action must be present. Because we conclude that, reading the pleadings in the best light for Plaintiffs, they can prove no set of facts that would implicate state action, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

      . These "matters” included the following: 1) the AEELA was created as a quasi-public entity to provide financial services to government employees, which is a traditional government function; 2) membership in the AEELA is mandatory for most Commonwealth employees as is the 3% payroll deduction to fund the AEELA’s operations; 3) the AEELA’s operations and delegate elections are heavily regulated by statute (e.g., number of members per delegate); 4) heads of government departments appoint the Election Committee to run the delegate elections; 5) the Board of Directors and the Election committee members often work on government time, and use government facilities and equipment; 6) the AEELA's finances are supervised by the Commonwealth’s Comptroller; 7) the AEELA is exempt from state taxation; 8) the Commonwealth collects the 3% membership fee for the AEELA by making payroll deductions; 9) the AEELA may make investments only "on advice” from the Commonwealth's Treasury Department; 10) the AEELA’s employees participate in the Commonwealth government's pension plan; 11) the Commonwealth provides the AEELA with some services free of charge; and 12) the AEELA’s members, delegates, and directors are all government employees.

        . For the purposes of section 1983, "Puerto Rico enjoys the functional equivalent of statehood,” and thus the term "state law” includes Puerto Rico law. Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir.1995); see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of P.R., 906 F.2d 25, 31 n. 8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959, 111 S.Ct. 388, 112 L.Ed.2d 399 (1990).