author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRACTS 31A, LOTS 31 AND 32, LAFITTE’S LANDING PHASE TWO PORT ARTHUR, JEFFERSON COUNTY TEXAS, including all buildings, appurtenances, and improvements thereon, Defendant Stacy Walker, Claimant-Appellant
    No. 16-40588
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Filed March 9, 2017

      Michael Wayne Lockhart, Esq., Robert L. Rawls, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Richard Bratton Roper, III, Esq., Thompson & Knight, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Claimant-Appellant.
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

The husband of Claimant-Appellant Stacy Walker agreed to forfeit two annuities held solely in his name as a part of a plea agreement with Plaintiff-Appellee, the United States of America. Stacy contends that the district court erred in effectively ordering the forfeiture of her one-half community interest in those annuities. Because the Government was entitled to rely on the legal presumption that her husband was authorized to forfeit the annuities as a part of his plea agreement, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 4, 2011, a federal grand jury indicted Calvin Walker, the husband of Claimant-Appellant Stacy Walker, for various types of fraud and money laundering. The indictment generally alleged that Calvin defrauded the Beaumont Independent School District of more than $3.7 million by submitting false or inflated invoices for electrical supplies and materials. The indictment contained a notice of the Government’s intention to seek forfeiture of, among other things, two Transamerica Preferred Choice Fixed Annuity Contracts purchased for a total of $3.4 million. The indictment alleged the two annuities represented proceeds from the charged fraud offenses and, therefore, were subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 982(a)(4), and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). The two annuity contracts listed Calvin as the sole owner and Stacy as the primary beneficiary. On December 12, 2011, Calvin’s criminal trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision.

On April 10, 2012, the Government filed a civil forfeiture complaint in rem, initiating the present forfeiture proceeding. The complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that the two annuities were subject to forfeiture because they were “property involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1343 or is property traceable to such violation.” On June 7, 2012, Calvin and Stacy Walker filed their own verified claim. The claim asserted that “Calvin Walker and Stacy Walker are the true owners of the ... two Transamerica Annuities made the subject of the government’s Complaint for Forfeiture,” and alleged that the Government’s complaint was “a belated attempt to bring pressure on Calvin Walker to enter a guilty plea to the false charges he has fought vigorously.” The Walkers subsequently filed an answer and counterclaim to the Government’s complaint, in which they denied that the annuities were subject to forfeiture and “demand[ed] the return of the subject community property” after hearing and trial.

On July 13, 2012, the Government filed an information in the criminal proceeding, charging Calvin with one misdemeanor count of willful failure to pay income tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Calvin pleaded guilty, with the benefit of a plea agreement, to the charge on July 17, 2012. As relevant to this appeal, the plea agreement contained a restitution provision, stating that restitution “shall consist solely of taxes, penalties, and interest,” and that “[t]he payment of any tax liability will be accomplished by ... payment directly to the Internal Revenue Service from the proceeds of the liquidation of any annuity currently held under seizure warrant in this matter.” The plea agreement also contained a forfeiture provision, stating, in pertinent part:

The defendant agrees to enter into an agreed order of forfeiture in [the civil forfeiture proceeding] and agrees to forfeit to the United States voluntarily and immediately all of the defendant’s right, title and interest to the property which is subject to forfeiture under the agreed order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981. The property subject to [the] agreed order of forfeiture are the liquidated value of two annuities ... less $200,000 to be returned to the defendant and the amount of any fine imposed by the court.... The defendant agrees not to file a claim, and agrees to withdraw any filed claim, to the [annuities] in any civil proceeding, administrative or judicial, which may or has been initiated.

On November 12, 2013, the Government moved for entry of judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding, asserting that the plea agreement resolved all of the issues in the proceeding except one — whether interest that accumulated on the two annuities after entry of the plea agreement was subject to forfeiture — and requesting that the district court resolve this dispute. The Walkers filed an objection to the Government’s motion, arguing that its proposed judgment allocated a greater amount of funds to the IRS than had been agreed because the IRS was impermissibly calculating interest and penalties assuming a finding of fraudulent conduct.

On April 3, 2014 (more than 20 months after the execution of Calvin’s plea agreement), the Walkers’ counsel moved to stay entry of judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding to address a conflict of interest in their joint representation. Counsel stated that, although Calvin had agreed to forfeit his interest in the two annuities and “abide[d] by that agreement,” Stacy “was not a party to the plea agreement” and “would not consent to an entry of judgment in this case that would divest her of her [community] interest in the annuities.” Counsel asserted that Stacy informed him of her lack of consent on April 2, 2014, at which point he told her that he could not continue to represent her in this matter.

On April 18, Stacy’s new counsel filed a response and objection to the Government’s motion for entry of judgment. In pertinent part, Stacy asserted that the two annuities were community property and, as such, she was the owner of one-half of them. She further asserted:

While claimant Calvin Walker, as a part of his plea agreement, waived notice of any forfeiture proceeding and expressly agreed to forfeit “the defendant’s (his) interest” in the two annuities, claimant Stacy Walker has not waived anything, and has never agreed with the government to deal with her interest in the two annuities. As such, Stacy Walker’s interest in the two annuities has never been litigated in this proceeding.

Stacy requested the district court to deny the Government’s motion for entry of judgment to the extent it sought to forfeit Stacy’s interest in the two annuities.

On September 30, 2014, a magistrate judge granted the Government’s motion for judgment of forfeiture. After Stacy appealed to the district court, the magistrate judge withdrew the order, and the Government moved for summary judgment. In its motion, the Government asserted, in pertinent part, that the two annuities are presumed to be subject to Calvin’s sole management, control, and disposition because they were held in his name; therefore, the Government asserted, it was entitled to rely on Calvin’s authority to agree to forfeit the two annuities under section 3.104 of the Texas Family Code. On September 3, 2015, the magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation that the district court grant the Government’s motion, finding that the Government was entitled to rely on Calvin’s authority to deal with the two annuities under section 3.104. Both Stacy and Calvin objected to the report and recommendation, and on December 1, 2015, the district court, after conducting a de novo review, adopted the report and recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor of the Government. The district court separately entered final judgment, and Stacy timely appealed the grant of summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmov-ing party.’ ” Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Agrex, Inc., 820 F.3d 790, 794 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014)). “[T]his court construes ‘all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012)).

III. FORFEITURE OF THE ANNUITIES

On appeal, Stacy argues that the district court erred in three respects in granting summary judgment in favor of the Government. Because Stacy’s arguments turn in large part on Calvin’s ability to dispose of the two annuities under Texas law, it is instructive first to review Texas law concerning a spouse’s ability to manage, control, and dispose of community property assets. In analyzing that issue, Texas distinguishes between joint management community property and sole management community property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.102. Under section 3.102 of the Texas Family Code, a spouse’s sole management community property includes his or her “(1) personal earnings; (2) revenue from separate property; (3) recoveries from personal injuries; and (4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all property subject to the spouse’s sole management, control and disposition.” Id. § 3.102(a). All other community property is joint management community property, unless the spouses have provided otherwise by power of attorney or other written agreement. Id. § 3.102(c).

Joint management community property — as the name suggests — is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the spouses. See id. Accordingly, to effect a valid conveyance of joint management community property, Texas law requires both spouses to join in the transaction. See, e.g., City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 85 (Tex. App. — Tyler 2009, no pet.); see also, e.g., 38 Tex. Prac., Marital Property and Homesteads § 15.13 (“[I]f a spouse does not have a written power of attorney or other agreement, the spouse may not convey or otherwise dispose of joint management community property without the joinder of the other spouse.”). Conversely, Texas law provides that each spouse has the power to convey his or her sole management community property without approval of the other spouse, even though both spouses have an undivided one-half interest in the property. See, e.g., Lemaster v. Top Level Printing Ink, Inc., 136 S.W.3d 745, 748-49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.); see also, e.g., 38 Tex. Prac., Marital Property and Homesteads § 15.8 (“A spouse, in dealing with that spouse’s sole management community property, may act alone.”).

Because property that appears to be subject to sole management may, in fact, be subject to joint management — and thus require joinder of both spouses to affect a valid conveyance — third parties that enter into transactions involving community property might be placed in a precarious position. Section 3.104 of the Texas Family Code, however, offers third parties some protection. Under section 3.104, property held in one spouse’s name is presumed to be sole management community property, and if the named spouse conveys such property to a third party, the third party is entitled to rely upon the authority of that spouse to convey the property if, in pertinent part, the third party “does not have actual or constructive notice of the spouse’s lack of authority” to deal with the property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.104(b)(2)(B).

With this background in place, we turn back to Stacy’s arguments. Stacy first points to section 3.102(c) of the Texas Family Code, which states that “community property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the spouses unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.” She argues that, because the funds used to purchase the two annuities were properly considered community property, the annuities are subject to joint management and disposition under section 3.102. As the magistrate judge pointed out, however, the annuities are presumed to be Calvin’s sole management community property under section 3.104(a) because they were held in Calvin’s name only, and section 3.104(a) “trumps” section 3.102. Jean v. Tyson-Jean, 118 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

Stacy next argues that the Government knew of Calvin’s lack of authority from the joint claim and answer filed in the forfeiture proceeding that referred to the annuities as “community property” and stated Stacy’s (and Calvin’s) objection to forfeiture. Therefore, Stacy argues, the Government is not entitled t'o rely upon section 3.104 of the Texas Family Code. In support, Stacy points to Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1974, writ dism’d). In Williams, a note and deed of trust were initially prepared by a bank for execution by both the debtor and his spouse. 514 S.W.2d at 125. The spouse refused to execute either, and the debtor gave this information to the president of the bank; at that point, a new note and deed were prepared for execution by the debtor alone. Id. The court concluded that the bank’s knowledge of the wife’s refusal constituted constructive notice of the debtor husband’s lack of sole authority to deal with the property. Id.

This case is readily distinguishable from Williams. Here, the Walkers’ joint claim and answer served to notify the Government that the annuities were community property in which Stacy owned a one-half interest. However, unlike in Williams, the Walkers’ joint claim and answer did nothing to suggest that the annuities were joint management community property that Calvin could not transfer without Stacy’s consent. Indeed, as the district court recognized, the Government had good reason to believe that Calvin did have authority to transfer the annuities without Stacy’s consent: Stacy was represented in the present forfeiture proceeding by the same attorney who was negotiating the plea agreement in Calvin’s criminal proceeding; Stacy was present at Calvin’s plea hearing, at which Calvin confirmed his understanding of the plea agreement; and Stacy never brought the lack of Calvin’s authority to the attention of her attorney or the Government. Accordingly, under section 3.104 of the Texas Family Code, the Government was entitled to rely on Calvin’s authority to deal with the annuities in executing the plea agreement. See In re McCloy, 296 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that mere notice of the fact that property held in one spouse’s name was community property was insufficient to establish notice that the named spouse lacked authority to deal with that property as sole management community property); see also, e.g., Lemaster, 136 S.W.3d at 748-49.

Finally, Stacy argues that the Government was required by “statutory and regulatory civil asset forfeiture protocol to protect her spousal interest in [the annuities],” ostensibly by obtaining her express consent to the plea agreement. Yet Stacy does not point to any statute or regulation that actually requires the Government to obtain spousal consent to an agreement providing for the forfeiture of property that is, under state law, presumptively subject to a party’s sole management, control, and disposition. And Stacy provides no compelling justification for this court to treat Calvin’s agreement in this case any differently than another agreement he might have made under state law to dispose of the annuities — that is, to enforce the agreement notwithstanding the absence of spousal consent.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      . 18 U.S.C. §§ 666 and 1343 concern fraud upon programs receiving federal funds and wire fraud, respectively. Calvin’s 32-count indictment charged him with 20 counts of fraud upon programs receiving federal funds in violation of § 666 and five counts of wire fraud in violation of § 1343.

      . Specifically, in the answer and counterclaim, Calvin denied "that he is guilty of any acts that would justify seizure or forfeiture of the property in question," noting that his criminal trial resulted in "a hung jury in which the jurors were unable to agree on a verdict.” For her part, Stacy noted that she "has not been accused of any acts or violations which would justify seizing or forfeiting any of her interest in [the annuities].”

      . The Government’s delay in moving for entry of judgment was attributable to two factors. First, on September 4, 2012, the Beaumont Independent School District filed a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding, alleging that it had "assisted the United States Attorney’s office in gathering information [and] witnesses for prosecution of [Calvin Walker]” and seeking “to obtain payment for attorney fees and costs associated with the attempted prosecution of Calvin Walker.” The district court granted the Government’s motion to strike the District’s claim on June 10, 2013. That order is not at issue in this appeal. Second, the proceedings were stayed for a period of time due a lapse in appropriation for the operation of the Department of Justice. See W.D. Tex. Gen. Order No. 13-19.

      . Section 3.104 of the Texas Family Code, in relevant part, provides:
      A third person dealing with a spouse is entitled to rely, as against the other spouse or anyone claiming from that spouse, on that spouse's authority to deal with the property if:
      (1) the property is presumed to be subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the spouse; and
      (2) the person dealing with the spouse:
      (A) is not a party to a fraud on the other spouse or another person; and
      (B) does not have actual or constructive notice of the spouse’s lack of authority.
      Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.104(b).

      . Stacy also appears to argue, in a footnote, that the district court erred in a fourth respect — namely, granting summary judgment when Calvin's plea agreement "is ... ambiguous as to whether ... Calvin ... was trying to contract away all of the annuities, or rather, as the plea agreement states ‘his interest’ in the two annuities.” However, Stacy does not raise this argument in the body of her brief; therefore, her argument is waived. See, e.g., Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 810 F.3d 335, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2016) ("Arguments subordinated in a footnote are 'insufficiently addressed in the body of the brief,' and thus are waived.” (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003))). Regardless, even if we were to conclude that the plea agreement was ambiguous on this point, Stacy has failed to point to any extrinsic evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact as to the parties’ intent to merely contract with respect to Calvin’s one-half interest in the annuities. See, e.g., Jhaver v. Zapata OffShore Co., 903 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that summary judgment is appropriate when extrinsic evidence does not raise genuine issue of material fact as to parties’ intent).

      . The parties do not dispute that the funds used to purchase the two annuities were from the community property of Calvin and Stacy Walker and, therefore, are community property themselves under Texas law.

      . Stacy instead cites primarily to two internal documents of the Department of Justice: the United States Attorneys' Manual and the Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual. Those documents, however, are not intended to be binding. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 1-1.100 (2016), https://www.justice. gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual ("The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.”); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual 21 (2016), https:// www.justice.gov/criminalafmls/file/839521/ download ("These guidelines are intended to be sufficiently flexible to enable each [United States Attorneys’ Office] ... to establish and utilize local procedures that clearly define and assign local pre-seizure/restraint planning responsibilities.”). Moreover, the documents Stacy cites do not address the circumstances of this case, much less recommend obtaining spousal consent in such cases. For example, the section of the Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual that Stacy cites concerns foreign enforcement of judgments, which is not implicated in this case. See Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual, supra, at 142.

      . Indeed, Stacy herself may have benefited, at least in part, from Calvin’s agreement. At the time the agreement was drafted, the Government had been seeking forfeiture of two parcels of land and a vehicle, in addition to the two annuities. As part of the agreement, the Government dropped its claim to the land and vehicle, and returned — to Stacy personally— three checks payable to Calvin’s company for the sum of $520,000. The Government also agreed that all of Calvin’s restitution would be paid from the proceeds of the two annuities.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chanda HUOR, also known as Kevin Thorn, Defendant-Appellant
    No. 15-50174
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Filed March 10, 2017

      Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Diane D. Kirstein, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, Jennifer Sheffield Freel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    Judy Fulmer Madewell, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Laura G. Greenberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

      Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
   REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Chanda Huor was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). His sentence included a prison term followed by ten years of supervised release during which he would be subject to various conditions. His appeal challenges five of the conditions imposed. We find the district court acted within its discretion by imposing a special condition requiring Huor to undergo sex offender treatment but abused its discretion by imposing a special condition prohibiting purchase, possession, or use of sexually stimulating materials. The district court also erred, as a matter of law, by imposing a special condition requiring the defendant to “follow all other lifestyle restrictions ... imposed by the therapist.” Further, the judgment must be reformed to omit a special condition prohibiting Huor from “residing or going to places” frequented by minors without permission from his probation officer because that special condition was not pronounced orally at sentencing. Similarly, the judgment must be reformed to omit a “standard” sex offender treatment condition that largely overlaps with, but materially differs from, the similar “special” condition that was orally pronounced at sentencing and included separately in the written judgment.

In light of our rulings, only the treatment condition will stand. The defendant also challenges a discrete aspect of this condition, which provides: “After an initial evaluation if the doctor finds that treatment isn’t necessary and the defendant is not a danger, the Court will amend and abate this special condition of supervised release.” Because the district court retained its power to sentence the defendant and did not improperly delegate it to the doctor, we uphold this aspect of the treatment condition.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1998, at the age of 16, defendant Chanda Huor pleaded guilty to raping a four-year-old girl. In addition to a lengthy prison sentence, he was required to register as a sex offender for life. Huor got out of prison in 2005. Since then, he has updated his registration several times but not with the diligence required by law; he has multiple failure-to-register convictions.

Huor updated his registration with the Virginia State Police in early 2013. In March of that year, he moved to San Antonio, Texas and did not update his registration. When the deadline to do so passed, a warrant for Huor’s arrest issued out of Virginia. U.S. Marshals eventually tracked him to Texas, where he had moved to be with a girlfriend. After the relationship ended, he lived with a woman named Crystal Quesada and her eight-year-old son for nearly a year. Marshals contacted Quesada and learned that she knew Huor as Kevin Thorn. They did not find Huor until several days later. When they did, he was living with a new girlfriend and her two young daughters. This third girlfriend, Rosemary Valdez, was unaware that Huor was a convicted sex offender and also knew him as Kevin. Huor was at Valdez’s residence when the Marshals arrived and was arrested without incident.

Huor was charged in a one-count indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) as a person required to register under SOR-NA who had traveled in interstate commerce and knowingly failed to register or update his registration. He pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced Huor to 24 months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. Much of the sentencing hearing concerned the propriety of sentencing conditions, particularly the requirement that Huor undergo sex offender treatment and the ban on sexually stimulating materials. The district court acknowledged that Huor had not committed any sex offenses since being released from prison and had indeed shown no “propensity at least in the last ten years ... to reengage in the kind of behavior that put him where — where he is today.”

Huor’s counsel objected to the sex offender treatment condition. The district court explained that it was imposing the special condition primarily because Huor had lied to two different women, earned a place in those women’s homes by the deceit, and thereby placed himself under the same roof as small children. This combination of events, a scenario SORNA is specifically designed to prevent, satisfied the district court that Huor required continuing sex offender treatment. In response to Huor’s objection, however, the district court agreed that such treatment may be unnecessary and qualified the special condition as follows: “I’m going to amend that condition, at this time, to require that he undergo at least an initial evaluation, and if the psychiatrist or psychologist believes that under the circumstances a — further treatment is not necessary, then I will amend and abate the condition.” This “initial evaluation qualification” is challenged on appeal along with the special condition itself.

Huor’s counsel also objected to the special condition prohibiting sexually stimulating materials. When Huor’s counsel noted the absence of any link to pornography in Huor’s case, the district court replied, “No, he didn’t have child pornography. He just raped a four year old.” The district court also relied on evidence heard in prior cases that sexually stimulating materials contribute to recidivism in pedophiles. The special condition, however, was amended and made subject to the initial evaluation qualification.

Other conditions imposed at sentencing provoked no objection. Pertinent here, Huor’s counsel did not object to a condition requiring Huor to “follow all other lifestyle restrictions or treatment requirements approved by the therapist, psychiatrist, or psychologist and continue those restrictions as they pertain to avoiding risk situations throughout the course of his supervision.” And the written judgment, when handed down, included another special condition to which Huor’s counsel had no opportunity to object — a special condition prohibiting Huor from “residing or going to places” frequented by minors without permission from his probation officer. The written judgment also included, as “Standard Condition 14,” sex offender treatment largely redundant of the sex offender treatment separately imposed as a special condition but lacking the “initial evaluation qualification.” Huor timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Essential Law

When challenged on appeal, conditions of supervised release are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Morin, 832 F.3d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 2016).

[S]uch conditions must be reasonably related to one of the following statutory factors: (i) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (ii) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (iii) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (iv) the need to provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2)).

Supervised release conditions must be “reasonably related to any of the four factors” and “cannot involve a ‘greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to achieve the statutory goals.” Id. (quoting United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 2001)). Sentencing courts have an obligation to explain why each special condition has been imposed. Id.

To the extent Huor challenges conditions to which he did not object at sentencing, we review only for plain error. See id. at 448. To satisfy this standard of review, Huor “must show ‘(1) an error (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Mendoza-Velasquez, 847 F.3d 209, 212 (5th Cir.2017) (quoting United States v. Nava, 762 F.3d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 2014)). He bears the burden as to each of these four questions, and carrying that burden “is difficult, as it should be.” Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)).

B. The “Treatment Condition”

Huor’s first challenge is to the treatment condition. He argues that treatment is “unnecessary” and not supported by findings reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors. We disagree. The district court adequately articulated why the treatment condition is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of Huor’s crime, the need to protect the public from further crimes, and the need to provide Huor with treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(2).

The district court explained: “the reason for the imposition ... is his false — and lying to these women and resulting in his placing himself within a home with small children.” The district court was concerned because Huor’s failure to register led to precisely the risk of harm that SORNA is designed to prevent — a convicted sex offender living in a home with small children under a false name and without informing the children’s mother of his past. Huor previously raped a small child and has since violated SORNA with the consequence (and perhaps purpose) of embedding himself into the household of a woman with small children. The district court determined, based on this specific conduct, that sex offender treatment was warranted, and this determination was not an abuse of discretion.

Huor also challenges, on appeal, the initial evaluation qualification, which provides that “[a]fter an initial evaluation if the doctor finds that treatment isn’t necessary and the defendant is not a danger, the Court will amend and abate this special condition of supervised release.” There being no objection at sentencing to this aspect of the special condition, our review is for plain error.

It is proper for a court to decide that “the manner and means” by which a condition of supervised release is implemented may be determined by a probation officer or therapist. Morin, 832 F.3d at 516-17. A court may not, however, delegate the duty of determining whether a condition will be imposed at all. See id. at 518. Rather, the court must “retain and exercise ultimate responsibility” for that sentencing decision. Id. (quoting United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted)). Thus, for example, giving a therapist power to impose “lifestyle restrictions” on a defendant “[without the supervision of the district court” represents a violation, but there is no violation if the district court retains a supervisory role. See id.

In Morin, we rejected a special condition that required the defendant to “follow all other lifestyle restrictions or treatment requirements imposed by the therapist, and continue those restrictions as they pertain to avoiding risk situations throughout the course of supervision.” Id. at 515-17 (emphasis added). In United States v. Lomas, the challenged special condition required the defendant “to participate in a mental health program as deemed necessary and approved by the probation officer,” and we vacated and remanded for clarification, instructing that if the district “court intends to leave the issue of the defendant’s participation in therapy to the discretion of the probation officer, such a condition would constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority and should not be included.” 643 Fed.Appx. 319, 324-25 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Lomas was recently followed in a published opinion, United States v. Franklin, 838 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2016). In all three cases, we focused on the wording of the condition in determining its propriety. Morin, 832 F.3d at 517 (reviewing the condition “as presently constructed”); Lomas, 643 Fed.Appx. at 322 (focusing on the “wording” of the special condition at issue); Franklin, 838 F.3d at 567 (same).

Huor’s arguments largely ignore the actual wording of the written judgment, imbuing the reviewing doctor with sentencing power not reflected in the judgment. Thus, Huor argues that “the conditions take effect, by default, if a doctor finds that treatment is necessary,” that the “conditions take effect even if the doctor is undecided about the necessity for treatment,” that the “conditions abate only upon a finding that treatment is unnecessary,” and that “[e]ither way, it is the doctor who has the power to decide whether Huor will be subject to” the special conditions. Not so.

It is the district court that “will amend and abate this special condition of supervised release” if a “doctor finds that treatment isn’t necessary and the defendant is not a danger.” Thus, the district court has retained ultimate supervisory power as required by Morin, 832 F.3d at 518; see also Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1056 (“Conditions delegating limited authority to non judicial officials ... are permissible so long as the delegating judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsibility.”). It is the district court that does the sentencing, and that is all Article III requires.

While the judgment’s wording rightly preserves the judiciary’s power to impose the sentence, its if/then structure creates the concerning impression that the judge may act as an automaton upon receiving the findings of the doctor. “[P]reserving the judiciary’s exclusive authority to impose sentences is an area in which it is important for courts to be 'vigilant.” Morin, 832 F.3d at 518. We have held that the district court committed no improper delegation precisely because it did not delegate the power to sentence. We emphasize that the district court must retain that power in a meaningful way. “[I]n every delegation, the court must retain the right to review findings and to exercise ultimate authority for resolving the case or controversy.” United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995). The judge’s role must not be reduced to the clerical; the doctor’s role must not be elevated to the judicial. Under our- reading of the special condition, the doctor makes findings on the necessity of treatment and danger of the defendant, and the judge retains the authority and responsibility to review the doctor’s findings and to adjust the sentence if, in its considered view, the findings so merit. See id. (“It has long been recognized that courts may utilize masters and commissioners in connection with factfinding, and the Supreme Court has affirmed Congress’ delegation of factfinding functions to an administrative agency.”).

C. The “Sexually Stimulating Materials Condition”

Huor also challenges the sexually stimulating materials condition requiring the defendant to “refrain from purchasing, possessing, or using any sexually stimulating or sexually oriented materials including but not limited to written, audio and visual depictions, such as, pornographic books, magazines, photographs, films, videos, DVDs, computer programs, or any other media for portrayal of the same.” Relying primarily on Salazar, he contends that the record does not support a prohibition of sexually stimulating materials.

Our analysis starts with the reasons given by the district court and analysis of their relationship to the § 3553(a) factors. As mentioned previously, the district court imposed the sexually stimulating material condition because Huor previously raped a small child and because, from evidence presented in prior cases, the district court was concerned that sexually stimulating materials may contribute to recidivism in pedophiles. The first of these reasons bears an inadequate relationship to the statutory factors. The second reason reflects a failure to tailor the special condition to the individual defendant and is unsupported by the record.

The sexually stimulating materials condition was imposed, in part, because Huor “raped a four-year-old.” This rationale relates to the first § 3553(a) factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. “[A] special condition that is not related to the crime of conviction will nevertheless be upheld as long as it is justified by a defendant’s criminal history,” and it is therefore proper to consider Huor’s 1998 rape conviction. Salazar, 743 F.3d at 452. Under Salazar, however, that “singular and now-remote sexual offense” does not justify a ten-year sexually stimulating materials condition. See id.

Like Huor, the defendant in Salazar had been convicted of one sex-related offense years prior — a conviction that subjected him to SORNA’s registration requirements. Id. at 447. And like Huor, the conviction leading to imposition of supervised release and the concomitant sexually stimulating materials condition was failure to register. Id. As here, “[n]othing in Salazar’s history suggested] that sexually stimulating materials fueled his past crimes,” and there was no evidence that Salazar was “a repeat offender of sex crimes or that access to pornographic materials contributed to his original offense.” Id. at 452. Indeed, Huor was only 16 at the time of his crime, and the only evidence regarding its catalyst is that he was himself the victim of a similar crime when he was 5 years old. Neither the past offense, nor the new conviction, nor the two of them considered in tandem, “justify the imposition of this restriction.” Id.; see also United States v. Windless, 719 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2013).

The district court explained the second reason for imposing a sexually stimulating materials condition: based on testimony heard in other cases, “exposure to sexually explicit materials for these kinds of individuals can in fact result in an acceleration of [the] process” toward recidivism. This rationale can be classified as deterrence, protection of the public, and therapeutic — the final three § 3553(a) factors. Nonetheless, on this record, imposition of the special condition fails to pass muster.

“[S]pecial conditions must be tailored to the individual defendant and may not be based on boilerplate conditions imposed as a matter of course in a particular district.” United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Thus, district courts are required “to set forth factual findings to justify special probation conditions.” Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451 (quoting United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Factual findings made in support of a sentencing determination must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1993). This includes factual determinations justifying conditions of supervised release. See Windless, 719 F.3d at 420.

Early in the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it did not “know whether [Huor] would be classified as a pedophile or not.” Nonetheless, it went on to discuss how “they’re notoriously hard to treat and have a pretty high recidivism rate from all the testimony I’ve heard over the many years from psychiatrists and psychologists and those who treat sex offenders.” The district court returned to this topic when justifying the sexually stimulating materials condition:

I’ve — over the years, I’ve heard testimony from psychiatrists and psychologists, I can’t even begin to tell you how many times, about how these individuals who have these predilections, it’s very difficult to treat them. There’s a very high recidivism rate, and that exposure to sexually explicit materials for these kinds of individuals can in fact result in an acceleration of that process.

The district court’s approach is not the “tailored,” individualized approach required by the law. See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 276. Rather, the district court based his sentencing decisions on evidence heard in other cases — evidence with uncertain relevance to Huor. In short, the district court sentenced Huor as a pedophile after acknowledging uncertainty regarding whether Huor actually is a pedophile. This was error. The factual basis supporting the special condition was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See Windless, 719 F.3d at 420. Indeed, the district court acknowledged that many of the facts it considered most important in imposing the sexually stimulating materials condition — whether Huor would be classified as a pedophile, whether Huor was “regressing,” whether viewing pornography would contribute to his risk of recidivism — were unknown at the sentencing hearing. Conditions of supervised release must be “narrowly tailored” and supported by the record. United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 403 (5th Cir. 2015). The sexually stimulating materials condition is neither and cannot stand.

The government’s meager defense of the sexually stimulating materials condition only confirms our ruling. The government distinguishes Salazar primarily on the basis that Salazar “concluded that the district court erred by not explaining how the supervised release condition was reasonably related to the goals of supervised release,” whereas here “the district court identified and explained its reasons for imposing the special conditions and how they related to the goals of supervised release.” An explanation is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Thus, Salazar did more than vacate and remand for lack of an explanation; it also found that the record could not support imposition of the sexually stimulating materials condition. See 743 F.3d at 452-53. Here, the district court gave reasons, but they were inadequate under Salazar and other cases, and our review of the record yields “insufficient evidence of a reasonable relationship between the condition and the statutory factors.” Id. at 453.

The government also points out that, unlike Salazar, Huor previously violated the terms of his parole by viewing pornography. Thus, this case is closer than Salazar: it cannot be said of Huor (as it was of Salazar) that there is “no indication in the record [of] an unhealthy relationship with such materials” and no evidence that he “ever used pornography.” Id. at 452. Nonetheless, a defendant’s right to possess and view sexually stimulating materials is not defeated by evidence that the defendant has in fact viewed sexually stimulating materials. While it is worrisome that Huor violated the terms of his parole to view such material, it remains “hard to imagine how preventing [Huor] from accessing sexually stimulating materials would prevent future criminal conduct.” See id. Conditions of supervised release must serve the purposes of § 3553(a) and may not merely represent stumbling blocks.

The district court did not mention Huor’s past pornography-related parole violation as a basis for imposing the sexually stimulating materials condition, and this is not a case where “clear evidence in the record” allows us to conclude that the condition “was reasonably necessary.” See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 276. On remand, the district court is free to consider the past parole violation in view of the § 3553(a) factors when deciding whether to re-impose the special condition.

The government’s remaining arguments in support of the sexually stimulating material condition are generic and lack merit. The government contends that “given Appellant’s designation as a ‘violent sex offender’ and the court’s desire to deter him from this conduct in the future, the condition prohibiting him from access to sexually stimulating material was not an abuse of discretion.” Similarly, it argues that “because Appellant had committed a crime that was sexual in nature it was reasonable for the district court to restrict Appellant’s access to sexually stimulating material in an effort to prevent future crimes or aid in his rehabilitation.” These blanket arguments were rejected in Salazar, see 743 F.3d at 450-51, and are inconsistent with the individualized approach the law requires, see Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 276.

The primary case upon which the government relies, United States v. McGee, 559 Fed.Appx. 323 (5th Cir. 2014), is unpublished and distinguishable. In a footnote, McGee acknowledged that Salazar involved “a similar special condition imposed in a SORNA failure-to-register case” but nonetheless found the condition warranted. Id. at 330 n.33. The difference, we explained, was that the defendant McGee had a “significant criminal history involving several sexual assaults and his pattern for quickly reoffending following release.” Id. Huor’s offense was grave and disturbing, but it is the “singular and now-remote sexual offense” of Salazar rather than the multiple offenses of McGee. Salazar is far more similar to this case than is McGee. See also United States v. Prieto, 801 F.3d 547, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (discussing Salazar and McGee). Other cases cited by the government fare no better. The government points us to United, States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). But Ellis involves a defendant who was tried and convicted for possession of child pornography. 720 F.3d 220 at 223. Unlike the defendant in Ellis and just like the defendant in Salazar, “[njothing in [Huor’s] history suggests that sexually stimulating materials fueled his past crimes” and there is no evidence “that access to pornographic materials contributed to his original offense.” Salazar, 743 F.3d at 452. Finally, the government cites United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149 (2009). That case involved the plain error standard of review and a defendant with a “lengthy history” of crime including multiple violent sex offenses. Id. at 151, 154. It does not aid the government.

D. Delegation and Plain Error

We return to Article Ill’s prohibition on the delegation of core judicial functions. According to Huor, the district court erred by imposing a special condition requiring the defendant to “follow all other lifestyle restrictions or treatment requirements imposed by the therapist, and continue those restrictions as they pertain to avoiding risk situations throughout the course of supervision.” Because he did not object to this condition at sentencing, our review is for plain error.

The challenged condition is identical to the condition found impermissible in Morin. Accordingly, there is error, and it is plain. See Morin, 832 F.3d at 518; see also United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[Wjhere the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal, the ‘plainness’ of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal.”). Further, under Prieto, we “easily conclude that the district court’s error affected [Huor’s] substantial rights” because “[h]ad the error not occurred, [Huor] would not have been subjected to the unwarranted special condition.” 801 F.3d at 553. Morin also establishes the requisite effect on Huor’s substantial rights. See 832 F.3d at 517 (explaining that the condition “extends to a therapist the authority to impose, without court review, independent conditions of supervised release that might extend beyond the period of supervised release and that could serve as the basis for violations of the terms of supervised release separate and apart from noncompliance with the treatment program”).

The only remaining question is “whether the error affects ‘the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ such that the appellate court should exercise its discretion to correct the error.’’ Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d at 425 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. at 1429). Here we confront a judgment that cedes the judiciary’s exclusive sentencing power to a therapist. Such an error necessarily “undermines the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Renteria-Martinez, 847 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2017).

Given the error’s stark impact on the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings, we will exercise our discretion to correct it. In doing so, we are not alone. See United States v. Pitts, Case No. 15-50850, 670 Fed.Appx. 375, 2016 WL 6832953 (5th Cir. Nov. 18, 2016) (per cu-riam) (correcting, on plain error review, an identical error involving the same special condition); see also United States v. Alaniz, Case No. 16-40321, 671 Fed.Appx. 292, 293, 2016 WL 7187378, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2016) (per curiam) (“Because such an error involves ‘core judicial functions,’ see Franklin, 838 F.3d at 568, we find the exercise of this court’s discretion to correct the error is warranted under these circumstances.”).

E. Conflicts Between the Oral Pronouncement at Sentencing and the Written Judgment

The written judgment includes a special condition prohibiting Huor from “residing or going to places” frequented by minors without permission from his probation officer. This condition was not announced at sentencing. Defendants have a constitutional right to be present at their sentencing, and the government concedes that the judgment must be reformed to conform to the oral sentence. United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[W]hen there is a conflict between a written sentence and an oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls.”).

The same body of law governs Huor’s next argument, that Standard Condition 14 conflicts with the oral sentencing. As a general rule, standard conditions need not be orally pronounced. See United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 936 (5th Cir. 2003). This rule, however, does not resolve the issue. Huor’s argument is not premised on the notion that the standard condition was unannounced and therefore necessarily conflictual with all that was pronounced. See, e.g., Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942 (“The district court’s failure to mention mandatory drug treatment in its oral pronouncement constitutes a conflict, not an ambiguity.”). Huor’s argument is that Standard Condition 14 conflicts with the sex offender treatment as pronounced (and “amend[ed]”) at sentencing. In Huor’s view, this is not a case where “[t]he written judgment simply clar-ifie[s] the meaning of that sentence by specifying what the supervision [is meant] to entail.’ ” Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 938 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2002)). Rather, this is a case where the written judgment muddles the picture. We agree with Huor. The special conditions are nearly redundant but not quite identical, and only the orally pronounced condition should be part of the written judgment.

The Government argues that if the conditions are read together, there is no conflict because the sex offender treatment required by Standard Condition 14 is necessarily contingent on the initial evaluation qualification included in the special treatment condition. This argument would prevail if we perceived ambiguity rather than conflict. See United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“If ... the difference between the [the oral pronouncement and the written judgment] is only an ambiguity, we look to the sentencing court’s intent to determine the sentence.”). Here, however, the asserted ambiguity is created by nothing more than a simple conflict: one condition imposes sex offender therapy subject to the initial evaluation qualification; one condition flatly imposes sex offender therapy. Only the first of these two conditions was pronounced at oral sentencing, and only it may remain. The judgment must be reformed to conform to the oral pronouncement, and Standard Condition 14 must be excised. See Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND for resentencing. The treatment condition stands, but all other challenged conditions are VACATED. The district court may reconsider imposing the sexually stimulating materials condition in light of this opinion.

      . Windless was decided on the grounds that the challenged condition of supervised release involved a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary to achieve the statutory aims. 719 F.3d at 422. Salazar did not reach that question, instead finding the challenged condition not reasonably related to any of the four factors. See 743 F.3d at 451. While Huor has argued both points, our decision rests on the relationship between the condition and the statutory factors. Windless took a different analytical approach but is illuminating nonetheless.

      . In Prieto, as here, we distinguished both McGee and Ellis. See 801 F.3d at 552-53.


author: EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

text:
    KIPP FLORES ARCHITECTS, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant v. MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
    No. 16-20255
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    FILED March 24, 2017

      Louis Karl Bonham, Osha Liang, L.L.P., Patrick Zummo, Law Offices of Patrick Zummo, Houston, TX, Louis Karl Bonham, Osha Liang, L.L.P., Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Robert Sullivan Gebhard, Sedgwick, De-tert, Moran & Arnold, San Francisco, CA, Douglas J. Collodel, Esq., Sedgwick, L.L.P., Los Angeles, CA, Timothy Brian Poteet, Chamberlain McHaney, Austin, TX, Sherman Vance Wittie, Esq., Counsel, Sedgwick LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
   EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

This is the third appeal arising out of an architectural copyright infringement action and subsequent Chapter 7 bankruptcies of two related companies in the homebuilding business. After Kipp Flores Architects (“KFA”) sued Hallmark Collection of Homes, L.L.C., for copyright infringement, Hallmark Collection commenced a “no asset” bankruptcy case. KFA filed a bankruptcy proof of claim for copyright infringement damages. Relying on its “deemed allowed” claim, 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), as a final judgment, KFA sued appellee Mid-Continent Casualty Company, the debtor’s liability insurer. KFA argues that the unobjected-to claim constitutes a final judgment and is res judicata as to Mid-Continent. The question on appeal is what “deemed allowed” means when a proof of claim is filed in a no-asset bankruptcy case, no deadline is set for objections to claims, and no “party in interest” objects? We conclude that the text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code, Rules and Official Forms, and relevant case law all support affirming the district court’s summary judgment against KFA.

BACKGROUND

Appellant KFA creates and markets proprietary home designs and plans. In a series of licensing agreements, KFA prepared twenty-one different architectural designs for Texas-based Hallmark Collection of Homes, L.L.C. (“Hallmark Collection”). Hallmark Collection obtained a license to build one, and only one, house per plan — unless Hallmark Collection compensated KFA for each additional house built from that plan. Hallmark Collection, however, built several hundred houses from the licensed plans without paying KFA

KFA filed suit in March 2009 for violations of federal copyright law and actual or statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. The defendants included Hallmark Collection, the limited partnership Hallmark Design Homes, L.P. (“Hallmark Design”), and Joe Partain, an owner of Hallmark Collection. In the midst of the copyright lawsuit, Hallmark Collection and Hallmark Design filed separately for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in November 2009. Both bankruptcy filings stated on Form B1 that, “after any exempt property is excluded and administrative expenses paid, there will be no funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors.” KFA’s copyright suit was stayed pending the bankruptcy cases on November 28, 2009. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Hallmark Collection’s schedules disclosed liabilities in excess of $2.5 million but listed no assets available for distribution to creditors. KFA was listed as a creditor with an unsecured nonpriority claim for an unknown amount based on the copyright suit. In early January 2010, the Chapter 7 Trustee distributed the following notice to creditors:

It having appeared from the schedules of [Hallmark Collection] at the time of filing that there was no estate from which any dividend could be paid to creditors, the notice to creditors advised that it was unnecessary for any creditor to file his claim at that time.
It appearing subsequently that there is an estate from which a dividend to creditors may be paid, creditors must now file claims in this case in order to share in any distribution from the estate. CLAIMS MUST BE FILED ON OR BEFORE NINETY (90) DAYS FROM THE ISSUANCE OF THIS NOTICE. Claims which are not filed timely as set forth above will not be allowed, except as otherwise provided by law.

Responding to this notice, KFA timely filed a proof of claim for $63,471,000 against Hallmark Collection. (This amount was based on the debtor’s gross receipts from sales of the infringing homes.) No deadline was set by the court for objecting to claims. Unsurprisingly, neither the trustee nor any other party in interest objected to KFA’s proof of claim. The bankruptcy court entered no order allowing or disallowing the claim. But in August 2010, the Chapter 7 Trustee submitted a No Asset Report, stating that there were no proceeds from the Hallmark Collection estate for distribution to creditors. The bankruptcy court closed the case five weeks later.

While Hallmark Collection’s case was pending, KFA amended its complaint in the copyright lawsuit and added individual defendants Laura Partain and William Graper, each of whom filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. KFA persuaded the district court in August 2011 to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court of claims against Hallmark Design, Joe Par-tain, and Laura Partain in the underlying copyright suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). KFA never made a similar request with respect to the claim against Hallmark Collection.

In November 2011, KFA amended its proof of claim in the Hallmark Design bankruptcy case, seeking over $83 million, and filed an identical claim in the Partain case. The respective Chapter 7 Trustees’ objections to KFA’s claims were consolidated with the underlying copyright action. After the district court lifted the automatic stay, KFA prevailed in a jury trial of the copyright suit that yielded a finding of $3,231,084.00 damages against Hallmark Design but imposed no liability on the individual defendants. KFA was granted an “allowed unsecured claim” for $3,239,688.40 in the Hallmark Design bankruptcy. Hallmark Design appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Appellee Mid-Continent, Hallmark Design’s insurer, had been approved to represent the trustee in KFA’s litigation. The insurer next filed a declaratory judgment action in January 2013 to challenge its policy coverage of the judgment against Hallmark Design. KFA counter-claimed and prevailed in the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that judgment, and Mid-Continent paid KFA $3,031,563.12.

While litigation over the Hallmark Design judgment was pending, KFA made demand on Mid-Continent to pay off KFA’s “final judgment” obtained for its proof of claim in the Hallmark Collection bankruptcy. KFA sought payment of the Mid-Continent policies’ $6 million face value.

When Mid-Continent refused to pay, KFA filed this action in September 2014 for breach of contract as a judgment creditor of Hallmark Collection and third-party beneficiary under Mid-Continent’s policies. The district court referred the matter for pretrial management, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), to a magistrate judge. Following protracted proceedings, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Citing precedent from multiple bankruptcy courts around the country, the magistrate judge concluded that “KFA’s proof of claim was not ‘deemed allowed,’ as a matter of law.” In part, the magistrate judge reasoned that in cases where there are no assets available for distribution to creditors, the bankruptcy claims allowance process “was never ‘triggered’ at all.” After reviewing KFA’s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court adopted it with one modification that is irrelevant here. KFA appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo, Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009), applying the usual standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

KFA contends that the district court judgment created a “no asset case” exception to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) contrary to the provision’s plain language. According to KFA, the Bankruptcy Code is unambiguous: any proof of claim is deemed allowed if no party in interest objects. Because no party objected to KFA’s proof of claim in the Hallmark Collection bankruptcy case, the claim was “deemed allowed,” became a final judgment against Hallmark Collection, and under principles of res judicata, suffices to trigger Mid-Continent’s duty to indemnify its insured, Hallmark Collection.

Mid-Continent responds that KFA’s proof of claim did not result in a final judgment in Hallmark Collection’s no asset Chapter 7 case. The allowance of KFA’s claim for copyright infringement damages served no bankruptcy purpose because there were no assets to be marshalled and distributed among creditors. According to Mid-Continent, the Bankruptcy Code, read as a whole, provides that proofs of claim may be filed and become subject to bankruptcy court adjudication in the claims process only when assets are available or are thought to be forthcoming for distribution.

This appeal raises an intriguing question of statutory interpretation. We conclude that Mid-Continent has the better of the argument when Section 502 is read in tandem with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Further light is shed on the question by the relevant Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, which are promulgated under the auspices of the U.S. Supreme Court and approved by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (“Bankruptcy Rules”).

The core of KFA’s case is Section 502(a), which states:

A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.

11 U.S.C § 502(a). Standing alone, the provision appears to say that any bankruptcy proof of claim not objected to by a “party in interest” is “deemed allowed.” KFA would have the analysis stop here. But interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code, many of whose terms are subject to further explication, rarely end with a single sentence. This provision deems proofs of claim “allowed” only when the claims are “filed under [11 U.S.C.] Section 501,” and the claims are not objected to by “any party in interest.” “An understanding of the codal structure for the allowance or disallowance of creditors’ claims is critical to a proper understanding and analysis of this case.” In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1985). Section 502(a) cannot be correctly understood without examining the context in which “filing,” “allowance,” and “party in interest” are used throughout the Code.

The definition of a “claim” in bankruptcy is extremely broad, encompassing all rights to payment, of whatever nature, whether fixed, liquidated, contingent, matured, disputed, legal, equitable, or secured. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The job of the bankruptcy courts is to oversee trustees’ marshalling of a debtor’s assets for appropriate distribution among the creditors. Pioneer Invest. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). Claims “allowance” covers the approval, revision, or rejection of filed claims, and the process afforded by the Bankruptcy Rules, as effectuated in court orders.

A creditor whose claim is allowed may participate in the ultimate distribution of the debtor’s assets. Prefatory to allowance, however, Section 501 states that a creditor “may” file a proof of claim. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). In fact, that section uses the term “may” six times. Id. §§ 501(b), (c), (d), (e). “May” is not “must;” “may” can mean “is permitted to,” or “possibly” (as in “may or may not”). That filing a claim is described in permissive or contingent terms contrasts with the mandatory language prevalent elsewhere in Title 11. For example, if an objection is made to a filed claim, the bankruptcy court “shall determine the amount of the claim and allow the claim in such amount.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (emphasis added);. see also § 502(b), (c), (d).

Relevant here, courts have frequently held that creditors “may” choose not to file claims in a bankruptcy case with no assets available for distribution. “A proof of claim should be filed only when some purpose would be served.” In re Simmons, 765 F.2d at 551; see also Matter of Smith, 21 F.3d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding creditors are not obliged to file proofs of claim in no asset cases). “[I]n no-asset cases it is unnecessary for creditors to file claims and the bankruptcy court therefore sets no deadline for filing such claims.” Eide v. Colltech, Inc., 987 F.Supp.2d 951, 958 (D. Minn. 2013). “Courts have consistently viewed no-asset cases differently” because “proofs of claim are either unnecessary or not accepted for filing.” In re Anderson, 72 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). “If a trustee has determined that there are no assets to distribute in a Chapter 7 case, the requirement to file a proof of claim is meaningless.” In re Baskowitz, 194 B.R. 839, 845 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996).

Indeed, creditors are often discouraged from filing claims by the issuance of a standard “no asset” notice:

In a chapter 7 liquidation case, if it appears from the schedules that there are no assets from which a dividend can be paid, the notice of the meeting of creditors may include a statement to that effect; that it is unnecessary to file claims; and that if sufficient assets become available for the payment of a dividend, further notice will be given for the filing of claims.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(e) (emphasis added). Creditors who are told there are no assets available for distribution may be instructed that it is unnecessary to file claims. There’s the contingency again. “Indeed, creditors in no-asset chapter seven eases are not even required to file proofs of claim.” In re Mesa Bus. Park P’ship, 127 B.R. 144, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (emphasis original). See also In re Beezley, 994 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The bankruptcy rules ... permit the court to dispense with the filing of proofs of claim in a no-asset case.”). “Since most Chapter 7 cases begin and end as no asset cases, the Rule [Bankr. Rule 2002(e) ] has saved substantial time and storage space for bankruptcy clerks throughout the country.” In re Corgiat, 123 B.R. 388, 389 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).

The other side of the same coin appears in Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(5), which dictates procedures if assets are later discovered in what initially appeared to be a no-asset case:

If notice of insufficient assets to pay a dividend was given to creditors under Rule 2002(e), and subsequently the trustee notifies the court that payment of a dividend appears possible, the clerk shall give at least 90 days’ notice by mail to creditors of that fact and of the date by which proofs of claim must be filed.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)(5) (emphasis added). Thus, if there are assets and distribution “appears possible,” the clerk shall give notice and establish a deadline. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002. No permissive language eliminates the trustee’s obligation to give notice and set a claims deadline in an asset case.

In sum, whether or not claims “may” be filed pursuant to Section 502(a) is generally contingent on the possibility of asset distribution. Likewise, the necessity for creditors to file and the courts to adjudicate claims depends on the existence of assets in the debtor’s estate. See In re Mesa, 127 B.R. at 150, n.8 (“Chapter seven trustees ... are discouraged from objecting to ordinary unsecured claims even in asset cases if the claims will not receive a distribution in any event.”). The Bankruptcy Rules plainly contemplate pretermitting claims allowance and objection procedures when there are no distributable assets.

The current Official Bankruptcy Forms —critical to everyday bankruptcy practice — reinforce that Section 502(a) is directed to deeming claims “allowed” where a debtor’s estate may afford a distribution on account of those claims. Form 9D provides notice of the meeting of creditors and filing deadlines in a Chapter 7 business case and is parenthetically titled “Corporation/Partnership Asset Case.” Form 9D at 1 (emphasis added). This form is specific to cases with assets. Similarly, the default setting on the form applicable to corporate Chapter 7 cases, Official Form 9C (for Corporations and Partnerships), line 8, “Proof of claim,” states: “Please do not file a proof of claim unless you receive a notice to do so.” Later, Form 9C states:

No property appears to be available to pay creditors. Therefore, please do not file a proof of claim now. If it later appears that assets are available to pay creditors, the clerk will send you another notice telling you that you may file a proof claim and stating the deadline.

Id. (emphasis added). No assets means no proofs of claim should be filed.

Not only the Official Bankruptcy Forms, but the “General Information” instructions included with them consistently distinguish between asset and no-asset cases for purposes of claims filing. For example, “[f]orms 9A, 9B, 9C and 9D — used only for chapter 7 cases, — vary based on whether there are assets available to pay creditors.” Instructions, Form B9(A-I), 12.01.09, at 1 (emphasis added). The instructions later state:

In the forms used in no-asset cases— Forms 9A and 9B, there is no deadline for filing a proof of claims. In its place, creditors are instructed not to file a proof of claim unless they receive a notice to do so.

Id. at 3. Unless the Official Forms are inconsistent with Section 502(a), a contention not made by KFA, they explain that proofs of claim need only be filed in asset-holding bankruptcy cases, for it is only in such cases that the claims allowance process is required.

According to these standard procedures, when creditors in a no asset ease are instructed not to file proofs of claim, they are effectively deterred from exercising their rights as “parties in interest” to object to others’ claims. The Bankruptcy Code does not provide an exclusive definition of a party in interest, but the Code broadly includes debtors, creditors, trustees, indenture trustees, and equity security holders among the parties entitled, e.g., to notice of proceedings in the case. See, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002. Any “party in interest” may object to a proof of claim and request the court to determine its correct amount. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007(a). Objections are often filed by the trustee or other parties in order to prevent unauthorized distributions to creditors. KFA contends that Mid-Continent was a “party in interest” in the Hallmark Collection case not only because it is the debtor’s liability insurer but because it specifically sought notices in the case and in fact participated in the Hallmark Design ease. Regardless, after learning that the Hallmark Collection bankruptcy was a no asset case, no party in interest, including Mid-Continent, had any reason to ascertain that KFA filed a proof of claim, much less to object to the superfluous claim.

Section 502 would be significantly transformed if, under KFA’s reading, certain “parties in interest” in no asset cases would be required to monitor, object to, and litigate proofs of claim that need not even be filed. Those parties would have to invoke the claims allowance process, not to affect non-existent distributions from the debtor’s estate, but solely to prevent collateral consequences in other litigation. Not only insurers like Mid-Continent, but also parties in the position of sureties, guarantors, general partners, and other entities that might share liability for claims against a debtor would risk suffering adverse judgments in the form of “deemed allowed” claims. Since the bankruptcy courts “shall” adjudicate claims to which an objection has been filed, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), the courts’ workload would increase substantially without yielding any benefit whatsoever to the debtor or the debtor’s estate.

Mid-Continent emphasizes the lack of benefit to the bankruptcy process to argue that in this case, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate KFA’s claim against Hallmark Collection because the outcome of the dispute could have no conceivable impact on the nonexistent debtor’s estate. See Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding the outer limit of the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction involves matters which have a “conceivable effect” on the estate’s administration); In re Skuna River Lumber, LLC, 564 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose Bankruptcy Code surcharge after property was transferred from the estate); In re Mesa, 127 B.R. at 147-78 (declining to value lender’s deficiency claim as advisory opinion in the absence of any assets available for distribution to creditors). We do not agree. That a bankruptcy case is filed as or becomes a no asset case does not deprive the bankruptcy court of subject matter jurisdiction for many administrative purposes. The bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction over this no asset case, but the Bankruptcy Code affords discretion with regard to claims allowance, and no claims allowance procedures took place here. There cannot be a “deemed allowed” claim where there were no distributable assets, no other bankruptcy-related purpose for claims “allowance,” and parties in interest were not on notice of the obligation to file objections to claims.

It is additionally worth observing that filing a proof of claim in the Hallmark Collection case was not only superfluous but wholly unnecessary to preserve KFA’s ultimate rights. Courts often grant creditors relief from the automatic stay so they can adjudicate their unliquidated claims against a debtor outside of bankruptcy court, particularly when the claims are already the subject of pending litigation. See, e.g., In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, 510 B.R. 106, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014). In the Hallmark Design case, this is what happened, and KFA recovered a judgment, which it then enforced to the extent of that debtor’s policy from Mid-Continent. KFA could have sought relief from the automatic stay to pursue its claim against Hallmark Collection in litigation. In fact, requesting such relief might not have been necessary inasmuch as the stay terminates against a non-individual debtor, like this L.L.C., when the case is closed or dismissed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). Such a debt- or, unlike an individual debtor, is not entitled to a discharge or to protection against later litigation, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), and the statute of limitations is suspended during the bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 108. The Bankruptcy Code did not (and still does not) interfere with KFA’s right to pursue its claims against Hallmark Collection, and subsequently its insurer, for their full value without more than a temporary hindrance from the automatic stay. These facts further undermine the argument that KFA should benefit from having filed a superfluous proof of claim.

KFA relies on a body of cases that simply quote or rephrase Section 502(a) where the provision’s meaning for no asset cases was not at issue. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 132 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 1998) (in a Chapter 11 tax liability dispute, “[o]nce a proof of claim is filed, the debt is considered allowed unless the debtor or another party in interest files an objection to the proof of claim”). KFA attaches to these holdings the general principle that judicial interpretation of a statute should be limited to “the words of the statute, which are assumed to carry their ordinary meaning.” Stanford v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 450, 455-456 (5th Cir. 1998). This approach, however, fails to address the whole context covered by Sections 501 and 502 as elucidated in the Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms and case law. It also fails to account for the fact, evidenced by the Hallmark Design case, that lifting the Section 362 automatic stay allows a creditor even in a no-asset case to litigate its dispute with the debtor outside of the bankruptcy court. KFA’s interpretation of Section 502(a), in contrast, invokes the claims allowance procedure in a no-asset case unnecessarily and solely for its offensive purposes in extrinsic litigation.

Just one appellate court case, Siegel v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 143 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 1998), superficially supports KFA’s interpretation of Section 502(a). There, the Ninth Circuit held that because a mortgagee’s proof of claim had been “deemed allowed” in the absence of an objection, the debtor was precluded from pursuing a later state court suit arising out of the mortgagee’s foreclosure. Id., 143 F.3d at 529-30. Siegel states that proofs of claim not objected to are deemed allowed. Siegel does not, however, discuss the claims allowance process for a no asset case. Moreover, as Mid-Continent correctly notes, Siegel concerned a potentially valuable asset of the debtor’s estate: lender liability claims against the creditor. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if the causes of action could have been successfully prosecuted, the debtor “could even have come out solidly solvent,” rather than bankrupt. Siegel, 143 F.3d at 531. The lender liability suit might, in other words, have conceivably affected the debtor’s estate. The situation here is the opposite. As the magistrate judge noted, no matter what the outcome of KFA’s lawsuit, Hallmark Collection’s bankruptcy estate would have remained insolvent and without assets. Siegel is both distinguishable and non-dispositive for KFA.

KFA also contends that rejecting its narrow textual interpretation would have unintended consequences for IRS’s “routine” filing of proofs of claim in no asset cases and for claims arising from individual debtors’ personal property that is subject to security interests. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6). Both propositions are incorrect, and both are based on the premise, not adopted here, that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to rule on claims in a no asset case. First, KFA cites only one case in support of its contention about IRS practice. In re Geisler, 539 B.R. 253 (W.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd. sub nom. In re Geisler, 667 Fed.Appx. 781 (3d Cir. 2016). Read carefully, however, Geisler referred to an IRS tax claim as “deemed allowed” that had been filed in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case and was not objected to until a year later and following subsequent conversions to Chapter 11 and Chapter 7. A Chapter 13 case, by definition, has assets. Moreover, the court ruled on the merits of IRS’s claim rather than resting on the claim’s “deemed allowed” status. Geisler is inapposite. Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 505 expressly authorizes bankruptcy courts to determine all debtors’ tax liability within certain parameters. Second, Section 521(a)(6) requires particular secured creditors of individual debtors to have an “allowed claim” as a predicate for reaffirmation or redemption agreements that must be approved by the bankruptcy court. By specifying how the claims allowance procedure operates in particular instances, Section 521(a)(6) as well as Section 505 confirm rather than undermine the conclusion that the necessity for claims allowance procedures must be interpreted in light of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole.

CONCLUSION

We hold that KFA did not have a “deemed allowed” claim that constitutes res judicata against Mid-Continent because in this no asset bankruptcy case, nothing in the court proceedings required claims allowance, no notice was provided to parties in interest to object to claims, and no bankruptcy purpose would have been served by the bankruptcy court’s adjudicating KFA’s claim. The district court’s judgment in favor of Mid-Continent is AFFIRMED.

      . Kipp Flores Architects, L.L.C. v. Hallmark Design Homes, L.P., 544 Fed.Appx. 553, 554 (5th Cir. 2013).

      . See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Kipp Flores Architects, LLC, No. 1:-13-CV-60-JRN, 2014 WL 3417544 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2014).

      . See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Kipp Flores Architects, LLC, 602 Fed.Appx. 985 (5th Cir. 2015).

      . "Section. 501 permits, but does not require, a creditor to file a proof of claim.” In re Thomas, 883 F.2d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 1989).

      . See "May,” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966). See also “May,” Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, http://www. merriamwebster.com/dictionary/may, accessed Mar. 22, 2017 (defining "may” as “used to indicate possibility or probability”).

      .Secured creditors, for instance, are also not required to file proofs of claim in order to protect their security interests. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996) ("a secured creditor need not file a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding to preserve its lien”); In re Kleibrink, No. 3:07-CV-0088-K, 2007 WL 2438359, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2007) (“the bankruptcy code does not require a secured creditor to file proof of claim to preserve a lien.").

      . See also In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 867 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[A] proof of claim serves only one purpose in a Chapter 7 case: it is the creditor’s assertion of a right to participate in the distribution of the assets of the estate. In a case without assets to distribute the right to file a proof of claim is meaningless and worthless.”). Indeed, the bankruptcy hornbook answer to the question in this appeal is that the only purpose of a Chapter 7 case is to distribute whatever assets the trustee marshals on a pro rata basis among the creditors:
      In no-asset chapter 7 liquidation cases, the filing of a proof of claim serves no practical purpose since there will be no distribution from the estate in which to participate. In such cases, the notice of the meeting of creditors may include a statement that it is unnecessary to file claims. If a trustee subsequently notifies the bankruptcy court that a dividend may be possible, Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(5) provides that notice may be sent to creditors informing them of the need to file a proof of claim.
      4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 501.01, at 501 — 3[b] (16th ed. 2011). Rather than reflecting a "pur-posivist” interpretation of claims filing, however, the hornbook applies "may” in Section 502 consistently with related provisions as detailed in text above.

      . See “United States Courts Services & Forms,” where users can search for and find national federal court forms that can be used in all federal courts, available at http://www. uscourts.gov/services-forms/forms, last accessed Mar. 22, 2017.

      . "A bankruptcy court will normally not involve itself in fixing the amounts of claims in no-asset cases. Bankruptcy procedure is structured so that there will not be a claims resolution process in a no-asset chapter 7 case.” In re Shapiro, 188 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).

      . “The list of potential parties in interest in [11 U.S.C.] § 1109(b) is not exclusive.” In re Glob. Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2011).

      . "[C]ourts are generally in agreement that an insurance policy will be considered property of the estate ... Any rights the debtor has against the insurer, whether contractual or otherwise, become property of the estate.” Matter of Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993). See also In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984); Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). Liability insurance, however, is a different matter. "We have held that while insurance policies are generally property of the estate, the proceeds of liability insurance policies, unlike first party policies, generally are not.” Sosebee v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 701 F.3d 1012, 1023 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 801 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) ("[T]he proceeds of liability insurance payable to non-debtor parties are not property of the debtor’s estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541, or any other provision of the Code.”).

      . KFA urges this court to take judicial notice of a PACER filing showing, in the underlying bankruptcy, that Siegel did indeed concern a no-asset case. But regardless whether the Sie-gel bankruptcy was, in fact, a no-asset case, the specific question of whether claims should be deemed allowed in a no-asset case was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit.

      . KFA contends that Siegel has been adopted in this circuit, but Siegel was cited only for a general proposition while this court was deciding whether a debtor has standing to pursue the appeal of a claim allowance. In re Mandel, 641 Fed.Appx. 400, 403 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam, unpublished).