author: NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerrod Laqon MACK, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-4684
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: December 8, 2016
    Decided: May 1, 2017

      ARGUED: Mireille P. Clough, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE Circuit Judges.
   NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After Jerrod Laqon Mack pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen firearm knowing that it was stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and § 924(a)(2), the district court sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment, a sentence at the low end of the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. In calculating the recommended Guidelines range, the court applied U.S.S.G. 1 2K2.1(a)(2) (2014), which provided for a base offense level of 24 for the firearm offense at issue when the defendant has “at least two [prior] felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” The court relied on Mack’s two prior North Carolina convictions for (1) attempted first-degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary, and (2) felony breaking and entering, concluding that they were crimes of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2014). With respect to the first of these prior convictions, the court relied on the commentary to § 4B1.2, which provided that the term “ ‘[c]rime of violence’ ... inelude[s] the offense of ... eonspir-ing[] and attempting to commit such offenses.” Id. cmt. n.l.

Challenging his sentence on appeal, Mack argued that because conspiracies and attempts to commit burglary do not constitute the completed crime of burglary, as enumerated in the text of § 4B1.2(a), the Guidelines Commentary relied on by the district court to include conspiracies and attempts must be a construction of § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s “residual clause.” The residual clause includes in the definition of crime of violence any crime involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” He reasoned that because the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), found' the same residual-clause language, as contained in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”), unconstitutionally vague, the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is likewise unconstitutionally vague, thus invalidating the text for which the Commentary provides explanation.

The government conceded that Johnson prevented the district coutf from relying on the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). But it contended that Mack’s prior conviction for attempting and conspiring to commit first-degree burglary nonetheless qualified as a crime of violence because the Commentary’s inclusion of inchoate offenses such as conspiracies and attempts was a valid construction of the broader term “crime of violence,” rather than necessarily being an interpretation of the residual clause.

After we heard oral argument, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), which held that the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause and therefore that § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness. Based on Bedeles, we now reject Mack’s vagueness challenge to § 4B1.2(a). Concluding that Mack’s North Carolina conviction for attempting and conspiring to commit first-degree burglary qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), we affirm the district court’s sentence.

I

In sentencing Mack, the district court determined that his base offense level was 24, as provided in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) for defendants convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) who have two prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” Applying the definition of “crime of violence” provided in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), the court found that Mack had two prior North Carolina convictions that satisfied this predicate-crimes requirement. The presentence report, on which the court relied, showed that Mack was sentenced in November 2012 in North Carolina state court to 25 to 42 months’ imprisonment for having committed “felony attempted first degree burglary” and “felony conspiracy to commit first degree burglary” in May 2012, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51. It also showed that Mack was sentenced in March 2014 in state court to 8 to 19 months’ imprisonment for “felony breaking and entering” in June 2012, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54.

While Mack did not, at sentencing, dispute his criminal record, he argued that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, his conviction of attempting and conspiring to commit first-degree burglary did not qualify as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). That section, in the version in force at the time of Mack’s sentencing, defined a “crime of violence” as:

[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2014) (emphasis added to the residual clause). And Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 provided that a “ ‘[cjrime of violence’ ... includefe] the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” (Emphasis added). Mack argued that because the language of the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a) was the same as the language in the residual clause in ACCA, which Johnson had held was unconstitutionally vague, the residual clause in the Sentencing Guidelines was likewise invalid. He argued further that the text of § 4B 1.2(a) included only the completed crime of “burglary of a dwelling,” such that the government would have to rely on the residual clause to cover his conspiracy and attempt conviction. And because the residual clause was invalid, the district court could not rely on the commentary to include inchoate offenses such as conspiracy and attempt.

The district court rejected Mack’s arguments, concluding that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2(a) had the force of law and therefore that Mack’s conspiracy and attempt conviction was a crime of violence.

From the district court’s judgment, Mack filed this appeal.

II

Mack’s sole argument on appeal is that his North Carolina felony conviction for conspiracy and attempt to commit first-degree burglary is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition in § 4B1.2(a) and therefore that his base offense level for his illegal possession of a stolen firearm violation should not have been enhanced based on this conviction. He argues that because Johnson held that the residual clause in ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague, the Guidelines’ residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2), which uses the same language, is likewise unconstitutionally vague.

After Mack made that argument, both in his brief and at oral argument, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Beckles, 137 S.Ct. 886. In Beckles, the petitioner was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced as “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines — a sentencing enhancement that, like Mack’s base offense level, depended on the defendant having two prior convictions for a “crime of violence,” as that term is defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Id at 890-91. The petitioner challenged his sentence, arguing that one of his prior convictions was not a crime of violence after the Court’s decision in Johnson. Id. at 891-92. The government conceded, as it did here, that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a) was unconstitutionally vague, but it argued that the petitioner’s sentence nonetheless remained valid. Id. at 892. The Court, however, did not accept the government’s concession. Instead, it rejected the petitioner’s effort to apply Johnson to the Sentencing Guidelines, explaining:

Unlike the ACCA, ... the advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range. Accordingly, the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. The residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) therefore is not void for vagueness.

Id.

This decision clearly forecloses Mack’s argument based on Johnson. With the residual clause remaining in force, we must now apply § 4B1.2(a) with all its relevant language, including the residual clause and any Guidelines Commentary that may explain it.

Mack concedes that “with ... § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause intact, the commentary that includes attempts and conspiracies as crimes of violence [is] consistent with the language of the guideline.” See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (“[Commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it ... is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline”). This concession represents a common-sense understanding of the residual clause — inchoate crimes that would qualify as violent if completed “pres-ente] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2014). Accordingly, because the completed crime of “burglary of a dwelling” is enumerated as a crime of violence in the text of § 4B1.2(a), it follows that, based on the Commentary, attempts and conspiracies to commit “burglary of a dwelling” similarly qualify. The. question remains, however, whether the North Carolina crime of first-degree burglary, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51, qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) (2014).

In making this determination, we use a two-step “categorical approach.” See United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 2011). First, we establish the “generic” definition of the Guidelines-enumerated offense, either from prior cases or, where courts have not interpreted the enumerated offense, by “distill[ing] a ‘generic’ definition of the predicate offense based on how the offense is defined ‘in the criminal codes of most states.’ ” Id. at 436 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). Then we decide whether the state offense is a “categorical match” to the generic offense' — that is, whether a defendant convicted of the state offense necessarily satisfied the elements of the generic offense. If so, the defendant’s conviction for the state offense counts as a conviction of the Guidelines-enumerated offense.

The generic definition of burglary is well established to mean the “unlawful or unprivileged entry into ... a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143. And with the added requirement in § 4B1.2(a)(2) that the burglary be “of a dwelling,” the Taylor requirement of a “building or other structure” is, in turn, limited to a dwelling. See United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012). In other words, to qualify categorically, the state offense must require (1) the unlawful or unprivileged entry into a dwelling (2) with intent to commit a crime.

Applying these principles, we conclude that a North Carolina conviction of first-degree burglary under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51 categorically matches the generic definition of burglary of a dwelling in § 4B1.2(a). To obtain a conviction for first-degree burglary in North Carolina, the State must prove “(i) the breaking (ii) and entering (iii) in the nighttime (iv) into the dwelling house or sleeping apartment (v) of another (vi) which is actually occupied at the time of the offense (vii) with the intent to commit a felony therein.” State v. Sin-gletary, 344 N.C. 95, 472 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51).-While this formulation does not explicitly require an “unlawful or unprivileged entry,” state decisions show that it is an essential element of the North Carolina crime. See State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 421 S.E.2d 577, 588 (1992) (noting that to support a conviction for first-degree burglary, the breaking and entering must be “without the consent of anyone authorized to give consent”). Accordingly, Mack’s prior conviction in North Carolina for conspiracy and attempt to commit first-degree burglary is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a).

In sum, we conclude that the district court properly considered Mack’s North Carolina conviction for conspiring and attempting to commit first-degree burglary as a predicate offense under § 2K2.1(a)(2), which provides for a base offense level of 24 when the defendant has “at least two felony convictions of ... a crime of violence,” as that term is defined in § 4B1.2(a).

AFFIRMED

      . After the sentencing in this case, which took place on October 15, 2015, the Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), effective August 1, 2016, by, among other things, deleting the residual clause and expanding the "enumerated offense clause.” The Commission explainéd that the change was made because of a lack of clarity in the residual clause that had prompted a significant amount of litigation, particularly after Johnson. Amend. 798, U.S.S.G. app. C, at 127-30 (Supp. Nov. 1, 2016).

      . Mack does not challenge the district court’s use of his prior conviction for felony breaking and entering under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 as the second predicate crime of violence required by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Nonetheless, the government notified us after oral argument that it had abandoned its argument that the North Carolina breaking and entering conviction qualified as "burglary of a dwelling” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a). It maintains, however, that the felony breaking and entering offense would still qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause in § 4B 1.2(a)(2), citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s residual clause and explaining that "burglary would be covered ... because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime”). See also In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2016) (assuming that defendant’s ability to challenge use of Kentucky third-degree burglary as a predicate offense supporting a Guidelines enhancement depended on § 4B1.2’s residual clause being invalid); United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that North Carolina breaking and entering qualifies as generic "burglary” for purposes of ACCA, as it requires an "unlawful or unprivileged” entry). Because this issue has not been raised on appeal, we do not address it.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fathia-Anna DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-4140
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: March 30, 2017
    Decided: May 1, 2017

      ARGUED: Jaclyn Lee DiLauro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Ap-pellee.
    Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
   SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Without knowing their true identity, Fathia-Anna Davis hired two undercover police detectives to murder her ex-husband. During the detectives’ undercover investigation, Davis used her car and three mobile phones on multiple occasions to meet and communicate with them about the plot, and she eventually paid them $4,000 when they falsely told her the murder had been committed. As a result, Davis was convicted and sentenced to the 120-month statutory maximum under the federal “murder-for-hire” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958. She now appeals, arguing that the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the § 1958 charge based on the “manufactured jurisdiction” doctrine and by imposing an unreasonable sentence. Finding no merit to these arguments, we affirm.

I

We first address Davis’ “manufactured jurisdiction” argument. Pertinent here, § 1958 criminalizes the use of any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including means of transportation and communication, with intent that a murder be committed for compensation. Davis moved to dismiss the charge against her based on the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine, which prohibits the government from “manipulating] events to create federal jurisdiction over a case.” United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1995). By invoking this doctrine, Davis essentially argues that the government failed to prove the requisite use of a facility of interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. Wallace, 85 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (2d Cir. 1996). We review this matter de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1220, 194 L.Ed.2d 221 (2016).

A.

The government’s evidence establishes that while Davis was married to Jodi Davis (“Jodi”), she unsuccessfully attempted to kill him by putting Ambien in his food before he went to work. Davis intended for Jodi to lose consciousness while driving and die in a car crash. However, Jodi passed out from his Ambien-laced food before driving and eventually received medical care. When Davis learned that Jodi was alive in the hospital, she told her family nanny that she thought Jodi was dead, and she also described her effort to drug and kill him. The nanny later told Jodi about the drugging, and Davis fired her.

After divorcing Jodi, Davis asked her friend Huy Nguyen if he knew anyone who could kill Jodi. Davis was aware that Nguyen had previously worked for a car dealership used by gang members and drug dealers. Nguyen advised Davis not to kill Jodi and told her that he would ask someone to do so if she wanted him to.

However, Nguyen decided against helping Davis and several days later told a Charlotte-Meeklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”) officer about her request. Subsequently, CMPD Detective Jim Hetrick met Nguyen, who agreed to assist police with an investigation. At the request of officers, Nguyen sent Davis a text message stating he had found someone to do the job for her. Through a series of cellphone conversations and text messages, Nguyen arranged for Davis to meet CMPD undercover detectives Robert Rendon and Rolando Ortiz-Trinidad. Eventually, Davis met with them on three occasions, and she drove her car to and from each meeting.

The first meeting occurred on February 15, 2015, at a shopping center. Nguyen introduced Davis to the detectives, and she got into their unmarked car. Davis used a mobile phone to show the detectives Jodi’s photograph and told them that she wanted him killed. Davis then directed the detectives to Jodi’s apartment complex, where she provided his address and identified his automobiles. During the meeting, the detectives asked Davis if she was certain of her intent to have Jodi killed, and she replied: “I want him out of my life. I want him out of my daughter’s life. I’ve been trying for the last two years.” J.A. 104. Davis and the detectives discussed the timing and method of the murder and agreed on a price of $4,000, with $500 to be paid up front. After the detectives and Davis returned to the shopping center, Jodi happened to pass by, and Davis pointed him out.

Three days later, on February 18, Davis placed a voice call and sent several text messages asking the detectives to call her. Although Davis had previously used two other phones to arrange the first meeting, this time she used a Tracfone, which is a prepaid phone that can be obtained without a name or credit-card information. Detective Rendon returned Davis’ call and arranged to meet her at the same shopping center where they previously met.

On February 22, Davis met with the detectives and gave them $500 as the down payment for the planned murder. She also displayed the remaining $3,500, which would be due after the murder. When Davis learned that the murder would not occur that day, she appeared to be disappointed. The detectives told Davis to call them if she changed her mind, but she replied that her mind was made up. When Davis overheard Detective Ortiz telling Detective Rendon to “let her know that this is final,” she replied, “Yeah. I understand it’s final.” J.A. 168-69.

Two days later, Detective Rendon called Davis on her Tracfone, told her that they had murdered Jodi, and arranged a final meeting at a gas station for her to deliver the outstanding balance of $3,500. Of course, Jodi — who was cooperating with police — was alive and well, and to assist the operation he had temporarily stopped going to work and using his phone. Additionally, the police made Jodi’s apartment look like a crime scene, complete with crime-scene tape and a marked vehicle.

Within a few minutes of the phone call, Davis met the detectives at the gas station. Because a camera monitored the premises, Davis asked the detectives to move to a different location. They drove across the street, where Davis got into the detectives’ car and asked how they killed Jodi. Upon hearing their description of the murder, Davis paid the detectives $3,500. Detective Ortiz then asked Davis for her phone, but she responded that a friend was going to destroy it for her. Detective Ortiz said that he would destroy the phone, and he grabbed and broke it. Davis returned to her car and left.

Subsequently, CMPD officers arrested Davis. During a search incident to this arrest, officers recovered the two mobile phones that she used to set up the February 15 meeting.

B.

Davis properly acknowledges that automobiles and telephones are facilities of interstate or foreign commerce for § 1958 purposes, see Brief for Appellant, at 25-26, and the foregoing summary shows that the government presented abundant evidence of her frequent car and cell phone use to facilitate the murder plot. However, relying primarily on United States v. Coates, 949 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991), Davis argues that her conviction must be vacated. In her view, when officers asked Nguyen to send a text message informing her that he found someone to kill Jodi, they improperly manufactured jurisdiction by “availing] themselves of the facilities of interstate commerce in the first instance.” Brief for Appellant, at 21. She further contends that her response to the Nguyen text message and her subsequent use of her mobile phones and car to communicate and meet with the detectives during the plot do not alter the analysis. We disagree.

In Coates, which involved a § 1958 conviction, we considered “whether the government can prosecute a person for arranging a murder-for-hire through the use of interstate commerce facilities, where the only basis for federal jurisdiction derives from actions the government admits were undertaken by its agents solely to manufacture jurisdiction.” 949 F.2d at 104-05 (emphasis added). We explained that despite investigating Coates for a month, the government “had no evidence of his use of interstate mail or wire facilities in connection with the murder-for-hire scheme. To cure this problem, the government agent drove to Virginia for the sole purpose of making a telephone call across state lines in order to induce Coates to ‘use’ that interstate facility to discuss the scheme.” Id. at 105. On appeal, Coates argued that “such ‘manufactured jurisdiction’ cannot form the basis for a federal prosecution.” Id. at 106. We agreed.

We began our analysis by looking at United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court dismissed an indictment under the analogous Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which prohibits traveling in interstate or foreign eom-merce, or using the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to engage in certain illegal activity. The Archer court based its ruling in part on the fact that the government’s agent made the necessary interstate telephone call for the sole purpose of transforming an otherwise local offense into a federal crime. The court explained that in enacting the Travel Act and similar legislation federalizing criminal conduct on the basis of its interstate connections, Congress “did not mean to include cases where the federal officers themselves supplied the interstate element and acted to ensure that an interstate element would be present.” 486 F.2d at 682.

Continuing, we pointed to United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1985), where we reversed a Hobbs Act conviction. Citing Archer, we stated that “federal agents may not manufacture jurisdiction by contrived or pretensive means,” id. at 163, and we noted that the only involvement of interstate commerce lay in the FBI’s movement of gambling machines, liquor, and money across state lines to establish a phony gambling parlor. We explained that “[i]t was wholly unnecessary for the FBI to move gambling equipment from Virginia to South Carolina, or to have its agents pretend to gamble and to purchase whiskey. We do not think the commercial predicate for federal jurisdiction can be found in such pretense on the part of federal agents.” Id.

Applying these authorities in Coates, we examined the government’s reasons for making the interstate phone call and concluded that “there is no doubt here that, by the government’s candid admission, it was solely to create a federal crime out of a state crime.” 949 F.2d at 106. We therefore held that the § 1958 count “was not based upon cognizable federal jurisdiction and should have been dismissed.” Id. Importantly, we emphasized “the narrowness of our holding,” noting that it was based “entirely on the fact that the only reason the sole jurisdictional link occurred here was that it was contrived by the government for that reason alone.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Davis’ reliance on Coates specifically, and the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine generally, is misplaced for several reasons. First, contrary to Davis’ apparent contention, the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine does not categorically prohibit government agents who are conducting an undercover operation from using a facility of interstate or foreign commerce to initiate contact with a suspect. Instead, it only prohibits them from doing so for the sole purpose of transforming a state crime into a federal crime.

Second, on the record before us, the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine simply has no bearing. Unlike Coates, where the government conceded that its agent telephoned the defendant for the sole purpose of manufacturing jurisdiction, the record here is silent regarding the officers’ intent in instructing Nguyen to send Davis the original text message. Cell phone usage is obviously commonplace in modern society, and it is likely that the officers asked Nguyen to text Davis because that was a convenient means of communicating with her. Although this supposition is not established in the record, it is clear that there is no evidence to suggest that the officers directed Nguyen’s text solely to trigger a federal crime.

In United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984), a Travel Act case, we considered a manufactured jurisdiction challenge based on a similarly silent — but much more suspicious — record. There, the defendant’s only pertinent interstate travel occurred during an undercover operation when a government agent selected a rendezvous point with him that was 100 yards across state lines. We expressed concern about the “troubling implications” from the selection of the rendezvous point, but we rejected the manufactured jurisdiction defense because the record did not provide “an adequate explanation supporting a conclusion of improper purpose for the somewhat dubious turn of events.” Id. at 982. We explained:

To conclude that the interstate travel was indeed “manufactured,” without the benefit of any explanation on the record as to the basis for the decision determining the location of the meeting, would be to assume that there was no legitimate explanation underlying the choice. We decline to operate from the premise that the government’s actions were presumptively improper....

Id. Brinkman makes it clear that the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine comes into play only when there is evidence to support it. Evidence of this type is lacking here.

Finally, even if we accept Davis’ contention that Nguyen’s initial text was contrived by law enforcement officers to establish a § 1958 federal nexus, the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine still provides her no relief. Unlike Coates, this is simply not a case where a suspect’s use of a facility of interstate or foreign commerce is a one-time direct response to a government agent’s invitation. Instead, the record is replete with instances in which Davis voluntarily used her car and mobile phones to meet and communicate with the detectives regarding the murder-for-hire scheme. Each of these voluntary acts by Davis is sufficient to support her criminal culpability under § 1958, and they are not somehow tainted or discounted by Nguyen’s initial text.

II

Having disposed of Davis’ challenge to her conviction, we now consider her challenge to her sentence. Ordinarily, our review of a criminal sentence requires initial consideration of whether the district court committed significant procedural error, such as incorrectly interpreting or calculating the Guidelines range; if there is no procedural error, we then examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion, applying a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence that is within the guidelines range. United States v. White, 850 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2017).

A.

The sentencing guideline for § 1958 is found in U.S.S.G. § 2E1.4, which provides for two possible base offense levels: 32 or, if greater, the level applicable to the underlying unlawful conduct. Here, the pre-sentence report (PSR) cross-applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5, which applies to conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder, and which establishes a base offense level of 33. The PSR added four levels under § 2A1.5(b)(1) because Davis offered to pay money to the undercover detectives for the murder. Davis thus had a total offense level of 37. With a criminal history category of I, the PSR calculated Davis’ advisory guideline range to be 210-262 months. However, because the statutory maximum for Davis’ offense is 10 years, the PSR recommended 120 months as the guideline term. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(a) (‘Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”). Without objection, the district court adopted this recommendation.

At sentencing, Davis presented several character witnesses and spoke directly to the court, and her attorney requested a downward variance sentence of time served (approximately 8 months). The gist of her presentation is that she is a good person who has learned from her mistake, and that no further incarceration is needed. Speaking as a victim, Jodi stated that Davis had made “several attempts” on his life, and he asked the court to impose the maximum sentence. J.A 426. The government also argued for the maximum sentence. During the parties’ presentation, the court expressed concern for Davis’ untruthfulness and her apparent failure to accept responsibility for her criminal conduct. Ultimately, the court sentenced Davis to 10 years, stating that the sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to accomplish the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court noted that it had considered Davis’ downward variance request and explained the necessity for a 10-year sentence under the circumstances of this case and the § 3553(a) factors, particularly the need for deterrence and protection of the public. The court also discounted the notion that Davis’ attempt to kill Jodi was an aberrant act, finding that this was not the first time she attempted to kill him. The court described Davis’ crime as being “cold,” “calculated,” and showed “real intent to kill another human being.” J.A. 443.

B.

In challenging her sentence, Davis references several mitigating factors and generally asserts that the district court should have relied upon them to vary downward from the 10-year advisory range. However, the primary basis for her argument involves an attack on the operation of the guidelines. Specifically, she contends that her sentence is “substantively unreasonable, and a significant portion of the blame for that belongs to the guideline that governed [her] offense of conviction.” Brief for Appellant, at. 35.

The guideline to which Davis refers is § 2E1.4 which, as noted, provides for a minimum base offense level of 32 for a § 1958 murder-for-hire offense. Pointing to the graduated penalties set forth in § 1958, Davis notes that her conviction, which involved no physical injury to Jodi, carries a 10-year maximum imprisonment term but no minimum term, and she asserts that the interplay between the guidelines and § 1958 creates an incongruity. As she explains, in cases such as hers, § 2E1.4 will always make § 2A1.5 the applicable guideline, and the base offense level will therefore always be 33. Additionally, she states that because the offer' or receipt of something of pecuniary value is an element of § 1958, everyone convicted under that statute will receive a four-level enhancement under § 2A1.5. “In other words, every defendant convicted under the ten-year-maximum provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 will have a base offense level of at least 37, just as [Davis] did, and every defendant’s guideline imprisonment range will be 120 months, just as [hers] was.” Brief for Appellant, at 38.

For this reason, Davis states that “she is challenging the reasonableness” of § 2E1.4, Reply Brief for Appellant, at 7, and she refers to the 10-year range in this instance as being “absurdly high” id. at 16, and a “perverse result[] that derive[s] from a guideline that ignores Congress’s graduated punishment scheme,” Brief for Appellant, at 40. In Davis’ view, she “should have been sentenced under a guideline consistent with the punishment provided by the statute of conviction, a guideline that provided for a range of punishment, and did not deny her her right to individualized sentencing.” Reply Brief for .Appellant, at 15 (emphasis in original). Seeking resentencing, she claims that “the guideline range should not serve as a ‘starting point’ or a ‘benchmark;’ the sentence should be viewed instead in relation to Congress’s prescribed penalty” and with consideration of her mitigating evidence and criminal history score. Brief for Appellant, at 43.

Davis labels this argument as á challenge to the substantive reasonableness of her sentence, but we believe that it fits’ neatly in the category of procedural error. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345-46, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016) (“A district court that ‘improperly calcúlateles]’ a defendant’s Guidelines range ... has committed a ‘significant procedural error.’ ” (citation omitted)); United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2008) (“An error in the calculation of the applicable Guidelines range, whether an error of fact or of law, infects all that follows at the sentencing proceeding, including the ultimate sentence chosen by the district court, and makes a sentence procedurally unreasonable.”). However, regardless of whether the theory involves procedural or substantive error, or both, Davis did not advance it below. Certainly, her request for a downward variance based on her personal characteristics — which involves a very different analysis — was insufficient to alert the district court to the technical legal argument she now makes.

C.

To the extent that Davis is challenging the district court’s interpretation or application of the guidelines, which is her primary argument, her failure to raise that argument below results in plain-error review. United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2012). Under this standard, our “authority to remedy [an] error ... is strictly circumscribed.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). In our discretion, we may correct an error not raised in the district court only where the appellant demonstrates: (1) there is in fact an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010).

We conclude that the district court did not err in establishing and considering 120 months as the guideline range. The guidelines are the “starting point” and “initial benchmark” for sentencing, Beckles v. United States, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 894, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), and the court was required to consult them as part of the process. In doing so, the court correctly interpreted and calculated the guidelines, and properly recognized that because the advisory range (210-262 months) exceeded the statutory maximum for Davis’ offense (120 months), the range became 120 months. This range is not, as Davis asserts, “absurdly high” or “perverse,” it does not contravene the § 1958 graduated punishment scheme, and it did not deny Davis her right to individualized sentencing. From the 120-month “starting point,” Davis was permitted to argue for a downward variance. The court did not place undue weight on the guideline range, but instead gave respectful consideration to Davis’ presentation and explained its reasons for denying the request in light of the facts of this case and the § 3553(a) factors. “This sort of particularized assessment is the hallmark of individualized sentencing.” United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 329 (4th Cir. 2017).

Even if some error lurks in this circumstance, it certainly is not plain. Our cases hold that an error is plain if (1) the explicit language of a statute or rule resolves the question or (2) at the time of appellate consideration, the settled law of the Supreme Court or this Court establishes that an error has occurred. See United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 149 (4th Cir. 2007). In the absence of such authority, as is the case here, “the issue has not been resolved ‘plainly.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 480 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original).

D.

Apart from her challenge to the guideline application, Davis also argues more generally that the district court abused its discretion because mitigating factors warrant a downward variance sentence substantially below 10 years. This argument — which is consistent with her position below — presents a straightforward challenge to the length of the sentence in light of her particular circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors, and it therefore questions the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing various substantive reasonableness theories). As is evident from our previous discussion, we find no merit to this argument.

Looking at the “totality of the circumstances,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), we are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptively reasonable 10-year sentence. The court properly considered the parties’ sentencing arguments and provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence, with specific consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and Davis’ downward variance request.

III

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED

      . The punishment under § 1958 increases depending on the harm to the victim. If, as here, the crime results in no personal injury, the statutory maximum is 10 years, but the maximum increases to 20 years if personal injury results, and to life imprisonment or death if death results.

      . The government correctly notes that an interstate commerce element of a federal crime “implicates the power of Congress to regulate the conduct at issue, not the jurisdiction of the court to hear a particular case.” United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2001).

      . When Coates was decided, § 1958 required use of a facility in interstate or foreign commerce. Congress has since amended the statute to its current form, which requires only use of a facility of interstate or foreign commerce.

      . In denying the government's rehearing petition, the Archer panel clarified that it “went no further than to hold that when the federal element in a prosecution under the Travel Act is furnished solely by undercover agents, a stricter standard is applicable than when the interstate or foreign activities are those of the defendants themselves.” 486 F.2d at 685-86.

      . In United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988), government agents operating a reverse sting project initiated contact with the defendant by mail after seeing his advertisement for child pornography in an adult magazine. Relying on Brantley, the defendant sought reversal of his child pornography conviction on manufactured jurisdiction grounds. In affirming the conviction, we implicitly rejected the notion that government agents are prohibited from using a facility of interstate or foreign commerce to initiate contact with a suspect. Id. at 37 n.3.

      . In two other Travel Act cases, we found the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine to be unavailing based on the lack of evidence. See United States v. Cooper, 1995 WL 44654, *1 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the defendant “could not show that the only reason” for an undercover drug deal occurring across state lines was to establish a federal crime); United States v. Hillary, 1988 WL 118652, *3 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that “there [was] no evidence in the record from which to conclude the interstate travel or communications were specifically manufactured to create federal jurisdiction”).

      . We note that other circuit courts have rejected challenges to the § 2E1.4 cross reference to § 2A1.5. See, e.g., United States v. Lisyansky, 806 F.3d 706, 709-10 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1505, 194 L.Ed.2d 595 (2016); United States v. Smith, 755 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 2014).


author: DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcel KIZA, a/k/a Amuri Ntambwe Kiza, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-4165
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: March 23, 2017
    Decided: May 1, 2017

      ARGUED: Melissa Jane Warner, LAW OFFICE OF MELISSA J. WARNER, Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellant. Heather Hart Mansfield, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Ap-pellee.
    Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
   DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Marcel Kiza, a.k.a. Amuri Ntambwe Kiza (“Defendant”), was convicted of theft of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. Defendant appeals, arguing primarily that social security survivors’ benefits are not a thing of value within the meaning of § 641. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

In light of the somewhat intricate facts before us, we begin with an overview of the statutory context. We then turn to Defendant’s particular circumstances.

A.

The benefits at issue in this case are .survivors’ benefits — that is, benefits paid to eligible surviving spouses and children. Those benefits come from the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund (the “Trust Fund”), one of several trust funds Congress established to manage benefits programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 401(a). The Trust Fund is funded by designated appropriations “from the general fund in the Treasury” based on actual payroll taxes. Id. In addition to appropriations, the Trust Fund also controls “other assets,” including “gifts and bequests.” Id.; see also id. § 401(i).

To oversee the Trust Fund, Congress created a Board of Trustees, composed of four government officials and two members of the public nominated by the President. Id. § 401(c). The Board of Trustees holds the Trust Fund, reports to Congress on its operation and “actuarial status,” recommends improvements to its administration, and notifies Congress when the amounts in the fund are “unduly small.” Id. As to its operation, Congress stipulated that the Trust Fund would reimburse the Treasury’s general fund for certain administrative costs related to benefits programs paid out of the Treasury’s general fund. See id. § 401(g).

B.

Defendant immigrated to the United States in 1991 and soon thereafter applied for permanent residence using the name Ntambwe Kiza Amuri. The government granted his application, assigning him an Alien Registration Number ending in 21. On December 9, 1991, Defendant applied for a social security number using the name Amuri Ntambwe Kiza. The government assigned him a social security number ending in 53.

As Amuri Ntambwe Kiza, Defendant applied for social security benefits twice, first on November 18, 2005, and again on February 22, 2007, but the government denied both applications. On at least one of those applications,' Defendant represented that his children were G.K. and N.K., that he was married to Afia Bubanji Kiza, and that his social security number ended in 53.

In 2007, Defendant applied for naturalization under the name Ntambwe Kiza Amuri using his Alien Registration Number ending in 21 and social security number ending in 53. Again, he listed his children as G.K. and N.K. Defendant also indicated that he would like to change his name at the time of naturalization to Marcel Joshua Kiza. That name change became effective with his naturalization on April 18, 2007.

On August 29, 2007, Defendant, as Marcel Joshua Kiza, applied for another social security number, using as proof of his eligibility two documents: his naturalization certificate and Alien Registration Number ending in 21. On the application, Defendant falsely stated that he had never filed for or received a social security number card. He received a new social security number ending in 31.

Using the identity Marcel J. Kiza, in late 2010 Defendant applied for social security survivors’ benefits for minors G.K. and N.K. On that application, Defendant represented that Amuri Ntambwe Kiza, assigned social security number ending in 53, had died on August 30, 2010, and that therefore G.K. and N.K. were entitled to benefits. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) approved benefits and assigned Defendant as the representative payee for the children. Defendant completed payee reports to account for the monies he received. From 2011 until August 2013, as the representative payee for G.K. and N.K., Defendant received survivors’ benefits totaling $51,860.

C.

On March 18, 2015, a grand jury indicted Defendant of one count of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. The trial began on October 5, 2015. Because Defendant chose not to testify and presented no evidence at trial, all of the witnesses and exhibits came from the government.

To explain to the jury the nature of social security benefits, at trial the government called as a witness Gavi Simms, a special agent with SSA’s Office of the Inspector General. Agent Simms testified that SSA is an agency of the United States and asserted that property dispersed by SSA is therefore property of the United States. He also explained that money paid by taxpayers goes into the Trust Fund, which is a government creation. SSA determines who is qualified to receive certain benefits. If SSA designates benefits to go to children under the age of 18, it appoints a representative payee to receive those benefits on behalf of the children. Agent Simms further explained that the money paid to recipients as benefits is issued from the U.S. Treasury. Referencing Defendant’s application for social security survivors’ benefits provided by the government, Agent Simms testified that Defendant applied for, and received as representative payee, social security survivors’ benefits for G.K. and N.K.

The government also offered evidence and witnesses to show that Defendant created two identities and used those identities to perpetrate the fraud. Special Agent Henry Scott, also from SSA’s Office of the Inspector General, testified that he interviewed Defendant at his home as part of SSA’s investigation into his receipt of social security benefits. Defendant, identifying himself as Marcel Kiza, indicated that he was married to Afia Kiza and that they shared two children, G.K. and N.K. Agent Scott further testified that when he confronted Defendant with the identity of Amuri Kiza, “the story changed,” and Defendant said that Amuri Kiza was the biological father of the children and had “died in a car accident in Congo in 2008.” J.A. 53.

In addition to Defendant’s conflicting statements at his interview, the government also introduced evidence at trial to show that Marcel Kiza and Amuri Kiza are the same person. A fingerprint examiner testified that the fingerprints taken from Marcel Joshua Kiza by the Virginia State Police and Amuri Ntambwe Kiza by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services belonged to the same person and that they also matched the fingerprints taken from Defendant at the time of his arrest. The government proffered photographs of driver’s licenses Defendant obtained from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles under the identities of Amuri Ntambwe Kiza and Marcel Joshua Kiza.

To further confirm Defendant’s double identities, the government called Jack Bu-banji as a witness. Bubanji testified to knowing Defendant because Defendant had lived with him and his sister, Afia, for four years and that Bubanji called Defendant his brother-in-law. He said Defendant had two children with Afia, a daughter G. and a son N. Bubanji knew Defendant as Marcel Kiza, but said people asked for “Amuri Kiza Ntambwe, something like that,” when they visited. J.A. 76. Bubanji never knew Defendant to have a twin brother.

During cross-examination Bubanji testified that Afia was not present in court, that he did not currently live with her, and that he did not know government agents had spoken with her. Defense counsel then inquired whether Bubanji was aware that the government had initiated deportation proceedings against Afia Kiza as part of the defense’s strategy to impeach Bubanji as biased against Defendant. Defense counsel argued that Afia Kiza “would not have otherwise been on immigration radar except for th[e] investigation” into Defendant. J.A. 85. The government objected, and the district court sustained, finding that Bubanji’s knowledge of deportation proceedings against his sister had only “very tenuated” relevance and risked confusing the jury by raising a speculative “sub issue” about why the government began deportation proceedings against Afia Kiza. J.A. 86.

At the end of the government’s case, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion.

On October 6, 2015, a jury found Defendant guilty of the single charge in the indictment: theft of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. Defendant timely appealed.

II.

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 641, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the money or property described in the indictment is money or a thing of value of the United States (2) that the defendant stole, fraudulently received, or converted to his own use (3) with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the government of that money or thing of value. United States v. Hamilton, 699 F.3d 356, 363 (4th Cir. 2012). On appeal, Defendant argues that the government failed to prove each of these elements and the district court therefore erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Defendant also argues that the district court erred by limiting his cross-examination of Bubanji, a government witness. We address each argument in turn.

A.

We review de novo both the essential- statutory elements of a crime and a district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we assess whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We must uphold the jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, substantial evidence supports it. United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2006).

1.

Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because social security survivors’ benefits are not government property within the meaning of § 641. Under Defendant’s theory, individuals pay payroll taxes into social security, which is held in a trust fund and invested only in government securities, and only that money (and interest) is later paid out to the persons who paid into that fund. Defendant contends that because the benefits he received on behalf of the children were money from individual citizens, not money from the United States government, the government cannot establish the first element of § 641. The government counters that the benefits at issue are a thing of value under § 641 because they originated from the United States government and are regulated and accounted for by the government. We agree.'

“The Fourth Circuit takes a broad view of what constitutes a ‘thing of value of the United States.’ ” United States v. Gill, 193 F.3d 802, 804 (4th Cir. 1999). In Gill, we held that social security disability checks intercepted prior to reaching their intended recipient are a thing of value of the United States. Id. There, the intended recipient’s mother had a joint bank account with the intended recipient. Id. at 803. The mother intercepted the checks without the intended recipient’s knowledge and deposited the disability checks into the account, but used the money for her own benefit. Id. We concluded that the checks “originated from the government and thus were unquestionably property belonging to the government.” Id. at 804. And because the defendant there, prevented the intended recipient from receiving the money, the checks “were still the property of the United States.” Id.

The same reasoning applies here. In this case, the funds originated from the same government agency as in Gill, the SSA, and never reached their intended recipients. In fact, there were no valid intended recipients: because Defendant pretended to be a surviving guardian of his own children the government never should have disbursed the benefits at all. Defendant nevertheless contends that the money from SSA at issue here is not government property in the first instance because it comes from individual taxpayers and is allegedly earmarked for them in a trust, unlike the disability benefits based on reported wages at issue in Gill. We disagree.

The Eighth Circuit rejected a trust-fund argument substantially similar to the one Defendant raises here. United States v. Shirley, 720 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2013). In Shirley, the defendant challenged his § 641 conviction, arguing that social security disability payments came from a trust fund, which belonged to the individuals who funded it, and therefore were not property of the United States. Id. at 663. The court disagreed. It found that social security trust funds — including the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund (at issue there) and the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund (at issue here) — are “funded by appropriations from the Treasury’s general revenues.” Id. at 664. Thus, “the distinction between trust funds ... and general revenues of the United States Treasury [is] ‘unsound’ and ‘artificial.’ ” Id. (quoting Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1308 (8th Cir. 1980)). The court reasoned that although the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund was a “ ‘bookkeeping entity’ conceptually separate from the general revenues of the United States Treasury, it is a ‘creation of the government’s taxing and spending power’ that is not fully independent of the general revenues.” Id. (quoting Overton, 619 F.2d at 1307). The court therefore held that the social security payments were a “thing of value of the United States” and thus could support a conviction under § 641. Id. at 663-64.

The same is true here. Like the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund at issue in Shirley, the Trust Fund at issue here is funded by appropriations from the Treasury’s general revenues. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 401(a), with id. § 401(b). Congress also stipulated that the trust funds would reimburse the Treasury’s general fund account for certain social security obligations paid out of the general fund. See id. § 401(g). These provisions suggest that, while the funds may be conceptually distinct from the general revenues, in practice they operate as an accounting mechanism that does not undermine their federal character.

Other general statutory provisions belie Defendant’s theory. That the Board of Trustees for the Trust Fund must report to Congress on the “actuarial status” of the fund, id. § 401(c), suggests that the government does not reserve individual taxpayer contributions for those individuals but rather makes statistical estimates for the population of intended beneficiaries. Moreover, that the Trust Fund has “other assets” besides appropriated funds, including “gifts and bequests,” id. § 401(a), suggests that the funds do not, as Defendant asserts, include only individual taxpayers’ contributions, but also other funds that are unquestionably government property.

Because of their distinctly federal character, we hold that, as a legal matter, social security survivors’ benefits are a thing of value of the United States that can support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 641. Therefore, to satisfy this element of the offense it was enough for the government to show that Defendant received such benefits. The government provided ample evidence that he did, and Defendant does not argue otherwise on appeal. For these reasons, the government met its burden of proof as to the first element of the offense, and the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for acquittal on this basis.

2.

Defendant also argues that the district court otherwise erred in denying his Rule 29 motion because the government failed to prove the second and third elements of the offense — that he “stole and knowingly converted the money and that he acted knowingly and willfully with intent to deprive the government of the use and benefit of the property.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. This argument lacks merit.

The government presented ample evidence that Defendant faked his own death and created a new identity, his alleged twin brother, to receive social security survivors’ benefits for his two children. The government established that Amuri Kiza and Marcel Kiza were the same person, rather than two brothers, based on (1) fingerprint evidence showing that the fingerprints of Amuri Kiza and Marcel Kiza are from the same individual, Defendant, (2) Defendant’s immigration records, (3) Defendant’s interview statement that the children were his and his later statement that they were his brother’s, and (4) testimony from Defendant’s brother-in-law, Jack Bubanji, that Defendant does not have a twin brother. The evidence also established that before perpetrating the instant fraud Defendant twice applied for supplemental social security benefits but was denied both times. The jury could reasonably infer from two denied benefits applications that Defendant had a motive to file under a different benefits program to again attempt to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, substantial evidence supports Defendant’s conviction for theft of government property beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan, 455 F.3d at 260.

B.

Finally, Defendant argues that the district court’s decision to circumscribe his cross-examination of Bubanji was arbitrary, enhanced Bubanji’s credibility, and was not harmless error. The government responds that Defendant’s line of inquiry was not directly relevant to exploring bias and the district court was well within its discretion in excluding the line of inquiry to avoid confusing the jury and wasting time.

“We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s limitation on a defendant’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 220 (4th Cir. 2006). Exploring bias is a proper topic for cross-examination, see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-51, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984), but it is not without limits. A trial judge has “wide latitude” to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to address concerns of prejudice, confusing the jury, relevance, and repetition. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Smith, 451 F.3d at 221. And while the threshold for determining whether evidence is relevant is comparatively low, we rarely reverse such decisions because they “are fundamentally a matter of trial management.” United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2008)).

Here, the district court weighed the relevant factors and acted within its discretion. Bubanji’s awareness of deportation proceedings against his sister was not relevant to his testimony about his familiarity with Defendant’s identity and his relationship with Afia Kiza, the children, and Defendant. The potential bias defense counsel sought to explore was speculative. Bubanji had already testified that he did not know government agents had talked to Afia Kiza and that he does not live with her. And there is no evidence that Defendant took any action to provide the government with information concerning Afia Kiza’s immigration status. Finally, delving into deportation proceedings of Afia Kiza, who was not present to testify, had the potential to confuse the jury and waste time, as the district court noted. Under these circumstances, the district court’s trial management on this issue was reasonable and far from an abuse of discretion. See Zayyad, 741 F.3d at 460-61.

III.

We hold that social security survivors’ benefits are a thing of value of the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 641. Defendant’s other arguments are unavailing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      . Other trust funds include the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal' Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401(b), 1395i, 1395t. These funds are funded in different ways. For example, the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund is funded from general appropriations based on certain percentages of reported wages. Id. § 401(b).

      . We aláo agree with the government's argument that its supervision and control even after disbursing social security benefits, as demonstrated by Defendant's filing forms accounting for the benefits he received, further supports our conclusion that these benefits are a thing of value of the United States. Cf. United States v. Littriello, 866 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McIntosh, 655 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1981).

      . The record also includes nearly identical photographs purportedly of the two brothers obtained from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles. Compare J.A. 212, with J.A. 215. Given Defendant’s claim that he has an identical twin brother, this evidence, standing alone, is not dispositive; but in the context of the other evidence, these images bolster the conclusion that Defendant is both Marcel Kiza and Amuri Kiza.


author: WYNN, Circuit Judge:

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karen KIMBLE, a/k/a Karen Kimble Mamah, a/k/a Karen Mamah, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-4672
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: March 24, 2017
    Decided: May 2, 2017

      ARGUED: Vincent Anthony Jankoski, VINCENT A. JANKOSKI, ESQ., Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Kathleen O’Connell Gavin, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
   WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Following a two-day bench trial, the district court convicted Defendant Karen Kimble of numerous charges stemming from her submission of fraudulent immigration and tax filings to various state and federal agencies over a nearly five-year span. Seeking to overturn her conviction, Defendant argues that the district court erred in admitting certain evidence obtained following a search of her home pursuant to a validly issued warrant. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court correctly admitted this evidence, which — together with additional evidence offered at trial — provided sufficient support for the trial court’s guilty verdict on each of the government’s charges against Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

A.

A summary of the facts proven at trial, as found by the district court, follows. Between 2007 and 2011, Defendant perpetrated a series of schemes that ultimately led to her indictment on charges ranging from tax and visa application fraud to aggravated identity theft. First, in the fall of 2007, Defendant participated in a marriage and immigration fraud scheme with Tamim Mamah, a native of Ghana. According to the government, after Mamah’s earlier attempt to obtain a green card by means of a fraudulent marriage failed, Defendant filed, under Mamah’s first wife’s name, for a divorce from Mamah. Thereafter, Defendant submitted a new green card application on Mamah’s behalf using a marriage certificate listing herself as Mamah’s wife.

During roughly the same period, in September 2007, Defendant committed perjury in connection with her testimony in the criminal trial of Mamah’s brother, who was charged with importing heroin in his luggage on a flight from Ghana. At that trial, Defendant testified that she traveled with Mamah’s brother to Ghana in 2006. In particular, Defendant testified that, during that trip, she observed numerous individuals visit the brother’s home, which she asserted was customary in Ghana. The defense relied on Defendant’s testimony as evidence that someone other than Ma-mah’s brother packed his luggage and placed the heroin in his bag. However, a subsequent review of Defendant’s travel records revealed that she did not travel to Africa during the period in question.

Finally, beginning in February 2008 and continuing through at least April 2012, Defendant submitted numerous fraudulent tax returns for herself and others. In addition to inflating her own refunds, Defendant — who falsely held herself out as a certified tax preparer — filed returns on behalf of others that included artificially inflated credits and deductions. Defendant provided the taxpayers with versions of the returns that did not include the inflated figures and kept the excess refunds, which totaled roughly $222,000. During the course of her tax fraud scheme, Defendant committed identity theft on at least four occasions.

B.-

In July 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (“Homeland Security”) obtained a search warrant in connection with its investigation of Defendant’s marriage and immigration fraud and perjury. In an accompanying affidavit, the government asserted probable cause to believe that Defendant’s home contained evidence of perjury, marriage and immigration fraud, and false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1425, 1621, and 1623 and 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c). Entitled “Items to be Seized from [Defendant’s Residence],” Attachment B to the warrant affidavit averred that the requested search would enable the government to seize “[a]ny and all records and documents relating to the travel of [Defendant] to Ghana in 2006 including but not limited to ... documents, correspondence, notes, statements, receipts or other records that reference or indicate the fraudulent activity [and] items evidencing the obtaining, secreting, trans7 ferring, concealment and/or expenditure of illegal proceeds and currency to include cash.” J.A. 46.

Homeland Security agents executed the search warrant on July 29,' 2011. At the beginning of the search, the agents asked Defendant if she had any valuables in the house, to which Defendant replied that there was some cash in a laundry basket. Defendant then led the agents to the cash, which was contained in a bag in a laundry basket in the home and totaled more than $41,000. When the agents inquired as to the source of the funds, Defendant told the agents that the cash did not belong to her. Rather, she said that, at Mamah’s request, she had retrieved the cash from a stranger about a week earlier and was holding it for Mamah. Aware Mamah was detained on unrelated narcotics distribution charges, the agents seized the cash on suspicion that it derived from Mamah’s alleged drug activity.

Several months later, Defendant filed a claim to recover the seized funds. At odds with the explanation she gave at the time of the initial seizure, Defendant claimed that the cash was proceeds of an insurance claim she filed after her home was damaged in a fire. Their suspicions piqued by Defendant’s revised account, investigators subpoenaed Defendant’s bank records in an attempt to confirm the source of the seized funds. After reviewing the records, however, investigators found numerous deposits from the Internal Revenue Service, which they later determined to be the inflated refunds obtained through Defendant’s tax fraud scheme.

After further investigation, the government charged Defendant in a twenty-one-count indictment with: (1) six counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; (2) five counts of making a false statement on a tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); (3) five counts of aiding and assisting in the making of a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); (4) four counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; and (5) one count of visa application fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).

On May 1, 2013, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the July 2011 search of her home. Specifically, Defendant argued that the warrant supporting that search addressed only the government’s then-current investigation of her alleged perjury, such that much of the property seized during the search (in particular, the more-than $41,000 in cash) exceeded the scope of the warrant. In Defendant’s view, because the cash was improperly seized, any evidence obtained as result of her subsequent efforts to reclaim the seized funds (i e., bank records and other tax records documenting Defendant’s submission of fraudulent tax returns) amounted to “fruit” of the illegal seizure and therefore was subject to exclusion at trial. After Defendant waived her right to a jury trial, the district court elected to hear evidence and argument regarding the suppression motion at trial.

A two-day bench trial followed, during which the district court heard testimony from Defendant’s alleged victims and officials from the various federal agencies involved in the investigations that precipitated Defendant’s prosecution. Among those witnesses, Homeland Security Special Agent Eli Bupp testified that, in executing the search of Defendant’s residence, agents sought to obtain “[documents and evidence related to marriage fraud [and] visa fraud, [and other] travel documents.” J.A. 69. Bupp characterized the heading in Attachment B, which focused on documents and records relating to Defendant’s purported travel to Ghana, as a “drafting error” that was not meant to limit the scope of the search. J.A. 70. The government also emphasized that the affidavit supporting the warrant included representations regarding the government’s basis for believing that Defendant not only committed perjury, but also committed visa and marriage fraud and made false statements to authorities.

At the close of evidence, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Defendant subsequently withdrew her Rule 29 motion as to the immigration fraud charge, and the district court denied Defendant’s motion as to the remaining charges. The district court further denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the July 2011 search and, in a comprehensive written opinion, convicted Defendant on all counts. The district court later sentenced Defendant to a total of 48 months’ incarceration, prompting this timely appeal.

II.

Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress the more-than $41,000 in cash seized from her home in the course of the July 2011 search, as well as any incriminating evidence obtained as a result of that initial seizure. Second, Defendant challenges the denial of her post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal on the government’s wire and tax fraud charges. We consider these proposed grounds for reversal in turn.

A.

We turn first to the parties’ eviden-tiary dispute. Defendant does not challenge the validity of the warrant authorizing the search of her home in July 2011. Instead, Defendant argues that the valid warrant did not permit the agents to seize the cash found in the laundry basket. Defendant’s challenge thus calls on us to consider whether the seizure exceeded the scope of the warrant. In so doing, we review the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of the warrant de novo and the factual findings underlying those conclusions for clear error. United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009).

1.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although the Fourth Amendment does not “expressly preclud[e] the use of evidence obtained in violation of’ its protections, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), courts have long relied on the judicially created “exclusionary rule” to ensure that “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (citing authorities). “This prohibition applies as well to the fruits of [any] illegally seized evidence.” Id.

It is axiomatic that a “search conducted pursuant to a warrant is limited in scope by the terms of the warrant’s authorization.” Phillips, 588 F.3d at 223 (citing authorities). Thus, a valid warrant “must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 706 (4th Cir. 2006) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2001)). “This particularity requirement protects against ‘a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,’ to the extent that a valid warrant leaves nothing to the discretion of the officers performing the search.” Id. (quoting Robinson, 275 F.3d at 381). As such, even when law enforcement officers conduct a search pursuant to a valid warrant, the “officers cannot grossly exceed the scope of a search warrant in seizing property.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the same time, we have long recognized that “a search warrant is not a ‘constitutional strait jacket.’ ” Phillips, 588 F.3d at 223 (quoting United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988)). Rather, we “employ a commonsense and realistic approach [in interpreting warrants], and avoid hypertechnical scrutiny ... lest police officers be encouraged to forgo the warrant application process altogether.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (same).

Defendant argues that the agents’ seizure of the cash in this case violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant permitted the agents to seize evidence relating only to her purported travel to Ghana with her brother-in-law — the subject of her perjured testimony. In support, Defendant points to the prefatory language in Attachment B to the warrant, which included a list of items to be seized preceded by the phrase “[a]ny and all records and documents relating to the travel of [Defendant] to Ghana in 2006.” J.A. 46. Defendant argues that the seizure of the cash— which, at the time of the seizure, the agents admittedly believed to be linked to unrelated drug activity — exceeded the scope of the warrant because it could not have related to Defendant’s alleged perjury.' Defendant further contends that the additional evidence developed by investigators after Defendant later sought to reclaim the seized funds must be suppressed as “fruit of the illegal seizure.” Appellant’s Br. at 22.

In response, the government emphasizes that, in determining whether a search or seizure exceeds the scope of a warrant, our inquiry “is one of practical, rather than hyperteehnical, accuracy.” Appellee’s Br. at 14 (citing United States v. Gary, 528 F.3d 324, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2008)). Read holistically, the government argues, the warrant and supporting affidavit make clear that investigators were authorized to seize evidence of perjury and marriage or immigration fraud during their search. We agree.

On its face, the warrant application indicates that the proposed search is “related to a violation” of not only the federal statutes criminalizing perjury and false declarations before a grand jury — the offenses related to Defendant’s purported travel to Ghana — but also “marriage fraud, false statement[s], [and] procurement of cit[i]z-enship or naturalization unlawfully.” J.A. 43. Likewise, the warrant itself lists the property to be seized as the “[f]ruits, evidence and instrumentalities of marriage fraud, false statements], unlawful procurement of citizenship, and perjury.” j.A. 44.

To be sure, both the government’s application and the resulting warrant also incorporate by reference Attachment B when describing the property to be seized during the course of the government’s search. And Defendant correctly notes that the attachment refers most directly to evidence of Defendant’s purported travel to Ghana. Nonetheless, its prefatory language notwithstanding, Attachment B did not limit the items subject to seizure to potential evidence of Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations regarding her overseas travel. For example, among the items identified as subject to seizure are records of vehicles titled in Defendant’s or Mamah’s name; documents and correspondence referring to or indicating fraudulent activity; and all manner of financial records or other evidence of obtaining, concealing, or spending illegal proceeds.

Much the same, the affidavit supporting the warrant application not only includes detailed allegations regarding Defendant’s perjury, but also describes at length the government’s investigation of Defendant’s efforts to fraudulently obtain a green card for Mamah. That section of the affidavit concludes, ‘Tour affiant ... believes that in [Defendant’s home] there is evidence of violations of [various federal marriage and visa fraud statutes].” J.A. 56. In sum, a “practical” and “non-hypertechnical” reading of the warrant establishes that the government’s authority in executing the search was not as limited as Defendant maintains. Instead, by its express terms, the warrant permitted the government to seize from Defendant’s residence potential evidence of both Defendant’s false statements in connection with her September 2007 testimony about her purported trip to Ghana and her marriage and immigration fraud.

2.

Apart from seeking to narrow the scope of the warrant, Defendant argues that— even if the warrant encompassed evidence related to her alleged marriage and immigration fraud — the seizure of the cash violated the Fourth Amendment because the agents initially seized it as evidence of suspected drug activity, not as evidence of any of the offenses set forth in the warrant. We disagree.

“[T]he scope of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is defined objectively by the terms of the warrant and the evidence sought, not by the subjective motivations of an officer.” Williams, 592 F.3d at 522 (citing authorities); see also United States v. Srivastava, 540 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2008) (“In analyzing the constitutionality of a search warrant’s execution, we must conduct an objective assessment of the executing officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, rather than make a subjective evaluation of the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985))). Accordingly, to determine whether the agents lawfully seized the cash in Defendant’s laundry basket, we must consider whether the seized cash objectively constituted potential “[f]ruits, evidence and instrumentalities of marriage fraud, false statements, unlawful procurement of citizenship, [or] perjury.” J.A. 44. Or, as set out in Attachment B, whether a reasonable officer conducting the search could believe the cash to constitute potential “evidenc[e of] the obtaining, secreting, transferring, concealment and/or expenditure of illegal proceeds” of such crimes. J.A. 46. We conclude that a reasonable officer could.

Although “not every item that falls within the language of the warrant will prove probative in a future criminal prosecution, ... the evidentiary significance of each and every item may not be instantly apparent” during the course of a search. Phillips, 588 F.3d at 224. As a result, items seized pursuant to a validly issued warrant are “not required, on their face, to necessarily constitute evidence of [an offense identified in the relevant warrant] — rather, they only potentially ha[ve] to be evidence of such [offense].” Srivasta-va, 540 F.3d at 291 (emphasis added). Moreover, we have observed that, “[o]ften, a single piece of evidence will be probative of multiple crimes, especially in cases ... which involve intricate, interweaving, and extensive financial fraud schemes.” Phillips, 588 F.3d at 224 (finding that evidence seized to prove securities fraud fell under scope of warrant targeting evidence of credit card fraud); see also Srivastava, 540 F.3d at 287-91 (permitting seizure of defendant’s personal tax records under warrant targeting business’s medical billing practices where defendant operated business as a sole proprietorship).

Viewed in this light, the seized cash fell within the scope of the warrant. In particular, given the large quantity of cash at issue, as well as Defendant’s unusual explanation for the source of the funds, an agent executing the warrant could reasonably have concluded that the more-than $41,000 in cash Defendant voluntarily revealed at the outset of the search was potentially proceeds of marriage and immigration fraud, ie., cash received as payment for Defendant’s participation, in the scheme to obtain a fraudulent green card for Mamah. Consequently, because the challenged seizure did not exceed the scope of the warrant, the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence arising from that initial seizure.

B.

Having concluded that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress, we turn next to Defendant’s contention that the government failed to meet its burden of proving the tax and wire fraud charges against Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, we review the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 525 (4th Cir. 2014).

As noted above, in addition to marriage and immigration fraud, the grand jury charged Defendant with six counts of wire fraud and five counts of aiding or assisting tax fraud. These charges stemmed from Defendant’s alleged transmission via interstate wires of tax returns on behalf of four individuals in 2009 and 2010, with Defendant allegedly submitting returns on behalf of two of those individuals in both years. At trial, the government offered extensive evidence — including testimony from the taxpayers identified in the indictment, bank records, and other documentary evidence — demonstrating that Defendant, who held herself out as a certified tax preparer to her friends and coworkers, fraudulently obtained inflated tax refunds on behalf of the taxpayers who sought her assistance. The government’s evidence further suggested that Defendant provided the taxpayers with “dummy” returns to conceal her fraud, thereby permitting her to retain the portion of the refunds attributable to the unauthorized deductions and credits.

In light of this evidence, Defendant concedes that “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence ... showed that [she] prepared tax returns for various taxpayers and, unbeknownst to those taxpayers, took unauthorized deductions.” Appellant’s Br. at 26. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against her, however, Defendant argues that the wire and tax fraud charges rested on an “aiding and abetting” theory of liability. Under this theory, Defendant maintains, the court could convict her of “aiding and abetting” wire and tax fraud only if the taxpayers themselves were aware of Defendant’s fraudulent filings and thus served as “principals” whom Defendant aided or abetted. Because the government’s evidence established that the taxpayers were unaware of the fraud, Defendant contends that the government failed as a matter of law to prove these charges beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument’s cleverness does not obscure its lack of merit.

Defendant’s argument misunderstands the nature of the government’s charges and evidence presented against her at trial. As an initial matter, in the federal system, culpability for an offense as an aider and abettor is treated no differently from treatment as a principal. See United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 165 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Aiding and abetting is not an independent crime [and, instead,] merely obviates the need for awkward phrasing and strained readings of statutes by making clear that in all crimes an accessory will be punished as a principal. Thus, aiding and abetting is implicit in all indictments.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). For this reason, “the precise language used in the indictment, by the prosecution, or in the jury instructions is unimportant. So long as all of the elements necessary to find [the defendant] guilty of the crime, whether as a principal or as aider or abettor, were put before the jury, conviction will be proper.” Id.

As to Defendant’s wire fraud charges, the indictment charged Defendant with aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, and the substantive offense set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Defendant concedes that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that she submitted fraudulent tax returns via interstate wires in order to obtain a portion of the fraudulent refunds for herself. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16 (arguing that the government’s evidence “showed that, in this case, there was no principal other than appellant” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported her conviction for wire fraud, and the district court properly denied her motion for judgment of acquittal on these charges.

Defendant’s argument that her tax fraud convictions were not supported by the evidence also finds no support in the law. The trial court convicted Defendant of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), which reads:

Any person who ... [w]illfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or document ... shall be guilty of a felony....

26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (emphasis added).

Defendant argues that she cannot be convicted under Section 7206(2) because she submitted the fraudulent tax returns, not the taxpayers. Defendant contrasts Section 7206(2) with the immediately preceding section, which prohibits “[wjillfully mak[ing] and subscribing] any return ... which [the defendant] does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.” 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). According to Defendant, because she prepared and submitted the fraudulent returns, she may be convicted, if at. all, only as a principal under Section 7206(1) and not as an aider and abettor under Section 7206(2).

We addressed the elements of Sections 7206(1) and 7206(2) in United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996). There, we explained that, “[t]o obtain a conviction under ... [Section] 7206(1), the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant made and subscribed to a tax return containing a written declaration; (2) the tax return was made under penalties of perjury; (3) the defendant did not believe the return to be true and correct as to every material matter; and (4) the defendant acted willfully.” 88 F.3d at 1382 (citing United States v. Owen, 15 F.3d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1994)). By comparison, a conviction under Section 7206(2) is appropriate when the government shows: “(1) the defendant aided, assisted, or otherwise caused the preparation and presentation of a return; (2) that the return was fraudulent or false as to a material matter; and (3) the act of the defendant was willful.” Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 902 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Kamalu, 298 Fed.Appx. 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, although “[s]ubsection (1) directly prohibits false statements by the taxpayer[,] subsection (2) applies to those, such as tax preparers, who aid or assist the taxpayer in making such statements.” United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 251 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).

Here, the indictment alleged — and the government’s evidence amply established — that Defendant, acting under false pretenses, “caused the preparation and presentation of’ fraudulent tax returns on behalf of her innocent Mends and coworkers. J.A. 449. As we explained in Rogers, this conduct — preparing false tax returns on behalf of others — falls under Section 7206(2), not Section 7206(1). Rogers, 858 F.2d at.251. Indeed, Section 7206(2) explicitly provides for liability for tax preparers, like Defendant, who submit fraudulent returns, regardless of whether the taxpayer was aware of, much less consented to, any such fraud. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (providing for liability “whether or not [the] falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or document”). Consequently, the district court correctly concluded that the evidence at trial supported its verdict on the tax fraud charges and properly denied Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      . In a separate action, Defendant pleaded guilty to perjury in connection with her September 2007 testimony on behalf of Mamah’s brother.

      .' That the cash ultimately led to a broadened investigation and additional charges against Defendant does not undermine the validity of its seizure. Indeed, we have "never held that a search is overbroad merely because it results in additional criminal charges.” Williams, 592 F.3d at 520 (quoting Phillips, 588 F.3d at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, "[w]hether seized evidence falls within the scope of a warrant’s authorization must be assessed solely in light of the relation between the evidence and the terms of the warrant's authorization.” Id. at 520-21. As such, the fact that evidence seized from Defendant’s home led to tax fraud charges not identified in the government's application or the warrant itself does not render the challenged seizure unconstitutional.

      . Defendant repeatedly emphasizes language in- the indictment alleging that she "caused the submission” of fraudulent tax returns, which Defendant describes as "the language of aiding and abetting.” See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16. On the contrary, the substantive wire fraud statute specifically prohibits "causfing] to be transmitted by means of wire ... any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing” a fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

      . As a further illustration of the distinction between these provisions, in addition to being convicted under Section 7206(2) of preparing fraudulent returns on behalf of others, Defendant was convicted under Section 7206(1) for submitting fraudulent returns of her own between 2007 and 2011.