author: Baker, Judge.

text:
    ESTATE OF Zachary D. STAGGS BY AND THROUGH his Personal Rep., Denise COULTER, and Mackenzie Taylor, by and through her Parent and Guardian, Denise Coulter;
    Jennifer L. Daugherty, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael G. Daugherty, Deceased; and Dennis Byrd, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Shannon R. Steele, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. ADS LOGISTICS CO., LLC, Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 64A03-1708-CT-1961
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    Attorneys for Appellants Estate of Staggs and Mackenzie Taylor: J., Kevin King, Cline, King & King, P.C., Columbus, Indiana, William R. Ogden, Farrar & Ball, LLP, Houston, Texas
    Attorney for Appellants Jennifer Daugherty and Estate of Daugherty: William H. Mullis, William H. Mullis, P.C., Mitchell, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellant Estate of Steele, Matthew J. Schad, George A. Budd, V, Schad & Schad, P.C., New Albany, Indiana
    Attorney for Appellee: Scott B. Cockrum, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Schererville, Indiana
   Baker, Judge.

[1] In January 2010, a large steel coil that was secured to a flatbed tractor-trailer became unsecured and struck other motorists traveling on State Road 37. The accident resulted in serious injuries and multiple deaths.

[2] Following the accident, the following parties filed complaints that were ultimately consolidated: (1) the Estate of Zachary D. Staggs by and through his personal representative, Denise Coulter ("Staggs"); (2) Mackenzie Taylor, by and through her parent and guardian, Denise Coulter ("Taylor"); (3) Jennifer L. Daugherty, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Michael G. Daugherty ("Daugherty"); and (4) Dennis Byrd, as special administrator of the estate of Shannon R. Steele ("Steele") (collectively, the Appellants).

[3] One of the named defendants was ADS Logistics Co., LLC (ADS), which had warehoused the steel coil. ADS moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion, finding as a matter of law that ADS had no duty to the Appellants. The Appellants appeal, arguing that summary judgment was improperly granted. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[4] ADS is, in part, a warehouse facility. ADS has a long-standing contractual relationship with ArcelorMittal USA, LLC ("Mittal"), pursuant to which ADS warehouses products for Mittal. Relevant to this case is ADS's agreement to warehouse a large steel coil weighing just under 40,000 pounds for Mittal.

[5] Mittal agreed to sell or ship the coil to Ohio River Metal Services, Inc., doing business as Eagle Steel Products, Inc. ("Eagle Steel"). Eagle Steel then hired Kendall Transportation to haul the steel coil from ADS to Eagle Steel. Israel Rankin operated a tractor-trailer that he owned under the motor carrier authority of Kendall Transportation.

[6] On January 11, 2010, Kendall Transportation dispatched Rankin to haul the steel coil from ADS to Eagle Steel. Eagle Steel paid Kendall Transportation for this work, and, in turn, Kendall Transportation paid Rankin a percentage of the load plus a fuel surcharge. Kendall Transportation's dispatcher and Rankin controlled the means and methods of delivering a load to a customer. Rankin had been trained how to secure a steel coil through previous employment and through his work at Kendall Transportation. He provided his own equipment to secure the coil to his vehicle.

[7] At the ADS warehouse, an ADS crane operator placed the steel coil onto Rankin's flatbed trailer. ADS corporate representative Matt Brinkley attested that, as would normally occur, the crane operator followed Rankin's instructions on where and how to place the steel coil on the flatbed. Rankin attested that he stood on top of his trailer and directed the crane operator where to place the steel coil. Brinkley also attested that the crane operator would not have loaded a coil onto a flatbed in a position that was obviously and apparently unsafe.

[8] After the crane operator moved the steel coil onto the flatbed, Rankin secured the steel coil to the trailer. Brinkley, Kendall Transportation, Rankin, and Kendall Transportation's safety consultant agree that it is the driver's responsibility to secure the load onto the driver's vehicle.

[9] Rankin performed a mental calculation to determine how to secure the coil. Specifically, he would take the total weight of the coil and divide it in half to determine the amount he had to account for. In this case, he calculated he had to secure approximately 21,000 pounds; therefore, he used 3 chains, which he mistakenly believed would equal a working load limit of 30,000 pounds. He erroneously thought that each chain had a working load limit of 10,000 pounds, but in fact, each chain had a working load limit of 6,600 pounds. Moreover, Rankin used 3 binders to secure the coil, but each binder had a working load limit of only 5,400 pounds, meaning that the total working load limit for the binders was 16,200 pounds-well below the 21,000 pounds required for the subject coil.

[10] After securing the steel coil to his flatbed trailer, Rankin began the drive to Eagle Steel. He made one stop to eat lunch. After lunch, he checked the load to ensure that it was still secured and then continued on his way. In Mitchell, a car pulled out in front of him and Rankin was forced to brake a little harder than normal (the "hard braking incident"). He did not stop to check his load after the hard braking incident even though he had observed that the incident "jarred his truck," that he "felt something in the truck," and afterwards, that the load "felt funny." Appellants' App. Vol. III p. 72, 74.

[11] A few miles down the road from the hard braking incident, while traveling on State Road 37 in Orange County, the steel coil became unsecured. At that time, Taylor, Staggs, and Steele were traveling in Staggs's pickup truck, and Daugherty was traveling in a different vehicle, near Rankin's tractor-trailer. When the coil became unsecured, it left Rankin's tractor-trailer and crashed into the pickup truck and Daugherty's vehicle, killing Staggs, Steele, and Daugherty and seriously injuring Taylor.

[12] In January 2012, Daugherty, Steele, Staggs, and Taylor filed lawsuits stemming from the accident against multiple defendants, including ADS. These lawsuits were later consolidated. On December 16, 2016, ADS filed a motion for summary judgment. Following briefing and a hearing, on July 27, 2017, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of ADS, finding as a matter of law that ADS had no duty to the plaintiffs "regarding securing the load to the tractor trailer that was involved in this incident." Appealed Order p. 1. The Appellants now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[13] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well settled:

The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reed v. Reid , 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012). Once these two requirements are met by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. Any doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment should be granted only if the evidence sanctioned by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. Freidline v. Shelby Ins. Co. , 774 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. 2002).

Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc. , 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016).

[14] To prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by that breach. Id. Absent a duty, there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach, and whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. at 386-87.

II. Duty

[15] The Appellants argue that the trial court erred by finding as a matter of law that ADS bore no relevant duty to them. Specifically, they argue that ADS assumed a duty by virtue of its contract with Mittal, that ADS had a duty under common law, and, alternatively, that there are issues of fact that must be resolved to determine whether common law imposes a relevant duty on ADS.

A. Contract

[16] A duty of care may arise where one party assumes a duty. Yost v. Wabash College , 3 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Ind. 2014). One way in which a party may assume a duty is by contract. Therefore, if a contract "affirmatively evinces intent to assume a duty of care, actionable negligence may be predicated upon the contractual duty."

Stumpf v. Hagerman Constr. Corp. , 863 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). A duty imposed by contract, once formed, is non-delegable. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc. , 72 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind. 2017).

[17] Here, the Appellants argue that the contract between ADS and Mittal (the entity that paid ADS to warehouse the steel coil) imposes a duty owed by ADS to the Appellants. Initially, we note that the contract states that it is "the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof" and that it may not be modified except in writing. Appellants' App. Vol. IV p. 65. Furthermore, it explicitly provides that

[n]othing in this ... Contract is intended to confer any rights or remedies upon any persons other than Mittal and [ADS] and their respective successors and permitted assigns ... nor shall any provision of this ... Contract give any third person any ... claim or cause of action against any party.

Id. at 66. From the outset, therefore, it is readily apparent that this contract was not intended to bestow any rights upon any third parties or, concomitantly, create any duty owed by ADS to any third parties.

[18] The Appellants direct our attention to the following sections of the contract in support of their argument that ADS assumed a duty:

(a) Mittal is committed to safety, health and protection of the environment. In particular, safety of its personnel, and those of its suppliers, contractors, and visitors to Mittal's Premises is a priority for Mittal. No other priority may override safety. [ADS] fully endorses these policies and adopts them as its own, in so far as they relate to the performance of its obligations under this ... Contract . [ADS] shall have and shall enforce and strictly comply with a strong internal safety policy that includes all current industry standards and any other applicable safety codes or procedures....
* * *
(c) While on Mittal's Premises , [ADS] shall comply with any safety, health, and environmental measures implemented by Mittal from time to time in respect of its property and personnel, including those of contractors, suppliers and other persons visiting or working on the Mittal's Premises.
(d) [ADS] shall notify Mittal immediately of any safety, health or environmental issues ... which may arise in connection with the performance of its obligations under this ... Contract .

Id. at 66 (emphases added). Subsections (a) and (d) are limited to ADS's performance of its obligations under the contract, which, again, was simply for the warehousing of the coil. ADS's contract with Mittal did not relate to the transportation of the coil off of ADS's property. And subsection (c) is limited to Mittal's premises, which is not relevant to the case at hand. No contractual language requires or implies that ADS assumed a duty to secure the warehoused coil onto another driver's trailer. Therefore, we simply cannot conclude that this contract created a duty owed by ADS to the Appellants with respect to the way in which the steel coil was secured to Rankin's flatbed trailer.

[19] The Appellants direct our attention to the portion of subsection (a) requiring ADS to have, enforce, and comply with a strong internal safety policy. Indeed, ADS has a policy that requires all ADS drivers to comply with specific cargo securement and protection procedures. Appellants'

App. Vol. VI p. 101-07. That policy, however, is not relevant to the case at hand, as Rankin was not an ADS driver and ADS's only role in the process was to ensure that its crane operator followed Rankin's instructions regarding the loading of the coil onto the flatbed trailer. After the loading was complete, so was ADS's involvement. We do not find that this policy created a duty owed by ADS to the Appellants regarding the way in which the coil was secured to the flatbed by Rankin. The trial court did not err by finding as a matter of law that neither the contract nor ADS's driver policy created a duty owed by ADS to the Appellants.

B. Common Law

[20] The Appellants also argue that even if there was no contractual duty, a duty is imposed on ADS by common law. Whether a duty exists depends upon balancing the following factors: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person(s) injured; and (3) public policy concerns. Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 387.

1. Relationship

[21] As for the relationship between ADS and the Appellants, there is none. ADS's only involvement was to warehouse the steel coil and then load it onto Rankin's flatbed per Rankin's instructions. ADS also had no contractual relationship with Rankin, Kendall Transportation, or Eagle Steel, nor did it have any right of control over Rankin's acts, including the securing of the coil onto the flatbed. The accident did not occur on ADS's property, it did not involve ADS's employees or vehicles, and it did not involve anyone with whom ADS has a contractual relationship. See Williams v. Cingular Wireless , 809 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (wireless company did not owe a duty to person injured by a driver using a cell phone while driving because company had no contractual relationship with the plaintiff, accident did not occur on company's property or involve its employee or vehicle, and product did not malfunction and cause the injury). This factor weighs against finding a duty.

2. Foreseeability

[22] Turning next to the foreseeability of harm to the Appellants, our Supreme Court clarified in Goodwin how this factor should be analyzed:

"the foreseeability component of proximate cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while the foreseeability component of duty requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence."

Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 389 (quoting Goldsberry v. Grubbs , 672 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ). Put another way, we must " 'evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.' " Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 391 (quoting Strahin v. Cleavenger , 216 W.Va. 175, 603 S.E.2d 197, 207 (2004) ).

[23] Per our Supreme Court's instructions, as we consider whether the harm suffered by the Appellants was reasonably foreseeable to ADS, we must ask the broad questions of what type of plaintiffs are the Appellants and what type of harm occurred. The plaintiffs are motorists and the type of harm that occurred is a vehicular accident after commercial cargo became unsecured and struck the motorists.

[24] As a general matter, of course it is foreseeable that large and heavy cargo, which is secured to a flatbed trailer, could become unsecured on a public roadway and cause injuries to nearby motorists. But the broad type of defendant here-a warehousing entity-would have no reason to foresee that its own conduct, in warehousing the cargo or in loading the cargo onto another entity's vehicle, at the instruction of the other entity's driver, would result in harm to motorists. Put another way, an entity that has no role whatsoever in securing the cargo to the flatbed could not foresee that its own actions would result in that cargo becoming unsecured. This factor weighs against a finding of duty.

3. Public Policy

[25] Finally, we must consider public policy. This factor focuses on "who is, or should be, in the best position to prevent [an] injury and how society should allocate the costs of such injury." Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. , 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[26] In this case, Rankin was in possession and control of his flatbed trailer. Rankin told the ADS crane operator how to load the steel coil onto the flatbed trailer, and after that point in time, ADS had no more involvement with the coil. Rankin was solely responsible for securing the steel coil to his vehicle. He provided his own equipment, including chains and binders, to do so. Rankin then hauled the cargo and was responsible for ensuring that it remained secured throughout the drive. After the hard braking incident, Rankin was the only person able to decide whether to stop and ensure the coil was still fully secured.

[27] It is apparent that the party best suited to prevent an injury to motorists with respect to commercial cargo secured to a flatbed trailer is the entity responsible for securing, hauling, and checking on the cargo during the drive. Here, that is Rankin and his employer, Kendall Transportation. ADS had such a limited role in these proceedings that it would have had little to no ability to prevent the tragic accident that occurred.

[28] Therefore, we find that there is no common law duty owed by ADS to the Appellants. Moreover, we disagree with the Appellants that there are issues of fact with respect to duty that must be determined by a factfinder.

[29] Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by finding as a matter of law that ADS did not owe a duty to the Appellants. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of ADS.

[30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

      Also named as defendants in each of the complaints were Rankin, Kendall Transportation, and Reitnouer, Inc., the designer and manufacturer of the flatbed trailer. It appears from the Chronological Case Summary that litigation related to these defendants is still ongoing.

      This statement in no way implies a conclusion regarding the liability of either Rankin or Kendall Transportation. Instead, we merely conclude that as a matter of public policy, they, rather than ADS, were in the best position to prevent the ultimate harm.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Bailey, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Cameron HUNTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 43A03-1711-CR-2633
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: David C. Kolbe, Warsaw, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] While criminal charges against Cameron Hunter ("Hunter") were pending, the State alleged that Hunter had contemptuously violated a condition of his bail. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a contempt finding and imposed a sanction of 180 days in jail. Hunter presents two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court abused its discretion by imposing a criminal contempt sanction upon the violation of a condition of bail.

[2] We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Hunter was released on bail during the pendency of criminal charges against him. Hunter and the State eventually reached a plea agreement, and the trial court scheduled the matter for hearing. At the hearing, Hunter sought to postpone consideration of the plea in order to determine whether he was eligible for community corrections. The State then orally sought a modification of the conditions of Hunter's bail, to which Hunter's counsel agreed. The court continued the hearing and orally modified the conditions of Hunter's bail, specifying that Hunter was not to contact or "be around anyone under the age of 18." Tr. Vol. II at 10. Hunter confirmed that he had no questions about the trial court's oral pronouncement. Hunter then left the courthouse and entered a vehicle that contained the three people he rode with to the hearing: his girlfriend, his fifteen-year-old sister, and a sixteen-year-old female. Thereafter, the State filed a petition alleging that Hunter had contemptuously violated a condition of his bail by leaving the courthouse with two minors. The trial court held a hearing on October 9, 2017, at which it determined that Hunter was in contempt. As a sanction, the court ordered Hunter to serve 180 days in jail.

[4] Hunter now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Hunter argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a criminal contempt sanction for the violation of a condition of bail. We review the imposition of contempt sanctions for an abuse of discretion, Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc. , 964 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ind. 2012), which occurs "when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." Mitchell v. Mitchell , 785 N.E.2d 1194, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, in reviewing a contempt order, "we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id.

[6] The instant matter arose because Hunter violated a condition of his bail, and bail procedures are controlled by the Indiana Code. See generally Ind. Code ch. 35-33-8. Therein, Section 35-33-8-5 sets forth a remedy for the violation of a bail condition-and that remedy is revocation of bail. Here, however, the State alleged contempt, and the trial court ultimately imposed a punitive contempt sanction. A court's contempt power enables it to impose sanctions designed to "maintain[ ] its dignity, secur[e] obedience to its process and rules, rebuk[e] interference with the conduct of business, and punish[ ] unseemly behavior." City of Gary v. Major , 822 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 2005). Contempt sanctions are often remedial in nature, aimed toward "coerc[ing] action for the benefit of [an] aggrieved party." In re Paternity of M.P.M.W. , 908 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A court may nonetheless impose a punitive contempt sanction, but only if the offending conduct amounts to "criminal" contempt-that is, when the conduct was "willful and involve[d] a deliberate design to disobey the order as an act of defiance of, and interference with, the function of the court." Denny v. State , 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313, 320 (1932). Indeed, conduct amounts to punishable criminal contempt only when "directed against the dignity and authority of the court[,] ... obstruct[ing] the administration of justice and ... tend[ing] to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." State v. Heltzel , 552 N.E.2d 31, 33-34 (Ind. 1990).

[7] In this case, the State presented evidence of Hunter's violation, and argued that Hunter "defied the Court's order" because he "proceeded to exit the building" with minors. Tr. Vol. II at 31. Hunter testified that he did not know whether he was supposed to wait while his girlfriend drove the minors back and returned to pick him up, or first leave without the minors. In imposing a punitive contempt sanction, the trial court seemingly drew on Hunter's testimony, determining that Hunter "contemptuously ignored" its orders "because to comply would have been inconvenient for him." App. Vol. II at 13. Yet, Hunter's conduct did not affect the dignity or operation of the court. Thus, the conduct did not rise to the level of punishable criminal contempt.

[8] Ultimately, Hunter failed to comply with a condition of his bail. Under such circumstances, an appropriate remedy was to revoke bail-a remedy the State should have sought in accordance with the controlling statute. See I.C. § 35-33-8-5. Because Hunter's conduct did not amount to criminal contempt, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a punitive contempt sanction.

[9] Reversed.

Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.

      On February 16, 2018, this Court granted Hunter's Motion for Recognizance Bond Pending Appeal, and remanded for a hearing and determination of an appropriate bond.

      Hunter also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that counsel should have insisted on adherence to statutory procedures instead of stipulating to a modification of his bail conditions, see Ind. Code § 35-33-8-5 (setting forth the process for modification of bail conditions), and that counsel should have advised him of the "import and magnitude" of the modification before he left the courthouse. Appellant's Br. at 14. As we resolve this appeal on other grounds, we do not reach these contentions.

      Notably, an individual accused of criminal contempt is entitled to due process of law in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257, 271-76, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Indeed, both the Fourteenth Amendment and provisions of the Indiana Code demand certain procedural safeguards upon an allegation of "indirect" contempt-that is, where the judge lacked personal knowledge of the allegedly contemptuous conduct. See id. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499 (recognizing that summary proceedings for instances of "direct" contempt are permissible as a "narrow exception" to typical due process requirements); In re Nasser , 644 N.E.2d 93, 95-96 (Ind. 1994) ("Courts have inherent power to punish summarily acts of direct contempt without formal charges or an evidentiary hearing."); I.C. §§ 34-47-3-5, -6, -7. The Fourteenth Amendment requires, as a baseline, that the accused receive notice of the contempt allegations against him and have a reasonable opportunity to defend against those allegations through a fair, public hearing that affords the right to counsel and the chance to testify and call witnesses. In re Oliver , 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499. In Indiana, before indirect contempt proceedings may commence, the trial court must receive a verified information that sets forth the facts alleged to constitute contempt. I.C. § 34-47-3-5. Once the trial court has received a verified information, the court may then initiate further proceedings by issuing a rule to show cause. Id. The rule must, inter alia , "clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt," id. , however, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that there is no due process violation where-as here-only the information sets forth the factual allegations. Reynolds v. Reynolds , 64 N.E.3d 829, 833-34 (Ind. 2016). Moreover, the rule to show cause must set forth a specific time and place for a hearing at which the alleged contemnor may defend the allegations. I.C. § 34-47-3-5. Significantly, however, certain contemptuous conduct carries sufficient potential for bias to disqualify the sitting judge from hearing the matter. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania , 400 U.S. 455, 465-66, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971) (observing that "not every attack on a judge ... disqualifies him from sitting" but that "a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor"); cf. Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 ("A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially."). Our legislature has accounted for the prospect of bias by mandating the appointment of a special judge upon certain kinds of indirect contempt allegations. See I.C. § 34-47-3-7. However, no special judge is required where-as here-the indirect contempt allegations "grow[ ] out of willfully ... disobeying any lawful process or order of court." I.C. § 34-47-3-7(b). Nonetheless, even where the alleged contemptuous conduct does not implicate issues of impartiality, we remind courts to "exercise their extraordinary contempt powers with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection,"Matter of Craig , 552 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (quotation marks omitted), and, in selecting contempt sanctions, exercise the least-possible power adequate to the end proposed. Mockbee v. State , 80 N.E.3d 917, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied .


author: May, Judge.

text:
    James R. EISERT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 69A01-1708-CR-1938
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 25, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Leanna Weissmann, Lawrenceburg, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Tyler G. Banks, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
   May, Judge.

[1] James R. Eisert appeals his six-year sentence for Level 5 felony stalking and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. He argues that sentence is inappropriate in light of his character and offenses. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Eisert was married to G.E., and together they had two children, L.E. and M.E. By December 2015, Eisert and G.E. were estranged, L.E. was at college, and M.E. lived with G.E. On December 26, 2015, Eisert battered G.E. and M.E., and he threatened to hurt G.E. and to kill G.E., M.E., and L.E. Eisert was arrested, and the State charged him with multiple counts of battery on December 30, 2015. The trial court released Eisert on bond pending trial and ordered him to have no-contact with his ex-wife or children, but on January 1, 2016, Eisert was arrested for violating that no contact order. The court once again released Eisert from custody and entered another no contact order as to G.E. and M.E.

[3] Following the violence in December 2015, G.E. consulted with workers at a domestic violence shelter to develop a safety plan for herself and her children. G.E. changed the locks on all the doors to her home and added two additional locks to each door. She installed security cameras that recorded what was happening at her house's back door and basement door. She and M.E. changed their routines to ensure their arrival and exit at work and school, respectively, were monitored by others.

[4] On February 5, 2016, after 10:30 p.m., Eisert climbed onto the roof of G.E.'s house, entered the attic through a window, and then used razor blades to cut his way through the dry wall between the attic and the living space. G.E. was home alone, and when she heard someone trying to break into the house, she called M.E. and then called 911. G.E. was on the line with the 911 operator when she saw Eisert emerge. G.E. screamed repeatedly and told the operator she was running outside her house, but then the phone went dead. G.E. tried to run out the front door, but Eisert grabbed her by the hair, pulled her to the garage, and tried to force her into a car. Eisert told G.E. that they needed to "go talk to Jesus," (Tr. Vol. II at 36), which G.E. believed was a threat to kill her, and she was "scared to death." (Id. ) Before Eisert could get G.E. into a car, M.E. returned home. Eisert fled the house and hid near the woods until police used heat sensors to locate him. G.E. was so terrified that she needed medical attention at the scene.

[5] On February 9, 2016, under Case Number 69C01-1603-F5-11, the State charged Eisert with Level 5 felony stalking, Level 6 felony residential entry, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. In May 2017, Eisert and the State entered an agreement whereby Eisert would plead guilty to stalking and invasion of privacy, while the State would dismiss the residential-entry charge. The trial court accepted Eisert's plea.

[6] The trial court held a sentencing hearing at which the State and Eisert presented evidence. The court then entered a very detailed sentencing order to explain its sentencing:

The Aggravating Factors are as follows:
1) The trauma suffered by the victim was significant and continues to impact her, as well as continues to impact her children. First, immediately after the crime the victim suffered an anxiety related episode that resulted in law enforcement calling an ambulance-she broke-down because only moments before she believed that she was going to be killed by her estranged husband. Second, Kim Bowman, Safe Passage Director of Shelter, testified that the safety plan implemented to protect the victim was the most extensive Safe Passage has ever implemented: the victim had a security system installed (which is why the Defendant accessed the home through the attic), the locks on the marital home were changed, guns were removed, and the son they share was escorted to and from the school house doors. Bowman stated that the Lethality Assessment indicated that the victim and her family were in danger. Third, during the sentencing hearing, the fear the victim had, and continues to have, is readily apparent due to her demeanor of fear. Fourth, the statements of the children concerning the events herein show that they too fear the Defendant. The significant impact on the victim and her children is a substantial aggravating factor.
2) The nature and circumstances of the crime are particularly egregious. The events of February 5, 2016, are substantially aggravating: Defendant broke into the victim's attic by prying open a window, then cut a hole in the drywall between the attic and the residential portion of the home using a razor blade to gain access to the living quarters, attempted to pull the victim into a car while telling her they were going to go "talk to Jesus," and when law enforcement responded to the home Defendant fled and hid until he was discovered via the use of thermal imaging. Clearly stated, the events of that evening were terrifying and went far beyond the "course of conduct" necessary to prove Stalking.
3) Defendant's criminal history and history of controlled substance related criminal behavior. First, Defendant's felony conviction in 60D01-1512-F6-181 involved the same victims. Second, the Defendant's substance abuse history has resulted in two (2) 30-day inpatient treatment stays. Third, the Court is further concerned by the Defendant's employment motto of "If you can pass a drug test, we don't want you." These matters reflect poorly on the Defendant's character and are an aggravating factor. This aggravating factor is of significant weight, however not as heavy as the first two aggravators.
4) Defendant, twice, recently violated conditions of bond. This aggravating factor is also of significant weight. The Court gives this factor the appropriate weight due.
The Mitigating Factors are as follows:
1) The Defendant appears remorseful and has, while incarcerated, regularly attended AA/NA and religious counseling. This mitigating factor is of some weight, however the Court places these actions in their proper light: attending programs while the Defendant had little to nothing else to do compares unfavorably to Defendant's repeated refusal to follow the law and court orders when he was previously released.
The Court does not find the guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility to be a mitigating factor because the Defendant has already been rewarded for his guilty plea via the agreed dismissal of Cause Numbers 69D01-1601-CM-004 and 69D01-1608-CM-0240.
The Court weighs the Aggravating and Mitigating Factor[s] and finds that the Aggravating Factors grossly and substantially outweigh the Mitigating factors.

(Appellant's App. Conf. Vol. 2 at 83-4) (formatting in original). The court imposed a six-year sentence for stalking and a one-year sentence for invasion of privacy. The court ordered the sentences served concurrently, as required by the plea agreement, and then suspended one year to GPS-monitored probation.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Eisert asserts his sentence is inappropriate. We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Williams v. State , 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) ). We consider the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court and also any other factors appearing in the record. Baumholser v. State , 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied . The appellant must demonstrate his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 418.

[8] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g 878 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is "a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2014). A person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may be imprisoned for "a fixed term of not more than one (1) year." Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2 (1977).

[9] The court imposed six years for stalking and one year for invasion of privacy and, as required by the plea agreement, ordered the sentences served concurrently. Thus, the court imposed the maximum possible sentence for the crimes to which Eisert pled guilty. Eisert claims this is inappropriate for his crimes because he "did not physically harm G.E., other than the fright he caused which required medical treatment." (Br. of Appellant at 11.)

[10] Contrary to Eisert's assertion, the lack of physical harm to G.E. does not minimize the horrendous nature of his crimes. Invasion of privacy and stalking are crimes that can be accomplished by telephone calls, emails, letters, or rung doorbells. See , e.g. , Ind. Code § 35-45-10-3 (1993) (for purposes of stalking, " 'impermissible contact' includes but is not limited to knowingly or intentionally following or pursuing the victim"); Pittman v. State , 45 N.E.3d 805, 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (stalking statute not void for vagueness when defendant made repeated phone calls threatening victim's death and showed up with a gun at a doctor office where victim was); McElfresh v. State , 40 N.E.3d 1259, 1263-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (sending letter to third party, asking third party to deliver message to protected person, when third party fails to deliver the message, is attempted invasion of privacy), summarily aff'd by McElfresh v. State , 51 N.E.3d 103, 107 (Ind. 2016) (citing App. R. 58(A)(2) ); Hatchett v. State , 33 N.E.3d 1125, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming invasion of privacy based on telephone call). Instead of contacting G.E. by one of those comparatively less-invasive forms, Eisert, who had repeatedly threatened to batter and kill G.E., climbed onto the roof of her house, broke through a window into the attic, and cut his way from the attic into the living quarters of the house. He then grabbed G.E. and attempted to place her in a car so that he could take her to "talk to Jesus." (Tr. Vol. II at 36.) That Eisert's attempt to take G.E. from the home was foiled by the arrival of other people does not persuade us to ignore that his statement suggests he intended to hurt G.E. Nor do we need to overlook the increased terror that would be caused by his method of entry. Nothing about Eisert's crimes suggests a six-year sentence is inappropriate.

[11] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history. Rutherford v. State , 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id. Eisert asserts his criminal history does not justify an enhanced sentence because, prior to these recent domestic incidents, he had only "a substance-related driving offense." (Br. of Appellant at 11.) While Eisert did not have a long history of convictions, the fact that he repeatedly violated pre-trial release and court orders when committing multiple invasions of privacy in a two-month period does not suggest Eisert is a person who respects the law or the court's authority.

[12] Eisert also argues the recent domestic incidents occurred because he "briefly fell off the rails due to his drug addiction." (Br. of Appellant at 11.) However, G.E. testified Eisert had battered her and the children in prior years but she had not reported those incidents to authorities. This led the court to note that Eisert looked more like "a domestic abuser than a drug abuser." (Tr. Vol. II at 83.) While Eisert's poor behavior choices may have been exacerbated by drug use during this two-month period, we reject his suggestion that his drug use was the root of his problem.

[13] Finally, Eisert claims that, because of his attendance at Bible study, AA, and NA, he is "not the same man who terrified his wife and son in early 2016." (Br. of Appellant at 13.) While we hope spirituality and sobriety have transformed Eisert into a man who would not commit the same mistakes he made in his past, only time will tell whether Eisert truly has changed. (See Tr. Vol. II at 85 (court notes Eisert is a model inmate, but he violates bond when released).) Eisert's consistent attendance at those meetings while incarcerated does not so rehabilitate his character that we can say a six-year sentence is inappropriate. See , e.g ., Smith v. State , 839 N.E.2d 780, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (eight-year sentence for stalking not inappropriate when defendant contacted victim dozens of times).

[14] Because a six-year sentence is not inappropriate for Eisert's character and offenses, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[15] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

      Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5 (2014).

      Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(1) (2014).

      Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).

      The agreement simultaneously disposed of three other criminal actions against Eisert. In Case Number 69D01-1512-F6-181, Eisert would plead guilty to three counts of battery, two as misdemeanors and one as a felony, and the State would dismiss other pending charges. The State also agreed to dismiss all charges under Case Number 69D01-1601-CM-4 and Case Number 69D01-1608-CM-240.

      Invasion of privacy occurs when a person knowingly or intentionally violates one of various forms of protective or no contact orders. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2014).

      " '[S]talk' means a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened." Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1 (1993). " '[H]arassment' means conduct directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress." Ind. Code § 35-45-10-2 (1993).

      Nor is his character bolstered by his failure to access help for his drug abuse problem prior to committing the heinous acts at issue herein.


text:
    Jeffery CERTA, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. STEAK 'N SHAKE OPERATIONS INC., Mikal Gillham, and Matthew Hulett, Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1708-CT-1873
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 29, 2018
    Attorneys for Appellant: James F. Olds, William E. Emerick, Mark R. Molter, Stuart & Branigin LLP, Lafayette, Indiana
    Attorney for Amicus Curiae Indiana Trial Lawyers Ass'n: Gabriel A. Hawkins, Cohen & Malad, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee Steak 'n Shake: Thomas C. Hays, Lisa M. Dillman, Barath S. Raman, Lewis Wagner LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
    Attorney for Amicus Curiae Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana: Lucy R. Dollens, Jacob V. Bradley, Quarles & Brady, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Barteau, Senior Judge Statement of the Case

[1] Appellant Jeffery Certa appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Steak 'n Shake. We reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] Certa presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in granting Steak 'n Shake's motion for summary judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts most favorable to Certa, the nonmovant, follow. In the early morning hours of May 4, 2013, Certa and his friends, Rick and Arlene Luse, arrived at the Steak 'n Shake in Lafayette, Indiana. Certa and the Luses had been drinking. As they walked from the parking lot to the entrance of the restaurant, they observed a man and a woman arguing and saw the man push the woman against the wall. Certa stepped between the two people and told the man not to put his hands on the woman. Mikal Gillham was with the man and woman and witnessed Certa's actions. She and Certa exchanged words when she suggested that Certa stay out of their affairs. Certa then entered the restaurant with the Luses and informed a Steak 'n Shake employee that there was a physical altercation occurring outside the restaurant. The employee indicated that he would take care of the situation, and Certa and the Luses were seated at a table.

[4] Gillham entered the restaurant to join her friends, Matthew Hulett and Lynn Huhn, who had already been seated. Like Certa and the Luses, Gillham and her friends had been drinking that evening. Gillham's aunt, Ladonna Musik, is a Steak 'n Shake employee and was the server on duty that night. Musik was aware that the two groups had been drinking. When Gillham entered the restaurant, she told Musik about her exchange with Certa, and she advised her aunt not to allow Certa and his friends into the restaurant because she "could tell that they were intoxicated" and she "just had a feeling that they were going to start an argument[ ] or a fight." Gillham Depo., Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2, p. 152. Musik stated that everyone should calm down, eat their food, and mind their own business. Musik advised her manager to watch the two tables because there might be a conflict.

[5] Gillham and her friends were seated at a table on the other side of the restaurant from Certa and the Luses. Although there was no conversation, yelling, or fighting between the two tables, the people at Gillham's table were talking loudly, pointing, and gesturing at Certa's table. From Certa's table, Arlene was glaring at Gillham and her friends.

[6] After about thirty to forty-five minutes, Gillham's group finished eating, paid their bill, and exited the restaurant. Subsequently, the Luses paid their bill and exited. Certa was the last to pay and leave. As he was paying his bill, he told Musik, "If I go out there and that girl runs her mouth[,] the sh**t's going to hit the fan." Musik Depo., Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 134. As Certa exited the restaurant, he saw that a woman in a car was reaching out of the open driver's window and punching Arlene. The woman punching Arlene was later identified as Gillham. Certa ran back into the restaurant and told the employees to call the police. At some point, Certa noticed that Rick was also involved in an altercation outside the restaurant. Upon exiting the restaurant the second time, Certa went around to the back of the vehicle in which Gillham was sitting and attempted to get the license plate number. While Certa was standing behind the car, Hulett, who was seated in the front passenger seat of the car, reached over and put the car in reverse. The car backed over Certa, causing him injury.

[7] Based on these events, Certa sued Steak 'n Shake, Gillham, Hulett, and Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company for his injuries. In his complaint, Certa alleged that Steak 'n Shake was negligent when it breached its duty to him by "[f]ailing to reasonably control its customers;" "failing to properly train its staff in customer control and handling intoxicated persons;" "failing to provide proper security;" and "failing to call the police in a timely manner." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 221. Steak 'n Shake filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing. Steak 'n Shake subsequently filed a motion to reconsider based upon two recent Indiana Supreme Court decisions. The parties acknowledged the trial court should consider Steak 'n Shake's motion to reconsider as a renewed motion for summary judgment, and, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for Steak 'n Shake. Certa now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Certa contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Steak 'n Shake. The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which can be determined as a matter of law. Sheehan Const. Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co. , 938 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. 2010). On appeal from a summary judgment, we apply the same standard of review as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated evidentiary matter shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Young v. Hood's Gardens, Inc. , 24 N.E.3d 421, 423-24 (Ind. 2015) ; see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Sheehan Const. Co., Inc. , 938 N.E.2d at 688. Further, the trial court's grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the party who lost in the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Benko , 964 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied .

[9] Certa's negligence claim against Steak 'n Shake is grounded in premises liability. Indiana law is well established that a person entering upon the land of another comes upon the land as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.

Pickering v. Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC , 988 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The status of the person entering the land of another determines the duty the landowner owes to him. Mohr v. Virginia B. Smith Revocable Tr. , 2 N.E.3d 50, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied . Here, the parties agree that Certa was an invitee of Steak 'n Shake, meaning that Steak 'n Shake owed Certa a duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection. See Christmas v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship , 952 N.E.2d 872, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that landowner owes to invitee highest duty of care, which is duty to exercise reasonable care for invitee's protection while he is on premises).

[10] To prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach. Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC , 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Absent a duty, there can be no negligence or liability based upon a breach. Powell v. Stuber , 89 N.E.3d 430, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts to decide. Podemski v. Praxair, Inc. , 87 N.E.3d 540, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied .

[11] Two recent decisions by our supreme court, Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc. , 62 N.E.3d 384 (Ind. 2016) and Rogers v. Martin , 63 N.E.3d 316 (Ind. 2016), drive our decision in this case. In Goodwin , a patron at a bar became angry when he overheard comments he believed to be about his wife. He produced a handgun and shot three people. The three individuals who were shot sued the bar for negligence based on premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bar, and the three patrons appealed. This Court reversed the trial court's decision.

[12] On transfer, our supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment that the bar did not owe the patrons a duty to protect them. In doing so, the court acknowledged foreseeability as a component of the duty element of negligence and concluded that the assessment of foreseeability in this context is a determination to be made by the court utilizing an analysis of the " 'broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.' " Id. at 390 (quoting Goldsberry v. Grubbs , 672 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied and adopting analysis set forth therein because it provides more accurate framework for assessing foreseeability in duty context; expressly disapproving three-part balancing test in Webb v. Jarvis , 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991) ; and stating totality of circumstances test endorsed in Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson , 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999) ill-suited to determine foreseeability in duty context). The court also declared that "for purposes of determining whether an act is foreseeable in the context of duty we assess whether there is some probability or likelihood of harm that is serious enough to induce a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid it." Id. at 392.

[13] In applying this foreseeability analysis to the facts before it in Goodwin , the court stated that the broad type of plaintiff was a patron of a bar and the broad type of harm was the likelihood of a criminal attack, namely a shooting inside a bar. Id. at 393. The court reasoned that although bars can be host to rowdy behavior, bar owners would not routinely contemplate that one patron might suddenly shoot another. Id. at 393-94. Therefore, the court declined to impose a duty and held that a shooting inside a neighborhood bar is not foreseeable as a matter of law. Id. at 394.

[14] On the same day it decided Goodwin , our supreme court also decided Rogers . In that case, a homeowner and her boyfriend co-hosted a party. At the end of the night, the boyfriend engaged in a fistfight with two guests. Afterward, the homeowner found one of the guests lying motionless on her basement floor. He died a short time later. The estate of the deceased guest and the other guest sued the homeowner for negligence. The homeowner filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The estate appealed, and this Court reversed. Transfer was sought and granted.

[15] Our supreme court summed up the issue in Rogers as, "Where a premises liability claim is based on activities on the land [rather than a condition of the land], foreseeability is the critical inquiry in determining whether the landowner's duty of reasonable care extends to the particular circumstances at issue." Id. at 323. Expounding on its determination in Goodwin , the court further stated:

When foreseeability is part of the duty analysis, as in landowner-invitee cases, it is evaluated in a different manner than foreseeability in the context of proximate cause. Specifically, in the duty arena, foreseeability is a general threshold determination that involves an evaluation of (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm. In other words, this foreseeability analysis should focus on the general class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member and whether the harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected-without addressing the specific facts of the occurrence.

Id. at 325 (citing Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 388-89 ). The court then applied this analysis to the facts to determine whether a homeowner has a duty to take precautions to prevent a co-host from fighting with and injuring (i.e., broad type of harm) a house-party guest (i.e., broad type of plaintiff). In answering this question in the negative, the court explained, "Although house parties can often set the stage for raucous behavior, we do not believe that hosts of parties routinely physically fight guests whom they have invited. Ultimately, it is not reasonably foreseeable for a homeowner to expect this general harm to befall a house-party guest." Id. at 326.

[16] The court was also presented with and determined a second issue concerning the homeowner's duty in Rogers : whether the homeowner had a duty to protect the guest when she found him lying unconscious on her basement floor. This question the court answered in the affirmative. The court reasoned that "[h]omeowners should reasonably expect that a house-party guest who is injured on the premises could suffer from an exacerbation of those injuries" and for that reason, the homeowner owed the guest a duty to protect him from the exacerbation of his injury that occurred in her home. Id. at 327.

[17] In this case, both parties acknowledge the applicability of Rogers and Goodwin to the situation, but they disagree about the ensuing result. Certa asserts that Steak 'n Shake, as a 24-hour restaurant, had a reasonable duty of care to protect him from injury inflicted by intoxicated patrons when Steak 'n Shake knew Certa and the patrons had engaged in a verbal altercation and was aware of the potential for escalation of the conflict.

[18] Steak 'n Shake, on the other hand, argues the trial court properly determined that Steak 'n Shake did not owe a duty to Certa because it was not foreseeable that Certa, a restaurant patron, would be injured by an intoxicated patron in the parking lot of a restaurant that does not serve alcohol. Steak 'n Shake maintains that in this case the broad type of plaintiff is a patron of a restaurant and the broad type of harm is a criminal attack from a third party.

[19] Application of the broad type of plaintiff and harm analysis is not as narrow as Steak 'n Shake suggests. In this analysis, foreseeability is the "critical inquiry," and this inquiry acknowledges that the landowner-invitee duty to protect is not limitless; rather, some harms are so unforeseeable that a landowner has no duty to protect an invitee against them. Rogers , 63 N.E.3d at 320, 324. Yet, even given the "lesser inquiry" that is the broad plaintiff/harm analysis, the court considered what the landowner knew or had reason to know as it concerned the injured party in both Goodwin and Rogers when determining the foreseeability of these events. Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 390, 393 (quoting Goldsberry , 672 N.E.2d at 479 ). This approach is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f, which provides, "[s]ince the possessor [of land] is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur."

[20] For example, in Goodwin , the court acknowledged that bar owners do not "routinely contemplate that one bar patron might suddenly shoot another." Id. at 394 (emphasis added). Use of the word "suddenly" indicates that this was an unexpected occurrence relative to the landowner/bar owner. Likewise, in Rogers , the court called the fight an "unpredictable situation" and stated that hosts of parties do not "routinely physically fight guests whom they have invited." Id. at 326. Again, the court's language reflects the unanticipated nature of the fight vis-à-vis the landowner/homeowner. Finally, with regard to the second issue of duty in Rogers , the court decided that the landowner/homeowner's knowledge that the guest had been injured gave rise to a duty to protect the guest from exacerbation of the injury occurring in her home. Thus, what the landowner knew or had reason to know is a pivotal consideration in determining foreseeability which Steak 'n Shake disregards in its analysis.

[21] Accordingly, as did our supreme court in Goodwin and Rogers , we apply the broad type of plaintiff and the broad type of harm analysis and determine the foreseeability of the events with consideration of what Steak 'n Shake knew or had reason to know. The broad type of plaintiff is a restaurant patron, and the broad type of harm is injury caused by a third party. In determining the foreseeability, we are mindful that Steak 'n Shake did not have to know the precise harm that its customer would suffer, only that there was some probability or likelihood of harm that was serious enough to induce a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid it. See Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 392. Steak 'n Shake knew that a heated encounter that began outside the restaurant between two groups of intoxicated people spilled into the restaurant. The Steak 'n Shake server was told by her niece that she feared a fight would ensue, and the groups exchanged dirty looks and finger pointing while inside the restaurant. In addition, the Steak 'n Shake server specifically informed her manager that the two groups might be trouble. Further, Certa indicated to the Steak 'n Shake server that he would retaliate if Gillham engaged him in the parking lot. Given these circumstances, we conclude that Steak 'n Shake's knowledge of the events on its premises in this case gave rise to a duty to take reasonable steps to provide for Certa's safety as a patron of its establishment.

[22] We caution that our determination is only of the existence of a duty in this situation. The issues of breach of that duty and proximate cause must still be determined by the trier of fact.

Conclusion

[23] Thus, having determined that Steak 'n Shake owed a duty to Certa, we necessarily conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Steak 'n Shake.

[24] Reversed and remanded.

Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.

      Although Defendants Mikal Gillham and Matthew Hulett did not participate in the proceedings below and have not participated in this appeal, they are parties on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A) (stating that a party of record in the trial court shall be a party on appeal).

      In July 2017, the trial court ordered Allstate dismissed from this case with prejudice by stipulation of the parties.


author: BARNES, J.

text:
    Tammi LACY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1708-CR-1951
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Terry E. BELDEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 73A04-1709-CR-2242
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    Robert A. PETERSON, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 16A01-1706-CR-1334
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed in part and remanded.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brandan Lee EAKRIGHT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 85A02-1710-CR-2577
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jasper E. WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1710-CR-2275
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Deandre BARNUM, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1707-CR-1641
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    IN RE The PATERNITY OF: K.B.:
    Kyle Burkholder, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Amanda Jensma, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A02-1704-JP-721
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

text:
    S.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1712-JV-2915
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHEPARD, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Elliot Edward SHELTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 10A05-1709-CR-2084
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

BARNES, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    Charles B. ELDREDGE, Appellant-Respondent, v. Susan M. RUCH, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 12A02-1710-DR-2352
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J.

text:
    Andrew KITT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-CR-2494
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J., Concurs.

text:
    A.C., JR., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 92A04-1711-JV-2812
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHARPNACK, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Donald JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1711-CR-2549
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

BARNES, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE: The Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.B. and A.H., Minor Children,
    C.B. (Father), H.B. (Mother), Appellants-Respondents, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner. and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian ad Litem.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1711-JT-2602
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    Charlene LEWIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1712-CR-2776
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Joe E. JACKSON, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1709-CR-2179
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE: The Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.A., N.A., W.A., W.A., (Minor Children), and R.F. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1710-JT-2492
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed April 30, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Justin KASTEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-CR-2654
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Robert WIKLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 67A04-1711-CR-2524
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 1, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    Brian BASSETT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-CR-2212
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Phillip EVANS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 84A01-1709-CR-2116
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    S.T., Appellant-Respondent, v. K.D., Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 12A05-1710-PO-2356
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: BAILEY, J.

text:
    IN RE the PATERNITY OF K.W. (Minor Child):
    K.P., Appellant-Respondent, v. W.W., Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-JP-2639
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: O.W. (Minor Child), and T.W. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 40A01-1712-JT-2860
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Johnnie JONES-GUNN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05-1711-CR-2625
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J., Concurs.

text:
    James A. GEYMAN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 39A05-1709-CR-2200
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   ROBB, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Leon HOLLINGSWORTH III, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 64A03-1708-CR-1804
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF H.W., a Child Alleged to be in Need of Services
    J.W. (Father) Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1711-JC-2560
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

BARNES, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael NETTLETON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 29A02-1710-CR-2308
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Andrew KLIMAN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. MUTUAL WEALTH MANAGEMENT GROUP, Trustee; Marjorie L. Kliman; Christine E. Kliman; and Carol L. Kliman, Appellees-Respondents.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 54A01-1710-TR-2272
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    IN RE the Matter of: M.G., Child in Need of Services
    K.H. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellees-Petitioners
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1711-JC-2657
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Kevin JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1709-CR-2003
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    DARDEN, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    N.M., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1711-JV-2539
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the true findings.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    P.R.M., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A04-1710-JV-2301
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the adjudication.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: CRONE, J.

text:
    T.A.S., Appellant-Petitioner, v. J.S., Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A01-1709-DR-2193
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    Gary Lee BEASON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1701-PC-112
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Justin BOWLING, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 15A05-1710-CR-2271
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kenitta K. CHANDLER, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Rhonda BOWSER, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1706-CT-1346
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: BARNES, J.

text:
    Bruce K. POND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 90A02-1709-PC-2226
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lonnell BRISBON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-CR-2707
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Michael Lee SUGARS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Heather Leanne SUGARS, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 55A04-1707-DR-1691
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kevin J. MAMON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Ryan GARRITY, et al., Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 30A01-1706-PL-1210
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Cynthia S. GORDON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A01-1711-CR-2597
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Durell T. CRAIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-CR-2299
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Juan FLAGG, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1708-PC-1719
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Joshua Wayne ASHLEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 73A01-1710-CR-2354
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    S.B., Appellant-Respondent, v. K.F., Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-PO-3043
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    John Charles PRENDERVILLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Cause No. 45A04-1712-CR-2838
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: M.S., Je.S., and Ja.S. (Minor Children) and C.I. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A01-1711-JT-2582
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    IN RE the GUARDIANSHIP OF: A.E.S.
    Glen Scisney, Appellant-Respondent, v. Saleem Adams and Tamara Adams, Appellees-Petitioners.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1708-GU-1923
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Edward L. MUSE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A04-1711-CR-2673
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Stephen Keith BOLIN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1710-CR-2442
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Robin L. RAJSKI and Robert A. Rajski:
    State of Indiana, Appellant-Intervenor,
    Robin L. Rajski, Petitioner, v. Robert A. Rajski, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1710-DR-2321
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the ADOPTION OF L.A.Z.:
    L.Z., Appellant-Respondent, v. E.G., Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 26A01-1711-AD-2828
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

BARNES, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J.

text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.H. (Minor Child);
    J.H. (Father), Appellant-Defendant, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-JT-2488
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: D.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH METHODIST, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-MH-2343
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the GUARDIANSHIP OF: A.S.S.
    Glen Scisney, Appellant-Respondent, v. Saleem Adams and Tamara Adams, Appellees-Petitioners.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1708-GU-1921
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Raquan Charles MCKINSTRY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 50A03-1711-CR-2689
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Duane Lamar HERRON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1711-CR-2741
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.L. (Minor Child), and J.L. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian ad Litem.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1712-JT-2759
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mario L. SIMS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Emily TAYLOR, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1708-CT-2026
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jacob WHITE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 34A02-1711-CR-2553
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    Derek Franklin WILLIAMS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 14A04-1708-PC-1964
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    James Brady HELMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1710-CR-2416
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    David GALYEN, Appellant, v. Amber GALYEN, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 83A04-1711-DR-2664
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF B.W., Minor Child, and A.T., Mother, Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A01-1709-JT-2041
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    SOUTH SHORE GP, LLC, and Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living, Inc., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Jonathan ANDERSON, Anderson Partners LLC, UP Commons LLC, UP Development LLC, UPA LLC, and Cullen J. Davis, Appellees-Defendants
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A04-1710-PL-2287
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

text:
    Lonnie GARNER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1711-CR-2543
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    DARDEN, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Robert D. MILLS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A03-1709-CR-2251
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jeremy E. GRIMES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A04-1709-CR-2001
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Rolly B. DULWORTH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 35A02-1711-CR-2784
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kelvin Lamonte LAMPKINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A02-1711-CR-2750
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    Warren V. PIERCE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1708-CR-1807
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Gregory SMITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1709-CR-2031
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Theodore BRISCOE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1709-CR-2327
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Ronnie L. DAVIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 20A03-1711-CR-2772
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mercy DARRINGTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1708-CR-1876
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Justin Howard SUEDMEYER, Appellant-Respondent, v. Julie Louise SUEDMEYER, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 65A01-1711-DR-2789
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Pausides ALAYO, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 09A02-1712-CR-2800
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    In re the Commitment of D.E., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MH-128
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Derrick HICKS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1707-PC-1661
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Heath BRADLEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1709-CR-2170
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BARNES, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Larry D. NEWKIRK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 15A01-1709-CR-2062
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    James HIGGASON, III, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 64A04-1710-CR-2329
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    John B. MYLES, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A04-1611-PC-2602
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Faderick D. RILEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1712-CR-2923
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Kathleen SPREHE, Appellant-Defendant, v. CVP HOLDING CORP., Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1710-CT-2463
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Reversed and remanded.

BARNES, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: I.C. & J.C., Jr. (Minor Children) and J.C. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 82A05-1712-JT-3008
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 22, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    C.V., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 85A02-1712-JV-2826
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 22, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the PATERNITY OF G.H. and J.H. (Minor Children):
    R.H., Appellant-Petitioner, v. H.W., Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-JP-3011
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mark KINSEY, Appellant, v. Julia KINSEY, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1712-DR-2743
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    IN RE: ESTATE OF Lester Frank SUMRALL, Deceased
    Lester L. Sumrall, Appellant/Petitioner, v. Angela N. Grabowski, Appellee/Counter-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05-1710-ES-2476
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Joshua A. GUNTLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 38A02-1707-CR-1604
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Julian BYRD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A04-1709-CR-2209
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J., Concurs.

text:
    Susanna CONLIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1709-CR-2080
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.
   BAKER, J., Concurs.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    Mark RHODES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1710-CR-2483
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lakesha L. NORINGTON (aka) Shawntrell H. Norington, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1707-PC-1966
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 22, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Keyno W. THOMAS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1708-CR-1853
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 22, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J.

text:
    In the Matter of the Marriage of: Bobbie SALES (f/k/a Bobbie Herron), Appellant-Respondent, v. Richard Allen MOULDER, Jr., Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 29A02-1709-DR-2150
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Curtis PEARMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Andrew Alexander SZAKALY, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 41A01-1711-CC-2647
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jared Wayne JESSIE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 04A03-1708-CR-1891
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF A.K., A Child in Need of Services,
    N.K., Father, Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1711-JC-2658
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    J.B. and P.B., Appellants-Petitioners, v. J.V. and K.V., Appellees-Respondents.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-MI-2754
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Jack W. LOMBARD, III, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1711-CR-2755
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lawrence NUNLEY, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 31A01-1703-PC-547
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED May 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


text:
    Johnny MOORE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 53A04-1706-CR-1269
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed May 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.