author: PYLE, Judge.

text:
    In the Matter of the Supervised Estate of Evelyn GARRARD. Ronald D. Garrard, Appellant/Plaintiff/Counterclaim and Third-Party Defendant, v. Debra L. TEIBEL and Douglas Grimmer, Appellees/Defendants/Counterclaim and Third-Party Plaintiffs, and Debra Lindsay, Appellee/Third-Party Defendant.
    No. 45A03-1111-PL-547.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    March 8, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied April 26, 2013.
    Ronald D. Garrard, Appellant Pro se.
    Michael L. Muenich, Griffith, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
   OPINION

PYLE, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the second appeal stemming from a lawsuit filed by Ronald Garrard (“Garrard”) as the attorney-in-fact for Evelyn Garrard (“Evelyn”), now deceased, against Evelyn’s children, Debra L. Teibel (“Teibel”) and Douglas Grimmer (“Grimmer”), who filed a counterclaim and a third-party complaint against Garrard and his daughter, Debra Lindsay (“Lindsay”). The proceeding on the initial lawsuit and counterclaim has gone before multiple trial judges, accompanied by various changes in cause numbers. This case has also been intertwined with a separate guardianship proceeding — which apparently resulted in the appointment of a guardian over Evelyn — and an estate proceeding (“the Estate”) — which was filed by Teibel as personal representative for Evelyn following Evelyn’s death and against which Garrard filed various claims.

Throughout these proceedings, Garrard, who represented himself, was repeatedly warned by the trial court about using language in his pleadings that impugned the trial court and opposing counsel. Garrard was ultimately held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the trial court’s orders.

Teibel and Grimmer filed three separate summary judgment motions-one on Gar-rard’s complaint, one on them counterclaim, and one on Garrard’s claims against the Estate. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Teibel and Grimmer on all three motions. Garrard now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Teibel and Grimmer on their counterclaim and on Garrard’s claims against the Estate.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether Garrard has waived appellate review of his arguments.

FACTS

This is the second appeal Garrard has filed in this case. The underlying facts leading up to Garrard’s action against Tei-bel and Grimmer were set forth in Gar-rard’s first appeal as follows:

Garrard was previously married to Evelyn, but the two were divorced on July 13, 1993. On May 13, 2003, after being diagnosed with mild dementia which was expected to progress, Evelyn executed a durable power of attorney appointing her children Debra T[ei]bel and Douglas Grimmer as her attorneys-in-fact.
By September 2005, Evelyn was formally diagnosed with Pick’s disease, a form of frontal temporal dementia. In the spring of 2006, Evelyn became reacquainted with Garrard, and on March 3, 2006, executed a full power of attorney naming Garrard as her attorney-in-fact. That same day, Evelyn also revoked all prior powers of attorney, including the May 2003 document naming T[ei]bel and Grimmer as her attorneys-in-fact. On April 17, 2006, Evelyn remarried Gar-rard.
On June 15, 2007, Garrard filed a complaint for damages against T[ei]bel and Grimmer alleging that, despite the revocation of their powers of attorney, they had taken unlawful action in various accounts owned by Evelyn. On July 26, 2007, T[ei]bel and Grimmer filed their answer and affirmative defenses. In addition, they filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint against Garrard seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment invalidating Garrard’s power of attorney for Evelyn (Count II), and the appointment of a guardian over Evelyn (Count III). On August 13, 2007, Gar-rard moved to dismiss the counterclaim and third-party complaint. Following T[ei]bel’s and Grimmer’s August 21, 2007 filing of an amended counterclaim and third-party complaint, the trial court held a hearing on October 24, 2007. In a January 31, 2008 order, the trial court denied Garrard’s motion to dismiss, and it ordered that America L. McAlpin be named guardian ad litem for Evelyn. The trial court additionally issued an injunction prohibiting the disposition of Evelyn’s property by any party.
On July 22, 2008, McAlpin filed a petition seeking emergency appointment of a temporary guardian for Evelyn. Following a hearing on December 3, 2008, the Probate Commissioner found Evelyn to be incapacitated and in need of a guardian.
On January 9, 2009, T[ei]bel and Grimmer moved for summary judgment on Counts II and III of their counterclaim! ] In support of their motion, T[ei]bel and Grimmer designated, inter alia, affidavits from Dr. Richard Cristea, M.D., and Dr. Joseph Fink, PhD., indicating that Evelyn was incapacitated as of September 2005 and would have been unable to understand the nature and effect of a power of attorney or the nature and obligation of a marriage contract.
Following a hearing, on December 11, 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of T[ei]bel and Grimmer on Counts II and III of their counterclaim.[] In granting summary judgment, the trial court found that the undisputed evidence showed Evelyn was incapacitated by September of 2005. Significantly, the trial court refused to consider Garrard’s evidence on the grounds that it consisted of un-sworn, unauthenticated reports which were not proper designations. The court subsequently denied Garrard’s motion to correct error.

Garrard ex rel. Garrard v. Teibel, Gause No. 45A04-1003-PL-229, *1-2 (Ind. Ct.App. June 8, 2011), trans. denied.

Garrard, pro se, appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Teibel and Grimmer on Counts II and III of their counterclaim. This Court initially dismissed Garrard’s appeal due to his failure to file a brief or appendix that complied with .the Indiana Appellate Rules, but we later reinstated his appeal. After reviewing the parties’ appellate briefs, we noted that Garrard had failed to demonstrate what designated evidence he had presented that would show a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the grant of summary judgment against him, and we further stated that Garrard’s arguments in his brief left us “unable to discern Gar-rard’s basis for appeal.” See id. at 2. Ultimately, we held that Garrard had waived appellate review of his challenge to the trial court’s summary judgment order due to his failure to comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules, and we affirmed the trial court’s judgment against Garrard. Thereafter, we granted Teibel and Grimmer’s motion to tax costs of the appeal under Appellate Rule 67 but denied their motion for appellate attorney fees.

This current appeal is the result of three separate motions for summary judgment, which were filed by Teibel and Grimmer during the pendency of the appellate proceedings on the prior summary judgment motion. On December 18, 2009, Teibel and Grimmer filed a motion seeking summary judgment on Garrard’s claims in his complaint. On January 11, 2010, Teibel and Grimmer filed a motion seeking summary judgment on Counts IV and V in their counterclaim. On February 17, 2010, Teibel and Grimmer filed a summary judgment motion on Garrard’s claims against the Estate. Garrard filed responses to these summary judgment motions but has not included a copy of them in his Appellant’s Appendix.

The trial court set a combined summary judgment hearing and bench trial for April 29 and 30, 2011. Judge Hawkins commenced the hearing/bench trial but then recused from the case on April 30, 2011.

Thereafter, in July 2010, Judge Elizabeth F. Tavitas accepted jurisdiction of the case. In February 2011, Garrard filed various motions, including the following: (1) motion for change of venue; (2) motion for Judge Tavitas to recuse; (3) motion to dismiss Teibel and Grimmer’s counterclaim; and (4) motion to void all prior orders of Judge Hawkins. On February 17, 2011, the trial court denied these orders and “admonished [Garrard] [ ]not to file material in the future which is redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.” (Teibel & Grimmer’s App. 7).

On August 16, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the three pending summary judgment motions. The trial court took the summary judgment motions under advisement and directed the parties to file three proposed summary judgment orders within one week. The trial court also instructed Teibel and Grimmer’s counsel to deliver a copy of the proposed summary judgment orders to her court reporter or bailiff in the courtroom so that they would “get to [her] quicker[.]” Supplemental Tr. at 14.

Also during this hearing, the trial court addressed whether Garrard should be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the trial court’s previous order regarding “scandalous” pleadings. The trial court found Garrard in “‘direct criminal contempt of Court’ ” and instructed him not to file any further pleadings that violated the trial court’s previous order. (Teibel & Grimmer’s App. 6).

Thereafter, the parties filed their proposed summary judgment orders, with Teibel and Grimmer filing theirs on August 23, 2011, and Garrard filing his on August 25, 2011. Based on the content of Garrard’s proposed order, Teibel and Grimmer filed a motion to strike Garrard’s proposed summary judgment orders.

On September 1, 2011, the trial court held a pretrial hearing. During this hearing, the trial court heard argument on various motions, including Teibel and Grimmer’s motion to strike Garrard’s proposed summary judgment orders. When Garrard offered excuses of why his proposed orders were filed late, the trial court stated that it was not concerned with the filing time of the orders as it was with the content of the orders. The trial court noted that Garrard’s proposed summary judgment orders were in the nature of a brief and contained “scandalous” material. Tr. at 28. As a result, the trial court ruled that Garrard’s proposed summary judgment orders would be struck.

At the end of the pretrial hearing, counsel for Teibel and Grimmer expressed his concern to the trial court that the clerk’s office had file stamped his proposed summary judgment orders as being filed on August 26th instead of August 23rd, when he brought them to the trial court’s staff in open court as instructed by the trial judge. That same day, the trial court issued an order, finding that Teibel and Grimmer’s proposed summary judgment orders were filed on August 23, 2011.

On September 8, 2011, the trial court entered three separate summary judgment orders, all granting summary judgment to Teibel and Grimmer. Specifically, the trial court: (1) granted summary judgment to Teibel and Grimmer on all claims in Gar-rard’s complaint; (2) granted summary judgment to Teibel and Grimmer on Counts IV and V of their counterclaim; and (3) granted summary judgment to Tei-bel and Grimmer on Garrard’s claims against the Estate. In these summary judgment orders, the trial court indicated that the documents attached to Garrard’s summary judgment responses were not supported by affidavit or certification. As a result, the trial court struck these documents from consideration on summary judgment.

On September 12, 2011, the trial court held a bench trial on the issue of damages relating to Garrard’s fraudulent transfer. Before proceeding to the bench trial, Tei-bel and Grimmer requested that the trial court enter final judgment, pursuant to Trial Rule 54(B), on the prior summary judgment orders. Additionally, the trial court heard argument on some of Gar-rard’s various motions, including: (1) his motion objecting to the trial court’s September 1st order regarding the time of filing of Teibel and Grimmer’s proposed summary judgment orders, in which Gar-rard accused the trial court of setting forth “falsified and untrue assertions”; and (2) his motion for Judge Tavitas to recuse, in which Garrard accused the trial judge and counsel for Teibel and Grimmer of collusion and ex parte communication in relation to the trial judge’s instructions to counsel to deliver copies of the proposed summary judgment orders to her court staff. The trial court allowed Garrard to present evidence and argument regarding his motions. Thereafter, the trial court heard evidence regarding damages on the fraudulent transfer issue and took all matters under advisement.

On September 14, 2011, the trial court entered an order, denying Garrard’s recu-sal motion and granting Teibel’s motion for entry of final judgment on the previous summary judgment orders. In relevant part, the trial court entered final judgment on the following summary judgment orders: (1) Judge Hawkins’ December 11, 2009 summary judgment order on Counts II and III in Teibel and Grimmer’s counterclaim; (2) the December 8, 2011 summary judgment order on Garrard’s complaint; (3) the December 8, 2011 summary judgment order on Counts IV and V in Teibel and Grimmer’s counterclaim; and (4) the December 8, 2011 summary judgment order on Garrard’s claims against the Estate.

Thereafter, on October 13, 2011, Gar-rard filed a motion to correct error on the trial court’s order granting summary judgment against Garrard on his claims against the Estate, and he filed a separate motion to correct error on the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on Counts IV and V in Teibel and Grimmer’s counterclaim. The trial court denied Garrard’s motions to correct error on October 25, 2011.

On November 14, 2011, Garrard filed two notices of appeal: one from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment against Garrard on his claims against the Estate and the other from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on Counts IV and V in Teibel and Grimmer’s counterclaim.

On November 21, 2011, the trial court issued an order from the bench trial on damages. The trial court entered judgment against Garrard for $601,315.44. Garrard did not file a notice of appeal from this order.

DECISION

Garrard, pro se, is appealing from two of the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment against him. Summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated evidence shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is “ ‘clothed with a presumption of validity,’ ” and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ind.2009) (quoting Rosi v. Bus. Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993)).

Garrard’s appellate brief and arguments contained therein are not the model of clarity. He appears to argue that: (1) the trial court erred by denying discovery; (2) the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Teibel and Grimmer; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing him to submit evidence; and (4) the trial court falsified orders and committed fraud upon the court with opposing counsel.

As he did in his pleadings during the trial proceedings, Garrard continues to use a contentious tone in his appellate brief. Furthermore, as with his prior appeal, Garrard has failed to comply with our Appellate Rules. Due to the deficient nature of Garrard’s brief, Teibel and Grimmer request that we find that Garrard has waived all issues on appeal. We agree.

Indeed, we have explained that ■
one who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of procedure that a trained legal counsel is bound to follow and, therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action. While we prefer to decide cases on the merits, we will deem alleged errors waived where an appellant’s noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors. The purpose of our appellate rules, Ind. Appellate Rule 46 in particular, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searchr ing the record and briefing the case. We will not become an advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.

Ramsey v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Garrard has failed to comply with our Appellate Rules in both his appendix and brief. For example, contrary to Appellate Rule 50(A)(2), Garrard has failed to include a copy of the CCS in his appendix. Furthermore, he did not include a copy of either parties’ summary judgment' motions or designated evidence. “[B]oth our appellate rules as well as applicable case law clearly indicate that when appealing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must file with the appellate court those materials that were designated to the trial court for purposes of reviewing the motion for summary judgment.” Yoquelet v. Marshall County, 811 N.E.2d 826, 829-30 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). See also Hughes v. King, 808 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (dismissing appeal of grant of summary judgment when appellant failed to include all designated evidence in the ■ appendix). Moreover, Garrard has failed to include copies of some of the trial court’s orders that he appears to be arguing were erroneous.

Garrard’s brief also fails to comply with multiple Appellate Rules. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5) provides that an appellant’s Statement of the Case “shall briefly describe the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review, and the disposition of these issues by the trial court[.]” It also requires an appellant to provide page references to the record on appeal or the appellant’s appendix. However, Garrard’s Statement of the Case is argumentative in nature and does not contain any references to the course of the summary judgment proceedings or disposition of the issues relevant to this appeal.

Furthermore, Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) requires an appellant’s brief to' have a Statement of Facts section that “shall describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for. review....” This rule also re-' quires' that the facts be in narrative form and supported by citations to the record on appeal or the appellant’s appendix. Gar-rard’s facts, however, are not in a narrative format and do not include relevant citations to his appendix. More troubling is that Garrard’s facts section contains argument and unsupported accusations against the trial court judge, such as (1) “Judge Tavitas committed perjury, relevant to the to her [sic] falsified court order of September 1, 2011[;]” (2) the trial court “set forth absolute ‘outright lies’” in its final judgment against Garrard; (3) “it appears obvious that Judge Tavitas lied and committed perjury in the process, a sign of unbridled corruption by a sitting judge, validating [Garrard’s] assertions that Judge Tavitas is both biased, partial, and prejudiced.” Garrard’s Br. at 7, 8, 9. Finally, in his facts section, Garrard sets forth allegations, which are derogatory in nature, against this Court in relation to his prior appeal: “This denial of [Garrard’s] first appeal appears to set forth the abject bias and prejudice exhibited by the sitting judges of the Court of Appeals, towards pro-se litigants.” Id. at 5.

Garrard also violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) by failing to support his bare assertions of error with cogent argument or relevant citations to the record on appeal or legal authority. A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record. See Ramsey, 789 N.E.2d at 490; see also Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (“It is well settled that we will not consider an appellant’s assertion on appeal when he has not presented cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record as required by the rules.”).

Garrard’s lack of cogent argument impedes our ability to provide meaningful appellate review of any of his apparent issues. For example, Garrard generally alleges that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against him but makes absolutely no cogent argument to show how the trial court erred. Moreover, he utterly fails to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Additionally, Garrard seems to suggest that the trial court erred by denying discovery and by not allowing him to submit evidence, but he does not specify or point to the record to show what discovery was denied or what evidence he sought to submit. Finally, in relation to Garrard’s allegation that the trial court committed fraud by entering an order specifying the date that Teibel and Grimmer’s counsel filed their proposed summary judgment orders, Garrard fails to provide any cogent argument showing that the trial court erred in its order. Furthermore, he does not explain how the trial court’s order regarding the date that a party’s proposed summary judgment orders were filed affects the trial court’s ultimate decision to grant summary judgment.

Finally, we note that Garrard’s argument section is also rife with unsupported accusations and derogatory comments against opposing counsel, the trial judge, and the trial bench as a whole. For example, he accuses the trial court judge and Teibel and Grimmer’s attorney of committing fraud upon the court by engaging in “collusion, conspiracy, perjury, and falsification of orders of the court[,]” Garrard’s Br. at 23, and he calls the judges in Northwest Indiana “corrupt” and asserts that they are a “pitiful and despicable group[.]” Id. at 45. We warn Garrard that “we do not look favorably upon disparaging and disrespectful language in briefs with regard to this Court or the trial courts of this state.” Small v. Centocor, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 22, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

Here, Garrard’s noncompliance with the Appellate Rules — most notably his failure to provide cogent argument — substantially impedes us from reaching the. merits of this appeal. Thus, we find that he has waived all issues in this appeal. See, e.g., Ramsey, 789 N.E.2d 486 (holding that the appellant’s substantial noncompliance with rules of appellate procedure resulted in waiver of his claims on appeal). See also Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 345 (finding that appellant waived summary judgment challenge where his unsupported assertions were “too poorly developed to be understood”).

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.

      . Lindsay did not file a brief in this appeal. However, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of record in the trial court shall be a party on appeal.

      . Judge Diane Kavadias Schneider was appointed special judge in September 2007. She presided over the case until April 2009 when she recused.

      . Evelyn died on January 31, 2009. Sometime thereafter, Teibel, as personal representative, opened the Estate for Evelyn. Garrard has not included a copy of the chronological case summary ("CCS") or the underlying pleadings from the Estate case in the record before us.

      . Judge Calvin Hawkins presided over the summary judgment hearing and issued the summary judgment order.

      . In Count IV, Teibel and Grimmer asserted a claim of fraudulent transfer of the marital residence in violation of the Fraudulent Transfer Act, and in Count V, they asserted a claim of fraud and sought treble damages and attorney fees under the Crime Victim Compensation Act.

      . From the record before us, it appears that Garrard filed the following claims against the Estate: (1) spousal claims, including a surviving spouse allowance and a distribution to the second childless spouse; (2) funeral expenses; and (3) attorney fees for being attorney-in-fact. Again, neither the CCS nor any pleadings from the Estate case have been included in the record on appeal.

      . Garrard also failed to include a copy of Teibel and Glimmer’s summary judgment motions in his Appellant’s Appendix. However, Teibel and Grimmer filed an Appellees’ Appendix and included copies of their summary judgment motions.

      . Garrard has not included a copy of these motions in his Appellant's Appendix.

      . We note that Teibel and Grimmer's Appel-lees’ Appendix contains highlighted portions of the CCS. We are unaware of who highlighted the appendix, but we discourage such a practice.

      . Garrard did not include a copy of the trial court’s contempt order in his Appellant’s Appendix.

      . Garrard did not include a copy of either motion to correct error in his Appellant’s Appendix. He did, however, attach a file-stamped copy of both motions to his-Appellant's Case Summary. Teibel and Grimmer argue that Garrard did not file a motion to correct error from the summary judgment order on their counterclaim. Given the file-stamped copies of the two motions to correct error and the trial court’s entry in the CCS indicating that it denied "Motions to Correct Error filed by Garrard[,]” we cannot agree. (Teibel & Glimmer's App. 4).

      . The trial court initially entered an order finding that Garrard’s notices of appeal were untimely and that the clerk or court reporter did not need to prepare a record or transcript. Shortly thereafter, the trial court vacated that order.

      .In his Reply Brief, Garrard suggests that he is appealing the monetary judgment entered on November 21, 2011. Because he did not file a notice of appeal from this judgment within thirty days of the trial court’s order, he has forfeited his right to appeal that judgment. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A). See also Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind.2005) ("The law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant’s initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived.”).

      . His challenge to the alleged denial of discovery would also be waived because Garrard admits that he already unsuccessfully raised this issue in his prior appeal.

      . Indeed, ‘'[t]he use of impertinent, intemperate, scandalous, or vituperative language in an appellate brief opens it to being stricken by this court.” Hoosier Outdoor Adver. Corp. v. RBL Mgmt., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: VAIDIK, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Samuel G. DYKSTRA and Michelle L. Bahus, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF HAMMOND, Appellee-Defendant.
    No. 45A03-1206-PL-287.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    March 15, 2013.
    Ordered Published April 3, 2013.

      Guy A. Relford, The Law Offices of Guy A. Relford, Carmel, IN, Kirk S. Freeman, The Law Office of Kirk Freeman, Lafayette, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
    David C. Jensen, John M. McCrum, Brian R. Dehem, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, IN, Kevin C. Smith, Smith Ser-sic Munster, IN, Adam J. Sedia, Rubino, Ruman, Crosmer & Polen Dyer, IN, Shana D. Levinson, Levinson & Levinson, Mer-rillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge.

Case Summary

Samuel G. Dykstra and Michelle L. Ba-hus appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Hammond. They contend that the Hammond Ordinances regulating firearms that are at issue violate Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-2 and “adversely affect” them as individuals who possess licenses to carry a handgun and others similarly situated, so summary judgment in favor of the City was erroneous. We find that Dykstra, Bahus, and others similarly situated have not been adversely affected because the City of Hammond has not adopted or enforced an ordinance that is in violation of the state law. We therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The Hammond Municipal Code contains four ordinances that were in effect before July 1, 2011, that regulated firearms, ammunition and or/firearm accessories: Hammond Ordinance Numbers 92.03, 93.020, 99.28, and 132.073 (“the Ordinances”). Indiana Code Section 35-47-11.1-2, however, went into effect on July 1, 2011, and states:

Except as provided in section 4 of this chapter, a political subdivision may not regulate:
(1) firearms, ammunition, and firearm accessories;
(2) the ownership, possession, carrying, transportation, registration, transfer, and storage of firearms, ammunition, and firearm accessories; and
(3) commerce in and taxation of firearms, firearm ammunition, and firearm accessories.

On August 22, 2011, at a meeting of the Hammond Common Council, an ordinance was considered that would have amended at least Hammond Ordinance Number 132.073 to bring it into compliance with Indiana Code section 35^7-11.1-2. The mayor of Hammond opposed the amendment. City Attorney Kristina Kantar advised the mayor that she had received notice that the city needed to change its laws that were contrary to State law; the city “laws were [not just] superseded, it made it the affirmative duty of all municipalities with an ordinance in conflict to repeal or amend.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. However, the mayor indicated that he would unilaterally defeat the proposed ordinance if it passed. The ordinance was eventually defeated, leaving the Ordinances that were in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-2 a part of the Hammond Municipal Code.

On August 29, 2011, Dykstra and Bahus (“Firearm Owners”), two residents of Hammond who possess valid Licenses to Carry a Handgun issued by the Indiana State Police, filed a proposed class-action suit against the City of Hammond. On September 7, 2011, the mayor issued an executive order directing that neither the Hammond Police Department nor any other city, employee enforce Hammond Ordinance Number 132.073. Appellant’s App. p. 102. On September 21, 2011, the mayor issued another executive order prohibiting enforcement of any other city regulation that was in violation of either state or federal law. Id. at 103. However, the City of Hammond never officially repealed the Ordinances and they are still a part of the Hammond Municipal Code that is both published to the public and provided on the City’s website.

The Firearm Owners moved for summary judgment on their claim, contending that the City of Hammond was strictly liable for failing to repeal the ordinances that were in violation of state law. The City responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the state law voided and superseded the ordinances, making any obligation to repeal the ordinances moot. The trial court held a hearing and entered summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the state law had invalidated the ordinances so the Firearm Owners had no claim.

The Firearm Owners now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

The Firearm Owners contend that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the City of Hammond.

When reviewing the entry or denial of summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ind.2009). All facts established by the designated evidence, and all reasonable inferences from them, are to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Naugle v. Beech Grove City Sch., 864 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind.2007).

The Firearm Owners argue that Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-5 provides them with a cause of action in this case. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo. In re Guardianship of E.N., 877 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ind.2007). We first examine whether the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. City of Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind.2007). If it is, we will not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be given ■ their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings. Id. However, when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and open to judicial construction. Id. It is -a well-established rule of statutory construction that we will attempt to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and, to that end, we read provisions of a statute together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. Id. We presume that a statute was to be applied in a logical manner. See State v. Hensley, 716 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied.

Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-5 states:

A person adversely affected by an ordinance, a measure, an enactment, a rule, or a policy adopted or enforced by a political subdivision that violates this chapter may file an action in a court with competent jurisdiction against the political subdivision for:
(1) declarative and injunctive relief; and
(2) actual and consequential damages attributable to the violation.

The Firearm Owners contend that they and others similarly situated have been “adversely affected” by the Ordinances because they are still present in the Hammond Municipal Code and they therefore are being subjected to them. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. We disagree.

Looking at the plain language of the statute, a person can only bring a cause of action if he has been adversely affected by the adoption or enforcement of an ordinance. However, Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-3 explicitly states that “any provision of an ordinance, measure, enactment, rule or policy or exercise of proprietary authority of a political subdivision ... enacted or undertaken before, on, or after June 30, 2011 ... is void.” Therefore, regardless of whether the Ordinances were still in the Hammond Municipal Code, they became void upon the effective date of Indiana Code chapter 35-47-11.1. An individual cannot be adversely affected by a void ordinance, because by its very nature, a void ordinance is “[o]f no legal effect; null.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004).

Additionally, even if the Ordinances were not rendered void by Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-3, “[t]he general rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be given prospective effect only, unless the legislature unambiguously and unequivocally intended retrospective effect as well.” Ind. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Judd, 554 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). In this case, the Firearm Owners have not designated any evidence that indicates that the legislature intended that this statute have any retrospective effect. We therefore find that the statute was meant to prevent the adoption of future ordinances that may conflict with state law and to prevent the future enforcement of statutes that were in place at the time Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-2 was adopted.

The Ordinances were in effect before July 1, 2011, indicating that the City of Hammond could not have adopted the Ordinances at a time in which they would be in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-2. The Firearm Owners have also failed to designate any evidence that the City of Hammond made any attempt to enforce the void ordinances; on the contrary, the only evidence presented was that the mayor issued two executive orders prohibiting the enforcement of the void ordinances. Appellant’s App. p. 102-03. Therefore, the Firearm Owners have not shown that they have been “adversely affected by an ordinance ... adopted or enforced” in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-11.1-2, so they have failed to show that they have any valid claim under Indiana Code section 35^47-11.1-5.

We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Firearm Owners’ motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Hammond.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.


author: NAJAM, Judge.

text:
    Detona SARGENT, Appellant-Respondent, and One 1996 Buick, VIN 1G4AG55M3T6449095, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
    No. 49A02-1209-MI-708.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    April 8, 2013.

      Andrew A. Ault, Jay Chaudhary, Indiana Legal Services, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, John E. Brengle, Indiana Legal Services, Inc., New Albany, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kathy Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Detona Sargent appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the State of Indiana, the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (collectively referred to as “the State”), on the State’s request that Sargent’s vehicle be forfeited pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-24-l-l(a)(l)(B). Sargent raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether there was a sufficient nexus between the underlying crime and the seized property; and
2. Whether either Indiana’s statutory bankruptcy exemptions or Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution required the trial court to exempt Sargent’s vehicle from forfeiture.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September of 2011, Sargent worked at a Wal-Mart returns center. On September 16, she drove her 1996 Buick to work. Thereafter, she allowed a co-worker to borrow her car while Sargent was working on the condition that the co-worker returned in time for Sargent to drive home.

Five minutes before it was time for her to leave, Sargent grabbed four iPhones and concealed, them under her shirt. She then attempted to leave. She was immediately stopped and searched. During her ensuing questioning, Sargent told her manager “to go outside to make sure that[,] if [her co-worker] was [in Sargent’s car] waiting, she should stop waiting and go home because [Sargent] would not be coming out.” Appellant’s App.. at 16. Officer Shane Foley of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Pólice Department had Sargent’s vehicle towed and placed on forfeiture hold. Sargent was eventually convicted of theft, as a Class D felony.

On November 22, 2011, the State filed a complaint seeking the forfeiture of Sargent’s vehicle pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-24-l-l(a)(l)(B). Thereafter, the State filed a motion for summary judgment on its complaint. Sargent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in April of 2012, in which she asserted that her vehicle was exempt from Indiana’s forfeiture laws. After a hearing, the court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied Sargent’s cross-motion. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

Our standard of review for summary judgment appeals is well established:

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those facts that the parties designated to the trial, court, we must determine whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the moving party is entitled to a judgment a matter of law.” In answering these questions, the reviewing court construes all factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolves all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and once the movant satisfies the burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind.2009) (citations omitted). Where, as here, the facts are undisputed and the issues presented are pure questions of law, we review the matter de novo. Crum v. City of Terre Haute ex rel. Dep’t of Redev., 812 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

Issue One: Sufficient Nexus

We first consider Sargent’s assertion that the forfeiture of her vehicle was without a sufficient nexus to her theft. The State seized Sargent’s vehicle pursuant to the following statutory language:

The following may be seized: (1) All vehicles ... if they are used or are intended for use by the person ... in possession of them to transport ... the following: ... (B) Any stolen ... property ... if the retail or repurchase value of that property is [$100] or more.”

Ind.Code § 34-24-1-1(a)(1)(B); see also I.C. § 34-24-1-4 (providing for the forfeiture of lawfully seized property).

As our supreme court has explained:

Serving more than a punitive purpose, civil forfeiture proceedings advance diverse legislative interests — while punishing and deterring those who have engaged in illegal drug activity, forfeiture simultaneously advances other non-punitive, remedial legislative goals. First, forfeiture creates an economic disincentive to engage in future illegal acts. It also serves another significant, albeit secondary, purpose.. Forfeiture advances our Legislature’s intent to minimize taxation by permitting law enforcement agencies, via the sale of property seized, to defray some of the expense incurred in the battle against drug dealing. ...

Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 347-48 (Ind.1995).

“[I]n order for a forfeiture action to succeed, the government must show a nexus between the use of the property sought in forfeiture and the underlying [offense].” Id. at 348. However,

a substantial connection is not required between the property and the related drug offense for forfeiture of property under the federal forfeiture statute. Instead, the government must only demonstrate that the nexus between the property sought in forfeiture and the underlying offense is more than incidental or fortuitous. Our statute, similarly, requires more than an incidental or fortuitous connection between the property and the underlying offense.

Id. at 348-49 (discussing United States v. Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.1990)) (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). “The State need only show the facts supporting forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 348.

Sargent argues that the connection between her theft and her car is merely incidental or fortuitous. Specifically, she states as follows:

Sargent had not planned anything in advance, did not use her car to carry away the goods she attempted to steal, and it was her only intent, at the time of the attempted theft, to carry the property out of her workplace without getting caught. Because Sargent never got close to achieving her objective, that is, leaving her workplace with the concealed goods without getting caught, she never arrived at the point of considering what she would do if she successfully left the building with the concealed items.

Appellant’s Br. at 16 (citation omitted).

We are not persuaded. The undisputed evidence shows that Sargent intended to leave her workplace in her car following the theft. She drove her car to work, and she allowed a co-worker to borrow her car on the express condition that the co-worker return in time for Sargent to leave. As such, there is a clear nexus between Sargent’s theft of the four iPhones and her car, which she intended for use to transport the stolen goods. That Sargent’s attempted theft was not successful is irrelevant to the State’s lawful seizure of the vehicle.

Neither are we persuaded by Sargent’s assertion that she had to intend to use the vehicle to transport the stolen goods when she first drove her car to work that morning for the seizure to have been lawful. There is no such limitation to the perpetrator’s intent in the statute. Indiana Code Section 34-24-l-l(a)(l)(B) required the State only to show that Sargent’s vehicle was “intended for use” by Sargent to “transport” “stolen ... property.” The State easily met its burden based on the undisputed designated evidence. Accordingly, the State demonstrated a sufficient nexus between Sargent’s vehicle and her underlying offense.

Issue Two: Whether Sargent’s Vehicle was Exempt from Forfeiture

Overview

Sargent also asserts that her vehicle was exempt from forfeiture because she is impoverished. In particular, Sargent relies on Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Code Section 34-55-10-2(c)(2). Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale, for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted; and there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in case of fraud.

As our supreme court has explained:

the American democracy has long struggled with balancing the creditor’s interest in being repaid against the debtor’s interest in leading a self-sufficient, productive life. American bankruptcy laws have typically attempted to protect both the property rights of creditors and society’s interest in allowing a debtor to keep enough property so as not to become a public charge. Though our English common law tradition includes debtors’ prison, from the earliest days of our Republic penal sanctions for failing to satisfy all obligations due were sharply curtailed or abolished altogether. Consistent with this policy, the drafters of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 gave us Article I, Section 22....

Citizens Nat’l Bank of Evansville v. Foster, 668 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (Ind.1996) (footnote omitted).

Article I, Section 22 is implemented in part by Indiana Code Section 34-55-10-2, which is titled, “Bankruptcy exemptions; limitations.” That statute “substitute[s Indiana’s] own set of exemptions for the federal exemption scheme” found in Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522. Id. at 1238 (discussing a predecessor statute to Indiana Code Section 34-55-10-2). Specifically, that statute provides, in relevant part: “The following property of a debtor domiciled in Indiana is exempt: ... tangible personal property of [$8,000].” I.C. § 34-55-10-2(c)(2) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Sargent’s Buick was valued at less than $8,000. We address her argument that Section 34-55-10-2 applies be-, fore turning to Article I, Section 22.

Whether Section 3⅛-55-10-2 Applies

Indiana’s statutory bankruptcy exemptions do not apply to forfeiture proceedings. As we have explained:

Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is reviewed de novo. Ind. Pesticide Rev. Bd. v. Black Diamond Pest & Termite Control Inc., 916 N.E.2d 168, 181 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. De novo review allows us to decide an issue without affording any deference to the trial court’s decision. Id. Our goal in statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. Id. When a statute has not previously been construed, our interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. Id. We review the statute as a whole and presume the legislature intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results. See Curley v. Lake County Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.

State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. Exemption statutes are construed liberally. In re Zumbrun, 626 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ind.1993).

The plain language of Indiana Code Section 34-55-10-2 describes “[b]ankruptcy exemptions” and limits its reach to “a debtor.” As explained by our supreme court, the statute provides a set of bankruptcy exemptions as a substitute to the federal exemptions provided for in the United States Bankruptcy Code. See Citizens Nat’l Bank, 668 N.E.2d at 1238. The forfeiture proceedings from which Sargent appeals were not part of a bankruptcy proceeding, and expanding the reach of those exemptions to proceedings outside the scope of bankruptcy would be contrary to the clear intent of our legislature.

Neither is Sargent a “debtor” within the meaning of Section 34-55-10-2. She asserts that the statute is written broadly enough to capture all judgment debtors and that we are bound to give the statute a liberal application. But, again, “[o]ur goal in statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature.” Prater, 922 N.E.2d at 748. It is clear that the intent of our legislature was to limit Section 34-55-10-2 to debtors in bankruptcy proceedings.

In any event, “a forfeiture action under Ind.Code ch. 34-24-1 is an in rem action,” meaning that it is filed against the property rather than against a person. $100 v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. Thus, Sargent’s argument that Section 34-55-10-2 applies to her because she is a judgment debtor is mistaken. A judgment debtor is a “person against whom a money judgment has been entered but not yet satisfied.” Black’s Law Dictionary 848 (7th ed. 1999). The court’s order on forfeiture is not a money judgment against Sargent.

Accordingly, the statutory bankruptcy exemptions listed in Indiana Code Section 34-55-10-2 do not exempt Sargent’s vehicle from forfeiture.

Article I, Section 22

Sargent also asserts that Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution requires that her vehicle be exempt from forfeiture. Sargent’s argument presents a matter of first impression under Article I, Section 22. As our supreme court has explained:

Questions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by examining the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. In construing the constitution a court should look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. Because the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision, this Court will consider the purpose which induced the adoption[ ] in order that we may ascertain what the particular constitutional provision was designed to prevent.

Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996) (citations and quotations omitted).

Rather than analyzing “the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions,” Sargent instead relies substantially on Minnesota law. We do not find Minnesota law persuasive.

According to the Minnesota Bill of Rights: “A reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined by law.” Minn. Const, art. I, § 12. The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long construed the constitutional language to refer to debts or liabilities of every kind or description, without exception.” Torgelson v. Real Property Known as 17138 880th Ave., Renville County, 749 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn.2008) (quotations omitted). In Tor-gelson, the court held that Minnesota’s statutory exemption of homestead property from the reach of creditors applied to the State’s civil forfeiture proceedings when that property had been used in an illegal drug operation. Id. at 27-28. The court, noting that exemptions should be liberally construed and forfeiture should be strictly construed, reasoned that “[t]he constitutional phrase ‘debt or liability’ is broad, and we see no basis for excluding civil forfeiture from its scope.” Id

The language of the Minnesota Bill of Rights differs materially from Indiana’s. Namely, Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution contains the unqualified requirement that “[a] reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability.” But the corresponding text in Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution is qualified: “The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale, for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted .... ” (Emphases added.)

As our supreme court has explained, the historical context of this language at the time of its drafting and ratification demonstrates that our framers were principally concerned with “balancing the creditor’s interest in being repaid against the debtor’s interest in leading a self-sufficient, productive life.” Citizens Nat’l Bank, 668 N.E.2d at 1239. Indeed, Article I, Section 22 is expressly limited to “debt- or[s].” As explained above, Sargent is not a debtor in these proceedings. Accordingly, Article I, Section 22 does not exempt her vehicle from forfeiture.

Conclusion

In sum, we hold that the State demonstrated a sufficient nexus between the underlying crime and the seized property. We also hold that neither Indiana’s statutory bankruptcy exemptions nor Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution required the trial court to exempt Sargent’s vehicle from forfeiture. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s forfeiture order.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J„ and BARNES, J., concur.

      . The parties address this issue second in their briefs. We consider it first because "courts traditionally foreswear deciding a constitutional question unless no non-constitutional grounds present themselves for resolving the case under consideration." Citizens Nat. Bank of Evansville v. Foster, 668 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind.1996).

      . According to Sargent, the total value of all her property is $7,420, which includes about $1,700 for the 1996 Buick.

      . Sargent makes passing reference to the fact that the debtor in a garnishment order has an Article I, Section 22 right to a reasonable exemption. See Mims v. Commercial Credit Corp., 261 Ind. 591, 595, 307 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1974). The relevance of a garnishment order to a forfeiture order is not clear.

      . The court also acknowledged similar holdings in the courts of Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Illinois, but Sargent concedes on appeal that those jurisdictions "involved statutory and constitutional provisions somewhat different from those in Indiana.” Appellant’s Br. at 14 n. 5.


text:
    David R. MERTZ, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GREENWOOD, Indiana, Appellee-Defendant.
    No. 41A01-1206-MI-286.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    April 12, 2013.

      Edward J. Merchant, Ruekelshaus Kautzman Blackwell, Bemis & Hasbrook, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Rosemary L. Borek, Stephenson Morow & Semler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
   OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

David R. Mertz appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition to reverse the disciplinary action taken against him by the Greenwood Police Merit Commission (“the Commission”) following an evidentia-ry hearing. Mertz presents a single issue for review, namely, whether the Commission was authorized to hear the particular disciplinary matter against Mertz and impose discipline against him.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Mayor of Greenwood appointed Mertz to be Assistant Chief (“Assistant Chief’) of the Greenwood Police Department (“the Department”) on January 1, 2008. Beginning November 2, 2010, Mertz acted as lead investigator in a case involving alleged misconduct by Officer Nicholas Dine. On March 18 the mayor terminated the police chief from that position and removed Mertz from the position of assistant chief. Mertz was subsequently appointed to the rank of Lieutenant in the Department, the rank he had held prior to his appointment as Assistant Chief. As a lieutenant, Mertz worked in a supervisory capacity as shift commander.

At the conclusion of the Dine disciplinary proceedings in early April 2011, the Commission asked a conduct review board to “examine and review the testimony and conduct of some ranking officers regarding their conduct during the investigation and disciplinary proceedings of Nick Dine, one being Lt. David Mertz.” Appellant’s App. at 4. The conduct review board, comprised of Assistant Chief James Ison, Sergeant Russell Crague, and Officer Dan Skeel, reviewed the transcripts from the Dine disciplinary proceedings and concluded that Mertz had violated three rules and regulations in relation to his conduct in the Dine disciplinary proceedings. As a result, on June 27, 2011, Police Chief Richard McQueary filed disciplinary charges against Mertz with the Commission, requesting the Commission to determine whether Mertz should be demoted from the rank of Lieutenant due to his actions while serving as assistant chief and lead investigator in the Dine matter (“the Charges”). In particular, the Charges allege that Mertz committed the following:

Count 1. Violation of Greenwood Police Department Rules and Regulations Established by the Greenwood Board of Public Works and Safety (1979), Rule 2.34 “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer” “(H) Any act or conduct, which is unethical or tends to ridicule, debasement, disrepute, disgrace or degrade another officer, the department, or otherwise creates disrespect from other officers.”
Count 2. Violation of Greenwood Police Department Rules and Regulations Established by the Greenwood Board of Public Works and Safety (1979), Rule 4.14 “Harmony and Cooperation”
“Employees shall conduct themselves in a manner that will foster the greatest harmony and cooperation between each other, other sections of the department and between other police agencies.”
Count 3. Violation of Greenwood Police Department Rules and Regulations Established by the Greenwood Board of Public Works and Safety (1979), Rule 4.50 “Court Cases and Attendance”
“Employees shall not take part or be concerned either directly or indirectly in making or negotiating any compromise or arrangement for any person with a view of permitting such a person to escape the penalty of law; nor shall they seek to obtain any continuance of any trial in court out of friendship for the defendant or otherwise interfere with the court of justice.”

Id. at 5-6. All of the Charges were based on Mertz’s conduct regarding the Dine disciplinary proceedings.

Mertz filed a motion to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary charges, arguing that the Commission was not authorized to pursue disciplinary charges against Mertz because the conduct on which the Charges were based occurred while he was in the position of Assistant Chief. In support, Mertz cited statutes, a local ordinance, and the Greenwood Municipal Code. The Commission held an evi-dentiary hearing on the Charges and the motion to dismiss on November 3, 2011. Following the hearing, the Commission found as follows:

1. On or about June 27th, 2011[,] Richard McQueary, Chief of Police for Greenwood Police Department filed Written Charges against Lieutenant David R. Mertz wherein it was alleged that Lieutenant Mertz violated certain rules and regulations of the Greenwood Police Department and Greenwood Municipal Code.
2. On November 3rd, 2011[,] the Greenwood Merit Commission did conduct a hearing regarding these alleged violations and[,] after due consideration thereof, the Commission[ ] did make certain findings of fact and determinations.
3. Specifically, with regard to Count II of the charges, the Merit Board finds that pursuant to definition 2.1 of the general provisions of the Greenwood Police Department Rules and Regulations, the term “Department” shall mean the Greenwood Police Department and that the Merit Board is not included within this definition[. Therefore the Board finds that Rule 4.14 “Harmony & Cooperation” is not applicable to this matter.
4. As to Count III, the Board further finds that the actions of Lieutenant Mertz, while disturbing to the Merit Commission, do not constitute a technical violation of Rule 4.5 of the Greenwood Police Department Rules & Regulations, “Court Cases and Attendance[,”] for the reason that Section 4.5 is not intended to apply to merit board proceedings but is intended to apply in Courts of Law and under penalty of law.
5. As it relates to Count I of the pending charges, the Board finds that on April 6th and 7th, 2011[,] Lieutenant Mertz was not the Assistant Chief of Police and that he did in fact commit unethical conduct because his actions, by his own admission, were intended to delay and manipulate- the Nicholas Dine disciplinary proceedings until the composition of the Merit Board could change. The Merit Board further finds that a Lieutenant in the Police Department is in a position of authority and that the truth and veracity of Lieutenant Mertz’s testimony at his own disciplinary hearing continued to remain in question and reflect poorly on the Department. Therefore, Lieutenant Mertz has violated Greenwood Police Department Rules and Regulations, Rule 2.34 “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer” in that his actions and conduct tend to’ ridicule, debase, disrepute, disgrace or degrade another officer, the department, or otherwise create disrespect from other officers[.”]
6. The Board finds that Lieutenant Mertz’s Motion to Dismiss the disciplinary charges should be denied.

Id. at 54-55. As a result, the Commission imposed the following discipline: .

A. That for the violation of Count I, “Conduct Unbecoming!,”] Lieutenant Mertz upon his return to active duty shall be suspended for ten (10) days without pay.
B. That Lieutenant Mertz will retain the rank of Lieutenant within the Greenwood Police Department.

Id. at 56.

On December 1, Mertz filed a verified petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision, requesting that the trial court rule that the Commission had lacked authority to hear the disciplinary matter against him and to reverse the Commission’s determination. On April 26, 2012,' the trial court held a hearing on Mertz’s petition, and on May 29 it issued the Order, denying Mertz’s request. The Order provides, in relevant part:

4. Findings of Fact.
a. Mertz was appointed Assistant Chief of Police of the Greenwood Police Department on or about January 1, 2008.
b. During his tenure as Assistant Chief, Mertz served as lead investigator in a misconduct investigation against Officer Nicholas Dine.
c. Mertz was removed from the position of Assistant Chief by the Mayor in March of 2011. His removal as Assistant Chief resulted in him returning to the rank of Lieutenant.
d. The Merit Commission held disciplinary proceedings with regard to Of-, ficer Dine on April 6th and 7th, 2011[,] at which Mertz testified about his own actions during the investigation.
e. At the time of the actions about which he testified, Mertz was Assistant Chief of Police, but at the time of his testimony, he was a Lieutenant with the Police Department serving in a supervisory capacity as shift commander.
f. After his testimony on April 6th and 7th, a Conduct Review Board was convened to review Mertz[’s] own conduct, issued a decision on or about June 6, 2011[,] and forwarded the same to Richard McQueary, Chief of Police for the City of Greenwood. The decision of the Review Board resulted in formal charges against Mertz filed with the Merit Commission by Chief McQueary on June 27, 2011.
g. On November 3, 2011, the Merit Commission heard the charges and issued its Findings of Fact and Judgment. The Merit Commission found that Mertz[ ]
did in fact commit unethical conduct because his actions, by his own admission, were intended to delay and manipulate the Nicholas Dine disciplinary proceedings until the composition of the Merit Board could change. The Merit Board further finds that a Lieutenant in the Police Department is in a position of authority and that the truth and veracity of Lieutenant Mertz’s testimony at his own disciplinary hearing continued to remain in question and reflect poorly on the Department. Therefore, Lieutenant Mertz has violated Greenwood Police Department Rules and Regulations, Rule 2.34 “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer” in that his actions and conduct tend to ridicule, debase, disrepute, disgrace or degrade another officer, the department, or otherwise create disrespect from other officers!?’]
h. The Merit Commission ordered that “Lieutenant Mertz upon his return to active duty shall be suspended for (10) days without pay.” Exhibit E to Mertz’[s] Petition for Judicial Review.
5. Conclusions.
a. Authority of the Court to conduct a Judicial Review of the Merit Commission action.
i. Indiana Code [S]ection 36-8-3.5-18(a) governs judicial review of merit commission decisions and provides that “[a] member who is aggrieved by a decision of the commission to suspend him for a period greater than ten (10) calendar days, demote him, or dismiss him may appeal to the circuit or superi- or court of the county in which the unit is located.”
ii. Though Mertz argues that his 10[-]day suspension was applied to “the next ten (10) days the department had scheduled Mertz to work”[ 1 there is no indication of such application in the Findings and Judgment of the Merit Commission issued on November 3, 2011.
iii. However, if the suspension was, in fact, applied to the next 10 working days and the period from the first day of suspension to the last day of suspension was more than 10 calendar days, the court would have jurisdiction to review the Merit Commission action!1
b. Authority of the Merit Commission
i. According to Greenwood Common Council Ordinance No. 93-3 Section 14-27(k) and the Greenwood Municipal Code (1993) Article 12 Section 6-386(k), the city of Greenwood Police Merit Commission may take disciplinary action, including suspension, against any police officer except the Chief or Assistant Chief.
ii. The Mayor has exclusive authority to appoint and remove the Police Chief and Assistant Police Chief. I.C. 36-8-3.5-11.
iii. Once removed by the Mayor, the member is appointed to the rank held at the time of the appointment (or a higher rank if promoted while serving as Chief or Assistant Chief) and is subject to discipline by the Merit Commission.
iv. Though the actions for which Mertz was disciplined occurred primarily while he was Assistant Chief, the nature of Mertz[’s] actions was determined, at the earliest, by the Conduct Review board in June of 2011 well after he had been removed as Assistant Chief.
v. The extent to which his actions could impact Mertz’[s] fitness or ability to serve in the supervisory capacity to which he was appointed as Lieutenant could not have been properly evaluated until the nature of his actions was determined.
vi. Once removed as Assistant Chief, the Merit Commission had the authority to consider disciplinary action against Lieutenant Mertz.
c. Judicial Review.
i. The Court declines to find the Merit Commission’s decision to suspend Lieutenant Mertz willfully unreasonable considering the facts and circumstances revealed by the record presented for review.

Id. at 1-3 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the trial court denied Mertz’s petition for review. Mertz now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Judicial review of administrative decisions is very limited. City of Indianapolis v. Woods, 703 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing City of Greenwood v. Dowler, 492 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (Ind.Ct.App.1986)), trans. denied. Deference is to be given by the reviewing court to the expertise of the administrative body. Id. (citation omitted). Discretionary decisions of administrative bodies, including those of police merit commissions, are entitled to deference absent a showing that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id. Further, review is limited to determining whether the administrative body adhered to proper legal procedure and made a finding based upon substantial evidence in accordance with appropriate constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. at 1090-91. The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body or modify a penalty imposed by that body in a disciplinary action, without a showing that such action was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1091.

Additionally,

the challenging party has the burden of proving that an administrative action was arbitrary and capricious. An arbitrary and capricious decision is one which is patently unreasonable. It is made without consideration of the facts and in total disregard of the circumstances and lacks any basis which might lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence is not to be reweighed by a reviewing court.

Id. (citation omitted). This case involves the construction of a municipal ordinance and a municipal code. When this court construes a municipal ordinance, we apply the rules applicable to statutory construction. City of Jeffersonville v. Hallmark at Jeffersonville, L.P., 937 N.E.2d 402, 406 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing City of Indianapolis v. Campbell, 792 N.E.2d 620, 624 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)), trans. denied. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the statute’s drafters. Id. (citation omitted). The best evidence of that intent is the language of the statute, and all words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by the statute. Id. (citation omitted).

The Johnson Superior Court initially reviewed the Commission’s decision. We, in turn, review the trial court’s decision which affirmed the Commission.

In order to properly adjudge whether the initial review was erroneous, we necessarily look through its decision to consider the validity of the Commission’s determination.[fn] In so doing, we use the same standard which was required to be applied in the initial review, as to those facts and conclusions addressed by the Merit Board.
Footnote: In this regard, our review is unlike the appellate review of an original trial court decision or judgment. In such instance it is the obligation of this tribunal to give deference to the discretionary prerogatives of the trial court. This is particularly so with respect to factual determinations. Haseman v. Orman (1997) Ind., 680 N.E.2d 531; Kennedy v. Kennedy (1997) Ind.App., 688 N.E.2d 1264, trans. denied.

See id.

Mertz contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the Commission had authority to consider disciplinary action against him after he was removed as Assistant Chief for conduct that occurred while he.was Assistant Chief. In support of his contention that the Commission lacked authority in this case, Mertz relies on municipal code provisions and a local ordinance. Specifically, City of Greenwood Municipal Code article 12, section 6-386 and Greenwood Ordinance No. 93-3, section 14-27 provide, in relevant part:

(j) Authorization for discipline. Any police officer may be disciplined by the commission for any reason authorized by I.C. 36 — 8—3—4, as amended, by this Ordinance, as amended, or by department rules and regulations existing at the time of the act constituting the alleged offense.
(k) Disciplinary action that may be taken. The commission may take the following disciplinary actions against any police officer except the chief or assistant chief of police:
. (1) Reprimand;
(2) Suspension with or without pay;
(3) Demotion;
(4) Dismissal;
(5) Forfeiture;
(6) Administrative leave[ ]

Appellant’s App. at 69, 83 (emphasis added).

Mertz contends that the Commission lacked authority to discipline him because his discipline was based on conduct which occurred while he was Assistant Chief of the Department. In support he points out that the Assistant Chief of the Department serves at the pleasure of the mayor. And he relies on City of Greenwood Municipal Code article 12, section 6-386 and Greenwood Ordinance No. 93-3, section 14-27, which provide that the Commission may not take any of the enumerated disciplinary actions against a chief or assistant chief of police. These provisions also refer to the “rules and regulations existing at the time of the act constituting the alleged offense.” Greenwood, Inc., Municipal Code art. 12, § 6-386(j), Greenwood, Ind., Ordinance No. 93-3, § 14-27(j). Mertz construes these provisions to mean categorically that the Commission lacks authority to discipline an officer for conduct committed while he was serving as chief or assistant chief of police. We cannot agree.

First, the plain language of the municipal code and ordinance does not squarely address the question before us. In other words, the municipal code and the ordinance are silent as to whether a chief or assistant chief can be disciplined for conduct that occurred while holding one of those offices. But while the chief of police and the assistant chief serve at the pleasure of the mayor, they remain police officers subject to the same professional standards as other police officers. Greenwood Municipal Code article 12, section 6-386 and Greenwood Ordinance No. 93-3, section 14-27 provide that “any police officer may be disciplined for any reason authorized by [Indiana Code Section 36-8-3^1], as amended, by this Ordinance, as amended, or by department rules and regulations existing at the time of the act constituting the alleged offense.”

Mertz was at all relevant times a police officer, and, as such, he was subject to the same professional standards as other police officers. And, at the time of his disciplinary proceedings, Mertz was neither a chief nor assistant chief of police, and the Commission applied the statute, ordinances, and department rules and regulations that were in effect at the time of his conduct. Mertz proposes that we interpret the municipal code and ordinance to prohibit any discipline by the Commission for misconduct by a chief or assistant chief of police. But such an interpretation is untenable because it would undermine the entire command structure. Under Mertz’s interpretation, superior officers would not be subject to the same professional standards and rules of conduct as the officers whom they command.

Moreover, under Mertz’s construction of the municipal code and ordinance, the' chief and assistant chief of police would be im.mune from liability except for removal from office by the appointing authority. For example, if a mayor reduced a chief or assistant chief to the rank of a “regular member” of the police department but imposed no other discipline, then such an officer might well escape any further accountability for the offense. Mertz’s interpretation would lead to absurd results. See City of Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind.2007) (“we do not presume that the Legislature intended language used in a statute to be applied ... to bring about an unjust or absurd result.”); Curley v. Lake County Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied.

We find an analogous situation in our state constitution relating to whether state legislators are subject to prosecution for criminal offenses. Specifically,

Senators and Representatives, in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest, during the session of the General Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same; and shall not be subject to any civil process, during the session of the General Assembly, nor during the fifteen days next before the commencement thereof. For any speech or debate in either House, a member shall not be questioned in any other place.

Ind. Const, art. 4, § 8. In other words, during the legislative session, state legislators are exempt from prosecution for all offenses except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. However, once the legislative session has ended, the legislators are no longer immune from prosecution. Similarly, here, the chief and assistant chief of the Greenwood Police Department are immune from discipline by the Commission while they serve in those offices. But, again, they are at all times police officers. And in the event they are demoted from chief or assistant chief, their immunity from discipline by the Commission, granted by the municipal code and ordinance, no longer exists.

We must reconcile two provisions in apparent conflict with each other. First, again, the City of Greenwood Municipal Code article 12, section 6-386{j) and Greenwood Ordinance No. 93-3, section 14-27(j) provide that any police officer may be disciplined by the Commission for any reason authorized by statute, ordinance, or department rules and regulations existing at the time of the act constituting the alleged offense. But subsection (k) of both the municipal code and the ordinance provides that “any police officer except the chief or assistant chief of police” may be reprimanded, suspended, demoted, dismissed, forfeited, or placed on administrative leave. Appellant’s App. at 69, 83 (emphasis added). In construing subsection (k), we must consider not only what it says but also what it does not say. See State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind.2003). The exception is for “the chief or assistant chief of police,” which speaks to the present. The words “former chief’ or “former assistant chief’ or the equivalent do not appear in the text of the code or ordinance. In construing an ordinance, we cannot supply missing terms. See Uhlman v. Panares, 908 N.E.2d 650, 657 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Those ordinances do not provide that a police officer serving as either chief or assistant chief when the act constituting the alleged offense occurs is immune from discipline by the Commission at a later date. Subsection (k) is an exception to the Commission’s general authority to discipline any police officer and, as such, should be strictly construed. See Robinson v. Indiana University, 659 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding exceptions to a statute should be strictly construed), trans. denied. The burden of proving the exception is upon the party claiming it. Id. Thus, Mertz appeals from a negative judgment on this issue. Subsection (k) does not by its terms grant an absolute, durable immunity that survives when an officer is no longer chief or assistant chief of police, and Mertz has not shown otherwise.

When two provisions are in apparent conflict, we must construe them harmoniously if reasonably possible. See Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ind.2010). Mertz contends that the exception nullifies in perpetuity the Commission’s general authority under the Greenwood Municipal Code and the ordinance to discipline a police officer if the conduct in question occurred while the officer was also the chief or assistant chief. Instead, we conclude that the purpose of the exception is to prevent the Commission from interfering with the mayor’s executive authority over the police department which the may- or exercises through his appointments of the chief and assistant chief. Here, the Commission did not interfere with the mayor’s authority over administration of the police department because Mertz was no longer assistant chief when the Commission considered the disciplinary charges against him. Thus, we hold that the exception is not absolute but suspends the Commission’s authority to discipline an officer while he holds the appointment as chief or assistant chief. Once the mayor has terminated the appointment or the appointment otherwise ends, the purpose of the exception no longer exists, and the exception no longer applies.

Mertz has not met his burden to show that the trial court determination, upholding the Commission’s interpretation of the relevant ordinances, is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Woods, 703 N.E.2d at 1090. Therefore, Mertz has not met his burden to prevail on appeal, and we affirm the determination of the trial court that the Commission had authority to hear the disciplinary proceeding against Mertz, a former Assistant Chief of the Department, based on conduct that occurred while he was serving as Assistant Chief, and to impose discipline against him.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.

      . Mertz asserts that he was removed from the position of Assistant Chief “[a]s a result of actions taken by [him] while serving as lead investigator” in the Officer Dine matter. Mertz’s citation to the record does not support that assertion but, instead, merely cites the part of the Order that states the date of Mertz’s removal from that position.

      . Mertz cites Indiana Code Section 36-4-4-2, regarding the separation of powers in city government, to show that only the mayor had authority to discipline a chief or assistant chief of police. He also cites Section 36-8-3-4(m), which provides that only the mayor is authorized to discipline a member of the police department who holds an "upper level policy[-]making position.” Appellant's Brief at 8.

      . The quoted portions of the Greenwood Municipal Code and the Greenwood Ordinance are identical except for a footnote in the ordinance. That footnote is not material to this case.

      . The Commission also contends that the Commission had authority to discipline Mertz for his conduct at his own disciplinary hearing after he was removed from office. On these facts we cannot agree because at the hearing in question Mertz was charged only with past misconduct. He was not charged and could not have been charged with conduct that had not yet taken place. As such, the Commission’s finding against the truth and veracity of Mertz’s testimony was a valid credibility determination but did not constitute independent grounds to discipline Mertz in the same proceeding.

      . The parties point to no legal authority to show how and to what extent the mayor may discipline the chief or assistant chief of the Department aside from removing them from office.

      . Mertz makes no argument under Indiana Code Section 36-8-3.5-1 through -23. And this case can be adequately disposed of under the municipal ordinances discussed above. Therefore, we need not consider the question suggested by the City, whether Indiana Code chapter 36-8-3.5 governs merit commission issues in Greenwood.