author: Najam, Judge.

text:
    Jason Michael GIBSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-743
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED October 2, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Amy D. Griner, Mishawaka, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Jason Michael Gibson appeals his convictions for robbery, as a Level 3 felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, as a Level 3 felony, following a jury trial. He presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it entered judgment of conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence his inculpatory statements to law enforcement.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the testimony of an eight-year-old witness.
4. Whether his convictions violate Indiana's prohibition against double jeopardy.
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 29, 2017, Tyshawn Owens was babysitting Talanda Peck's five children at her home in South Bend. Peck was gone overnight, and Owens invited his friends Gibson and Shayla Brazier to spend the night. After Gibson and Brazier left on the morning of May 30, they met with Deangelo Dove and Deziara Parker and discussed robbing Peck's house.

[4] At approximately 11:00 a.m. that morning, Dove entered Peck's house, and within a few minutes someone disabled a video surveillance system at the house. Two of Peck's daughters, including T.O., were in Peck's bedroom when Dove, who had a gun, found them and tied them up using duct tape. At some point, one of the perpetrators used duct tape to tie up Owens. Gibson, Dove, and Parker then stole from the home televisions, a computer, an iPad, a cell phone, a vacuum cleaner, and tennis shoes. A neighbor, Michael Griffin, saw a blue Buick with front-end damage parked in Peck's backyard during the time of the robbery. And Griffin saw that car drive away shortly before Peck's daughters and Owens, who were able to get out of the duct tape bindings, came to his house and told him they had just been robbed. At some point, T.O. went to a nearby store and called police to report the robbery.

[5] Later that evening, Officer Scott Gutierrez with the South Bend Police Department was on patrol when he saw a blue Buick with front-end damage, which he knew matched the description of the car used in the robbery earlier that day. Officer Gutierrez followed the car until it stopped at a gas station, where he initiated a traffic stop. He questioned the female driver, Caprice Guidan, and the passenger, Parker, and he conducted a search of the car. Officer Gutierrez found an ATM card belonging to Dove in the back passenger seat.

[6] In the meantime, Officer James Taylor questioned Gibson at the police station. Gibson told Officer Taylor that he and Dove had made a plan to rob Peck's house, that Dove had committed the robbery, and that the stolen items could be found at Guidan's house. Officers later found several of the stolen items there.

[7] On June 5, 2017, the State charged Gibson with three counts of robbery, as Level 3 felonies. On December 15, the State amended the information to add a fourth count, conspiracy to commit robbery, as a Level 3 felony. And in January 2018, the State moved to amend the three robbery charges "to allege that [Gibson] Aided, Induced, or Caused another person in committing [sic] the robberies against Tyshawn Owens and the two minor children"

on May 30, 2017. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39. The trial court permitted that amendment over Gibson's objection.

[8] At trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of the four counts against Gibson: three counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. And the State and defense counsel addressed all four counts in their opening and closing arguments. The jury found Gibson guilty as charged on all four counts, but the trial court entered judgment of conviction only on one count of robbery, as a Level 3 felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, as a Level 3 felony. The court then sentenced Gibson to fourteen years for robbery and three years for conspiracy to commit robbery, and the court ordered those sentences to be executed and to run consecutively. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery

[9] Gibson first contends that, because the State's amended information filed in January 2018 only referenced the three robbery counts, "he was not charged with [conspiracy to commit robbery] at the time he went to trial" and his conviction on that count "must be vacated." Appellant's Br. at 12. He maintains that he "cannot be convicted of a crime for which he was not charged by the State of Indiana and it would be fundamental error to do so." Id. But the State points out that it did not dismiss the conspiracy to commit robbery charge by its January 2018 amendment, so it was still a "live" charge at the time of trial. We agree with the State.

[10] "In every criminal case, an accused is entitled to clear notice of the charge or charges against which the State summons him to defend." Wright v. State , 658 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ind. 1995) (citing Ind. Const. art 1, § 13 ). "Clear notice serves the dual purposes of allowing an accused to prepare his defense and of protecting him from being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Id. Here, there is no dispute that the State charged Gibson with conspiracy to commit robbery when it amended the information to add that charge in December 2017, and there is no dispute that Gibson had prepared his defense to that charge after clear notice of the charge. And at trial, Gibson argued the conspiracy to commit robbery charge in opening and closing statements, and he proffered a jury instruction on the conspiracy charge.

[11] The only question on appeal is whether, when the State amended the information a second time in January 2018, the conspiracy to commit robbery charge was effectively dismissed or remained a "live" charge against Gibson. We have found no statutory or case law indicating that where, as here, the State amends some but not all charges in an information without any reference to unamended charges previously filed, the amended information effectively dismisses the previously charged but unamended counts. Rather, it appears that an amended information revising fewer than all charges against a defendant only supersedes the previous information as to the amended counts .

[12] We note that the better practice would be to include both the unamended charges and the amended charges in a single, clean charging document before the start of trial so as to avoid the type of confusion presented here. But there is nothing that prohibits what the State did here. Indeed, when the State added the fourth count, conspiracy to commit robbery, by amendment in December 2017, it included only that single count in the amended information. See Appellant's App.

Vol. 2 at 35. Accordingly, when the State amended the three robbery counts in January 2018 and included only those three counts in the second amended information, that procedure was consistent with the manner in which the State amended the information the first time. See id. at 41-42.

[13] In sum, under the facts and circumstances presented here, where Gibson was clearly notified of the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery and prepared and executed a defense to that charge at trial, and where the State did not dismiss the conspiracy charge prior to trial, the trial court's entry of judgment of conviction on that charge was not error, let alone fundamental error.

Issue Two: Inculpatory Statements

[14] Gibson next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence his inculpatory statements to police. Gibson maintains that the State did not "establish a corpus delicti " required to admit those statements at trial. Appellant's Br. at 14. We cannot agree.

[15] In Shinnock v. State , 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017), our Supreme Court explained as follows:

In Indiana, a person may not be convicted of a crime based solely on a nonjudicial confession of guilt. Green v. State , 159 Ind. App. 68, 304 N.E.2d 845, 848 (1973). Rather, independent proof of the corpus delicti is required before the defendant may be convicted upon a nonjudicial confession. Id. Proof of the corpus delicti means "proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone." Walker v. State , 249 Ind. 551, 233 N.E.2d 483, 488 (1968). Thus, admission of a confession requires some independent evidence of commission of the crime charged. Workman v. State , 716 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ind. 1999). The independent evidence need not prove that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely provide an inference that the crime charged was committed. Malinski v. State , 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1086 (Ind. 2003). This inference may be created by circumstantial evidence. Id. The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to prevent the admission of a confession to a crime which never occurred. Hurt v. State , 570 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ind. 1991). The State is not required to prove the corpus delicti by independent evidence prior to the admission of a confession, as long as the totality of independent evidence presented at trial establishes the corpus delicti . McManus v. State , 541 N.E.2d 538, 539-40 (Ind. 1989).

[16] Further, as the State points out,

the State's case may be tested by reference to the corpus delicti in two ways. For the preliminary purpose of determining whether the confession is admissible, the State must present evidence independent of the confession establishing that the specific crime charged was committed by someone. The degree of proof required to establish the corpus delicti for admission of a confession is that amount which would justify the reasonable inference that the specific criminal activity had occurred. It is not necessary to make out a prima facie case as to each element of the offense charged, and the corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
On the other hand, in order to sustain a conviction the corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction, the confession may be considered along with the independent evidence.

Harkrader v. State , 553 N.E.2d 1231, 1232-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).

[17] Here, we cannot discern whether Gibson is challenging one or both types of corpus delicti requirements. In any event, in essence, Gibson contends that, other than his inculpatory statements, there is no evidence that he had made an agreement with Dove to commit the robbery to establish the conspiracy. But T.O. testified that she saw Gibson helping another man steal televisions from the house, and she saw both men going through her mother's jewelry. Gibson and Dove worked together to commit the robbery, which is circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that they had made a plan before they arrived to commit the robbery. See Hickman v. State , 654 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding corpus delicti for conspiracy to commit burglary satisfied where circumstantial evidence showed defendant had committed burglary with others' help). We hold that the corpus delicti rule was satisfied here. In particular, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence Gibson's inculpatory statements to police, and the evidence was sufficient to support Gibson's conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery.

Issue Three: T.O.'s Testimony

[18] Gibson contends that T.O., who was eight years old at the time of trial, was "not a competent witness." Appellant's Br. at 17. Thus, he maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed her to testify. But, while Gibson initially questioned her competency, after the trial court conducted a competency hearing and found her competent, Gibson made no objection to her testimony.

[19] It is well settled that the failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence at trial results in waiver of the error on appeal. Jackson v. State , 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2000). A contemporaneous objection affords the trial court the opportunity to make a final ruling on the matter in the context in which the evidence is introduced. Id. Gibson's failure here results in waiver of appellate review. See, e.g. , Kochersperger v. State , 725 N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding defendant waived issue of child witness' competency for failure to make contemporaneous objection).

Issue Four: Double Jeopardy

[20] Gibson contends that his convictions violate double jeopardy principles. He maintains that, because "[t]here was no independent evidence of any agreement between co-conspirators except Gibson's statements[,]" there is a "reasonable possibility that the jury relied on the same evidence to prove both the conspiracy to commit robbery as to prove the robbery, namely: Gibson's statements." Appellant's Br. at 16. Gibson misunderstands the actual evidence test under Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, and his contention on this issue is without merit.

[21] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution states, "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." In Richardson v. State , 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme Court held that two or more offenses are the "same offense" in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.

[22] Here, Gibson does not contend a violation under the statutory elements test. Instead, he claims that his convictions constitute double jeopardy under the actual evidence test. "The actual evidence test prohibits multiple convictions if there is 'a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense.' " Davis v. State , 770 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Richardson , 717 N.E.2d at 53 ). The actual evidence test "is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense." Spivey v. State , 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002).

[23] A "reasonable possibility" that the trier of fact used the same facts to reach two convictions requires substantially more than a logical possibility. Lee v. State , 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). " '[R]easonable possibility' turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions." Id. Application of this test requires the court to "identify the essential elements of each of the challenged crimes and to evaluate the evidence from the jury's perspective[.]" Spivey , 761 N.E.2d at 832. In determining the facts used by the jury to establish the elements of each offense, we consider the charging information, jury instructions, and arguments of counsel. Lee , 892 N.E.2d at 1234 ; Spivey , 761 N.E.2d at 832 ; Richardson , 717 N.E.2d at 54 n.48.

[24] The State charged Gibson with robbery, as a Level 3 felony, as follows:

On or about May 30, 2017 in St. Joseph County, State of Indiana, Jason Michael Gibson did knowingly aid, induce, or cause another person or persons, including Deangelo Dove, to knowingly take property from another person or the presence of another person, to-wit: T.O., by putting T.O. in fear, while armed with a deadly weapon.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 41. And the State charged Gibson with conspiracy to commit robbery as follows:

On or about May 30, 2017, in St. Joseph County, State of Indiana, JASON MICHAEL GIBSON, with the intent to commit the crime of Armed Robbery, did agree with one or more other persons, including Deangelo Dove, to commit the crime of Armed Robbery by knowingly taking property from the presence of Tyshawn Owens by using or threatening the use of force while armed with a deadly weapon, and that one or more of those other persons did commit an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.

Id. at 35.

[25] At trial, the court instructed the jury in relevant part that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either Gibson or Dove committed the overt act of entering Peck's residence in furtherance of their agreement to prove conspiracy. And in its closing argument, the State directed the jury to the evidence that Dove entered the residence to prove the overt act in support of the conspiracy charge. That evidence has no relation to the evidence supporting the robbery charge, which required only proof that Gibson aided Dove in stealing items from the presence of T.O., which T.O.'s testimony supports. In short, considering the charging information, jury instructions, and arguments of counsel there is no reasonable possibility that the jury used the evidence proving the elements of robbery to also establish the elements of conspiracy to commit robbery. We hold that Gibson's convictions do not violate double jeopardy principles.

Issue Five: Sentencing

[26] Finally, Gibson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. As our Supreme Court has explained,

sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.... So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for abuse of discretion.... An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.
One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence-including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any-but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration , or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Under those circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.

Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007) (emphasis added) (some citations and quotation marks omitted), clarified on reh'g , 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007).

[27] Gibson maintains that "the trial court failed to recognize mitigating factors clearly advanced for consideration[,]" namely, his youth, his cooperation with police in this case, his remorse, his desire to "repay the victims for the property taken," and the undue hardship his incarceration will pose on his daughter. Appellant's Br. at 19-20. However, it is well settled that a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it does not consider a mitigating factor that a defendant does not raise at sentencing. Anglemyer , 868 N.E.2d at 492. The State points out that Gibson did not proffer to the trial court any of the mitigators he outlines in his brief on appeal.

[28] In any event, at sentencing the trial court considered Gibson's youth and remorse, but declined to give them any mitigating weight. It is well settled that a trial court is under no obligation to explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court found it to be insignificant. Sandleben v. State , 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied . Gibson has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Id.

[29] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

      The record does not reveal how officers learned that Gibson was involved in the robbery, but it appears that Owens told officers of Gibson's involvement.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ALTICE, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Michael Eugene RITTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1711-CR-2744
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    Tyree GILBERT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-695
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kenneth MCBRIDE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1705-CR-1050
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    David SPOHN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1026
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Paul Simon PRICE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-23
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    David Alan HALL and Lisa Ann Hall, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. WEST CENTRAL CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-1130
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    Michael L. WILSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-621
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jeremy STREEVAL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-626
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.W. and E.C. (Minor Children) and C.W. (Father) and E.M. (Mother), Appellants-Respondents, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-453
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Daniel L. JONES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-949
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 4, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Rolland R. LADYGA, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-595
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    Christopher L. HOLDERMAN, Appellant, v. Zachary A. LEWIS and West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05-1712-CT-2751
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Christopher M. DILLARD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-CR-3050
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Bennie TRUTH, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1711-PC-2610
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: Mathias, Judge.

text:
    Robert J. ADKINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A04-1711-CR-2643
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 7, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Michael P. Quirk, Quirk & Hunter, P.C., Muncie, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
   Mathias, Judge.

[1] Following a jury trial in Delaware Circuit Court, Robert J. Adkins ("Adkins") was convicted of two counts of Class A felony child molesting and one count of Class D felony disseminating matter harmful to minors. The trial court sentenced Adkins to an aggregate term of forty-two years of incarceration. Adkins appeals and presents three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred by permitting the prosecuting attorney to refer to Adkins's taped statement to the police, in which he admitted to molesting the victim, as a confession;
II. Whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial because a portion of Adkins's taped statement to the police contained a reference to a polygraph examination; and
III. Whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to amend the information charging Adkins with dissemination of matter harmful to minors during trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At the time relevant to this appeal, A.N., who was born in October 2002, was close with her maternal aunt, April ("April"), and her aunt's husband, the defendant Adkins. In 2011, when A.N. was nine years old, she visited Adkins's home on one particular occasion. Adkins showed A.N. a pornographic video on his laptop computer of a man and a woman engaged in sexual intercourse. Adkins then fondled A.N.'s breasts and genital area, inserted his fingers into her vagina, and licked her vagina. He also showed A.N. his penis.

[4] Some time after this incident, Adkins and his wife moved to a different house, which A.N. did not visit very often. But when the Adkinses moved yet again, A.N. resumed her almost weekly visits. Adkins began to tell A.N. that she was "getting so beautiful" and "growing into [her] body[.]" Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 99-100. He also asked A.N. if she was still a virgin and offered her alcohol. He again showed A.N. a pornographic video, this time of two women engaged in sexual activities, on his laptop. On one occasion, A.N. was in her cousin's room watching a movie when Adkins came in and placed his hands on A.N.'s breasts, inserted his finger into her vagina, and licked her vagina.

[5] On another occasion, Adkins offered A.N. alcohol and money in exchange for sex. Adkins told A.N. that he had previously paid another woman for sex. He also told A.N. that if she knew of anyone her age that would be willing to have sex with him in exchange for money, "he could make something happen." Id. at 109. When Adkins and his wife moved to another house, A.N. continued to visit. At this house, Adkins again molested A.N. when she was approximately eleven or twelve years old by placing his fingers on and in her vagina.

[6] In March 2017, A.N. wrote a letter to her girlfriend, who apparently had a bad experience with her own uncle. Regarding this, A.N. wrote:

?

Ex. Vol., Defendant's Ex. A, p. 5 (typographic errors in original). Somehow, this note was misplaced and found by a school guidance counselor, who confronted A.N. regarding the accusations about her uncle. This counselor informed A.N. that the molestation needed to be reported, so A.N. wrote a letter to her mother describing what Adkins had done to her. A.N.'s mother then informed the police.

[7] On April 10, 2017, the police interviewed Adkins. The interrogating officer read Adkins his Miranda rights, and Adkins signed a waiver of his rights. The officer confronted Adkins with A.N.'s accusations, which Adkins initially denied. Adkins admitted that he may have brushed against A.N.'s breasts while wrestling with her. Eventually, however, after several hours of interrogation, Adkins admitted to placing his fingers inside A.N.'s vagina, fondling her breasts, performing oral sex on her, and showing her pornography.

[8] On April 17, 2017, the State charged Adkins with two counts of Class A felony child molesting and one count of Class D felony disseminating of matter harmful to minors. At a pre-trial hearing held on September 18, 2017, the trial court heard arguments on the State's motions in limine. At this same hearing, Adkins made an oral motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State from referring to Adkins's taped statement to the police as a "confession or admission," except during closing argument. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 6. The prosecuting attorney indicated that the State had no objection. Accordingly, the following day, the trial court entered an order that granted the State's motions and also granted Adkins's oral motion regarding the statement to the police, stating in relevant part: "The Court now GRANTS the Defendant's oral Motion in Limine as to referring to the Defendant's statement as a 'confession' or 'admissions' except as to characterizations that the State may make in closing argument." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 59.

[9] A jury trial began on September 25, 2017. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, Adkins moved for a directed verdict on all counts. With regard to the charge of dissemination of matter harmful to minors, Adkins argued that showing pornography on his computer to A.N. did not constitute "disseminating" as set forth in the charging information and the statute it was based on. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 209-10. The State argued that it had met this definition, but nevertheless moved to amend the information to conform with the evidence, i.e., to allege that instead of "disseminat[ing] matter harmful to minors" under Indiana Code section 35-49-3-3(a)(1), Adkins instead "display[ed] matter that is harmful to minors in an area to which minors have visual, auditory, or physical access," under section 35-49-3-3(a)(2). Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 213-14. Adkins objected, claiming that he had based his defense on the original language of the charging information. The trial court took the matter under advisement. The State then filed a written motion to amend the language of the information charging Adkins with dissemination of matter harmful to minors the following day, the last day of trial, which motion the trial court granted.

[10] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Adkins guilty of Class A felony child molesting and of Class D felony disseminating matter harmful to a minor. On November 1, 2017, the trial court sentenced Adkins to concurrent terms of forty years on the Class A felony convictions and to a consecutive term of two years on the Class D felony conviction. Adkins now appeals.

I. Alleged Violations of the Motion in Limine

[11] Adkins first contends that the State repeatedly violated the trial court's motion in limine and that he was prejudiced by this violation. As noted above, the trial court granted Adkins's oral motion in limine prohibiting the State from referring to Adkins's taped statement to the police as a "confession" or "admission" except in closing argument. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 59. On appeal, Adkins claims that the State violated this order "30 times." Appellant's Br. at 10. Adkins, however, fails to cite to any portion of the transcript in which the State or the State's witnesses refer to Adkins's statement as a "confession" or "admission." It is not our role to scour the transcript in search of these alleged violations. See Myers v. State , 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1105 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the court on appeal would not scour the voluminous record to search for support of appellant's contentions), trans. denied .

[12] Our review of the transcript finds little support for Adkins's contentions. To the contrary, our search of the transcript indicates that the only times the words "confession" or "admission" were used were during Adkins's own counsel's questions regarding false confessions and the witnesses' answers in response to these questions. See , e.g. , Tr. Vol. 3, p. 20 (testimony of interrogating officer responding to defense counsel's cross-examination regarding why police did not investigate another individual, "He [Adkins] admitted to the crime, and I had no reason to go talk to [the other individual]."); Id. at 74 (testimony of interrogating officer responding to defense counsel's questions suggesting that officer had already informed Adkins of the substance of the accusations against him, claiming that he had not informed Adkins of specific details, "so if he confess[es] and give[s] me specific details, then he's recalling an incident and not something I told him."); Id. at 81-82 (defense counsel questioning interrogating officer, "In any of your training, did they talk to you about the dangers of false confessions?" and "you don't recall anything about dangers of false confessions during any of [your] trainings[?]" and "So they sent you to a school and they didn't bring anything up about the dangers of false confessions?" and "Are you aware that people falsely confess to things?"); Id. at 82 (interrogating officer's testimony that he was not trained on false confessions and that he tries not to tell suspects specific details "so when they do confess, they - they're not just saying yes or no, they're - they're explaining an actual narrative of an event.").

[13] It appears that neither the prosecuting attorney nor the State's witnesses otherwise mentioned the word "confession" or "admission" until the State's closing argument, which was permitted under the trial court's order on Adkins's motion in limine. Adkins's claim that the State repeatedly violated the court's order on his motion in limine is meritless.

II. Reference to Polygraph Examination

[14] Adkins next argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a portion of his statement to the police which appears to reference hooking Adkins up to a polygraph machine. Questions regarding the admission of evidence are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Harrison v. State , 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied . We therefore review the court's decision on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision regarding the admission of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.

[15] The portion of Adkins's recorded statement at issue is the interrogating officer's statement: "Okay. So is there anything else you think we need to talk about before we hook you up to this machine and go from there?" Tr. Vol. 2, p. 181 (emphasis added). Adkins claims that this was an impermissible reference to a polygraph test and that the trial court should therefore have declared a mistrial.

[16] As this court summarized in Shriner v. State :

In general, a reference to a polygraph examination without an agreement by both parties is inadmissible and grounds for error. Proof of the fact that a polygraph examination was taken or refused is, in the absence of waiver or stipulation, inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. A defendant is prohibited from stating he offered to take a polygraph test[,] and the State is equally prohibited from referring to such a test.

829 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

[17] " 'A mistrial should be granted where the accused, under all the circumstances, has by such trial proof been placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected.' " Id. (quoting Conn v. State , 535 N.E.2d 1176, 1180 (Ind. 1989) ). But "[a] mistrial is an extreme remedy and should only be used when no other curative measure will rectify a situation." Id. We afford great deference to the trial court's decision on whether to grant a mistrial because the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of an event and its impact on the jury, and, on appeal, we review the trial court's decision only for an abuse of this discretion. Id.

[18] Although Adkins claims that the trial court should have declared a mistrial, our review of the record reveals that Adkins never requested a mistrial. When the above-quoted portion of Adkins's recorded statement to the police was played for the jury, Adkins requested that the jury be excused from the courtroom. Adkins's counsel stated, "I'm extremely concerned about what he just said. I thought that was to be taken out." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 182. The prosecuting attorney responded, "Judge, I thought they were all removed. In fact, I didn't hear that listening to it." Id. The trial court then ordered the recorded statement to be replayed, which it was. The trial court asked Adkins's counsel, "So what's the remedy? Do you want me to tell the jury to disregard and not to consider or do you want a mistrial? Do you want some time to think about it and to talk to your client[?]" Id. at 183. Adkins's counsel stated that he would like to take some time to speak with Adkins, and the trial court took a brief recess. When the trial resumed, the trial court resumed playing the recording without objection, and an no further point did Adkins request a mistrial.

[19] Adkins has accordingly forfeited this issue by failing to request a mistrial. See Sherwood v. State , 702 N.E.2d 694, 697 (Ind. 1998) (holding that defendant waived appellate argument that reference to polygraph required mistrial where defendant failed to request a mistrial at trial). Nor does Adkins argue that this brief reference to "hooking" him up to a "machine" constituted fundamental error. And even if he did, we fail to see how this brief reference constituted fundamental error. The State did not refer to a polygraph or otherwise mention the reference to hooking Adkins up to a machine, nor was the matter ever brought up again. See Lay v. State , 659 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind. 1995) (holding that evidence that witness had agreed to take a polygraph examination as a condition of his plea agreement did not constitute fundamental error because the testimony did not imply that the witness had taken a polygraph test, did not reveal any results of a polygraph, and therefore generated minimal prejudice). We therefore reject Adkins's claim that this brief reference requires reversal of his convictions.

III. Amendments to Charging Information

[20] Lastly, Adkins argues that the trial court erred by permitting the State to amend the language of the charging information with regard to the charges of disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The State charged Adkins with this crime as follows: "Robert J. Adkins did knowingly disseminate matter to A.N., a minor, that is harmful to minors, to-wit: Pornography[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 21. As set forth above, at the conclusion of the State's evidence, Adkins moved for a directed verdict on all counts. With regard to the charge of disseminating matter harmful to a minor, Adkins alleged that the evidence adduced by the State-that he showed pornographic videos to A.N.-did not constitute dissemination. Ultimately, the State moved to amend the charge to allege that Adkins "displayed" pornography to A.N. instead of "disseminated" it to her. The trial court granted this motion to amend, and the jury was ultimately instructed that, to convict Adkins of disseminating matter harmful to a minor, the State had to prove that he knowingly "displayed matter to A.N., a minor ... that is harmful to minors, to-wit, pornography ... in an area to which minors have visual, auditory, or physical access." Id. at 111.

[21] Adkins argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to amend the charging information at this late stage. He maintains that there was no evidence that he "disseminated" pornography to A.N. and that he was therefore prejudiced when the State was allowed the amend the charging information to allege that he "displayed" pornography to A.N.

[22] We conclude that Adkins has forfeited this argument. If a defendant believes that an amendment to the charging information is prejudicial, he must request a continuance to further evaluate and prepare his case in light of the amendment. Miller v. State , 753 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ind. 2001) ; Wright v. State , 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104 (Ind. 1997) ; Haak v. State , 695 N.E.2d 944, 951 n.5 (Ind. 1998). Failing to request a continuance results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Wright , 690 N.E.2d at 1104 (citing Haymaker v. State , 667 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ind. 1996) ; Daniel v. State , 526 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. 1988) ). Although Adkins did object to the State's motion to amend the charging information, he did not seek a continuance and therefore failed to preserve this claim of error.

[23] Waiver notwithstanding, Adkins would still not prevail. "A charging information may be amended at various stages of a prosecution, depending on whether the amendment is to the form or to the substance of the original information." Erkins v. State , 13 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ind. 2014). Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(a) provides that an information "may be amended on motion by the prosecuting attorney at any time because of any immaterial defect[.]" Immaterial defects include spelling and grammatical errors, the misjoinder of parties, the failure to state the time or place of the offense where such information is not of the essence of the offense, or "any other defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant." I.C. § 35-34-1-5(a)(1), (2), (7), (9).

[24] In opposition to amendments of form, an information "may be amended in matters of substance ... by the prosecuting attorney, upon giving written notice to the defendant at any time" up to thirty days prior to the omnibus date where the defendant is charged with a felony or "before the commencement of trial" "if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant." I.C. § 35-34-1-5(b)(1) - (2).

[25] The amendment statute further provides, "[u]pon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the trial, permit an amendment to the ... information in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant." I.C. § 35-34-1-5(c). Thus, "[a]n amendment of substance is not permissible after trial has commenced," and after trial has begun, only amendments to fix defects, imperfections, or omission in form are permitted, so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. Blythe v. State , 14 N.E.3d 823, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ; see also Rita v. State , 663 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an information may be amended at any time, before, during, or after trial, so long as the amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant), trans. granted, summarily aff'd in relevant part , 674 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1996).

[26] Whether an amendment to a charging information is a matter of substance or form is a question of law, which we review de novo . Erkins , 13 N.E.3d at 405. "A defendant's substantial rights 'include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights.' " Id. (quoting Gomez v. State , 907 N.E.2d 607, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied ). Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges. Id. at 405-06. An amendment is one of form and not substance if a defense under the original information would be equally available after the amendment and the accused's evidence would apply equally to the information in either form. Bennett v. State , 5 N.E.3d 498, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied . And an amendment is one of substance only if it is essential to making a valid charge of the crime. Id.

[27] Here, Adkins insists that the amendment was one of substance because, under the original language of the information, he had a defense that was not available to him under the amended information, i.e., that he did not "disseminate" pornography to A.N. The statute under which Adkins was charged provides in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) disseminates matter to minors that is harmful to minors;
(2) displays matter that is harmful to minors in an area to which minors have visual, auditory, or physical access, unless each minor is accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
* * *
commits a Class D felony.

Ind. Code § 35-49-3-3(a) (2006). Thus, the amendment changed the subsection under which Adkins was charged from 3(a)(1) to 3(a)(2). Adkins argues that, by amending the charging information to allege that he displayed, as opposed to disseminated, the pornographic video, the State made a substantive change to the charge. We disagree.

[28] Under the original charge, Adkins was alleged to have disseminated pornography to A.N. The probable cause affidavit supporting Adkins's arrest and charges set forth the factual basis of this charge, i.e., that Adkins showed pornographic videos to A.N. Under the amended information, the factual basis for the charge remained the same-that Adkins showed pornographic videos to A.N. Thus, any defense Adkins had to the original charge was equally available under the amended charging information. Indeed, Adkins's defense at trial was to argue that he did not show A.N. pornography, and this defense was still available to him after the amendment to the charging information. Therefore, the amendment was not one of substance, and could be made at any time.

Conclusion

[29] No reversible error occurred when witnesses referred to Adkins's taped statement to the police as a "confession." Not only was this description accurate, most of it was elicited by Adkins's own counsel. The trial court also did not err by failing to declare a mistrial when a portion of Adkins's recorded statement to the police referenced "hooking" Adkins up to "this machine." Adkins did not request a mistrial, and this brief reference did not require a mistrial or otherwise constitute fundamental error. Lastly, the trial court did not err in permitting the State to amend the information charging Adkins with disseminating matter harmful to a minor because the amendment was not one of substance and could therefore by made at any time. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[30] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and May, J., concur.

      The State also charged Adkins with one count of Class D felony dissemination of matter harmful to minors regarding A.N.'s brother. The jury acquitted Adkins on this charge.

      As noted above, the jury acquitted Adkins on the charge of disseminating matter harmful to a minor with regard to A.N.'s brother.

      The word "admit" was used by both defense counsel and the interrogating officer during cross-examination. See id. at 55 (defense counsel asked the interrogating officer whether Adkins, during the interrogation, "did admit that there was pornography on [his computer?]" to which the officer replied, "He did - he did admit to viewing pornography on there."); Id. at 61 (defense counsel asked the officer, "Did it ever dawn on you that he didn't know? He actually is innocent? Or did you at that point think this guy's guilty?" to which the officer answered, "He had already admitted there was something that he didn't want to talk to me about because he didn't want to go to jail."); Id. at 67 (defense counsel asked the officer, "At the 2:39 mark, you cut [Adkins] off and you said, I can get you charged. It doesn't matter what you tell me or not. Was that a true statement?" and the officer responded, "I felt like I had enough since he had already admitted there was something that he didn't want to tell me about because he didn't want to go to jail. I felt that was enough that I could - I could pursue with a probable cause affidavit for his arrest."); Id. at 80 (testimony of interrogating officer during cross-examination that Adkins "admitted" to having an extra-marital affair after initially denying it). Again, all of these questions came during cross-examination by defense counsel.

      And even if the State or the State's witnesses had referred to Adkins's statement to the police as a "confession" or "admission," we fail to see how he would have been harmed thereby. The jury heard the admitted portions of the statement, including Adkins's initial, repeated denials, but also his eventual admission to molesting A.N. and showing her pornography. Referring to the statement as a "confession" or "admission" would not have been inaccurate. See Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84, 91 n.7 (1954) ("A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it."). Nor do we believe it would have been reversible error to refer to Adkins's statement as a confession or admission. See United States v. Hicks , 393 Fed. Appx. 201, 204 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that no error occurred where prosecutor did not characterize the defendant's statements generally as a confession or admission of guilt on a particular charge but instead referred to specific admissions of fact the defendant made to the police, and it was defendant's own counsel who extensively questioned the police about recording "confessions" by witnesses); United States v. Goodlow , 105 F.3d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that prosecutor's reference to defendant's statement to the police as a "confession" was not misconduct where, even though defendant denied use of force or threat of force element, he admitted to the remaining elements of the crime for which he was convicted). Cf. United States v. Morsley , 64 F.3d 907, 912-13 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that prosecutor's reference to defendant's statement, in which he admitted to several aspects of his involvement in a conspiracy but did not formally confess his guilt, was improper).

      As previously noted, the State charged Adkins with two counts of disseminating matter harmful to minors, one involving A.N. and the other involving A.N.'s brother. Because the jury acquitted Adkins on the latter charge, we limit our discussion to the amendment to the former charge.

      This statute was amended effective July 1, 2014 to provide the crime is now a Level 6 felony. We cite to the version of the statute that was in effect at the time Adkins committed the crime.

      Adkins claims that the amended information deprived him of his defense that showing a pornographic video does not constitute "dissemination." But if this tautology were the rule, then any amendment would necessarily constitute a substantive change. For example, in Jones v. State , 863 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), we held that the State's amendment of a charging information one week before trial was one of form, and not of substance, even though the amendment altered the identity of the substance the defendant was alleged to have possessed from cocaine to heroin. The defendant in Jones had a "defense" under the original charging information that was taken away by the change only in the sense that he could no longer argue that the substance he possessed was heroin and not cocaine as originally alleged. But we still held that the State's late amendment did not cause Jones to lose any potential defenses or affect the application of his evidence to the crime charged. Id. Indeed, the discovery provided to Jones made it clear that the substance he was charged with possessing was heroin, not cocaine. Id. at 338-39 ; see also Owens v. State , 263 Ind. 487, 497-98, 333 N.E.2d 745, 750 (1975) (holding that amendment of charging information on day of trial to allege that defendant shot victim with a revolver instead of a shotgun was one of form, not substance, even though defendant would have had a technical defense to original charge in that he did not use a shotgun); Markoff v. State , 553 N.E.2d 194, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that amendment on the day of trial to change the name of the owner of the building in which a burglary occurred was one of form, not substance, even though defendant would have had a technical defense to the original charge in that the building was not owned by the person alleged in the original information).


text:
    Tanner CRIPE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-452
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    T.W., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-292
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.K. (Minor Child), and M.S. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Cause No. 18A-JT-982
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    Steven A. REDINBO, Appellant-Respondent, v. Kristin L. REDINBO, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DC-904
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    A.D., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-127
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Timothy W. SHACKLEFORD, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. D & W FINE PACK, LLC, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-489
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    David RICHMAN and Lynette Gridley, as Trustee of the Hartunian Family Trust (u/d/t dated November 8, 1989), Appellants-Third Party Defendants, v. JPMCC 2006-CIBC14 EADS PARKWAY, LLC, Appellee-Third Party Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-727
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    John J. KENNELLY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-412
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Matter of S.L., a Child Alleged to be a Delinquent Child, Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-1017
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J., Concurs.

text:
    Michael S. DUFFIELD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-213
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   BAKER, J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Tara D. PARHAM, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-004
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: CRONE, J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF N.I. (Minor Child), a Child in Need of Services, and K.R.H. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JC-624
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Reversed and remanded.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J.

text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.H. (Minor Child);
    T.H. (Mother) and J.H. (Father), Appellants-Respondents, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-410
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


author: TAVITAS, J.

text:
    Thomas A. DECOLA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 64A03-1711-CR-2556
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Robert J. PRICE, II, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-607
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    SAIL 22, LLC, Appellant-Defendant, v. OUTDOOR BUSINESS NETWORK, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1707-CC-1627
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In re the Marriage of Jeffrey E. NELSON, Appellant-Respondent, v. Julie A. NELSON, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-248
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    John T. PITCHER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-791
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    Nicole A. BASWELL, Appellant-Respondent, v. Bryan E. BASWELL, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-00401
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Vassil M. MARINOV, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOTIVE, Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1711-SC-2807
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION [M J]
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Derek J. BELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05-1711-CR-2687
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: KA.C., R.W., A.W. and L.C., Minor Children,
    K.C., Mother, Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Guardian Ad Litem.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-646
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 11, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Al SENG, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA-AMERICAN WATER CO., INC., Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CC-43
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J., Concurs.

text:
    Donnell HOWARD, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-344
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J.

text:
    David Paul JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-644
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Dwayne E. GRAY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. PPS OF INDIANA, LLC, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-PL-2799
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHEPARD, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   NAJAM, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: BAILEY, J.

text:
    Calvin MCKELLER, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-570
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    Philip D. HARTSOUGH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-545
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Ricky A. MCQUEEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-121
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brittany L. LOFTIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-934
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Daniel MASON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-240
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed and Remanded.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jermaine Doushion MUNN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-82
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael FRANCIS, et al., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. ACCUBANC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-596
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kurt BRENNEMAN, Appellant, v. Lisa K. BRENNEMAN, et al., Appellees.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1711-DR-2841
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: Bradford, Judge.

text:
    Tricia DENNIS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. R & M CONSTRUCTION, INC. and the Lakes of the Four Seasons Property Owners Association, Inc., Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-425
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 14, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Daniel W. Sherman, Valparaiso, Indiana
    Attorney for Appellee Lakes of the Four Seasons Property Owners Association, Inc.: Brian E. Less, Law Office of Brian E. Less, PC, St. John, Indiana
    MEMORANDUM DECISION

      While counsel for R & M Construction, Inc. filed an appearance, he did not file an appellate brief or otherwise participate in this appeal.

   Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Tricia Dennis owns a home in the Lakes of the Four Seasons subdivision. Dennis claims to have experienced drainage issues after R & M Construction ("R & M") started construction on the lot adjacent to Dennis's property. Dennis filed suit against R & M, the Lakes of the Four Seasons Property Owners Association, Inc. (the "Association"), and a number of other parties. The Association was dismissed from the lawsuit after the trial court found that it did not owe a duty to Dennis. On April 12, 2016, Dennis requested permission to file a second amended complaint in which she sought to amend her claims against the Association and bring the Association back into the lawsuit. The Association objected, arguing that it would suffer undue prejudice if Dennis were granted the requested relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Dennis's request. Dennis argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 13, 2014, Dennis filed suit against the Association asserting negligence and breach of contract claims. The Association filed a motion to dismiss on August 27, 2014, arguing that (1) it did not owe Dennis a duty and (2) Dennis failed to include the restrictive covenants relied on in her breach of contract claim. Dennis responded on September 2, 2014, by filing her first amended complaint to which she attached an unverified copy of the restrictive covenants. The Association renewed its motion to dismiss on September 19, 2014.

[3] On October 27, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Association's motion. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims levied against the Association, stating the following:

The Court has not found any place in the portions of the covenants that have been submitted where there's any obligation on the part of the [Association] to enforce those covenants; they have the power, they may, there's no absolute duty and there's no duty under contract, there's no duty on negligence. So I'll grant the motion to dismiss and the Defendant, [the Association], will be dismissed from this case.

Tr. p. 12. Dennis's motion to correct error was denied on December 16, 2015. She did not appeal either the dismissal of her claims against the Association or the denial of her motion to correct error.

[4] On April 12, 2016, Dennis filed a motion requesting permission to file a second amended complaint. Specifically, she sought to amend her claims against the Association and to bring the Association back into the lawsuit. Dennis relied on two pieces of allegedly newly-discovered evidence in support. The first piece included instructions given by the Association to the contractors building new homes on property falling inside the Association's physical parameters. The instruction highlighted by Dennis reads as follows:

Existing topography of the building lot is to be maintained as nearly as possible. Finished ground elevation of the sides and rear of the lot must meet the level of the adjacent lots not less than two (2) feet within the lot boundaries. The Building Control Committee shall not approve any plans, which adversely affect the drainage form said lot to the adjacent land.

Appellant's App. Vol. IV, p. 21. The second piece included a statement attributed to one of the Association's directors during an October 7, 2013 executive meeting of the Association indicating that the building plan for the home built adjacent to her home should not have been permitted through building control. Dennis asserted that these pieces of evidence bolstered her claim that the Association owed her a duty.

[5] For reasons unclear in the record, the trial court did not conduct a hearing or rule on Dennis's motion. On July 18, 2017, Dennis asked the trial court to set a hearing on her April 12, 2016 motion. The Association filed an objection to Dennis's April 12, 2016 motion on August 1, 2017. The trial court conducted a hearing on December 7, 2017, after which it denied Dennis's request for permission to file a second amended complaint.

Discussion and Decision

[6] At the outset, we note that to the extent that Dennis's appellate arguments can be interpreted as a challenge to the propriety of the trial court's October 27, 2015 dismissal of the Association from the underlying action, such a challenge is untimely. We will therefore limit our review to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Dennis's request for permission to file a second amended complaint.

[7] Dennis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her April 12, 2016 motion. Trial Rule 15(A) allows a party to amend her pleading one time as a matter of course if the request is filed within a certain time frame. After that, a party may amend her pleading "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires." Ind. R. Trial P. 15(A).

Although amendments to pleadings are to be liberally allowed, the trial court retains broad discretion in granting or denying amendments to pleadings. We will reverse only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. We consider whether a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend is an abuse of discretion by evaluating a number of factors, including undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the amendment, and futility of the amendment.

Hilliard v. Jacobs , 927 N.E.2d 393, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

[8] Dennis did not change her theory of recovery or add an additional theory of recovery in the proffered second amended complaint. She merely argues that allegedly newly-discovered evidence, i.e. , the building instructions and the statement during the October 7, 2013 executive meeting, bolsters her claim that the Association owed her a duty.

[9] It has long been "a familiar rule of practice, as applicable to all classes of cases, that a new trial will never be granted on account of newly-discovered evidence where, by the use of reasonable diligence, the newly-discovered evidence might have been obtained and used at the trial sought to be vacated." Allen v. Bond , 112 Ind. 523, 530, 14 N.E. 492, 495 (1887). As far as the Association is concerned, the proceedings were over and the matter had been resolved. Bringing it back into the case would, in effect, subject it to a new trial on the question of duty. As such, pursuant to the rationale of Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Allen , it would be inappropriate to bring the Association back into the lawsuit if the allegedly newly-discovered evidence could have been discovered by the use of reasonable diligence by Dennis before the Association was dismissed from the lawsuit.

[10] Dennis presents no argument that either piece of allegedly newly-discovered evidence could not have been discovered or was not available to her prior to initiation of the lawsuit. She does not dispute the Association's assertion that both the building instructions and the minutes from the executive meeting were available to members of the Association upon request well before the August 13, 2014 filing date. We conclude that Dennis failed to exercise reasonable diligence by not requesting all relevant documents from the Association before initiating the underlying lawsuit. Given that both the building instructions and the minutes of the October 7, 2013 executive meeting were available to and could have been discovered by Dennis prior to initiation of the underlying lawsuit, neither qualifies as newly-discovered evidence sufficient to re-open the case against the Association. It would therefore be inappropriate and unduly prejudicial to allow Dennis another bite at the proverbial apple to prove duty.

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

      The other parties have been dismissed from the lawsuit.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Ivan ARAGON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 09A04-1712-CR-2824
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Charles GERRON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-393
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jamie L. HANCOCK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-180
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.Y. (Minor Child);
    C.Y. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1001
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mauricio PALOMINO, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-324
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Matter of Name Change of Minor Child Justin MORGAN, Appellant, v. Meghan PRICE, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-653
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Nicholas R. HEDRICK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-762
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: D.H., Appellant-Respondent, v. ESKENAZI HEALTH/MIDTOWN MENTAL HEALTH CMHC, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MH-635
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kimberley A. FISHER, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Frederick H. FISHER, III, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-929
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Derek A. SAYLOR, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-528
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed
   MAY, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Christopher D. MCCOY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1022
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of: H.H., A.H., and A.S. (Minor Children) and M.R., Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-790
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lance PRUITT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-224
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Terry Lee SHAW, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-741
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Torrey HUSTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-642
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Wanya Marcellas DUNN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1124
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J., Concurs.

text:
    K.M., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-643
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kyra JACOBS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-554
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF J.I., Child in Need of Services,
    L.I., Mother, Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JC-617
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Sylvanus PAELAY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-387
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Carlos OWENS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-160
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    Searcy T. BOYD Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1108
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Paresh SHAH and Shobhana Shah, Appellants-Defendants-Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee-Plaintiff-Counterclaim Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MF-629
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jalen HUMPHRIES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1115
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Gary HAMITER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-222
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Antwoin RICHMOND, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Keith BUTTS, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-366
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Diego A. PACHECO-MANZO, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-252
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kim TOWNSEND, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1046
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Mark F. JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1709-PC-2265
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Delmar KELLY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1162
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Tracy Ray MELOY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1281
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Shannon GRAVES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1712-CR-2986
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    Chad KRAEMER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-731
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    William E. MORRISON and Sonya Morrison, Appellants-Respondents, v. PUTNAM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Appellees-Petitioners, and Donald Richards, Appellee-Intervenor
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-462
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mark S. LEA, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1128
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Isaiah MORRELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1224
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 21, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Marvin J. PERKINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-702
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Remanded with instructions.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF C.D. and S.D.;
    S.C. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1293
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lloyd BROWN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-469
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jermaine THORNTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 47A01-1706-CR-1266
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael L. ELLIOTT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-284
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Tyler STEFFEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-798
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF D.K.R. (Child) and D.W.R. (Father);
    D.W.R. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-613
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Islom NIYOZOV, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-IF-853
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.K. (Minor Child) and B.S. (Father)
    B.S. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee-Guardian ad Litem
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-944
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael G. TOMERA, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Rachel B. TOMERA, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-587
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

text:
    Kathleen STROHBACH, Appellant-Petitioner, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-1018
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHARPNACK, Sr.J.
    Reversed and remanded.
   MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Robert CURRY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-940
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    J.G., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-1146
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    William Henry COOK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-547
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    James JONES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-41
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Theodore Andrew CARNEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-559
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    RUCKER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Marvin J. PERKINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-754
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: CRONE, J.

text:
    Ricky HILL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-550
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Reversed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J.

text:
    Maynona BLACKMON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MT. ZION APOSTOLIC CHURCH, INC., Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1707-CT-1488
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed and remanded.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    V.P. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Steven Rilenge, and Julie Rilenge, Appellants, (Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs and Third-Party Plaintiff below), v. INTERIOR RENOVATION & DESIGN, INC., and Patricia A. Geisler, Appellees, (Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants and Third-Party Defendant below)
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-CC-2851
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Dissents with separate opinion.


text:
    Marquelle SMITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 82A01-1711-CR-2730
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kevin D. HAMLET, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-142
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Beverly Louise CRATTY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-937
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed and remanded.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: TAVITAS, J.

text:
    Ashley N. GUFFEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-531
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: BAILEY, J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.D. (Minor Child), and G.D. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-837
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MARRIAGE OF ALBERTSON:
    Amanda Albertson, Appellant-Petitioner, v. William Albertson, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-441
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    Fredrick L. MAGEE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-747
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Rasoul WADDY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-640
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Scotty R. IRVIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-856
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Glen A. CARNAHAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-90
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Reversed and remanded.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jerry LEONARD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-436
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Randi SETTO, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-IF-854
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Christopher ALLEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1192
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed September 28, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.