text:
    L.P., by and through his Next Friend, Tenyiah Patterson, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARIAN CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-2856
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued January 18, 2017
    Decided March 29, 2017

      Mary Johanna Grieb, Attorney, Shiller Preyar, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Andrew Kopon, Jr., Attorney, Kopon Airdo LLC, Chicago, IL, D. Faye Caldwell, Attorney, Caldwell Everson PLLC, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and'HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
   WOOD, Chief Judge.

Marian Catholic High School has a policy of subjecting its students to random drug tests. Although it is run by the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago, it receives federal funds to cover the cost of this program. Students who test positive for illegal drugs are subject to a range of sanctions, from counseling to expulsion.

The plaintiffs in this case are seven Marian students who received false positive results in the school-ordered tests. Six of them are African-American, and one is White. They have sued because they believe that the drug-testing program is being run in a way that discriminates against them on the basis of their race, in violation of both the Constitution and various federal statutes. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and later, after plaintiffs passed up the opportunity to file an amended complaint, dismissed the action with prejudice. Our own review of the complaint reveals nothing that would support a claim of racial discrimination or a violation of any of the statutes plaintiffs invoke. We therefore affirm.

I

Because of the procedural posture of the case, the account of the facts that follows takes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Like many high schools, Marian, which is owned and operated by the Dominican Sisters, strives to maintain a drug-free environment for its students. One mechanism it uses is random drug testing. Its methodology involves taking a hair sample from the student to be tested and sending the sample for analysis to a company called Omega Laboratories. Joanna Drackert, a guidance counselor, was responsible for running the program at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. Over the course of a school year, every student at Marian is tested at least once.

Marian is registered with the Illinois State Board of Education and operates in Cook County, Illinois. In connection with its registration, it makes a commitment to comply with all nondiscrimination laws. It also receives various benefits from the state, including recognition of its programs for purposes of participating in interscholastic sports and contests and recognition of its credentials for the purpose of admission to college, post-secondary, training, and military programs. In 2008, Marian was awarded a federal grant of $84,110 for a school-based drug-testing program; in 2009 it received $149,831 for similar purposes; in 2010 it received $84,878; and in 2011 it received $7,233. All students enter into “contracts” with Marian at the time they are admitted; in those contracts, they agree to participate in the drug-testing program. (No one makes anything of these supposed contracts, and so we need not consider whether they are formally binding on minors.)

The first plaintiff, I.J., had a hair test analyzed by Omega in September 2015. The results were positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine. (Benzoylecgonine is the main metabolite of cocaine. See What is benzoylecgonine, Reference, at https:// www.reference.com/health/benzoylecgo nine-811a983d6e2cdadd (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). Most of the Omega tests we describe below revealed both substances, but for the sake of brevity, we refer from this point onward only to cocaine.) Two weeks after providing the sample given to Omega, and just four days after receiving the positive results, I.J. voluntarily underwent a test administered by Dr. Wilburn of Back to Health Chiropractic. The latter test was evaluated by Quest Diagnostics, which found LJ.’s hair and urine to be free of any illegal substances. Although Marian wanted I.J. to undergo further drug tests, it appears that I.J. is still at the school.

On October 26, 2015, plaintiff J.B. was selected for a random drug test. Omega reported that J.B.’s hair had tested positive for cocaine, and so Drackert pulled J.B. out of class on November 5 to inform him of this fact. Drackert questioned J.B. for about an hour about this, and she accused J.B.’s parents of being drug dealers. She also telephoned his parents and told them about the test results. On November 6, he voluntarily submitted to a urine drug test performed by the Franciscan Physician network. That test came back negative for any illegal substances. A few days later, he voluntarily participated in a second test, which was conducted by Dr. Wilburn and evaluated by Quest. The second test confirmed the results of the Franciscan test. Drackert refused to admit that there had been any problem with the Omega results: on November 23, she stopped J.B. in the hallway and announced (within the hearing of others) that he was still a drug user and that the later test results just meant that the substance(s) had worked their way out of his system.

The outcome for plaintiff J.H. was less favorable. J.H. submitted to two hair tests through Marian in the fall of 2014; Omega found that both were positive for cocaine. Another one in January 2015, also ordered by Marian, was positive for cocaine, although apparently at a lower level. J.H. had one final school-ordered test on March 4, 2015, which was also positive. Five days later, Marian required him to withdraw from the school, in accordance with its substance abuse program. On March 23, his hair was evaluated by Quest, in a test administered by Dr. Wilburn; the results came back negative for both substances.

L.P.’s problems began with a complaint from the school about hair style. On October 21, 2014, L.P.’s hair was tested, but Drackert complained to L.P.’s parents that L.P.’s hair style was interfering with the test, and that if L.P. did not change the style, L.P. would need to undergo four additional drug tests over the next six weeks. Once again, tests conducted by Omega returned positive results for cocaine, and outside tests (this time Advocate Healthcare) were negative. In response, Drackert wrote L.P.’s parents informing them about the results and advising them that L.P. and perhaps his family needed to participate in a substance abuse program. The letter warned that any additional positive drug tests could result in L.P.’s dismissal from the school. After the negative test results from Advocate arrived, L.P.’s parents met with Drackert to discuss the inconsistencies between the tests. During the meeting, Drackert insisted that L.P. was using illegal drugs; L.P. denied the charge. L.P.’s parents complained to Marian about Drackert, but to no avail. L.P. underwent further drug testing in 2015. The pattern of positive results from Omega and negative results from Advocate continued, and in late September 2015 L.P. was forced to withdraw from Marian.

Plaintiff C.C. has been tested repeatedly for drugs — an average of three times per year. Before 2016, he had passed nine tests ordered by Marian. C.C.’s earlier tests used hair from his leg; they were negative. On January 25, 2016, however, Marian used a sample of hair from his head. At that time, C.C. was wearing his hair in an “afro” style, and portions of his hair were dyed blond. His mother noticed that an unusually large sample of hair had' been taken. The January test came back from Omega as positive for cocaine, although C.C. did not use cocaine. C.C.’s mother promptly took him to the University of Chicago for a urine drug test, which came back negative for everything. His mother also went with him to Marian to demand a re-test. Both Marian and Quest took samples of his hair on February 9, 2016; the Marian sample came back positive, and the Quest sample came back negative.

The last of the African-American plaintiffs is J.R., who was tested by Omega in October 2014. At the time of that test, he was wearing his hair in dreadlocks. His test came back positive for cocaine, and so the school compelled him to attend drug counseling classes despite his denial of any involvement with that drug. He, too, was retested — in his case by Redwood Toxicology Laboratory — and the result was negative. Drackert nonetheless accused both J.R. and his family of having drugs at home.

The seventh and final plaintiff is Shane Ratkovich, the only White student in the group. Like his fellow classmates, Ratko-vich was given a test and received a false positive from Omega. He followed up with a test from Quest, which was negative. Shortly thereafter, he was tested again by Omega, which again reported positive results (as usual, for cocaine). Without giving Ratkovich an opportunity to contest the Omega results, Marian expelled him from school at the end of his junior year.

After reviewing these allegations carefully, the district court concluded that they did not portray a plausible account of race discrimination. The complaint did not allege that the hair testing had a racially disproportionate impact, either because of anything identifiable about different hair types, or because of differences in technology used or sample processing. It also did not allege that Omega knew the race of the person whose hair it was testing. Moreover, for purposes of the count against Drackert under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court found nothing in the allegations indicating that she was a state actor. The fact that the school receives federal funds did not transform either the school or its employees into state actors. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982). The claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 failed for lack of allegations of intentional discrimination. The court observed that “the varied ways in which Drackert treated positive-testing students suggests that the favorable treatment [referenced in the complaint] was not favorable in any material way and was, in fact, consistent with how African-American students were treated.” It also rejected several other theories and chose to dismiss the supplemental state claims without prejudice.

After the dismissal, the plaintiffs declined the district court’s invitation to amend their complaint, and instead asked for the case to be converted into a dismissal with prejudice, so that they could appeal. The district court granted their request. The plaintiffs now appeal some of their federal law claims.

II

We will discuss the plaintiffs’ claims theory-by-theory, because the facts are not specific to any particular claim. We begin with their effort to state a claim against Omega under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits only intentional discrimination. See Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2006). (Plaintiffs seem to have dropped their Title VI arguments against Omega on appeal, but this is of little importance, as the analysis would be the same as it is for section 1981. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001).) The plaintiffs assert that Omega should have realized that its testing protocols were flawed and were returning false positives, because later tests undergone by the students in question were negative. But this assumes that Omega knew the races of the students whose hair samples it tested, yet the complaint makes no such allegation. Indeed, it does not allege that Omega was told the races corresponding to each sample, or that Marian reported the race in some other way, or even that anyone told Omega when its results produced an alleged false positive.

Even if we assume that Omega was using poor scientific techniques in its testing, that is a far cry from alleging that it was systematically disadvantaging some sample providers on the basis of race. We note as well that the allegations relating to Ratkovich do not help the cases of the six African-American plaintiffs, even though Ratkovich does not seem to be involved in the section 1981 and Title VI counts. Even putting him to one side, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the section 1981 claims against Omega.

Plaintiffs fare no better with their section 1981 and Title VI claims against Drackert, Marian, and the Dominican Sisters. They assert that Drackert’s actions after being informed that the positive test results were erroneous can be viewed as evidence of racial animus. Essentially, they argue that the only possible non-discriminatory reaction Drackert and her employer could have had would have been to accept the results of the new tests on the students in question. But no one disputes that Drackert and her superiors had, at a minimum, conflicting test results that needed to be reconciled. Moreover, plaintiffs suggest nothing in the complaint that would link Drackert’s reactions to race. The fact that she stood by the Omega test results and disparaged the value of later, “clean” tests has no relation to anyone’s race. It suggests only that she had confidence — perhaps unwarranted — in the school’s program and Omega’s testing procedures. There is no allegation that she tended to credit later negative tests for White students, but not for African-American students. The worst one can say is that she made some troubling remarks about the hairstyles and home life of the African-American students. But these remarks were made in the context of explaining why a later test might fail to reflect the presence of a drug (because, she thought, by that time the drug had “worked its way through the system”).

The sole allegation of racially disparate treatment in the complaint has nothing to do with those remarks. The complaint alleges that non-African-American students who tested positive for cocaine “were allowed opportunities to re-test immediately, have hair taken from their legs or other parts of their body (as opposed to their heads) and not immediately sent to drug counseling and/or not expelled from Marian Catholic High School.” But the very same complaint recounts the numerous opportunities to re-test that the African-American students were given, as well as the fact that several of the African-American plaintiffs were referred to counseling rather than being expelled. Finally, it frankly admits that Ratkovich, the White student, was expelled after two positive tests. This is not enough to amount to a plausible allegation that intentional race discrimination lay behind the actions of the school defendants. These claims were thus properly dismissed as well.

Finally, the plaintiffs believe that they have satisfied the generous notice-pleading standard found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, in their allegation that Drackert was a state actor and thus that they can proceed with their section 1983 suit against her.

To state the obvious, Marian Catholic High School is a private, sectarian school, not a public school. Its employees, including Drackert, are thus private actors as well, unless something intervenes to give them “state actor” status. And only if that alchemy is performed can such a private person be found liable under section 1983: “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).

A private person acts under color of state law when she is a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). This requires “evidence of a concerted effort between a state actor and that individual.” Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). The plaintiff must identify a sufficient nexus between the state and the private actor to support a finding that the deprivation committed by the private actor is “fairly attributable to the state.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).

The plaintiffs in this case have alleged no such link between Drackert (or Marian) and the state, even with respect to the drug-testing program. The fact that Marian is registered with the State of Illinois is not enough to transform it into a state actor. The fact that it receives a modest amount of federal money for the drug-testing program does not do the job either. The Supreme Court held in Rendell-Baker that a private school’s receipt of public funding and its duty to comply with state regulations was not enough to make it a state actor. 457 U.S. at 840,102 S.Ct. 2764. In that case, the Court was looking at a private school that received about 90 percent of its funding from the state and federal governments. Id. at 832, 102 S.Ct. 2764. Despite that huge share, the court concluded that the school’s personnel decisions could not fairly be attributed to the state. See id. at 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764. In reaching that conclusion, the Court took four points into account: whether the state funding ordered or encouraged the private action; whether the state contributed to the challenged action; whether the school was performing a “public function”; and whether there was a “symbiotic relationship” between the school and the state. Id. at 840-43,102 S.Ct. 2764.

None of those considerations supports a finding of state action in our case. The funding at issue is federal, not state, funding. Actions on behalf of the federal government might make one a federal actor (though we are not saying such a finding would be warranted here), but that would require an entirely different legal theory. Section 1983 addresses only state action. The State of Illinois is not alleged to have anything to do with Marian’s drug-testing program, and so there is nothing like the symbiotic relationship the Court mentioned in Rendell-Baker. And neither drug testing nor education as a whole falls solely in the province of the state, to the exclusion of private parties. There is nothing in the complaint that would support a finding that Drackert (or Marian or the Sisters) acted with a “badge of authority” from the state. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). The district court was thus correct to dismiss these claims for failure to allege the essential element of state action.

Ill

Drug-testing programs are sensitive, and we readily accept the proposition that errors can creep into test results. But errors alone do not violate the laws against racial discrimination, without some showing that distinctions (usually intentional, but sometimes based on disproportionate impact) based on race explain what is going on. The operative complaint in this case fails to meet this burden, and some aspects of it also fail for want of a state actor. We therefore Affirm the judgment of the district court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: POSNER, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lee Ann PRATHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUN LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.), Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 16-1861
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    March 30, 2017

      Mark D. DeBofsky, Attorney, DeBofsky & Associates, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Edna Sybil Kersting, Attorney, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
   POSNER, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs decedent, Jeremy Prather, was employed by a company that had obtained a Group Insurance Policy from Sun Life which provided accidental death and dismemberment coverage for the company’s employees, in the amount of $92,000 for Prather. The policy limited coverage to “bodily injuries ... that result directly from an accident and independently of all other causes.” The clause we’ve italicized was the focus of an appeal from the district court, which had granted summary judgment for Sun Life, which had invoked the clause to deny the payment of death and dismemberment coverage to Prather’s survivor on the ground that Prather’s death had not been the exclusive result of an accident — it had also been the result of “complications from surgical treatment.” Prather’s widow brought suit “to recover benefits due to [her]” under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).

On July 16, 2013, Prather, age 31, had torn his left Achilles tendon playing basketball. He was operated on to repair the torn tendon six days later. The surgery was uneventful and he was discharged from the hospital the same day. He returned to work and was reported as doing well in a follow-up visit to his surgeon on August 2, but four days later he collapsed at work, went into cardiopulmonary arrest, and died the same day as a result of a deep vein thrombosis (blood clot) in the injured leg that had broken loose and traveled through the bloodstream to a lung, thus becoming a blood clot in the lung— that is, a pulmonary embolism — which caused cardiac arrest and sudden death.

Sun Life’s position was and is that the pulmonary embolism and ensuing death were consequences not of — at least not entirely of — the accident to Prather’s Achilles tendon, but of the surgery, and therefore was not covered by the insurance policy, which as we said covered only “bodily injuries ... that result directly from an accident and independently of all other causes.”- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sun Life, Prather’s widow appealed, and we reversed, see Prather v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 843 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2016). We reasoned that Sun Life had failed to make any plausible showing that the surgery on Prather’s ankle, rather than the accident that necessitated the surgery, had caused his death. We instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff, as in Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1991).

Prather’s widow has now moved us to award her the attorneys’ fees (that is, to order Sun Life to reimburse her for those fees), amounting to $37,170, that she incurred in her successful suit against the insurance company. The suit had been based on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal law that sets minimum standards for certain private pension and health plans, in order to provide financial protection for individuals enrolled in these plans (as Jeremy Prather had been) and their survivors (Prather’s widow, in this case). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). Specifically, she seeks the fees under section 1132(g)(1), which authorizes a court in its discretion to “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party,” provided the party awarded the fee and costs had (the Supreme Court said in Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010)), “achieved some success on the merits.” The plaintiff, Prather’s widow, achieved not some, but complete, success on the merits of her suit. That makes it an easy ease for us to exercise discretion favorably to her, and thus award her her attorneys’ fees and costs.

We are mindful that a number of judicial opinions embrace a “five factor” test for whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs in cases such as this. They are “(1) the degree of the offending parties’ culpability; (2) the degree of the ability of the offending parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether or not an award of attorneys’ fees against the offending parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. Raybourne v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co. of New York, 700 F.3d 1076, 1090 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Jackman Financial Corp. v. Humana Ins. Co., 641 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 2011).

We have no information about factor 4, so let’s forget it. All the other factors (four in number) favor the plaintiff in this case: there is no doubt of Sun Life’s culpability (factor 1), or of its ability to pay without jeopardizing its existence (it is a multibil-lion dollar company) (factor 2); the award of attorneys’ fees against it is likely to give other insurance companies in comparable cases pause (factor 3); and a comparison of the relative merits of the contending parties clearly favors the plaintiff (factor 5). The score is 4 to 0 in favor of the plaintiff. Prather’s widow doesn’t have the big pockets of the insurance company and would have to pay her lawyer out of whatever money she recovered from it. Even though she had a meritorious claim, the insurance company denied it without medical evidence and then put her through all the hoops of litigation. Fee-shifting under ERISA is entirely appropriate for situations like this.

It remains to consider Sun Life’s challenge to the amount of the award of attorneys’ fees ($37,170). We are persuaded by its argument that 3.6 hours of the attorney’s work should be subtracted because they were hours devoted to simple administrative tasks such as preparing the table of contents and appendix of the brief, and formatting the brief; 4.4 hours incurred by failing to delegate portions of the research, drafting, and editing of the brief to a more junior attorney; and 2 hours for preparation for oral argument, which was too much time given the lawyer’s experience in arguing in the courts of appeals. The result of these adjustments is to reduce the number of hours on which the $37,170 fee award is based from 59 to 49, yielding (with a further adjustment, reducing the attorney’s billing rate from $630 to $620, on the ground that the $630 rate reflected an excessive rate increase of 5 percent from his hourly rate of $600 in 2015) a total fee award of $30,380 — which is the amount we award the plaintiff.

So ordered.


author: WOOD, Chief Judge.

text:
    Ivan JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Karen JAIMET, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 15-2577
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued December 6, 2016
    Decided March 30, 2017
    Rehearing Denied May 16, 2017

      Scott J. Fishwick, Attorney, Winston & Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Joshua M. Schneider, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
   WOOD, Chief Judge.

Douglas Keefer’s badly beaten body was found by police in Keefer’s own backyard in Rock Falls, Illinois, the morning of November 27, 2006. A jury convicted Ivan Johnson of Keefer’s murder. While Johnson admits he beat Keefer the night before, in the same backyard, he insists that he did not kill him. Keefer’s actual murderers, Johnson says, were two men with baseball bats who attacked Keefer later that night, in the same spot.

Johnson’s theory apparently came from Dustin Manon, a one-time occupant of the Whiteside County Jail. Manon told police that his cellmate there, Donnie Masini, told him that Masini had hired two men to Mil Keefer with bats and that they did so. Unsurprisingly, Masini denied maMng the statement when police questioned him. The trial court barred Johnson from introducing Masini’s hearsay statement, reasoning that it was too unreliable to allow into evidence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed.

After exhausting other options, Johnson now seeks habeas corpus relief. He argues, as relevant here, that the state court’s exclusion of the hearsay evidence was an unreasonable application of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The district court denied Johnson’s petition, but it granted him a certificate of appealability. We agree with our colleague that the state court’s decision did not run afoul of Chambers and thus that Johnson is not entitled to habeas corpus relief-

I

At Johnson’s jury trial, the prosecution and the defense agreed that Johnson repeatedly punched an unarmed Keefer on the evening of Sunday, November 26, 2006. The critical difference between their stories lay in the degree to which Johnson beat the victim. Johnson argued that he could not have, and did not, cause Keefer’s death, while the prosecution maintained that he did. Johnson unsuccessfully sought to introduce Manon’s report of Masini’s confession. Without that evidence before it, the jury resolved the factual question in the prosecution’s favor.

Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs this case, the findings of the state court are entitled to substantial deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We therefore begin by recounting the prosecution’s version of events. The state argued that Johnson beat and killed Keefer after a dispute about drugs and money. Marie Schlosser, a witness to the attack, testified that the two men started arguing about money shortly after Johnson showed up at Keefer’s house on the fateful evening. Earlier that weekend, Schlosser and a pair of men, all from Chicago, teamed up with a man known as “Little C” to sell drugs in the Rock Falls area, in northwestern Illinois. Johnson and Keefer visited the dealers in their hotel room at different times that weekend. On Sunday, Schlosser and Little C drove to Keefer’s house to sell more drugs, but only Little C went inside. He returned to the car where Schlosser was waiting a few minutes later, claiming he had been robbed. He then made a phone call in which he repeated the accusation.

But if there was a robber, it apparently was not Keefer, who came outside soon after Little C returned to the car. Little C demanded that Keefer tell him where the man who robbed him lived or that Keefer cover the cost of the stolen drugs. At this point, according to Schlosser, Johnson arrived and started arguing with Keefer. Johnson reportedly told Keefer that “we don’t play about our money” and then began punching Keefer. It was a one-way fight; Keefer did not hit back, as Johnson acknowledged at trial. Instead, Schlosser recalled, Keefer ran behind a parked car, presumably to try to evade the beating. Johnson followed. Schlosser reported that he knocked Keefer to the ground, striking him in the face repeatedly and kicking him at least once while he was prone. Eventually Johnson drove away, leaving Keefer on the ground. Schlosser too left the scene. She said that she and her friend returned that evening to see if Keefer was still there — and “see if he was really dead.” She saw Keefer in the same spot where he had lain when she left the yard shortly after Johnson’s attack, but she did not approach him.

Johnson recalled the evening differently. He testified that Keefer was arguing with Little C at Keefer’s place Sunday evening when Johnson arrived. Johnson said he approached the pair and told Keefer to cool down. Keefer did not; instead, he started arguing with Johnson, telling him that “if anybody gonna take a whippin’ it’s gonna be” Johnson. With that, Keefer “threw up his guards.” Johnson said this was a sign to fight, and so Johnson did. Johnson admitted that he punched Keefer when he was standing and continued after Keefer fell to the ground. But Johnson acknowledged Keefer did not return any blows or even swing back. Johnson also admitted that he had lied to police earlier when he said that Keefer also threw punches and that Little C had also struck Keefer. Johnson explained that he told police that Keefer struck back “to make it look good on [his own] behalf.” By Johnson’s own admission, then, he was the sole combatant in the fight with Keefer. The only difference between his account and the state’s was the brutality of the beating he administered.

One way or the other, the fight must have ended by 9 p.m., because Keefer’s friend, Vern Williams, arrived at Keefer’s empty house about that time. Williams found it odd that Keefer’s house was unlocked, yet Keefer was nowhere to be found. Williams waited inside Keefer’s residence until about 2 a.m. Monday, at which point he wrote Keefer a note and left. Williams never looked in the back yard.

A Rock Falls police officer was dispatched to Keefer’s house around 10 a.m. Monday to investigate a report of a man lying in the back yard. There the responding officer, Jeremy Vondra, found Keefer dead. At trial, Schlosser testified that a police photograph of the scene where police found Keefer’s body showed that Keefer’s body was just where Johnson had left him the night before.

An autopsy showed that Keefer had extensive bruising on his face and neck, along with a broken jaw and a fractured throat bone. The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy said that Keefer’s injuries were consistent with being punched in the face, falling to the ground, and being punched while prone. He noted that most of Keefer’s bruises were round — like those that would result from a punch — but two bruises, along his jaw, were linear. These contusions could have resulted from being struck with a straight object, such as a rod, a piece of wood, or a shoe. Keefer’s cause of death was neuro-genic shock, brought on by blunt force trauma to the head and neck. The trauma triggered a hemorrhage inside his skull. The pathologist theorized that blows to Keefer’s head while he was on the ground — which was so hard that his body could not absorb the strikes — might have caused his death.

On January 18, 2007, Johnson was in-dieted on four counts of first-degree murder for Keefer’s death. Before the start of trial, the prosecution moved to exclude the hearsay testimony from Manon as inadmissible. See III. R. Evid. 802. Johnson wanted Manon to testify about what Masini allegedly told him about Keefer’s murder. As we noted, the defense’s theory was that it was two men with baseball bats who actually killed Keefer, by attacking him later Sunday evening, after Johnson had fled the scene. This account attributed the two linear bruises to bats, not something like the kick to which Schlosser had referred.

The only problem with Johnson’s theory was an utter lack of evidence backing it up. Manon was his sole source, but all he had was hearsay from Masini, recounted to Manon while Manon was in jail facing obstruction of justice charges. There Masini supposedly told him that Masini had hired two men to “take [Keefer] out” with baseball bats and that he had “got” Keefer. Manon added that Masini had asked him to blow up a woman’s car and burn down her house. The targeted woman had been the subject of a running dispute between Keefer and Masini. Indeed, apparently that was why Masini was in jail: Police arrested him in October 2006, after the woman reported that Masini had shot Keefer, and investigating officers found a loaded gun at Masini’s home. Manon said Masini gave him a map showing the location of the woman’s house during this conversation.

Manon had first reported these statements from Masini to the police around 9 a.m. Tuesday, November 28, less than three hours after Manon had been released from jail on bond. This was almost 24 hours after police found Keefer’s body, but several hours before the local newspaper first published a story about Keefer’s death that afternoon. Manon gave the police a hand-drawn map that showed the woman’s house — artwork from Masini, he claimed. But there were “no particulars as to when [Masini’s] statement [to Manon] was made other than it was made within 24 hours of Doug Keefer’s death,” as the trial court noted. The news would have traveled fast, under the defense’s theory, because Masini needed to hear of the successful attack and then share the news with Manon before Manon was released from jail around 6:30 a.m. Tuesday.

Johnson argued that this hearsay was admissible under the due process exception established in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), for certain statements against penal interest. Masini’s testimony, he urged, was highly reliable. The Illinois court evaluated this argument but concluded that “justice d[id] not require” the Ma-sini hearsay to be admitted. Following a jury trial in Whiteside County, Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 35 years in prison.

On direct appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the exclusion of the evidence. Citing Chambers, it reasoned that the hearsay statement lacked sufficient in-dicia of reliability to require it to be allowed in at trial. The court noted the absence of any indication that Masini and Manon were more than cellmates; nothing suggested that they had a personal relationship. Furthermore, nothing corroborated the hearsay; the two linear bruises could have resulted from any kind of a linear object, not just a bat. Moreover, most of Keefer’s bruises were consistent with punches. The court also pointed to the evidence indicating that Keefer’s body was “unmoved from where it was located when [Johnson] left the crime scene.” Masini’s purported motive to kill Keefer — their dispute about a woman — was of no help because it did not relate specifically to Masi-ni’s purported hiring of men with baseball bats.

Further counseling against admission was the fact that Masini would be “unavailable” for cross-examination. During the murder investigation, Masini denied making the statements Manon attributed to him. He also disclaimed any responsibility for Keefer’s death. The appellate court assumed that if Masini had been called to testify, he would have asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege or denied making the statement, making him “unavailable” in the evidentiary sense of the word. This conclusion parted ways with the trial court’s analysis. That court thought that there was ample opportunity to cross-examine Masini, who was incarcerated again by then. The only factor weighing in favor of admissibility, in the Illinois Appellate Court’s view, was the fact that Masini’s statement was against his penal interest. Overall, the court concluded, the hearsay statement was too unreliable to be admitted.

After exhausting his appeals in state court, Johnson filed his federal habeas corpus petition on August 6, 2014. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition on July 10, 2015, but certified for appeal the question whether the Illinois court denied Johnson his right to present a defense by excluding the hearsay that implicated another person.

II

Our review of Johnson’s petition is governed by AEDPA, which strictly limits the circumstances in which a federal court may grant relief to a petitioner whose claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court. Johnson relies on § 2254(d)(1), which allows a federal habeas court to grant relief if the state court’s decision is “contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application, of clearly established federal law.” He argues that the state court unreasonably applied Chambers when it excluded Manon’s account of Masini’s admission.

A state court decision “involves an unreasonable application of [the Supreme] Court’s clearly established precedents if the state court applies this Court’s precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To succeed, Johnson must do more than show that the state court made a mistake. McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634, 649 (7th Cir. 2015). Rather, he must show that the Illinois court’s decision was “so erroneous as to be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Under this demanding standard, a petitioner’s claim fails if “fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

A

As the Illinois Appellate Court correctly observed, Chambers provides the controlling Supreme Court precedent. Chambers similarly concerned the exclusion of hearsay evidence of another person’s confession to a murder. The murder defendant in that case, Leon Chambers, had sought to introduce evidence from third parties that another man, Gable McDonald, had repeatedly confessed to the crime. 410 U.S. at 292-93, 93 S.Ct. 1038. But the state court blocked Chambers from using the statements at trial by application of a state evidence rule prohibiting hearsay, despite the existence of evidence that corroborated the out-of-court statements. Id. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Its evidentiary ruling prevented the jury from considering the defense’s strongest evidence that someone other than Chambers was responsible for the murder. Id. at 292-93, 93 S.Ct. 1038.

The Court held that the state court’s hearsay exclusion violated Chambers’s due process right to present a complete defense. Id. at 298-300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. It did so notwithstanding the fact, which it acknowledged, that hearsay evidence as a general matter “lack[s] the conventional indicia of reliability.” Id. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Rules barring hearsay are permissible because they protect triers of fact from considering “untrustworthy information.” Id. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). But when hearsay statements are made and offered “under circumstances that pro-vid[e] considerable assurance of their reliability,” that justification for exclusion disappears. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038.

Under Chambers, it is necessary, though not sufficient, for critical hearsay of this type to be reliable. Rather than prescribing a litmus test for reliability, however, Chambers instructs trial courts to determine reliability by considering all the circumstances, including such points as whether the statement was made by a close acquaintance; whether any evidence corroborates the statement; whether the statement was against the declarant’s penal interests; and whether the declarant will be subject to adequate examination. Id.

In the decades since Chambers, the Supreme Court has remained steadfast in its recognition that states have “broad latitude under the Constitution” to restrict the admission of evidence in criminal trials, but at the same time that there will be cases in which the defendant’s due process rights must override those rules. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); see Kubsch v. Neal, 838 F.3d 845, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (explaining that “Chambers was not a one-and-done opinion” and summarizing subsequent Supreme Court precedent). We must decide on which side of the line Johnson’s case falls.

B

The Illinois Appellate Court was not satisfied that Manon’s hearsay testimony had sufficient “indicia of reliability.” Johnson argues, in essence, that we must take into account both how reliable and how essential it was. He then turns to the latter factor and urges that the exclusion of his evidence had the effect of denying him a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. It did so by preventing him from showing that someone else was responsible for Keefer’s murder. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). Given the wealth of evidence against Johnson, including Johnson’s admission that he beat Keefer right before he died, his best and only hope was to suggest that someone else was responsible. For purposes of this discussion, we will assume that the hearsay was critical to Johnson’s defense and focus on reliability.

We look first at the question whether Masini was available for cross-examination. The Illinois trial court said yes, but the state appellate court disagreed. The appellate court thought that Masini “likely ... would have either asserted his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, or would have continued to deny having made the statement.” That, it said, would have made him effectively unavailable. And because the operative decision for our review is that of the last state court to adjudicate Johnson’s claim on the merits, we need not concern ourselves with the trial court’s assessment. Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2015).

In our court, the respondent warden concedes that the appellate court’s determination that Masini was “unavailable” was incorrect; indeed, this was one of the reasons why the district court granted a certificate of appealability to Johnson. Ma-sini could have been put on the stand “in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038. To the extent it matters, Masini’s whereabouts apparently were known, because he told the police that he did not make the statement Manon attributed to him, and it appears that Masini was incarcerated at the time of Johnson’s trial. For present purposes, therefore, we treat this part of the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision as erroneous.

But as we already have noted, the fact that a decision is in error does not necessarily make it “unreasonable.” To begin with, the finding that Masini was available was not the only reason that the state court gave for finding the hearsay evidence to be insufficiently reliable. Moreover, AEDPA requires the federal court to give deference to the state court’s decision, as opposed to its reasoning. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98-99, 131 S.Ct. 770; Makiel, 782 F.3d at 907. A “bad reason does not necessarily mean that the ultimate result was an unreasonable application of established doctrine.” Makiel, 782 F.3d at 906 (quoting Bradly v. Pfister, 711 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2013)). We thus move on to the other reasons offered by the state court in support of its finding of unreliability: the absence of evidence corroborating the hearsay, and the superficial relationship between Manon and Masini.

Johnson argues that there was evidence corroborating the hearsay, but that the state court disregarded it. He points to the linear contusions on Keefer’s jaw; Masini’s knowledge of Keefer’s death before it was reported in the media; and Masini’s motive to kill Keefer as part of their alleged dispute about the woman. The state court reasonably concluded, however, that this evidence has little or no bearing on the hearsay Johnson sought to introduce.

First, there is no proof of what caused the two linear contusions. While the pathologist opined that they could have been caused by a bat, he stressed that any linear object, including a foot, would have sufficed. These injuries thus could have resulted from a kick, such as the one witnessed by Schlosser. This inconclusive physical evidence hardly provides “considerable assurance” of the statement’s reliability. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The absence of clear physical evidence supports the state court’s determination that the statement was not sufficiently reliable. Masini’s purported motive to kill Keefer is also of limited significance. The contusions have nothing to do with Masini’s supposed hiring of two men with bats.

The fact that Manon reported Masini’s confession before the local paper published a story on Keefer’s death is also at best weak corroboration. Keefer’s body was found in the backyard of a “busy thoroughfare and ... [his] home was surrounded by crime scene tape for all of a day before Manon talked to the police,” according to the prosecution. Schlosser said that she and a friend returned to the crime scene some time after Johnson’s beating and saw Keefer’s body in the same spot. Word of Keefer’s death (no matter the means) easily could have traveled fast around Rock Falls, whose population at the last Census did not exceed 10,000. Finally, Manon had a few hours between his release from jail and his report of Masini’s statement to police — time during which he could have learned of Keefer’s death in some way other than through Masini.

Johnson does not challenge the state court’s conclusion that Masini and Manon were “mere cellmates,” but he argues the state court overemphasized this fact in its reliability determination. The weight of that fact, however, was for the state court to determine. Johnson also argues that, even if Masini was a relative stranger, Chambers recognized that the spontaneity of a statement argues in favor of reliability. See 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. True enough. But Chambers also holds that the closeness of the relationship between de-clarant and witness is a key component of the reliability assessment of a statement against the declarant’s penal interests. See id. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038. In reality, Johnson wants us to analyze the hearsay anew by reweighing these considerations to arrive at a different conclusion. That is not our role under AEPDA.

We do not find the Illinois Appellate Court’s ultimate reliability determination to be an unreasonable application of Chambers, given the absence of corroborating evidence and obvious untrustworthiness of a murder confession to a stranger-turned-cellmate. Johnson’s case is quite different from the one we faced in Kubsch, where we held that due process required the admission of a police interview of a witness because it was particularly reliable and essential to the defense. 838 F.3d at 845. The evidence at issue there was trustworthy, because it was recorded, independent, and almost contemporaneous, and also because there was some evidence that corroborated (and more that could have done so, if pursued) the out-of-court statement. Id. at 860-62. While the state court in Johnson’s case might seen things differently, if for example it had placed more emphasis on the fact that Masini’s confession was against his penal interest, its decision was well within the range of reasonable outcomes.

Ill

Because we hold that the state court did not unreasonably apply Chambers, we do not need to address whether any error it might have made was harmless. We simply note that another reason to leave the state conviction undisturbed is the fact that any exclusion of the hearsay evidence probably made no difference to the outcome, given the abundance of evidence against Johnson.

We therefore Affirm the judgment of the district court.


author: FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Matthew C. STECHAUNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Judy P. SMITH, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 16-1079
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued January 11, 2017
    Decided March 31, 2017

      Jacob V. Bradley, Attorney, Quarles & Brady LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Kevin Michael LeRoy, Attorney, Office of the Solicitor General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before BAUER, FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
   FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Matthew Stechauner seeks habeas relief from his Wisconsin convictions for second-degree reckless homicide and armed robbery. He argues that the Wisconsin appeals court unreasonably denied post-conviction relief despite alleged Miranda violations and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied Stechauner’s petition for habeas relief. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

On November 22, 2004, Stechauner was riding in a car with, friends. An unmarked police cruiser pulled up behind the car, and Stechauner tried to hide his sawed-off shotgun from view. In the process, the gun accidentally fired and hit Stechauner in the leg, and he was driven to the hospital.

Stechauner received treatment for the gunshot wound. In the process of tending to Stechauner, one of the nurses noticed a bag of bullets in Stechauner’s pocket, and so called the police. Officer Guajardo went to the hospital but could not locate the bullets. Then, at about 7:15 pm, Detective Kolatski arrived, followed later by Sergeant Doney. Officer Guajardo was in full police uniform; Detective Kolatski and Sergeant Doney apparently were not. The officers entered Stechauner’s hospital room, where he was awaiting discharge but still dressed in a hospital gown. Stechauner’s mother also arrived at the hospital but was denied access to Stechauner’s room. (However, there is no indication that Stechauner was aware at that time that his mother was trying to see him.) Detective Kolatski later testified that he had the following exchange with Stechauner in the hospital room:

... I told [Stechauner] that in order for me to help him out at all that he needed to tell me the entire truth including about where the bullets were.... I explained to him that ... we realized that he hadn’t left the room, there were no visitors, and that the bullets were either in the room someplace or he had possibly ingested them. And that shortly thereafter Mr. Stechauner bent over on the gurney and pulled ... the bag of bullets out from what I believe to be his rectum.

Stechauner had then explained to the officers that he had shot himself with the sawed-off shotgun in a car, and that he had a probation officer. When Detective Kolat-ski asked Stechauner what had happened to the gun, Stechauner answered that it was being kept at a friend’s house. Ste-chauner then called the friend from the hospital to arrange for the gun to be dropped off in a trash container close to the house. The questioning lasted about ninety minutes, during which time Ste-chauner “seemed lucid, and ... was able to answer ... questions.” Stechauner was not given Miranda warnings at the hospital. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Around 8:00 or 8:30 pm, Stechauner was discharged from the hospital. He left on crutches with the officers, was placed in handcuffs, and got into Officer Guajardo’s cruiser, with Detective Kolatski following behind. Stechauner directed the officers to the place where he believed the gun was located, but the officers were unable to find the gun in the trash bins near Ste-chauner’s friend’s house. Around that time, the friend arrived and he and Stechauner got into a heated discussion, with Ste-chauner still seated inside the cruiser and the friend on the other side of the cruiser door. After the exchange, either Stechauner or the friend (neither party knows which) told the officers that the gun was actually hidden under the steps leading up to the friend’s house. Officer Guajardo found the gun and gave it to Detective Kolatski. Kolatski then tried to remove a casing lodged inside the gun but had trouble doing so. Seeing Detective Kolatski struggle, Stechauner shouted out that one had to use pliers to remove the casing. Officer Guajardo also heard Stechauner’s instructions and recalled that she had found a pair of pliers in Stechauner’s coat when she had been searching for the bag of bullets in the hospital. She gave Detective Kolatski the pliers, who then removed the casing. As of this point, Stechauner still had not received any Miranda warnings.

While handling the sawed-off shotgun, Detective Kolatski developed a hunch that Stechauner may have been involved in a recent string of robberies and other crimes carried out using such a weapon. Detective Kolatski said that he' wanted to bring Ste-chauner in for further questioning. Around 9:00 pm, Stechauner went with Detective Kolatski to the station, where Stechauner was formally arrested. Several hours later, starting around 2:00 AM the following day, Stechauner was given Miranda warnings and was interrogated by two other officers. Over the course of the next nine hours, Stechauner admitted to several crimes, some tied to the sawed-off shotgun.

Based on Stechauner’s confession, the State charged Stechauner with first-degree reckless homicide as ■ party to a crime; “two counts of 'armed robbery, use of force’ as party to a crime”; personal robbery; and possession of a firearm by a felon. Stechauner pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress his hospital statements, cruiser statements, and the sawed-off shotgun.

The trial court held a suppression hearing at which Stechauner, Detective Kolat-ski, and other law enforcement officials testified. Kolatski testified that Stechauner had not been in custody at the hospital, had been free to leave, had seemed lucid and able to answer questions, and never had been placed in handcuffs in the hospital room. Regarding the cruiser statements, Kolatski said that Stechauner had “indicated where the alley was where the gun was supposed to be hidden” and had “yelled out to [Kolatski] when [Stechauner] saw [Kolatski] struggling ... to get the casing out.”

In contrast, Stechauner testified that he had been intoxicated upon arriving at the hospital from a combination of alcohol, marijuana, sleeping pills, and ecstasy; that the officers had handcuffed him to the hospital bed; that the officers had told Stechauner’s mother that he was already under arrest at the hospital; and that the hospital had given him three Vicodin, which he had taken before leaving. Relevant to this appeal, Stechauner’s trial counsel did not call several witnesses. According to Stechauner, these witnesses included Stechauner’s mother, who would have testified that Stechauner had been in custody in the hospital; several friends, who would have said that Stechauner had been intoxicated before the accidental shooting; and the treating physician and nurse, who would have testified that he had been handcuffed to the hospital bed. Trial counsel also did not introduce the hospital report of Stechauner’s treatment.

The trial court denied Stechauner’s motion to suppress. The court credited Detective Kolatski’s testimony and discredited Stechauner’s, finding that Stechauner had not been restrained in any way in the hospital, and had not been in custody, such that Miranda’s warning requirement had not been triggered. The court ruled the hospital statements were admissible. The trial court then found that Stechauner had been in custody once in handcuffs and in the squad car. However, the court determined that Stechauner’s statements regarding the shotgun had all been volunteered and were not the result of custodial interrogation. The court found no Miranda violation with respect to these statements and admitted them, as well. The court also admitted the shotgun.

Stechauner later pleaded no contest to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime, and armed robbery as party to a crime. The other counts were dismissed but considered for sentencing purposes. Stechauner was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years of confinement and fifteen years of extended supervision.

Stechauner moved for post-conviction relief in the trial court, arguing that the court should have suppressed the inculpa-tory statements made in the hospital and in the police cruiser. The court denied that motion, and Stechauner, represented by new counsel, appealed. In this first state-court appeal, Stechauner argued that both the hospital and cruiser statements had been taken in violation of Miranda, but did not argue that his trial counsel had been ineffective for not calling the friendly witnesses and for not introducing the hospital report. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, State v. Stechauner, No. 2006AP1923-CR, 301 Wis.2d 750, 731 N.W.2d 384 (unpublished table decision), 2007 WL 901536 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2007), and the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined review, State v. Stechauner, No. 2006AP1923-CR, 304 Wis.2d 612, 741 N.W.2d 241 (unpublished table decision) (Wis. July 17, 2007).

On July 14, 2007, Stechauner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the district court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”), and raised five grounds for relief. The trial court’s screening order eliminated two of those grounds, leaving the following: (1) that the state trial court had admitted Stechauner’s statements and shotgun in violation of Miranda, (2) that Stechauner had received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to appellate counsel’s failure to argue that trial counsel had been ineffective at the suppression hearing, and (3) that Ste-chauner’s plea had been involuntary. Noting that Stechauner had failed to exhaust grounds (2) and (3) in the state courts, the district court administratively closed the habeas petition to give Stechauner a chance to exhaust them.

Stechauner then filed a second motion for post-conviction relief in state court, raising the three remaining issues mentioned above. See Wis. Stat. § 974.06. The state trial court denied relief, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Stechauner, No. 2009AP2367, 331 Wis.2d 487, 795 N.W.2d 62 (unpublished table decision), 2010 WL 4945103 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010). The appellate court rejected Stechauner’s Miranda arguments on the ground that it had already disposed of them in his first motion for post-conviction relief. Because Stechauner had failed to raise the two other arguments in the first post-conviction motion, they were barred unless Stechauner could demonstrate good cause for having failed to raise them. See Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4). The court reasoned that post-conviction counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to raise these issues would have been sufficient reason to excuse their earlier absence. The court then applied the Strickland standard for effective assistance of counsel and rejected the arguments. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The court determined that none of the proposed witnesses actually would have aided Stechauner’s suppression arguments, and dismissed the hospital-record argument as meritless or underdeveloped. The court concluded that Stechauner had not suffered any prejudice from these alleged errors and thus had received effective assistance of counsel. The Wisconsin Supreme Court again declined review. State v. Stechauner, No. 2009AP2367, 332 Wis.2d 279, 797 N.W.2d 524 (unpublished table decision) (Wis. Apr. 12, 2011).

On June 15, 2011, the district court reopened Stechauner’s case. Stechauner presented the three grounds for relief and requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied habeas relief and the request for a hearing, but granted a certificate of appealability on the Miranda and Strickland issues.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). When a state court has reviewed a petitioner’s claim on the merits and denied relief, a habeas petition may be granted only if the state court’s ruling “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, the state court’s ruling stands unless “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree” that it conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

“The operative decision under review is that of the last state court to address a given claim on the merits.” Harris, 698 F.3d at 623 (citing Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 132 S.Ct. 38, 45, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011); Garth v. Davis, 470 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2006)). In this case, there are two operative decisions: (1) the Wisconsin appellate court’s March 27, 2007, decision denying relief on the Miranda claims (Stechauner I); and (2) the appellate court’s December 7, 2010, decision denying relief on the ineffective-assistance claims (Stechauner II).

A. Miranda Warnings

Under Miranda v. Arizona, the government may not use in a prosecution any “statements” that “stemm[ed] from custodial interrogation of the defendant” unless the government has first given the familiar Miranda warnings and the defendant has voluntarily waived his rights. 884 U.S. at 444^15, 86 S.Ct. 1602. This warning requirement obtains when the defendant is interrogated while in custody.

Police interrogation includes both express questioning and “words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). A person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes when one’s “freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Custody is an objective, totality-of-the-cir-cumstanees test: whether “a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (citation and internal brackets and quotation marks omitted); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Factors to consider in assessing custody “include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (citations omitted). Because custody is determined by an objective standard, the subjective beliefs of the suspect and police officers are irrelevant. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-26, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

The trial court heard testimony from Stechauner and Detective Kolatski about the hospital-room interrogation. The trial court discounted the former’s testimony and credited the latter’s. According to that testimony, the circumstances of the hospital interrogation were as follows: The officers arrived at the request of the treating nurse — not Stechauner — to investigate the shooting and bag of bullets. Stechauner was at the hospital because he had shot himself and wanted medical attention. The questioning took place in a hospital room (the record does not indicate the room’s size) over the course of about ninety minutes, while Stechauner was lying in his hospital bed in a gown and connected to an intravenous drip. Stechauner appeared awake and lucid, and had already been treated for the gunshot wound. Stechauner resisted answering some of the questions about who else had been in the car when the gun had gone off, but generally answered questions about where the gun was. There were up to three officers in the room at a time, and one of them was in full police uniform. Though the officers did not use physical restraints at the hospital, they also did not mention either that Stechauner was not under arrest or that he was free to end the conversation. After the questioning, Stechauner walked out on crutches with the officers and was then placed in handcuffs and into the cruiser.

After hearing this testimony, the trial court concluded, “I don’t find any factual circumstances which would indicate that while [Stechauner] was at St. Francis Hospital he was in custody.” The Stechauner I court affirmed:

The police testified that Stechauner was not in custody at the hospital, that he was not handcuffed or restrained in any way, and that he was not considered a suspect at that time. Stechauner contradicted that testimony, claiming he was handcuffed and believed he was in custody. In reviewing the trial court’s findings, we conclude that they are not clearly erroneousl The testimony of the police supports the trial court’s findings that Stechauner was not in custody when he spoke with police at the hospital.

2007 WL 901536, at *3.

On these facts, reasonable jurists could conclude that Stechauner was not in custody at the hospital. Though some of the interrogation circumstances suggest that Stechauner’s freedom of movement was restricted, the duration of the questioning was relatively short, Stechauner was not placed in handcuffs or other restraints, and there is no indication of coercion, deception, or use of force on the part of the police. As the Fourth Circuit noted in assessing a similar hospital-questioning case, there has been no police custody when a suspect “was primarily restrained not by the might of the police, but by his self-inflicted gunshot wound [and] the medical exigencies it created.” United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 632 (4th Cir. 2007).

Stechauner also claims that the Ste-chauner I court impermissibly relied on Detective Kolatski’s subjective belief that Stechauner had not been in custody. Ste-chauner is correct that an officer’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the custody analysis, see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-26, 114 S.Ct. 1526. However, the Wisconsin appellate court does not appear to have relied on such considerations here. While the state court noted that “[t]he police testified that Stechauner was not in custody at the hospital ... and that he was not considered a suspect at that time,” 2007 WL 901536, at *3, simply mentioning how police officers testified does not amount to relying on their subjective beliefs. The officers’ testimonies addressed much more than their respective beliefs and included details about the timing of the investigation, questions that the officers had asked Stechauner, locations of the interrogations, and many other non-subjective facts on which the state courts relied in concluding that Stechauner had not been in custody at the hospital.

Stechauner next argues that he should have received Miranda warnings once he had been placed in the police cruiser. Thus, Stechauner claims that two of his statements should have been suppressed: (1) his statement revealing the location of the gun — assuming he, and not his Mend, made that statement — and (2) Stechauner’s advice to Detective Kolatski to use pliers to get the casing out of the shotgun. On this issue, the Stechauner I court held:

[The trial court] found that the statement as to the location of the gun was provided after the confrontation between Stechauner and [his friend]. The trial court indicated that this statement was not provided as a result of police interrogation or questioning. Further, the trial court found that the statement Ste-chauner made about how to remove the casing was a voluntary statement he made after he saw the detective struggling to remove the casing. This statement, too, was not the product of police interrogation. The detective did not ask Stechauner how to remove the casing; rather, Stechauner, on his own, shouted out this information to the officer. Again, these findings are not clearly erroneous as the testimony of the police at the suppression hearing supports the trial court’s findings.

2007 WL 901536, at *3.

The record indicates that the police did not expressly question Stechauner once he was in custody in the cruiser. Furthermore, neither the heated conversation between Stechauner and his friend nor Detective Kolatski’s attempt to remove the casing from the shotgun meets the Innis standard for interrogation. 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (interrogation includes conduct that a police officer “should have known w[as] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”). First, the exchange between Stechauner and his friend was not police interrogation because it included no “words or actions on the part of police officers.” Id. (emphasis added). Second, there is no reason that a police officer in Detective Kolatski’s position should have known that trying to take a shell casing from a gun would be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Stechauner. See id. The state courts did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in finding that Ste-chauner had been in custody but had not been interrogated while in the police cruiser, or in declining to suppress his statements.

B. Voluntariness

Stechauner also argues that his statements should have been suppressed because they were given involuntarily. The Stechauner I court held on this issue:

Stechauner makes various assertions, claiming he was drowsy, under the influence, and coerced by the police during the interrogation. There is nothing in the record to support Stechauner’s assertions, except his own testimony, which the trial court found to be incredible. The record reflects that Stechauner’s statements were voluntary and were the product of free and unconstrained will, not due to police pressure.

2007 WL 901536, at *5. Stechauner argues on appeal that his statements were involuntary because Kolatski had impermissibly promised to help him and because of the medication Stechauner had received at the hospital.

As an initial matter, respondent-appellee argues that this Court ought not to consider this issue at all, since, she claims, the district court did not grant a certificate of appealability on the voluntariness question. See Rittenhouse v. Battles, 263 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a ha-beas petitioner may appeal only those issues for which a certificate of appealability has been granted.”) (citation omitted). Ste-chauner responds that the district court’s certificate of appealability on the Miranda issue did include the voluntariness question, entitling him to appeal on this ground. The certifícate of appealability does not specifically mention voluntariness with respect to the hospital or cruiser statements. Regardless of the scope of the district court’s certificate of appealability, however, “we ... consider requests to amend a certificate of appealability even when they are presented in a petitioner’s briefs to this court,” which can be done “by simply including issues in [the] briefs that were not specified in the certificate.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To receive a certificate of appeal-ability, generally a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

The admission of a defendant’s involuntarily-made statements at a later criminal proceeding offends due process. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). “In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court ... assessefe] the- totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). However, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary.’ ” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

First, Stechauner argues that the “narcotic pain medicine ... likely would have rendered Stechauner more susceptible to coercive interrogation tactics utilized by the officers here [and] ... may have interfered with Stechauner[’s] free will and ability to understand questions, potentially rendering any statements made after he received the drugs ... involuntary.” (emphases added). Yet Stechauner refers to no specific “coercive interrogation tactic” the officers supposedly used in this case. He does not argue, for example, that the police administered the drugs, or that he was given drugs against his will. Second, speculation about how the narcotics “may have” “potentially” contributed to involuntariness is insufficient to show a denial of Steehauner’s constitutional rights. Simply taking pain medication administered by a hospital does not involve coercive police activity. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. 515.

Next, Stechauner argues that his statements were involuntary because, he says, Detective Kolatski impermissibly promised him leniency in exchange for cooperating in the investigation. Stechauner is correct that a confession is involuntary if prompted by “direct or implied promises, however slight.” Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)). However, Stechauner misreads the record in making this argument. During the suppression hearing, Ko-latski testified:

A: I informed [Stechauner] that I [Ko-latski] was aware of the fact that when the nurse initially began treating him that she had discovered a baggy containing three or four bullets and ... [t]hey could no longer be found. And I told [Stechauner] that in order for me to help him out at all that he needed to tell me the entire truth including about where the bullets were.
Q: And when you meant help him out, what did you mean by that?
A: At that point in time as far as I knew he was shot.... And in order for me to conduct a thorough investigation which somebody may be able to be prosecuted for shooting him, I needed the entire truth.

This testimony does not demonstrate that Kolatski was offering Stechauner leniency or making any other promise. At that time, there was no indication that Stechauner was considered a suspect of any particular crime for which Detective Kolatski could offer leniency. Kolatski simply wanted to know where the bullets were so he could investigate the incident. Kolat-ski’s statements did not amount to coercive conduct sufficient to have overcome Ste-chauner’s will. In short, the hospital interrogation lacked the “necessary predicate” of coercive police activity required to render Stechauner’s statements involuntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. 515.

C. Ineffective Assistance

The Supreme Court recently rear-ticulated the standard for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel:

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. A defendant who claims to have been denied effective assistance must show both that counsel performed defi-ciently and that counsel’s deficient performance caused him prejudice.
Strickland’?, first prong sets a high bar.... The lawyer has discharged his constitutional responsibility so long as his decisions fall within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. It is only when the lawyer’s errors were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment that Strickland’s first prong is satisfied.
To satisfy Strickland, a litigant must also demonstrate prejudice — a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Buck v. Davis, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 759, 775-76, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017) (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). On collateral review, this Court does not assess directly whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland', rather, we ask “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S.Ct. 770.

Stechauner did not argue in his first. motion for post-conviction relief that his trial counsel had been ineffective at the suppression hearing. In his second motion, Stechauner argued that his post-conviction counsel had been ineffective for having failed to raise trial counsel’s allegedly ineffective performance as a ground for post-conviction relief. The Stechauner II court noted that, while claims not raised in the first motion for post-conviction relief typically would be barred,

Ineffective assistance of a postconviction lawyer may constitute a sufficient reason for a second postconviction proceeding. When a defendant claims that a postconviction lawyer was ineffective by failing to challenge a trial lawyer’s alleged ineffectiveness, however, the defendant must establish that the trial lawyer’s assistance was, in fact, ineffective.

2010 WL 4945103, at *2 (citations omitted). Stechauner argued before the state court that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to call eight witnesses at the suppression hearing: Ste-chauner’s mother, the treating nurse and physician, and several friends. Stechauner says that these witnesses would have corroborated his ultimately-discredited testimony that he had been intoxicated on the day in question and that he was in custody at the hospital.

The state court disagreed and concluded that trial counsel had not been ineffective at the suppression hearing:

Stechauner fails to show how [his mother’s] testimony could have assisted the circuit court to determine his custodial status in the hospital, given that [she] had no contact with him while he was hospitalized. Thus, Stechauner did not satisfy his burden of showing how [her] testimony would have altered the outcome of the proceeding.
Stechauner names seven people in addition to his mother who he claims should have testified at the suppression hear-
ing, and he faults his first trial lawyer for failing to.call them as witnesses. He offers no support for his conclusory assertions that the people he names would have provided any relevant information about his custodial status. Therefore, the circuit court properly rejected the allegations.

2010 WL 4945103, at *4 (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Stechauner II court appears to have denied relief under Strickland because, even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient, there was no prejudice from the failure to call the witnesses. To determine whether the state court reasonably concluded that there was no “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s” failure to call the witnesses, “the result of the proceeding would have been different,” Buck, 137 S.Ct. at 775, we must revisit the merits of Stechauner’s Miranda claims.

As mentioned above, for a statement to warrant suppression at trial, it must have been the product of custodial interrogation and been made before the suspect has waived his or her Miranda rights. The trial court here declined to suppress any of Stechauner’s statements, finding that Ste-chauner had not been in custody at the hospital and that the cruiser statements had not been the product of police interrogation but rather had been volunteered.

It is undisputed that the questioning in the hospital room constituted police interrogation under Miranda. Thus, to have demonstrated prejudice in state court, Stechauner needed to show only that the missing testimony likely would have changed the custody analysis. However, under current Supreme Court precedent, the Stechauner II court was not unreasonable in determining that the absence of Stechauner’s mother’s and friends’ testimonies did not prejudice Ste-chauner. First, Stechauner does not argue that any of these proposed witnesses were in the hospital room or had any knowledge of the circumstances of the interrogation. Nor does he allege that he was aware of. his mother’s attempts to see him at the hospital at the time he was speaking with the police officers. Cf Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (“Counsel'for Alvarado alleges that Alvarado’s parents asked to be present at the interview but were rebuffed, a fact that — if known to Alvarado — might reasonably have led someone in Alvarado’s position to feel more restricted than otherwise.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the witnesses’ testimonies would not have been helpful in determining custody under the objective standard articulated above. Second, assuming Stechauner’s friends would have testified as he claims — that he had used several substances earlier in the day — this testimony likely would not have changed the state court’s custody analysis. Stechauner did not and does not argue that the police gave him any intoxicating substances or that they knowingly took advantage of Stechauner’s allegedly intoxicated state. Prior voluntary intoxication does not bear on the objective custody analysis and so would not have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

This leaves us with the purported testimonies of the nurse and doctor. Stechauner claims that these individuals would have testified that he had been handcuffed to the hospital bed.. However, -as the state court noted, Stechauner has never introduced, at any stage of the proceedings of this case, any indication that these two proposed witnesses would have testified in the manner he claims. Without more, Ste-chauner’s assertions about what these witnesses said are merely conclusory, and as such are insufficient to demonstrate prejudice or to show that Stechauner actually was in custody in the hospital. Thus, the Stechauner II court was not unreasonable in determining that Stechauner suffered no prejudice from these two witnesses’ absence from the suppression hearing.

Stechauner next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing the hospital record at that hearing. However, again, Stechauner cannot show prejudice from this omission. He claims that “[t]he fact that the hospital — an objective third-party — determined that Stechauner was in police custody is compelling evidence that a reasonable person would have believed Stechauner was not free to leave.” Even setting aside that hospital staff do not make legal determinations, Stechauner also misreads the record on this point. In fact, the hospital report states: “Patient will be discharged in police custody,” and “[p]atient was discharged in police custody in good condition.” (emphasis added). These statements, if true, suggest only that hospital staff believed Stechauner had been in custody upon discharge from the hospital — a fact at all times conceded by respondent-appellee — and not that he had been in custody while at the hospital. The hospital record provides no help to Ste-chauner’s prejudice argument.

Stechauner also argues that the hospital record indicates that he had been under the influence of drugs during treatment for his gunshot wound. As an initial matter, he cites to no authority for the proposition that voluntarily taking drugs impacts a Miranda custody analysis. Even if such facts were pertinent to the custody question, the document does not support Ste-chauner’s argument that he had taken Vi-codin prior to the interrogation; rather, the record states: “Patient discharged with prescription(s) for Keflex Vicodin.” This does not indicate that he had taken Vicodin prior to the hospital-room questioning, and so would not have likely altered the custody analysis. In his reply brief, Stechauner mentions that the hospital record reflects that he had been given Dilaudid intravenously around 6:80 pm, several minutes before the officers had arrived, and asserts that this drug affected the voluntariness of his hospital statements. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 336 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

In sum, Stechauner has not offered any new information that likely would have altered the state court’s Miranda analysis. As a result, the Stechauner II court reasonably applied Strickland in concluding that Stechauner suffered no prejudice as a result of the omitted witness testimony and hospital record. Because Stechauner cannot show prejudice, we need not determine whether his trial counsel’s performance was deficient.

D. Evidentiary Hearing

Lastly, Stechauner argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request for an eviden-tiary hearing. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181-82, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Stechauner wanted to call several witnesses, including Detective Kolatski and Stechauner’s state-court counsel. As discussed in Pinholster, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. In other words, no federal evidentiary hearing is permitted when the state court has already addressed the issue; rather, “the record under review is limited to ... the record before the state court.” Id. at 182, 131 S.Ct. 1388.

Pinholster bars Steehauner’s request, since his claims were adjudicated on the merits by the Stechauner I and Stechauner II courts. However, he now argues that under our decision in Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2012), the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing constituted an abuse of discretion. However, Mosley did not alter — and could not have altered — the holding of Pinholster. We noted in Mosley that “[t]he district court had to make [the ineffective-assistance] decision based on the record before the state courts,” id. at 841 (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), and reasoned “If § 2254(d) does not bar relief, then an evi-dentiary hearing may be needed,” id. at 844 (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 205-06, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis added). In Mosley, the district court held, and this Court agreed, that § 2254(d) did not bar relief, and so further hearings into the veracity of certain affidavits were needed before granting the habeas petition. Here, the district court clearly held that § 2254(d) barred relief, and therefore no additional hearing was permitted. We agree and likewise conclude that a straightforward application of Pinholster precludes an additional evidentiary hearing in this case.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the judgment of the district court.

      . The report of Stechauner’s hospital visit stated that he received a dose of "Dialudin” around 6:30 pm, and a prescription for Vico-din.

      . In Wisconsin, “[w]hoever is concerned in the commission of a crime is a principal and may be charged with and convicted of the commission of the crime although the person did not directly commit it...." Wis. Stat. § 939.05. Such a defendant is called a "party to a crime.” Id.

      . The district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability on the ground that Ste-chauner's plea had been involuntary, and Ste-chauner does not pursue this issue on appeal.

      . Stechauner does not argue that the trial court erred in crediting Detective Kolatski's account of the interrogation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”).

      . Jamison is partly distinguishable: While the defendant in that case initiated a police investigation by telling officers he had been shot by someone else, see 509 F.3d at 625, here, Ste-charmer did not want the police to be involved. This difference, however, is not dis-positive in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

      . The order clearly rejected Stechauner’s earlier contention that his plea was involuntary, though that point was separate from the question of whether Stechauner's statements were involuntary.