author: NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

text:
    NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC, on behalf of its members; Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors’ Association, Inc., on behalf of its members; International Longshoremen’s Association AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members and affiliated locals in the Port of New York and New Jersey; Local 1804-1, International Longshoremens Association, AFL-CIO; Local 1814, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members v. WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR New York Shipping Association Inc., Appellant in 14-3956 New York Shipping Association Inc, on behalf of its members; Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, Inc. on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association AFL-CIO, On behalf of its members and affiliated locals in the Port of New York and New Jersey; Local 1804-1, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Local 1814, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1804-1, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1814, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Appellants in 14-3957 New York Shipping Association Inc, on behalf of its members; Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors’ Association, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members and affiliated locals in the Port of New York and New Jersey; Local 1804-1, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Local 1814, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors’ Association, Inc., Appellant in 14-3958 New York Shipping Association Inc, on behalf of its members; Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association Local 1804-1, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association 1814, on behalf of its members v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor New York Shipping Association, Inc., Appellant in 14-4278 New York Shipping Association Inc, on behalf of its members; Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, on behalf of its members;International Longshoremens Association 1814, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association Local 1804-1, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Association 1814, International Longshoremen’s Association 1804-1; Appellants in 14-4279 New York Shipping Association Inc, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association 1814, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members; International Longshoremens Association Local 1804-1, on behalf of its members; Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association, on behalf of its members v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association Inc., Appellant in 14-4422
    Nos. 14-3956, 14-3957, 14-3958, 14-4278, 14-4279, 14-4422
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    ARGUED JULY 9, 2015
    (Filed: August 30, 2016)

      James R. Campbell, Jr., Esq., Donato Caruso, Esq. [Argued], The Lambos Firm, 303 South Broadway, Suite 410, Tarry-town, NY 10591 Counsel for Appellant New York Shipping Association, Inc.
    Kevin J. Marrinan, Esq. [Argued], John P. Sheridan, Esq., Marrinan & Mazzola Mardon, 26 Broadway, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10004 Counsel for Appellants International Longshoremen’s Association AFL-CIO, International Longshoremen’s Association AFL-CIO Local 1804-1, and International Longshoremen’s Association AFL-CIO Local 1814
    Peter O. Hughes, Esq. [Argued], Ogle-tree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, 10 Madison Avenue, Suite 400, Morristown, NJ 07960 Counsel for Appellant Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors Association
    Phoebe S. Sorial, Esq. [Argued], Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 39 Broadway, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10006 Counsel for Appellee Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
    BEFORE: FUENTES, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
   OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

The District Court ruled that the Appel-lee, Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor (Commission or Waterfront Commission), was within its statutory authority to require shipping companies and other employers to certify that prospective employees had been referred for employment pursuant to federal and state nondiscrimination policies. The District Court also rejected claims that the Commission had unlawfully interfered with collective bargaining rights, holding that such rights were not completely protected under the language of the Waterfront Commission Compact (Compact), which was entered into by the states of New Jersey and New York in 1953. We will affirm.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal takes us deep into the hiring practices and procedures utilized on the New York/New Jersey waterfront. We will start with some history, which to varying degrees, has been reported elsewhere. See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960); Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 764 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1985); Hazelton v. Murray, 21 N.J. 115, 121 A.2d 1 (1956); Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Constr. & Marine Equip. Co., Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1388 (D.N.J. 1996). Years of criminal activity and corrupt hiring practices on the waterfront were first brought to light in 1949 in a series of 24 articles published in the New York Sun by journalist Malcolm Johnson. Entitled “Crime on the Waterfront,” these articles won Johnson the Pulitzer Prize, and formed the basis for the 1954 film “On the Waterfront.”

Hiring practices on the waterfront also caught the attention of the New York State Crime Commission (Crime Commission), which issued a report in 1953 relating in detail the pervasive influence of crime and corruption on waterfront hiring practices. See Fourth Report of the New York State Crime Commission, N.Y.S. Leg. Doc. No. 70 (1953). The Crime Commission singled-out the “shape-up” hiring system for particular scorn. The term eon-notes a hiring method whereby the applicants appeared daily at the docks or other locations and a hiring boss would select those who would be given work. Id. at 37. The foundation of this practice was the union foreman’s unfettered control over the process and his unchecked power to select whomever he desired for employment.

The Crime Commission report led to public hearings on its findings. Then-New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey held hearings, the goal of which was to come up with a legislative plan to address the Commission’s concerns. Representatives of the State of New Jersey were also present for and participated in these hearings. The “shape-up” hiring system was identified by the Commission as a vector for corruption and criminal practices on the docks. So as “to investigate, deter, combat and remedy” this criminality and corruption, the states of New Jersey and New York entered into the Compact in 1953. Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 2014); see also N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1, et seq. Pursuant to Art. I., § 10 of the United States Constitution, Congress approved the Compact in August of 1953. The Compact created the Waterfront Commission to, among other things, eliminate corrupt hiring practices on the waterfront. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping Inc., 164 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Hazelton, 21 N.J. at 120-23, 121 A.2d 1). In enacting the Compact, the legislatures of both states noted:

that the conditions under which waterfront labor is employed with the Port of New York district are depressing and degrading to such labor, resulting from the lack of any systemic method of hiring, the lack of adequate information as to the availability of employment, corrupt hiring practices, and the fact that persons conducting such hiring are frequently criminals and persons notoriously lacking in moral character and integrity and neither responsive or responsible to the employers nor to the uncoerced will of the majority members of the labor organizations of the employees; that as a result waterfront laborers suffer from irregularity of employment, fear and insecurity, inadequate earnings, an unduly high accident rate, subjection to borrowing at usurious rates of interest, exploitation and extortion as the price of securing employment.

N.J.S.A. § 32:23-2.

One way the Compact sought to rein in the corruption associated with hiring on the waterfront was by requiring the Commission to regulate longshoremen and stevedores. Employment Information Centers were to be operated by the Commission to handle all hiring of longshoremen. Further, the Compact charged the Commission with registering all individuals who were qualified to work as longshoremen and specifically provided that “no person shall act as a longshoreman within the Port of New York district unless at the time he is included in the longshoremen’s register.” N.J.S.A. § 32:23-27. The Compact also provided a definition of a longshoreman:

[ A] natural person, other than the hiring agent, who is employed for work at a pier or other waterfront terminal, either by a carrier of freight by water or by a stevedore (a) physically to move waterborne freight on vessels berthed at piers, on piers or at other waterfront terminals, .or (b) to engage in direct and immediate checking of any such freight or of the custodial accounting therefore, or in the recording or tabulation of the hours worked at piers or other waterfront terminals by natural persons employed by earners of freight by water or stevedores, or (c) to supervise directly and immediately others who are employed as in subdivision (a) of this definition.

N.J.S.A. § 32:23-6. This definition was expanded in 1957 to include workers who performed labor that was incidental to the movement of waterborne freight. N.J.S.A. § 32:23-85(6). A longshoreman who fits either the original or expanded definition was known as a “deep sea” longshoreman. Further, the Compact gave the Commission the authority to license stevedoring companies that wanted to operate at the Port. A ‘stevedore,’ according to the Compact, is a contractor hired by a carrier of waterborne freight to move freight in ships that are berthed at piers, or at other waterfront terminals. See N.J.S.A. § 32:23-6.

By 1969, new developments in shipping technology required changes to hiring procedures on the waterfront. The New Jersey Supreme Court has summarized this new technology:

Containerization involves the loading of cargo by a shipper into a box-like object called a container. The cargo-laden container is loaded onto a truck frame that transports it to a pier where it is hoisted aboard a ship designed to carry containers. At the port of discharge, the process is simply reversed. Containerization contrasts sharply with the traditional “break-bulk” shipping method, which involved loading trucks item by item, emptying them piece by piece.at the pier, and then loading the ship in the same fashion.

Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 99 N.J. 402, 411-12, 493 A.2d 504 (1985). Containerization and other new technologies dramatically decreased the need for manual labor at the port. This decrease in the size of the labor force led, in turn, to the enactment of an amendment to the Compact: Section 5-p. Known as the “closed register statute,” Section 5-p authorized the Commission to open or close the Longshoreman’s Register so as to balance the workforce with the demand for labor. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. of Women, N.Y. Chapter v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 468 F.Supp. 317, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114. The prevalence of containerization in the shipping industry also led to the creation of a new class of dock worker: longshoremen who did not load or unload ships, but instead performed services that were incidental to those tasks. This new class of longshoremen were registered with the Commission and commonly referred to as “A-registrants,” to distinguish them from deep sea longshoremen. A-registrants were not permitted to do any work that involved the discharge or unloading of cargo vessels. New classifications of stevedores were also created to cover those contactors that were involved in the loading and unloading of the containers, cargo storage, cargo repairing, coopering, general maintenance and other miscellaneous work.

The Commission codified these worker classifications in Section 4.4 , of its Rules and Regulations. Section 4.4 divided the Longshoreman’s Register into two sections, reflecting these two classifications of labor:

(b) The register shall be divided as follows: (1) A “deep sea” register which shall include all persons registered by the commission as longshoremen and checkers except those persons registered as longshoremen pursuant to the 1969 amendments to the Act (NY Laws 1969, ch. 953; NJ Laws 1969, ch. 128); (2) An “A” or “1969 amendment” register which shall include all persons registered by the commission as longshoremen pursuant to the 1969 amendments to the act (NY Laws 1969, ch. 953; NJ Laws 1969, ch. 128).

N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 21 § 4.4 (2013). This resulted in the bifurcation of the labor force: members of the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) represented the deep sea registrants while Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractor’s Association (MMMCA) members employed the A-registrants. In the 1980s, the Commission clarified the status of these two workforces as they related to the closed register. Section 5-p was amended to now provide that “[Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the commission may include [A-registrants] in the longshoremen’s register under such terms and conditions as the commission may prescribe.” NJ.S.A. § 32:23-114(4).

Section 5-p was again amended in 1999. Increased business in the port and attrition in the labor force, among other things, necessitated changes to the procedures that had previously been used to open the longshoreman’s register. Public hearings were held in which the Commission and several of the Appellants participated. As amended, Section 5-p required that

[ t]he sponsoring employer shall certify that the selection of the persons so sponsored was made on a fair and non-discriminatory basis in accordance with the requirements of the laws of the United States and the States of New York and New Jersey dealing with equal employment opportunities.

N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(1).

The dispute before us today arose from the Commission’s decision to open the longshoremen’s register in December of 2013. The NYSA, an organization representing marine terminal operators, steve-doring companies and ship operators in the Port of New York and New Jersey, along with the MMMCA, and the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (ILA), filed a complaint against the Commission in November of 2013. The NYSA and the ILA had, three months earlier, asked the Commission to add, on its own initiative, more than 600 employees to the deep sea register. The NYSA and the ILA also told the Commission that they would recruit, train, and hire individuals pursuant to the terms of the Recruitment and Hiring Plan, which was agreed to under a new collective bargaining agreement between the NYSA and the ILA. After meeting with representatives of the NYSA, MMMCA and others, the Commission issued Determination 35 in December of 2013 which, among other things, stated that the Commission would open the Register to accept applications for 225 new positions. The Commission’s Determination also required:

... that prior to the Commission’s acceptance of any application for inclusion in the Longshoremen’s Register pursuant to this Determination, a representative of the NYSA-ILA Contract Board directly involved with the administration of the Hiring Plan shall submit a letter setting forth the name and address of the recommended individual, and certifying that:
(1) he or she has personal knowledge of the facts concerning the recruitment, referral, selection and sponsorship of [the applicant] and (2) the selection of the person so sponsored was made in a fair and nondiscriminatory basis in accordance with the requirements of the laws of the United States and the States of New York and New Jersey dealing with equal employment opportunities.

Commission Determination 35 (Dec. 3, 2013).

The Appellants sued the Commission in November of 2014. They asked for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2202 (2006). They also asked the District Court for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Commission from implementing its antidiscrimination certification requirements. The District Court denied the request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Appellants failed to show irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. The Commission then filed a motion to dismiss. Appellants amended their complaint in January of 2015, which the District Court ultimately dismissed. Appellants have timely appealed that dismissal.

III.

We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s October 9, 2014 order dismissing the Appellants’ amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and apply the same standard as the District Court. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

IV.

Appellants NYSA, ILA and the ILA Locals filed a joint brief while Appellant MMMCA opted to brief us separately. Appellants collectively question the validity of the antidiscrimination certification procedure added to Section 5-p in 1999, and, by extension, Rule 4.4. They also claim that they have successfully pleaded the Commission’s unlawful interference with their collective bargaining rights. The NYSA, ILA and ILA Locals further claim that the Commission violated their due process rights in promulgating its certification amendment in Rule 4.4. For organizational purposes, we will address these issues with reference to the specific counts of the Amended Complaint in which they were raised.

A

Dismissal of Counts I and II

The Compact permits “amendments and supplements” as long as those changes implement the Compact’s purposes and are concurred in by the legislatures of New Jersey and New York. N.J.S.A. § 32:23-70; N.Y.. Unconsol. § 9870. Such amendments have the pre-approval of Congress. Here, Count I of the Amended Complaint challenges the Commission’s amendment to Rule 4.4 on the basis that the Compact provision under which it was promulgated — the 1999 amendment to Compact Section 5-p — is not consistent with the purposes of the Compact, and is therefore invalid due to a lack of Congressional approval. Therefore, to resolve this issue, we must determine whether the antidiscrimination certification requirement of Section 5-p is a valid amendment which implements the purposes of the Compact. The parties agree that the resolution of this issue turns on whether one of the purposes of the Compact was the elimination of racial discrimination in the hiring of longshoremen. Meanwhile, Count II of the Amended Complaint turns on the scope of the 1999 amendment to Section 5-p itself; that is, whether that amendment applies to A-reg■istrants. The resolution of these questions requires us to interpret provisions of the Compact. To so do, we treat the Compact like any other federal statute, and interpret it accordingly. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128, 107 S.Ct. 2279, 96 L.Ed.2d 105 (1987).

Appellants argue that because the Compact did not specifically mention racial discrimination at the time it was enacted, any. amendment designed to ensure fair and nondiscriminatory hiring practices cannot further the Compact’s purposes and is, therefore, unconstitutional. They base this argument on their belief that the phrase “corrupt hiring practices” (which they admit the Commission was formed to combat) does not include the purposeful exclusion of racial minorities. Therefore, the Appellants conclude, the Commission cannot require them to certify that their hiring practices comply with federal and state laws dealing with equal opportunity. This argument is meritless. Like the District Court, we also conclude that Count I of the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim as matter of law because one of the purposes of the Compact is the elimination of racial discrimination in hiring. Section 5-p’s certification requirement furthers this purpose and is thus, constitutional.

The stated purpose of the Compact, as set out in Article I, is to rid the docks of “corrupt hiring practices,” “depressing and degrading” labor conditions, and “irregularity of employment.” N.J.S.A. § 32:23-2; see also Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d at 180 (“The Compact was enacted to eliminate corrupt hiring practices on the ... waterfront.”). Can it seriously be argued that racial discrimination in hiring (or anywhere, for that matter), is not a corrupt practice? We questioned counsel for the NYSA at oral argument on this very point and counsel conceded that the antidiscrimination certification requirement was “a good thing.” Oral Argument Tr. at 8-9. When pressed further, and mirroring the arguments raised in their brief, counsel maintained that racial discrimination may be a corrupt hiring practice, but that it was not one of the practices considered corrupt when the Compact was enacted in 1953. This argument belies the Compact’s legislative history and we have little difficulty concluding that such a corrupt practice was indeed contemplated by the state legislatures and Congress in enacting and approving the Compact.

Racial discrimination in hiring was a concern brought to the attention of the state legislatures in 1953. Testimony provided by Cleophus Jacobs, the secretary-treasurer of ILA Local 968, a predominately African-American local, revealed that of its 500 members, only 100 had been getting work at that time. Jacobs specifically pointed to the shape-up system as an instrument of racial discrimination:

Our opposition to the shape-up, therefore, is not of recent origin, nor are we jumping on the bandwagon of an outraged public opinion. To the members of our local the shape-up had produced an even greater evil than that which the public generally has now come to recognize. It has been the instrument of racial discrimination against our members and consequently has further reduced job opportunities for them.

WC-ADD at 301. This testimony was not the only instance where racial discrimination was discussed prior to the enactment of the Compact.. Special Counsel to the Dewey hearings, Theodore Kiendl, followed-up on Jacob’s statements by asking him:

Q: And you think [the shape-up] system leads to racial discrimination?
A: It does. Whether crime might have been produced or not, but the system of shape-up really facilitates the exercise of racial discrimination.

WC-ADD at 305. Counsel also produced a March 1952 edition of the “Negro Longshoreman,” a newsletter written and edited by the rank-and-file membership of Local 968. Counsel called attention to the following statement: “We Negro longshoremen are discriminated against first of all by our own International officials of the ILA who deny us representation or jurisdiction over any piers on the waterfront.” Id. at 306. Finally, the record of the state hearings clearly demonstrates that racial discrimination was one of the corrupt hiring practices the Compact strove to eliminate. Counsel directly asked Jacobs:

Q: Now, don’t you think that the programs presented by the State Crime Commission eliminate the shape-up entirely and substituting a new form of hiring is highly desirable to obtain the very ends that your union wants to accomplish, to wit, the elimination of racial discrimination entirely?
A. I agree the Commission has made an effort ...

Id.

The subsequent federal Congressional hearings on the Compact likewise contain discussions about the problem of racial discrimination in waterfront hiring practices. During a 1953 hearing on the Compact before the United States Senate, New Hampshire Senator Charles W. Tobey scathingly criticized ILA hiring practices of the time as racially discriminatory. Senator Tobey first noted the ILA’s practice of charging African-American union members double the amount of initiation fees they charged to white members. WC-ADD at 445. Then, the Senator continued his statements decrying the racial discrimination inflicted upon the ILA’s African-American members:

Man’s inhumanity to man is being exemplified in certain labor circles. Such labor unions had better take cover. They are riding for a fall. The time cannot come too soon. Let us clean them out. Who is running this country anyway, I ask — honest, God-fearing people, or crooked labor union leaders? We can give names and addresses. Cry out, America, “Unclean, unclean.”

Id. The “corrupt hiring practices” language used in the Compact embodies the concerns both the state and federal legislatures had in confronting racial discrimination in hiring on the docks. Given this legislative history, we easily conclude that the 1999 Amendment to Section 5-p reflected the legislatures’ belief that ending racial discrimination in employment was part of the Compact’s core purposes. As such, it had Congressional approval. We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Count I fails to state a claim.

We also will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Count II. As we indicated earlier, the issues raised in this Count invoke the scope of Rule 4.4, that is, to which workers it applies. Under the framework in place for hiring of A-registrants, the ILA has the exclusive right to recruit and select potential employees to be referred for employment as A-registrants. The Commission maintains that this practice is no better than the shape-up system of old. In amending Rule 4.4, the Commission’s purpose was to hold employers accountable for any racial discrimination that may have infected the ILA’s selection and referral of A-registrants. Put another way, the amendment was an attempt by the Commission to ensure that the NYSA and the MMMCA’s hiring of A-registrants was done in a nondiscriminatory manner.

Appellants argue that the Rule’s certification requirement is improper because Section 5-p, on which it was based, only applies to deep-sea longshoremen, not A-registrants. Appellant MMMCA goes further, arguing that the Commission has repeatedly stated that the Section 5-p does not apply to maintenance and repair workers, an overwhelming majority of whom are A-registrants. A look at the language of Section 5-p itself quickly defeats this argument. Section 5-p of the Compact contains five subdivisions, the fourth of which states that “[njotwithstanding any other provision of this act, the commission may include in the longshoremen’s register under such terms and conditions as the commission may prescribe: ... [a] person defined as a ‘longshoreman’ in subdivision (6) of section l(5-a) of P.L.1954, c. 14 (C.32:23-85), who is employed by a stevedore as defined in paragraph (b) or (c) of subdivision (1) of the same section (C.32:23-85) and whose employment is not subject to the guaranteed annual income provisions of any collective bargaining agreement relating to longshoremen.” N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(4). These persons, in other words, are A-registrants and under the Compact, the Commission may include them in the register under whatever terms and conditions it wishes.

Appellants offer us little contrary argument, pointing only to an unreported ruling of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York as support for their position. In Bozzi, supra, two A-registrant workers had mistakenly been working as deep-sea longshoremen in the holds of general cargo vessels. The Commission, after learning of this error, told the two workers to cease performing general longshore work, except for those jobs they had been approved to perform. The A-registrants sued, asking for a declaratory judgment that the Commission had the authority under Section 5 — p(5)(b) of the Compact to include them in the closed deep-sea register. The Commission argued that the closed register provision has always been interpreted to apply only to deep-sea longshoreman and the Commission has consistently viewed Section 5-p(5)(b) as a housekeeping provision, which merely clarifies the status of A-registrants. The District Court, after an extensive discussion of Section 5-p(5)(b)’s legislative history, agreed with the Commission, and held that the two A-registrants could not individually be added to the closed deep-sea register. The individual workers asked for a declaratory judgment that the Commission had the authority to include them in the closed deep-sea register.

The Appellants seize upon the Commission’s position in Bozzi — that the closed register provisions of Section 5-p only apply to deep-sea longshoremen, not A-registrants — to argue that the nondiscrimination certification requirements of Section 5-p only apply to deep-sea longshoremen. This contention is baseless and misconstrues Bozzi. While A-registrants may not be included in the closed register provisions of Section 5-p, they are subject to Section 5-p’s other provisions, like the nondiscrimination provisions at issue here. As the District Court noted, the Commission has been interpreting Section 5-p(5)(b) this way for decades, and that interpretation is entitled to great weight. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

In sum, Compact Section 5p-(5)(b) clearly provides that A-registrants may be included in the deep-sea register under “such terms and conditions as the [C]om-mission may prescribe.” N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(4). The District Court did not err in dismissing Count II of the Amended Complaint'for failure to state a claim.

B.

Dismissal of Counts III, IV and VII

We will also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Counts III, IV, and VII of the Amended Complaint. Taken together, these three counts accuse the Commission of unlawfully interfering with the Appellants’ collective bargaining rights by implementing the nondiscrimination certification provisions. The Appellants also maintain that the Commission’s actions violate national labor policy by dictating the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. We reject both contentions.

We take these claims out of numerical order, and start our discussion with Count VII. The District Court dismissed Count VII for an inadequacy in pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and we review such a ruling for an abuse of discretion. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). We see no abuse of the District Court’s discretion in its dismissal of this count. At the outset, the NYSA and ILA acknowledge this count’s lack of a specific .demand for relief. NYSA-ILA Br. at 61. This omission, in and of itself, justifies a dismissal of the count. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Further, we share the District Court’s conclusion that Count VII is little more than a collection of conclusory statements and a recitation of Commission. Determination 35. Given this, the District Court’s conclusion that the Appellants failed to connect their allegations to a violation of Compact Article XV was not unreasonable and therefore, its decision to dismiss this count for a failure to adequately allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief was not an abuse of its discretion.

Turning now to Counts III and IV, •we note that the Appellants argue, with more specificity, that the Commission’s actions violate Article XV of the Compact, which states, among other things, that:

This compact [was] not designed ... to limit in any way any rights granted or derived from any other statute or any rule of law for employees to organize in labor organizations, to bargain collectively and to act in any other way individually, collectively, and though labor organizations or other representatives of their own choosing.
This compact is not designed and shall not be construed to limit in any way rights of longshoremen, hiring agents, pier superintendents or port watchmen or their employers to bargain collectively....

N.J.S.A. § 32:23-68, -69. Appellants argue that this Article guarantees them “unfettered collective bargaining” and gives them “freedom of choice in the selection of employees.” NYSA-ILA Br. at 9-10. This position is untenable, however, because the language of Article XV is not absolute. Indeed, in this very context, we have held that collective bargaining rights cannot supersede “the Commission’s supervisory role regarding practices that might lead to corruption.” Sea Land, 764 F.2d at 966-67. That is, Article XV “guarantees that [collectively bargained] hiring procedures will not be displaced where they eomport with the Compact.” Id. at 963. Obviously, the converse is true as well: where actions are not in furtherance of the original purposes of the Compact, collective bargaining rights may be infringed upon.

Here, as we previously determined, the eradication of racial discrimination in hiring was one of the original purposes of the Compact. The Commission’s actions in requiring certification that prospective employees were selected in a nondiscriminatory manner certainly further the Compact’s purposes of rooting out corrupt hiring practices such as racial discrimination. Therefore, the Commission’s certification regulation cannot be viewed as an improper intrusion into Appellants’ collective bargaining rights.

Appellant MMMCA takes a slightly different tact on this issue, arguing that the Commission cannot undertake any action that would limit the ability of labor and management to agree to a mutually satisfactory way of selecting employees. The MMMCA maintains that “the Compact treats as inviolable whatever method the bargaining parties arrive at.” MMMCA Br. at 56. While the Compact does safeguard the Appellants’ collective bargaining rights, it does so only to the extent those rights do not conflict with the purposes of the Compact. We held as much in Sea Land, supra. There, in order to resolve a conflict between a Commission regulation and an existing CBA, we proposed a modification, noting that this change “maintains both the Commission’s supervisory role regarding practices that might lead to corruption and the union’s collectively-bargained hiring procedures.” 764 F.2d at 966-67. We reject, therefore, the argument that Appellants’ collective bargaining rights are absolute and will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of these counts.

C.

Due Process Issues

Appellants’ last issue will not detain us long. The Appellants contend that their due process rights were violated because the Commission did not conduct public hearings before implementing the nondiscrimination amendment. This argument does not hold up under scrutiny because the Commission’s actions were legislative and procedural due process does not extend to legislative action. See Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915); see also Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc)).

First, and contrary to their own argument, the Appellants note that the Amended Complaint alleged that the nondiscrimination amendment was “enacted,” which connotes legislative action. Second, the Amended Complaint fails to allege that the Commission acted in some way that was contrary to statutory procedures. Indeed, amending the Commission’s own rules is legislative action.

More importantly, the Commission gave the NYSA-ILA ample notice and opportunity vis-a-vis the nondiscrimination amendment. The Appellants were notified of the proposed amendments and indeed, submitted comments in opposition during the pertinent time period. We see no procedural due process violation here simply because the Commission did not hold a public hearing before amending its own rules. Neither did the District Court and we will affirm that determination.

V.

Like the District Court, we conclude that the Amended Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, we see no error in the District Court’s dismissal.

      . Appellee Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor is a bi-state corporate and political entity created by interstate compact. N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1; N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9801 (McKinney). All statutory citations to the Compact provisions will be to the New Jersey statute, unless otherwise noted.

      . For detailed historical'information on the New York waterfront and its association with criminal activity, see Nathan Ward, Dark Harbor: The War for the New York Waterfront (2010); see also Jonathan Eig, ‘Waterfront’ Jungle, N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2010.

      . See also Levias v. Pac. Maritime Ass’n, 760 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2011).

      . The Compact Clause of the Constitution provides that ”[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Accordingly, before a compact between two States can be given effect it must be approved by Congress. See Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 66, 124 S.Ct. 598, 157 L.Ed.2d 461 (2003). Once a Compact receives such approval, it is "transformfed] ... into a law of the United States.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

      . These longshoremen are sometimes referred to as “five-digit” longshoremen in light of the five digit registration number assigned them by the Commission. See Bozzi v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, No. 90-cv-0926, 1994 WL 606043 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1994).

        . The "A” classification comes from the "A” prefix attached before these worker’s multi-digit registration number, which appear on licenses issued by the Commission to those workers. See Bozzi, 1994 WL 606043 at *3.

      .The MMMCA represents maintenance contractor employers and the ILA represents longshoremen and other waterfront workers employed by the NYSA’s members. Also parties to this dispute are two local chapters of the ILA — Local 1804-1 and Local 1814. Where appropriate, we will refer to all Appellants collectively.

      . Under this plan, 51% of new hires were to consist of honorably discharged military veterans, 25% of new hires would be referrals from the ILA and 24% would be referrals from the NYSA.

      . A copy of Determination 35 is available at http://www.waterfrontcommission.or^'news/ determinations 5 .pdf

      . Congress’ pre-approval of such amendments is certainly rare. As the Supreme Court has noted: "Congress expressly gave its consent to such implementing legislation not formally part of the compact. This provision in the consent by Congress to a compact is so extraordinary as to be unique in the history of compacts. Of all the instances of congressional approval of state compacts ... we have found no other in which Congress gave its consent to implementing legislation. It is instructive that this unique provision has occurred in connection with approval of a compact dealing with the prevention of crime where, because of the peculiarly local nature of the problem, the inference is strongest that local policies are not to be thwarted.” De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 154, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960).

      . Appellant MMMCA argues that Article I of the Compact is "the least likely place to find ' the purposes' of the Compact,” and that "Congress did not treat ‘the purposes of the Compact’ as a coded reference to Article I.” MMMCA Br. at 37, 48. Instead, the MMMCA maintains that Article I is merely a preamble or introduction for the "substantive provisions of the Compact.” MMMCA Br. at 47-48. As the Commission points out, however, this argument quickly withers when confronted with testimony offered when the Compact was discussed in the United States Senate in July of 1953. Speaking about the Compact, New Jersey Senator Robert C. Hendrickson, who had introduced a bill granting the consent of Congress to the Compact, stated that "the purpose of this bill can be best stated by referring to article I of the compact, which sets forth the findings which shook and rocked the American people on the occasion of their recent public disclosure.” WC-ADD at 448. In support of their arguments on appeal, the Appellee submitted an addendum containing Commission reports and extensive legislative history materials. We refer to that addendum hereinafter as "WC-ADD.”

      . The NYSA and the ILA argue, in a brief footnote, that the District Court’s dismissal of Count V should be reversed for the same reasons as Count I. NYSA-ILA Br. at 45 n.10. They point to no other grounds for reversal of this Count. Inasmuch as we will affirm the dismissal of Count I, we likewise will affirm the dismissal of Count V.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Michele Owen BLACK, Appellant, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY; Det. John T. Fallon; Lower Merion Township; Det. Gregory Henry; Bryan Garner; Chief Fire Off. Charles Mcgarvey; Deputy Fire Marshall Frank Hand; State Trooper Robert Pomponio.
    No. 15-3399
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Argued on June 8, 2016
    (Filed: August 30, 2016)
    Amended September 16, 2016

      Michael C. Schwartz [ARGUED], James, Schwartz & Associates, 1500 Walnut Street, 21st Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102, Counsel for Appellant.
    Carol A. Vanderwoude [ARGUED], Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, 2000 Market Street, 18th Floor, Suite 2300, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for Appellees Township of Lower Mer-ion, Detective Gregory Henry, Bryan A. Garner, Chief Fire Off. Charles McGarvey and Deputy Fire Marshal Frank Hand.

      Philip W. Newcomer [ARGUED], Montgomery County, Solicitor’s Office, One Montgomery Plaza, Suite 800, P.O. Box 311, Norristown, PA 19404-0311, Counsel for Appellees Montgomery County and Detective John T. Fallon.
    Claudia M. Tesoro [ARGUED], John G. Knorr, III, Office of the Attorney General, 21 South 12th Street, Third Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19107, Counsel for Appellee State Trooper Robert Pomponio.
    Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
   OPINION

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Michele Black filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law alleging that various police and fire officials, as well as a county and township, violated her constitutional rights in connection with criminal proceedings against her. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the District Court granted these motions.

Two issues are now before us on appeal from the order granting the motions to dismiss. The first issue is whether the District Court erred in determining that Black was not “seized” as required for a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. The second issue is whether the District Court erred in finding that Black’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for fabricated evidence required that she be convicted at trial, since she was acquitted. We hold that the answer is yes for both issues. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings;

I.

On November 21, 2012, a fire broke out at the home where Black had grown up in Lower Merion Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Black’s mother had sold the home two days before. Originally, the closing date was set for November 30, 2012, but it was moved up so the buyers could upgrade the wiring before they moved in. The buyers could not obtain homeowner’s insurance unless the old wiring was upgraded because it was viewed as a fire hazard. Black’s mother entered into a post-settlement possession addendum which allowed her to remove her possessions from the' home while the buyer’s contractors upgraded the wiring.

The fire broke out in the third floor of the home. Black was in the home helping her mother remove possessions, while the buyer’s electricians were upgrading the wiring. The fire resulted in a “V” pattern of fire damage extending from a 220-volt electrical outlet. The electricians extinguished the fire before they called the fire department. After arriving at the home, the Gladwyne Fire Chief called the dispatcher to report an electrical fire.

Defendant Deputy Fire Marshal Frank Hand and his supervisor defendant Chief Fire Officer Charles McGarvey arrived at the scene. Hand was not an electrical expert, but he disassembled the electrical outlet where the fire had started. Hand could not determine that the fire was accidental, so he called the District Attorney’s Office and the state police for help. Hand concluded that the fire was intentionally started and was not an electrical fire. Despite fire damage on the electrical outlet, Hand did not preserve the outlet, supporting brackets, electrical box, or the outlet cover. Hand intentionally misrepresented his findings that the wire to the outlet had been cut 18 inches from the outlet to support the proposition that there was no power source for the outlet. His supervisor, defendant McGarvey, witnessed the fire scene and assisted Hand with his investigation.

Defendant State Trooper Thomas Pom-ponio, an alternate deputy fire marshal, arrived at the scene. After he learned that the wire had already been cut, Pomponio concluded the fire was caused by an open flame, ruling out that the outlet caused the fire. Pomponio did not inspect the electrical panel in the basement as he normally would because he heard that it had already been inspected. Had he done so, he would have discovered that the fire was an electrical one.

Defendant John Fallon, a certified fire inspector, arrived at the home, examined the outlet and concluded the damage was caused by an open flame, not by the electrical outlet. Fallon determined that the outlet was not energized when the fire occurred. In arriving at his conclusion, Fallon relied on the word of one of the electricians, rather than personally inspecting the panel box in the basement as required by protocol.

A box of matches was found on another windowsill in the room where the fire started, and Fallon, Pomponio, and Hand assumed these matches were used to start the fire, despite evidence that this was an electrical fire. These three defendants never tested the box of matches for DNA or fingerprints, or analyzed whether the match strike pad had been used.

Shortly after the fire broke out, Fallon, Pomponio, Hand, as well as defendant Detectives Gregory Henry and Bryan Garner, first questioned the electricians.'Black “was advised that she was not free to leave the premises until she was questioned by police, and was escorted by police to and from the bathroom.” Appendix (“App.”) A41. These defendants did not check the veracity of the electricians’ story. During the interrogation of Black, the officers immediately accused Black of setting the fire. Black also alleges that at the end of her interrogation, Fallon told her that if she did not surrender herself to them at a later date, a warrant would be issued for her arrest, the defendants would have her hometown District Attorney’s Office in California send a police officer to arrest her, she would remain in custody until extradited, and remain in jail until her arraignment.

Black alleges that Fallon made several material falsehoods and omissions in an affidavit of probable cause to arrest her. These falsehoods and omissions included: failing to report that the fire started at an electrical outlet; failing to mention that the Gladwyne Fire Chief first reported an electrical fire; failing to mention that electricians were at the scene to fix the wiring; failing to mention that the circuit panel was never checked in the basement; and failing to mention that the outlet and live wires were never tested.

Black returned home to California after the fire. On December 17, 2012, Pennsylvania authorities issued an arrest warrant for Black for arson endangering persons, risking catastrophe, criminal mischief, and recklessly endangering another person. Black flew to Pennsylvania on December 18, 2012 for her arraignment. She was arraigned and was released on $50,000 unsecured bail. A condition of her bail was that Black was required to appear at all subsequent proceedings. Black was then required to be fingerprinted and photographed at a police station, which took over an hour.

Black again returned to her home in California. On January 24, 2013, Black flew from California to Pennsylvania to attend her preliminary hearing. She flew from California to Pennsylvania for twelve out of fourteen pre-trial conferences because the Court Notices for each conference said that if she did not appear a bench warrant would be issued for her arrest.

Prior to trial, Black retained a fire expert, John J. Lentini, who concluded that the fire was unequivocally an electrical one, not an arson. Lentini reached out to Hand to discuss his findings and to review the photographs of the fire with Hand. Lentini never received a response from Hand. Black’s counsel emailed the assistant district attorney assigned to the case to advise him about Lentini’s findings and to offer to meet the prosecutor and his expert. The assistant district attorney never responded to this offer.

On April 23, 2014, Black’s trial began. Fallon and Hand offered evidence at trial that the outlet was not energized and that the wire was cut. Photographs offered by Black, however, taken the day of the fire show the wire was intact. The photographs offered and explained by Fallon and Hand appear to have been taken later. Black presented evidence that the defendants fabricated and suppressed exculpatory evidence. On April 24, 2014, she was found not guilty of all charges. The jury deliberated for less than forty minutes.

Subsequently, Black filed this lawsuit on November 21, 2014. She filed the Second Amended Complaint on June 11, 2015. Black named as defendants Montgomery County, Detective John T. Fallon, Lower Merion Township, Detective Gregory Henry, Detective Bryan Garner, Chief Fire Officer Charles McGarvey, Deputy Fire Marshall Frank Hand, and State Trooper Robert Pomponio. The complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged, inter alia, malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights due to fabrication, suppression, and destruction of evidence, conspiracy claims under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), against the defendant government entities, and various state law claims.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On September 21, 2015, the- District Court granted the motions to dismiss all of the federal claims and declined jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In particular, the District Court dismissed Black’s malicious prosecution claim because it determined Black never experienced the types of liberty restrictions that constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. Next, the District Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for fabricated evidence could not succeed because our decision in Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014), requires a conviction for such a claim, and Black was acquitted at trial. Finally, the District Court dismissed the conspiracy and Monell claims because Black could not succeed on the underlying malicious prose-ration or due process claims. Black filed a timely appeal.

II.

Our review of the granting of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).

III.

A plaintiff seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must demonstrate “that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiffs federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but rather a mechanism to vindicate rights afforded by the Constitution or a federal statute. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Black argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim and her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim for fabrication of evidence. We. agree.

A.

To prove a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). Black challenges the District Court’s dismissal of her Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim based on its determination that she was not “seized” by the defendants.

1.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, forged a general definition of the meaning of seizure: “when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The restraint by an officer must be “through means intentionally applied” as opposed to an unknowing act. Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). A traditional arrest by an officer is a commonly understood type of seizure. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 568 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (“An arrest, of course, qualifies as a ‘seizure’ of a ‘person’ .... ”). But the scope of what may be considered a seizure is broader than this common example and the Supreme Court has supplied some helpful guidance as to the parameters of the term. See generally Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (“It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime.... ”).

An actual physical touching is not required to constitute a seizure of a person, but in the absence of a physical touching, there must be a submission to an officer’s show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). As a corollary, the deprivation or restraint of a person’s liberty may be physical, or it may be that “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (plurality). Cf. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“[T]he ‘coercive effect of the encounter’ can be measured ... by asking whether ‘a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991))). So, while an officer merely asking a citizen questions may not be a seizure, circumstances indicating a seizure might include “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (plurality); see, e.g., Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (“The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” (quotation makes omitted)); Brower, 489 U.S. at 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (noting that officers’ use of a roadblock to stop petitioner’s car constituted a seizure of the petitioner and explaining “a roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, but [it] is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur”); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (plurality) (holding that no seizure occurred when agents approached a person to ask questions in a public place, and the agents identified themselves but did not display weapons, did not place demands upon the person, and were not wearing uniforms); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (“In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden ‘seized’ petitioner ... when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.”).

In Albright v. Oliver, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that a party essentially claiming an officer maliciously prosecuted him cannot rely upon a substantive due process theory and held specifically that “it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright’s claim must be judged.” 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). Although the Court posited that Albright’s “surrender to the State’s show of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,” id. the Court did not rule upon whether Albright’s claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment because he failed to raise the issue, id. at 275, 114 S.Ct. 807.

Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurrence in Albright discussing the meaning of seizure and, in particular, what we have termed a “continuing seizure.” See, e.g., Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011); DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 602 (3d Cir. 2005). Justice Ginsburg first noted that consideration of the common law may assist today’s understanding of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. Albright, 510 U.S. at 277, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She acknowledged that, “[a]t common law, an arrested person’s seizure was deemed to continue even after release from official custody.” Id. at 277-78, 114 S.Ct. 807. Noting that the common law purposes of arrest and other means such as bail are to compel a person to appear in court, Justice Ginsburg recognized that “[t]he common law thus seems to have regarded the difference between pretrial incarceration and other ways to secure a defendant’s court attendance as a distinction between methods of retaining control over a defendant’s person, not one between seizure and its opposite.” Id. at 278, 114 S.Ct. 807. Justice Ginsberg determined that this concept of seizure comports with “common sense” as well as “common understanding,” and explained:

A person facing serious criminal charges is hardly freed from the state’s control upon his release from a police officer’s physical grip. He is required to appear in court at the state’s command. He is often subject, as in this case, to the condition that he seek formal permission from the court (at significant expense) before exercising what would otherwise be his unquestioned right to travel outside the jurisdiction. Pending prosecution, his employment prospects may be diminished severely, he may suffer repu-tational harm, and he will experience the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense.
A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers greater burdens. That difference, however, should not lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still “seized” in the constitutionally relevant sense. Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his movements, indeed “seized” for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in court and answer the state’s charges. He is equally bound to appear, and is hence “seized” for trial, when the state employs the less strong-arm means of a summons in lieu of arrest to secure his presence in court.

Id. at 278-79.

We have described the analysis in Justice Ginsburg’s Albright concurrence as “compelling and supported by Supreme Court case law,” Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1998), and have expressly adopted her concept of “continuing seizure,” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 319. Further, we have explained that under this view, “[p]re-trial restrictions of liberty aimed at securing a suspect’s court attendance are all ‘seizures’ ... [because] the difference between detention in jail, release on bond, and release subject to compliance with other conditions is in the degree of restriction on the individual’s liberty, not in the kind of restriction.” Id. at 320.

We subsequently applied Justice Ginsburg’s analysis to determine whether a person was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. In Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, we held that a plaintiff seeking section 1983 relief for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights was seized post-indictment because he had to post a $10,000 bond, attend court hearings including his trial and arraignment, contact Pretrial Services on a weekly basis, and was prohibited from travelling outside of two states, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 161 F.3d at 222. Noting that we had adopted “a broad approach in considering what constitutes a seizure,” id. at 224, we concluded “that the combination of restrictions imposed upon Gallo, because they intentionally limited his liberty; constituted a seizure,” id at 225.

In contrast, in DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, we held that the plaintiffs were not seized when “only issued a summons; they were never arrested; they never posted bail; they were free to travel; and they did not have to report to Pretrial Services.” 407 F.3d at 603. We noted that unlike the “significant pretrial restrictions” imposed in Gallo, the plaintiffs’ liberty in DiBella was restricted only during their municipal court trial and that merely attending trial does not amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. We further explained that “[pjretrial custody and some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Id.

2.

Turning to the facts alleged in this case and applying pertinent case law, we conclude that Black was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. Black, insofar as she was charged with arson and other crimes, meets Justice Ginsburg’s threshold of “[a] person facing serious criminal charges.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 278, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Black’s liberty was subject to constitutionally significant restraints by the defendants, according to the complaint.

Less than one month after being interrogated by police and accused of committing arson, Black flew from her home in California to Pennsylvania for her arraignment because an arrest warrant had been issued and she had been directed to return. See Gallo, 161 F.3d at 223 (“When he was obliged to go to court and answer the charges against him, Gallo, like the plaintiff in Terry, was brought to .a stop.... [I]t is difficult to distinguish this kind of halt from the exercise of authority deemed to be a seizure in Terry.”). She spent more than an hour being fingerprinted and photographed at a police station — and she was clearly not free to leave. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (plurality). Black was required to post unsecured bail of $50,000. She was told that the bond would be forfeited if she did not attend all court proceedings — compelling her to travel across the United States to attend pretrial hearings. Even though Black was never incarcerated, that “should not lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still ‘seized’ in the constitutionally relevant sense.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 279, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Further, the cloud of very serious charges demonstrates that Black was “hardly freed from the state’s control upon [her] release from a police officer’s physical grip.” Id. at 278, 114 S.Ct. 807.

The defendants seek to distinguish this case from other similar cases by pointing out that the Pennsylvania state court handling Black’s criminal proceedings did not impose a formal limitation on her travel. However, in Gallo, we determined that the plaintiffs “liberty was restrained through travel restrictions and mandatory court appearances.” 161 F.3d at 225 (emphasis added); see also id. at 224-25 (“[Constraints on Gallo’s freedom were not limited to restrictions on his travel, he was also compelled to attend all court hearings.”). Accordingly, it is significant that Black was required to fly from California to Pennsylvania for twelve pre-trial conferences in just a year “to appear in court at the state’s command.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 278, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We have consistently held that a post-arraignment defendant who is ‘obligated to appear in court in connection with [criminal] charges whenever his attendance [i]s required’ suffers a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty.” (quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997))). Black was forced to travel this great distance — presumably at great expense — a dozen times to defend herself. This demonstrates that Black was “scarcely at liberty; [s]he remained] apprehended, arrested in [her] movements, indeed ‘seized’ for trial, so long as [s]he [was] bound to appear in court and answer the state’s charges.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 279, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In contrast to Gallo and DiBella, Black did not live in the jurisdiction where she was tried and if she did not travel, she faced serious charges and a possibility of incarceration. Further, Black’s life was presumably disrupted by the compulsion that she travel out of state a dozen times. See generally id. at 278, 114 S.Ct. 807 (“Pending prosecution, [her] employment prospects may be diminished severely, [s]he may suffer reputational harm, and [s]he will experience the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense.”). Black’s circumstances demonstrate that she experienced “constitutionally significant restrictions on [her] freedom of movement for the purpose of obtaining h[er] presence at a judicial proceeding” and she was “seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 321-22.

Considering the totality of the circumstances alleged, Black has sufficiently alleged that her liberty was intentionally restrained by the defendants. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s determination that she was not seized as is required for a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.

B.

We next consider Black’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for fabrication of evidence. Black has alleged that defendants Fallon and Hand conspired with the other defendants and deliberately fabricated, suppressed, and destroyed evidence from the inception of their investigation through the trial of the criminal ease against her. Relying on our opinion in Halsey v. Pfeiffer, the District Court ruled that Black’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for fabricated evidence must fail because Halsey requires a conviction for such a claim, and she was acquitted at trial.

The legal question before us is whether a plaintiff may pursue a fabricated evidence claim against state actors under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even if the plaintiff was never convicted. While' we held in Halsey that a fabricated evidence claim could proceed when a plaintiff was convicted at trial, we explicitly left open the question of whether such a claim would be viable if a plaintiff was acquitted. Consistent with other Courts of Appeals that have considered this question, as well as our reasoning in Halsey, we now hold that such a stand-alone fabrication of evidence claim can proceed if there is no conviction.

We begin our analysis by examining our decision in Halsey. Much of our discussion in that decision centered upon which constitutional right was implicated by a fabricated evidence claim and, ultimately, whether there could be a stand-alone claim for fabrication of evidence. 750 F.3d at 288-96. The defendants rightly conceded that fabrication of evidence would deny a defendant due process of law, but they argued that a plaintiff could only seek redress through a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution action, as “the two claims are intertwined and ... the former [a due process claim] can only exist as a portion of the latter [a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim].” Id. at 290. The plaintiff countered that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause protects the right to be free from evidence that is fabricated by state actors and is independent of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 290-91. Viewing both types of claims, we recognized that not all of the plaintiffs allegations may “fall under the traditional definition of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.” Id. at 292. Further, we observed the untenable possibility “that there would not be a redressable constitutional violation when a state actor used fabricated evidence in a criminal proceeding if the plaintiff suing the actor could not prove the elements of a malicious prosecution case, such as the lack of probable cause for the prosecution.” Id. We also observed that “[w]hen falsified evidence is used as a basis to initiate the prosecution of a defendant, or is used to convict him, the defendant has been injured regardless of whether the totality of the evidence, excluding the fabricated evidence, would have given the state actor a probable cause defense in a malicious prosecution action that a defendant later brought against him.” Id. at 289. As a result, we rejected the defendants’ argument that claims of evidence fabrication must be tied to malicious prosecution cases. Id. at 292. We supported this view by noting “that no sensible concept of ordered liberty is consistent with law enforcement cooking up its own evidence.” Id. at 292-93.

Addressing the issue presented in Halsey we held, accordingly, that “if a defendant has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted.” Id. at 294. Nonetheless, we explicitly left open the question we face today. Id. at 294 n.19 (“Nor do we decide whether a defendant acquitted at a trial where fabricated evidence has been used against him has an actionable section 1983 claim.” (emphasis added)). The defendants seem to argue, inter alia, that because we cautioned that courts in our circuit should not use the Halsey decision “beyond the scope of our holding,” id. at 295, we have already foreclosed the question.

We see no reason to require a conviction as a prerequisite to a standalone due process claim against a state actor for fabrication of evidence. The harm we were concerned with in Halsey — corruption of the trial process — occurs whether or not one is convicted. It would be indeed anomalous if an attentive jury correctly saw through fabricated evidence, and its acquittal categorically barred later relief to the criminal defendant. Such a result would insulate the ineffective fabricator of evidence while holding accountable only the skillful fabricator. Fabricated evidence is an affront to due process of law, and state actors seeking to frame citizens undermine fundamental fairness and are responsible for “corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); see Napue v. People of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (acknowledging the principle that state actors “may not knowingly use false evidence ... [is] implicit in any concept of ordered liberty”). The Supreme Court has explained that section 1983 is intended “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). A contrary holding would contravene the purposes of section 1983. There is no meaningful reason why due process protections precluding fabricated evidence should turn on whether or not one is convicted at trial.'

Our reasoning in Halsey makes no distinction between fabricated evidence leading to a wrongful conviction and wrongful criminal charges. For example, we repeatedly referred to the injury of falsified evidence leading to wrongful initiation of prosecution. See, e.g., 750 F.3d at 289 (“When falsified evidence is used as a basis to initiate the prosecution of a defendant, or is used to convict him, the defendant has been injured....” (emphasis added)); id. at 294 n.19 (“[I]f fabricated evidence is used as a basis for a criminal charge that would not have been filed without its use the defendant certainly has suffered an injury.”). Furthermore, when we explained in Halsey why the injury violated due process, we focused on the corruption of the trial process. See id. at 293 (“[W]e think it self-evident that a police officer’s fabrication and forwarding to prosecutors of known false evidence works an unacceptable corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” (quotation marks omitted and emphasis added)). It is challenging to square away Halsey’s broad language about “law and fundamental justice,” id. with a requirement that one be convicted for a fabricated evidence claim to be viable; the harm of the fabrication is corrupting regardless of the outcome at trial or the particular time in the proceeding that the corruption occurs. We stressed in Halsey that we were not suggesting that “there is nothing wrong with the fabricating of evidence if it does not affect the final verdict.” Id. at 295 n.20.

Others Courts of Appeals have permitted plaintiffs to pursue due process claims predicated on the fabrication of evidence notwithstanding the fact, as here, that the plaintiff was not convicted of criminal charges. See, e.g., Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015); Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997). For instance, in Cole, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized “a due process right not to have police deliberately fabricate evidence and use it to frame and bring false charges against a person.” 802 F.3d at 771. The court noted that deliberate framing by officials “offends the most strongly held values of our nation.” Id. at 772. Accordingly, the court determined that “even when a trial functions properly to vindicate a person’s innocence,” fabrication of evidence deprives a person of his or her due process rights. Id. at 767. The court “held that a victim of intentional fabrication of evidence by officials is denied due process when he is either convicted or acquitted.” Id. at 768 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[A] conviction [is] a requirement we have not insisted upon.”).

Accordingly, we hold that an acquitted criminal defendant may have a stand-alone fabricated evidence claim against state actors under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have been criminally charged. In Halsey, we required a “reasonable likelihood” that a defendant would not have been convicted absent the fabricated evidence, and that standard was merely based on principles of causation. 750 F.3d at 294 n.19. The “reasonable likelihood” standard we employ simply requires that a plaintiff draw a “meaningful connection” between her particular due process injury and the use of fabricated evidence against her. See id.; see also Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish both causation in fact and proximate causation.”).

Aside from the causation requirement, there are other hurdles facing a plaintiff alleging a due process violation for- fabrication of evidence. For instance, as we cautioned in Halsey, a civil plaintiffs fabricated evidence claim should not survive summary judgment unless he can demonstrate that the fabricated evidence “was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal case.” See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295. In addition, there is a notable bar for evidence to be considered “fabricated.” We have noted that “testimony that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to have been wrong.” Id. There must be “persuasive evidence supporting a conclusion that the proponents of the evidence” are aware that evidence is incorrect or that the evidence is offered in bad faith. Id. For these reasons, we reiterate that “we expect that it will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot obtain a summary judgment in a civil action charging him with having fabricated evidence used in an earlier criminal case.” Id. at 295.

We conclude that Black’s acquittal does not preclude her claim that the defendants intentionally fabricated evidence in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand the District Court’s dismissal of Black’s fabrication of evidence claim.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      . These facts come from Black's Second Amended Complaint and are construed in the light most favorable to her. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002).

      . The fact that Black was in the home when the fire occurred does not appear to be specifically alleged in the complaint. But both parties state it in their briefs, Black Br. 3; Montgomery County Br. 3, and it is implied by subsequent events.

      . Release on unsecured bail bond means "[r]elease conditioned upon the defendant's written agreement to be liable for a fixed sum of money if he or she fails to appear as required or fails to comply with the conditions of the bail bond. No money or other form of security is deposited.” Pa. R. Crim. P. 524(C)(3).

      . The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

      . We have recognized that the lack of a decision on the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim in Albright "as well as the splintered views on the constitutional implications of malicious prosecution claims expressed in the various concurrences, has created great uncertainty in the law.” Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that "Albright muddied the waters rather than clarified them”); Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996) (alluding to the "Albright minefield”)).

      . For instance, we have noted that in Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300-01, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984), the Supreme Court held that release on personal recognizance falls within the definition of "in custody” under the federal habe-as corpus statute, and have reasoned that this holding "is relevant given that both seizure and custody concern governmental restriction of the freedom of those suspected of crime.” Gallo, 161 F.3d at 223.

      . We reiterate here that "[w]e hold open the possibility that some conditions of pre-trial release may be so insignificant as to not implicate constitutionally protected liberty interests.” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 321 n.12.

      . We note that after Black was interrogated, Fallon warned Black that if she did not surrender at a later date she would be arrested in California, remain in custody until extradited, and remain in jail until arraignment.

      . We acknowledge that Black has alleged a variety of wrongful acts including fabrication, suppression, and destruction of evidence. For the ease of reference, we will refer to her allegations collectively as fabrication of evidence.

      . Indeed, we observed that "[t]o the best of our knowledge, every court of appeals that has considered the question of whether a state actor has violated [a] defendant’s right to due process of law by fabricating evidence to charge or convict the defendant has answered the question in the affirmative. See Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 585 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting court of appeals cases).” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 292.

      .Noting that the boundary between the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments "is, at its core, temporal,” we observed in Halsey that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizure extends until trial whereas the due process of law guarantee "is not so limited as it protects defendants during an entire criminal proceeding through and after trial.” Id. at 291. We determined, however, drawing a precise line between claims invoking the two rights was unnecessary in Halsey (as in the present case) because the fabrication of evidence allegedly infected the entirety of the criminal proceeding, from securing the indictment through trial. Id.; see also id. ("Wherever the boundary between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims lies, it is in the rear view mirror by the end of trial, when Fourth Amendment rights no longer are implicated.”).

      . Two Courts of Appeals appear to require a conviction as a prerequisite to a stand-alone due process claim. See Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[A] police officer does not violate an acquitted defendant’s due process rights when he fabricates evidence.”); Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014) ("Fabrication of evidence alone is insufficient to state a claim for a due process violation; a plaintiff must plead adequate facts to establish that the loss of liberty — i.e., his conviction and subsequent incarceration — resulted from the fabrication.”). While the Massey court provided very little analysis to support its holding, the Saunders-El court noted that the only " 'liberty deprivation’ ” in a fabricated evidence case where one is acquitted " 'stems from his initial arrest.’ " Id. at 561 (quoting Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2012)). The Saunders-El court rejected the view that " 'the burden of appearing in court and attending trial, in and of itself, constitute[s] a deprivation of liberty [because] [i]t would be anomalous to hold that attending a trial deprives a criminal defendant of liberty.’ ” Id. (quoting Alexander, 692 F.3d at 557 n.2). As explained in Subsection 111(A) supra, however, we take a broader view of the liberty deprivations occasioned by the criminal process. Further, considering our Court’s concern in Halsey and in this decision with the corruption of the truth-seeking process of trial, we disagree with Saunders-El.

      . The procedural posture of this case is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and we thus assume all of the facts alleged are true. The evidence may tell a different story and we express no opinion as to whether summary judgment may be appropriate at a later time.

      . Black also asks us to vacate the dismissal of her conspiracy claims and claims under Monell. Because the District Court reasoned that Black could not succeed on her underlying Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution or Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, it correctly determined that she could not succeed on her conspiracy claims. See, e.g., Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.”). Similarly, the District Court correctly reasoned that the Monell claims against defendants Lower Mer-ion Township and Montgomery County require a constitutional deprivation, but the District Court already dismissed the underlying malicious prosecution and due process claims. See, e.g., Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[F]or there to be municipal liability, there still must be a violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.”). Because we vacate the District Court’s determination regarding both the underlying malicious prosecution and due process claims, we will vacate on the conspiracy and Monell claims as well.