author: Bailey, Judge.

text:
    Jacob L. MACIASZEK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-939
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 8, 2018
    Appellant Pro Se: Jacob L. Maciaszek, Michigan City, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Henry A. Flores, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Jacob L. Maciaszek ("Maciaszek") appeals, pro se, his sentence, following a guilty plea, for two counts of burglary, as Class B felonies. He raises two issues on appeal, but we consider only the dispositive issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that Maciaszek's sentence be served consecutively to his sentence imposed by the State of New Hampshire.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In a decision dated April 10, 2017, this court set forth the following facts and procedural history of Maciaszek's prior appeal from the denial of credit time in this case:

On May 22, 2012, the State charged Maciaszek with two counts of Class B felony burglary and two counts of Class D felony theft. The next day, the State placed a hold on Maciaszek in Collier County, Florida, where he was serving a sentence on an unrelated conviction with a release date of August 1, 2012. When Indiana placed that hold, Maciaszek was already subject to holds placed by New Hampshire and Maine, where he also was alleged to have committed crimes.
After completing his sentence in Florida, Maciaszek was transported to New Hampshire, where he was found guilty and given a sentence of one-and-a-half to six years, with a parole eligibility date of February 27, 2014. On January 10, 2013, while incarcerated in New Hampshire, Maciaszek filed a Request for Disposition of his pending Indiana charges under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), which provides a mechanism for the "attendance of defendants confined as prisoners in institutions of other jurisdictions of the United States" in an Indiana court. Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4 (1981).
Based on his request, Indiana authorities took custody of Maciaszek on March 19, 2013, and transported him to Indiana. On August 6, 2013, he pled guilty to two counts of Class B felony burglary and was sentenced to sixteen years with no credit for time served prior to sentencing ("Indiana Sentence"). The trial court ordered Maciaszek "shall be immediately returned to the New Hampshire State Prison, Northern Correctional Facility, Berlin, New Hampshire. Upon completion of the New Hampshire sentence, authorities of the State of Indiana shall be notified and custody of Jacob Maciaszek returned to the State of Indiana." (App. at 9/1 [sic] ).
On November 5, 2015, Maciaszek filed, pro se, a "Verified Petition for Presentence Jail Time Credit and Earned Credit Time," (id. at 13), arguing he should have been given credit on his Indiana Sentence from May 23, 2012, when Indiana put a hold on him in Florida, until his sentencing in Indiana on August 6, 2013. The trial court did not hold a hearing, and on December 4, 2015, the trial court denied Maciaszek's petition.

Maciaszek v. State , 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1090-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (footnotes omitted), trans. denied (hereinafter, " Maciaszek I ").

[4] In Maciaszek I , we held that Maciaszek was entitled to credit time for actual time served in Indiana while awaiting trial on the Indiana charges, i.e., 141 days, and to a determination of his credit class and good time credit due. Id. at 1094. In reaching this holding, we noted that the trial court's judgment of conviction did not indicate whether his Indiana sentence was to be served consecutively to his New Hampshire conviction. Therefore, we stated: "we must conclude the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences were to be served concurrently." Id. We ordered the trial court, on remand, to award Maciaszek the credit for actual time served and to determine any good time credit due to him. Id. at 1095.

[5] On remand, on July 17, 2017, the trial court amended its judgment of conviction to award Maciaszek 141 days of credit for actual time served, and another 141 days for good time credit, for a total credit of 282 days. Appellant's App. at 42. On March 14, 2018, the trial court, sua sponte, issued another amended judgment of conviction which stated:

PURSUANT TO I.C. 35-50-1-2 [,] [j]udgment entered herein shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed by the State of New Hampshire for which Defendant was serving a suspended sentence revocation at the time of the instant offense herein.

Id. at 43. Maciaszek now appeals that amended judgment.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] Maciaszek appeals the trial court's order that he serve his sentence consecutively to his sentence in New Hampshire. "The decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences lies within the trial court's sound discretion, and, on appeal, we review the trial court's decision only for an abuse of that discretion." Henderson v. State , 44 N.E.3d 811, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, "or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Gross v. State , 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied . The defendant "has the burden to establish that prejudicial error was committed." Nasser v. State , 727 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied . However, because we already decided this same issue in a prior appeal of this case, the law of the case doctrine bars the trial court from reconsidering it.

Law of the Case

[7] The "law of the case doctrine" is a discretionary tool by which appellate courts decline to revisit legal issues already determined on appeal in the same case and on substantially the same facts. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Summers , 974 N.E.2d 488, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted), trans. denied . Under that doctrine, the decision of an appellate court becomes the law of the case and governs the case throughout all of its subsequent stages, as to all questions which were presented and decided, both directly and indirectly. E.g. , Terex-Telelect, Inc. v. Wade , 59 N.E.3d 298, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied . However, to invoke the law of the case doctrine, "the matters decided in the prior appeal must clearly appear to be the only possible construction of the opinion." Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Maplehurst Farms, Inc. , 18 N.E.3d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riggs v. Burell , 619 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind. 1993) ), trans. denied .

[8] Here, there is no question that this court already decided that the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences run concurrently; we stated "the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences were to be served concurrently." Maciaszek I at 1094. That holding is unambiguous, with only one possible construction. And that holding was key to our ultimate determination that Maciaszek was entitled to actual credit time for the period during which he was incarcerated in Indiana awaiting trial. Id. at 1092 (quoting Payne v. State , 838 N.E.2d 503, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied , for the proposition that "[i]f a person incarcerated awaiting trial on more than one charge is sentenced to concurrent terms for the separate crimes, he or she is entitled to receive credit time applied against each separate term").

[9] However, the State contends, and the trial court held, that consecutively running sentences were required in this case under Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) because Maciaszek was "serving a suspended sentence revocation [in New Hampshire] at the time of the [Indiana] offense." Appellant's App. at 43. That specific issue was not raised or decided in Maciaszek I , nor was the relevant fact-i.e., whether Maciaszek was serving a suspended sentence or revocation of the same in New Hampshire at the time he committed the Indiana offense-presented in Maciaszek I . Therefore, if that is indeed a new fact, the law of the case doctrine would have no application here. See In re Change to Established Water Level of Lake of Woods in Marshall Cty. , 822 N.E.2d 1032, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Fair Share Org., Inc. v. Mitnick , 245 Ind. 324, 198 N.E.2d 765, 766 (1964) ) ("Indeed, where new facts are elicited upon remand that materially affect the questions at issue, the court upon remand may apply the law to the new facts as subsequently found."), trans. denied .

[10] There is no evidence of any new, material fact in the matter of Maciaszek's sentencing. The Indiana presentence investigation report (PSI) shows that Maciaszek committed the Indiana crime on December 10, 2011. Appellant's App. at 7. However, the PSI shows that New Hampshire did not sentence Maciaszek until November 20, 2012, almost one year after he committed the Indiana crime. Therefore, at the time of the Indiana offense, Maciaszek could not have had his New Hampshire sentence suspended or had the suspension revoked, as the trial court incorrectly found, and there is no basis for applying Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) to this case.

[11] However, there is a difference of opinion among our panel as to whether our prior decision in this case was in error. In Maciaszek I , we relied upon Ramirez v. State , 455 N.E.2d 609, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Ramirez v. Indiana , 469 U.S. 929, 105 S.Ct. 322, 83 L.Ed.2d 259 (1984), judgment summarily aff'd without opinion , 471 U.S. 147, 105 S.Ct. 1860, 85 L.Ed.2d 113 (1985), reh'g denied , for the proposition that, where there is no indication whether sentences for different crimes in different jurisdictions are to run consecutively or concurrently, we assume the sentences are to run concurrently. Although Ramirez was summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, Indiana cases decided since Ramirez have clearly held "there is no right to serve concurrent sentences for different crimes in the absence of a statute so providing, and that concurrent sentences may be ordered only when they are to be served at the same institution." Sweeney v. State , 704 N.E.2d 86, 110 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Shropshire v. State , 501 N.E.2d 445, 446 (Ind. 1986) ); see also Perry v. State , 921 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ("Perry has failed to cite and we have found no controlling precedent authorizing an Indiana court to order a sentence to run concurrent with a sentence being served in another state.").

[12] Regardless of whether Maciaszek I was erroneously decided, we hold that the law of the case doctrine requires that that decision controls in this case. Indiana applies the law of the case doctrine "in its strictest sense and has resisted creating exceptions to the strict application of the doctrine." Ind.-Ky. Elec. Corp. v. Save the Valley, Inc. , 953 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Farm Gas Prod. Co. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. , 662 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied ), trans. denied . And "Indiana courts have held numerous times that the law of the case must be followed even when the earlier decision is deemed to be incorrect ." Id. (emphasis added). We have recognized a narrow exception when application of the law of the case doctrine would "work a manifest injustice." Ind. Farm Gas Prod. Co. , 662 N.E.2d at 981 ; see also E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Erroneous Decision as Law of the Case on Subsequent Appellate Review , 87 A.L.R. 2d 271, § 15[a] (noting that courts will apply the law of the case doctrine even to an erroneous prior decision where, among other things, a correction of the former error would create a hardship or where the prior decision resulted in a change in a party's status upon which the party relied).

[13] Here, it would create a hardship and work a manifest injustice to Maciaszek if we did not apply the law of the case doctrine, in that he would be subject to additional incarceration time. Therefore, we apply that doctrine.

Conclusion

[14] The trial court was barred from revisiting whether Maciaszek's Indiana and New Hampshire sentences run consecutively, as we already decided in Maciaszek I that they do not, there are no new facts that materially affect our prior decision, and it would work a hardship on Maciaszek and result in a manifest injustice if we failed to apply the law of the case doctrine in this case.

[15] Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

Mathias, J., concurs.

Bradford, J., dissents with opinion.

[1] Because I believe that application of the law of the case doctrine results in the imposition of an illegal sentence, I respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the trial court.

[2] The Indiana Supreme Court has established "that there is no right to serve concurrent sentences for different crimes in the absence of a statute so providing, and that concurrent sentences may be ordered only when they are to be served at the same institution." Sweeney v. State , 704 N.E.2d 86, 110 (Ind. 1998). Stated differently, "[s]entences to penal institutions of different jurisdictions are cumulative and not concurrent." Perry v. State , 921 N.E.2d 525, 527-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). "Moreover, a defendant is not even entitled to credit on his Indiana sentence while he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction for a totally different offense."

Carrion v. State , 619 N.E.2d 972, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

[3] In this case, Maciaszek was serving a sentence in New Hampshire when he was sentenced in relation to his criminal behavior in Indiana. In an earlier appeal, a panel of this court noted that because the trial court's judgment of conviction did not specify whether Maciaszek's Indiana sentence was to run concurrently or consecutively to his New Hampshire sentence, "we must conclude that the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences were to be served concurrently." Maciaszek v. State , 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (" Maciaszek I "), trans. denied . The matter was remanded to the trial court, and, on March 14, 2018, the trial court entered an amended judgment of conviction in which it clarified that Maciaszek's Indiana sentence would run consecutively to his New Hampshire sentence.

[4] Maciaszek challenges the propriety of the trial court's amended judgment, arguing that under the law of the case doctrine, the trial court was bound by the conclusion in Maciaszek I that the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences would run concurrently. Generally, the law of the case doctrine binds the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal, and the doctrine applies whether the earlier decision was right or wrong. See Ind. Farm Gas Prod. Co., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. , 662 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (providing that the law of the case doctrine should generally be followed "even when the earlier decision is deemed to be incorrect"). However, contrary to this general practice, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that appellate courts have "always maintained the option of reconsidering earlier cases in order to correct error." State v. Huffman , 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994). A court has the power to revisit its prior decisions "in any circumstance." Id. This is especially so when the earlier decision was " 'clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.' " State v. Lewis , 543 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind. 1989) (quoting Ariz. v. Cal. , 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) ).

[5] Pursuant to Sweeney , Perry , and Carrion , Maciaszek's Indiana sentence must run consecutively to his New Hampshire sentence. See Sweeney , 704 N.E.2d at 110 ; Perry , 921 N.E.2d at 527-28 ; Carrion , 619 N.E.2d at 973. Therefore, application of the law of the case doctrine would result in the imposition of an illegal sentence. We have previously concluded that when the sentence imposed is improper, "it is the general if not unanimous rule that the trial court has the power to vacate the illegal sentence and impose a proper one." Lockhart v. State , 671 N.E.2d 893, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Further, although one could argue that Maciaszek would suffer a manifest injustice, i.e. , he would be subjected to a longer term of incarceration, if the law of the case doctrine were not applied, we have previously recognized that following vacation of an illegal sentence, the trial court may impose a proper sentence even if it "results in an increased sentence." Niece v. State , 456 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Thus, given the interstate nature of Maciaszek's seemingly repetitive criminal behavior, one could reasonably conclude that application of a lawful sentence will not result in a manifest injustice to him. Moreover, one could also reasonably conclude that imposition of illegal concurrent sentences would result in a manifest injustice to the citizenry of both Indiana and New Hampshire, especially those individuals victimized by Maciaszek.

      Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1) (2011).

      Although Maciaszek, who appeals pro se, did not use the term "law of the case doctrine" in his briefs, he nevertheless raised that issue when he argued that our ruling in Maciaszek I was controlling and the trial court was bound by it. See Appellant's Br. at 9, 13; Appellant's Reply Br. at 8-9, 11-12, 14.

      Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) provides that terms of imprisonment must run consecutively if, after being arrested for one crime, a person commits another crime either (1) before the person is discharged from probation, parole, or imprisonment imposed for the first crime, or (2) while the person is released on bond or his own recognizance for the first crime.

      It appears that the PSI was not a part of the record in Maciaszek I .

      The PSI also shows that Florida had not arrested or sentenced Maciaszek at the time he committed the Indiana offenses. Id.

      Nor is there any evidence that Maciaszek had been arrested for the New Hampshire crime at the time he committed the Indiana crime. Id.

      Because we reverse the trial court's amended judgment of conviction, we need not address Maciaszek's claim that he had a right, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, to be present at the correction of his sentence. However, we note that Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15"is applicable only when a defendant files a motion to correct an erroneous sentence." Ousley v. State , 807 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, the court's resentencing order followed this court's prior decision and not a motion to correct erroneous record, Appellant's App. at 53. See Davis v. State , 978 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding statute inapplicable under similar procedural posture).

      We note that Ramirez involved two different crimes and sentences within two different jurisdictions of Indiana.

      We note that neither Sweeney , Shropshire , nor Perry involved the application of the law of the case doctrine.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Friedlander, Senior Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Yusuf HOTEP-EL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-477
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 13, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Valerie K. Boots, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Supervising Deputy Attorney, General, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Friedlander, Senior Judge.

[1] Yusuf Hotep-El appeals the trial court's termination of his self-representation. We affirm.

[2] In August 2016, Hotep-El was charged with possession of cocaine, a Level 5 felony; two counts of possession of a narcotic drug, both Level 5 felonies; possession of a controlled substance, a Level 6 felony; driving while suspended, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and later he was also alleged to be an habitual offender.

[3] At his initial hearing on these charges, Hotep-El was appointed counsel to represent him. Subsequently, a motions hearing was held on February 15, 2017, at which Hotep-El, through counsel, requested permission to represent himself. Following a proper inquiry by the court, his request was granted with appointed counsel remaining as standby counsel.

[4] At a hearing in April, the court terminated Hotep-El's self-representation. The court stated that his abundant inappropriate filings as well as his statements and behavior in court caused it concern regarding his mental fitness. The court then reappointed standby counsel for the purpose of determining whether a competency evaluation was warranted.

[5] In May, defense counsel filed a combined notice of insanity defense and motion for psychiatric examination to determine Hotep-El's competence to stand trial, which the trial court granted. Dr. Olive and Dr. Parker were appointed to examine Hotep-El. Dr. Olive concluded he was competent. Dr. Parker, although unable to conduct a complete evaluation, formed an opinion that Hotep-El was capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and assisting his counsel. At the pretrial conference and competency hearing in July 2017, the trial court found Hotep-El competent to stand trial based on the doctors' reports. Appointed counsel continued as counsel for Hotep-El.

[6] At the final pretrial conference in January 2018, the State asked the court to address the status of Hotep-El's representation. The court and defense counsel then attempted to ask Hotep-El if he wanted the public defender to represent him or if he wanted to represent himself, but he refused to answer the question.

[7] On the first morning of trial, defense counsel informed the court that Hotep-El was requesting to proceed pro se. The court denied the request and proceeded with the trial. The State dismissed the charge of driving while suspended, and the jury found Hotep-El guilty on all remaining charges and determined that he is an habitual offender. The court sentenced Hotep-El to an aggregate sentence of ten years executed. He now appeals.

[8] Hotep-El contends the trial court improperly terminated his self-representation. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a defendant's right to counsel encompasses the right of a defendant to represent himself. Hopper v. State , 957 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. 2011) (citing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ). Yet, this right is not without limits. The United States Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Faretta , 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.

[9] While the trial court terminated Hotep-El's right to proceed pro so at a hearing in April 2017, a timeline of events and background information prior to and following that hearing is helpful to our discussion. At Hotep-El's initial hearing, counsel was appointed to represent him. Despite that, he sent numerous pro se documents to the court throughout January and February 2017. Some of these documents were entitled "Averment of Jurisdiction - Quo Warranto," "Affidavit of Fact - Writ of Discovery," and "Affidavit of Error." Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 71-133. Many of these documents contained the following, or a similar, heading:

THE MOORISH NATIONAL REPUBLIC FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NORTHWEST AFRICA
THE MOORISH DIVINE AND NATIONAL MOVEMENT OF THE WORLD.
Northwest Amexem/Northwest Africa/North America.
'The North Gate'.
Societas Republicae Ea Al Maurikanos.
Aboriginal and Indigenous Natural Peoples of the Land.
The true and de jure Al Moroccans/Americans

Id. at 71. In addition, several showed copies being sent to people or organizations such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, Interpol, the President of the United States, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Justice Department. See id. at 72. On February 7, 2017, the court issued an order denying Hotep-El's pro se requests because he was represented by counsel and explaining that Trial Rule 11 requires pleadings and motions to be signed by an attorney when a party has representation.

[10] At the motions hearing in February 2017, defense counsel informed the court that Hotep-El did not want counsel to represent him and that he wanted to represent himself. The court asked Hotep-El if he understood what a jury trial is and that he was charged with felony charges. Hotep-El answered affirmatively. The court further inquired as to Hotep-El's education, understanding of trial procedure, and mental health history. Hotep-El informed the court that he has a GED and culinary arts training, that he has experienced several jury trials, and that he had never been treated for any mental illness. The court instructed Hotep-El that his opponent would be a trained lawyer, that he would be held to the same standard as an attorney, and that he would be expected to know the rules of evidence, investigate, engage in plea negotiations, conduct voir dire, make opening and closing arguments, subpoena witnesses, and preserve issues for appeal. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 5-10. After receiving Hotep-El's acknowledgment that he understood what would be required of him, the court granted his request to represent himself and ordered appointed counsel to remain as standby counsel.

[11] Once Hotep-El's request to represent himself was granted, the court asked for his contact information. He stated his mailing address and his email address. However, when the deputy prosecutor asked him to write his email address on paper, Hotep-El replied that he did not "consent to filling out any documentation, for the record." Id. at 15. Hotep-El then told the court he wanted to read his documentation into the record and stated, "Department of jurisdiction, Code 1, sir, for the record, to be read into the record. Notice to Agent is notice to principle, notice to principle is notice to agent." Id. at 16. He continued, "According to the Canon, Rule of 2.6, I'm showing a right to be heard." Id. The court informed Hotep-El:

There are certain formalities, there's certain evidentiary rules of things that we have to follow as attorneys in court. You're held to that same standard. If you become obstructive, particularly in front of the jury, then you can forfeit your right to represent yourself. You can even forfeit your right to be present during trial. Do you understand that? I'll let you represent yourself, but you're going to follow procedures and rules.
* * * * *
Like I say, we are certainly happy to let you represent yourself, but if you become such a distraction because of your stubbornness, I'm just giving you a warning on that, that you won't be representing yourself, okay?

Id. at 17, 22. Hotep-El replied that he understood and then asked, "I have a question. I'm on this electronic house monitor on the (inaudible) arrest and coercion and I do not consent to any confinement, detainment, anything that lines up with that. So could you order that this be taken off my leg?" Id. at 22. The court denied his motion.

[12] In March 2017, there was again a flurry of filings by Hotep-El with documents entitled "Affidavit of Fact," "Writ of Mandamus," "Legal Notice of Removal," and "Averment of Jurisdiction - Quo Warranto." See Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 154, 168, 171, 173, 177, 189, 194, 199. One such Writ of Mandamus states, in part:

COMES NOW, Yusuf Hotep-El, Natural Person, In Propria Persona Sui Juris (not to be confused with, nor substituted by, Pro Se by unauthorized hand of another). I am Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish-American; possessing Free-hold by Inheritance and Primogeniture Status; standing squarely Affirmed, aligned and bound to the Zodiac Constitution, with all due respect and honors given to the Constitution for the United States Republic, North America. Being a descendant of Moroccans and born in America, with the blood of the Ancient Moabites from the Land of Moab, who received permission from the Pharaohs of Egypt to settle and inhabit North-West Africa/North Gate. The Moors are the founders and are the true possessors of the present Moroccan Empire; with our Canaanite, Hittite and Amorite brethren, who sojourned from the land of Canaan, seeking new homes. Our dominion and inhabitation extended from Northeast and Southwest Africa, across the Great Atlantis, even unto the present North South and Central America and the Adjoining Islands-bound squarely affirmed to THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP OF SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVEN (1787) A.D. superseded by THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP OF EIGHTTEEN [sic]
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIX (1836) A.D. between Morocco and the United States ( http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/barbary/barl866t.htm or at Bevines Law Book of Treatises) the same as displayed under Treaty Law, Obligation, Authority as expressed in Article VI of the Constitution for the United States of America (Republic).

Id. at 173. Hotep-El also accused the trial court judge of violating her oath of office to uphold the U.S. Constitution, claimed she did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, and accused her of knowingly committing fraud. See id. at 174. On March 24, 2017, the court issued its "General Order Regarding Miscellaneous Filings" in which it noted that Hotep-El's filings did not appear to pertain to his pending criminal action, struck all documents as improper, and admonished Hotep-El that future filings not complying with the trial rules or pertaining to the pending cause would also be struck.

[13] In April, the court held a hearing on a notice of a pretrial release violation which alleged that Hotep-El had failed for five days to report for home detention and to be hooked back up to GPS monitoring for this case after he was arrested and released on new charges of driving while suspended and refusing to identify himself. At the hearing, this colloquy ensued:

THE DEFENDANT: I'm not in need of the Public Defender's Agency.
THE COURT: All right. I know I-I think you are representing yourself in your current case. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. For the record, I In Propria Persona.
* * * * *
THE COURT: Mr. El, how do you plan on representing yourself [at the contested hearing for the pretrial release violation/probation violation]?
THE DEFENDANT: Through starting, going on documentation, studying court rules, studying evidentiary rules, like I've been doing. And for the record, My Honor, filed on April 3rd, 2017, a violation of jurisdiction, (inaudible) for the record to be read into the record, notice to agent. There's no-
THE COURT: All right. I know where you're going with this. You have a lot of what I would consider unorthodox laws and views that you want to bring up that I don't recognize. Do you understand what a jury trial is?
THE DEFENDANT: For the record, you-I definitely understand, but what is so unorthodox about my (inaudible)?
THE COURT: What is a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: What I'm reading, what makes what I'm reading unorthodox?
THE COURT: Tell me what a jury trial is.
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not here to exercise any law or practice any law, I mean we all are here. I mean [sic] tell you what a jury trial, I'm not trying to be disrespectful, My Honor, but I-
THE COURT: Well, I'm asking you on the record what is a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: I mean what are you asking me this for, My Honor? I mean I'm [sic] just now told you I understand what a jury trial is.
THE COURT: Because you're acting somewhat disorderly today and I'm a little concerned about your ability to represent yourself under the laws that you're going to have to represent yourself on. Okay? So I'm just asking you some simple question[s], what's a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I do not choose to exercise any, you know, on the record for the record, I'm not trying to exercise any [sic] what a jury trial is, what any words mean.
THE COURT: All right. So you're just-you're not going to answer that question?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't refuse to answer anything, My Honor.
THE COURT: Well-
THE DEFENDANT: I'm just not understanding the question that you're asking.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to give you one more chance. It's not a hard question, tell me what a jury trial is.
THE DEFENDANT: A simple-I mean something that you have a trial with juries on.
THE COURT: Okay. What do they do?
THE DEFENDANT: You have 12 peers, or six peers on some cases.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: To decide, make decisions on crimes, whether you're guilty or not guilty.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
THE DEFENDANT: And proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
THE COURT: How do you pick a jury? How do you go to pick a jury?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, (inaudible) I explain exactly what a jury was, I get to exercise my right. I mean I don't see how this pertains-
THE COURT: Well, I mean I'm going to go through this. I want to see if you're competent to represent yourself at this point.
THE DEFENDANT: I am, My Honor.
* * * * *
THE COURT: Based on what I've heard, I'm a little concerned right now of a lot of different things regarding your ability to represent yourself in this case; also based on some of the things I've heard about your activities at the Track Group the other day, and I know it's just allegations at this point.
So, I am going to appoint the Public Defender office to represent you in this probation violation. I am going to appoint the Public Defender's Office to represent you in your current case, the Level 5 felony case, and I'm also going to order an examination by a couple of psychiatrists just to-
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I object.
THE COURT: -just to [sic] as to your competency at this point, sir.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I object, My Honor. For the record, I-
THE COURT: I know you do.
THE DEFENDANT: I do not consent to a psychiatrist.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: And for the record, I-
THE COURT: Actually, what I will do-actually, I'll appoint the Public Defender's Office to represent you and then I'll wait for their determination-
THE DEFENDANT: Well-
THE COURT: -but I honestly think-
Well, let me put it this way, at this point I am going to order him examined as to his competency to stand trial at this stage.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record, My Honor, so we definitely-I mean I do not need the services of the Public Defender Agency.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know. If the Public Defender meets with you again, if the psychiatrists meet you and say you're fully competent, you understand what-THE DEFENDANT: Well, I see-I see, for the record, you all being-you all being restricting my documents from the record.
THE COURT: Sir, you're interrupting me.
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not trying to interrupt you.
THE COURT: Okay, you're interrupting me.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: If you meet with the Public Defender and the psychiatrists give you a clean bill of health, then I don't see why you couldn't represent yourself, but right now, you're also demonstrating an inability to follow the Court's rules because Judge Gooden, some weeks ago, issued orders on what motions you would-can file and what you can't. I don't have the order in front of me, but I know that there have been a lot of motions, her orders striking everything you're filing because you're not complying with the Rules of Procedure.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Now-
THE COURT: So that also tells me that you're not doing a very good job representing yourself right now.
* * * * *
THE DEFENDANT: I mean I-for the record, I do not consent to any further jail time, prison time.
THE COURT: I understand, but again, your behavior has warranted this. You have not followed the rules regarding the pleadings that you filed. You're talking something about Moorish law that doesn't even apply to your case.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record, My Honor, I would like to explain this to you. Well, I know I know [sic] that the delegation of authority the Prosecution is supposed to provide, due to the fact that the Prosecution has brought forth the allegations or whatever criminal charges that I am facing. And the delegation of order of authority would clearly tell me what the position is of the commissioners and the magistrates, and administration of these-of this venue.
Now, the oath of office is just the oath of office to the Constitution. Now these things-these is all the things, all the (inaudible) unorthodox. If one that took the oath to the Constitution in there, and me asking for the oath of office to the Constitution, that's not unorthodox to me.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: And my documentation speaks clear, it's not veering off or anything-
THE COURT: -Well, here's another-Mr. Hotep-El, here's another problem we have is that 49G21-1309-FD-58514, that is the case you're here for on a probation violation. You have continually, allegedly continually tested positive for use of drugs. And a person that is allegedly using drugs, I would think would have a harder time representing himself. I'm not saying that you've been found guilty of anything, but that's just another fact that I have to consider as to your ability to do this.
* * * * *
THE COURT: -All right. With all that's going on, and again, I'm going to repeat this, you continually file irrelevant pleadings that have been stricken, the allegations of drug use on your behalf. You're not showing up-
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I would like to object for the record. It sounds like you're practicing law from the bench.
THE COURT: -not showing up-sir-
THE DEFENDANT: -it sounds like you're practicing law from the bench-THE COURT: -not showing up for your Community Corrections or pretrial release afterward. All this tells me that there is an issue as to your competency at this point. One more time, I am going to appoint a Public Defender's Office to represent you, both of these case[s], and I am going to order an independent-two psychiatrists to review you for competency at this point.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 28, 29-31, 32-34, 35-36, 38.

[14] The court's order from the hearing states, in part:

The Court further now questions the Defendant's ability to represent himself. He has repeatedly violated the Court[']s Order in [this case] by filing inappropriate and improper pleadings based on "Moorish Law[."] He has exhibited irrational behavior in court and there are now allegations of menacing behavior that have been brought to the attention of the court during the hearing. The court takes note of the Defendant[']s criminal history and drug use.
As Such the Court now appoints the Office of the Public Defender to represent the Defendant in these cases. Since the Defendant is now represented by Counsel, the court leaves the decision as to competency evaluation to appointed counsel and does not now order the same.

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 226-27.

[15] The trial court should not grant a defendant's request for self-representation unless it is satisfied that the defendant has the mental capacity to understand the proceedings. Ellerman v. State , 786 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). As the transcript and the court's order demonstrate, the court reappointed the public defender, who had been acting as standby counsel, for the purpose of determining whether a competency evaluation was warranted and specifically explained on the record its concern that Hotep-El may not be competent to stand trial. Although the trial court had previously questioned Hotep-El concerning his waiver of counsel at the hearing in February, his conduct and filings over the intervening months, as well as his colloquy with the court at the April hearing, so concerned the court that it believed his competency to stand trial may need to be examined by experts.

[16] Moreover, "[a] trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious or obstructionist misconduct." German v. State , 268 Ind. 67, 73, 373 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1978) (citing Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) ). Indeed, trial judges " 'confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.' " Gilmore v. State , 953 N.E.2d 583, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Allen , 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057 ).

[17] As the record here demonstrates, Hotep-El had submitted filings in violation of court orders, disrupted and impeded court proceedings with statements concerning irrelevant, nonsensical subjects, and had exhibited evasive/argumentative behavior such that the court had difficulty distinguishing between his genuine inability to understand the proceedings (i.e., competency to stand trial) and his intent to impede them (i.e., deliberate obstructionist behavior). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining reasonable grounds existed for seeking a determination of Hotep-El's competency to understand the proceedings and to stand trial. See Benefiel v. State , 716 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. 1999) (whether reasonable grounds exist to order evaluation of competency is within sound discretion of court). Further, given the circumstances of this case and Hotep-El's obstreperous behavior, the trial court did not err in terminating, or at least suspending, his self-representation while it obtained such a determination.

[18] Following the termination in April of Hotep-El's self-representation for the purpose of determining his competency to stand trial, his obstructionist behavior continued. In addition, he never asserted a clear and unequivocal request to again proceed pro se. Once the trial court reappointed counsel, counsel moved for a psychiatric evaluation. The court appointed Doctors Olive and Parker to evaluate Hotep-El. Following his examination of Hotep-El, Dr. Olive concluded he was competent and possessed sufficient ability to consult with his attorney and understand the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Dr. Parker, on the other hand, was unable to complete a formal evaluation because Hotep-El abruptly left the interview after only a few minutes. Nevertheless, based on the brief interview and the available records, it was Dr. Parker's opinion that Hotep-El was capable of understanding the nature and objectives of the proceedings against him and assisting his counsel, though he might not be willing to cooperate with either. Dr. Parker noted that Hotep-El is a follower of a set of fringe political beliefs known as the sovereign citizen movement, which he described as using odd interpretations of both federal and state laws and constitutions to conclude that they do not apply to these citizens. He further characterized the followers of this movement as typically serving as their own counsel, filing unconventional motions in an attempt to frustrate the court proceedings, and generally competent to stand trial as they typically do not have a serious mental illness.

[19] In May, Hotep-El filed correspondence with the court indicating he did not consent to the public defender taking his case and complaining that he had not heard from defense counsel and that counsel had a conflict of interest. Further correspondence accused defense counsel of violating the rules of professional conduct and declined his services while also stating that Hotep-El did not waive any of his rights. See Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 228, 240.

[20] At the pretrial conference/competency hearing in July, the trial court found that Hotep-El was competent to stand trial based upon the doctors' reports. At the end of the hearing, Hotep-El stated:

THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record I am not (inaudible) man. The court continues to have these gentleman [sic] on my-on this-this suit, when I-I clearly have made record that it's a conflict of interest, due to this fact it's prejudice of my nationality and things, and things like that, but the Court continues to force this attorney on me.
For the record, on the record, and let the record reflect I'm in proper persona (inaudible). I'm here on the threat, duress, and coercion.
Furthermore, I do not consent to any other jail time, prison time, to finally detain me, and I demand that this Court dismiss all the suits, and for the record, on the record, and let the record reflect.
* * * * *
No, matter, I filed a removal with the Federal Court, and I've also sent to the tribunal the consent sheet. I want to know if you have signed the documentation to transfer this to the Federal Court, for lack of jurisdiction; one other issue which the tribunal has got a copy of the documentation?
* * * * *
For the record I have not consent [sic] to proceed.
THE COURT: I understand.
THE DEFENDANT: The Court has not prove-proven jurisdiction, judicial must be proven-
THE COURT: I understand.
THE DEFENDANT: -or the town. So it's versus United States.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 47-49.

[21] Throughout July, August, September, October, November, and December of 2017, and January and February of 2018, Hotep-El continued to file pro se documents with the court. These filings are filled with illogical and nonsensical statements and alleged theories of law. See Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 17-22, 28-30, 33, 34, 37-39, 41, 93, 96-97, 100-102, 104-106, 113-128, 135-40, 147-51, 183-221, 238-39; Appellant's App. Vol. IV, pp. 2-8. In response, the court issued orders stating he was represented by counsel and citing Trial Rule 11. See Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 26, 42, 45, 94, 109, 131, 143, 222; Appellant's App. Vol. IV, p. 9.

[22] In addition, in October Hotep-El filed with the court an "Affidavit to Dismiss Public Defender" in which he requested dismissal of the public defender due to a conflict of interest and deterioration of their relationship. Yet, he also stated, "the Petitioner is exercising rights to self representation and do [sic] not waive his rights to a [sic] attorney." Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 104-06. He filed similar documents with the court in November and again in January 2018. See id. at 113-14, 207-08, 238-39.

[23] At the final pretrial conference in January 2018, the State noted Hotep-El's previous requests to represent himself and the results of his competency evaluations and inquired as to the status of the situation. The court and the parties responded:

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I did, we had a hearing on this, and you know, it was my ruling at the time based on-and I can't go back and recreate the wheel on all my thought processes, but I did find that with what was going on that he did-was not legally competent to represent himself. I denied his right to go pro se in this case.
Is that still what he wants to do?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Hotep-El, what do you want to do? Do you want me to represent you, or do you want to represent yourself, or what?
THE DEFENDANT: For the record, I'm Yusuf Hotep-El, In Propria Persona (inaudible) to the jury, here by special appearance (inaudible). I continue to exercise my rights and reserve them, and I will respectfully demand that this Court continue to reserve all my rights.
And for the record, I've been-I mean, I've been in propria persona, (inaudible). Since no matter when the Court addressed or said that I was incompetent, I haven't stopped filing my documents. I have continued to file in proper personas to the jurors. I haven't waived any of my rights.
For the record, with all due respect the Court has no right-no right or no authority to weigh any of my rights. Today I'm here to address, you know, the-the tax matter, and-
THE COURT: The tax matters?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I sent-I sent it via certified mail, certified numbers 7013171000019184890. The tax 156. For the record, on the record you were provided with executor and appointed as-as a co-trustee (inaudible). And like I said, I have documents to tender, for the record, on the record, and let the record reflect.
THE COURT: All right. I'm not sure what to make of all that, but-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, just answer the man's question, do you want to represent yourself, or do you want me to represent you?
[THE DEFENDANT]: I am in Propria persona.
[STATE]: Okay. So I think the record is clear, as clear as it's going to get.
THE COURT: No. He hasn't answered my question.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I do not consent to proceeding, but I'm-I am in proper persona, two jurors. I am going to representing-
THE COURT: What does that-
THE DEFENDANT: I am in my proper self.
THE COURT: -mean, you're in propria persona?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm in my proper self.
THE COURT: Okay. You're in your proper self?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: But do you want [defense counsel] to be your attorney at trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record, on the record, like I said, I have to continue to reserve my rights. He's-he was appointed by the Court.
THE COURT: Right.
THE DEFENDANT: And it's not disrespect to him, I mean, he's always represented the corporation, he can never represent. He also (inaudible) up here. Because once again I'm in propria persona.
THE COURT: So whether he sits there or not you think that you're in proper persona?
THE DEFENDANT: It's a fact.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The record has to be clear.
THE DEFENDANT: I have answered the question. I'm not the right representative. I'm the attorney of facts, so therefore I'm in propria persona.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 59-61.

[24] And then:

THE COURT: I am not going to allow this man to represent himself, when he's sitting here telling me he wants to address tax issues. I don't know that he understands even what he's here for today. I know he's legally competent. I don't know whether this-if this is an act, or what's going on, but he is currently not component [sic] to be an attorney for himself.
[STATE]: Okay.
THE COURT: I think I made that ruling-
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I'd like to object, are you a doctor, My Honor.
THE COURT: You can object all you want at that this point Mr. [Hotep-El]. I have made that ruling in this case, and that's based on a lot of different factors. The violations of [Judge Gooden's] file, the continuing stream of I guess sovereign citizen type of filings. The fact that when I address questions to you about your case, all I hear are issues about taxes, and things at in persona, whatever.
But, [defense counsel], you will be his attorney for trial.
* * * * *
But I know from what I've seen of this man, my experience is that I don't know that we could ever get through a trial with all the documents he wants to put in, the tax issues he wants to raise.
As a matter [sic] fact, I actually feel like if he represented himself he would not be around at trial very long, because he would have to be removed because of all the stuff.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think this would be an [appropriate] time for the Court to inform Mr. Hotep-El of what would be expected of his demeanor at trial. If I'm going to represent him, then that means he cannot represent himself, and he can't be making-
THE COURT: Well-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -objections, and-
THE COURT: No, he cannot and he cannot-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because-
THE COURT: -do anything except through his attorney. If you've got motions they have to be-
THE DEFENDANT: I don't have an attorney.
THE COURT: -through your attorney. If you-
[STATE]: You do now.
THE COURT: -at some point if you become disruptive to the proceedings, Mr. [Hotep-El], you will be-the Court can do a lot of things. I could bind and gag you, I don't prefer to do that, but at some point you risk not being at your jury trial, I may have to remove you.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I object, for the record. I am not the corporation, I am Yusuf Hotep-El, in propria persona. I have-
THE COURT: Mr. [Hotep-El], we've gone through that. If you do not behave at trial you were [sic] forfeit your right to be at trial; do you understand that, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: No. I not-I not [sic] have waived of my rights.

Id. at 62-65 (emphasis added). As the hearing was concluding, Hotep-El continued:

THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record mine-I still have my documents to file. I have my documents to tender.
THE COURT: You can give those to your attorney. If he thinks that they're relevant to any issues in this case he-
THE DEFENDANT: I don't have an attorney-
THE COURT: -will file them.
THE DEFENDANT: -my Honor.
THE COURT: He's sitting right-
THE DEFENDANT: He's fired-
THE COURT: -right next to you.
THE DEFENDANT: -for the record. And let the record reflect.
THE COURT: You fired him?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. He's fired.
THE COURT: All right. We'll see you February 1st, Mr. [Hotep-El].
* * * * *
THE COURT: We went off the record. I just want to make it clear for the record that Mr. [Hotep-El] became very unruly and disruptive as he was leaving. He indicated that his life was in danger, and that the officer had threatened him, and he's back there screaming now.
So, again, I'm making that for the record, because it's been my continual belief that this man cannot represent himself, and I think he continues to give us evidence every time he comes to court. Okay.

Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).

[25] Finally, on February 1 the morning of trial, defense counsel informed the court that Hotep-El was requesting to represent himself. The court responded:

THE COURT: And I understand that. But I think I've made quite a significant record of this over the last few months. I just did not feel that he's competent to represent himself as an attorney. And I'm not going to go through all the different reasons again. So I'm going to deny that motion.
Mr. Hotep-El, I will tell you today that this is going to be a jury trial. We're going to conduct this in a civil manner. I know that you have been prone to voice your displeasure with many things at different times during your hearings in this case. But we need to act civilly today. You are represented by attorneys.
You cannot speak to the jury or me unless it's through your attorneys. So we're just going to do this in a calm, civilized manner. You can forget your right to be here at any point if you become disruptive. Do you understand that, Mr. Hotep-El?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record, on the record and let the [sic] reflect, I am Yusuf Dunwayne Hotep-El In Propria Persona (inaudible)-
THE COURT: Okay. Well, see, you're not going into legal things without your attorney commenting. I'm just asking for a yes or no. Do you understand the ground rules on proper behavior in this Court?
THE DEFENDANT: And also, Your Honor, I've filed documentation with the Court which-
THE COURT: All right, Mr. El, apparently, you're not going to answer my question. So let's just say I've given you your warning, okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, for the record, my Honor, I have filed documentation with the Court-
THE COURT: All right. And I have rejected all your documentation because it has not been filed through your attorney.

Id. at 82-83. While the court and the attorneys discussed preliminary instructions, Hotep-El interrupted:

THE DEFENDANT: I want to place on the record that-
THE COURT: Mr. [Hotep-El], we're going to get off to a bad start. You have no right to say anything unless it's through your attorney at this point, okay?
THE DEFENDANT: They're fired, they're fired, they're fired, I don't need him on the-
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: So, I mean, I'm just-
THE COURT: All right. Well, I've gone over the ground rules. The jury's not here yet. But I'm not going to give you too much rope based on your prior conduct. If you just disrupt these proceedings and are not proceeding in a civilized manner, you will forfeit your right to be here. Okay?
THE DEFENDANT: For the record, My Honor, I do not forfeit any of my rights.

Id. at 86. Later, while the court and counsel were discussing instructions and verdict forms out of the presence of the jury, Hotep-El addressed the court:

THE DEFENDANT: For the record, I want the record to reflect I have a right to be heard right 2.6. And I just want to make record of this is on the record, Joseph Hotep-El. Certified 90-70-13-170000, 1918, 4906, there was a written clarification of the tribunal on 1/25 I sent-I put it in the certified mail, which was continuously ignored. For the record, I do not consent to any further jail time, prison time, make a finding of detainment, et cetera. I want to put on the record, also that I filed in jury instructions, certified number 7013.17100000, 1918. It was for my respectfully requesting and demand a jury instructions of this tribunal going into jury trial. And also my in propria persona appearance in which it has been ignored for the record. And that by my documents that I've lawfully filed with this tribunal being denied, it has biased and prejudiced my due process. For the record, on the record, let the record reflect.
* * * * *
Well, for the record, I want to let the record reflect I have continued to make aware of, you know, [Trial Court Commissioner] that I did not need or require, or that I was terminating the services of the Public Defender Agency, yet, the trial still proceeded over my objections and my continuance. You know, like I said, I put in-I put in the proper documentation assuming that I was in propria persona-you know, my in propria persona appearance. Not to be confused with pro se. So therefore, I mean, just make a record.
* * * * *
-I would address the jurisdiction of the Court which has been assumed, but not been proven by the state [sic] of Indiana which April 3rd, 2017 documents was filed certified mail, also further was filed on 2/6/2017 certified mail. Not stamped by the court, affirming the jurisdiction, per Warnto (phonetic) and written nature of discovery, requesting that the state [sic] of Indiana provides Joseph Hotep-El with the oath of office, and delegation of authority, also bond and signatures of each public official operating within this tribunal. Yet, still, there has been no production from the State account and as well as it has assumed jurisdiction. The want for jurisdiction it still doesn't have jurisdiction, because it still has not been proven. For the record, on the record, and let the record reflect.
* * * * *
I just want to make clear, the last time I was in here, for the record, on the record, and let the record reflect that [Trial Court Commissioner], that you was fired, as executor and appointed co-trustee for settlement closure in this tax matter. It still has not been-you know, so that's just for the record. And that's all I was here for, from the get go of the Clerk attachment.

Id. at 245, 246, 247-48.

[26] We observe that recently, the Texas Court of Appeals dealt with a similar case of obstreperous conduct. In Lewis v. Texas , 532 S.W.3d 423 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), the defendant, who was being prosecuted for possession of cocaine, engaged in confrontational and obstructive behavior, raised the so-called defense of being a "sovereign citizen," and made irrelevant references to the Uniform Commercial Code. On appeal, the court held:

The record in this case indicates that appellant is one of a loosely-formed group of citizens who believe that they are sovereign individuals, beyond the reach of any criminal court. These so-called "sovereign citizens" share a common vernacular and courtroom strategy. Courts across the country have encountered their particular brand of obstinacy-not consenting to trial, arguing over the proper format and meaning of their names, raising nonsensical challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, making irrelevant references to the Uniform Commercial Code, and referring to themselves as trustees or security interest holders. These calculated obstructions and delay tactics pose a unique challenge for trial courts considering Faretta motions. When a defendant asserts irrelevant or nonsensical arguments, it becomes difficult to discern whether he lacks a complete understanding of the proceedings or whether he is simply attempting to subvert them. See United States v. Mosley , 607 F.3d 555, 557-59 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding a trial judge's decision to deny self-representation based on an observation that the defendant either did not understand the proceedings or was 'unwilling to participate in them'). The trial court's own assessment, therefore, is critical in determining whether the defendant actually lacks the mental capacity to conduct his own defense or whether he is utilizing his intact mental capacity to consciously obstruct the proceedings against him. We hold, that in either case, the trial court may deny the defendant's request to represent himself and insist on representation by appointed counsel.

Id. at 430-31 (internal footnotes omitted). The court further explained that although it relies "heavily on the trial court's assessment of an obstreperous defendant," the trial court's discretion to deny a defendant's right of self-representation is limited. Id. at 431. First, allowing a defendant to represent himself will, necessarily, result in delay. Nevertheless, as long as the delay is not a calculated obstruction, such delay cannot deprive a defendant of his right of self-representation once it has been properly asserted. Id. Second, the denial of self-representation cannot be based on expected obstructive behavior. Id.

[27] Once the court was informed that Hotep-El was found competent, it was clear that his filings, statements, and behavior that disrupted and delayed the proceedings were not disruptions related to an inability to understand the proceedings or to self-representation without a legal education; rather, they were deliberate and calculated tactics. Further, the trial court's decisions were based, not on conjecture, but on firsthand observation of Hotep-El's behavior each time he was present in court and with every filing. We thus conclude that given these facts it was not improper for the trial court to decline to reinstate Hotep-El's pro se status when his deliberate obstructive behavior did and further threatened to undermine the proceedings and compromise the court's ability to maintain order and efficiency of its courtroom and caseload.

[28] Moreover, a defendant asserting his right of self-representation must do so clearly and unequivocally. Stroud v. State , 809 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 2004). Our Supreme Court has explained, "half-hearted expressions of dissatisfaction with counsel fail to meet the requisite clear and unequivocal assertion for the right of self-representation." Dobbins v. State , 721 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 1999). None of Hotep-El's statements represent a clear and unequivocal request to proceed without counsel; rather, they are complaints about counsel and declarations asserting his right to counsel. Further, he consistently accepted the assistance of his court-appointed counsel, and when asked, point blank, if he wanted to proceed pro se, he stated, "I'm not the right representative." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 61.

[29] In addition, our Supreme Court has held that a request to proceed pro se on the morning of trial is per se untimely, and denial of such a request is permissible. Moore v. State , 557 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. 1990). Thus, even if Hotep-El had clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation the morning of trial, such request was per se untimely and its denial was proper.

[30] Finally, we note that Hotep-El argues the trial court improperly denied his request to represent himself because he was found competent to stand trial and was not found to be suffering from a severe mental illness. His argument is based on our Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. State , in which the Court stated, "We understand [ Indiana v. ] Edwards [, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008) ] to announce the following rule of law: a trial court may deny a defendant's request to act pro se when the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial but suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself." 902 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2009).

[31] While we understand his argument, we conclude it is not reasonable in light of the overwhelming evidence in the record. As this opinion sets forth, the trial court did not deny Hotep-El the right to proceed pro se because it determined that he suffered from a mental illness so severe that he was not competent to conduct his own defense. Nonetheless, the trial court uses the term "competency" at times to refer to Hotep-El's actual mental competence to stand trial as determined by Doctors Olive and Parker and mistakenly at other times to refer to his obstructionist conduct. When taken in context, the court's meaning is readily apparent, and its conclusion is clear: Hotep-El was legally competent and was intending to deliberately impede the proceedings. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 63-64. Although the trial court indicated at the April hearing that Hotep-El could again represent himself if he was found competent to stand trial, the court's decision on this issue changed given the behavior and tactics set forth in the record and discussed in this opinion. Dr. Parker's report further explains the sovereign citizen movement to which Hotep-El claimed affiliation, characterizing the movement's members as typically unwilling to cooperate with the proceedings and counsel and attempting to frustrate court proceedings.

[32] We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err when it terminated Hotep-El's self-representation in order to determine his competency to stand trial and subsequently when it did not reinstate his pro se status based on its conclusion that he sought to use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of the proceedings.

[33] Judgment affirmed.

Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.

      Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (2014).

      Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.

      Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7 (2014).

      Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2 (2016).

      Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (2014).

      Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2015).


author: CRONE, J., Concurs.

text:
    Mykel SMITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-637
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   CRONE, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J.

text:
    Muhammad A. STEWART, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1303
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Reversed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    Dewayne VAN ALSTINE, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1555
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    Curtis PEARMAN, d/b/a Forest Park-Pearman, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Rande MARTIN and R.L. Martin Associates, Inc. d/b/a Management Recruiters of Richmond, Appellees-Plaintiffs
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CC-239
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: CRONE, J.

text:
    Alexander ZSCHUNKE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-902
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    Roderick WHITNEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-223
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: Altice, Judge.

text:
    Jeffrey DYSON, Appellant-Respondent, v. WABASH COUNTY AUDITOR, Wabash County Treasurer, et al. Appellees-Petitioners
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-TS-931
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 7, 2018
    Appellant pro se: Jeffrey Donald Dyson, Wabash, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Mark A. Frantz, Jordan L. Tandy, Wabash, Indiana
    MEMORANDUM DECISION

      The Notice of Appeal wrongly includes as appellees several individuals who were not parties below. Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A)"limits the class of parties on appeal to parties of record in the trial court." Treacy v. State , 953 N.E.2d 634, 635-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

   Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] The Wabash County Auditor (the Auditor) and the Wabash County Treasurer (the Treasurer) initiated proceedings in the trial court to sell several tracts of real property owned by Jeffrey D. Dyson due to delinquent property taxes. Dyson filed a written objection to the tax sale. Following a hearing, which Dyson did not attend, the trial court entered its Order Overruling Objections and Defenses to Tax Sale (the Order). Dyson, pro se, appeals from the Order.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On August 31, 2017, the Treasurer and the Auditor filed a Joint Application for Judgment and Order of Sale, along with a joint affidavit and a 2017 tax sale judgment listing of properties with delinquent uncollected taxes, special assessments, penalties, and costs. Included in this list were five properties owned by Dyson, with delinquency amounts totaling over $9000. That same day, the trial court issued a Judgment and Order of Sale, entering judgment against the listed tracts of real property in the amount of their delinquencies and ordering the properties sold at a tax sale. The advertised date of the tax sale was September 20, 2017.

[4] On or about September 5, 2017, Dyson filed with the trial court a self-styled "Verified Notice of Defense in Opposition to Tax Sale(s), and Amotion [sic] of Possession" (the Notice of Defense), which listed the following alleged defenses:

LACK OF PRIVATE VENUE
LACK OF VERIFIED SIGNED CLAIM
LACK OF STANDING
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM THAT RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
LACK OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS REQUIRD BY PATENT LAWS

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 6. In the Notice of Defense, Dyson set out thirty-six "lawful reasons not to sign a judgment for tax sale on [his] private land under United States patent numbers 91 & 137[.]" Id. at 12. The following is a representative sampling of his "reasons":

1. From the King James Bible written in Psalm 24 verse 1: "The earth is the LORD's and the fullness thereof, the world, and those who dwell therein";
2. The Revolution against England was because King George "erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance" (Declaration of Independence);
3. Federalist Papers # 46: "Rights come from the LORD God, and not the State; that rights are antecedent to acts of legislation (Declaration of Independence);
* * * *
7. The alleged authority to collect property taxes from I, man Jeffrey Donald Dyson, a declared natural person, non-resident alien, upon patent numbers 91 & 137, are contrary and prohibited by the treaty of International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings of said Covenant, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992).
* * * *
22. Only a genuine Article III United States Court has exclusive venue and jurisdiction to hear claim(s) against my land, protected by United States Patent Numbers 91 & 137 held in allodium, (see attached recorded land patents);
* * * *
36. United State Constitution Amendment XIII, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction[."]

Id. at 7, 8, 10, and 12. Dyson appended to the Notice of Defense an "Affidavit of Truth For Registration of Memorial Upon Birth Certificate Number 113-1960-101193," id. at 14, a "Declaration to renounce and nullification of my Corporate US Citizenship, and my declaration of non-corporate franchise Indiana state citizenship," id. at 16-19, a "GRANTEE/ASSIGNEE'S NOTICE OF UPDATE OF LAND PATENT," id. at 30-37, and, among other things, an "AFFIDAVIT AND NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF PATENTED LAND FROM TAX ROLES," id. at 45-50.

[5] On September 6, 2017, the trial court entered an order in which the court observed that it could not hold a hearing within seven days of the advertised tax sale due to court congestion. Accordingly, the court ordered the removal of Dyson's property from the list of tracts for sale at the upcoming tax sale. The court scheduled a hearing on Dyson's objections for January 9, 2018. The hearing was rescheduled twice and eventually held on March 29, 2018.

[6] On September 12, 2017, Dyson filed with the trial court a document titled, "Praecipe for judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law and trial by jury of my peers, with investigation". Appellees' Appendix Vol. 2 at 25. The court noted in the CCS that Dyson's filing was not clear as to what relief, if any, was being requested. The court indicated that "all proceedings herein shall be in accordance with the laws and trial rules of the State of Indiana, as required." Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 3. This same day, the trial court also issued an order governing future filings in the case, which required all pleadings and documents to be "in compliance with the statutes of the State of Indiana and the Indiana Trial Rules, as they exist on and after this date" and include only information relevant to the proceedings. Id. at 54. Further, the order required that requests for relief clearly state the Indiana trial rule or statute on which the request is made and that requests for relief "be for only such relief as may be lawfully had in the Wabash Circuit Court." Id. The trial court concluded its order by noting that violations "may be enforced by contempt if necessary" and that "any pleadings or documents not filed in accordance with this order shall be placed in a trash receptacle." Id.

[7] At the hearing on March 29, 2018, the trial court noted that Dyson had notice of the hearing but had chosen not to appear. The trial court took judicial notice of the August 31, 2017 filings and order related to the tax sale. The attorney for the Treasurer and the Auditor then presented brief argument to the court. Counsel argued that the Notice of Defense filed by Dyson did not comply with the requirements of I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4.7(b) and that it was difficult to decipher the asserted defenses. The trial court agreed and noted at the hearing that the court had been "generous by characterizing [the Notice] as an objection and supporting documentation." Transcript Vol. 2 at 6. The court continued:

I find nothing after reviewing [the Notice of Defense] that remotely addresses any reasonable ground for an objection, uh, or frankly, is anything other than nonsense. Um, based on the history the Court's had with similar nonsensical pleadings, I think that, uh, it clearly warrants, uh, a finding of bad faith, frivolous, and, um, without any basis, in fact, to support that.

Id. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Treasurer and the Auditor and ordered Dyson to pay their attorney fees in the amount of $600 for the frivolous fillings. The court asked counsel to prepare a proposed order, which was filed and signed that same day.

[8] On April 2, 2018, Dyson filed a Motion for Order to Certify Right of Subrogation. The motion, which is not contained in the record before us, was found by the trial court to be "nonsensical in nature" and noncompliant with the court's order of September 12, 2017. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 4 (CCS entry). Accordingly, the trial court ordered that any further filings made on behalf of Dyson shall be filed in open court and in full compliance with the September order. On three additional dates in April 2018, Dyson unsuccessfully attempted to file a document or pleading without complying with the trial court's orders. Dyson now appeals the Order, pro se.

Discussion & Decision

[9] We begin by observing that "a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented." Zavodnik v. Harper , 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Further, "[t]here is no right to engage in abusive litigation, and the state has a legitimate interest in the preservation of valuable judicial and administrative resources." Id. at 264 ("Every resource that courts devote to an abusive litigant is a resource denied to other legitimate cases with good-faith litigants.").

[10] The trial court aptly identified Dyson's various filings as nonsensical and not based on applicable law. His lengthy appellate briefs similarly lack cogency and veer off on new topics not raised in the Notice of Defense. Dyson expressly presents four issues for appeal, which we attempt to decipher as follows: 1) whether he is a taxpayer as defined by Ind. Code § 6-5.5-1-17 ; 2) whether his property is exempt from taxation pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-1.1-11-9(b) and 6-1.1-2- 7 and his alleged federal land patents; 3) whether the Auditor and the Treasurer failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Dyson's summary of his appellate argument is representative of the clarity, or lack thereof, throughout his briefs:

The facts of the laws herein are clear, when I Jeffrey Donald Dyson is not a tax payer defined under the law(s), and only a taxpayer's property is assessable, and my property is exempted by law, by patent, and the Auditor's and Treasurers [sic] failure to file a claim when advertised and complete the Administrative remedy required to collect a tax, and show the property was assessable, together with the Court's lack of venue, lack of standing, lack of personal jurisdiction & subject matter jurisdiction, as a matter of law mandates a reversal of the lower court's order.

Appellant's Brief at 8.

[11] In addition to his arguments generally lacking merit, sound reasoning, and citation to relevant authority, we observe that the precise issues presented by Dyson were not presented below. For example, a review of the Notice of Defense reveals that Dyson never directed the trial court to the Indiana statutes upon which he now relies ( I.C. §§ 6-5.5-1-17, 6-1.1-11-9, and 6-1.1-2-7 ), he did not mention exhaustion of administrative remedies, and he asserted entirely different, though equally vague, jurisdictional arguments. Accordingly, we find the issues waived. See Zavodnik , 17 N.E.3d at 266 (issue waived where appellant - an abusive litigant - failed to present argument below and another issue waived where he failed, on appeal, to present cogent argument and citation to relevant authority).

[12] Waiver notwithstanding, we observe that Dyson's objection to the application for judgment and order of sale was wholly improper. Dyson acknowledged that he owned and occupied the real property in question, which is all located in Wabash County, Indiana. Moreover, Dyson did not dispute that the property taxes from the prior year's spring installment remained unpaid. His objection boiled down to the fact that he believed the property taxes were wrongfully assessed for various nebulous reasons. These issues should have been raised, if at all, in another forum, but they were not proper objections here.

[13] The tax sale process is a purely statutory creation. Stump v. St. Joseph Cty. Treasurer , 33 N.E.3d 360, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Indiana Code Chapter 6-1.1-24 governs the sale of real property when taxes become delinquent. "If a real estate owner fails to pay property taxes, the property may be sold to satisfy the outstanding tax obligation." Stump , 33 N.E.3d at 363.

[14] The statutory process begins with the county treasurer and auditor developing the list of real property with delinquencies and providing proper notices to the owners regarding the tax sale. Thereafter, the county treasurer and auditor "make application for judgment and order for sale" in a single cause of action "to any court of competent jurisdiction". I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4.6(b). Along with their joint application to the trial court, the county treasurer and auditor are required to file an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the delinquency list as of that date. I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4.6(a).

[15] I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4.7 addresses the action in the trial court and provides in part:

(a) No later than fifteen (15) days before the advertised date of the tax sale, the court shall examine the list of tracts and real property .... No later than three (3) days before the advertised date of the tax sale, the court shall enter judgment for those taxes, special assessments, penalties, and costs that appear to be due.... The affidavit provided under section 4.6 of this chapter is prima facie evidence of delinquency for purposes of proceedings under this section....
(b) If written objections are timely filed, the court shall conduct a hearing on the written objections not later than seven (7) days before the advertised date of the tax sale. At the hearing, the court shall hear any defense offered by any person interested in any of the tracts or items of real property to the entry of judgment against them, hear and determine the matter in a summary manner, without pleadings, and enter its judgment. The court shall enter a judgment under this subsection not later than three (3) days before the advertised date of the tax sale. The objection must be in writing, and no person may offer any defense unless the writing specifying the objection is accompanied by an original or a duplicate tax receipt or other supporting documentation ....
(c) If judgment is entered in favor of the respondent under these proceedings or if judgment is not entered for any particular tract... because of an unresolved objection made under subsection (b), the court shall remove those tracts...from the list of tracts and real property provided under section 4.6 of this chapter.
* * * *
(f) The court that enters judgment under this section shall retain exclusive continuing supervisory jurisdiction over all matters and claims relating to the tax sale.
* * * *

(Emphases supplied).

[16] At the hearing, Dyson did not appear to present any of his defenses to the entry of judgment against him. Moreover, the written objection that he filed with the trial court was not accompanied by original or duplicate tax receipts (i.e. , evidence that he had paid the delinquencies) or other supporting documentation, as required by statute. Rather, the Notice of Defense asserted a laundry list of nonsensical defenses (or "reasons") and included documents irrelevant to the question of whether the inclusion of Dyson's property on the delinquency list was in error. The trial court properly denied the objections and defenses raised in the Notice of Defense.

[17] Judgment affirmed.

[18] Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.

      The trial court noted a discrepancy regarding the date of filing. The document had a handwritten received date of August 28, 2017, but the document was not presented to the court until September 5, 2017. Regardless, the parties do not dispute that the Notice of Defense was timely filed.

      Dyson recorded this document with the Treasurer on March 28, 2016, notifying the Treasurer that two days prior (apparently through a deed with himself as both grantor and grantee) Dyson "acknowledged, took delivery, accepted, updated and recorded in public record by BLM Land Patent no. 137 and Land Patent no. 91 from the State of Indiana[.]" Id. at 45. Accordingly, Dyson requested that the Treasurer "lawfully remove the below described land from all tax roles [sic], as is provided by law." Id. He agreed to pay any taxes that remained due up to that date but indicated he would pay no further property taxes.

      Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4.7(b) requires that a hearing on written objections to a tax sale be heard not later than seven days before the advertised date of the sale.

      The Order, which Dyson appeals, provided in part:
      The Court, having reviewed the Notice of Defense, and having heard the comments of counsel for the County, now finds as follows:
      1 The Notice of Defense was not accompanied by an original or duplicate tax receipt or by any other documentation which could be considered as supporting in nature, as required by statute.
      2. The allegations contained in the Notice of Defense are gibberish and fail to present any cogent argument or other basis for justifying relief.
      3. Dyson failed to carry his burden of proof on any issue before the Court on the Notice of Defense.
      4. The allegations contained in the Notice of Defense are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, and were filed in bad faith, therefore entitling the County to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00).
      Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 55.

      This statute defines "taxpayer" exclusively within the context of the taxation of financial institutions. This definition has no applicability to this case.

      This statute is similarly inapplicable, as it addresses the exemption from assessments for public properties. I.C. § 6-1.1-11-9(b) provides: "No assessment shall be made of property which is owned by the government of the United States, this state, an agency of this state, or a political subdivision of this state if the property is used, and in the case of real property occupied, by the owner." (Emphasis supplied). It is undisputed that the real estate in question is owned by Dyson, a private individual.

      This statute addresses exempt personal property, not real property.

      For instance, Dyson asserted in the Notice of Defense that "[o]nly a genuine Article III United States Court has exclusive venue and jurisdiction to hear claim(s) against my land". Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 10. On appeal, he asserts now that the Indiana tax court has exclusive jurisdiction.

      Except as otherwise provided by law, all tangible property (including real property) that is within Indiana on the assessment date of a year is subject to assessment and taxation for that year. See I.C. § 6-1.1-1-15 (defining "real property); I.C. § 6-1.1-1-19 (defining "tangible property"); I.C. § 6-1.1-2-1 (property subject to tax in Indiana).

      Indiana Code Chapter 6-1.1-15 sets forth procedures for review and appeal of property tax assessments. There is no indication in the record that Dyson pursued this course to dispute the assessments of his property.

      To the extent Dyson challenges the imposition of attorney's fees, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Wabash County pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b). The record supports the finding that Dyson's Notice of Defense was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or filed in bad faith. See Zavodnik , 17 N.E.3d at 264 (I.C. § 34-52-1-1(b) is a tool for trial courts to use to "deal with abusive litigation practices").


text:
    Terrance L. THOMAS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-PC-2884
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Reversed and remanded.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the ADOPTION OF M.R.R., a Child
    M.R., Appellant-Respondent, v. N.G., Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-AD-923
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 7, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    Gary AMICK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1027
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Cornell Louis ROBERSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-752
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    David S. WILLAMOWSKI, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-924
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.W., Mother, and T.W. and L.W., Minor Children:
    J.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-981
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

1

--------


text:
    Richard L. BARWICK, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-114
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Nicolas Rasheed TAYLOR, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1318
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael MOFFATT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1424
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 8, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Waylon L. SADLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 27A02-1711-CR-2562
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    DARDEN, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Sean M. KEITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1129
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Christopher S. GOBLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1414
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    Michael I. KEIHN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-118
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Derrick R. BURT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1382
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Dismissed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Richard FORD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-881
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: TAVITAS, J.

text:
    Lindani A. MZEMBE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1035
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Daniel PIERCE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PC-679
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Laurentino ZUNIGA, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1711-PC-2844
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J.

text:
    E.B., Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 93A02-1712-EX-2997
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Gary J. LEYES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1396
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Shane T. WILSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-233
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Richard E. CARTER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1074
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Kevin L. MARTIN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Arvil R. HOWE and Charles W. Lahey, Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-680
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Dismissed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    James SHORT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1372
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: BAILEY, J.

text:
    Alfred STANLEY, et al., Appellants-Defendants, v. Dorothy DEVERICK, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-1354
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed and remanded.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

text:
    Michael M. WILLIAMS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ALLEN COUNTY SUPERIOR AND CIRCUIT COURTS, Wendy W. Davis, Lisbeth A. Borgmann, and Marcia Terenet, Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1708-MI-1913
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHEPARD, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brent S. POTOSKI, Appellant-Respondent, v. Nicole R. STOTTS, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JP-1285
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Z.K. (Minor Child) and C.M., Appellant-Defendant, v. The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-979
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   TAVITAS, J.

Affirmed.

BROWN, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.T., Ph.T., and C.T., Minor Children, W.J., Mother, and P.T., Father, Appellants, v. The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-910
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 15, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.

TAVITAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: C.H., Appellant-Respondent, v. OPTIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM, Appellee-Petitioner
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: L.C., Appellant-Respondent, v. Community Health Network, Inc., Appellee-Petitioner
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: D.P., Appellant-Respondent, v. Community Health Network, Inc., Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MH-638
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J., Concurs.

text:
    Charisse E. TAYLOR, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-543
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    SHEPARD, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   BAKER, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Samuel M. WALKER and Nancy Mae Walker, Appellants-Petitioners, v. TOWN OF ORLEANS, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-839
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    V.E., Appellant-Petitioner, v. A.S., Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PO-1226
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed November 14, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.