author: Altice, Judge. Baker, Judge, dissenting.

text:
    Levetta TUNSTALL, Appellant-Defendant, v. Dawn MANNING, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1711-CT-2572
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed August 20, 2018
    Attorneys for Appellant: Brian J. Paul, Harmony A. Mappes, Jason M. Rauch, Indianapolis, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellee: Ronald S. Todd, Noblesville, Indiana
    Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Indiana Trial Lawyers Association: Thomas C. Doehrman, Daniel J. Buba, Indianapolis, Indiana
   Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In 2014, Dawn Manning and Levetta Tunstall were involved in a minor vehicle collision. Tunstall admitted fault and the parties litigated the issue of damages at a three-day jury trial in 2017. The jury awarded Manning $1.3 million for her pain and suffering resulting from on-going neck and back pain caused by the accident. Tunstall now appeals, arguing that she is entitled to a new trial for four reasons: (1) the verdict is excessive; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Tunstall to cross-examine Manning's expert witness about his disciplinary history with the Medical Licensing Board; (3) the trial court committed fundamental error by discharging a juror during deliberations without creating the appropriate record; and, (4) jury deliberations were improperly tainted by the comments of a juror.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On the afternoon of October 24, 2014, Manning - age thirty-one - was stopped at a stop sign preparing to turn right out of her apartment complex onto Georgetown Road in Indianapolis. Tunstall approached from behind, did not realize that Manning was still at the intersection, and hit her brakes and swerved just before colliding with Manning's vehicle. The right front of Tunstall's vehicle struck the left corner of Manning's rear bumper, pushing Manning's vehicle into Georgetown Road. Fortunately, no on-coming traffic was present. The low-speed collision caused damage to Manning's bumper and misalignment of Tunstall's vehicle. After moving her vehicle out of traffic, Manning called 911 and her mother.

[4] Manning began experiencing a headache and neck pain at the scene. She refused an ambulance but had her boyfriend drive her to the emergency room that same day. The emergency room physician treated Manning for whiplash, prescribing pain medicine and a muscle relaxant. When the pain did not subside over the next couple days, Manning returned to the emergency room and was told to seek chiropractic treatment. On November 14, 2014, she went to a chiropractor, complaining of bilateral posterior neck pain that radiated to her head and shoulders, headaches, and mid-back pain. After months of bi-weekly treatments, Manning experienced little relief from her pain.

[5] In June 2015, Manning saw another doctor for her on-going neck and back pain. X-rays taken of her cervical and thoracic spine were normal. The doctor prescribed pain medication and a muscle relaxant and referred her to a spine specialist, Dr. Rick Sasso of the Indiana Spine Group. Manning was treated at Dr. Sasso's office in July 2015. The impressions contained in the medical record of that visit indicate that Manning was suffering from significant cervical sprain, as well as an upper thoracic sprain. Dr. Sasso ordered an MRI, which returned unremarkable. Dr. Sasso recommended that Manning's pain be managed with injections, but Manning was unwilling - at least at that point - to start regular injections that would potentially last the rest of her life. Dr. Sasso also recommended physical therapy and prescribed a muscle relaxant.

[6] On September 22, 2015, Manning met with Dr. Steven Paschall - the medical expert she later retained for trial - for an independent medical examination. Manning complained of a constant ache in her neck, multiple daily neck spasms, and mid-back pain. Dr. Paschall inquired about the effects that her condition had on her activities of daily living. After a physical examination, which demonstrated a limited range of motion in her cervical spine, Dr. Paschall took several x-rays, including x-rays in flexion and in extension. The x-rays in flexion demonstrated "a significant angular motion segment integrity change at C4/5" with a loss of motion integrity of over twenty degrees. Id. Based on his independent examination of Manning, Dr. Paschall diagnosed her with "cervical spine ligament laxity, with alteration of motion segment integrity; thoracic strain, and limited cervical range of motion." Id. at 11. Dr. Paschall opined that Manning had reached maximum medical improvement and suffered from a permanent injury/chronic pain as a result of the collision. He gave her a permanent partial impairment rating of twenty-eight percent.

[7] Manning filed her complaint for damages on February 29, 2016. At the three-day trial in August 2017, in addition to Dr. Paschall's video deposition, Manning presented the testimony of her mother and father, her best friend, her boyfriend, and herself to establish the effect her chronic pain has had on her life since the accident. The pain limits her ability to stand or sit for extended periods of time, lift objects overhead or off the floor, wear heels, and participate fully in activities that she previously enjoyed, such as dancing, shopping, taking long walks, traveling, and high-adventure activities. Manning has become isolated and unable to enjoy her once-active lifestyle. Since the accident, she has become moody, depressed, and not her vivacious, outgoing self. Particularly devastating to Manning, she has been unable to continue her previously-active modeling career, and has gained a significant amount of weight due to her inability to work out and her mood. Although she has been able to continue working in her father's seasonal tax business and as a real estate agent, her pain has limited the number of hours she can work. Manning's long-term boyfriend emphasized that even three years after the accident, her quality of life was still negatively affected. He also noted the drastic change to their intimate relations since the accident, which has had an effect on their relationship.

[8] Tunstall presented opposing expert testimony. Ana Barbir, a forensic biochemical engineer, testified that Manning's alleged long-term injuries were not "consistent...with what's known for biomechanical tests." Id. at 175. Manning subjected Barbir to vigorous cross-examination. Dr. David Steinman, a neurosurgeon specializing in the cervical and lumbar spine, testified regarding his own independent medical examination of Manning and his review of her past medical records. In Dr. Steinman's opinion, Manning had no permanent injuries and was a malingerer.

[9] As set forth above, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Manning in the amount of $1.3 million. Tunstall filed a motion to correct error, arguing that the verdict was excessive and alleging juror misconduct. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to correct error on October 25, 2017, and then took the motion under advisement. On November 2, 2017, the trial court issued an order summarily denying the motion to correct error. Tunstall now appeals. Additional facts will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Excessive Verdict

[10] In considering whether a jury verdict is excessive, we do not reweigh the evidence and look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom that support the verdict. West v. J. Greg Allen Builder, Inc. , 92 N.E.3d 634, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied . "If there is any evidence to support the amount of the award, even if it is conflicting, this court will not reverse." Ritter v. Stanton , 745 N.E.2d 828, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied . To warrant reversal, "the award must appear to be so outrageous as to impress the Court at first blush with its enormity." Id. at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the award is so outrageous that it indicates the jury was motivated by passion, prejudice, partiality, or the consideration of improper evidence, we will find the award excessive. Groves v. First Nat'l Bank of Valparaiso , 518 N.E.2d 819, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied . We will uphold a verdict if it "can be explained on any reasonable ground." Berman v. Cannon , 878 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied .

[11] "[A]wards for pain, suffering, fright, humiliation, and mental anguish are particularly within the province of the jury because they involve the weighing of evidence and credibility of witnesses." Ritter , 745 N.E.2d at 845. Because physical and mental pain are not readily susceptible to quantification and cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty, the jury is given "very wide latitude" in determining such damages. Id. "Our inability to look into the minds of jurors and determine how they computed an award is, to a large extent, the reason behind the rule that a verdict will be upheld if the award falls within the bounds of the evidence." Id.

[12] Tunstall argues that the $1.3 million verdict in this case is excessive and urges us to engage in a comparative analysis of jury verdicts in other cases involving "a very common type of accident (a fender-bender) with very common alleged injuries (neck and back pain)." Appellant's Brief at 29. For the reasons thoroughly addressed in Ritter , we reject this approach. See Ritter , 745 N.E.2d at 845-49. "The nature and extent of pain and suffering are seldom, if ever, alike in any two cases." Id. at 849.

[13] Here, the evidence favorable to the verdict reveals that although the collision in question was relatively minor, it resulted in painful injury to Manning and left her with a twenty-eight percent whole person permanent impairment. Manning, a young woman, now has chronic neck/back pain and neck spasms that limit her daily activities and have substantially affected her life. Before the accident, she was a successful model with several agencies and was extremely fit, working out at the gym on a near daily basis. She was extroverted, full of life, and had "energy...through the roof". Transcript Vol. II at 221. She enjoyed being active, traveling, all-day shopping trips, long walks, dancing, and adventure. All this changed, when at the age of thirty-one, she was struck from behind by Tunstall. In the months after the accident, Manning suffered headaches and significant neck/back pain, which caused her to stay in bed and become despondent. She pursued various treatments and took prescribed medication, but she experienced little relief. She learned to limit her daily activities and made other changes to her life in attempts to reduce the pain and frequent neck spasms. Manning could no longer model or workout. She experienced significant weight gain, changes in her mood, and bouts of depression and anxiety. Her intimate relationship with her long-term boyfriend has also suffered. Years after the accident, Manning continues to live with pain, has substantial, daily limitations on regular life activities, and in many ways, cannot live the life she enjoyed before the accident.

[14] Although the jury might have assessed higher damages than we would have, we are unpersuaded that the $1.3 million verdict in this case is great enough to be characterized as excessive. In other words, we cannot say as a matter of law that Manning's pain and suffering since the accident and into the future is worth less than the jury's award. The verdict fell within the bounds of the evidence, and Tunstall's attempt to have us reweigh the evidence is improper.

2. Dr. Paschall's Disciplinary History

[15] Tunstall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit evidence regarding Dr. Paschall's disciplinary history with the Indiana Medical Licensing Board (the Board). On appeal, Tunstall expressly does not argue that the reasons for past discipline were admissible; she argues only that the fact Dr. Paschall had been disciplined in the past was admissible.

[16] A trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of evidence is afforded great discretion. Linton v. Davis , 887 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied . We will find an abuse of discretion where the trial court's ruling is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court or the court misinterpreted the law. Id. Moreover, evidentiary error requires reversal only if it is inconsistent with substantial justice. Id. In determining whether to reverse, we assess the probable impact on the jury. Id.

[17] The record establishes that throughout his more than 30-year medical career, Dr. Paschall has been disciplined by the Board twice. In November 2009, Dr. Paschall entered into a stipulated agreement with the Board pursuant to which he was fined $500. In January 2016, he was fined $1000 and his license was placed on indefinite probation for a minimum of 1 year with certain terms and conditions. By the time of the instant trial in August 2017, Dr. Paschall's license was back in good standing.

[18] In Linton , this court held that "the licensure status of a physician who gives an expert opinion is admissible to impeach the doctor's opinion." Id. at 969. Thus, the Linton court affirmed the trial court's admission of evidence that the medical-malpractice defendant, who testified as an expert regarding his compliance with the standard of care, was currently on indefinite probation. Id. at 967-69. Only the final action taken by the Board, however, was admissible. Id. at 969.

[19] Unlike in Linton , Dr. Paschall was in good standing (i.e., not on probation) at the time he testified in this case. Tunstall argues that this is a distinction without a difference. We are not so sure. Clearly, an expert's past disciplinary history is, if at all, not as relevant as the expert's current probationary status.

[20] Further, we do not believe that admission of the following deposition testimony would have had any significant impact on the jury:

[Tunstall's Counsel:] Okay. So during the course of your - your medical career, has your license ever been on probation, revoked, suspended?
[Dr. Paschall:] Yes, ma'am.

Appellee's Appendix Vol. 2 at 2. The trial court's redaction of this portion of the deposition, if erroneous, was harmless at best.

3. Discharge of Juror

[21] Less than an hour and one-half into deliberations, regular juror Mary Staton sent a note to the trial court. Staton indicated, "I don't feel as we are close to a decision. I need to leave to pick up my grandson. Can I be excused?" Transcript Vol. IV at 146. After discussing the matter with counsel, the court refused the request and directed the jury to continue deliberating.

[22] Over an hour later, the jury sent the court a note that said, "Your Honor, the jury cannot reach a verdict at this point due to the award amount. We find for the plaintiff, but can't agree on the award. We are one million dollars apart with one juror unable, or unwilling to budge." Id. at 148. Again, the court addressed the note with counsel and then instructed the jury to continue deliberating.

[23] Forty-nine minutes later, the court received another note from juror Staton, who wrote, "I would like to be excused due to pain in my legs. Can the alternate take over in my absence? I hate to ask but I'm in pain and can't take it any longer." Id. at 149-50. Once again, the court spoke with counsel. Manning's counsel stated that he did not have a problem with granting the juror's request. Tunstall's counsel then expressly indicated that she had no objection to the request either. The court brought the jury back into the courtroom, along with counsel (Tunstall's counsel on the phone) and stated:

I've received a note from Ms. Staton indicating that she's having some problems, and I've discussed your request with the parties, and I think there's an agreement that you can be released from your service, uh, based upon your having pain and experiencing it, and not being able to take it any longer. So, Ms. Staton you will be excused from the jury, and that means, Mr. Hill, you are now a juror as opposed to an alternate juror, and you could participate in the deliberations....

Id. at 50-51. The jury deliberated for about forty more minutes and then issued its $1.3 million verdict.

[24] Tunstall argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by discharging Staton without creating the appropriate record. Relying on Riggs v. State , she notes that once deliberations have begun, "the discharge of a juror is warranted only in the most extreme situations where it can be shown that the removal of the juror is necessary for the integrity of the process, does not prejudice the deliberations of the rest of the panel, and does not impair the parties [sic] right to a trial by jury." 809 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Ind. 2004). Riggs requires a "carefully developed record as to the grounds for removal and also requires precautions to avoid inappropriate consequences from the removal." Id. at 327.

[25] There are several important differences between Riggs and this case. Staton - not the trial court - requested that the alternate replace her. Thus, the trial court did not remove a willing juror. Further, unlike in Riggs , Staton's replacement was not based on her being "a dissenting juror" or due to any misconduct. Id. at 327. Staton was dismissed because she was experiencing pain in her legs during deliberations, and the trial court informed the remaining jurors that this was the reason for her removal. The most notable distinction is that Tunstall affirmatively agreed to the removal of Staton, while in Riggs, the defendant vehemently and repeatedly objected.

[26] We assume, arguendo, that the trial court's failure to fully comply with the developed-record requirements set forth in Riggs amounted to structural error. See Durden v. State , 99 N.E.3d 645, 654 (Ind. 2018). The record, nevertheless, establishes that Tunstall invited the error when her counsel affirmatively agreed to the removal of Staton. See id. at 655-56 (invited-error doctrine precluded a remedy for the defendant's claim of structural error); see also Brewington v. State , 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014) ("fundamental error gives us leeway to mitigate the consequences of counsel's oversights, but invited error precludes relief from counsel's strategic decisions gone awry"). Tunstall's counsel was in the best position to observe Staton throughout trial and to make a reasoned decision whether to keep her on the jury. Further, counsel knew that one juror - possibly Staton - was $1 million away from the verdict proposed by the rest of the jury. Based on the record, we conclude that Tunstall engaged in a rational, albeit unsuccessful, trial strategy. She cannot now be heard to complain.

4. Juror Misconduct

[27] Finally, Tunstall argues that she is entitled to a new trial due to juror misconduct. She directs our attention to an affidavit made by Staton (and prepared by Tunstall's counsel) just shy of a month after the trial. Staton sought out defense counsel after learning of the verdict and expressed her disagreement with the amount of the verdict. According to Staton's affidavit, a juror named Michelle shared during deliberations that she had been treated by Dr. Sasso, one of Manning's physicians, for similar back injuries. Based on her own experience with that doctor, Michelle maintained that the doctor would not have "ordered the MRI or prescribed injections unless he saw something." Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 81. The trial court denied Tunstall's motion to correct error in which she alleged juror misconduct.

[28] A trial court's ruling with respect to a motion to correct error carries a strong presumption of correctness and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. S. Bend Clinic, Inc. v. Kistner , 769 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). A defendant who seeks a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct generally must demonstrate that the conduct was gross and that it probably harmed the defendant. Id. For juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons, prejudice must be affirmatively demonstrated; it will not be presumed. Id. ; see also Ramirez v. State , 7 N.E.3d 933, 938 (Ind. 2014) ("the 'probable harm' standard [is] reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons-that is, that the misconduct is "gross" and "probably harmed the defendant").

[29] Although a verdict may not normally be impeached by juror testimony, an exception exists where "extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention". Ind. Evidence Rule 606(2)(B) ; see also Kistner , 769 N.E.2d at 593 ("exception to this general rule occurs when there is evidence demonstrating that the jury was exposed to improper, extrinsic material during its deliberations, and when a substantial possibility exists that the verdict was prejudiced by the improper material").

[30] Tunstall acknowledges that jurors are allowed, and even encouraged and instructed, to bring their common sense, knowledge, and general personal experience to deliberations. But she argues that the statements made by Michelle, as well as Michelle's personal opinions, go "beyond the kind of general knowledge that a juror might appropriately bring to deliberations; it is specific knowledge about a specific person involved in this specific case. This infiltration of outside information and bias provides an independent basis for granting a new trial." Appellant's Brief at 48.

[31] We conclude that Staton's affidavit does not amount to evidence warranting a new trial. Michelle's statements were based on her own knowledge and common sense. See Naumoski v. Bernacet , 799 N.E.2d 58, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ("We no longer expect or wish for our jurors to ignore the knowledge with which they enter the courtroom."), trans. denied . That is, she had been treated by Dr. Sasso in the past and her experience and common sense indicated that Dr. Sasso would not order an MRI and spinal injections if his patient was entirely healthy. Further, Dr. Sasso was not a testifying witness, and his credibility was not at issue. In fact, Tunstall's own medical expert relied on the records and MRI from Dr. Sasso's treatment of Manning.

[32] In sum, we cannot say that there was a substantial possibility that Michelle's statements prejudiced the verdict. See Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 477 (Ind. 2001) ("extrinsic or extraneous material brought into deliberation may be grounds for impeaching a verdict where there is a substantial possibility that such extrinsic material prejudiced the verdict"). Nor do we believe that her statements constituted gross misconduct. See Naumoski , 799 N.E.2d at 63 (we instruct jurors to use the knowledge with which they enter the courtroom, so "it cannot be gross misconduct to do precisely what the court instructed the jurors to do"). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on this ground.

[33] Judgment affirmed.

[34] Kirsch, J., concurs.

[35] Baker, J., dissents with opinion.

Baker, Judge, dissenting.

[1] I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority's conclusion regarding Dr. Paschall's testimony.

[2] In Linton , this Court squarely held that "the licensure status of a physician who gives an expert opinion is admissible to impeach the doctor's opinion." Id. at 969. Here, the trial court implicitly distinguished this case from Linton by finding that because Dr. Paschall's license was in good standing at the time of trial, his disciplinary history was irrelevant and inadmissible.

[3] I agree with Tunstall that this is a distinction without a difference. Although there is little Indiana caselaw on the issue, I find Sneed v. Stovall , 22 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), instructive. In that case, Sneed asserted that the trial court erroneously permitted Stovall to present proof of Sneed's medical expert's past conduct. The Sneed Court disagreed:

Certainly, the truthfulness of the witness will be a matter of grave concern for the jury .... [The expert] was bound by the ethical rules of his profession, and yet engaged in a practice of deception for a number of years even though he knew that his acts could constitute grounds for revocation of his license. His veracity as a witness should surely be questioned by virtue of this conduct.
* * *
In short, the jury must determine whether [the expert's] testimony ... is truthful and in giving weight to his testimony, the jury should have the benefit of evidence concerning his veracity and character.

Id. at 282. Ultimately, the court found that evidence regarding the expert's past disciplinary history-not just his licensure status at the time of trial-was admissible. Id.

[4] In this case, the Medical Licensing Board found that in the past, Dr. Paschall committed "fraud or material deception in order to obtain a license to practice." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43. At the time he examined Manning, he was facing another disciplinary complaint, which ultimately resulted in the indefinite probation of his medical license for a minimum of one year. I agree with Tunstall that she was entitled to ask about the status of his license when she examined Manning, "if not before and after then, and the jury was entitled to hear his answers and use them to evaluate the credibility of his opinions." Appellant's Br. p. 37. Precluding that line of questioning effectively precluded her from attacking his credibility, which is neither in line with Linton , nor, in my opinion, with the principle of fairness. Therefore, I believe the exclusion of this evidence was erroneous.

[5] I part ways with my colleagues' conclusion that, even if the exclusion was erroneous, it was harmless error. Dr. Paschall was the only medical expert presented by Manning, and his testimony squarely and profoundly disagreed with the multitude of experts presented by Tunstall. Even though Tunstall concedes that the specific acts underlying his disciplinary history would not be admissible, the mere fact that the Medical Licensing Board found that he had behaved in fraudulent or deceptive ways in the past would be material to the jury's evaluation of his testimony. That, in turn, would have the potential to affect the ultimate verdict, inasmuch as he was Manning's only medical expert.

[6] I note that the only deposition testimony referred to by the majority was Dr. Paschall's affirmative response to the question of whether his license had ever been on probation, revoked, or suspended. op. p. 1098-99. Tunstall's attorney attempted to ask a series of follow-up questions at the deposition, which Dr. Paschall repeatedly refused to answer. After a series of refusals, Tunstall's attorney concluded the deposition without further pursuing the line of questioning because it would have been futile to continue. Counsel indicated a plan to file a motion to compel the doctor's response to questions regarding his disciplinary history. I believe that the trial court should have granted said motion to compel, meaning that there would have been more testimony regarding his disciplinary history for the jury to have considered.

[7] In sum, I believe that the exclusion of this line of questioning was both erroneous and not harmless. Therefore, I would reverse on this basis and remand for a new trial.

      We held oral argument in Indianapolis on July 10, 2018.

      Dr. Paschall is board certified in emergency medicine, which he practiced for about thirty years before retiring in 2012. Upon his retirement, he started a business called Medical Legal Consultants of Indiana.

      "These are the types of x-rays that one obtains if one suspects someone has some type of motion segment integrity violation in their neck, which is commonly found in patients that have cervical ligament or muscle injury." Transcript Vol. III at 10. Manning's previous doctors had not performed x-rays in flexion and in extension.

      During the deposition, rather than address the timing of Dr. Paschall's one instance of probation, defense counsel attempted to ask a series of questions exploring the reasons for the discipline. Dr. Paschall refused to answer these questions. Tunstall openly acknowledges on appeal that testimony regarding the reasons for the discipline would not have been admissible at trial. Despite this, the dissent references the last-minute motion to compel that Tunstall filed on the eve of trial and eleven days after the deposition. In the motion, which was denied, Tunstall asked the trial court to compel Dr. Paschall to answer the unanswered questions from the deposition, as well as reasonable follow-up. Tunstall did not submit additional questions for the witness or request another deposition. A review of the unanswered questions reveals that the answers to these questions would not have been admissible, and the questions themselves were permeated with inadmissible references to criminal convictions.
      Additionally, we find the dissent's reliance on Sneed v. Stovall , 22 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) to be curious. In Sneed , the restrictions on the expert witness's medical license were still in place at the time of trial - he was just over three years into his five-year term of probation. See id. at 278. Moreover, during the deposition, the witness was asked about the status of his medical license and whether he had been subject to any disciplinary proceedings. Unlike in the case at hand, the witness in Sneed untruthfully responded that he had not. See id. at 281 (defendants sought to impeach expert's credibility "because of his untruthful answers under oath concerning prior disciplinary proceedings, and they [sought] to show his current status as a practicing physician").

      In Riggs , "the actions leading to the dismissal arose from the deliberations." Id. at 328. Our Supreme Court found dismissal unwarranted in that case, explaining: "Removal of a juror for misconduct requires more than a refusal to negotiate further. If there were a showing of physical confrontation, or attempts to intimidate other jurors, then removal may be permissible. But this record does not establish these extreme modes of conduct." Id. (internal citation omitted).

      In this case, the jury was specifically instructed by the trial court: "In deciding what or whom you believe, you should use your own knowledge, experience, common sense - and common sense gained from day-to-day living." Transcript Vol. II at 74.

      We note that the trial court impliedly questioned Staton's credibility. At the hearing on the motion to correct error, the court noted that Staton "didn't have the courage to stay in that room and fight for her beliefs and wanted out" and then returned after the verdict to try to "nullify" it. Transcript Vol. IV at 170.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Brown, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Cynthia MORRISON, Individually and on behalf of Ernest Morrison, Deceased, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Ricardo VASQUEZ, M.D., and Vascular Center & Vein Clinic of Southern Indiana, Appellees-Defendants,
    Kevin O'Connor M.D., Fort Wayne Radiology Association, LLC, Amar Pinto M.D., Premier Healthcare, LLC, Mohamed Nassar, M.D., and Indiana University Health Bloomington, Inc. d/b/a Bloomington Hospital, Inc., Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-376
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed August 28, 2018 Rehearing Denied October 22, 2018
    Attorney for Appellant: Mary A. Findling, Findling Park Conyers & Woody, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana
    Attorneys for Appellees: Karl L. Mulvaney, Nana Quay-Smith, Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana, David S. Strite, Rachel K. Dalton, O'Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky
   Brown, Judge.

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Cynthia Morrison ("Morrison"), individually and on behalf of Ernest Morrison ("Ernest"), deceased, appeals from the trial court's order that the case be transferred from Marion County to Monroe County. We affirm.

Procedural History

[2] On December 20, 2017, Morrison filed a complaint for medical malpractice in Marion County naming as defendants Dr. Ricardo Vasquez and Vascular Center & Vein Clinic of Southern Indiana (together, "Appellees"), as well as Dr. Kevin O'Connor, Fort Wayne Radiology Association, LLC, Dr. Amar Pinto, Premier Healthcare, LLC, Dr. Mohamed Nassar, and Indiana University Health Bloomington, Inc. d/b/a Bloomington Hospital, Inc., ("Bloomington Hospital"). The complaint alleged in part that the care, advice, and treatment of the defendants fell below the acceptable standard of care, proximately resulting in Ernest's death.

[3] On January 17, 2018, Appellees filed a Motion to Transfer Venue requesting transfer of the case to the Monroe Superior Court pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 75(A). Appellees argued that Marion County does not meet preferred venue requirements and the greater percentage of defendants reside in Monroe County. They argued in part that Ernest presented to Dr. Vasquez's office in Bloomington in November 2013 and underwent a procedure at Bloomington Hospital in December 2013; Ernest presented to Bedford Hospital on May 27, 2014, where a CT was performed; Dr. O'Connor in Fort Wayne remotely interpreted the CT; Dr. Pinto agreed to consult; Dr. Nassar, the hospitalist at Bloomington Hospital, accepted care of Ernest and Ernest was transferred from Bedford Hospital to Bloomington Hospital on the evening of May 27, 2014; and Ernest expired at Bloomington Hospital on May 28, 2014. Appellees further argued that they, as well as Dr. Pinto and Premier Healthcare, LLC, reside in Monroe County; Dr. Nassar resides in Marion County; Bloomington Hospital is primarily located in Monroe County; and Dr. O'Connor and Fort Wayne Radiology Association, LLC, are located in Allen County, and noting that five of the eight named defendants are located in Monroe County.

[4] On January 18, 2018, Morrison filed an objection to Appellees' motion to transfer venue and argued that Marion County is a county of preferred venue because the registered office and agent of Bloomington Hospital, one of the defendants, are located in Marion County. In support of her objection, Morrison cited to Trial Rule 75(A)(4) and Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. , 857 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. 2006). On February 19, 2018, the trial court entered an Order Granting Transfer of Venue which ordered that the case be transferred to the Monroe Superior Court pursuant to Trial Rule 75(A). Morrison now brings this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion

[5] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees' motion to transfer venue from Marion County to Monroe County. We review factual findings on an appeal from a ruling on a motion for transfer of venue for clear error and review conclusions of law de novo .

Arkla Indus., Inc. v. Columbia St. Partners, Inc. , 95 N.E.3d 194, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. , 857 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ind. 2006) ), trans. denied . Where factual determinations are made from a paper record, those determinations are also reviewed de novo . Id.

[6] Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) allows a case to be filed in any county in Indiana. Id. However, the rule also sets forth criteria establishing ten "preferred" venues. Id. at 196-197. Trial Rule 75(A) provides in part:

Preferred venue lies in:
(1) the county where the greater percentage of individual defendants included in the complaint resides, or, if there is no such greater percentage, the place where any individual defendant so named resides; or
* * * * *
(4) the county where either the principal office of a defendant organization is located or the office or agency of a defendant organization or individual to which the claim relates or out of which the claim arose is located, if one or more such organizations or individuals are included as defendants in the complaint; ....

[7] Trial Rule 75(A) does not create a priority among the subsections establishing preferred venue, and there may be multiple preferred venues in a given case. Arkla Indus. , 95 N.E.3d at 197. "A motion to transfer venue cannot be granted when an action has been filed in a preferred venue, but if the complaint is not filed in a preferred venue, the court is required to transfer the case to a preferred venue upon a proper request from a party." Id. (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. , 857 N.E.2d at 974 ).

[8] The Indiana Supreme Court has observed that "[p]referred venue is located in counties where information is readily available, where relevant land and personal property can be found, where witnesses can be easily brought to court, and where the litigants reside or hold office" and that litigants "benefit from relative certainty about the preferred forum and from the savings in time and expense that such rules provide." Randolph Cty. v. Chamness , 879 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 2008).

[9] Morrison argues that Marion County is a county of preferred venue under Trial Rule 75(A)(4). She contends that, pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Am. Family Ins. Co. , the registered agent and office of a domestic corporation provide the basis for venue under Rule 75(A)(4), that the address of Bloomington Hospital's registered agent was an address in Marion County, and thus that Marion County is a county of preferred venue. Morrison also argues that the complaint was filed on December 20, 2017, that venue is determined as of the time the complaint was filed, and that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, which became effective on January 1, 2018, does not apply to this case.

[10] Appellees maintain that Marion County is not a county of preferred venue. They argue that Am. Family Ins. Co. applies only to foreign corporations without a physical office in Indiana. Appellees further maintain that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 should be applied because they filed their motion to transfer venue after the statute became effective and, alternatively, that it is a procedural and remedial statute which should be applied retroactively. They contend that venue statutes are procedural rather than substantive in nature and that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 was a legislative response to Am. Family Ins. Co.

[11] In reply, Morrison maintains that Am. Family Ins. Co. , by its language, applies equally to domestic and foreign corporations and its holding is not limited to corporations without a physical office in Indiana. She further maintains that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is ineffective under Trial Rule 75(D) and there is no compelling reason to apply the statute retroactively.

[12] The parties do not dispute that Monroe County is a county of preferred venue under Trial Rule 75(A)(1). Thus, if Marion County is not a county of preferred venue, the trial court was required to transfer the case to a preferred venue upon request. See Arkla Indus. , 95 N.E.3d at 197.

[13] Trial Rule 75(A)(4) provides for preferred venue in "the county where ... the principal office of a defendant organization is located." In Am. Family Ins. Co. , the Indiana Supreme Court addressed preferred venue under Rule 75(A)(4) where the plaintiff filed suit in Marion County against Ford Motor Company, which had no offices in Indiana but maintained a registered office and agent in Marion County. 857 N.E.2d at 972. The Court found that the term "principal office" in Rule 75(A)(4) refers to a domestic or foreign corporation's registered office in Indiana and thus that Marion County was a county of preferred venue. Id. Subsequently, in CTB, Inc. v. Tunis , the plaintiffs filed suit in Marion County against CTB, Inc., an Indiana corporation with a registered agent and office in Kosciusko County, CTB requested transfer of venue to Kosciusko County, and the trial court denied the request. 95 N.E.3d 185, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied . This Court cited Am. Family Ins. Co. , noted that CTB's principal office under Rule 75(A)(4) was in Kosciusko County, and found that the court should have transferred the case to Kosciusko County. Id. at 189. Our opinion in CTB specifically acknowledged that revisions to Indiana's corporation law took effect on January 1, 2018, and that the parties did not argue that the revisions were applicable. Id. at 187. We also note that, in CTB , the complaint was filed on May 9, 2017, CTB filed its motion to transfer venue on June 20, 2017, and the court entered its order denying the motion on September 8, 2017.

[14] We observe that, unlike in Am. Family Ins. Co. , where defendant Ford Motor Company had no offices in Indiana but maintained a registered office and agent in Marion County, see Am. Family Ins. Co. , 857 N.E.2d at 972, the Indiana Secretary of State's record for Bloomington Hospital shows a "principal office address" for Bloomington Hospital on Second Street in Bloomington, Indiana. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 62. We further observe that, unlike in CTB , where defendant CTB was an Indiana corporation based in Kosciusko County and which had a registered agent in that county, see CTB , 95 N.E.3d at 186-187, Bloomington Hospital's principal office address, according to its filing with the Indiana Secretary of State, is in Monroe County. Also, unlike in CTB , where the trial court made a determination regarding venue well before Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 became effective and the parties did not argue the statute was applicable, in this case Bloomington Hospital filed its motion to transfer venue after the statute became effective, and Appellees argue the statute is applicable. We also note that the greater number of defendants are located in Monroe County, a medical procedure and the decedent's death occurred in Monroe County, medical records and fact witnesses are in Monroe County, and Cynthia Morrison does not live in Marion County.

[15] We find that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) is applicable in this case. The statute provides in part: "The address of the agent does not determine venue in an action or a proceeding involving the entity." This Court has stated that the venue status of a county is determined when an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint. See Painters Dist. Council 91 v. Calvert Enterprises Electronic Services, Inc. , 906 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Shelton v. Wick , 715 N.E.2d 890, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied ). Also, statutes generally will not be applied retroactively absent strong and compelling reasons. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast Fuel & Servs., Inc. , 783 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2003). However, an exception to this general rule exists for remedial or procedural statutes. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson , 70 N.E.3d 380, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Martin v. State , 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002) ). Although statutes and rules that are procedural or remedial may be applied retroactively, they are not required to be. Id. A remedial statute is intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute and will be applied retroactively to carry out its legislative purpose unless to do so violates a vested right or constitutional guaranty. Bourbon Mini-Mart , 783 N.E.2d at 260.

[16] The provision of Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 related to the determination of venue is procedural in nature. If new legislation changes only a mode of procedure in the law while providing a remedy substantially similar to the existing one and does not violate vested rights, "it will be applied to all cases pending and subsequent to its effective date." Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 713 N.E.2d 851, 855 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), trans. denied ; see also Hayden v. State , 771 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("Procedural, adjective or remedial law is that portion of the law which prescribes the method of enforcing a right or obtaining a redress for the invasion of that right. Substantive law, on the other hand, is that portion of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights."), trans. denied . We further observe that an entry in American Jurisprudence provides in part:

"Venue" refers to the place of trial or the locality where an action may be properly brought.... Venue is not a jurisdictional requirement or substantive right but is merely a procedural matter designed for the convenience of the parties, judicial efficiency, and allocating judicial resources....

77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 1 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Also, an entry titled "Retroactive application of venue statute" provides in part:

Normally, venue provisions are considered procedural in nature, not substantive, and courts generally apply them retroactively .... It is the rule in a number of jurisdictions that a statute fixing venue is applicable even to actions pending on the effective date of the statute .

77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 7 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added).

[17] The provision of Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 related to the determination of venue is procedural. Although the complaint here was filed on December 20, 2017, Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 became effective twelve days later on January 1, 2018, Appellees filed their motion to transfer venue on January 17, 2018, and the court granted the motion on February 19, 2018. Thus, this action was pending, and the court had not yet made a determination regarding venue, as of the date Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 became effective. Morrison has not established that she has been deprived of any substantive right. We conclude that the venue provision of Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is applicable. See Capps v. State , 268 Ind. 614, 618, 377 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (1978) (finding that the procedural mechanism in the Indiana criminal rules governing change of venue did not deprive the appellant of a substantive right such as a fair trial before an impartial jury); Borgman , 713 N.E.2d at 855-856 (finding, in response to an argument that a bad faith statute should not be applied retroactively, that the statute was procedural and merely set forth the proper forum for certain claims, and also noting the statute simply designated the proper forum for bringing enumerated claims and did not operate to strip the plaintiffs of an established right of recourse"); see also Gardner v. Gardner , 43 N.C. App. 678, 681, 260 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1979) ("Generally, a statute fixing venue is applicable even to actions pending on the effective date of the statute.") (citing 77 AM. JUR. 2d Venue § 1 ), aff'd .

[18] Further, we do not find Morrison's argument that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is ineffective under Trial Rule 75(D) to be persuasive. Trial Rule 75(D) provides in part: "Any provision of these rules and any special or general statute relating to venue, the place of trial or the authority of the court to hear the case shall be subject to this rule, and the provisions of any statute fixing more stringent rules thereon shall be ineffective." As explained above, Trial Rule 75(A)(4) provides that preferred venue lies in the county where "the principal office of a defendant organization" is located, and Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 provides that the address of the registered agent does not determine venue. Thus, Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 does not, by its express terms, fix more stringent rules related to venue than the terms of Trial Rule 75(A)(4).

[19] To the extent Am. Family Ins. Co. may have determined that the term "principal office" in subsection (4) of the rule referred to a domestic corporation's "registered office," that determination was premised on Indiana corporation law which has since been considerably amended. Specifically, the Court in Am. Family Ins. Co. observed that, at the time Rule 75 was adopted in 1970, Indiana's corporation law required that corporations maintain a "principal office in this state" where an agent for service of process could be found and that, "[w]hen the Business Corporation Act was adopted in 1986, what had formerly been called the 'principal office in this state' was designated the 'registered office.' I.C. § 23-1-24-1 (2004)." 857 N.E.2d at 974-975. The Court expressly found that, "[b]y adopting the term 'registered office,' the Business Corporation Act did not intend to change the venue rules for foreign corporations." Id. at 975 (emphasis added). Thus Am. Family Ins. Co. was based on the corporation law adopted in 1986 and the fact the statutory provisions added by the legislature at that time did not intend to change the venue rules. However, Indiana's corporation law was significantly amended by Pub. Law No. 118-2017 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Among other changes, the law repealed all of Ind. Code §§ 23-1-24, including Ind. Code § 23-1-24-1 upon which Am. Family Ins. Co. depended, and added the new article of Ind. Code §§ 23-0.5 which contains §§ 23-0.5-4 governing the designation and maintenance of registered agents, including Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 which, unlike the provisions adopted in 1986, expressly intends a change to the venue rules. See Pub. Law No. 118-2017, § 5 (enacting Ind. Code §§ 23-0.5), § 11 (repealing Ind. Code §§ 23-1-24). Thus the Indiana corporation law upon which Am. Family Ins. Co . was centered has been extensively amended, and the specific statutory provision relied upon in that case has been repealed and Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 has been added. We decline to find that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12's provision that the address of a registered agent does not determine venue fixes a more stringent rule related to venue than Trial Rule 75 or is ineffective pursuant to Trial Rule 75(D).

[20] Pursuant to Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, the address of Bloomington Hospital's registered agent does not determine venue and Marion County is not a county of preferred venue for purposes of Trial Rule 75(A)(4) on that basis. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court's order that the case be transferred to the Monroe Superior Court.

Conclusion

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's February 19, 2018 Order Granting Transfer of Venue.

[22] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.

      According to the Indiana Secretary of State's record for Bloomington Hospital, a copy of which was attached as an exhibit to Morrison's objection to Appellees' motion for change of venue and which is file-stamped January 18, 2018, Bloomington Hospital's registered agent was Mary Beth Clause, Esq., with an address on 10th Street in Indianapolis. The filing also shows a "principal office address" for Bloomington Hospital on Second Street in Bloomington, Indiana. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 62.

      Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) provides: "The designation or maintenance in Indiana of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in Indiana. The address of the agent does not determine venue in an action or a proceeding involving the entity."

      Ind. Code § 23-1-24-1 (2004), subsequently repealed, provided:
      Each corporation must continuously maintain in Indiana:
      (1) a registered office; and
      (2) a registered agent, who must be:
      (A) an individual who resides in Indiana and whose business office is identical with the registered office;
      (B) a domestic corporation or not-for-profit domestic corporation whose business office is identical with the registered office; or
      (C) a foreign corporation or not-for-profit foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Indiana whose business office is identical with the registered office.

      Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is modeled after Section 1-414 of the Uniform Business Organizations Code and Section 15 of the Uniform Model Registered Agents Act. See Uniform Business Organization Code (Last Amended 2011), § 1-414; Model Registered Agents Act (2006) (Last Amended 2011), § 15. The Comment to Section 15 of the Model Registered Agents Act states in part: "This section makes clear that the address of a registered agent does not determine venue."


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    IN RE: the PATERNITY OF V.A.C.
    Benjamin T. Colburn, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Raliza V. Pashova, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A03-1711-JP-2722
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Charles E. JUSTISE, Sr., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. David LIEBEL, et al., Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-102
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

text:
    Anthony WISE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 54A01-1711-CR-2710
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE The Termination of The Parent-Child Relationship of: CA.B. and C.B. (Minor Children), and T.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 30A05-1711-JT-2788
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARNES, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    KNOX COUNTY ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Mellissa (Cope) DAVIS, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 93A02-1701-EX-141
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    Daurrell L. FIGGS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 02A05-1711-PC-2839
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 2, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    Benjamin E. FAULK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1706-CR-1255
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED February 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

BARNES, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Robert J. FIEDLER and Dianne C. Fiedler, Appellants-Respondents, v. LAGRANGE COUNTY REGIONAL UTILITY DISTRICT, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 44A03-1712-MI-2951
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brandon A. KINCHELOE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-235
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    David E. BRUNER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-122
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Tracy S. COOP, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-192
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael A. KENNEDY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. The Honorable Joe HOGSETT, Mayor of Indianapolis, and the Indianapolis Department of Public Works, Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-431
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    Susan TENNANT, Appellant-Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, v. PEAKS & VALLEYS, INC., and Toni Staples, Appellees-Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
    Court of Appeals Case No. 92A04-1710-CC-2474
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    Taylor D. JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 89A05-1709-CR-2245
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARNES, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Alejandro Eligio PASCUAL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1712-CR-2900
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARNES, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    David JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-70
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 5, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Cynthia VERMETTE, Appellant-Defendant, v. NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-364
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Dismissed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    AMERISTAR CASINO, Appellant-Defendant, v. Margaret ROMERO, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-EX-3053
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Cody Ryan BANKS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Cause No. 82A04-1712-CR-2959
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J., Concurs.

text:
    A.S., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-JV-3037
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed
   ROBB, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Joseph Dale LEWIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1706-CR-1349
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 3, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    DARDEN, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   MAY, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: ROBB, J.

text:
    In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.R. and E.R. (Minor Children) and W.G. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-508
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Penelope STILLWELL and William Stillwell, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. EAGLE-KIRKPATRICK MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., Kirkpatrick Management Company, Inc., G.T. Services, Inc., d/b/a Green Touch Services, Inc., and Sycamore Springs Section C Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellees-Defendants, v. Cohen & Malad, LLP, Appellee-Intervenor.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1708-CT-1919
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   ROBB, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Travis Jovan ALLEN, Jr. Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-CR-2345
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 6, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARNES, Sr.J.
    Reversed and remanded.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Ronte A. TERRELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A04-1712-CR-2941
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: BRADFORD, J.

text:
    Devin COMBS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-CR-3059
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Diane SEIWERT and 19942 Longview Drive, LLC, Appellants/Defendants/Cross-Claim Plaintiffs, v. Ty BROWN and Brown Roofing Co., Appellees/Plaintiffs/Cross-Claim Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 15A01-1707-PL-1616
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the PATERNITY OF E.M.S.,
    Angela Marie Goodson, Appellant-Respondent, v. Jason Wyatt Schmittler, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JP-403
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BAKER, J., Concurs with opinion.


author: CRONE, J.

text:
    Daniel P. BREWINGTON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 15A04-1712-PC-2889
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Reversed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jason HUMPHREY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-335
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF J.Z. (Minor Child) and J.C. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 11A04-1712-JT-2919
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 10, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the GUARDIANSHIP OF COR. G. and Col.G.,
    William Tankersley and Mona Tankersley, Appellants-Petitioners, v. Gregory Greer (Father) and Shelly Brewer (Mother), Respondents, and Tony Greer and Rebecca Greer, Appellees-Intervenors
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1711-GU-2676
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    George F. HAUK, IV, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 70A05-1710-CR-2437
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 9, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


author: BROWN, J.

text:
    Julio Cesar PINA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-291
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    John MEANS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1711-CR-2701
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Ryan STABLER, Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-166
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Reversed and remanded.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Patrick HOLMES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1710-CR-2342
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF:
    J.B. and P.C. (Minor Children), and J.B. (Mother) and B.C. (Father), Appellants-Respondents, v. The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-349
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: VAIDIK, C.J.

text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.A. (Minor Child) and F.R. (Father)
    F.R. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-459
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

PYLE, J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J., Concurs.

text:
    Brian R. SOSBE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-16
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   RILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J.

text:
    IN RE: The Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.W.;
    J.W. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-JT-2933
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael J. DAVIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A05-1712-CR-2920
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Wayde COLEMAN, Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY TREASURER and Marion County Auditor, Appellees.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1711-CT-2733
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    Douglas CRAWFORD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 32A05-1710-PC-2486
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Richard DODD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1702-PC-452
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 13, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   PYLE, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Sonny DAVIS, Appellant-Petitioner. v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1710-PC-2328
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 12, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Richard FRYE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Sarah (Frye) MOSBY, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1711-DR-2671
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Andy GODSEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-CR-3026
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Otto SUTTON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-CR-2916
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

PYLE, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: BAILEY, J.

text:
    Charles A. MCMICHAEL, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-394
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    ANONYMOUS N.P., Appellant-Third-Party Defendant, v. ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 03A04-1712-MI-3006
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed and remanded.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Dissents with opinion.


text:
    Keith A. HOGLUND, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Robert E. CARTER, Jr., Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-SC-3051
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Eric MUSSELMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN, et al., Appellees-Defendants.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-440
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    John GUAJARDO, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 54A01-1711-CR-2749
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Robert Ryan FLEMING, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 09A05-1712-CR-2813
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


author: RILEY, J.

text:
    Jeremy FLETCHALL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 34A02-1712-CR-2976
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF L.C.
    C.J. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JC-313
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Reversed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    William Clyde GIBSON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 22A01-1711-PC-2528
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 16, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: T.H. (Minor Child), and B.H. (Father) and D.A. (Mother), Appellants-Respondents, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-423
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jarvice SEARS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 82A01-1708-CR-1815
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


author: KIRSCH, J.

text:
    Alex P. BICE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-124
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


author: PYLE, J., Concurs.

text:
    J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., and Terry L. Brown, Jr., Appellants-Defendants, v. The GUARDIANSHIP OF Kristen ZAK, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1710-CT-2429
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   PYLE, J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    Joshua Travis HALL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-54
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    D.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-JV-2849
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.

BAKER, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.


author: VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

text:
    C.M., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1712-JV-2762
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARNES, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Timothy M. SEE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1712-CR-2930
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FRIEDLANDER, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   PYLE, J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    Joshua D. PRESTON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 35A04-1711-PC-2727
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Michael BURGESS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-208
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 18, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   KIRSCH, J.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Mylon S. BETTS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-215
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 17, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

PYLE, J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    In the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: P.L., C.B.(1), C.B.(2), K.P., and D.R. (Minor Children), and P.M.L. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-456
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Antonio D. MOORE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-263
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J., Concurs.

text:
    James TRAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 79A04-1706-CR-1310
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
    BARTEAU, Sr.J.
    Affirmed.
   NAJAM, J., Concurs.

RILEY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Timothy SMITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1712-CR-2825
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Thomas AVERY, Appellant-Respondent, v. Laura Mae AVERY, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A04-1712-DR-2960
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ROBB, J.

Reversed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Dissents with opinion.


text:
    Bryan Joseph BENWAY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-66
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BRADFORD, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


author: NAJAM, J.

text:
    Stephen Anthony BYRD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A05-1710-CR-2288
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brian J. OFFRINGA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-316
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


author: MATHIAS, J.

text:
    CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Bradley T. MAYNARD, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-MI-2300
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Dennis E. BREWER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 15A01-1709-CR-2181
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jeffrey K. JOHNSON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 84A01-1703-PC-491
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


text:
    Marzono R. SHELLY, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 46A03-1702-PC-274
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 20, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MATHIAS, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MAY, J., Concurs.


author: BAKER, J.

text:
    Aaron CLARK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-411
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 19, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


author: ALTICE, J.

text:
    STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Ernesto B. RUIZ, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 36A01-1712-CR-2999
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Andrew C. ABBOTT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-670
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed and remanded.

ROBB, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    IN RE the ADOPTION OF B.L., S.L., and R.L.
    Ri.L. and R.O., Appellants-Respondents, v. C.M. and B.M., Appellees-Petitioners.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 52A02-1711-AD-2753
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs in result.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Lionel GIBSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-59
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 23, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Ruben CABLE, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. KINSEY YOUTH CENTER, Appellee-Defendant.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 93A02-1705-EX-1182
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Dismissed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.M. & D.M. (Children) and W.M. (Father);
    W.M. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-168
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    J.S., Appellant-Respondent, v. M.C., Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 34A04-1711-MI-2715
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Anthony GIBSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 27A04-1712-CR-2745
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Amanda L. ZEIGLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 03A01-1711-CR-2781
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

PYLE, J., Concurs.

ALTICE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Deshaun W. JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A02-1710-CR-2289
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.L., A.E., and D.E.;
    C.E. (Father) and M.L. (Mother), Appellants-Respondents, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-261
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Melvin P. OWENS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-451
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   VAIDIK, C.J.

Affirmed.

PYLE, J., Concurs.

BARNES, Sr.J., Concurs.


text:
    R.H., Appellant-Respondent, v. L.H. and C.H., Appellees-Petitioners.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-AD-174
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 24, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   ALTICE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

ROBB, J., Concurs.


text:
    Samuel Lawrence MORGAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1712-CR-2862
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.


text:
    Candice SCARBROUGH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAILEY, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Asher B. HILL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Frank LITTLEJOHN, Robbie Marshall, Christopher Nicholson, Linda VanNatta, Adam Davis, and Wade Collins, Appellees-Defendants
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-CT-2557
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    Teresa PARNELL and Patrick Parnell, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. AGRICOR, INC., Steinberger Construction, Inc., E & B Paving, Inc., and Keith Sullivan Excavating, Inc., Appellees-Defendants
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-399
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 25, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

BROWN, J., Concurs.


text:
    JE.M., and Jo.M., Appellants-Petitioners, v. D.A., Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 17A-AD-3042
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Charles JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1712-CR-2948
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   MAY, J.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    John F. WILLIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-518
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   NAJAM, J.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Charles LAIN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
    Court of Appeals Case No. 03A01-1710-PC-2293
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    N.L., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 45A05-1712-JV-2879
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Elaine DAVEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Richard E. BOSTON, Appellee-Defendant
    Court of Appeals Case No. 89A01-1712-PL-2955
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BAKER, J.

Granted in part and denied in part.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

BRADFORD, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jared BUSTLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Cause No. 17A-CR-3033
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., Concurs.

VAIDIK, C.J., Concurs.


text:
    Teresa ORTIZ, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-63
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    Jeremiah WALKER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Cause No. 49A05-1712-CR-2901
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 26, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   RILEY, J.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., Concurs.

MATHIAS, J., Concurs.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.D., M.D., and J.H.D. (Minor Children), and
    E.D. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-132
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Filed July 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Brenzell BELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1711-CR-2603
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   BROWN, J.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., Concurs.

CRONE, J., Concurs.


text:
    Keith PHILLIPS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-210
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    FILED July 27, 2018
    DISPOSITION OF CASE BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
   CRONE, J.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., Concurs.

PYLE, J., Concurs.