text:
    Charles SHEPHARD, Lynn Shephard, Laverne Davis, Alice Davis, Sharon Johnson, Heidi Johnson, Ronald Macy, Theresa Macy, C. Nicholas Cronauer, Audra Cronauer, Linnae Smith, and Dawn Styka, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF DE KALB COUNTY, De Kalb Community Unit School District No. 428, and Sycamore Community Unit School District No. 427, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 2-17-0407
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 28, 2018
    Burns, Cronauer & Brown, LLP, of Sycamore (Charles E. Cronauer, of counsel), for appellants.
    Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago (Joshua G. Vincent, Carson R. Griffis, and Yashekia T. Simpkins, of counsel), for appellee De Kalb Community Unit School District No. 428.
    Robbins Schwartz Nicholas Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., of Chicago (Heidi A. Katz and Jorge F. Rovelo, of counsel), for appellee Sycamore Community Unit School District No. 427.
    Richard D. Amato, State's Attorney, of Sycamore (Sarah J. Gallagher Chami, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for other appellee.
   JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiffs, Charles Shephard (Shephard), Lynn Shephard, Laverne Davis, Alice Davis, Sharon Johnson, Heidi Johnson, Ronald Macy, Theresa Macy, C. Nicholas Cronauer (Cronauer), Audra Cronauer, Linnae Smith, and Dawn Styka, petitioned the Regional Board of School Trustees of De Kalb County (the Board) to detach their properties from the boundaries of De Kalb Community Unit School District No. 428 (the De Kalb District) and annex them into the boundaries of Sycamore Community Unit School District No. 427 (the Sycamore District). After a hearing, the Board denied the plaintiffs' petition. On administrative review, the circuit court of De Kalb County affirmed the Board's decision. The plaintiffs appeal from that order. We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On April 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a petition with the Board, seeking to detach their properties from the De Kalb District and annex it to the Sycamore District. On October 2, 2016, the Board conducted a hearing on the petition.

¶ 4 At the hearing, the plaintiffs and the De Kalb District stipulated that the plaintiffs lived within 10 miles of both the De Kalb District and the Sycamore District. The plaintiffs acknowledged that both districts have equally competent curricula.

Eight of the twelve plaintiffs submitted written statements summarizing their contacts with the City of Sycamore. The written statements focused generally on how the plaintiffs identified themselves as residents of Sycamore rather than residents of the City of De Kalb or the Town of Cortland-they listed the recreational activities, public services, and business activities in which they participated in Sycamore.

¶ 5 Cronauer's written statement referenced an incident in January 2014 when students and faculty at Cortland Elementary School (Cortland Elementary), which is in the De Kalb District, were hospitalized "after toxic fumes (carbon monoxide) drifted from [a nearby] landfill and entered [the school's] ventilation system." Cronauer added that the landfill's capacity had increased from 300 tons of waste per day to 800 tons of waste per day as of January 2015. Cronauer asserted that the "chance of future harm to our children from the toxic fumes is significant."

¶ 6 Cronauer attached to his written statement newspaper articles about the incident. According to an article in the Daily Chronicle, a contractor for Waste Management, the landfill operator, "hit a pocket of old decomposing garbage" while performing maintenance work, "releasing the odor, but no methane gas, into the air." James Briscoe, the De Kalb District's superintendent, said that "wind carried the odor to the school less than a mile to the northeast." The Daily Chronicle reported that 63 students and staff of Cortland Elementary were treated with oxygen for "minor carbon monoxide exposure."

¶ 7 The article further reported that Waste Management stated that any future work would be performed "only when favorable conditions exist or the school is not in session as we complete this construction project." Waste Management also stated that, as of January 14, 2014, it hoped "to have this project completed in the next weeks *** based on favorable conditions."

¶ 8 The only plaintiffs to testify at the hearing were Shephard and Cronauer. Shephard said that he was familiar with the landfill incident at Cortland Elementary. He stated that he could smell the landfill when he drove by it. He acknowledged that he was not aware of any efforts to monitor emissions from the landfill by either Waste Management or Cortland Elementary. He also testified that, because De Kalb County had increased the amount of waste that Waste Management could bring to the landfill, there would be an additional 100 trucks driving to the landfill every day. He also noted that Cortland Elementary is located on Route 38, which means that traffic traveling 55 miles per hour passes the school.

¶ 9 Cronauer testified that he believed that children would benefit from going to the same school as other members of their community. He also believed that the "rural roads" around Cortland Elementary were not safe and that school buses going to and from the school have to turn onto a road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. He also stated that just because Waste Management or Cortland Elementary monitored emissions from the landfill, "that doesn't mean it's going to prevent another accident from happening again."

¶ 10 On behalf of the De Kalb District, Jennie Heuber, the De Kalb District's director of curriculum and instruction, and Andrea Gorla, the De Kalb District's assistant superintendent, testified. Heuber testified that the De Kalb District's curriculum met the standards of the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2016) ) and the Illinois State Board of Education. She stated that there were no meaningful distinctions between the De Kalb District's curriculum and the Sycamore District's curriculum. Heuber explained that all students in the De Kalb District enjoyed the benefit of "the 'curriculum tech initiative,' " through which all students in grades 3 through 12 received Chromebook laptops. She further noted that in all of its facilities the De Kalb District used "instructional coaches" who work with teachers to make "sure that best practices are in place" in the classrooms. She believed that the De Kalb District met the students' needs.

¶ 11 Gorla testified that, with respect to the landfill incident, meters had been installed in Cortland Elementary to monitor the air quality. Members of the school's staff were trained on how to respond if a monitor triggered an alarm. Since the monitors had been installed, there had been no negative readings.

¶ 12 At the close of the hearing, the Board denied the detachment petition. The Board explained that "based on the evidence presented *** there is no significant direct educational benefit to the [plaintiffs'] children if the change in boundaries were allowed."

¶ 13 On December 5, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the trial court for administrative review of the Board's decision. On May 12, 2017, following a hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiffs any relief. The trial court found that all of the relevant evidence had been presented to the Board and that there was no indication that the Board had ignored any of it. The trial court therefore determined that the Board's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Following the trial court's ruling, the plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the Board erred in denying their petition for detachment. The plaintiffs insist that the Board's finding that there would be no significant direct educational benefit to the plaintiffs' children if the petition were granted was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 16 A regional board's decision to grant or deny a petition to detach and annex pursuant to section 7-6 of the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/7-6 (West 2016) ) is an administrative decision for purposes of the Administrative Review Law ( 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016) ). 105 ILCS 5/7-7 (West 2016). As such, we review the ruling of the Board, "not the judgment of the circuit court." Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue , 236 Ill. 2d 368, 386, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (2010). The scope of our review of an administrative agency's decision extends to all questions of law and fact. Merchant v. Regional Board of School Trustees , 2014 IL App (2d) 131277, ¶ 71, 385 Ill.Dec. 756, 19 N.E.3d 688. An agency's factual findings are held to be prima facie true and correct. Id. ; see 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2016). However, this rule does not relieve us of our duties to examine the record and to set aside an order that is unsupported by the evidence. Merchant , 2014 IL App (2d) 131277, ¶ 71, 385 Ill.Dec. 756, 19 N.E.3d 688. Reversal of an agency's factual findings is warranted only when they were against the manifest weight of the evidence; that is, when it is clearly evident that the agency should have reached the opposite conclusion. Board of Education of Marquardt School District No. 15 v. Regional Board of School Trustees , 2012 IL App (2d) 110360, ¶ 20, 360 Ill.Dec. 621, 969 N.E.2d 431. Where administrative orders involve mixed questions of law and fact, we apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id. We review de novo an agency's decisions on questions of law. Id.

¶ 17 At the outset, we note that the legislature has recently amended the School Code as it pertains to school district boundary changes. The plaintiffs acknowledge that the law has changed, but they argue that the Board and the reviewing courts are still required to consider the same factors used by courts prior to those amendments. Prior to 2016, section 7-6(i) of the School Code provided that, at a hearing on a petition for detachment and annexation, the regional board of school trustees:

"shall hear evidence as to the school needs and conditions of the territory in the area within and adjacent thereto and as to the ability of the districts affected to meet the standards of recognition as prescribed by the State Board of Education, and shall take into consideration the division of funds and assets which will result from the change of boundaries and shall determine whether it is to the best interests of the schools of the area and the educational welfare of the pupils that such change in boundaries be granted." 105 ILCS 5/7-6(i) (West 2014).

¶ 18 Courts found that, under section 7-6(i) of the School Code, the regional board was required to perform a "benefit/detriment test." In applying this test, the regional board was required to consider the following factors: (1) the differences between school facilities and curricula, (2) the distances from the petitioners' homes to the respective schools, (3) the effect detachment would have on the ability of either district to meet the state's standards of recognition, (4) the impact the proposed boundary change would have on the tax revenues of both districts, and (5) whether the detaching district would remain financially healthy and able to meet state standards of recognition. Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees , 146 Ill. 2d 347, 356, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273 (1992) ; Dukett v. Regional Board of School Trustees of Calhoun, Greene, Jersey, & Macoupin Counties , 342 Ill. App. 3d 635, 641, 277 Ill.Dec. 277, 795 N.E.2d 945 (2003). The mere absence of a substantial detriment to either district was not sufficient to support a petition for detachment and annexation. Carver , 146 Ill. 2d at 358, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273. However, petitioners did not need to demonstrate a particular benefit to the annexing district as long as the overall benefit to the annexing district and the detachment area considered together outweighed the resulting detriment to the detaching district and the surrounding community as a whole. Id. (citing Board of Education of Golf School District No. 67 v. Regional Board of School Trustees , 89 Ill. 2d 392, 400-01, 60 Ill.Dec. 443, 433 N.E.2d 240 (1982) ). In the absence of a substantial detriment to either district, some benefit to the educational welfare of the students in the detachment area was sufficient to warrant granting a petition for detachment. Id.

¶ 19 Our supreme court offered some guidance regarding the balancing test and the relevant factors. The loss of revenue was not a determinative factor in detachment proceedings and alone would not prevent a boundary change if the district subject to detachment was not levying at the maximum tax rate. Id. at 356-57, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273. Although financial loss to the detaching district was not irrelevant, it could not serve as the basis for a denial of detachment unless it was serious. Id. at 357, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273.

¶ 20 Further, "educational welfare" should be broadly interpreted. Id. at 359, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273. Students' educational welfare was bettered not just through improved educational programs or facilities. Id. at 359-60, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273. Improvement could also occur by way of a shortened distance between students' homes and their school. Id. ; see Pochopien v. Regional Board of School Trustees of the Lake County Educational Service Region , 322 Ill. App. 3d 185, 194, 255 Ill.Dec. 6, 748 N.E.2d 710 (2001) (citing examples of educational welfare).

¶ 21 In addition to the factors set forth above, courts were allowed to consider the " 'whole child' " and " 'community of interest' " factors. Carver , 146 Ill. 2d at 356, 167 Ill.Dec. 1, 586 N.E.2d 1273. Those factors examined the identification of the detachment area with the district to which annexation was sought and the corresponding likelihood of participation in school and extracurricular activities. Id.

¶ 22 Effective January 1, 2016, the legislature amended section 7-6(i) of the School Code. That section provides in pertinent part:

"The regional board of school trustees *** shall hear evidence as to the school needs and conditions of the territory in the area within and adjacent thereto and the effect detachment will have on those needs and conditions and as to the ability of the districts affected to meet the standards of recognition as prescribed by the State Board of Education, and shall take into consideration the division of funds and assets which will result from the change of boundaries and shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the schools of the area and the direct educational welfare of the pupils that such change in boundaries be granted ***. ***
***
(2) The community of interest of the petitioners and their children and the effect detachment will have on the whole child may be considered only if the regional board of school trustees *** first determines that there would be a significant direct educational benefit to the petitioners' children if the change in boundaries were allowed." 105 ILCS 5/7-6(i) (West 2016).

¶ 23 In comparing the prior version of the law with the 2016 version, a stark difference is readily apparent: whereas the prior version (as interpreted by our supreme court) allowed the regional board (and ultimately the reviewing court) to consider multiple factors simultaneously in determining whether a detachment petition should be granted, the 2016 version requires the regional board to first determine that there would be a significant direct educational benefit to the petitioners' children if the petition were granted. Id. Absent such a finding, the regional board is not to consider other factors, such as the community-of-interest and whole-child factors. Id.

¶ 24 Here, the plaintiffs stipulated that the De Kalb District and the Sycamore District had comparable educational programs. The plaintiffs did not raise any concern about the educational facilities in the De Kalb District. The only concern that the plaintiffs raised that possibly implicated a significant direct educational benefit was that the children would be safer by not attending a school close to a landfill. The evidence that the plaintiffs presented on this issue, however, was less than compelling.

¶ 25 The plaintiffs submitted a January 2014 newspaper article that described how 63 students and staff had suffered minor carbon-monoxide exposure when a contractor at the nearby landfill had "hit a pocket of old decomposing garbage" that released an odor. Following that incident, Waste Management indicated that the contractor's work would continue only when conditions were favorable or school was not in session. Gorla testified that, following that incident, meters had been installed in Cortland Elementary to monitor the air quality and members of the school's staff had been trained how to respond if those monitors triggered an alarm. Since the monitors had been installed, there had been no negative air-quality readings. The plaintiffs also presented evidence that the capacity of the landfill had been increased and that, as a result, more trucks would be driving past Cortland Elementary on their way to the landfill.

¶ 26 Based on this evidence, the Board found that the plaintiffs had not established that there would be a significant direct educational benefit to the plaintiffs' children if the change in boundaries were allowed. The Board's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence suggests that the landfill incident was an isolated event not likely to reoccur, as Waste Management had taken remedial steps to prevent such an incident from happening again. Further, if such an incident were to reoccur, Cortland Elementary had trained members of its staff how to respond, thereby minimizing the risk that the children would become sick. As such, reversing the Board's decision would require us to determine that the plaintiffs had established that there would be a significant direct educational benefit to their children in not being exposed to a slight health risk that was unlikely to reoccur. That we cannot do.

¶ 27 The plaintiffs also suggest that their children's health is at risk because of the high volume of trucks passing the school to get to the landfill. One of the plaintiffs noted that the speed limit on the road by the school is 55 miles per hour. However, per the defendants' request, we take judicial notice that vehicles passing the school on school days when children are present may drive only 20 miles per hour. See Cortland Town Code § 6-1-2(A)(2) (adopted Feb. 13, 1995); Lopez v. Fitzgerald , 53 Ill. App. 3d 164, 169, 10 Ill.Dec. 761, 368 N.E.2d 356 (1977) ("It is well established in Illinois and a sound judicial policy for the courts in reviewing a case to take judicial notice of any and all statutes and ordinances which pertain to the case."). We also note that the plaintiffs did not present evidence of the traffic conditions around the elementary school in the Sycamore District. Even if we were to assume that the traffic conditions are better in the Sycamore District, we cannot say that the plaintiffs' children would enjoy a significant direct educational benefit if they went to a school with less traffic going by. Accordingly, the Board's decision to deny the plaintiffs' petition for detachment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 28 In so ruling, we note that the plaintiffs argue that the Board's finding was improper because it did not make specific findings in denying their petition. In discussing the prior version of the School Code, we rejected this same argument in Dresner v. Regional Board of School Trustees , 150 Ill. App. 3d 765, 775, 103 Ill.Dec. 666, 501 N.E.2d 983 (1986). We explained that courts are reluctant

"to reverse and remand decisions of regional school boards in detachment and annexation petitions for failing to enter extensive findings of fact because only a single issue is presented to the board, that being whether it is the best interests of the schools in the area and educational welfare of the students [citation], making a detailed and extensive finding of fact unnecessary." Id. at 780, 103 Ill.Dec. 666, 501 N.E.2d 983.

We then observed that the case involved only one question for the regional school board to decide and that much of the evidence was not in dispute. Id. We found that, although the board had not made detailed findings, its findings were nonetheless "sufficient to allow an orderly review by the circuit court, and this court, based upon the petition, pleadings, and transcripts." Id. at 780-81, 103 Ill.Dec. 666, 501 N.E.2d 983. We therefore concluded that "[t]o remand this cause to the regional school boards for a formal issuance of extensive written findings would be 'a useless act which would extol form over substance.' " Id. at 781, 103 Ill.Dec. 666, 501 N.E.2d 983 (quoting Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 300 v. County Board of School Trustees of Kane County , 60 Ill. App. 3d 415, 419, 17 Ill.Dec. 725, 376 N.E.2d 1054 (1978) ).

¶ 29 Here, nothing in the current School Code suggests that it requires the Board to make more explicit findings than were required under the prior version of the School Code. As in Dresner , the Board was confronted with a single issue: whether the plaintiffs' children would experience a significant direct educational benefit if the petition were granted. The Board found, based on the evidence presented, that they would not. The Board's findings were sufficient for this court to review. See Morgan v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 388 Ill. App. 3d 633, 655, 328 Ill.Dec. 139, 903 N.E.2d 799 (2009) (an agency is not required to make a finding on each evidentiary claim, and its findings need be only specific enough to permit an intelligent review of its decision).

¶ 30 The plaintiffs' reliance on Merchant , 2014 IL App (2d) 131277, ¶¶ 62-64, 385 Ill.Dec. 756, 19 N.E.3d 688, is misplaced. In that case, in considering the prior version of the School Code, this court reversed the regional board's decision after determining that the regional board had not addressed many factors that weighed in favor of detachment, such as the petitioners' school preferences, the shorter commutes to school, and the impact on property values. Id. ¶¶ 98, 115, 117. Here, however, the record does not indicate that the Board overlooked any evidence favorable to the plaintiffs regarding the threshold question-whether there would be a significant direct educational benefit if the petition were granted.

¶ 31 We also find without merit the plaintiffs' contention that, under section 7-2.6 of the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/7-2.6 (West 2016) ), the Board was required, but failed, to consider the "will of the people" in denying the plaintiffs' petition. That section pertains to "[a] petition for annexation to or detachment of territory from a special charter school district." See id. § 7-2.4. This case has nothing to do with a special charter school district.

¶ 32 The plaintiffs insist that other cases, such as Wirth v. Green , 96 Ill. App. 3d 89, 91-92, 51 Ill.Dec. 642, 420 N.E.2d 1200 (1981), considered the "will of the people of the area affected," even if detachment from a special charter school district was not at issue. Wirth relied heavily on this court's decision in Burnidge v. County Board of School Trustees , 25 Ill. App. 2d 503, 511, 167 N.E.2d 21 (1960), where we stated:

" 'All things being equal, the landowner, the taxes from whose property enables the school of the district to operate, the parents and students residing in the district, should be permitted to choose the school the pupils should attend.' "

Burnidge involved the interpretation of an earlier version of the School Code that is not applicable to the case at bar. Thus, neither Burnidge nor Wirth requires us to reach a different result.

¶ 33 As the Board's finding that there would not be a significant direct educational benefit to the plaintiffs' children if the change in boundaries were allowed was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we need not consider the community-of-interest and the whole-child factors. 105 ILCS 5/7-6(i)(2) (West 2016).

¶ 34 CONCLUSION

¶ 35 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County is affirmed.

¶ 36 Affirmed.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE MARRIAGE OF Sue CARSTENS, Petitioner-Appellee, and John Carstens, Respondent-Appellant.
    No. 2-17-0183
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 30, 2018
    Drake James Leoris and David Drenk, of Leoris & Cohen, P.C., of Highland Park, for appellant.
    Joel Ostrow, of Bannockburn, for appellee.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Respondent, John Carstens, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lake County granting in part and denying in part his amended petition to terminate or, alternatively, reduce the maintenance awarded to his ex-wife, petitioner, Sue Carstens. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Petitioner and respondent were married in 1986. Three children were born to the parties during the marriage. The parties separated on May 7, 2001, and petitioner subsequently filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On December 6, 2004, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage. At the time of the dissolution, both parties were 49 years old. Petitioner worked as a full-time homemaker while respondent was employed as the chairman and chief executive officer of Libertyville Bank & Trust.

¶ 4 The judgment of dissolution incorporated a "Marital Settlement Agreement" (MSA), entered on November 30, 2004. The MSA set forth the parties' obligations with respect to various matters, including child support, maintenance, the children's college expenses, and medical insurance. Regarding maintenance, the MSA provided for two "streams" of payments to petitioner. Pursuant to "Maintenance Stream # 1," respondent was required to pay $5000 per month on the fifteenth day of each month, beginning on January 15, 2005, for 60 consecutive months. "Maintenance Stream # 1" was subject to review upon petitioner's filing of a pleading prior to the due date of the sixtieth payment, but it was nonmodifiable by either party during the initial 60-month period. Pursuant to "Maintenance Stream # 2," respondent was required to pay $750 per month on the fifteenth day of each month, beginning on January 15, 2005, through September 15, 2007. "Maintenance Stream # 2" then decreased by $250 every two years until September 15, 2011, at which time all "Maintenance Stream # 2" payments ceased. The MSA further provided that the amount of maintenance was based upon "[respondent's] represented gross income from all sources of approximately $277,500 per year as a base salary, bonuses, restricted stocks, dividends, stock options, warrants, mortgage referral program compensation and company extras, and upon [petitioner's] representation that she is currently a full time homemaker who has not earned any significant income from any source since the children were born."

¶ 5 On December 10, 2009, petitioner filed two petitions, including a "Petition for Increase in Maintenance and Child Support and Other Relief." On March 8, 2010, respondent filed responses to petitioner's petitions, as well as a "Petition to Terminate Maintenance." A hearing on the parties' petitions was held before Judge Jay Ukena on August 31 and September 2, 2010. On March 17, 2011, Judge Ukena issued his oral ruling, which included the following factual findings.

¶ 6 Judge Ukena noted that the parties were married on June 21, 1986, and that the judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered on December 6, 2004. Pursuant to the judgment of dissolution, petitioner received approximately 55% of the marital estate. Neither party had acquired any property since the judgment of dissolution. According to the parties' financial affidavits, petitioner had assets worth about $2,329,427 and respondent had assets worth approximately $1,743,355. Judge Ukena noted that, although the parties were generally in good health, petitioner had back issues, the severity of which was disputed.

¶ 7 Judge Ukena further noted that, beginning in 1996 and until his ruling in March 2011, respondent was the chairman of Libertyville Bank & Trust. Respondent's income had increased from about $272,000 per year at the time of the judgment of dissolution to an average of approximately $392,000 per year by 2010. Petitioner was unemployed at the time of the dissolution. She made efforts to seek employment and had worked part time at Williams-Sonoma, but she left the position in 2008 because she had back issues when lifting heavy items. Thereafter, petitioner remained unemployed through March 2011, except for trying to establish a small side business. Petitioner received around $60,000 per year in investment income (about the same as it was on the date of the dissolution) plus maintenance from respondent. Petitioner indicated that her back problems still limited her employability, and she submitted evidence that she still received treatment for her back. Although neither party introduced evidence as to the exact nature of the back problems, respondent agreed that the condition did affect petitioner's ability "on some level to earn income." Nevertheless, respondent opined that with "appropriate employment" petitioner could earn a minimum of $30,000.

¶ 8 With respect to the standard of living established during the marriage, Judge Ukena found that the parties' lifestyle was not lavish but rather was "commensurate with an income of $272,000 a year," which, during the marriage, was supporting a family of five. Judge Ukena also reviewed the parties' needs and concluded that each party's financial affidavit contained what "each one represents their needs to be." Judge Ukena found that respondent's present and future earning capacity was $392,000 and that petitioner's present and future earning capacity was $60,000. Judge Ukena further found that petitioner had a limited ability to earn more, because she had sacrificed development of her career and education by staying at home for the family during most of the marriage. Judge Ukena found that, by staying at home and taking care of the children, petitioner helped advance respondent's career. Judge Ukena noted that, even if he were to impute an additional $30,000 per year to petitioner's investment income of $60,000, petitioner could not "live the lifestyle of the marriage" on $90,000 per year. After considering the time petitioner would need to acquire the education, training, and employment that would allow her to be financially independent, and balancing it with the standard of living established during the marriage, Judge Ukena determined that "[i]t appears at least that [petitioner] is a candidate for indefinite maintenance."

¶ 9 On March 31, 2011, Judge Ukena entered a written order in accordance with his oral findings. Relevant to these proceedings, Judge Ukena denied respondent's petition to terminate maintenance and granted petitioner's petition for an increase in maintenance. Specifically, the order provided: "[Petitioner] is awarded indefinite maintenance of $5,000 per month commencing on the first month after entry of this Order until further Order of the court." Attached to the order was the transcript of Judge Ukena's oral findings, which were expressly incorporated in the order. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen the proofs. Judge Ukena denied both motions, and neither party appealed Judge Ukena's rulings.

¶ 10 On February 24, 2016, respondent filed a "Verified Petition to Terminate, or Alternatively, Reduce Maintenance." On April 22, 2016, with leave of court, respondent filed an amended petition. He alleged that on or about December 11, 2015, as a result of corporate restructuring and through no fault of his own, his employment with Libertyville Bank & Trust was terminated. Concurrently with his termination, respondent entered into a "Separation Agreement and General Release" (Separation Agreement) dated December 18, 2015. Pursuant to the Separation Agreement, respondent's total gross compensation was reduced from approximately $38,667 per month to about $24,167 per month. On or about February 29, 2016, respondent accepted employment with The Private Bank. Respondent's gross pay from The Private Bank was approximately $15,500 per month. However, by virtue of having accepted full-time employment with The Private Bank, the compensation respondent had been receiving under the Separation Agreement would terminate on or about August 1, 2016. Respondent asserted that these facts demonstrated a substantial reduction of his income as a result of his termination by Libertyville Bank & Trust and thus constituted a substantial change in circumstances, warranting the termination or modification of maintenance pursuant to sections 504 and 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) ( 750 ILCS 5/504, 510 (West 2016) ). Respondent further asserted that, in light of the fact that he would turn 61 in May 2016 and the unlikelihood that he could procure employment similar in income to his former position with Libertyville Bank & Trust before he reaches 65, at which time he intends to retire, there had been an impairment of his future earning capacity.

¶ 11 On May 11, 2016, petitioner filed a response to respondent's amended petition. On December 12, 2016, respondent filed a motion in limine requesting, inter alia , that the trial court take judicial notice of the factual findings made by Judge Ukena in March 2011. On January 3, 2017, the trial court granted that part of the motion in limine . Specifically, the court stated that it would take judicial notice of "file # 01 D 1029 [and] in particular the transcript of 3/17/2011."

¶ 12 A hearing on respondent's amended petition was held on January 10, 2017. Both respondent and petitioner testified at the hearing, and various exhibits, including tax returns and financial affidavits, were admitted. Respondent testified regarding his employment status. He noted that, due to a decision by management, his position with Libertyville Bank & Trust was terminated in December 2015. However, under the terms of the Separation Agreement, he received his base salary for seven additional months, until July 2016. Respondent further testified that in February 2016 he began working as a commercial banking officer for The Private Bank. Respondent earns $175,000 per year at The Private Bank plus $11,000 per year to partially offset his country club dues. Respondent testified that there is also a "chance" for a bonus. The maximum bonus he could earn would be 40% of his base salary of $175,000. After July 2016, respondent's only source of income was his salary from The Private Bank. Respondent testified that he is paid twice a month at The Private Bank. He identified a check stub from November 30, 2016, showing that his gross salary each pay period is $7750 and that his net pay is $4805. Respondent testified that based on his new salary and after paying his monthly expenses, including petitioner's maintenance of $5000 per month, he has a monthly deficit of $2612.

¶ 13 Petitioner testified that she is not employed and that she has not tried to find employment since 2011. She stated that her back problems prevent her from seeking gainful employment. Petitioner testified that her monthly income is $7268, which consists of $2268 in dividend income and $5000 in maintenance from respondent. Petitioner stated, however, that the dividends she receives are reinvested and that the maintenance she receives is insufficient to cover her monthly expenses. Petitioner testified that her monthly expenses total about $12,000. This includes about $2900 per month toward expenses of the parties' three children, who are emancipated and reside outside of petitioner's home. As a result, petitioner has a monthly deficit of $6058. Petitioner testified that she makes up for the monthly shortfall out of her "asset accounts." Petitioner explained that she receives an automatic withdrawal of $5000 per month from one of her asset accounts, although she periodically makes additional withdrawals. In 2015, for instance, petitioner took out a total of $99,000 from her asset accounts. Petitioner testified that, as a result of the withdrawals, the value of these accounts decreased by about $120,000 between December 2014 and November 2016. Petitioner acknowledged that, if she did not provide for the children, her monthly expenses would be about $9000.

¶ 14 Following the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to submit written closing arguments. On February 3, 2017, petitioner filed a "Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and for Other Relief." On February 9, 2017, petitioner filed an "Amended Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and for Other Relief." On February 17, 2017, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike and Dismiss Respondent's Reply Brief and for Other Relief."

¶ 15 On February 23, 2017, after receiving the parties' closing arguments, the trial court issued its ruling. The court denied respondent's request for a termination of maintenance, but it granted his request for a reduction of maintenance. In so finding, the court, citing Radwill v. Manor Care of Westmont IL, LLC , 2013 IL App (2d) 120957, 369 Ill.Dec. 452, 986 N.E.2d 765, initially determined that Judge Ukena's March 31, 2011, order, which awarded petitioner "indefinite maintenance" of $5000 per month until further order of the court, was the "law of the case" because the order constituted a final judgment and neither party took an appeal therefrom. Accordingly, the court stated that it would not alter that order's provisions classifying the maintenance award as "indefinite."

¶ 16 Next, the court reviewed the maintenance award in light of the factors set forth in section 510(a-5) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016) ). The court focused on whether respondent established a "substantial change in circumstances" in his ability to pay maintenance. The court also considered the length of the marriage and the number of years that respondent had been paying maintenance. The court found that respondent did not present any evidence that petitioner's employability had changed since 2011. In addition, the court reviewed the parties' financial affidavits and noted that, since 2011, the value of respondent's assets had increased while the value of petitioner's assets had decreased. Ultimately, however, the court determined that respondent had established a substantial change in circumstances, based principally upon his change in employment. In this regard, the court determined that respondent's termination from his employment at Libertyville Bank & Trust "was not voluntary" and that the difference between respondent's salary at Libertyville Bank & Trust and his salary at The Private Bank met the definition of a "substantial change in circumstances" so as to qualify for a modification of his maintenance obligation. See 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5)(1) (West 2016).

¶ 17 The court then turned again to the issue of the duration of the maintenance award, rejecting respondent's argument that the guidelines in section 504(b-1)(1)(B) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(B) (West 2016) ) require the termination of his obligation to pay maintenance. The court cited two reasons for this finding. First, the court stated that the guidelines as to the duration of a maintenance award do not apply when there has been an award of permanent or indefinite maintenance. Second, citing In re Marriage of Cole , 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, 405 Ill.Dec. 702, 58 N.E.3d 1286, the court found that the guidelines were inapplicable because they were added to section 504 pursuant to an amendment that became effective in January 2016 and "the amendment to Section 504 [of the Act] represents a substantive change to the law and not a procedural change." As to the amount of the maintenance award, the court observed that a new method for calculating the amount also became effective in January 2016. See 750 ILCS 504(b-1)(1)(B) (West 2016). The court stated that, although this change was substantive and the court was therefore not bound by the change, it nevertheless considered the new calculation formula to be a guideline "as to what is equitable and just." Accordingly, the court used the new calculation method as a template and reduced respondent's maintenance obligation to $4196.40 per month with a commencement date of March 1, 2017. In addition, the court ordered respondent to pay as maintenance 30% of any income above his base salary and country club allowance, totaling $186,000.

¶ 18 On February 24, 2017, the trial court disposed of petitioner's "Motion to Strike and Dismiss Respondent's Reply Brief and for Other Relief." Specifically, the court found that respondent's reply brief violated local court rules. Nevertheless, the court observed that it read and considered respondent's reply brief before receiving petitioner's motion and that it considered the reply brief in its ruling. In the same order, the court stated that its ruling constituted a final and appealable order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). On March 2, 2017, the court entered an agreed order pursuant to which petitioner withdrew her "Amended Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Other Relief." On March 7, 2017, respondent filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 On appeal, respondent raises two assignments of error. First, respondent disputes the trial court's finding that Judge Ukena's award of "indefinite maintenance" constituted the law of the case. Second, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that the guidelines as to the duration of a maintenance award, set forth in section 504(b-1) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1) (West 2016) ), do not apply to this case. We address each contention in turn.

¶ 21 A. The Law of the Case

¶ 22 Respondent first contends that a maintenance award may be modified if the petitioning party establishes a substantial change in circumstances. See 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016). Thus, respondent asserts, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found itself bound, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, by Judge Ukena's award of "indefinite maintenance." Petitioner does not dispute that "the law of the case doctrine would not bar [respondent] from relitigating" the facts pertaining to the duration of maintenance, but she asserts that respondent did not present any evidence that termination of indefinite maintenance was warranted.

¶ 23 "[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine generally bars relitigation of an issue previously decided in the same case." People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 2012 IL App (2d) 100024, ¶ 31, 359 Ill.Dec. 833, 967 N.E.2d 863. Pursuant to the doctrine, questions decided on a previous appeal are binding on both the trial court on remand and the appellate court on subsequent appeals. Norris v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. , 368 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 306 Ill.Dec. 460, 857 N.E.2d 859 (2006). A prerequisite to the application of this doctrine is that there has been a prior appeal. See Norris , 368 Ill. App. 3d at 580, 306 Ill.Dec. 460, 857 N.E.2d 859 ("Under the law of the case doctrine, questions of law decided on a previous appeal are binding on the trial court on remand as well as on the appellate court on a subsequent appeal." (Emphasis added.) ); Marsaw v. Richards , 368 Ill. App. 3d 418, 425, 306 Ill.Dec. 395, 857 N.E.2d 794 (2006) ("The 'law of the case' doctrine provides that an issue of law that was decided on appeal is binding on the circuit court on remand and on the appellate court on subsequent appeal." (Emphasis added.) );

Ficken v. Alton & Southern Ry. Co. , 291 Ill. App. 3d 635, 649, 226 Ill.Dec. 187, 685 N.E.2d 1 (1996) ("The parties and issues to this appeal are the same as in the first appeal , so the law-of-the-case doctrine requires that we affirm ***." (Emphasis added.) ); Black's Law Dictionary 893 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "law of the case" as "[t]he doctrine holding that a decision rendered in a former appeal of a case is binding in a later appeal" (emphasis added) ). In this case, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply, because neither party appealed Judge Ukena's March 31, 2011, order awarding petitioner indefinite maintenance.

¶ 24 Moreover, even if we were to assume that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies, this court has observed that the doctrine does not preclude a trial court from reconsidering an earlier order if the facts before the court have changed or if an error or injustice must be remedied. In re Marriage of Connors , 303 Ill. App. 3d 219, 224, 236 Ill.Dec. 430, 707 N.E.2d 275 (1999) (citing People v. Williams , 138 Ill. 2d 377, 392, 150 Ill.Dec. 498, 563 N.E.2d 385 (1990) ). Furthermore, in Connors , we found that the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine, so as to preclude a trial court's authority to hear and rule upon a petition for a modification of maintenance, was irreconcilable with the Act's direct mandate, which provides that "any judgment" is subject to modification in certain circumstances. Connors , 303 Ill. App. 3d at 224-25, 236 Ill.Dec. 430, 707 N.E.2d 275 (citing 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 1996) ); see also 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016) ("An order for maintenance may be modified or terminated only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances."); In re Marriage of Bernay , 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 15, 416 Ill.Dec. 1008, 87 N.E.3d 1 (rejecting notion that law-of-the-case doctrine precluded court from modifying award of "permanent" maintenance, noting that court was free to review or terminate maintenance as long as there had been a substantial change in circumstances). Consequently, we find that, irrespective of how Judge Ukena classified the maintenance award in his March 31, 2011, order, a subsequent court is not precluded from modifying the award where a party establishes a substantial change in circumstances. 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016); Bernay , 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 15, 416 Ill.Dec. 1008, 87 N.E.3d 1 ; Connors , 303 Ill. App. 3d at 225, 236 Ill.Dec. 430, 707 N.E.2d 275 ; see also In re Marriage of Mittra , 114 Ill. App. 3d 627, 633-35, 71 Ill.Dec. 350, 450 N.E.2d 1229 (1983) (indefinite award of maintenance is subject to modification); In re Marriage of Bramson , 100 Ill. App. 3d 657, 659, 56 Ill.Dec. 205, 427 N.E.2d 285 (1981) (same).

¶ 25 In so finding, we observe that Judge Ukena's March 31, 2011, order expressly provided that the award of "indefinite maintenance of $5,000 per month" would stand "until further [o]rder of the court." Thus, Judge Ukena himself clearly contemplated that the order could be modified. In finding that the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded it from modifying the order's provisions classifying the maintenance award as "indefinite," the trial court relied on Radwill . We find the trial court's reliance on Radwill somewhat puzzling in that Radwill did not involve the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine in the context of a maintenance award. Additionally, the trial court's February 23, 2017, order is inconsistent in the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine. In this regard, we observe that, although the trial court determined that it was bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine, and therefore declined to modify the duration of the maintenance award, it nevertheless reduced the amount of the award. The trial court provided no rationale for applying the law-of-the-case doctrine as to the duration of the maintenance award but not as to the amount. More important, in light of the foregoing authority, we agree with respondent that the trial court erred in finding that the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded it from modifying the duration of the maintenance award. Petitioner asserts that respondent did not present any evidence that termination of indefinite maintenance was warranted. However, since the trial court did not address the issue of duration, we decline to decide whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a modification of the duration of the maintenance award and instead we remand this cause for the trial court to address the matter.

¶ 26 B. Applicability of Duration Guidelines

¶ 27 Next, respondent contends that the trial court erred in finding that section 504(b-1)'s guidelines for calculating the duration of a maintenance award did not apply in this case. Respondent asserts that, as a result of this alleged error, this cause must be remanded for the trial court to consider the duration of the maintenance award in light of the guidelines set forth in section 504(b-1). Because the applicability of section 504(b-1) will undoubtedly arise on remand, we consider the issue now.

¶ 28 To address respondent's argument, we must engage in statutory construction. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of Benink , 2018 IL App (2d) 170175, ¶ 26, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ----. The best indicator of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute. Benink , 2018 IL App (2d) 170175, ¶ 26, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ----. " 'When the statute's language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids of statutory construction.' " Benink , 2018 IL App (2d) 170175, ¶ 26, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- (quoting Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co. , 208 Ill. 2d 38, 43, 280 Ill.Dec. 523, 802 N.E.2d 774 (2003) ). The rules of statutory construction also require us to read the statute as a whole and reconcile all relevant language so as not to render any portion of the statute meaningless or void. See DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Ill. 2d 49, 60, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006) ("A fundamental principle of statutory construction is to view all provisions of a statutory enactment as a whole. Accordingly, words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute."). Issues of statutory construction are subject to de novo review. D'Attomo v. Baumbeck , 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶ 31, 394 Ill.Dec. 601, 36 N.E.3d 892.

¶ 29 Section 504(b-1) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1) (West 2016) ) governs the amount and duration of a maintenance award. That provision was added to the Act in 2015 as part of Public Act 98-961 (Pub. Act 98-961, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) (amending 750 ILCS 5/504 ) ). Section 510 of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2016) ) governs the modification and termination of maintenance, among other matters. Before respondent filed the petition at issue, various provisions of the Act, including sections 504 and 510, were amended as part of Public Act 99-90 (Pub. Act 99-90, § 5-15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 750 ILCS 5/504, 510) ). Public Act 99-90 also amended section 801 of the Act. Pub. Act 99-90, § 5-15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 750 ILCS 5/801 ). As amended by Public Act 99-90, section 801 provides in relevant part as follows:

"(a) This Act applies to all proceedings commenced on or after its effective date.
(b) This Act applies to all pending actions and proceedings commenced prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment has not been entered. Evidence adduced after the effective date of this Act shall be in compliance with this Act.
(c) This Act applies to all proceedings commenced after its effective date for the modification of a judgment or order entered prior to the effective date of this Act." 750 ILCS 5/801 (West 2016).

This court recently held that section 801(c), as amended by Public Act 99-90, applies to modification proceedings filed after January 1, 2016. Benink , 2018 IL App (2d) 170175, ¶ 27, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ----. In this case, respondent filed his original petition to terminate or reduce maintenance on February 24, 2016, and his amended petition on April 22, 2016. Thus, both petitions were filed after the effective date of Public Act 99-90. The amended petition sought the modification of Judge Ukena's March 31, 2011, order, an order entered prior to the effective date of Public Act 99-90. As such, respondent's amended petition clearly fell within section 801(c). As a result, the changes effectuated by Public Act 99-90 govern these proceedings. Cf. Benink , 2018 IL App (2d) 170175, ¶ 29, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- (holding that changes effectuated by Public Act 99-90 did not apply to parties' petitions for modification of child support where the petitions were filed prior to January 1, 2016).

¶ 30 Section 510(a-5) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016) ) provides that an order for maintenance may be modified or terminated "only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances." A "substantial change in circumstances" for purposes of section 510(a-5) means that there has been a change to either the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance or the ability of the other spouse to pay that maintenance. Shen v. Shen , 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 132, 394 Ill.Dec. 209, 35 N.E.3d 1178 ; In re Marriage of Anderson , 409 Ill. App. 3d 191, 198, 351 Ill.Dec. 440, 951 N.E.2d 524 (2011) ; see also Bernay , 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 18, 416 Ill.Dec. 1008, 87 N.E.3d 1 (noting that a substantial change in circumstances occurs when the payee's needs significantly decrease or the payor is no longer able to pay). When determining whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred such that the termination or modification of maintenance is appropriate, section 510(a-5) directs the court to consider the nine factors set forth in section 510(a-5) and the applicable factors listed in section 504(a) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2016) ). 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016).

¶ 31 The factors in section 504(a) are intended to assist the court in determining "whether a maintenance award is appropriate." 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2016). If the court determines that a maintenance award is "appropriate," it must set the amount and duration of the award in accordance with section 504(b-1), which provides:

"(b-1) Amount and duration of maintenance. If the court determines that a maintenance award is appropriate, the court shall order maintenance in accordance with either paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection (b-1):
(1) Maintenance award in accordance with guidelines. In situations when the combined gross income of the parties is less than $250,000 and the payor has no obligation to pay child support or maintenance or both from a prior relationship, maintenance payable after the date the parties' marriage is dissolved shall be in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph (1), unless the court makes a finding that the application of the guidelines would be inappropriate.
(A) The amount of maintenance under this paragraph (1) shall be calculated by taking 30% of the payor's gross income minus 20% of the payee's gross income. The amount calculated as maintenance, however, when added to the gross income of the payee, may not result in the payee receiving an amount that is in excess of 40% of the combined gross income of the parties.
(B) The duration of an award under this paragraph (1) shall be calculated by multiplying the length of the marriage at the time the action was commenced by whichever of the following factors applies: 5 years or less (.20); more than 5 years but less than 10 years (.40); 10 years or more but less than 15 years (.60); or 15 years or more but less than 20 years (.80). For a marriage of 20 or more years, the court, in its discretion, shall order either permanent maintenance or maintenance for a period equal to the length of the marriage.
(2) Maintenance award not in accordance with guidelines. Any non-guidelines award of maintenance shall be made after the court's consideration of all relevant factors set forth in subsection (a) of this Section." 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1) (West 2016).

Thus, reading the statute as a whole, the court must review the factors in section 510(a-5) and the applicable factors in section 504(a) to determine whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred. 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016). If, after reviewing the relevant factors, the court concludes that the modification of a maintenance award is "appropriate," it must proceed to section 504(b-1) and set an award in accordance with the guidelines in paragraph (1) of subsection (b-1) or set a nonguideline award in accordance with paragraph (2) of subsection (b-1). If the court deviates from the guidelines set forth in section 504(b-1)(1), however, it is required to "state in its findings the amount of maintenance (if determinable) or duration that would have been required under the guidelines and the reasoning for any variance from the guidelines." 750 ILCS 5/504(b-2)(2) (West 2016).

¶ 32 In this case, the trial court concluded that respondent established a substantial change in circumstances warranting the modification of the maintenance awarded to petitioner. Accordingly, it reduced the amount of the maintenance award. However, the court refused to assess whether the duration of the maintenance award should be modified, citing the law-of-the-case doctrine. As noted above, this was error. The court also indicated that, even if it were to review the duration of the maintenance award, it would not apply the provisions of section 504(b-1). The court cited two reasons for this. First, the court found that the section 504(b-1) guidelines as to the duration of maintenance do not apply when there has been an award of permanent or indefinite maintenance. Second, relying on Cole , the court concluded that the section 504(b-1) guidelines as to the duration of maintenance were inapplicable because they represented a substantive change to the law. We find the court's rationales flawed.

¶ 33 Initially, we observe that the trial court cited no authority for the proposition that the section 504(b-1) guidelines as to the duration of maintenance do not apply when there has been an award of permanent or indefinite maintenance. Further, this finding is contrary to section 510(a-5) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016) ), which expressly provides that an order for maintenance may be modified or terminated upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. See also Bernay , 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 15, 416 Ill.Dec. 1008, 87 N.E.3d 1 (noting that trial court was "free to review or terminate" award of permanent maintenance, provided there had been a substantial change in circumstances); Mittra , 114 Ill. App. 3d at 633-35, 71 Ill.Dec. 350, 450 N.E.2d 1229 (indefinite award of maintenance is subject to modification); Bramson , 100 Ill. App. 3d at 659, 56 Ill.Dec. 205, 427 N.E.2d 285 (same). In addition, the trial court's reliance on Cole is misplaced. In Cole , the court addressed the applicability of the maintenance guidelines enacted by Public Act 98-961. See Pub. Act 98-961, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) (amending 750 ILCS 5/504 ). During the course of its analysis, the court determined that these guidelines were substantive and thus could not be applied retroactively. Cole , 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶¶ 7-8, 405 Ill.Dec. 702, 58 N.E.3d 1286. However, the principal issue in Cole was whether the guidelines applied to a proceeding in which the marriage, separation, and dissolution hearing all occurred in 2014, before the amended statute took effect, but the trial court did not render its decision until 2015, after the amended statute took effect. Under these circumstances, the Cole court held that the amended statute did not apply. Cole , 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶ 9, 405 Ill.Dec. 702, 58 N.E.3d 1286. The court explained that, because "[a]ll of the events that shaped the trial court's opinion in formulating its ruling occurred in 2014," "[t]he mere fact that the matter was taken under advisement but not ruled on until 2015, after the effective date of the new statute, does not warrant retroactive application of the law." Cole , 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶ 9, 405 Ill.Dec. 702, 58 N.E.3d 1286. Of note, neither the Cole court nor the trial court in this case addressed the impact, if any, of section 801 of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/801 (West 2016) ). See Cole , 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶ 8, 405 Ill.Dec. 702, 58 N.E.3d 1286 ("[i]f a new statute contains no express provision regarding its temporal reach, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect").

¶ 34 Petitioner argues that section 504(b-8) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-8) (West 2016) ) applies to bar application of the section 504(b-1) guidelines as to the duration of maintenance ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1) (West 2016) ). Section 504(b-8) provides as follows:

"(b-8) Upon review of any previously ordered maintenance award, the court may extend maintenance for further review, extend maintenance for a fixed non-modifiable term, extend maintenance for an indefinite term, or permanently terminate maintenance in accordance with subdivision (b-1)(1)(A) of this Section." 750 ILCS 5/504(b-8) (West 2016).

According to petitioner, had the legislature intended the duration guidelines to apply to a modification proceeding, it would have expressly referenced subsection (b-1)(1)(B)

of section 504 in subsection (b-8) of section 504. We decline to address the merits of petitioner's argument. Subsection (b-8) was added to section 504 as part of Public Act 99-763 (Pub. Act 99763 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 750 ILCS 5/504 ) ). Public Act 99-763 did not become effective until January 1, 2017, months after respondent filed his amended petition. Petitioner cites no authority that this amendment applies to a petition filed prior to its effective date.

¶ 35 Petitioner also argues that it would be "both absurd and unjust for the legislature to suddenly subject every recipient of permanent or indefinite maintenance in Illinois who has been paid for longer than the length of their marriage, and who has planned their lives in accordance with the judgment or order a court afforded them, to the adverse rebuttable presumption that their maintenance should be terminated." However, the statute does not require the application of the duration guidelines. As noted above, if the trial court determines that the application of the guidelines would be inappropriate, it may set a "non-guidelines award of maintenance" after considering all relevant factors in section 504(a) of the Act ( 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2016) ). 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(2) (West 2016).

¶ 36 In short, we agree with respondent that the trial court erred in determining that the provisions of section 504(b-1) do not apply in assessing the duration of petitioner's maintenance award. Thus, we remand the matter for the trial court to assess whether the duration of the maintenance award should be modified in accordance with the provisions of section 504(b-1). We observe, however, that the trial court is not bound by the section 504(b-1) guidelines as to duration. Rather, if the court determines that the application of the guidelines "would be inappropriate" ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1) (West 2016) ), it may assess the duration of the maintenance award in accordance with subsection (b-1)(2) ( 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(2) (West 2016) ). However, if the court does deviate from the guidelines set forth in section 504(b-1), it shall make findings in accordance with section 504(b-2)(2). See 750 ILCS 5/504(b-2)(2) (West 2016) (providing that, if the court deviates from the guidelines in making a maintenance award, "it shall state in its findings the amount of maintenance (if determinable) or duration that would have been required under the guidelines and the reasoning for any variance from the guidelines"). We offer no opinion as to whether the duration of maintenance in this case should accord with the section 504(b-1) guidelines, whether a nonguideline analysis pursuant to section 504(b-1)(2) should occur, or whether the duration of the maintenance award should even be modified.

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County declining to address, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, the propriety of the duration of petitioner's maintenance award and concurrently finding that the provisions of section 504(b-1) do not apply to this case. This cause is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of addressing the duration issue pursuant to section 504(b-1). The remainder of the trial court's order, including the reduction in the amount of the maintenance award, is affirmed.

¶ 39 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶ 40 Cause remanded with directions.

Justices Hutchinson and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      The MSA was not attached to the copy of the judgment of dissolution included in the common law record. However, a copy of the judgment of dissolution with the MSA attached was admitted into evidence as petitioner's exhibit No. 9 at the hearing on the petition at issue.

      Petitioner's June 27, 2016, financial affidavit, which was admitted into evidence, shows a gross monthly income of $7268 less monthly deductions for taxes of $1017, resulting in a net monthly income of $6251. The financial affidavit also shows monthly living expenses and debt payments of $12,309. Petitioner's net monthly income of $6251 minus her monthly living expenses and debt payments results in a monthly deficit of $6058.

      Respondent does not challenge the amount of maintenance awarded by the trial court, so we do not address that issue in this appeal.

      The trial court in this case determined that respondent's salary and country club allowance was $186,000 and that petitioner's dividend income was $27,216. Thus, for purposes of section 504(b-1)(1), the parties' combined gross income ($213,216) was less than $250,000.


text:
    IN RE P.J., a Minor
    (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jacob R., Respondent-Appellant).
    Appeal No. 3-17-0539
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Opinion filed April 4, 2018
    Sam Snyder, of Peoria, for appellant.
    Jerry Brady, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Thomas D. Arado, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
    Louise M. Natonek, of Peoria, guardian ad litem.
   JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights against respondent alleging that he was a depraved person pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act (Act) ( 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2014) ). The trial court granted the State's petition, finding respondent unfit.

It subsequently terminated his parental rights. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 In December 2014, the State filed a juvenile petition, alleging that P.J., born July 7, 2014, was a neglected minor, and the trial court adjudicated P.J. neglected. In November 2016, the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights. Count I alleged that April J., P.J.'s mother, was an unfit person because she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of P.J. under section 1(D)(m) of the Act (id. § 1(D)(m) ); count II alleged that respondent Jacob R., P.J.'s father, was an unfit person because he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of P.J. under section 1(D)(m); and count III alleged that respondent was an unfit person because he was depraved under section 1(D)(i) of the Act (id. § 1(D)(i) ). The State later dismissed count II.

¶ 4 At the adjudication hearing, the State submitted an exhibit of respondent's criminal history, including a 2001 possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemical conviction (Class 2 felony), a 2002 possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemical conviction (Class 2 felony), a 2005 possession of methamphetamine manufacturing material conviction (Class 1 felony), a 2010 possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemical conviction (Class 3 felony), and a 2014 federal conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine conviction (felony).

¶ 5 Respondent submitted an exhibit of his inmate education data transcript wherein it showed a list of courses he attended and completed while incarcerated. He also testified that he was currently incarcerated at the Thomson facility within the Bureau of Prisons. He initially stated that he would be released in 2023 but later stated that his earliest release date was 2020 or 2021. He had been prescreened to participate in a drug treatment program but could not enroll until he had four years or less remaining on his sentence. He attended a "small business planning" class, a drawing class, a financial analysis class, an "entrepreneur opportunity" class, a "highly effective life" class, a "decoding recidivism" class, and a career preparation class. He received his GED while he was incarcerated in 2004. He also participated in inpatient drug treatment while incarcerated from 2003 to 2004. Respondent planned to sell his portrait drawings once he was released from prison.

¶ 6 The trial court determined that respondent was depraved, stating:

"And the State has presented evidence that your most recent felony was in 2014, and there are 4 others. Now, that allows for you to try and rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. And I do commend you for what you have done, but I don't think you've rebutted the presumption, and I'm going to find that the State has proven the petition."

¶ 7 Thereafter, a best interest hearing was held. The court determined that it was in the best interest of P.J. to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent appealed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Respondent claims that the trial court erred when it found him unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(i) because (1) it applied the wrong standard of proof to his burden of rebutting the presumption of depravity and (2) he presented evidence that rebutted the presumption of depravity.

¶ 10 Respondent did not object or file a posttrial motion on this issue. The State argues that respondent's claim is forfeited or, alternatively, suggests that this court may consider respondent's unpreserved error under the plain error rule. A party must object at trial and file a posttrial motion to preserve an alleged error for review. In re William H. , 407 Ill. App. 3d 858, 869-70, 348 Ill.Dec. 774, 945 N.E.2d 81 (2011) ; In re Christopher J. , 338 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1058, 273 Ill.Dec. 707, 789 N.E.2d 881 (2003). If a party fails to raise an issue in the trial court, it is forfeited and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. In re Marriage of Baecker , 2012 IL App (3d) 110660, ¶ 20, 367 Ill.Dec. 950, 983 N.E.2d 104. The plain error doctrine allows this court to consider forfeited issues when a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) the evidence is so closely balanced or (2) the error affects substantial rights. People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005) ; see also In re S.H. , 2014 IL App (3d) 140500, ¶ 22, 387 Ill.Dec. 588, 22 N.E.3d 1241.

¶ 11 Unfitness determination proceedings are civil in nature. 750 ILCS 50/20 (West 2014). Although the plain error rule is generally applied to criminal cases, it also may be applied in civil cases, but the application is exceedingly rare. Wilbourn v. Cavalenes , 398 Ill. App. 3d 837, 856, 338 Ill.Dec. 77, 923 N.E.2d 937 (2010). Also, waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the courts. Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners , 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 33, 363 Ill.Dec. 557, 975 N.E.2d 583. Therefore, reviewing courts may consider waived issues in the interest of achieving a just result or maintaining a sound and uniform body of precedent. Id. ¶ 33 ; see also Marconi v. City of Joliet , 2013 IL App (3d) 110865, ¶ 16, 371 Ill.Dec. 132, 989 N.E.2d 722 ; Daley v. License Appeal Comm'n , 311 Ill. App. 3d 194, 200, 243 Ill.Dec. 905, 724 N.E.2d 214 (1999). We choose to consider respondent's waived issue in the interest of justice.

¶ 12 Section 1(D)(i) states:

"There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved if the parent has been criminally convicted of at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State or any other state, or under federal law, or the criminal laws of any United States territory; and at least one of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing of the petition or motion seeking termination of parental rights." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2014).

¶ 13 In Illinois, the term "depravity" means " 'an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude.' " In re A.M. , 358 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253, 294 Ill.Dec. 698, 831 N.E.2d 648 (2005) (quoting Stalder v. Stone , 412 Ill. 488, 498, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952) ). The State shows depravity by establishing that respondent has a " 'deficiency' in moral sense and either an inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted morality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting In re J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678 (2000) ). "Where the presumption of depravity is rebuttable, the 'parent is still able to present evidence showing that, despite his convictions, he is not depraved.' " Id. (quoting J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678 ). If respondent presents evidence contradicting the presumption, the presumption is removed and the issue is determined based on the evidence presented. J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678. The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is depraved remains with the State. A.M. , 358 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 294 Ill.Dec. 698, 831 N.E.2d 648. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed de novo .

NC Illinois Trust Co. v. Madigan , 351 Ill. App. 3d 311, 314, 286 Ill.Dec. 23, 812 N.E.2d 1038 (2004).

¶ 14 During the fitness hearing, the court stated that respondent had the burden of rebutting the presumption that he was depraved by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent need not rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence; rather, he only had to provide evidence opposing the presumption. See A.M. , 358 Ill. App. 3d at 253-54, 294 Ill.Dec. 698, 831 N.E.2d 648 ("Under the analysis in J.A. concerning rebuttable presumptions, once the respondent's evidence came into the case, the presumption of depravity ceased to exist."). If respondent presented this evidence, the issue is determined based on the evidence presented. J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678. Based on A.M. and J.A. , the admission of respondent's inmate education data transcript rebutted the presumption.

¶ 15 "Fundamentally fair judicial procedures are critical for those parents facing the involuntary dissolution of their rights." In re J.J. , 201 Ill. 2d 236, 246, 267 Ill.Dec. 1, 776 N.E.2d 138 (2002) (citing Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ). The standard of proof is, therefore, important because "a parent's fundamental liberty interest cannot be protected if undue uncertainty is permitted in determining the facts supporting a termination of parental rights." Id. (citing Santosky , 455 U.S. at 757 n.9, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). This undue uncertainty can be just as detrimental in a fitness proceeding because a finding of unfitness is a condition precedent to termination of parental rights, which occurred in this case. See In re J.F. , 248 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 187 Ill.Dec. 698, 618 N.E.2d 289 (1992) ("[w]hile parental rights and responsibilities are of great societal and human importance, a parent's rights may be involuntarily terminated in the interests of the child's welfare, if the parent is adjudicated unfit"). An unrebutted presumption of depravity virtually ensures the termination of a respondent's parental rights.

¶ 16 In this case, by finding, on the basis of the wrong standard, that the presumption of depravity had not been rebutted, the trial court foreclosed any additional argument regarding respondent's alleged depravity. Respondent, absent the presumption, could have argued, for example, how the classes he had taken and those he planned to take when the Bureau of Prisons' time restriction on taking them was removed demonstrated not only a resetting of his moral compass but also that he had taken concrete steps to create a different life with different goals. We find that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof in its depravity determination and remand this cause for a new unfitness hearing.

¶ 17 CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed and remanded.

¶ 19 Reversed and remanded.

Presiding Justice Carter and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.