author: THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Errol HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee.
    No. 16-1402
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    January 11, 2017

      Thomas M. Libbos, Springfield, MA, Katherine L. Lamondia-Wrinkle, and Thomas M. Libbos PC on brief for appellant.
    Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, and Karen L. Goodwin, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appel-lee.
    Before LYNCH, SELYA, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.
   THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Preface

Errol Holloway appeals the grant of summary judgment to the United States in this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Spying no reversible error, we affirm.

How the Case Got Here

We reconstruct the chronology of events giving rise to this litigation:

• June 22, 2012. Holloway is injured while receiving treatment at Caring Health Center, Inc., a federally funded healthcare facility in Springfield, Massachusetts.
• April 8, 2014. Holloway — through his lawyer — files an administrative claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), using a Standard Form 95 (“SF 95”). But he fails to fill out the box for a sum certain. Text in that box warns that “[flailure to specify may cause forfeiture of your rights.” Elsewhere the form — occasionally using boldface, underlining, and capitalized text — says that he had to provide a sum certain for the claim to be considered “presented,” that he had “two years” to present the claim, and that “[flailure to completely execute this form or to supply the requested material within two years from the date the claim accrued may render your claim invalid.”
• April 17, 2014. HHS acknowledges receiving Holloway’s SF 95 and requests medical records, itemized bills, evidence of lost wages, and the like.
• June 25, 2014. More than two years after the incident at Caring Health Center, Holloway’s lawyer submits medical bills, employment records, and other documents.
• August 14, 2014. A paralegal in the HHS general counsel’s office calls Holloway’s attorney, mentions the missing sum certain, and asks counsel to submit an amended SF 95 with the required sum certain. HHS then gets an amended form requesting a sum certain in the amount of $3,000,000 for personal injuries.
• August 21, 2014. HHS denies Holloway’s claim, saying “[t]he evidence fails to establish that the alleged injuries were due to the negligent or wrongful act or omission of a federal employee acting within the scope of employment.”

An unhappy Holloway sued the United States in federal court in February 2015, seeking damages under the FTCA. Convinced that Holloway’s failure to provide a timely sum-certain demand deprived the court of jurisdiction, the United States moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Holloway responded with a double-pronged argument: first, that he timely presented his claim because his submissions satisfied HHS’s investigatory needs; second, and alternatively, that the limitations period should be tolled. The district judge referred the motion to a magistrate judge.

After noting that the Supreme Court had recently held that the FTCA’s limitations period is nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling, see United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, — U.S. ——, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 1638, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015), the magistrate judge treated the motion as one for summary judgment and recommended that judgment enter for the United States. Her reasoning ran this way. For starters, she concluded that Holloway had neither timely specified a sum certain nor timely provided documents from which “such a sum could be ascertained” and so had not properly presented his claim to HHS. And then she found that nothing that took place here qualified as extraordinary circumstances meriting equitable tolling, particularly since Holloway conceded that he did have constructive or actual knowledge of the filing requirements. Holloway objected, attacking only the magistrate judge’s untimeliness conclusion. Agreeing that Holloway “did not timely satisfy” the FTCA’s requirements, the district judge later adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation on de novo review.

Which brings us to today, with Holloway asking us to reverse and send the matter to trial. But before tackling his many arguments, we pause to give a quick tutorial on the relevant aspects of the FTCA.

The FTCA

The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain tortious acts and omissions of federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. And like other sovereign-immunity waivers, the FTCA gets a strict reading. See, e.g., Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 622 (1st Cir. 2011). What that means is that judges “must faithfully enforce” the FTCA’s “requirements, neither ‘extending] the waiver beyond that which Congress intended [nor assuming] authority to narrow the waiver.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 118, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)).

A key FTCA requirement is that a person cannot sue under it unless he first presents his “claim” to the relevant administrative agency “within two years after such claim accrues” — failure to present a claim within that period “forever bar[s]” the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). An essential element of a claim is “notification of the incident,” via “an executed” SF 95 or “other written” document, “accompanied by” a demand “for money damages in a sum certain.” See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (emphasis added). The purpose behind the sum-certain requirement is to tip the government off as to its “possible liability” so that it can “ ‘investigate the alleged negligent episode’ ” to see “ ‘if settlement would be in the best interests of all.’ ” Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Corte-Real v. United States, 949 F.2d 484, 486 (1st Cir. 1991), in turn quoting Lopez v. United States, 758 F.2d 806, 809 (1st Cir. 1985)); see also Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 173 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that “[t]he goal of the administrative claim requirement is to let the government know what it is likely up against: mandating that a claimant propound a definite monetary demand ensures that ‘[t]he government will at all relevant times be aware of its maximum possible exposure to liability and will be in a position to make intelligent settlement decisions’ ” (quoting Martinez v. United States, 780 F.2d 525, 530 (5th Cir. 1986))). And because the FTCA ties “both the authority to settle a claim and the source of settlement funds to the amount of the underlying claim,” not having a sum certain obviously makes it harder for the government to determine the claim’s value and to “handl[e]” the claim “efficiently.” Kokotis, 223 F.3d at 279.

Having said all this, we must acknowledge that we “approach[ ] the notice requirement leniently, ‘recognizing that individuals wishing to sue the government must comply with the details of the law, but also keeping in mind that the law was not intended to put up a barrier of technicalities to defeat their claims.’ ” Santiago-Ramírez v. Sec’y of Dept. of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Lopez, 758 F.2d at 809). Perhaps that is why our cases suggest that the failure to specify a sum certain on the SF 95 may not be fatal if the claimant provides documents (e.g., medical bills) that “lend” themselves “to determination of a sum certain or even an approximate total of damages claimed.” See Kokaras v. United States, 980 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Coska, 114 F.3d at 323 (noting that “[i]t is the information available rather than the form in which it is presented that is crucial,” but finding dismissal of plaintiffs claim appropriate where (among other things) “there was essential information missing from the packet and the letters” submitted there, “namely, the amount of damages being sought from the United States”).

With this legal primer in place, we turn to the particulars of Holloway’s challenges.

Arguments and Analysis

Conceding — as he must — that his SF 95 did not include a sum certain, Holloway raises several arguments for reversal. None has merit, as the United States is quick to point out.

Quoting Santiago-Ramirez’s language about our taking a “lenient” view of the FTCA’s claim-presentment requirements, Holloway argues first that we should reverse the lower court’s untimeliness ruling because his sum-certain omission was (emphasis his) “inadvertentas he sees things, an inadvertent omission — in and of itself — excuses him from having to satisfy the sum-certain requirement. But the cases of ours that he talks about — Kokaras and Corte-Real, for example — do not support his argument.

The Kokaras plaintiffs filed an SF 95 with the United States Post Office following a collision with a mail truck. See 980 F.2d at 21. In box A of the form, labeled “Property Damage,” plaintiffs wrote “$2,906.61” and in box B, labeled “Personal Injury,” they wrote “to be determined.” Id. They left box C, labeled “Total,” blank. Id. Later — but still within the two-year statute of limitations — they hired a lawyer who, during unsuccessful settlement talks, handed over medical records and bills. Id. Ultimately, we upheld the dismissal of the personal-injury claim, holding that plaintiffs did not timely state a sum certain— “[njowhere on form SF 95 is a sum certain for the personal injuries stated,” we wrote. Id. at 22-23. We also held that they did not timely provide the agency with documents with enough info to otherwise satisfy the sum-certain requirement (we did let the property-damages claim proceed because their SF 95 did specify a sum certain). Id.

The Corte-Real plaintiff filed an SF 95 that had “$100,000 plus because still treating and out of work” written in the box requiring him to state the dollar amount attributable to his personal injury. See 949 F.2d at 485. But he wrote “$100,000”— without any qualifying language — in the box requiring him to list the total dollar amount of his claims. Id Emphasizing “the importance and absolute necessity of adhering] to the sum certain requirement,” we said:

Where as here a claim clearly states a specific sum and meets the sum certain requirement in all respects but for concern over the possible detraction of improper surplusage of this insubstantial variety, we see no reason not to strike the surplusage rather than the claim itself.

Id. at 486-87.

From all of this it is clear that Holloway’s talk about inadvertent omissions is a distraction: Kokaras and Corte-Real whisper no hint of a suggestion that their outcomes turned on whether the plaintiffs accidently or intentionally failed to fill in the sum-certain box. As always in this type of case — given the FTCA’s goal of efficiently handling claims and our desire not to promote “bureaucratic overkill,” see Corte-Real, 949 F.2d at 486 — what matters is whether the plaintiff timely specified a sum certain on the SF 95 or otherwise timely provided documents from which a sum certain could be ascertained. And keeping our eyes firmly fixed on that standard, we trudge on.

Perhaps sensing the grave problem with his inadvertent-omission argument, Holloway fashions a fallback position — namely, that despite his accidently omitting a sum certain from his SF 95, HHS’s “investigatory needs were satisfied” in the end and so dismissal on timeliness grounds was not called for. To give his position a patina of plausibility, he contends that the documents he provided in response to HHS’s request disclosed “enough” information to satisfy the sum-certain requirement and thus he should be deemed to have fully complied with his FTCA obligations. More, he believes that HHS’s rejection of his FTCA claim “on the merits” shows that he in no way crippled “the agency’s investigatory purpose.” Call us unconvinced.

As for the “documents” facet of Holloway’s argument, we see two problems. One is that he submitted those papers after the limitations period had run. The other is that those documents — like the documents considered insufficient in Coska and Kokotis — lack the necessary info to calculate a sum certain. The magistrate judge here did a fine job of listing the documents’ shortcomings. “Plaintiffs medical bills,” she wrote (as a for-instance), “d[o] not consistently identify the service provided, the total cost of the service, the amount of the cost covered by insurance, or the amount of the cost covered by Plaintiff,” and “the employment records” contain no “indication as to the amount in lost wages Plaintiff might be claiming,” Our own review of the records leads us to the same conclusion. If more were needed — and it plainly is not — Holloway’s brief spends no time trying to explain away the flaws spotlighted below. And we will not do counsel’s work for them. See Ondine Shipping Corp. v. Cataldo, 24 F.3d 353, 356 (1st Cir. 1994).

As for the “merits” facet of Holloway’s argument, we note that even if HHS had enough info to conclude that a federal employee’s negligence did not cause his injuries, all of HHS’s investigatory needs were not satisfied without a sum certain. Remember, a sum certain helps the appropriate decisionmakers to decide whether settlement is the best option and, if it is, to also determine where to get the settlement funds from. See, e.g., Coska, 114 F.3d at 322; Reilly, 863 F.2d at 173. Holloway’s brief does not say anything about these important needs.

Taking a different tack, Holloway argues that, if nothing else, HHS misled him into thinking that its investigatory needs were satisfied and so the United States should not have been allowed to seek dismissal on timeliness grounds. But this argument has no oomph. Recall how the SF 95 let him know— as plain as day — that he had two years to present his claim, that for a claim to be considered presented a sum-certain dollar amount had to be included, and that he may forfeit his rights by failing to comply. Recall too how our caselaw highlights how important a timely-stated sum certain is. Well, Holloway makes no effort to explain how his theory about being misled can fly given the clarity of the SF 95 and our caselaw. Cf. United States v. Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that courts “publish” opinions “so that future lawyers” will “know the law”). Also and critically, because (as we just said) he does not address all of the agency’s important investigatory needs, he never explains how any HHS action implied that these needs had been met here — which further undermines his I-was-misled argument.

In a parting shot, Holloway argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the FTCA’s limitations period. But he did not raise this argument in his objection to the magistrate judge’s recommended decision. And our waiver rule bars any consideration of this issue. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Natl Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010).

Conclusion

For the reasons expressed above, we affirm the judgment entered below.

      . We summarize the background facts in the light most agreeable to Holloway, as required on de novo review of a summary-judgment ruling. See Baltodano v. Merck, Sharp, & Dohme (I.A.) Corp., 637 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2011).

      . "[C]laims of $2,500 or less,” for example, "can be settled on the authority of ‘[t]he head of each Federal agency or his designee’ and are paid ‘out of appropriations available to that agency' "[cjlaims of between $2,500 and $25,000 can be settled on the same authority, but are paid out of a separate appropriation”; and "claims in excess of $25,000 can only be settled 'with the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his desig-nee.' ” Kokotis v. USPS, 223 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2672).

      . Keep in mind, please, that we give fresh review to the grant of summary judgment, affirming if — after giving Holloway the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record— there is no "genuine dispute” of "material fact” and the United States "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tutor Perini Corp. v. Banc Am. Sec. LLC, 842 F.3d 71, 84 (1st Cir. 2016).

      . After marching us through our caselaw, Holloway insists that other "circuit courts” have "refused to order dismissal" in "factually analogous situations.” But he does not point to a single case from another circuit court to back up his statement. So we consider his other-circuits-support-my-position argument waived for lack of development. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,17 (1st Cir. 1990).

      , Holloway’s argument kind of sort of has a whiff of equitable estoppel — a "doctrine ... used sparingly against the government.” United States v. Ledée, 772 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that "under federal precedent, governments in the past have not been subject to estoppel or, more recently, have been held not subject to estoppel, save [in] exceptional situations that we have called 'hen’s-teeth rare' " (quoting Costa v. INS, 233 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2000))). But he does not develop the equitable-estoppel point, meaning any such argument is waived. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mary Rose REDDY; Sue Clifton; Jennifer Robidoux; Joan Espinóla; Terry Barnum; Jackie Pelletier; Betty Buzzell, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Joseph FOSTER, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire; D. Chris McLaughlin, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Cheshire County, NH; Scott W. Murray, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Merrimack County, NH; Dennis Hogan, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Hillsborough County, NH; Patricia Conway, in her official capacity as County Attorney for Rockingham County, NH; City of Manchester, NH; City of Concord, NH; City of Keene, NH; Town of Greenland, NH, Defendants, Appellees, Thomas P. Velardi, in his official capacity as County Attorney for Strafford County, NH; Town of Derry, NH, Defendants.
    No. 16-1432
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    January 11, 2017

      Michael J. Tierney, with whom Wadleigh Starr & Peters PLLC, Matthew S. Bowman, Kevin H. Theriot, and Alliance Defending Freedom were on brief, for appellants.
    Elizabeth A. Lahey, Assistant Attorney General, New Hampshire Department of Justice, for appellee Joseph Foster.
    John T. Alexander, Garry R. Lane, Ran-smeier & Spellman, P.C., Samantha D. Elliott, and Gallagher, Callahan & Gart-rell, P.C. on brief for municipal appellees.
    Before LYNCH, LIPEZ, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.
   LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

The district court dismissed without prejudice, for lack of Article III standing, this pre-enforcement challenge to a New Hampshire statute that has not been activated or enforced since its enactment in mid-2014. We agree that the challenge is not ripe and that there is no present Article III case or controversy before the court. We affirm the dismissal without prejudice.

The statute in question is New Hampshire Senate Bill 319, entitled “An Act relative to access to reproductive health care facilities” (“the Act”), which Governor Maggie Hassan signed into law on June 10, 2014. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (“RSA”) §§ 132:37-132:40. The Act permits (but does not require) a reproductive health care facility to demarcate a zone extending “up to 25 feet” onto public property adjacent to any of the facility’s private entrances, exits, or driveways. H. § 132:38, I. If a facility has demarcated a zone by posting the required signs, following the procedure specified, then members of the public (with certain listed exceptions) may not “knowingly enter or remain on [the portion of the] public way or sidewalk” within that zone. Id. The Act is enforced civilly, by its terms. See id, § 132:39.

McCullen v. Coakley, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014), which held unconstitutional a buffer zone statute in Massachusetts, was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 26, 2014, shortly after the signing of the Act. Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced this action in federal district court. Their complaint seeks to enjoin enforcement of the Act and to have the Act declared facially unconstitutional under McCullen. They filed the lawsuit before any facility had demarcated a buffer zone, and it remains true that no facility has ever created one. The parties agreed to a protracted stay, during which they agreed to preserve the status quo, and which was in effect until they agreed to dissolve the stay in part on August 27, 2015. See Reddy v. Foster, No. 14-cv-299-JL, 2016 WL 1305141, at *3 (D.N.H. Apr. 1, 2016). The district court ultimately granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Id. at *1.

We agree with the district court that this pre-enforcement facial challenge to the Act’s constitutionality relies on overly speculative allegations of injury in fact and is “premature.” Id. The plaintiffs have shown neither standing nor ripeness. First, the plaintiffs have not alleged that the Act has meaningfully altered them expressive activities, nor that it has objectively chilled their exercise of First Amendment rights. Because no facility in New Hampshire has yet demarcated a zone, and there is no present evidence that a zone will ever be demarcated, the plaintiffs’ “alleged injury is .., too speculative for Article III purposes.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). Second, the plaintiffs have failed to establish standing either by arguing that case law about prior restraint applies, see Van Wagner Bos., LLC v. Davey, 770 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2014), or by arguing from the fact that the Act authorizes private climes to create buffer zones. The Act is not a prior restraint, and there are no factual allegations that a clinic has used its zone-drawing power as a tool to change the plaintiffs’ behavior. Third, because the plaintiffs have not alleged a present chill, and because they have failed to allege the contours or location of any buffer zone, or why such a zone was created, we have no ripe case to adjudicate and no facts that would allow us to fashion judicial relief. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998).

I.

Background

Because the district court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), “ ‘we accept as true all well-pleaded fact[s] ... and indulge all reasonable inferences’ in the plaintiff[s’] favor.” Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770 F.3d 978, 981 (1st Cir. 2014) (first alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012)). The record properly before us consists of both the complaint and “other materials in the district court record,” whether or not the facts therein are consistent with those alleged in the complaint. Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island, 643 F.3d 16,17 (1st Cir. 2011).

A. Legislative History of the Act

In its “Statement of Findings and Purposes” accompanying the passage of the Act, the New Hampshire Legislature found that “[rjecent demonstrations outside of reproductive health care facilities” had (1) “resulted in the fear and intimidation of patients and employees of the[ ] facilities,” (2) “caused patients and employees ... to believe that their safety and right of privacy [wejre threatened,” and (3) “resulted in the fear and intimidation of residents and patrons seeking to enter or leave their homes or other private businesses adjacent to the ... facilities.” The Legislature simultaneously found, however, that “[tjhe exercise of a person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures is a First Amendment activity that must be protected.” Accordingly, the Legislature concluded that

establishing a limited buffer zone outside of some reproductive health care facilities located in the state of New Hampshire [wajs necessary to ensure that patients and employees of reproductive health care facilities ha[dj unimpeded access to reproductive health care services while accommodating the First Amendment right of people to communicate their message to their intended audience without undue burdens or restrictions.

Aiming to accommodate those interests, the Act provides that “[njo person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within a buffer zone demarcated by a reproductive health care facility. RSA § 132:38, I. That prohibition does not apply to four classes of persons:

a) Persons entering or leaving such facility.
b) Employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment for the purpose of providing patient escort services only.
c) Law enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction, utilities, public works and other municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment.
d) Persons using the public sidewalk or the right-of-way adjacent to such facility solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than such facility.

Id. § 132:28, I(a)-(d). The Act also provides that facilities must first consult with law enforcement and with local authorities with authority over signage “[p]rior to posting the signage ... to ensure compliance with local ordinances,” id. § 132:38, III, and then must “clearly demarcate” any zone they wish to create by means of signage bearing specified language, id. § 132:38, II. A zone created pursuant to the Act is “effective [only] during the facility’s business hours.” Id. § 132:38, IV.

Law enforcement officers may not impose sanctions, which are civil sanctions, for violating the Act “unless the signage authorized in RSA 132:38, II was in place at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. § 132:39, III. If that precondition is satisfied, an officer is restricted to giving a “written warning” for an individual’s first violation of the Act, and then a citation for subsequent violations. Id. § 132:39, I. The citation carries with it “a minimum fine of $100,” and “the attorney general or the appropriate county attorney may bring an action for injunctive relief to prevent further violations.” Id. § 132:39, II. The Act also has a severability clause. Id. § 132:40.

In the past, some of New Hampshire’s clinics have resolved or attempted to resolve disputes with protestors by asking local police officers to enforce generally applicable local civil ordinances relating to public peace, safety, and crowd control.

B. McCullen v. Coakley

Sixteen days after Governor Hassan signed the Act into law, the U.S. Supreme Court decided McCullen, and that decision affected the parties in this case. McCullen held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that “categorically excluded” most individuals from the area within a fixed 35-foot radius of “any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive health care facility” during the facility’s business hours. 134 S.Ct. at 2526. The statute was enforceable both civilly and criminally, with fines, imprisonment, or both. Id.

The Massachusetts statute, the Court said, was a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation of speech. See id. at 2530-34. The Court applied the test for such regulations, as articulated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored, see McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 2534-40, because it “burden[ed] substantially more speech than [wa]s necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests,” id. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746). Hence, Massachusetts’s statute violated the First Amendment. See id. at 2541.

The Court’s narrow tailoring analysis in McCullen placed particular weight on two key factors. First, the Massachusetts statute created buffer zones of a fixed size, 35 feet, around every abortion clinic in the state, see id. at 2537, 2539, although the record reflected that congestion problems occurred “mainly [in] one place at one time: the Boston Planned Parenthood clinic on Saturday mornings,” id. at 2539. The Court saw a mismatch between the narrowness of the problem and the breadth of the solution. Second, Massachusetts “ha[d] not shown that it seriously undertook to address the problem [of obstruction and harassment by protestors outside clinics] with less intrusive tools readily available to it.” Id. “Nor ha[d] it shown that it considered different methods that other jurisdictions ha[d] found effective.” Id.

C. This Lawsuit

1. The Parties

The complaint alleges that all seven plaintiffs “regularly engage in peaceful prayer, leafleting, sidewalk counseling, pro-life advocacy, and other peaceful expressive activities” outside various reproductive health care facilities in New Hampshire. It further alleges that the plaintiffs’ “sidewalk counseling ... regularly occurs on areas of the public sidewalks and ways that will be encompassed by buffer zones authorized by the Act,” and so they “fear prosecution under the Act” if they continue to engage in expressive activities in those public locations.

Defendant Joseph Foster is the Attorney General of New Hampshire. The other defendants are the municipalities containing the clinics at which the plaintiffs wish to continue engaging in expressive activities, as well as the county attorneys responsible for enforcing the law in those municipalities. The complaint names the municipal defendants as parties because they are “authorized to enforce the Act’s buffer zones” in their respective jurisdictions.

2. District Court Proceedings

On July 7, 2014, soon after the Supreme Court decided McCuIlen and three days before the Act was scheduled to take effect, the plaintiffs initiated this action. Their complaint seeks to enjoin enforcement of the Act and to have it struck down as facially unconstitutional under McCul-len, as well as unconstitutional as applied. When the district court lifted its stay on further proceedings in August 2015, the state Attorney General moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss on March 31, 2016, and then entered judgment and a corrected opinion on April 1, 2016. Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141. The plaintiffs timely appealed.

II.

Standing and Ripeness

Article III restricts federal court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. That limitation on “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” is fundamental to the federal judiciary’s role within our constitutional separation of powers. Spokeo, Inc, v. Robins, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const, art. III, § 1); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (discussing “the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society”). Two of the limitation’s manifestations are the justiciability doctrines of standing and ripeness, which are interrelated; each is rooted in Article III. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (“SBA List”), — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (“[T]he Article III standing and ripeness issues in this case ‘boil down to the same question.’” (quoting MedImmune, Inc, v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007))); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (noting the “close affinity” between standing, ripeness, and mootness); see also Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 219-20 (7th ed. 2015) (observing that ripeness “substantially replicate[s] the standing inquiry” in many respects). This case implicates both doctrines.

A. Standing

The “[fjirst and foremost” concern in standing analysis is the requirement that the plaintiff establish an injury in fact, Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547 (alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)), which “helps to ensure that the plaintiff has a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ ” SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197). To satisfy Article III, the injury “must be ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560,112 S.Ct. 2130).

In certain circumstances, “the threatened enforcement of a law” may suffice as an “imminent” Article III injury in fact. Id. at 2342. The rationale for pre-enforcement standing is that a plaintiff should not have to “expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). “An allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or [if] there is a ‘“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’ ” SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341 (quoting Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1147, 1150 n.5). But if a future injury is “ ‘too speculative for Article III purposes’ and no prosecution is even close to impending,” then there is no standing to sue. Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1147).

Because SBA List both postdated and cited Clapper, we follow its disjunctive framing of the test: injury is imminent if it is certainly impending or if there is a substantial risk that harm will occur. We hold that the plaintiffs have made neither showing here. It is their burden to do so. See Luían, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

B. Ripeness

Ripeness, another aspect of justi-ciability, “has roots in both the Article III case or controversy requirement and in prudential considerations.” Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2003)). Much as standing doctrine seeks to keep federal courts out of disputes involving conjectural or hypothetical injuries, the Supreme Court has reinforced that ripeness doctrine seeks to prevent the adjudication of claims relating to “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). “[T]he facts alleged, under all the circumstances, [must] show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of’ the judicial relief sought. Labor Relations Div. of Constr. Indus, of Mass., Inc, y. Healey, 844 F.3d 318, 326 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127,127 S.Ct. 764).

Insofar as ripeness is rooted in Article III, we must consider it as part of our assessment of whether we have jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The plaintiffs bear the burden of alleging facts sufficient to. demonstrate ripeness. See Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 326 (citing Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)). Even a facial challenge to a statute is constitutionally unripe until a plaintiff can show that federal court adjudication would redress some sort of imminent injury that he or she faces. See Texas, 523 U.S. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (“Here, as is often true, ‘[djeter-mination of the scope ... of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224, 74 5.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954))); Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 322 (finding a lawsuit seeking “pre-enforcement relief ... not ripe for adjudication no matter how it is best characterized along the facial/as-applied spectrum”).

Ripeness analysis has two prongs: “fitness” and “hardship.” See Texas, 523 U.S. at 300-01, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). The fitness' prong “has both jurisdictional and prudential components.” Roman Catholic Bishop, 724 F.3d at -89. The jurisdictional component of the fitness prong concerns “whether there is a sufficiently live case or controversy, at the time of the proceedings, to create jurisdiction in the federal courts.” Id. We find that the jurisdictional component has not been satisfied here, independently of any failure to establish the prudential component.

The prudential component of the fitness prong concerns “whether resolution of the dispute should be postponed in the name of ‘judicial restraint from unnecessary decision of constitutional issues.’ ” Id. (quoting Mangual, 317 F.3d at 59). “The hardship prong ... is ‘wholly prudential,’” id. at 90 (quoting Mangual, 317 F.3d at 59), and “concerns the harm to the parties seeking relief that would come to those parties from our ‘withholding of a decision’ at this time,” Labor Relations Div.,. 844 F.3d at 330 (quoting McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2003)). We find that these prudential dimensions of ripeness also have not been satisfied here.

III.

Application of Justiciability Doctrines

Our review of the district court’s dismissal is de novo. See Blum, 744 F.3d at 795.

We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs lack standing, at this time and on this record, to challenge the Act. The record does not contain allegations that the plaintiffs are currently facing a “certainly impending” injury, nor have the plaintiffs shown that they face a “substantial risk” of injury. SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341 (quoting Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1150 n.5).

A. A Precondition to Enforcement Has Not Been Satisfied, and the Plaintiffs’ Behavior Has Not Been Affected

No buffer zone currently exists, and none has ever existed in the years since the filing of this lawsuit. The Act is not currently preventing the plaintiffs from engaging in expressive activities in whatever public areas they please. See RSA § 132:39, III.

The complaint claims only that the plaintiffs “fear prosecution under the Act.” Nowhere does the complaint allege that the demarcation of a zone is imminent or that prosecution will occur without that precondition first having been satisfied. Moreover, the government has affirmatively disavowed prosecution under the Act unless and until a zone is demarcated according to the Act’s terms.

The other record materials confirm that the demarcation of a zone is both a precondition to enforcement and an event whose occurrence is speculative at present. In the plaintiffs’ declarations, submitted to the district court in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, they repeat the complaint’s allegation of a “fear [of] prosecution under the Act” if they continue to engage in their customary behavior. The declarations also allege that the zones, if created, would prohibit expressive activity, “make it substantially more difficult to distribute literature to patients,” and “displace [plaintiffs] from positions where [they] engage in sidewalk counseling.” But these alleged injuries are all conditioned on the demarcation of a zone, and the declarations allege no concrete or imminent threat of a clinic choosing to demarcate a zone. So the threat remains “hypothetical,” given the limited facts before us. SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341 (quoting Lu-jan, 504 U.S. at 560,112 S.Ct. 2130).

The record shows that, after McCullen, reproductive health care facilities in New Hampshire reevaluated their potential use of buffer zones. In her affidavit, dated July 22, 2014, the Concord clinic’s director declared that her facility “has re-evaluated whether to post a buffer [zone] in light of McCullen” and does “not currently intend to post a buffer zone at any of the [facility’s] entrances.” The Greenland clinic’s director, similarly, stated in her July 21, 2014 affidavit that her facility

does not presently intend to post any buffer zone.... The methods that we have available, and have used in the past, have been largely effective in providing a reasonably safe environment for our staff and patients.

Indeed, in her March 2015 testimony before a New Hampshire House committee, a vice president for Planned Parenthood of Northern New England stated that “in the spirit of the McCullen decision, [she] would not even suggest ... posting] a zone where there is not ... a history of documented attempts to address the balancing of rights in less restrictive means before considering the option of posting.”

The district court observed that the Act appears to allow facilities to demarcate buffer zones “within hours — if not minutes — of any perceived misstep by the plaintiffs.” Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141, at *8. The plaintiffs highlight that fact and argue that, because they have alleged that a zone could be created and enforced within a very short amount of time, they have pled a sufficiently “substantial risk” of injury. SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341. But the fact remains that demarcation is a “contingent future event[ ] that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 580-81,105 S.Ct. 3325).

The plaintiffs also do not advance their standing argument by contending that the district court should have analogized this case to SBA List rather than to Clapper. In fact, SBA List, like Clapper, confirms that the plaintiffs lack standing.

In SBA List, the Supreme Court recognized the standing of an organization challenging an Ohio statute that proscribed “false statements” about a political candidate during a campaign. 134 S.Ct. at 2338-39. That statute had been on the books for several decades, see Brief of Respondents at 5-6, SBA List, 134 S.Ct. 2334, and there was a robust history of its enforcement— including proceedings involving the very same organization “in a recent election cycle,”. SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345. Neither of those conditions is present here.

Additionally, in SBA List, the condition precedent to criminal prosecution was an administrative hearing before the Ohio Elections Commission, a proceeding that in itself was burdensome enough to cause some harm. See id. at 2345-46. Indeed, it was “the combination of those two threats” — Commission proceedings and criminal prosecution — that the Court found sufficient to establish injury in fact. Id. at 2346. By contrast, on this record, demarcation is purely a precondition to harm and not a harm per se. See RSA § 132:39, III. That distinction makes the “chain of possibilities” leading to a future cognizable injury, Clapper, 133 S.Ct. .at 1148, significantly more attenuated here than it was in SBA List.

Further, neither the complaint nor any of the plaintiffs’ declarations alleges that the Act, as of yet, has forced any sidewalk counselor or protestor to refrain from any expressive activities. To the contrary, several of the plaintiffs’ declarations acknowledge that “the Act has not yet impacted [their] activities.” Another plaintiffs declaration asserts that “[b]eing moved, beyond the driveway zone at the Greenland abortion facility would impair [her] message because it would make it harder for women driving into the facility to see [her] banner.” But nowhere does she allege that she has ever actually been forced to stand farther away from the clinic than she would like. Nor does any other plaintiff allege that harm, or any other present harm.

The plaintiffs do allege that they “fear prosecution under the Act if they continue to” engage in expressive activities in the public areas where zones may someday be created. But a plaintiffs conjectural fear that a government actor “might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to” her does not suffice t.o create standing. Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1152 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,11, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972)). Speculation of that sort amounts to “a subjective chill” — which, in the Article III standing context, is “not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Id. (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14, 92 S.Ct. 2318).

B. The Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Any Injury Arising from the Act’s Delegation of Authority to Private Parties

The fact that the Act delegates zone-drawing authority to private facilities also fails to "confer pre-enforcement standing.

The plaintiffs attempt to sharpen their argument for standing along two lines. The first is that this case should, as a matter of law, be treated like Van Wagner, a licensing case. That analogy is inapt, as we explain below. Plaintiffs’ second line is a factual theory that a clinic could use its authority to demarcate buffer zones to coerce the plaintiffs into changing, or refraining from, certain behavior. We need not decide whether this theory of First Amendment injury could ever be actionable, because the record is clear that there is no allegation that any clinic has done any such thing.

Van Wagner recognized that plaintiffs had pre-enforcement standing in their far cial challenge to a regulatory scheme in Massachusetts, which required “parties wishing to engage in outdoor [billboard] advertising to obtain a license in advance” from a state agency. Van Wagner, 770 F.3d at 35. The scheme granted “sole discretion” to the agency’s director to issue such licenses. Id. In recognizing standing in Van Wagner, this court stated that “[i]t is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.” Id. at 40 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). The plaintiffs, seizing on that language, argue that the Act’s delegation of zone-drawing authority confers pre-enforcement standing in itself, as a matter of law, without any requirement that the authority actually be exercised.

The analogy to Van Wagner fails. The Act does not require the- plaintiffs to obtain any sort of license before engaging in speech. Simply put, there literally is no prior restraint here imposed; there is only a delegation of the power to impose a restriction on speech, via demarcation of a zone, at some point in the future. The plaintiffs cite no case justifying their “novel theory” that the Act is a prior restraint, Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141, at *10, and we conclude that this is not a prior restraint case as a matter of law.

The plaintiffs also offer a fact-based theory: the clinics could influence or curtail the plaintiffs’ activities by threatening to demarcate a zone. At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that “the threat to draw zones is what chills [his] clients’ speech.”

But the record contains no allegations that this fear of coercion is anything more than conjecture. The Greenland clinic director’s affidavit, to which counsel directed us at oral argument when asked for his support on this point, states that “having the option of creating a buffer if other methods fail ... would be helpful when negotiating about unsafe behaviors of the demonstrators.” In the same affidavit, however, the director states that her clinic “does not presently intend to post any buffer zone” and that “[t]he methods that [the clinic] ha[s] available, and ha[s] used in the past, have been largely effective in providing a reasonably safe environment for [its] staff and patients.”

Similarly, the Greenland clinic director testified that “[t]he threat of having [the Act] enforced ... did make people behave in a better way and we’ve been able to work with that.... I think it’s already doing some good.” That statement does not suggest that the clinic has engaged in any form of persuasion, much less coercion, to alter the plaintiffs’ behavior. The complaint and declarations do not allege that the Greenland clinic has ever actually used its ability to engage in zone-drawing as a weapon to infringe the First Amendment interests of these plaintiffs — or indeed of any individuals wishing to express themselves.

C. The Dispute Is Not Presently Ripe for Adjudication

In light of our finding on the lack of plausible allegations of chill from the statute’s mere existence, there remains only the challenge predicated on the possible future implementation of a zone. But the possible establishment and contours of such a future zone are highly uncertain. “[W]e have no idea whether or when” a clinic will demarcate a zone. Texas, 523 U.S. at 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc, v, Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967)). That observation sounds in the analysis of both standing and ripeness.

Both components of ripeness’s fitness prong point toward a lack of ripeness in this case. If the dispute were to develop into a case or controversy fit for adjudication, it would be at some future time when the Act is causing cognizable harm — to particular plaintiffs, at a particular clinic, and under particular circumstances. Until then, a federal court could not meaningfully adjudicate a case, nor could it, if the facts warranted relief, frame redress through injunctive or declaratory relief. Until the dispute ripens, and more facts come to light, we “cannot perform the requisite claim-specific .., analysis as to any claim that may be brought, as we have before us only hypothetical ... claims, the details of which are not known.” Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 328; see also id. at 330 (finding lawsuit unripe because “no ... claim-specific inquiry c[ould] be made” (citing Mclnnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 72)).

With respect to ripeness’s hardship prong, there is no apparent prejudice to the plaintiffs if they must wait until their claims ripen to sue. They are “not required to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct, unless and until” a facility demarcates a zone. Texas, 523 U.S. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257; see also Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 330 (finding little to no hardship in delaying adjudication because of the contingent nature of the claimed injury)-

“In sum, we find it too speculative whether the problem [the plaintiffs] pres-ente] will ever need solving.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 302,118 S.Ct. 1257.

IV.

Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal is without prejudice. See Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 736 (1st Cir. 2016).

      . The Act defines a "reproductive health care facility” as "a place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered or performed.” RSA § 132:37, I. We use the terms "facility” and "clinic” interchangeably in this opinion.

      . More specifically, the stay rested on agreements that (1) no defendant would enforce the Act unless and until a clinic created a buffer zone; and (2) "[a]ny defendant who receive[d] notice, through whatever means, that a ... clinic intend[ed] to post ... signage” — thereby creating an enforceable buffer zone— would "immediately notify the plaintiffs, through their counsel,” at which point a preliminary injunction hearing would occur "forthwith.” One purpose of the stay was to give the legislature a chance to reconsider the Act in the wake of McCullen. Although the New Hampshire House voted to repeal the Act during its 2015 session, see H.B. 403, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2015), the Senate tabled the repeal bill and took no action on it, see Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141, at *3. In 2016, the House voted again to repeal the Act, see H.B. 1570, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2016), but the Senate declined again to pass the House bill, see Paige Sutherland, N.H.'s 25-Foot Buffer Zone Around Abortion Clinics Will Stay, N.H. Pub. Radio (May 6, 2016), http ://goo. gl/NfCIcj.

      . At a motion hearing, the district court recognized, but did not resolve, the ambiguity about what role law enforcement would play.

      . The complaint names the Town of Derry and its county attorney among the defendants. In the district court, the parties jointly stipulated that the Planned Parenthood facility in Derry "does not offer abortion services," and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed those two defendants from the action. Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141, at *3 n.3.

      . The "municipal defendants” maintain on appeal that the complaint fails to state a claim against them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because we dismiss on 12(b)(1) grounds, we need not reach this argument. See Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141, at *13 n.19.

      . Under present law, we may also consider the prudential aspects of ripeness “on our own motion,” regardless of the parties’ wishes. Reno v. Catholic Soc, Servs,, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993); accord Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 325. In SBA List, the Court cast a measure of doubt upon ripeness’s prudential dimensions, 'observing that prudential justici-ability doctrines, including ripeness, are “in some tension with .., the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.” SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2347 (quoting Lexmark Int'l, Inc, v. Static Control Components, Inc., — U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014)).

      . First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), also fails to support plaintiffs’ theory. First Unitarian did not establish any sort of special analysis for the delegation of speech-restricting authority to private parties, but rather held that Salt Lake City "could not ameliorate [its unconstitutional speech prohibition] by delegating its power to enforce that prohibition to a third party.” Reddy, 2016 WL 1305141, at *11 (citing First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1132).

      . The record does not show that the Greenland clinic has ever taken the steps of consulting with law enforcement or local authorities with authority over signage, making the argument that it will then use its zone-drawing ability ever more attenuated.


author: HOWARD, Chief Judge.

text:
    PEAJE INVESTMENTS LLC, Movant, Appellant, v. Alejandro GARCÍA-PADILLA et al., Respondents, Appellees. Peaje Investments LLC, Movant, Appellee, v. Alejandro García-Padilla et al., Respondents, Appellees, Financial Oversight and Management Board, Movant, Appellant. Assured Guaranty Corporation; Assured Guaranty Municipal Corporation, Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al., Defendants, Appellees, Financial Oversight And Management Board, Movant, Appellant. Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC et al., Movants, Appellants, Claren Road Credit Master Fund, Ltd. et al., Movants, v. Alejandro García-Padilla, in his official capacity as the Governor of Puerto Rico, et al., Respondents, Appellees. Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund V, Inc. et al., Movants, Appellees, v. Alejandro García-Padilla, in his official capacity as the Governor of Puerto Rico, et al., Respondents, Appellees, Financial Oversight and Management Board, Movant, Appellant. Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd. et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Alejandro J. García-Padilla, in his official capacity as Governor of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, Defendant, Financial Oversight and Management Board, Movant, Appellant. National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Alejandro J. García-Padilla et al., Defendants, Appellees, Financial Oversight and Management Board, Movant, Appellant. US Bank Trust National Association, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Alejandro García-Padilla, in his official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Financial Oversight and Management Board, Movant, Appellant. Dionisio Trigo-Gonzalez et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, Carmen Feliciano Vargas et al., Plaintiffs, v. Alejandro García-Padilla, in his official capacity as Governor of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Financial Oversight and Management Board, Movant, Appellant.
    No. 16-2377, No. 16-2430, No. 16-2431, No. 16-2433, No. 16-2435, No. 16-2437, No. 16-2438, No. 16-2439, No. 16-2440
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    January 11, 2017

      G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Hartford, CT, with whom Allan S. Brilliant, Robert J. Jossen, Andrew C. Harmeyer, Dechert LLP, New York, NY, Dora L. Monserrate Peñagarícano, Hato Rey, PR, and Monser-rate Simonet & Gierbolini, LLC were on brief, for Peaje Investments LLC.
    Erin E. Murphy, with whom Susan Marie Davies, Michael F. Williams, Peter A. Farrell, Matthew D. Rowen, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, and Margarita Luisa Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, were on brief, for Alejandro García-Padilla, Juan C. Zarago-za-Gómez, Luis Cruz-Batista, and Carmen Villar-Prados.
    Michael Luskin, with whom Stephan E. Hornung and Luskin; Stern & Eisler LLP, New York, NY, were on brief, for Financial Oversight and Management Board.
    Richard A. Chesley, with whom John M. Hillebrecht, Neal F. Kronley, and DLA Piper LLP (US), New York, NY, were on brief, for The Employees Retirement System of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
    Sparkle L. Sooknanan, New York, NY, with whom Beth Heifetz, Geoffrey S. Stewart, Bruce Bennett, Benjamin Rosenblum, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Alfredo Fer-nández-Martínez, Delgado & Fernández, LLC, San Juan, PR, Arturo Diaz-An-gueira, José C. Sánchez-Castro, Alicia I. Lavergne-Ramírez, Maraliz Vázquez-Mar-rero, Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC, San Juan, PR, Glenn M. Kurtz, John K. Cunningham, Jason N. Zakia, and White & Case LLP, New York, NY, were on brief, for Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC, Glendon Opportunities Fund, LP, Nokota Capital Master Fund, L.P., Óaktree-Forrest Multi-Strategy, L.L.C. (Series B), Oaktree Opportunities Fund IX, L.P., Oaktree Opportunities Fund IX (Parallel 2), L.P., Oaktree Value Opportunities Fund, L.P., SV Credit, L.P., Claren Road Credit Master Fund, Ltd., Claren Road Credit Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., and Ocher Rose, L.L.C.
    Before HOWARD, Chief Judge, THOMPSON and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
   HOWARD, Chief Judge.

These appeals involve the application of certain provisions of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), see 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241, a statute enacted by Congress in June 2016 to address Puerto Rico’s financial, crisis. As relevant here, PROMESA provides for a temporary stay of debt-related litigation against the Puer-to Rico government. See id. § 2194(a)-(b). But the statute does not leave creditors entirely without recourse during the presumptive pause. Rather, it allows them to move for relief from the stay and directs district courts to grant such relief “after notice and a hearing ... for cause shown.” Id. § 2194(e)(2). Because we conclude that Movant-Appellant Peaje Investments LLC (“Peaje”) failed to set forth a legally sufficient claim of “cause” to lift the PROME-SA stay, we affirm the district court’s denial of its lift-stay motion. By contrast, the various appellants in Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v. García-Padilla (No. 16-2433) (the “Altair Movants” and, together with Peaje, the “Movants”) presented sufficient allegations to entitle them to a hearing. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial of their lift-stay motion and remand for the court to hold such a hearing.

I.

Peaje is the beneficial owner of certain bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”). The bonds are secured by a lien on toll revenues, among other things. In July 2016, Peaje initiated the instant action in district court by filing a motion to lift the PROMESA stay so that it could challenge the diversion of PRHTA toll revenues pledged as collateral for the bonds. Peaje alleged that, acting pursuant to the Puerto Rico Emergency Moratorium and Financial Rehabilitation Act (“Moratorium Act”), see 2016 P.R. Laws Act 21, the Puerto Rico government was diverting the toll revenues to other uses, thereby diminishing the value of Peaje’s collateral.

About two months later, the Altair Mov-ants, holders of certain bonds issued by the Commonwealth’s Employees Retirement System (“ERS”), filed a similar motion to lift the PROMESA stay. The Altair Movants claimed that the Commonwealth had suspended required transfers to the fiscal agent of employer contributions pledged as collateral for the bonds.

PROMESA’s stay of the commencement of certain actions until February 15, 2017, applies to the lawsuits the Movants seek to pursue. See 48 U.S.C. § 2194(d)(1)(A)®. The stay may be extended until as late as April 17, 2017, if the district court determines that additional time is needed to complete a voluntary restructuring process, or to May 1 if the Financial Oversight and Management Board (“Board”) makes a similar finding. See id. § 2194(d)(l)(B)-(C). The district court is directed to grant relief from the PROME-SA stay “for cause shown” after “notice and a hearing.” Id. § 2194(e)(2).

After consolidating the actions, the district court scheduled a November 3 hearing on the motions to lift the PROMESA stay for cause. On the eve of the hearing, however, the court issued an order denying the lift-stay motions. In seeking to define the “cause” standard, the court looked to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision. The court held that “lack of adequate protection” for creditors constitutes cause for lifting the PROMESA stay, just as it does under the Bankruptcy Code. Turning to the Movants’ specific claims, the court held that neither Peaje nor the Altair Movants lacked adequate protection. Because the toll revenues are “constantly replenished,” Peaje continued “to hold a security interest in a stable, recurring source of income that will eventually provide funds for the repayment of the PRHTA bonds.” Similarly, the employer contributions in which the Altair Movants claimed an interest “are a perpetual revenue stream whose value is not decreased by the Commonwealth’s acts of temporary suspension.” The Movants timely appealed.

II.

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, we address our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In the analogous bankruptcy context, we have held that the denial of relief from a stay is not necessarily a final decision sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. See In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp., 761 F.3d 177, 185 (1st Cir. 2014). But such a decision is final where it “conclusively decide[s] the fully-developed, unreviewable-elsewhere issue that triggered the stay-relief fight.” Id. The order on appeal here did precisely that. It rejected the Movants’ substantive arguments, holding that their interests in the collateral were adequately protected. After that ruling, there was nothing left for the district court to do.

B. Denial of Relief from Stay

Turning to the merits of the lift-stay motions, the parties primarily dispute two issues concerning whether actions by Puerto Rico that impair or remove the collateral securing the pertinent bonds is cause for lifting the stay: (1) whether such an impairment or removal satisfies PROMESA’s “cause” standard if it leaves the creditor’s interest in having the debt repaid inadequately protected; and (2) if so, did the district court commit reversible error by failing to conduct a hearing on whether the Movants here were inadequately protected. On the record in this ease, we answer the first question in the affirmative. On the second question, we issue a split decision. Because Peaje failed even to make a legally sufficient claim that it lacked adequate protection, we conclude that the district court did not commit reversible error in denying its lift-stay motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Altair Movants, on the other hand, were entitled to such a hearing.

On the threshold issue of whether lack of adequate protection constitutes cause to lift the PROMESA stay, Appellees García-Padilla, Zaragoza-Gómez, Cruz-Batista, Villar-Prados, and ERS (together, the “Appellees”) point out that the relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code, unlike PROMESA, expressly defines “cause” to include lack of adequate protection. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), with 48 U.S.C. § 2194(e)(2). They contend that PROME-SA’s omission on this point is meaningful and reflects Congress’s intent that “cause” not be defined to include actions impairing the collateral in a manner that leaves the interest in having the debt repaid inadequately protected.

But the Appellees’ contention runs headlong into the “cardinal principle” of constitutional avoidance. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). Under this canon, when confronted with a statute of questionable constitutional validity, we must “first ascertain whether a construction ... is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.” I& If so, we adopt that construction. In the bankruptcy context, Congress’s explicit designation of lack of adequate protection as cause to lift a stay was based, at least in part, on constitutional concerns. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 339 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295 (explaining that the concept of adequate protection “is derived from the [F]ifth [A]mendment protection of property interests”). Indeed, prior to the enactment of the current bankruptcy stay provision, the Supreme Court had recognized that creditors are constitutionally entitled to protection “to the extent of the value of the[ir] property.” Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278, 61 S.Ct. 196, 85 L.Ed. 184 (1940); see also United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-78, 103 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982) (applying principle of constitutional avoidance to provision of Bankruptcy Code where a contrary reading “would result in a complete destruction of the property right of the secured party” in its collateral). The PROMESA stay implicates these same constitutional concerns. Under the Appel-lees’ reading of the statute, the Commonwealth could expend every penny of the Movants’ collateral, leaving the debt entirely unsecured. Because we doubt the constitutionality of such a result, we hold that lack of adequate protection for creditors constitutes cause to lift the PROME-SA stay.

In the bankruptcy context, one “common form” of adequate protection is “the existence of an equity cushion.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07[3][d][i] (Alan N. Res-nick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2016) [hereinafter Collier]; see also Baybank-Middlesex v. Ralar Distribs., Inc., 69 F.3d 1200, 1203 (1st Cir. 1995). Such an equity cushion exists “if the value of the collateral available to the creditor exceeds by a comfortable margin the amount of the creditor’s claim.” Collier ¶ 362.07[3][d][i]. The widespread acceptance of an equity cushion as a form of adequate protection makes eminent sense. Indeed, the “interest” for which the bankruptcy stay statute requires protection is “the right of a secured creditor to have the security applied in payment of the debt.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 370, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988) (emphasis added). Therefore, an oversecured creditor cannot “demand to keep its collateral rather than be paid in full.” In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).

Here, in denying the lift-stay motions, the district court, while not using the precise term, relied on the existence of an equity cushion. It cited future toll revenues and employer contributions, which it concluded would eventually flow to the fiscal agents in sufficient quantity to repay the bonds, to support its finding of adequate protection. On appeal, the Movants contend that the district court erred in finding these future funds sufficient to ensure repayment of the bonds without first holding a hearing.

PROMESA appears to contemplate that rulings on lift-stay motions will issue only “after notice and a hearing.” 48 U.S.C. § 2194(e)(2). And we agree that it certainly could have simplified matters had the district court conducted a hearing in these cases. But, under the bankruptcy stay statute, we have held that this same language does not require an actual hearing in every case. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 814 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming decision vacating stay without a hearing where “the court had the benefit of the papers filed by both parties” and the debtor “identified no ... viable reasons for maintaining the stay”); see also In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 B.R. 350, 354 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (“There was complete awareness on the part of the principal congressional architect of the Code that ‘after notice and a hearing' did not contemplate a hearing in every instance.”). A hearing may be unnecessary where, for example, the material facts are not disputed. See In re Marron, 485 B.R. 485, 491 (D. Mass. 2012).

The Appellees contend that no hearing was required because the Movants did not claim or propose to show facts sufficient to establish lack of adequate protection. The significance of this purported shortcoming depends upon PROMESA’s allocation of the burden of proof. We begin with the statutory language, which provides that district courts shall grant relief from the stay “for cause shown.” 48 U.S.C. § 2194(e)(2). By requiring a “show[ing]” of cause, the statute places the burden on the movant. Where, as here, the only cause identified is an impairment of collateral that leaves the interest in repayment inadequately protected, it follows that the mov-ant bears the burden of establishing such cause. In the bankruptcy context, however, Congress altered this result by enacting an express burden-shifting framework under which the movant “has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor’s equity in property,” but the debtor “has the burden of proof on all other issues.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(g). PROMESA contains no analogous provision.

While the complexity of the Bankruptcy Code and the sui generis nature of PROMESA counsel caution in too readily inferring that any silence in PROMESA on a matter addressed in the Code is a legislative rejection of the Code’s approach on'that matter, such differences nevertheless do raise the possibility that such was precisely Congress’s intent. See Helmer v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that where “a legislature models an act on another statute but does not include a specific provision in the original, a strong presumption exists that the legislature intended to omit that provision” (citation omitted)). Enhancing that possibility here is the fact that, prior to the enactment of § 362, bankruptcy courts placed the burden on creditors to show that they would be harmed by continuation of the stay. See, e.g., In re Planned Sys., Inc., 78 B.R. 852, 858 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); Anchorage Boat Sales, 4 B.R. at 641 n.6. Where the alleged harm was a decrease in the value of the creditor’s collateral, the required showing included evidence “that the value of the collateral [was] not substantially in excess of the amount of the debt.” In re Wynn Homes, Inc., 14 B.R. 520, 523 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981). In light of Congress’s decision not to transplant the Bankruptcy Code’s express alteration of the pre-Code burden regime into PROMESA, we hold that PROMESA, like the pre-Code regime, places the burden on creditors to establish cause, including lack of adequate protection.

Indeed, there are sound policy reasons supporting Congress’s choice to allocate the burden of proof differently under PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Code. The PROMESA stay, while similar in operation to its bankruptcy counterpart, was designed to address a truly unique situation, namely the “immediate ... and imminent” fiscal crisis facing Puerto Rico. 48 U.S.C. § 2194(n)(l). Congress found that a stay of litigation was necessary to allow the Commonwealth “a limited period of time during which it can focus its resources on negotiating a voluntary resolution with its creditors instead of defending numerous, costly creditor lawsuits.” Id. § 2194(n)(2). Moreover, the PROMESA stay, which lasts a maximum of about ten months, is less burdensome to creditors -than a bankruptcy stay, which may persist for the entirety of the bankruptcy proceeding. In light of the temporary nature of the PROMESA stay, as well as Congress’s express intent to minimize “creditor lawsuits,” it makes sense to require creditors to shoulder the burden of demonstrating that the impairment of the collateral will likely harm their protected interest in repayment.

Thus, in order to establish an entitlement to relief, the Movants were required to prove, respectively, that future toll revenues and employer contributions more likely than not failed to provide a sufficient equity cushion to protect their interests in the wake of the Commonwealth’s ongoing diversion of collateral. It follows that, absent any allegation that these future funds would be insufficient, the Movants lacked a viable claim to relief, and the district court was not required to hold a hearing to consider a claim that was facially insufficient. See Mitsubishi, 814 F.2d at 847.

Peaje’s claim failed to clear this hurdle. In its motion, Peaje alleged that the applicable bond resolution requires the PRHTA to deposit monthly toll revenues with a fiscal agent. The agent, in turn, credits the funds to one of several accounts, which must be maintained at certain levels. According to Peaje, the Commonwealth has stopped making the required deposits, resulting in depletion of the accounts. In opposing Peaje’s lift-stay motion, the Commonwealth responded that “[a]ny particular toll revenue not allocated to the ... bonds today could simply be made up for by toll revenues collected tomorrow.” Peaje sought to rebut this proposition by asserting that the Commonwealth failed to “argue, let alone demonstrate, that any future collateral will be sufficient to cover the expenses coming due” in the future “and to make up all obligations falling into arrears during the stay period.” This statement reflects a misunderstanding of the adequate protection requirement. While Peaje may have had a contractual right to monthly deposits with the fiscal agent and the maintenance of the accounts at particular levels, its protected interest for purposes of the lift-stay motion was limited to its interest in repayment of the debt owed. See Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370, 108 S.Ct. 626; Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 247. Nowhere in its district court filings did Peaje claim that the current diversion of toll revenues would leave that interest inadequately protected. In light of Peaje’s admitted security interest in future toll revenues, this omission was fatal.

The Altan- Movants’ claim, by contrast, warranted a hearing. Unlike Peaje, they included in their district court filings a 2014 statement by ERS that uncertainty about future employer contributions could affect “the repayment of the [ERS’s] bond payable.” Crucially, this alleged uncertainty applies to contributions from municipalities as well as those from the Commonwealth. The Altair Movants’ allegations as to the insufficiency of future funds to protect their interest in repayment of the debt entitled them to a hearing. ERS attempts to avoid this result by citing a joint stipulation filed in the district court reflecting ERS’s representation that the allegedly diverted employer contributions are currently being held in an operating account. The parties, however, dispute whether the Altair Movants’ lien extends to this account. If it does not, the Altair Movants face the prospect of being left with a mere unsecured claim. ERS provides no authority for the proposition that such a claim may constitute adequate protection. Because the district court made no finding as to whether the Altair Movants’ lien extends to the operating account, and the parties have not briefed the issue on appeal, we decline to address this question in the first instance.

C. Denial of Intervention

Having established the need to remand for further proceedings on the Altair Mov-ants’ lift-stay motion, we must now consider the district court’s denial of the Board’s motion to intervene as of right in those proceedings under PROMESA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. We have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from this decision. See, e.g., In re Efron, 746 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2014). The Board, an entity created by Congress to help Puerto Rico “achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets,” 48 U.S.C. § 2121(a), moved to intervene in district court to oppose the lift-stay motions. The court denied the Board’s motion, citing its purported failure to attach a “pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c):

Several circuits, including our own, have eschewed overly technical readings of Rule 24(c) similar to that applied by the district court here. See, e.g., City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc’ns Co., 532 F.3d 70, 95 n.11 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding “no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to elevate substance over form” and excuse the failure to file a pleading with a motion to intervene); United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that “statement of interest satisfie[d] Rule 24(c) because it provide[d] sufficient notice to the court and the parties of [the movant’s] interests”); Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp,, 373 F.3d 1199,1236 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that, absent any claim of “inadequate notice,” there was “no reason to bar intervention based solely upon” the “technical defect” of failure to attach a pleading). Accordingly, denial of a motion to intervene based solely on the movant’s failure to attach a pleading, absent prejudice to any party, constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 314-15 (6th Cir. 2005). That is exactly what the district court did here.

The district court’s reliance on an overly technical reading of Rule 24(c) was particularly problematic in the unique procedural context of this case. The Movants initiated the proceedings by filing motions to lift the PROMESA stay. No other pleadings (e.g., a complaint) were pending when the Board moved to intervene. The Board could hardly have been expected to respond to a complaint that had not yet been filed. And the Board did attach to its motion an opposition to the requests to lift the PROMESA stay, setting forth its position on the issue. In these circumstances, there was no prejudice from the Board’s failure to attach some additional unspecified pleading to its intervention motion. Indeed, no party has opposed the Board’s intervention in district court or on appeal.

We hold that the district court’s rejection of the Board’s intervention motion constituted an insufficiently supported exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we remand to the district court to apply the proper standard. See Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 27 (1st Cir. 2008). Rule 24(a) requires district courts to allow intervention where the movant “is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). While we leave the resolution of this issue to the district court in the first instance, we note that PROMESA appears to grant the Board such a right. See 48 U.S.C. § 2152(a).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Peaje’s motion to lift the PROMESA stay, but VACATE its denial of the Altair Movants’ motion. We also VACATE the court’s denial of the Board’s motion to intervene in the litigation of the Altair Movants’ motion for relief from the stay. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In conducting such proceedings, the district court should be mindful of Congress’s explicit direction to “expedite” its disposition of the matter “to the greatest possible extent.” 48 U.S.C. § 2126(d). The parties shall bear their own costs, and the mandate shall issue forthwith.

      . Some of the co-movants in this case elected not to appeal. For simplicity, this opinion uses the phrase "Altair Movants” to refer only to those movants that have appealed. Appellee García-Padilla, who was solely an official capacity defendant in these appeals, is no longer Governor of Puerto Rico. We use his name in this opinion merely to avoid confusion.

      . Appellees García-Padilla, Zaragoza-Gómez, Cruz-Batista, and Villar-Prados seek to distinguish the district court’s refusal to lift the PROMESA stay from a similar ruling on a motion to lift a bankruptcy stay, primarily because the PROMESA stay is of limited duration and is designed to protect unique interests. While these differences may bear on whether the stay should be lifted, they do not signal congressional intent for the denial of stay relief to have different jurisdictional consequences in these two related contexts. Compare 48 U.S.C. § 2194, with 11 U.S.C. § 362.

      . This conclusion is also consistent with bankruptcy precedent considering possible harm to creditors as part of the "cause” inquiry, even before the concept of adequate protection was explicitly codified. See, e.g., In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380, 1390-91 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 B.R. 635, 641-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).

      . If debt-adjustment proceedings are commenced under Title III of PROMESA, the statute contemplates that the bankruptcy stay provision will become fully applicable. See 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) (incorporating by reference 11 U.S.C. § 362). Assuming that this possibility materializes, presumably the Movants will have the option of seeking relief from the stay under § 362.

      . We note that the Altair Movants' request for adequate protection here appears to be quite modest. They ask only that the employer contributions collected during the PROMESA stay be placed “in an account established for the benefit of Movants.” In light of ERS’s representation that it is not currently spending the funds, but instead simply holding them in an operating account, this solution seems to be a sensible one, At oral argument, ERS expressed concern that transferring the contributions to an account subject to the Altair Movants’ lien might violate the Moratorium Act. But this concern may not present an obstacle to ERS's ability to settle or otherwise resolve this federal action. See, e.g., Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (“When the defendants chose to consent to a judgment ... the result was a fully enforceable federal judgment that overrides any conflicting state law....”); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 563 (6th Cir. 1981) (“A federal court’s power under the Supremacy Clause to override conflicting state laws ... is well established.”).
      Of course, this is not the only path to a finding that the Altair Movants' interest is adequately protected. An equity cushion is not the "sine-qua-non for adequate protection,” which is a "flexible concept to be tailored to the facts and circumstances of each case.” to re Smithfield Estates, Inc,, 48 B.R. 910, 914 (Bankr, D.R.I, 1985); see also Collier ¶ 362.07[3][f|. Again, we leave the existence of adequate protection to the district court to assess on remand.

      . The Board filed five additional appeals raising almost identical issues (Nos. 16-2431, 16-2437, 16-2438, 16-2439, and 16-2440). The movants in these cases, unlike Peaje and the Altair Movants, have not challenged the district court’s denial of their lift-stay motions. For this reason, the Board’s appeals are dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 824 F.2d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding appeal from denial of motion to intervene moot where ”[t]he disputes in which [the appellant] s[ought] to protect his interests ha[d] been resolved in his favor”). Similarly, in light of our ruling today on Peaje’s appeal, the Board’s appeal in that case (No. 16-2430) is dismissed as moot.

      . In denying the Board’s motion, the district court relied exclusively on our prior statement that failure to comply with Rule 24(c) "ordinarily would warrant dismissal” of an intervention motion. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 205 n.6 (1st Cir. 1998). But this statement about the "ordinarfy]” consequences of failure to attach a pleading provides little guidance in the present case, where the Board did attach an opposition to the lift-stay motions clearly setting forth its position on the issue for which it sought intervention,