author: PYLE, Judge.

text:
    Harold HAGGERTY, Appellant, v. HOOSIER ENERGY RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.; Merom Generating Station, Appellee.
    No. 77A01-1206-CT-293.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    April 10, 2013.

      John P. Nichols, Terre Haute, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Jason A. Scheele, Eric M. Blume, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

PYLE, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Harold Haggerty (“Haggerty”) appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. (“Hoosier Energy”).

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Hoosier Energy on Haggerty’s negligence claim.

FACTS

Hoosier Energy owns and operates an electric generation facility known as the Merom Generating Station (“Station”), located in Sullivan County, Indiana. Hoosier Energy entered into a contract with C & K Industrial Services (“C & K”), Hag-gerty’s employer. Hoosier Energy retained C & K to provide vacuuming, jetting and hydro blasting services at the Station as needed. One of these occasions was November 1, 2008.

On that evening, Haggerty, along with C & K coworker Matt Slaughter (“Slaughter”), worked at the Station vacuuming dust from certain areas. Slaughter vacuumed an elevated area using a broomstick handle taped to a four (4) inch hose. Hag-gerty was holding the excess hose below. Slaughter lost control of his end of the hose, which subsequently struck Haggerty in the face, causing pain and bleeding. Hoosier Energy did not own or control any equipment used by Haggerty or Slaughter that evening.

On October 27, 2010, Haggerty filed a complaint alleging negligence against Hoosier Energy. On January 12, 2012, Hoosier Energy filed its motion for summary judgment and designated as evidence the plaintiffs complaint and an affidavit from Hoosier Energy employee Chris Blunk. In response, Haggerty filed a Statement of Genuine Issue of Material Fact and a memorandum in opposition to Hoosier Energy’s motion on February 29, 2012. The trial court conducted a hearing on March 27, 2012, and, after taking the matter under advisement, granted summary judgment to Hoosier Energy on May 17, 2012. Haggerty subsequently filed a motion to correct error, which was denied. This appeal ensues.

DECISION

When reviewing a trial court’s order granting summary judgment, we apply the same standard as that used in the trial court. Kopczynski v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 928, 930 (Ind.2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated evidence shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is ‘material’ ’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth ..., or if the undisputed facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004). “This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. “However, a defendant may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiffs claim.” Pelak v. Indiana Indus. Servs., Inc., 831 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is “clothed with a presumption of validity” and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 762. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the designated evidence. SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cnty. Airport Authority, 831 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind.2005), cert. denied.

Haggerty alleges Hoosier Energy committed the tort of negligence, which consists of the following elements: (1) a duty owed to Haggerty by Hoosier Energy; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to Haggerty resulting from Hoosier Energy’s breach. Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d at 385. Hoosier Energy claims, and Haggerty concedes, that the general rule in Indiana is that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Bagley v. Insight Communications Co. L.P., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind.1995). However, there are five recognized exceptions to this rule. Haggerty claims that the following four exceptions apply: (1) where the contract requires the performance of intrinsically dangerous work; (2) where the principal is by law or contract charged with performing the specific duty; (3) where the act will create a nuisance; and (4) where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken. Becker v. Kreilein, 770 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind.2002).

Hoosier Energy contends that Haggerty’s status as an independent contractor excludes him from taking advantage of exceptions one (1), three (3), and four (4). Our Supreme Court specifically disagreed with this position, holding the following:

The exceptions encourage the employer of the contractor to participate in the control of work covered by the exceptions in order to minimize the risk of resulting injuries. Our objective is no less to protect workers who may be exposed to such risks than it is to protect non-employee third parties. The fact that partial remuneration through worker’s compensation benefits may be available to an employee of an independent contractor does not diminish the policy rationale of providing an additional incentive to eliminate or minimize particular risks of injuries which arise from nondelegable duties. Where a contractor’s employer is responsible for a nondelegable duty, the contractor’s injured worker should not discriminately be deprived of access to full compensatory damages but should have recourse equal to that of an injured bystander. Likewise, to the extent that an injured worker’s awareness of a job-related risk may be greater than that of a non-worker, substantial fairness and equal treatment are ensured because in a worker’s action against the contractor’s employer, any incurred risk on the part of a worker will be treated as “fault” and will be reflected in a proportionately reduced damages award under our comparative fault statute.

Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 588. We will address Haggerty’s claims separately.

1. Intrinsically Dangerous Activity

Haggerty argues that the work he performed was intrinsically dangerous. “Work is intrinsically dangerous if the risk of injury involved cannot be eliminated or significantly reduced by taking proper precautions.” Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 978 (Ind.1998) (emphasis added). The designated evidence reveals that Haggerty and Slaughter were vacuuming dust from areas of the Station. There is nothing inherently dangerous about vacuuming dust. Furthermore, according to the accident investigation report from C & K, Haggerty and Slaughter could have prevented Haggerty’s injuries if they had recognized the vacuum hose was not secure. (App. at 70). We therefore conclude this exception does not apply.

2. Nuisance Activity

Haggerty next claims that the work he performed is the type that will create a nuisance. The key requirement of this exception is that the act at issue was of a type that will create a nuisance. Becker, 770 N.E.2d at 318. Our General Assembly has defined a nuisance as “[w]hatever is: (1) injurious to health; (2) indecent; (3) offensive to the senses; or (4) an obstruction to the free use of property; so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance, and the subject of an action.” Ind.Code § 32-30-6-6. Further, “[a] public nuisance affects an entire neighborhood or community, while a private nuisance affects only one individual or a determinate number of people.” Scheckel v. NLI, Inc., 953 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). “A private nuisance arises when it has been demonstrated that one party has used his property to the detriment of the use and enjoyment of another’s property.” Id. Again, there is nothing in and of itself about vacuuming dust that tends to create a nuisance. Further, there is nothing designated in the record to support the work being classified as a nuisance under precedent or statute. Accordingly, we also find that this exception does not apply.

3.Possible Injury to Others

Haggerty also asserts that the act performed would probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken. “The exception applies where, at the time of the making of the contract, a principal should have foreseen that the performance of the work or the conditions under which it was to be performed would, absent precautionary measures, probably cause injury.” Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 588.

Given that Haggerty and Slaughter worked for C & K, and Haggerty’s injuries were a direct result of their use or misuse of C & K property, Hoosier Energy could not have reasonably foreseen nor prevented the accident. Again, Haggerty designates no evidence showing otherwise. This exception does not apply.

A Specific Duty by Law or Contract

Haggerty argues that Hoosier Energy, through contract, had control of Haggerty and Slaughter, and thus was responsible for Haggerty’s safety as well as properly training C & K employees on Hoosier Energy safety procedures. When interpreting a written contract, “it is the court’s duty to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the contract was executed as disclosed by the language used to express their rights and duties.” Merrill v. Knauf Fiber Glass GmbH, 771 N.E.2d 1258, 1268 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. We look to the contract as a whole by examining all of its provisions to determine whether a party is charged with a duty of care under a contract. Id. In addition, this Court has previously held that “the ‘assumption by contract’ exception to the general rule of non-liability is not triggered merely because [a contractor] may have a right to inspect and test the work, approve of the work and/or employees of the independent contractor or require the contractor to follow company rules.” Armstrong v. Cerestar USA, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360, 371 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (quoting Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1989)) (brackets in original).

Hoosier Energy and C & K executed a contract for certain work at the Station. The relevant portions of the contract read as follows:

24. CONTRACTOR’S SUPERVISION AND SAFETY AT THE JOBSITE
The Contractor shall furnish adequate management, supervisory, and technical personnel on the jobsite to ensure expeditious and competent handling of the work.
The Contractor shall be responsible for complete supervision and control of his subcontractors as though they were his own forces. Notice to the Contractor shall be considered notice to any affected subcontractor.
The Contractor’s supervisory personnel shall coordinate the Contractor’s and his subcontractors’ programs for safety and accident prevention, fee protection, and security and property protection. The Contractor shall be solely responsible for the safety of its employees and agents. The Contractor shall comply with all state, federal, and local statutes, ordinances and regulations to insure the safety of its employees and agents, Owner’s employees and agents, and other persons who may be on the work site. Contractor shall further comply with the provisions of any safety manuals or safety rules supplied by the Owner.
The Contractor shall conduct all operations under this Contract in a manner to avoid the risk of bodily harm and the risk of damage to any property. The Contractor shall promptly take necessary and adequate precautions against any condition which involves a risk of bodily harm or a risk of damage to any property. The Contractor shall continuously inspect all work, material, and equipment to discover and determine any unsafe condition and shall be solely responsible for the discovery, determination, and correction of any such condition. This requirement will apply continuously and not be limited to normal working hours.
The Contractor shall furnish safety equipment and enforce the use of such equipment by his employees and the employees of his subcontractors.
When ever, in the opinion of the Owner, the Contractor has not taken sufficient precaution for the safety of the public or the protection of the work to be constructed under this Contract or of adjacent structure or property, and w hen ever, in the opinion of the Owner, an emergency has arisen and immediate action is considered necessary, the Owner with or without notice to the Contractor may provide suitable protection by causing work to be done, and material to be furnished and placed. The cost of such work shall be borne by the Contractor, and if the same is not paid on presentation of the bills therefor, such costs may be deducted from any amounts due or to become due the Contractor. The performance of such emergency work shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility for any damage which may occur.

Haggerty’s Br. at 6. Haggerty cites only the last paragraph of this clause to support his contention. However, when we read the contract as a whole, C & K’s status as an independent contractor and its responsibility for Haggerty’s safety and training is clear. Hoosier Energy did not contractually assume control of Haggerty while he worked at the Station, nor did they assume responsibility for his safety.

Haggerty finally argues that Hoosier Energy gratuitously assumed a duty to provide for his safety. Haggerty again relies on his partial citation of clause twenty-four (24) of the contract. Again, the entirety of the clause, as well as the contract itself, establishes C & K’s responsibility for Haggerty’s safety and training. Further, Haggerty has designated no evidence showing the affirmative conduct by Hooiser Energy required to gratuitously assume a duty. See Butler v. City of Peru, 733 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind.2000).

Because Hoosier Energy successfully negated the element of duty in Haggerty’s negligence claim, we find the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hoosier Energy.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.

      . The fifth recognized exception to the non-liability of a principal for an independent contractor’s negligence is where the act to be performed is illegal. Haggerty does not assert the applicability of this exception.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROBB, Chief Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Shari (Ellis) LOVOLD, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Clifford Scott ELLIS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 54A01-1209-DR-410.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    April 26, 2013.

      William A. Goebel, Goebel Law Office, Crawfordsville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

      Monty K. Woolsey, Jonathan R. Deenik, Cross, Pennamped, Woolsey & Glazier, P.C., Carmel, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

ROBB, Chief Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

Shari (Ellis) Lovold (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order denying her request for contribution from Clifford Ellis (“Father”) towards the college expenses of their son, C.E. She raises the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that C.E. repudiated his relationship with Father. On cross-appeal, Father appeals the trial court’s order modifying child support. He raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in its child support calculation by requiring him to pay child support for the time C.E. lived on campus. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to the repudiation finding but that it erred in the child support calculation, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

Father and Mother were divorced in 2003. Mother was granted custody of C.E., who was eleven years old at the time, and Father was granted reasonable visitation and ordered to pay child support. In 2004, child support was modified to $150 per week. Father consistently paid child support throughout the years.

In 2011, Mother filed a petition for contribution to post-secondary education expenses against Father. In turn, Father filed a petition for emancipation and for modification of child support. Mother later filed her own petition to modify child support. Mother agreed that she would not file an affidavit for contempt if Father paid $60 per week in child support while C.E. was away from home for college until the court issued its ruling on the motions.

A hearing was conducted on November 16, 2011, an in camera interview took place with C.E. on November 23, 2011, and, several months later, after Father filed a verified motion to re-open evidence and request for hearing, a second hearing took place on May 17, 2012. On June 26, 2012, the trial court issued its order denying Mother’s request for contribution to post-secondary education expenses because it found C.E. had repudiated his relationship with Father. The trial court based its repudiation finding, in pertinent part, on the following findings of fact:

3. The October 27, 2004 Order directed the parties to attend one counseling session with the minor child to attempt to work out any differences, to reinstitute a positive parenting time experience for the minor child, and improve communication between the parties. Mother, as the custodial parent, has never scheduled this ordered counseling session.
4. Father exercised post-Decree visitation with [C.E.] for approximately nine months, though parenting time exchanges became increasingly more hostile and difficult over time. [C.E.] was having difficulty adjusting to the post-divorce changes, including parenting time and a new Step-Mother.
5. This culminated during a visit on March 31, 2004, during which [C.E.] began crying and told his Father that he wanted to go home. Father complied and, at the exchange, he told [C.E.], in the presence of his Mother, “If you want to see me, call me, you know where I am”. [C.E.] agreed this is basically what happened.
6. Father has not seen [C.E.] for more than eight years. After the divorce, Mother moved in with her mother. Then, after the 2004 Order was entered, she moved again without providing Father her and [C.E.]’s new address and contact information despite Father’s repeated unanswered calls requesting this information. Neither Mother nor [C.E.] communicated with Father about anything during the past 8 years and Father has been precluded from doing so with them by their failure to respond.
7. Father was surprised to learn for the first time, in Court, that [C.E.] has undergone eleven surgeries over time for his congenital cleft palate. Mother never advised him of this. [C.E.] has never sent a Father’s Day or birthday card to his Father nor has he ever called him to say hello or to wish him well on special occasions, despite knowing Father’s address and contact information. Father did not see [C.E.] at either of the funerals for [C.E.]’s paternal grandparents.
8. Father has not been kept abreast of [C.EJ’s grades, activities, or his progress during the past seven years. As of the hearing on 11/16/11, Father still had not received any contact information for [C.E.], required by the Decree, the Order on October 27, 2004 and the Parenting Time Guidelines.
9. Although [C.E.] turned 18 in May, 2010, he has continued to choose not to communicate with his Father or send him a single card, call him, or otherwise treat him as his Father. [C.E.] confirmed that he saw his Father at a Culver’s restaurant, where [C.E.] worked, but that he chose not to approach him or talk to him, even though [C.E.] was not working at the time. Instead, [C.E.] walked the other way.
10. Despite Father’s willingness for years to maintain a relationship with [C.E.], all [C.E.] appears to be requesting is his Father’s payment of college expenses. At the same time, neither [C.E.] nor his Mother ever discussed with Father the college [C.E.] would attend, nor how it will be paid (though it appears [C.E.] could have accepted financial aid covering almost all of his expenses).
11. During the In Camera interview on November 23, 2011, [C.E.] told the Court he is interested in having a relationship with his Father. This rings hollow and is highly suspect in light of the one and one-half years that had then passed since [C.E.] turned 18, and the prior five and one-half years, without any attempts by [C.E.] to visit his Father. This purported change of heart by [C.E.] appears chiefly motivated by the fact Mother is now requesting Father to pay [C.EJ’s college expenses and because [C.E.] is likely aware of the consequences that follow a finding of repudiation. [C.E.] testified on May 17, 2012, that he had spoken with Mother’s Counsel prior to coming to Court.
12. [C.EJ’s professed desire to now have a relationship with his Father also rings hollow in light of what transpired after the In Camera Interview.
13. On December 6, 2011, Father was advised by his counsel that the Judge relayed to Counsel what transpired during the In Camera Interview and that [C.E.] expressed a desire to have a relationship with his Father. As a result, Father sent a certified letter to Mother requesting contact information.
14. Because Mother never responded to Father, his Counsel sent an email to Mother’s Counsel on December 20th requesting the same information. On January 3, 2012, Mother’s counsel advised, bye-mail, that since [C.E.] is 19 years old, Mother feels she should step out of this matter and allow [C.E.] to communicate directly with Father and that Mother had given [C.E.] Father’s request for contact information.
15. Despite this, [C.E.] did not provide contact information to his Father until January 2, 2012, when he also advised that he is home on some weekends. [C.E.]’s college, ISU, is only about an hour away from his Father’s residence, but he has been unable to manage to spend any time with his Father, even over his extended break during Christmas.
16. [C.E.] testified during the hearing on May 17, 2012, that he did not contact his Father after the November 23, 2011 In Camera interview until January 2, 2012, because he did not want to meet with his Father until a decision was first entered by the Judge.
17. [C.E.] testified that he was home on 5 different weekends during the second semester. In contradiction, he also testified that he has not been able to arrange contact with his Father because he was too busy with his part-time work, starting up a fraternity, his studies, school projects, and other stuff. Though Father was not informed, as usual, a statement from his medical insurance provider covering [C.E.] shows that [C.E.] was home for a doctor appointment on December 22, 2011.
18. A review of the multiple e-mails between Father and [C.E.] from January 4 through February 26, 2012, establish that Father did arrange on several occasions to meet and have contact but [C.E.] always ultimately had an excuse, after the fact, for not having been able to do so, even after having agreed to the arrangements made by his Father. They also establish that [C.E.] was very vague in his e-mails, promising to “possibly meet this weekend” while also advising that he would let his Father know when he would be home and available to meet with him. This pattern was repeated by [C.E.] over and over again. It is for this reason Father only found it necessary to initiate the e-mails on three occasions.
19. Father testified that he did not respond to [C.E.j’s e-mails about spring break (March 5-9) because by that time he had it with [C.EJ’s repetitive false promises and excuses and he felt that “he had been played.”
20. As of the hearing on May 17, 2012, six months after telling the Judge he wanted to have a relationship with his Father, [C.E.] still had not met with his Father even one time. Despite Father’s wishes, he and [C.E.] have not spent any time together since March 31, 2004.
21. [C.E.], as an adult child has voluntarily made choices about the priorities in his life precluding him from purportedly being available to visit with his Father. [C.E.] should been [sic] held accountable for the consequences of his own actions.

Appellant’s Appendix at 18-23 (internal citations omitted). The trial court also addressed the modification of child support issue in its order:

Attached is a worksheet using $2,308 per week as Father’s income and $330 per week for Mother.... This results in a child support obligation while [C.E.] is in college in the amount of $177.46 per week. Mother has submitted a worksheet showing her belief that [C.E.] will be home for 16 weeks out of the year.

Id. at 26. Because the child support calculation of $177.46 did not significantly deviate from the $150 ordered in 2004, the trial court did not modify child support.

Father filed a motion to eorre'ct error. The only aspect of the trial court’s order he challenged was the child support calculation. He did not dispute the court’s determination of the parties’ incomes, but noted that while the trial court stated that C.E. would only be home sixteen weeks out of the year in its order, the post-secondary education worksheet used in the calculation actually included thirty-six as the number of weeks C.E. would be at home. In light of the fact that Father had been paying only $60 per week since the time C.E. started college, as agreed upon by the parties, he requested that the court correct this error to preclude Mother from later claiming that Father owed her the difference between $150 and $60 in arrear-age. If the thirty-six weeks were changed to sixteen weeks, the resulting child support calculation would be approximately $79 per week and Father would only owe the difference between $79 and $60 in ar-rearage. Mother filed her own motion to correct error, arguing that in light of the repudiation finding, the court should not have used a post-secondary education worksheet. She proposed using a child support obligation worksheet and calculating child support as if C.E. would be home year round, which would result in a child support calculation of $202.84 per week and an arrearage in the amount of $5,999.28 owed to her. The trial court issued an order denying Father’s motion to correct error and granting Mother’s motion to correct error with regard to the child support calculation. Mother now appeals and Father cross-appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

A trial court’s decision to deny college expenses is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Boruff v. Boruff, 602 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). A decision to grant or deny a motion to correct error and decisions regarding child support, such as modification of child support, are also reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Bales v. Bales, 801 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. When reviewing a decision for an abuse of discretion, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. Id.

Also, when a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Freese v. Burns, 771 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. The appellant must establish that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 701. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a mistake has been made. Id. However, we do not defer to conclusions of law, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id.

II. Repudiation

Indiana law provides that a court may enter an educational support order for a child’s education at a post-secondary educational institute. Ind.Code § 31-16-6 — 2(a)(1). Repudiation of a parent by the child, however, is recognized as a complete defense to such an order. McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In McKay, the court noted that there is no absolute legal duty on parents to provide a college education for their children, and adopted Pennsylvania’s approach, stating “where a child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent, that parent must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her contribution to college expenses for that child.” Id. Repudiation is defined as a complete refusal to participate in a relationship with the parent. Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). The focus should be on the child’s behavior as an adult:

we certainly will not consider pre-majority attitudes and behavior, as we all recognize that the maturity and restraint which can be expected of adults is not appropriately applied to evaluate children. But to extend this parental amnesty beyond the age of majority would be irresponsible.
By college age, children of divorced parents must be expected to begin to come to terms with the reality of their family’s situation. They must begin to realize that their attitudes and actions are their individual responsibilities. Whatever their biases and resentments, while one can understand how they got that way, when they become adults it is no longer appropriate to allow them to stay that way without consequence.

McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 167 (quoting Milne v. Milne, 383 Pa.Super. 177, 556 A.2d 854, 861 (1989), appeal denied, abrogated on other grounds by Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628, 633 (1992)). Thus, because the father in McKay had “stood with open arms” to reestablish a relationship with his son, and all his son wanted was “a court order requiring Father to stand with [an] outstretched, open wallet,” the court relieved the father of the responsibility of contributing to his son’s college education. Id. at 168.

Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that C.E. repudiated his relationship with Father. She claims the trial court relied on erroneous findings of fact. In essence, she argues that it was Father who did not schedule a court ordered counseling session, it was Father who refused to take Mother’s calls, and it was Father who failed to exercise his right to see C.E. and not the other way around. This is essentially an attempt to re-argue her case and an invitation for us to re-weigh the evidence, which we cannot do on appeal. See Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Even if there is evidence in the record supporting her contentions, there is also evidence supporting the trial court’s findings in favor of Father, and thus those findings are not clearly erroneous. We also note that Mother only points to four allegedly erroneous findings, and does not contend that the remaining findings are not supported by the evidence. The remaining findings of fact are sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.

A review of the evidence most favorable to the judgment in this case indicates that after an unpleasant visit in 2004, when C.E. was eleven years old, Father did not see C.E. for eight years. C.E. did not contact Father in any way nor did he inform him of his grades, activities, or health issues. The trial court found that this behavior continued after C.E. turned eighteen in May 2010. C.E. confirmed that he saw Father at a Culver’s restaurant but chose not to approach him and walked the other way. C.E. did not discuss his plans to go to college with Father. While C.E. claimed he was interested in having a relationship with Father during the in camera interview, the trial court found that “[t]his rings hollow and is highly suspect.” Appellant’s App. at 20. We cannot reassess the credibility of the witnesses. See Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d at 134. Also, the evidence indicates that after C.E. made this claim and Father responded by sending C.E. a certified letter with his contact information, C.E. made numerous excuses and did not follow through with plans to meet Father. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that C.E. refused to participate in a relationship with Father.

Mother also contends that other cases that have found repudiation involved behavior “far more egregious.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. However, a review of the cases cited by Mother reveals that this court will affirm a trial court’s decision regarding repudiation as long as there is evidence in the record that supports it. See Lechien v. Wren, 950 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the son had repudiated his relationship with his father based upon a review of the evidence and testimony most favorable to the judgment); Scales v. Scales, 891 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that two children had repudiated their relationship with their mother because the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court’s decision); Norris, 833 N.E.2d at 1033-35 (holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the child had repudiated her relationship with her father; even though the repudiation commenced when she was a minor, “it continued uninterrupted after she reached majority”); Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d at 134 (affirming the trial court’s finding that the son had not repudiated his father); cf. Redd v. Redd, 901 N.E.2d 545, 552 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (finding that the trial court’s finding concerning repudiation was not supported by the evidence). Because there is evidence in the record that supports the trial court’s judgment, any factual differences between the case here and other cases are irrelevant.

As Mother indicates, Father may not have been very diligent in attempting to reestablish a relationship with C.E. throughout the years. However, there is evidence in the record that C.E. did not want such a relationship. In recognizing repudiation as a defense to the payment of college expenses, this court has noted that there is no absolute duty on a parent to send his or her child to college and that this must ordinarily be earned by the child himself. McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 167 (quoting Milne, 556 A.2d at 865) (adult children who have abandoned a parent “may decide that the time is ripe for reconciliation. They will not, in any event, be allowed to enlist the aid of the court in compelling that parent to support their educational efforts unless and until they demonstrate a minimum amount of respect and consideration for that parent.”). And while the bad feelings between C.E. and Father began when C.E. was eleven years old and may have started with Mother and then filtered through to C.E., see id. at 167 (quoting Milne, 556 A.2d at 861) (noting that “one can understand” how a child of divorced parents’ biases and resentments “got that way”), considering the evidence most favorable to the judgment, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by finding that C.E., now over eighteen years of age, repudiated his relationship with Father. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Mother’s request for contribution from Father towards C.E.’s college expenses.

III. Child Support Calculation

In Indiana, a child support order and an educational support order are separate and distinct. Knisely v. Forte, 875 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Here, the trial court refused to enter an educational support order for college expenses due to C.E.’s repudiation of Father. Repudiation is not a defense, however, to an order for child support, Bales, 801 N.E.2d at 199, and the trial court found that Father was obligated to pay child support through July 1, 2012. The trial court’s child support calculation for the time C.E. was in college required Father to pay child support throughout the year, even though C.E. only lived with Mother for sixteen weeks of the year. Father argues that this vitiates the trial court’s repudiation ruling, because by requiring him to pay child support for the time his son was living on campus, he was in essence contributing to his son’s college expenses. Whether a child support order should be reduced for the time a child is living on campus when a court has found that the child has repudiated the non-custodial parent, and on that basis refused to enter an educational support order, is an issue of first impression.

When a trial court enters both an educational support order and a child support order, as it has the discretion to do, child support must be reduced for the expenses that are “duplicated by the educational support order.” Ind.Code § 31-16 — 6—2(b)(1). When both orders are entered, the Indiana Child Support Guidelines specifically require a reduction in child support for the time the child is living away from home for college. See Support Guideline 8(b) (“The impact of an award of post-secondary educational expenses is substantial upon the custodial and non-custodial parent and a reduction of the Basic Child Support Obligation attributable to the child in question will be required when [t]he child resides on campus or otherwise is not with the custodial parent.”). The post-secondary education worksheet takes into account how many weeks during the year the child is living with the custodial parent and holds the non-custodial parent responsible for child support for only that number of weeks. See Support Guideline 8(c). The amount is then annualized to avoid weekly variations. Id. Thus, it is clear that while a court may order college expenses and child support, living expenses for a child living on campus should be included in the educational support order and not in the child support order.

We hold that living expenses for a child living on campus should similarly not be included in the child support order when, as here, the child has repudiated the parent and the parent is therefore not required to contribute to the child’s post-secondary education. To hold otherwise would render repudiation no longer a complete defense to the payment of college expenses. We do not adopt a bright-line rule requiring the filing of both a child support obligation worksheet and a post-secondary education support worksheet because no educational support order has been entered. Cf. Child Support Guideline 8(c) (the post-secondary education worksheet along with the child support obligation worksheet “must be filed with the court” when both a child support order and educational support order are entered). But the trial court must reduce child support for the time the child will be living away from home for college. Cf. Lechien, 950 N.E.2d at 847 (holding that the non-custodial parent was required to pay child support year round, despite the child’s repudiation, because the child lived at home and not on campus). Because the trial court erred in its child support calculation, we reverse its order modifying child support and remand with instructions to recalculate child support so that Father does not pay child support for the time C.E. was living on campus.

Conclusion

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s request for contribution from Father towards C.E.’s college expenses based on its finding that C.E. repudiated Father. However, the court erred in its child support calculation by requiring Father to pay child support for the time C.E. was living on campus. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to the trial court to re-calculate child support in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.

      . Both parties also filed affidavits for contempt. However, the trial court's ruling on those affidavits is not at issue on appeal.

      . The trial court also noted that even if it had not found that C.E. repudiated his Father, it would exercise its discretionary authority and deny the request for Father to contribute towards C.E.’s college expenses under the facts of this case.

      . The court also found that the child support obligation terminated on July 1, 2012. Neither party takes issue with this date.

      . This sum is the difference between $202.84 and $60 over the course of forty-two weeks— from September 16, 2011, (the date Father started paying the reduced amount of $60) until July 1, 2012, (the date the court found child support terminated).

      . Under current Indiana law, a parent, generally, has a duty to support his or her child until the child reaches nineteen years of age. Ind.Code § 31-16-6-6(a). Until 2012, however, the presumptive age of termination of child support was twenty-one years. July 1, 2012, was the date the new law, changing the age from twenty-one to nineteen, took effect. At the time, C.E. was twenty years old.


author: CRONE, Judge.

text:
    PLATINUM CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, Appellant-Respondent, v. Christopher COLLINGS, Appellee-Claimant.
    No. 93A02-1210-EX-882.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    April 26, 2013.

      Sally P. Norton, Doran, Blackmond, Norton LLC, Granger, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Julie A. Dugan, Dugan, Repay & Ry-bicki, P.C., St. John, IN, Attorney for Ap-pellee.
   OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

Platinum Construction Group, LLC (“Platinum”) appeals an order of the Worker’s Compensation Board (“the Board”) awarding benefits to former Platinum construction supervisor Christopher Codings for injuries he suffered to his back, neck, and hip during a 2009 accident on the job. Platinum contends that the Board erred in awarding Codings sums for temporary total disability (“TTD”). Platinum also challenges the sufficiency of the findings supporting the Board’s order awarding Codings sums for permanent partial impairment (“PPI”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2009, thirty-six-year-old Codings was working as a construction superintendent for Platinum. He had worked for Platinum for four years and had fifteen years’ previous experience in construction. On January 30, 2009, while framing a house, a twenty-by-fourteen-foot wad fed on him, causing injury to his neck, back, and hip. Platinum instructed that he be evaluated at a certain clinic rather than at a hospital. Platinum deemed Codings’s injury compensable and provided authorized treatment through Drs. Michael Yergler and Todd Graham, who diagnosed Codings with a non-displaced fracture of the iliac crest and disc herniations at C5-6, C6-7, T2-3, and T4-5. Dr. Yergler ordered that Coldngs remain completely off work until March 6, 2009, during which time Codings received TTD benefits totaling $3180. On March 6, 2009, Dr. Yergler released Cod-ings to full duty, and his TTD benefits were terminated. Codings was never placed on limited duty. About that time, Platinum laid off its employees and closed its doors, so Collings filed a claim for unemployment compensation. He attempted to work construction for two other contracting companies, but his pain prevented him from performing the tasks associated with the work. In total, he earned about $1200 from his limited work for the two companies. He also started his own construction company but did not earn any income because his ongoing physical limitations prevented him from completing any projects.

Collings was released from authorized care in November 2009, whereupon Dr. Yergler rated his hip PPI at 0%, and Dr. Graham rated his neck and back PPI at 7%. He continued to experience pain and consulted with Dr. Robert Martino, who determined that additional treatment was necessary. Due to conflicting conclusions by the various doctors, Platinum sought an independent medical examination (“IME”). The Board appointed Dr. Peter Carney, who determined that Collings had been disabled since the time of the accident, that he was not at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”), and that a work hardening program was necessary. Collings participated in a work hardening program from May 2 to May 26, 2011. In December 2011, Collings sought a second opinion at the Spine Institute, where Dr. Jamie Gottlieb examined him. In an in-depth report, Dr. Gottlieb found that Collings’s injuries left him limited in his daily activities and rated Collings’s PPI at “18% based on AMA guidelines.” Ex. I.

In early 2012, Collings filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Board. After a hearing on the matter, the hearing member issued a decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding Collings $85,526 in additional TTD benefits, plus $26,210 in PPI benefits, for a total of $61,736 plus limited attorney’s fees. Appellant’s App. at 7. Platinum appealed to the full Board.

In an order dated October 10, 2012, the Board expressly adopted the hearing member’s findings and conclusions and affirmed the member’s decision. Platinum now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Platinum challenges the Board’s order awarding worker’s compensation benefits to Collings, and as such, confronts a stringent standard of review. When we review a decision of the full Worker’s Compensation Board, we are bound by the Board’s factual determinations and will not disturb them unless the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion. Howard v. U.S. Signcrafters, 811 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. Rather, we must disregard all evidence unfavorable to the decision and examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the Board’s findings. Id.

I. Temporary Total Disability

Immediately following his injury, Collings received a total of about $3000 for five weeks of TTD. Platinum asserts that the Board erred in awarding Collings an additional $35,526 for TTD. The purpose of awarding TTD payments under the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act is to compensate an employee for his loss of earning power because of an accidental injury arising out of, and in the course of, his employment. Ind.Code § 22-3-2-2(a); Ballard v. Book Heating & Cooling, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.

During the period of time that a claimant undergoes treatment for an injury, it is relevant whether the injured workman has the ability to return to work of the same kind or character. If the injured worker does not have the ability to return to work of the same kind or character during the treatment period, he is temporarily totally disabled and may be entitled to benefits.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Here, the parties do not dispute that Collings’s injuries arose out of, and in the course of, his employment. However, Platinum specifically argues that Collings was ineligible for additional TTD benefits because he applied for and received unemployment benefits. The premise behind this argument is that the two claims are incongruous because a TTD benefits claimant is asserting an inability to work, whereas an unemployment benefits claimant is asserting that he is able-bodied, available, and making an effort to find work. Id. at 57-58. See also Ind.Code § 22-4-14-3(b) (stating that an unemployed person is eligible for benefits only if physically and mentally able to work, available for work, making an effort to secure work, and participating in reemployment services). In Ballard, another panel of this Court affirmed the Board’s denial of TTD benefits to a claimant who was also receiving unemployment benefits, where the findings of fact stated that the claimant was physically and mentally able to work. Id. at 58. The Ballard court noted that our statutes do not specifically prohibit a claimant from receiving both types of benefits and examined the varying approaches taken in other jurisdictions, i.e., allowing, denying, or reducing one type of benefits when the claimant is already receiving the other. Id. at 57-58. The Ballard court seemed most concerned that claimants not receive a windfall in the form of dual benefits, while simultaneously raising mutually exclusive arguments about his physical ability/inability to work. Id.

Here, the Board considered the extent of Collings’s injuries, the authorized physician’s decision to release him to full and not limited work duty, and Platinum’s decision to lay off all of its employees and close its doors, and determined that Collings was unable to meet the physical demands of returning to work of the same type and character. The following findings offer insight into the Board’s reasoning concerning the effect of unemployment benefits on Collings’s eligibility for TTD benefits:

6. With no TTD benefits and no job to return to, Collings filed for unemployment benefits, which he received from March 28, 2009 through March 6, 2011 at a rate of $390 per week, leading to a total benefit amount of $87,050. Collings also attempted to work during that time and earned approximately $1200.
13. Collings was not fit to return to work without limitation as of March 6, 2009.
14. No evidence exists that Platinum could have or would have provided light duty within the restrictions outlined by Dr. Carney [the independent medical examiner].
15. The worker’s compensation statute allows for the collection of TTD benefits if the claimant cannot return to work of the same kind and character. Here, Collings was a construction worker that could not perform his job duties in [sic] as outlined by Dr. Carney.
16. Unemployment requires only that a claimant be physically and mentally able to work in some capacity, that claimant is available to work and making and [sic] effort to work, a much lesser standard than that outlined by the worker’s compensation statute.
17. Collings is not entitled to a windfall of dwplicative benefits and Platinum should be given a credit for all unemployment benefits collected.
19. Collings is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from March 7, 2009 through the date he was again released from work hardening at Maximum Medical Improvement on May 26, 2011 for a total of 116 weeks at his TTD rate of $636 per week. This leads to a total benefit amount of $73,776.00. After credit for unemployment of $37,050.00 and the $1200.00 Coll-ings collected in earnings, a balance of $35,526.00 is due and owing.

Appellant’s App. at 5-6 (emphases added).

Simply put, Collings was unable to perform work of the same kind and character due to the injuries that he suffered while working for Platinum. As a result, he met the statutory requirements to receive TTD benefits. After Dr. Yergler released him to full duty, he attempted to perform construction work but was unsuccessful. At the same time, he was willing, able, and available to work in a capacity that was less physically taxing, as required by the unemployment compensation statute. Because the Board credited Platinum for the sums that Collings had received as unemployment benefits, Collings did not receive a windfall. Thus, his benefits cannot be characterized as duplicative. Under these facts, the Board did not err in concluding that Collings’s receipt of unemployment benefits did not preclude him from eligibility for TTD benefits.

Platinum also contends that Coll-ings is not entitled to additional TTD benefits because he waived his right to object to his release to full duty as well as his right to request an IME by failing to dispute the proposed termination of TTD benefits as listed on state form 38911. Form 38911 states in part,

Employees who disagree with the proposed termination must serve a copy of this disagreement notice to the Worker’s Compensation Board and the employer within seven (7) days after receipt of the termination portion of this notice. Please sign below to make an independent medical examination request. An employee may request an independent medical examination to resolve a medical issue dispute.

Ex. B. An employee who disputes the proposed termination or wants to request an IME is instructed to check the appropriate box and mail the form to the Board at the address listed on the form. The concluding section of the form states, “Employer and employee must sign below to certify service or acknowledge receipt of this notice.” Id. Notably, the space for the employee’s signature is blank. Id. Collings never signed it.

Collings asserts that he never received the form. The Board examined the unsigned form and specifically found that “Collings did not receive the state form 38911 providing him notice of his right to object to the return to work finding and request an IME at that time.” Appellant’s App. at 5. Because the form did not contain Collings’s signature as required and there is no other evidence indicating that Collings in fact received it, the Board did not err in finding that he never received the form and that he therefore waived neither his right to dispute the proposed termination of TTD benefits nor his right to request an IME.

Platinum also challenges the Board’s award of additional TTD benefits on the grounds that during the time covered by the TTD award, Collings attempted to work for two different companies and to start his own business. In other words, Collings was allegedly working construction while claiming that he had a disability that prevented him from working construction. Collings testified that he had attempted to work on construction projects for two different companies and had made approximately $1200 total, but that he was fired from the projects when he could not complete the tasks due to severe pain associated with the work. Ex. D. He also formed his own construction company but was never paid for his projects because he could not complete the work and eventually had to turn the projects over to other contractors. Id. In its findings, the Board emphasized that Collings had no job to return to, since Platinum had closed its doors. His TTD benefits had terminated, and he attempted to perform construction work but was physically incapable of doing so. In short, Collings unsuccessfully attempted to perform the same kind and character of work that he had previously performed. In reaching its final damage award on the TTD benefits, the Board subtracted the meager amount that Coll-ings had made from his sporadic work over the two-year period from March 2009 to March 2011. We find no error here.

II. Permanent Partial Impairment

Platinum also challenges the sufficiency of the Board’s findings supporting its order awarding Collings sums for PPI. We disagree. Because the Board is the trier of fact, it has a duty to make findings that reveal its analysis of the evidence and that are specific enough to permit intelligent review. Smith v. Henry C. Smithers Roofing Co., 771 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). The more complex the factual disputes, the greater the specificity that is required, i.e., complex medical issues require particularly detailed findings. Id. at 1167-68.

Here, the Board made the following findings concerning Collings’s PPI:

7. Collings was released from authorized care on November 23, 2009 with a 0% Permanent Partial Impairment rating by Dr. Yergler for his iliac fracture, and a 7% PPI by Dr. Graham for his neck and back injuries.
8. Collings continued to have ongoing pain and limitation; hence, he sought consult with Dr. Robert Mar-tino, who opined additional treatment was necessary.
8. [sic] In an effort to resolve the dispute as to whether additional treatment was necessary, Platinum requested a Board appointed Independent Medical Examination, which was granted.
9. Collings’ Board appointed IME went forward with Dr. Peter Carney on December 15, 2010 and Dr. Carney filed his report with the Worker’s Compensation Board on January 18, 2011 indicating Collings was not at MMI, that a work hardening program was necessary and that Coll-ings has been disabled since the time of the incident, with several restrictions.
10. Platinum supplied work hardening as suggested by Dr. Carney from May 2, 2011 through May 26, 2011.
11. Collings continued to be limited in his daily activities, for which Dr. Gottlieb has supplied an 18% PPI.
20. Collings has reached maximum medical improvement. He is entitled to a Permanent Partial Impairment rating of 18% of the whole person as indicated by Dr. Gottlieb.
21. 18% of the whole person impairment has a statutory value of $26,210.00 based on Collings[’s] date of injury of January 20, 2009.

Appellant’s App. at 5-7.

Essentially, Platinum complains that these findings are inadequate because “there is no mention of the credibility of the several competing medical opinions offered by Platinum Builders and there is no explanation for the [Board’s] adoption of the 18% PPI rating over the 0% and 7% PPI ratings.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. The findings make it clear that Collings continued to have pain and limitation after he received the November 2009 PPI ratings from Platinum’s authorized physicians and that his continued impairment resulted in his treatment by IME Carney and eventually Dr. Gottlieb. By the time Dr. Gottlieb assessed Collings at 18% PPI, two years had elapsed. Thus, it was not merely a matter of the Board discrediting one physician in favor of another; rather, the passage of time and Collings’s continued impairment were relevant. The 18% PPI rating is supported by Dr. Gottlieb’s in-depth report, which specifically states that the rating is based on AMA guidelines. Ex. I. To the extent Platinum now appears to challenge the relative credibility of the physicians, we remind him that we may neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.

In short, the Board’s findings are adequate for review and support its conclusions, and the conclusions support the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s judgment in all respects.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J„ concur.

      . In Smith, the deficiency in the Board’s findings concerned the aggravating effect of the employee’s work-related injury on his preexisting condition. 771 N.E.2d at 1168-69.


text:
    VINCENNES UNIVERSITY by the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF VINCENNES, Appellant-Defendant, v. Daniel E. SPARKS, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 42A01-1206-PL-248.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    April 30, 2013.

      Anthony W. Overholt, Thomas D. Perkins, Maggie L. Smith, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
    William N. Riley, Joseph N. Williams, James A. Piatt, Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

After an investigation into falsified information on a basketball recruit’s application to Vincennes University (“the University”), Daniel Sparks, who was the head basketball coach in August of 2003, agreed that in lieu of facing disciplinary proceedings, he would forfeit his tenure and be subject to a zero tolerance policy. Thereafter the University renewed Sparks’s contract for the 2004-2005 academic year, but then notified him that his contract would not be renewed for the 2005-2006 academic year.

Sparks sued the University, contending that the University had to continue to employ him as long as he did not violate the zero tolerance policy. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied both motions, and the case was tried to a jury. After Sparks’s casein-chief, the University moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. The jury returned a verdict in Sparks’s favor.

The University appeals, arguing that, because Sparks surrendered his tenure, the University was free to decide not to renew his contract for any reason. The University therefore argues that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment, and alternatively, that the trial court should have granted its motion for a directed verdict and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact, that the designated evidence indicates that Sparks was not guaranteed continued employment with the University, and that summary judgment should have been granted for the University. We therefore reverse the verdict.

Facts and Procedural History

Sparks began working for the University in 1979 as the men’s basketball coach, athletic director, and professor of physical education. He became a tenured employee in 1982. In 2003, Sparks recruited a student from South Carolina, whom the parties have referred to as “Student A.” Student A did not obtain enough credits to graduate from high school. Student A “transfer[redj” his credits to a school in Philadelphia, which issued him a transcript. Tr. at 131. Sparks’s assistant coach, Jayson Holmes, also supplied Student A with an Indiana address to put on his application. When officials in the admissions department investigated Student A’s application, it was discovered that Student A had not graduated high school, had not attended the school in Philadelphia, had never lived in Indiana, and did not have any relatives who lived in Indiana.

On June 12, 2003, Sparks and Holmes were called to a meeting with Dale Dow-den, who was the University’s acting president at the time; Lynn White, assistant provost for student affairs; Jack Hanes, assistant provost for enrollment management; Gazella Summitt, human resources director; and Phillip Pierpont, assistant provost for academic affairs. White was Sparks’s direct supervisor, and she reported to Dowden. Student A’s application was discussed, and Holmes admitted to putting an in-state address on the application in order to increase the number of students who could receive a basketball scholarship. The coaches both denied being involved in falsification of the transcript. Sparks and Holmes were instructed not to use in-state addresses for out-of-state students.

According to Dowden, the University’s Board of Trustees was inclined to fire Sparks. Dowden and White felt that he deserved a second chance and therefore proposed that Sparks be retained subject to new terms of employment. On August 21, 2003, Dowden, White, Summitt, and Pierpont again met with Sparks and Holmes. Sparks was presented with the following proposal:

CONFIDENTIAL
August 21, 2003
Attention: Coach Dan Sparks
RE: Employment Status
* This is to notify each of you that you will not receive any pay increase for the fiscal year 2003-2004.
* You will each need to provide a letter of acknowledgement to be placed in your personnel file regarding falsification of application relating to a male basketball recruit and the conditions of your employment.
* There will be a zero tolerance for the duration of your employment at Vin-cennes University. This policy will be outlined by the Vincennes University legal counsel.
*You will forfeit tenure and you have until Monday, August 25, 2003 by 4:30 p.m. to provide to Lynn White in writing the acceptance of this agreement and the acknowledgment for your personnel file. If you choose not to accept this agreement, a recommendation will be presented to the Vincennes University Board of Trustees to terminate your employment effective. at the end of the Spring semester, 2004.
* Effective immediately, Coach Sparks will be removed as Athletic Director.

Plaintiffs Ex. 1 (This document will hereafter be referred to as “the Agreement.”) Holmes was presented with a similar proposal. Thus, Sparks and Holmes could either accept the Agreement or stand on their rights as tenured employees and risk being terminated.

Sparks and Holmes both decided to accept the Agreement. As directed, Sparks supplied a letter in which he accepted the new terms, but noted that he had not received a copy of the zero tolerance policy. He also offered the following explanation for his actions:

I tried to give these students in-state tuition by supplying a false address on the student application for the sole intent of trying to help the basketball program. The program has been falling behind in the past few years in funding for scholarships for players. I did this so there could be more than eight players on scholarship.

Appellant’s App. at 24. The Board voted to accept the Agreement on August 27, 2003. Sparks and Holmes both claimed that they never received the zero tolerance policy, despite efforts to obtain it, and the University does not claim otherwise.

In July 2004, interim president John Gregg sent Sparks a letter informing him that his contract would not be renewed for the 2005-2006 academic year. While the evidence was somewhat conflicting as to who made the final decision not to renew Sparks’s contract and why, the University has not taken the position that Sparks violated the zero tolerance policy. According to Sparks, Summitt informed him that he would not receive his benefits unless he opted to retire. In a letter dated October 5, 2004, Sparks stated that he would retire as of July 1, 2005. At his request, his decision to retire was not made public until after the end of the basketball season.

On May 29, 2007, Sparks filed a complaint against the University alleging breach of contract and promissory estop-pel. Sparks filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the University filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Sparks filed an amended complaint in which he substituted a fraud claim for the promissory estoppel claim. The University filed a new motion for summary judgment, and Sparks filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The designated evidence included various depositions, declarations, and affidavits from Sparks and several University officials. Sparks acknowledged that he had forfeited his tenure, but contended that statements from University officials had led him to believe that he would not be treated like a typical non-tenured employee. University officials generally indicated their understanding that the University had retained the right not to renew Sparks’s contract, while acknowledging that his employment potentially could have continued indefinitely.

The designated evidence also included the Agreement, the contract that Sparks signed for the 2004-2005 academic year, and the section of the University Manual regarding employment. The manual states: “Tenured faculty receive a letter of agreement indicating salary adjustments annually. Contracts are issued annually to non-tenured persons.” Appellant’s App. at 105. It further states:

The employment of a non-tenured faculty person shall be terminated by the University before the expiration date of the person’s written contract only for reason of incompetence, serious personal or professional misconduct, or insubordination by the faculty person. This termination of a non-tenured faculty person is to be distinguished from the non-renewal of the non-tenured faculty person’s contract, as non-tenured faculty persons are to have no expectation of employment after the expiration of each one-year contract.

Id. at 107.

On March 28, 2011, both parties’ summary judgment motions were denied. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which took place from May 2 through May 4, 2012. At the close of Sparks’s case-in-chief, Sparks and the University both moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. At the close of evidence, Sparks withdrew his claim for fraudulent inducement, and only the breach of contract claim was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in Sparks’s favor. The University now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The University argues, alternatively, that: (1) the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment; (2) the trial court should have granted its motion for a directed verdict; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. The University’s arguments regarding summary judgment, the motion for directed verdict, and the sufficiency of the evidence are all based on the University’s interpretation of the Agreement. In a nutshell, the University’s argument is that the provision of the Agreement that states that Sparks would forfeit tenure means that he was on a year-to-year contract, and the University was free to renew or not renew his contract each year as it saw fit. The University argues that the zero tolerance policy allowed the University to ter-mínate Sparks’s employment during the academic year for cause. Sparks contends that the Agreement is ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence supports a conclusion that he was entitled to continued employment as long as he did not violate the zero tolerance policy.

We conclude that the Agreement unambiguously requires Sparks to forfeit his tenure and that he therefore had no right to continued employment. Even if we were to find the Agreement to be ambiguous, the designated evidence supports the University’s interpretation, which also better harmonizes the provisions of the Agreement. Therefore, we conclude that summary judgment should have been granted for the University.

When reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind.2012).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party meets these two requirements, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact by setting forth specifically designated facts. We must accept as true those facts alleged by the nonmoving party, construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and resolve all doubts against the moving party.

Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112, 116-17 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he fact that the parties have made cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. Rather, we consider each motion to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Blasko v. Menard, Inc., 881 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citation omitted), trans. denied (2006).

“Summary judgment is especially appropriate in the context of contract interpretation because the construction of a written contract is a question of law.” TW Gen. Contracting Servs., Inc. v. First Farmers Bank & Trust, 904 N.E.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).

When the language of a written contract is not ambiguous, its meaning is a question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate. In interpreting an unambiguous contract, we give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the four corners of the instrument. Clear, plain, unambiguous terms are conclusive of that intent. We will neither construe clear and unambiguous provisions nor add provisions not agreed upon by the parties.

Kaghann’s Korner, Inc. v. Brown & Sons Fuel Co., 706 N.E.2d 556, 565 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citations omitted), clarified on reh’g on other grounds. A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to its proper construction; rather, a contract will be found to be ambiguous only if reasonable persons would differ as to the meaning of its terms. Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Cohen, 910 N.E.2d 251, 257 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). “We interpret a written contract by reading the contract as a whole, and we attempt to construe the language so as to not render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless.” DLZ Indiana, LLC v. Greene Cnty., 902 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). “And, in reading the terms of a contract together, we keep in mind that the more specific terms control over any inconsistent general statements.” Id. at 328.

The University argues that the “terms ‘tenure’ and ‘non-tenured’ are terms of art, well defined in the law and in common usage.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Black’s Law Dictionary defines tenure as a “status afforded to a teacher or professor as a protection against summary dismissal without sufficient cause” or “[m]ore generally, the legal protection of a long-term relationship, such as employment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1509 (8th ed. 2004).

The University compares this case to Orem v. Ivy Tech State College, 711 N.E.2d 864 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied (2000). Orem was hired by Ivy Tech as an at-will employee. In 1991, he filed three internal grievances regarding the conditions of his employment. The parties resolved the dispute by signing a “Release Agreement,” which stated:

In consideration of the agreement of Ivy Tech to accept Mr. Orem’s proposal to withdraw his grievances and be assigned the position of Director of Institutional Research and Development, which Mr. Orem is not otherwise entitled to receive, Mr. Orem hereby unconditionally releases and discharges Ivy Tech from any claims....

Id. at 870. In 1996, Orem was notified that his position would be eliminated due to a reorganization. Orem submitted a written objection and then requested appointment to an administrative position at the Logansport campus. That request was denied. Orem then filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and constructive fraud. Orem and Ivy Tech both filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment for Ivy Tech.

On appeal, Orem argued that the words “assigned” and “entitled” meant that he was given a permanent position. Id. at 871. We disagreed:

As used here, the word “assigned” simply means “appointed,” i.e., that Orem would be appointed to the position. The phrase “not otherwise entitled to receive” means that Orem would not have been appointed to the position but for the agreement, not that Orem was given an entitlement or right to employment.

Id. We noted that “Indiana has historically recognized two basic forms of employment: (1) employment for a definite or ascertainable term, and (2) employment at will.” Id. at 870. If an employment contract makes no reference to a term of employment, there is a presumption that the employment is at will and can be terminated at any time, with or without cause, by either party. Id. We distinguished cases where the presumption had been rebutted because the Release Agreement “con-tainted] no promise of job security” and “d[id] not contain a tenure provision.” Id. at 871. We declined to “add a material term regarding job-security which does not appear in the Release Agreement.” Id.

In this case, the Agreement required Sparks to forfeit his tenure. The Agreement made no reference to a term of employment. After entering the Agreement, Sparks signed a contract “for a period commencing on August 15, 2004, and ending on May 15, 2005.” Plaintiffs Ex. 7. Orem is not squarely on point because Sparks had a contract for the length of the academic year, which could be terminated only under certain limited circumstances; thus, he was not an at-will employee. However, Orem makes clear that our courts are reluctant to infer a promise of continued employment that is not clearly expressed in the contract. We find nothing in the Agreement or the 2004-2005 academic year contract that evinces an intent to guarantee Sparks’s employment beyond the contract term as long as he committed no misconduct.

Sparks attempts to avoid the clear import of the Agreement’s requirement that he forfeit his tenure by focusing on the provision which states that he would be subject to a zero tolerance policy for the duration of his employment. Sparks argues that the words “duration” and “zero tolerance policy” are ambiguous. However, that provision of the Agreement is not at issue. The University did not fire Sparks for violating the zero tolerance policy.

Sparks’s argument that the “zero tolerance policy” provision implies that the University would continue to employ him as long as he did not commit any misconduct is problematic because it would, in effect, afford him at least a modified form of tenure. However, the Agreement says nothing about modifying his tenure rights or creating some sort of hybrid form of employment; it says quite plainly that he would “forfeit” his tenure. Plaintiffs Ex. 1. We agree with the University that Spark’s interpretation renders meaningless the tenure forfeiture provision. The University argues, and we agree, that the provisions regarding tenure and the zero tolerance policy can be harmonized by interpreting the Agreement to mean that Sparks had a year-to-year contract with the University and could also be fired during the academic year for violation of the zero tolerance policy.

Even if we were to find that the Agreement is ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence supports the University’s interpretation of the Agreement. First, the University Manual states:

Tenured faculty receive a letter of agreement indicating salary adjustments annually. Contracts are issued annually to non-tenured persons.
Contracts for faculty not having been awarded tenure are only for the time specified in each of said contracts. Until tenure is granted, faculty shall have no expectation of continued employment after the duration of the contract, as the University expressly retains its right not to renew the contract.
Non-tenure appointments for faculty who are in tenure-track positions but who have not been awarded tenure will be employed for one year at a time and their employment will not exceed five years.
The employment of a non-tenured faculty person shall be terminated by the University before the expiration date of the person’s written contract only for reason of incompetence, serious personal or professional misconduct, or insubordination by the faculty person. This termination of a non-tenured faculty person is to be distinguished from the non-renewal of the non-tenured faculty person’s contract, as non-tenured faculty persons are to have no expectation of continued employment after the expiration of each one-year contract.

Appellant’s App. at 105-07.

The University Manual clearly supports the University’s interpretation of the Agreement. Pursuant to the University Manual, Sparks, as a non-tenured employee, was on a year-to-year contract, and the University had the right to determine whether or not to renew the contract. He had no expectation of continued employment after the expiration of each one-year contract. The parties’ course of dealings indicates that they were following the policies set out in the University Manual. For the 2004-2005 academic year, Sparks was offered a one-year contract, which he signed. There is no indication that he objected to receiving a contract for a specific term or expressed at that time a belief that he had been guaranteed continued employment. The contract states that Sparks’s employment “may be terminated by the University before the expiration date of this contract for reasons of incompetence, serious personal or professional misconduct, or insubordination by the Employee.” Id. This language tracks language in the University Manual regarding non-tenured employees.

Sparks relies on Dowden’s deposition, in which he testified as follows:

Q Back to that third paragraph again in the [Agreement]. It says, “There will be a zero tolerance for the duration of your employment.” What did Vincennes mean by the duration of your employment?
A Well, at the time we anticipated — I can’t speak for anyone else — it was my expectation that if the Board would accept these conditions, and we did not know initially whether they would, but they did, and if Mr. Sparks would find himself able to live within these, that his employment there could have gone on indefinitely.

Appellant’s App. at 303-04. In White’s deposition, she was asked if she agreed with this statement from Dowden, and she indicated that she did.

Dowden’s statement that Sparks’s employment could have gone on indefinitely is not inconsistent with the University’s interpretation of the Agreement: the University could have continued renewing his contract, but it was not required to. To the extent that this statement expresses a hope or expectation that Sparks’s employment would in fact continue indefinitely, Sparks fails to explain how Dowden’s personal hopes could be binding on the University.

At several points in his deposition and affidavit, Sparks claimed that Dowden made statements that led him to believe that he would not be treated like a nontenured employee. See Appellant’s App. at 48(in his affidavit, Sparks stated that Dowden and White told him “that this discipline was all that I would receive, and that the situation was over as far as the University was concerned”); id. at 135(in his deposition, Sparks says that Dowden told him, “This is all behind us. If you agree to this, this time next year, it will all be forgotten.”); id. at 162 (again in his deposition, Sparks says, “In the meeting •with Dale Dowden, it was explained to me that if I didn’t break the zero tolerance, it would all be forgotten and everything would be moving forward.”). However, when he was questioned further about this claim, he testified as follows:

Q So why did you choose to accept the school’s conditions for remaining at the University?
A We had been there for 25 years. We did not have anything in our files pertaining to anything we had ever done wrong, only letters of support about things that we had done good [sic]. And in the meeting, Dale Dowden expressed that, you know, we would get the zero tolerance, and this time next year it would all be forgotten and we would move forward.
Q But you understood that — at that point, that when the next year came around, you wouldn’t have tenure?
A Right.
Q So at that point, without tenure—
A He told us in that meeting that we could reapply for tenure.
Q My question is, after — as you left that meeting, you knew that if you accepted the agreement, you wouldn’t have tenure for that following year; right?
A Right.
Q So at that point you would — you knew, again, if you accepted it, that you would be without any job protections to keep your job for further years?
A Right.
Q And that the University could dismiss you for any reason or no reason at all at the completion of your one-year contract?
A Right.

Id. at 138-39.

This testimony clearly demonstrates that Sparks understood that giving up his tenure meant giving up his job security. To the extent that isolated portions of his deposition and affidavit contradict this testimony, this contradictory testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Sparks cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting himself. See Crawfordsville Square, LLC v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 906 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (a party cannot “generat[e] its own genuine issue of material fact by providing self-serving contradictory statements without explanation”; if such practice were allowed, it would “greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact”), trans. denied.

In sum, we conclude that the Agreement unambiguously stripped Sparks of his job protections, and the University therefore was not obligated to continue renewing his contract. However, even if the Agreement were considered ambiguous, the designated evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact, and that evidence supports the University’s interpretation rather than Sparks’s. Therefore, we conclude that summary judgment should have been granted for the University. We reverse the verdict.

Reversed.

MAY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.

      . We heard oral argument in this case on March 26, 2013, at Valparaiso University Law School. We would like to thank the students, staff, faculty, and administration of the school for their hospitality, and we commend counsel for the quality of their written and oral advocacy.

      . It appears that this may have happened with more than one basketball recruit, but the designated evidence and evidence at trial focused on Student A’s application.

      . Summitt's testimony appears to indicate that this was pursuant to the University’s general employment policies, rather than something that was specific to Sparks:
      THE COURT [asking a question from a juror]: Mrs. Summitt, as an HR person at Vincennes University could you explain, if you can, how benefits would be [a]ffected comparing a terminated employee versus a retired employee?
      [SUMMITT]: I'll try. It’s been a while since I’ve been in that position. A terminated employee, if he was eligible for retirement, would be allow[ed] to take retirement with benefits if he or she qualified. And there was a policy that you ... had to have at least 20 years of experience to have benefits. And if you were going to retire you also had to have the equivalent of ... 85, meaning years of service and age had to add up to 85. If an employee was terminated for what was considered a grievance decision there may not be any benefits allowed.

        Tr. at 288.

      . In support of its argument that the term "tenure” is well-defined, the University also cites several cases interpreting Indiana’s Teacher Tenure Act. See Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of the City of Indianapolis v. Walpole, 801 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Ind.2004) (permanent teachers had "a property interest in their jobs” and termination “must comport with due process requirements”); Aplin v. Porter Sch. Twp. of Porter Cnty., 413 N.E.2d 999, 1003 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (a permanent teacher’s employment could be terminated for the reasons listed in the Teacher Tenure Act and pursuant to the procedures outlined by the Act); N. Miami Educ. Ass’n v. N. Miami Cmty. Sch., 736 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (a nonpermanent teacher had "no contractual right to continued employment”), clarified on reh'g on other grounds, trans. denied (2001). The University acknowledges that the Teacher Tenure Act does not apply to public universities, but argues that it is illustrative of the common understanding of the meaning of "tenure.” Because these cases are interpreting a highly specific statutory scheme that is not applicable to this case, we find them to have little persuasive value.