text:
    Michelle PICKENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AAHMES TEMPLE #132, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.
    NO. 5-17-0226
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.
    Rule 23 Order Filed: May 10, 2018 Motion to Publish Granted: May 18, 2018 Opinion Filed: May 18, 2018
    Dedra M. Moore, of East St. Louis, for appellant.
    Michelle M. Rich, Kristina D. Cooksey, and Thomas C. Rich, of Fairview Heights, for appellee.
   JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Michelle Pickens, filed a complaint against the defendant, Aahmes Temple # 13, LLC, alleging that she suffered injuries due to the defendant's negligence when she slipped and fell at the defendant's facility. When the defendant failed to file an appearance or an answer, the circuit court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding the plaintiff $42,837.63 in damages. Nine months later, the defendant filed a motion to quash service and set aside the default judgment, arguing that the default judgment was void because the plaintiff never served it with process. The circuit court denied the motion, and the defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The defendant is an Illinois limited liability company that operates a nightclub facility in East St. Louis, Illinois, at which its members and guests socialize at various functions. On May 21, 2015, the plaintiff filed a one-count complaint against the defendant alleging that she sustained injuries at the defendant's facility because of the defendant's negligence when she slipped on a substance on the floor. At the time the plaintiff filed her lawsuit, the defendant's articles of organization filed with the Secretary of State designated its registered agent as an individual named "Jesse Gurley" and established the company's registered office at "104 Fletcher St., Collinsville, IL 62234" (registered office).

¶ 4 The plaintiff employed Kenneth Bouas of Bi-State Investigative Services, Inc., to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant's registered agent. Unknown to the plaintiff, her attorney, and Bouas, however, the defendant's registered office was a home in which three individuals named "Jesse Gurley" had lived at various times: Jesse Gurley III, Jesse Gurley IV, and Jesse Gurley V. The defendant intended that its registered agent was to be Gurley IV, but the defendant's designation of its registered agent did not include a suffix to distinguish which of the Jesse Gurleys located at its registered office was its registered agent.

¶ 5 Gurley III is Gurley IV's father, had lived at the location of the defendant's registered office for over 30 years, and had no affiliation with the defendant. Gurley V is Gurley IV's son and also lived at the location of the defendant's registered office but had no association with the defendant. In addition, at the time the plaintiff filed her complaint, Gurley IV no longer resided or conducted any business on behalf of the defendant at the defendant's registered office.

¶ 6 On July 24, 2015, Bouas filed a "process service affidavit" in which he certified that, on June 8, 2015, he served the summons and complaint on a "Jesse Gurley" at the defendant's registered office. He identified the "Jesse Gurley" he served as being a black male approximately 65 years old. Bouas's affidavit included a line for identifying the name of the person to be served that stated, "Aahmes Temple # 132, LLC a Corp. care of Jesse Gurley." The affidavit form provided check boxes for "service type" that included, among other options, a check box for "personal" service and a check box for "corporation" service. Bouas mistakenly checked the box next to "personal" as the service type he completed.

¶ 7 According to Bouas, when he served the summons and complaint, he knocked on the door of a residence that was located at the address of the defendant's registered office and a person answered the door. Bouas asked for "Jesse Gurley," and the person answering the door said, "I'm Jesse Gurley." Bouas identified himself as a process sever and told the person answering the door that he had a summons from the St. Clair County court. He read the caption of the complaint and stated that the papers were for "registered agent, Jesse Gurley."

¶ 8 According to Bouas, the person who answered the door and identified himself as Jesse Gurley, accepted the service of the summons and complaint, and did not indicate that he was the incorrect person or that he did not understand what was presented to him. The person who accepted the service of process was Gurley III.

¶ 9 No one entered an appearance or answered the complaint on behalf of the defendant after Bouas served the summons on Gurley III. On September 1, 2015, the plaintiff sent a certified letter addressed to "Jesse Gurley" at the address of the defendant's registered office. The purpose of this letter was to advise the defendant, through its registered agent, that more than 30 days had elapsed since the service of the summons and complaint and that no one had entered an appearance or answered the complaint on behalf of the defendant. The letter included a file-stamped copy of the complaint and Bouas's affidavit of service of the complaint and summons. Gurley III received and signed for this letter on September 5, 2015. Again, no one took action on behalf of the defendant after Gurley III signed for this letter.

¶ 10 On December 14, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment. The plaintiff also sent a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on the motion by certified mail to the defendant c/o "Jesse Gurley" at the registered office. The letter included another copy of the complaint as well as the plaintiff's medical bills that she intended to present as part of her proof of damages. The record indicates that the person who signed for this certified mail signed the receipt as "Jesse Gurley" with an illegible suffix that could be III or IV. According to Gurley IV, the signature is not his. In addition, he did not recognize the signature but believed that Gurley III signed for the letter but never gave it to him. Gurley III, however, stated that the signature was not his and denied signing for this letter.

¶ 11 On January 12, 2016, the plaintiff sent another certified letter to the defendant c/o "Jesse Gurley" at the registered office, again attempting to notify the defendant of the complaint and proof of service and that she would be seeking a default judgment on January 19, 2016. The letter included exhibits that the plaintiff stated she would present at the hearing. Gurley III signed for this letter on January 14, 2016. Again, no one appeared or answered the complaint on behalf of the defendant.

¶ 12 On January 19, 2016, the plaintiff appeared in court for a hearing on her motion for a default judgment. The defendant failed to appear. The circuit court entered an order granting the plaintiff's motion for a default judgment on the issue of liability. On January 27, 2016, the plaintiff attempted to send a copy of the default order to the defendant by certified mail addressed to the defendant c/o "Jesse Gurley" at the address of the defendant's registered office. The letter included notice that the plaintiff intended to appear in court on March 15, 2016, to establish her damages. Gurley IV's mother, Earline, who also lived at the address, signed for the certified letter on January 30, 2016. Again, no one appeared on behalf of the defendant.

¶ 13 On March 18, 2016, the defendant filed a statement with the Secretary of State to indicate a change of its registered agent. In this document, the defendant designated Suskin Lockett as its registered agent, rather than Jesse Gurley, and listed a new address for its registered office.

¶ 14 On March 23, 2016, the plaintiff sent a letter to the clerk of the circuit court with a proposed order concerning the default judgment and sent a copy of the letter and proposed order to the defendant c/o Jesse Gurley at the defendant's previous registered office (Gurley III's home). Earline signed for this letter. On April 1, 2016, the plaintiff appeared in court to prove her damages. The circuit court entered a default judgment against the defendant, awarding her $42,837.63 in damages.

¶ 15 On July 25, 2016, the plaintiff filed a citation to discover assets. On September 27, 2016, Bouas attempted to serve the citation to discover assets on the defendant c/o "Jesse Gurley" at Gurley III's home. This time Earline spoke with Bouas and informed him that the Jesse Gurley he needed to speak to was Gurley IV who had moved to Shiloh, Illinois.

¶ 16 On October 1, 2016, Bouas served the citation to discover assets on Gurley IV at 2740 Lake Lauren Drive, Shiloh, Illinois. In his affidavit, Bouas attested that he served "Jesse Gurley," a black male with an approximate age of 45. With respect to the type of service, Bouas checked the boxes for personal and corporation. Once served with these documents, Gurley IV gave the documents to a person who was affiliated with the defendant. The defendant then retained counsel and, on October 17, 2016, it filed a motion to quash service and to set aside the default judgment. This motion is the subject matter of the present appeal.

¶ 17 In its motion to quash, the defendant alleged that the circuit court's January 19, 2016, default order was void due to a lack of proper service. The defendant filed Gurley IV's affidavit in support of the motion. In his affidavit, Gurley IV stated that he resided in Shiloh, Illinois, that he was the former registered agent for the defendant, and that he was never served with the summons and complaint in the lawsuit.

¶ 18 On November 1, 2016, the parties appeared in court on the motion to quash, and the circuit court granted the parties "limited discovery regarding agency and service." The parties then took the depositions of Gurley III, Gurley IV, Earline Gurley, and Bouas. The defendant filed the transcripts of these discovery depositions in support of its request to quash service and set aside the default judgment.

¶ 19 Gurley IV testified in his deposition that he had previously lived at the address of the defendant's registered office for approximately 22 years but moved from that address to a new address in Belleville sometime in 2012. Prior to moving, he lived at the location of the defendant's registered office with his parents, Gurley III and Earline, as well as his ex-wife, two daughters, and son, Gurley V, who was born in July of 1995. When he left that address in 2012, his parents, ex-wife, two daughters, and son continued to reside at the address. He explained that his great-grandfather and grandfather, Jesse Gurley and Jesse Gurley II, had passed away prior to February 2015.

¶ 20 At the time of the deposition, Gurley IV lived in Shiloh, Illinois. He testified that when he lived at the location of the defendant's registered office he often received mail addressed to "Jesse Gurley" and had to open the mail to determine which Jesse Gurley was the intended recipient of the mail. He testified that his father and his son were never associated with the defendant as a member, director, or agent. He was the only person who had resided at the defendant's registered office who had been associated with the defendant in any capacity.

¶ 21 Gurley IV testified that he became associated with the defendant as a member in 2010 or 2011, that he became a member of its board in 2011 or 2012, and that he served in that capacity for approximately one year. As a board member, his responsibilities were fundraising events for the club. He did not file any of the defendant's paperwork with the Secretary of State and did not know who was responsible for the filings. When he moved from the defendant's registered office in 2012, he did not inform the defendant that he had changed his address. He explained that, after 2013, he was no longer a member of or affiliated with the defendant. He said that the defendant suspended his membership privileges in 2014 because he quit paying his dues.

¶ 22 Gurley IV stated that he was not aware that he was the registered agent for the defendant and did not know who filed the paperwork that designated him as the registered agent. He testified that, had anyone asked him if he would serve as the defendant's registered agent, he would have said no. He testified that he first learned that he had been designated as the defendant's registered agent when he was served with citation to discover assets in October 2016 after he had moved to Shiloh. He testified that he never received the summons and complaint or any of the certified letters that Gurley III and Earline signed for. He stated that neither he nor the defendant ever gave Gurley III or Earline authority to accept service on behalf of the defendant.

¶ 23 Gurley III testified during his deposition that he had resided at the location of the defendant's registered office for 30 years and that he was not the defendant's registered agent. He recalled Bouas serving him "papers" associated with the plaintiff's lawsuit. He testified that the process server told him that he had papers for Jesse Gurley and that he had to "sign for it or receive it." According to Gurley III, the process server never said that he was looking to serve "Jesse Gurley as a registered agent of Aahmes Temple in Pickens versus Aahmes Temple." Gurley III stated that he did not have "any conversation with a process server or anybody about the specifics involved" in the case "other than just mail being delivered to my house for either me or my son." He claimed that he did not know what he was accepting and that the process server did not ask him if he was the registered agent of the defendant. He agreed that his son never told him that he could accept anything on behalf of the defendant.

¶ 24 Gurley III explained that Gurley IV lived at the address of the defendant's registered office from 1984 through 2012 and that it was a common occurrence for deliveries, packages, or mail intended for him, his son, or his grandson to be received by an unintended family member with the same name. He testified that he always either gave his son his mail or put it in a pile for him to pick up later and that he instructed all household members to do the same.

¶ 25 Gurley III recalled giving paperwork regarding the plaintiff's lawsuit to Gurley IV. He testified that he believed that he had the authority to accept deliveries on behalf of his son and that it was common practice for him to do so at the address. After being shown documents that the defendant filed with the Secretary of State, he agreed that the documents did not contain anything that would distinguish which "Jesse Gurley" located at the defendant's registered office was the defendant's registered agent. With respect to accepting the service of the summons and complaint on June 8, 2015, the following exchange took place during his deposition:

"Q. Do you recall that happening back in June of 2015, a process server coming to you and giving you a paper that looks like what's indentified in-
A. I don't know-remember the exact date-but I know received paperwork similar to that that I probably signed for, because I knew my son was involved in the group at one time, and that's my address. Anything that comes to my house that's got a name Jesse Gurley, I'm interested in it.
Q. And you're going to accept that?
A. Yes, if it has my name on it, and it's a possibility it could be something that I need to follow up on or do something about.
Q. And even if it's for your son, you're going to accept it; correct?
A. It-
Q. And do you have the authority to accept deliveries, packages, mail on behalf of your son?
A. Well, I-you answer-when you say authority, I feel I do, because it's my house and my name on there. If it's not mine, they shouldn't be delivering it to me or asking me to sign or look at it. So-
Q. And when you pass mail on to your son, he understands that you've accepted that on his behalf, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And he's never told you not to do that; correct?
A. No."

¶ 26 Earline Gurley testified during her deposition that she had lived at the address for over 30 years and that it was a common occurrence that she received mail intended for Gurley IV at her home. She explained that she would give her son his mail and he would thank her. She stated that she had authority to sign for mail that was delivered to her home for Gurley III or Gurley IV, that she put all mail for Gurley IV in a pile for him, that he picked up his mail multiple times in 2015, and that she believed that he picked up all of the documents related to the plaintiff's lawsuit that were delivered to her home. According to Earline, Gurley IV never told her that she could not accept paperwork on his behalf. Earline agreed that nothing in the defendant's paperwork filed with the Secretary of State would distinguish which "Jesse Gurley" at the defendant's registered office was the defendant's registered agent.

¶ 27 Bouas testified at his deposition that he served the summons and complaint to an individual named Jesse Gurley at the address of the defendant's registered office on June 8, 2015. He testified:

"I knocked on the door, he answered the door. I asked for Jesse Gurley. He said, 'I'm Jesse Gurley.' At that time I said, 'I'm a process server,' identified myself, said I had a summons from St. Clair County Court, and then I read the Michelle Pickens versus Aahmes Temple, LLC, and it was paper for registered agent, Jesse Gurley."

¶ 28 Bouas testified that he did not ask the Jesse Gurley who answered the door whether he was the defendant's registered agent. He stated that his standard practice was to "read the plaintiff, defendant and then who it's being served to." He did not remember the person who he served "saying very much at all, other than he was Jesse Gurley."

¶ 29 Bouas testified during his deposition that when he went to the defendant's registered office to serve the citation to discover assets, he spoke with Earline and asked for Jesse Gurley. Earline responded, "Jesse Gurley my son?" and Bouas replied, "Jesse Gurley, whoever the registered agent is for [the defendant]." Earline informed him that he did not live at that address anymore, and she gave him Gurley IV's address in Shiloh. Bouas then began attempts to serve Gurley IV in Shiloh, serving him with the citation to discover assets on October 1, 2016.

¶ 30 On March 7, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion to quash service and set aside the default judgment. After arguments from counsel, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion. The court reasoned that the defendant "named Jesse Gurley, no other specifics" as its registered agent and that the defendant was "asking for relief from something that they could have avoided in many ways." The court entered a written order as follows: "Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Quash Service heard and denied." On April 6, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied on April 19, 2017. This appeal ensued.

¶ 31 ANALYSIS

¶ 32 The defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to quash service and set aside the default judgment because service of the complaint and summons was invalid. It argues that because the plaintiff did not properly serve it with the summons and complaint, the circuit court's default judgment is void.

¶ 33 Initially, we note that the defendant's motion did not cite the section of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) under which it brings its motion. Section 2-1401 of the Code allows parties to undo or avoid final judgments more than 30 days after the judgment is entered. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014). In Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education , 201 Ill. 2d 95, 102, 267 Ill.Dec. 58, 776 N.E.2d 195 (2002), the supreme court held that a pleading that challenges a void judgment based on invalid service is, in substance, a section 2-1401 motion. Accordingly, in the present case, we will treat the defendant's motion to quash service and set aside the default judgment as a section 2-1401 petition. We review an order denying a section 2-1401 petition under the de novo standard of review. People v. Vincent , 226 Ill. 2d 1, 18, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007).

¶ 34 Also, with respect to the standard of review, we note that the circuit court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion. It decided the issue based on pleadings, affidavits, deposition transcripts attached to pleadings, and arguments from counsel. Where a trial court holds no evidentiary hearing and bases its decision on documentary evidence, our review is de novo . Bank of New York Mellon v. Karbowski , 2014 IL App (1st) 130112, ¶ 10, 382 Ill.Dec. 513, 12 N.E.3d 792.

¶ 35 The issue raised in the defendant's motion was whether the plaintiff properly served the defendant with the summons and complaint. Service of process "is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant." Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. , 526 U.S. 344, 350, 119 S.Ct. 1322, 143 L.Ed.2d 448 (1999). It serves the dual purposes of protecting a defendant's right to due process by allowing proper notification and an opportunity to be heard ( In re Dar. C. , 2011 IL 111083, ¶ 61, 354 Ill.Dec. 304, 957 N.E.2d 898 ) and "vests jurisdiction in the court over the person whose rights are to be affected by the litigation" ( Equity Residential Properties Management Corp. v. Nasolo , 364 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31, 301 Ill.Dec. 467, 847 N.E.2d 126 (2006) ).

¶ 36 In absence of service of process or a waiver of service by the defendant, a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party. Id. A judgment entered by a circuit court without jurisdiction over the parties is void and may be challenged at any time. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell , 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 17, 379 Ill.Dec. 85, 6 N.E.3d 162.

¶ 37 In the present case, both parties incorrectly focus on section 2-204 of the Code, which provides that "[a] private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent of the corporation found anywhere in the State ; or (2) in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law." (Emphases added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-204 (West 2014). The defendant is not a private corporation; it is an Illinois limited liability company. Service on a limited liability company is governed by section 1-50 of the Limited Liability Company Act. 805 ILCS 180/1-50 (West 2014) ; John Isfan Construction, Inc. v. Longwood Towers, LLC , 2016 IL App (1st) 143211, ¶ 38, 402 Ill.Dec. 589, 52 N.E.3d 510.

¶ 38 Under section 1-50 of the Limited Liability Company Act, a plaintiff can serve process upon a limited liability company only by serving "the registered agent appointed by the limited liability company or upon the Secretary of State." 805 ILCS 180/1-50(a) (West 2014). Specifically, the statute provides in relevant part as follows:

"§ 1-50. Service of process on limited liability company.
(a) Any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served upon either a limited liability company or foreign limited liability company shall be served either upon the registered agent appointed by the limited liability company or upon the Secretary of State as provided in this Section.
(b) The Secretary of State shall be irrevocably appointed as an agent of a limited liability company upon whom any process, notice, or demand may be served under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Whenever the limited liability company shall fail to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this State.
(2) Whenever the limited liability company's registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered office in this State or at the principal place of business stated in the articles of organization."Id. § 1-50(a), (b)(1), (b)(2).

¶ 39 While section 2-204 of the Code allows private corporations to be served by service upon any "agent" of the corporation found anywhere in the state, section 1-50 of the Limited Liability Company Act is more limited. It allows service only "upon the registered agent appointed by the limited liability company or upon the Secretary of State." Id. § 1-50(a). Therefore, in the present case, in order to find the plaintiff's service to be proper under the statute, we must find that Gurley III was "the registered agent appointed by the limited liability company." We believe that, because of the defendant's filings with the Secretary of State, Gurley III was authorized by the defendant to accept service of process on behalf of the defendant under the plain language of the Limited Liability Company Act.

¶ 40 Section 1-35 of the Limited Liability Company Act provides that each limited liability company "shall continuously maintain in this State a registered agent and registered office, which agent must be an individual resident of this State or other person authorized to transact business in this State." Id. § 1-35(a). The company's articles of organization must set forth the name of the company's registered agent and the address of its registered office, and the articles of organization must be filed with the Secretary of State. Id. § 5-5(a)(3), (b).

¶ 41 In the present case, as noted above, the defendant's articles of organization set forth "Jesse Gurley" as its registered agent and set forth Gurley III's home address as its registered office. Although Gurley IV testified that the defendant intended to name him as its registered agent, not Gurley III, the defendant's articles of organization failed to make such a distinction. The process server relied on the defendant's representations to effect service of process on the company, and the process server complied with the defendant's express representations with respect to both the exact name and location of its registered agent. Service on a person bearing the exact name as the company's registered agent and located at the exact address of the company's registered office is service that is calculated to give the defendant fair notice of the pending lawsuit. Based on the statutory scheme outlined above, we believe that the legislature intended for such service to be effective under section 1-50 of the Limited Liability Company Act.

¶ 42 Had the defendant identified its registered agent as Jesse Gurley IV or had the process server served Gurley III at a location other than the defendant's registered office, our conclusion might be different. Here, however, the process server delivered the summons according to the defendant's directions. If the defendant's statutory obligation to establish its registered agent and registered office is to have any meaning, then service on a person having the exact name as the defendant's registered agent and located at the exact address of the defendant's registered office has to be effective service. The defendant had absolute control concerning the identification and location of its registered agent; it cannot now escape the consequences of the manner in which the summons was delivered when it was delivered in accordance with its own manifestations of agency.

¶ 43 Because the plaintiff's service of process complied with the requirements of section 1-50 of the Limited Liability Company Act, the circuit court correctly denied the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment and quash service.

¶ 44 CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.

Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      There appears to be a dispute among the courts concerning which party has the burden of proof when the defendant disputes the agency of the person served. Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc. , 2016 IL App (1st) 151876, ¶ 23, 404 Ill.Dec. 897, 57 N.E.3d 656, rev'd on other grounds , 2017 IL 121281, 418 Ill.Dec. 282, 90 N.E.3d 440. Some courts have held that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the presence of the agency relationship, and some courts have held that the defendant has the burden of proving that the person served was not an agent for purposes of accepting service. Id. Here, we need not determine which party had the burden of proof because our decision on review would be the same regardless of which party had the burden of proof in the proceedings below.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    David W. COOKE, Petitioner, v. The ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; Charles W. Scholz, in His Official Capacity as Chairman; Ernest L. Gowen, in His Official Capacity as Vice Chairman ; William M. McGuffage, in His Official Capacity as Member; Andrew K. Carruthers, in His Official Capacity as Member; William J. Cadigan, in His Official Capacity as Member; Betty J. Coffrin, in Her Official Capacity as Member; Casandra B. Watson, in Her Official Capacity as Member; Committee for Frank J. Mautino; and Philip M. Krasny, Hearing Officer, Respondents.
    NO. 4-17-0470
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
    Filed May 22, 2018
    Jeffrey M. Schwab, Jacob H. Huebert, and James J. McQuaid, of Liberty Justice Center, of Chicago, for petitioner.
    J. William Roberts, Sergio E. Acosta, Anthony J. Jacob, Adam R. Vaught, and Carson R. Griffis, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for respondent Committee for Frank J. Mautino.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Aaron T. Dozeman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other respondents.
   JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 David W. Cooke seeks direct review of a decision of the Illinois State Board of Elections (Board) concerning his complaint against the Committee for Frank J. Mautino (Committee). Cooke argues we should remand the matter for the Board to address and issue rulings on the merits of those claims which it failed to address. Alternatively, Cooke argues, to the extent the Board did in fact issue rulings on all of his claims, we should find any rulings against him to be clearly erroneous based on the evidence presented. We remand with directions.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Cooke's Pro Se Complaint

¶ 4 In February 2016, Cooke, an Illinois resident, filed a pro se complaint with the Board, alleging the Committee committed various violations of article 9 of the Election Code ( 10 ILCS 5/9-1 to 9-45 (West 2014) ) based on its reported expenditures to Happy's Super Service Station (Happy's) and Spring Valley City Bank (Bank) between 1999 and 2015. Specifically, Cooke alleged the Committee violated (1) section 9-7(1) of the Election Code (id. § 9-7(1) ), which requires a treasurer of a political committee to keep a detailed and exact account of a committee's expenditures and (2) section 9-8.10(a)(2) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(a)(2) ), which prohibits a political committee from making expenditures in excess of the fair market value of the services, materials, facilities, or other things of value received in exchange.

¶ 5 As to the nature of the alleged violations, Cooke asserted, citing the Committee's public reports detailing the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank, (1) "[a] majority of the expenses are recorded in whole dollar amounts, which strains reason to believe these expenses are for actual services rendered"; (2) "[a]n invoice almost never rounds to whole numbers, especially when repairs and fuel expenses are paid"; (3) "[i]t is apparent the [B]ank could not be providing the services for which the expenses were paid"; (4) "extremely high amounts of expenses were allocated to [Happy's], * * * total[ing] over $200,000 in just over a ten year period"; (5) "[n]o reasonable person would spend this type of money on fuel and expenses in this time period, especially when normal legislative travel expenses are reimbursed from the state"; (6) "[i]dentical expenses were reported for exactly $1500 dollars for a camp vehicle repair in a short amount of time and other high amounts for this vehicle as well"; (7) "[t]he rounding of numbers for expense records leads to a legitimate question of whether actual expenses are inflated above fair market value in order compensate friends of the Committee"; (8) "[t]he expenses to the [Bank] are almost entirely whole numbers and leave to [sic ] trail of the expenses once the cash had been withdrawn from the account"; and (9) "[t]he amount of expenses expended for gasoline[ ] are highly questionable due to extremely high individual amounts and rounding of numbers." Cooke attached to his complaint copies of the public reports detailing the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank.

¶ 6 B. Closed Preliminary Hearing

¶ 7 On March 1, 2016, a hearing officer, who had been appointed by the Board, held a closed preliminary hearing for the purpose of making a recommendation to the Board as to whether Cooke's complaint was filed on justifiable grounds. Cooke appeared pro se , and the Committee appeared through counsel.

¶ 8 The Committee initially noted it would be filing a written motion to dismiss Cooke's complaint on the grounds the (1) Board lacked jurisdiction because the Committee was dissolved after Frank J. Mautino became the Illinois Auditor General on January 1, 2016, and (2) complaint was insufficient because it failed to identify the nature of the offense. Cooke responded to the Committee's argument. The hearing officer indicated he would consider the motion to dismiss in making his recommendation and forward any written motion and response to the Board.

¶ 9 The hearing officer allowed Cooke to present evidence and argument on his complaint to determine if it was filed on justifiable grounds. Cooke submitted copies of the Committee's public reports detailing the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank, which the hearing officer admitted into evidence. Based on those reports, Cooke argued, in addition to the alleged violations of sections 9-7(1) and 9-8.10(a)(2), the Committee violated section 9-8.10(a)(9) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(a)(9) ), which (1) permits a political committee to purchase or lease a motor vehicle and maintain and repair that vehicle if the vehicle is used primarily for campaign purposes or for the performance of governmental duties and (2) provides individuals using privately owned vehicles may be reimbursed for actual mileage for using their vehicle for campaign purposes or for the performance of governmental duties. Specifically, Cooke argued, based on the reports detailing the expenditures to Happy's, he was unable to determine whether the gas and repair expenses were for vehicles owned by the Committee and that determination would affect whether the gas and repairs were properly expensed. The Committee noted an alleged violation of section 9-8.10(a)(9) was not raised in the complaint, and the evidence provided did not support any such violation.

¶ 10 C. Committee's Motion to Strike and Dismiss Cooke's Complaint

¶ 11 On March 31, 2016, the Committee filed a motion to strike and dismiss Cooke's complaint, asserting (1) the Board lacked jurisdiction over the Committee as a result of its dissolution and (2) "each of the allegations contained in the [c]omplaint fails to state an offense or violation upon justifiable grounds." As the second basis for dismissal, the Committee argued, (1) "[n]owhere in the [c]omplaint, even after reviewing [the nature of the alleged violations] and the attachments and exhibits to the [c]omplaint, does [Cooke] allege, suggest[,] or provide proof that [it] has violated the part of [s]ection 9-7 cited in the [c]omplaint" and (2) "[n]owhere in the evidence or in the [c]omplaint does [Cooke] provide what is fair market value for services and other things of value to determine if there is an excess of fair market value."

¶ 12 D. Cooke's Response to the Committee's Motion to Strike and Dismiss His Complaint

¶ 13 On April 5, 2016, Cooke filed a pro se response to the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss his complaint. In summarizing his complaint, Cooke contended, citing section 9-7, the Committee's public reports detailing the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank lacked the requisite "detail in the particulars." Cooke also asserted, based on those reports, (1) questions existed as to the propriety of the expenditures for gas and repairs to Happy's under section 9-8.10(a)(9) and (2) it was "impossible" to determine if the (a) amounts expensed to the Bank "exceeded fair market value for the services or good provided" under section 9-8.10(a)(2) and (b) Committee followed the requirement of section 9-11(a) of the Election Code (id. § 9-11(a) ) to report expenditures to any individual which exceeds $150. In responding to the Committee's arguments, Cooke maintained (1) the Board had jurisdiction and (2) his complaint sufficiently identified issues with the recording of expenses to Happy's and the Bank.

¶ 14 E. Committee's Reply to Cooke's Response to Its Motion to Strike and Dismiss Cooke's Complaint

¶ 15 On April 11, 2016, the Committee filed a reply to Cooke's response to its motion to strike and dismiss Cooke's complaint. The Committee argued Cooke could not use his response to amend the allegations in his complaint and his attempt to use his response to amend his complaint demonstrated the complaint was insufficient as a matter of law.

¶ 16 F. Hearing Officer's Recommendation

¶ 17 On April 29, 2016, the hearing officer issued a written recommendation. In reviewing the complaint, he noted (1) Cooke alleged the "Committee violated [s]ection[s] 9-7 and 9-8.10" and (2) "the documentation, amount[,] and accuracy of reported expenditures to [the Bank] and [Happy's] are questioned." In reviewing the events of the closed preliminary hearing, the hearing officer noted Cooke asserted the public reports "lack specificity," and he "question[ed] the propriety of expenditures related to the automobiles for gas and/or repairs." The hearing officer then listed various discrepancies in the public reports concerning the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank.

¶ 18 The hearing officer reviewed the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss Cooke's complaint, Cooke's response, and the Committee's reply. He noted Cooke's response raised alleged violations of section 9-11(a). The hearing officer rejected the Committee's jurisdictional argument. As to the sufficiency of Cooke's complaint, the hearing officer noted "[t]he two specific sections alleged to be violated are [s]ection 9-7 (treasurer keeping certain records) and [s]ection 9-8.10[ (a) ](2) (making expenditures in excess of fair market value)." The hearing officer found Cooke entered sufficient evidence to support his allegations. He also found the Committee, based on Cooke's attachment of the public reports detailing the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank to his complaint, "was aware that the propriety of those expenditures was at issue." The hearing officer recommended the Board deny the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss Cooke's complaint.

¶ 19 As to whether Cooke's complaint was filed on justifiable grounds, the hearing officer found the public reports detailing the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank "lack[ed] sufficient detail to determine if the breakdown is accurate." The hearing officer also found Cooke had shown it was "arguabl[e]" as to whether the public reports complied with section 9-11(a). He noted:

"A cursory review of the [public reports] disclose[d], at a minimum, lack of detail as to the ultimate beneficiary of expenditures to [the Bank] and an insufficient breakdown for repairs, gas, etc., to [Happy's]."

Similarly, the hearing officer found:

"At a minimum, the expenditures to [Happy's] lack[ed] sufficient detail and a breakdown between gas and repairs as to vehicles is required. Furthermore, the report[s] should clarify whether the vehicles are owned and/or leased by [the Committee], or are private vehicles."

As to the public reports concerning the Bank, the hearing officer found: "The expenditures to [the Bank] lack sufficient detail and do not disclose the purpose and/or recipients of numerous disbursements." The hearing officer concluded:

"The purpose of the closed preliminary hearing is to determine if the complaint is filed upon justifiable grounds. [Cooke] has met that standard."

¶ 20 Based on his findings, the hearing officer recommended: (1) the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss the complaint be denied, (2) the Board enter an order finding "[t]he [c]omplaint is filed upon justifiable grounds," and (3) "[t]he matter proceed to a public hearing unless [the Committee] files amended reports with sufficient detail within 60 days * * * as to [e]xpenditures made to [Happy's] and [the Bank]."

¶ 21 G. General Counsel's Recommendation

¶ 22 On May 12, 2016, the Board's general counsel issued a written recommendation. The general counsel concurred with the recommendations of the hearing officer but recommended the Board direct the Committee to amend its public reports to include specific information concerning the expenditures made to Happy's and the Bank. He recommended the Board direct the Committee to amend its public reports to (1) include an accurate breakdown between gas and repair expenditures to Happy's and indicate whether the vehicles involved in each itemized expenditure were either owned or leased by the Committee or privately owned and (2) identify the actual recipient of each itemized expenditure from the Bank and its specific purpose.

¶ 23 H. May 16, 2016, Board Meeting

¶ 24 At a May 16, 2016, meeting, the Board addressed Cooke's complaint. Cooke appeared pro se , and the Committee appeared through counsel. The Board's general counsel provided a brief review of the complaint and the prior proceedings to the Board. He stated, in part, as follows:

"[Cooke] is challenging the propriety and/or lack of specificity as to the reported expenditures, and the relatively obvious poor quality of the reporting on these particular expenditures makes it difficult to draft a more focused complaint. The expenditures to [Happy's] lack sufficient detail breaking down the various payments as being for gas or repairs to particular vehicles and whether those vehicles are owned or leased by the [C]ommittee or are private vehicles. The expenditures to [the Bank] lack sufficient detail as to the specific purposes and ultimate recipients of the disbursements."

¶ 25 The Board allowed Cooke the opportunity to make a statement. Cooke initially discussed the idea of "amending the complaint." He stated, in part, "just amending the complaint doesn't get to how we got to the impropriety that we're at and the inaccurate reporting as it is." Chairman Charles W. Scholz clarified to Cooke the hearing officer's and the general counsel's recommendations related to amending the public reports, as opposed to the complaint, to obtain the requisite disclosure. After Chairman Scholz's clarification, Cooke stated:

"Okay. Then at that point would the-the hearing would continue then once that happened? Or what would-I guess I don't understand. I thought that would be the end of the-if they did that, everyone's happy and the complaint's over with. Maybe I misunderstood the process."

The general counsel indicated he believed the hearing officer was attempting to get the public reports amended to comply with the Election Code and, "[i]n the event that [the Committee] can't do that in whatever time frame it is that the Board would grant, we would then proceed with the public hearing." At another point during the meeting, Cooke noted the Committee's public reports lacked any indication mileage was expensed for campaign workers' private vehicles, and therefore, any expenditures reported for gas had to be for a campaign vehicle, and information concerning whether the Committee owned a campaign vehicle could be found by means other than amending the public reports.

¶ 26 Based on the evidence, argument, and recommendations, the Board denied the Committee's motion to dismiss, found "the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds," and ordered the Committee to file amended reports with the specificity outlined by the general counsel. Chairman Scholz noted "[w]e're going to give a chance for compliance."

¶ 27 I. May 18, 2016, Order

¶ 28 On May 18, 2016, the Board entered a written order. The Board initially noted the complaint alleged the Committee "violated [sections 9-7 and 9-8.10] in that the [Committee] failed to keep a detailed and accurate account of contributions and expenditures and made expenditures in excess of the fair market value." The Board then made the following two findings:

"1. A [m]otion to [s]trike and [d]ismiss was filed by [the Committee] on [March 31, 2016,] asserting that the Board lacks jurisdiction over a committee that has filed a [f]inal report; and
2. In regard to the allegations that the expenditures made to [Happy's] and [the Bank] lack sufficient detail, the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds."

¶ 29 The Board ordered, in part, as follows:

"1. The recommendations of the [h]earing [o]fficer and the [g]eneral [c]ounsel are adopted; and
2. The [m]otion to [s]trike and [d]ismiss the complaint is [denied]; and
3. No later than July 1, 2016, the [Committee] shall file amended reports as follows:
a) In relation to [Happy's] expenditures, the [Committee] shall provide an accurate breakdown between gas and repairs, and indicate whether the vehicles involved in each itemized expenditure are owned or leased by the [C]ommittee, or are privately owned, and
b) In relation to [the Bank] expenditures, the [Committee] shall identify the actual recipient of each itemized expenditure, as well as the specific purpose for each one[;]
4. Failure to amend the reports as specified by the date specified will result in a [p]ublic [h]earing being held."

¶ 30 J. Committee's First Motion to Stay

¶ 31 On June 1, 2016, the Committee filed a motion to stay the proceedings based on an alleged federal investigation into the Committee and its expenditures. Specifically, the Committee argued a stay was warranted "so that Frank J. Mautino * * * will not be forced to have to choose to claim or waive the protection of his Fifth Amendment rights in this Illinois State Board of Elections * * * proceeding where there is a pending, parallel federal criminal investigation and both proceedings involve the same subject matter." The Committee also alleged, "on or about May 18, 2016, it was publically reported that campaign workers for Mautino, while he was a state legislator, have received federal grand jury subpoenas and that a federal investigation is pending."

¶ 32 On June 7, 2016, the Board's general counsel issued a written recommendation. The general counsel initially noted: "At the last meeting, the Board found the [c]omplaint to be filed upon justifiable grounds, and that the matter should proceed to public hearing, unless the Committee files amended reports as to [Happy's] and [the Bank] expenditures within 60 days." Based on the reported federal investigation, the general counsel recommended the Board grant the Committee's motion to stay.

¶ 33 At a June 13, 2016, meeting, the Board addressed the Committee's motion to stay. When reviewing the prior proceedings, the Board's general counsel initially noted "[t]he Board had found the complaint to be filed upon justifiable grounds and that the matter should proceed to public hearing unless the committee filed amended reports as to the two items that were raised in the complaint within 60 days." The general counsel stated the United States Attorney's office had not confirmed the existence of any federal proceedings. The Board continued the matter to July 11, 2016, to allow its general counsel to inquire further into the alleged federal investigation and extended the Committee's deadline to file its amended reports to that same date.

¶ 34 On June 28, 2016, the United States Attorney for the Central District of Illinois issued a letter to the Board's general counsel, which declined to comment on the existence of a federal investigation.

¶ 35 At a July 11, 2016, meeting, the Board, by way of a 5 to 3 vote, denied the Committee's motion to stay. The Board extended the Committee's deadline to file its amended reports to July 25, 2016. The Board's written order provided: "Failure to file [the amended reports] will result in the appointment of a [h]earing [o]fficer and the holding of a timely [p]ublic [h]earing in the matter."

¶ 36 K. July 25, 2016, Deadline to Produce Amended Reports

¶ 37 On July 25, 2016, the Committee did not file amended reports as required by the Board's May 18, 2016, order. Thereafter, the Board appointed a hearing officer to conduct a public hearing.

¶ 38 L. Committee's Second Motion to Stay

¶ 39 On September 6, 2016, the Committee filed a second motion to stay, which was substantially similar to its first motion to stay. On September 12, 2016, the Board's general counsel issued a memorandum, advising a denial of the motion would be consistent with the Board's prior decision.

¶ 40 At a September 19, 2016, meeting, the Board addressed the Committee's second motion to stay. During the hearing, Vice Chairman Ernest L. Gowen noted its last order was for the Committee to file amended reports, which was "a very limited obligation on [the] [c]ommittee, extremely limited." The Board denied the Committee's second motion to stay and ordered "[a] [p]ublic [h]earing be held in this matter as expeditiously as possible." The Committee appealed the denial of its second motion to stay to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.

¶ 41 M. Committee's Appeal

¶ 42 In March 2017, the First District dismissed the Committee's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the Board's ruling on the Committee's motion to stay was not an administrative decision subject to its review. Committee for Frank J. Mautino v. Illinois State Board of Elections , 2017 IL App (1st) 162530-U, ¶ 13, 2017 WL 1052282.

¶ 43 N. Public Hearing

¶ 44 On April 20, 2017, the appointed hearing officer conducted a public hearing. Both Cooke and the Committee appeared with counsel. At the beginning of the hearing, the hearing officer stated the issue subject to the public hearing "ha[d] gotten a little fuzzy as we've gone along." The hearing officer noted the Board had issued an order requiring the Committee to amend its public reports, which the Committee failed to do. The hearing officer found, comparing the situation to that where a party fails to comply with a court's discovery order, the focus of the hearing related to whether the Committee willfully violated the Board's order as opposed to whether the Committee violated the Election Code. Cooke objected, maintaining the purpose of the hearing was also to determine whether the Committee violated the Election Code. The hearing officer acknowledged "the complaint raise[d] other issues, but * * * the [Board's] orders really sort of narrowed everything down to ordering that the amendments be made vis-à-vis those two specific expenditures."

¶ 45 Notwithstanding his finding concerning the scope of the hearing, the hearing officer allowed the parties to present evidence, which included transcripts from a deposition of the Committee's former treasurer, and argument relating to both the Committee's failure to comply with the Board's order and the substantive issues raised in the complaint. The hearing officer also allowed the parties to submit written briefs in support of their respective positions.

¶ 46 In his written brief, Cooke argued the Committee (1) failed to provide an adequate justification for failing to comply with the Board's May 18, 2016, order and requested the Board impose a $5000 fine in accordance with section 9-23 of the Election Code ( 10 ILCS 5/9-23 (West 2014) ); (2) made prohibited expenditures to Happy's in excess of $225,000 for gas and repairs for privately owned vehicles in violation of section 9-8.10(a)(9) and requested the Board impose, at a minimum, a $225,109.19 fine in accordance with section 9-8.10(b) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(b) ); (3) made prohibited expenditures to Happy's in excess of fair market value for gas and repairs for privately owned vehicles in violation of section 9-8.10(a)(2) and requested the Board impose, at a minimum, a $225,109.19 fine in accordance with section 9-8.10(b); (4) made prohibited expenditures to the Bank in excess of fair market value for services the Bank did not provide in violation of section 9-8.10(a)(2) and requested the Board impose, at a minimum, a $159,028 fine in accordance with section 9-8.10(b); and (5) failed to properly record and report every person to whom it made expenditures in violation of sections 9-7(1) and 9-11(a) but did not request the Board impose any fines for such violations. Cooke asserted the Board should rule on the substantive issues because "[a]nother hearing would provide no additional benefit and would only waste resources."

¶ 47 In its written brief, the Committee asserted "[t]he only issue squarely before the Board [was] whether the [Committee] willfully violated the Board's order issued May 18, 2016." In support, the Committee cited the Board's May 18, 2016, order, which it asserted "significantly narrowed the scope of the allegations contained in the [c]omplaint." The Committee argued it had not willfully violated the Board's order and cited several grounds in support of its argument. The Committee responded to Cooke's substantive argument suggesting it made expenditures in excess of fair market value, contending the argument was baseless as Cooke failed to offer any evidence establishing the fair market value of the goods and service purchased or that the Committee's expenditures in fact exceeded fair market value.

¶ 48 O. Hearing Officer's Recommendation

¶ 49 On May 5, 2017, the hearing officer issued a written recommendation. In reviewing the procedural history, the hearing officer noted the prior hearing officer recommended the Board find "the complaint was filed upon justifiable grounds and that 'the matter proceed to a public hearing unless [the Committee] files amended reports with sufficient detail * * * as to [e]xpenditures made to [Happy's] and [the Bank],' " which the Board adopted. As to the pertinent statutes, the hearing officer cited sections 9-7(1), 9-8.10(a)(9), 9-8.10(a)(2), and 9-11(a).

¶ 50 The hearing officer found his assignment "was limited to opining on whether the [Committee] willfully refused to abide by the Board's May 18, 2016[,] order." Based on his analysis of that issue, the hearing officer recommended the Board find the Committee had (1) not willfully violated the Board's May 18, 2016, order concerning disclosure of reports filed prior to 2014 because those records were lawfully destroyed; (2) not willfully violated the Board's May 18, 2016, order concerning the disclosure of information on whether the Committee owned or leased any vehicles because its treasurer's deposition testimony indicated the Committee never owned or leased any vehicles; and (3) willfully violated the Board's May 18, 2016, order concerning disclosure of reports filed in 2014 and 2015. The hearing examiner recommended the Board access a fine consistent with sections 9-10 and 9-23 of the Election Code (id. §§ 9-10, 9-23).

¶ 51 P. General Counsel's Recommendation

¶ 52 On May 10, 2017, the Board's general counsel issued a recommendation. The general counsel concurred with the hearing officer's recommendation with one exception. He stated:

"The [h]earing [o]fficer is reading the Board's prior order(s) relating to amending the Committee's reports as essentially unqualified or unequivocal directives. In essence, the [h]earing [o]fficer interpreted the past orders as requiring the amendments, with a failure to amend in a timely fashion resulting in both the immediate ability to assess fines and having the matter proceed to public hearing. It is my reading of the past orders that the Committee was presented with two options. One option being to file the amendments and avoid the public hearing process; the other option being to proceed to public hearing. I believe the Board would need to have an unequivocal order to file the amendments, with an explicit reference to the possibility of a fine * * * to put us in the position of imposing a fine. It would be my recommendation that the Board order the Committee to amend its 2014 and 2015 reporting as to [Happy's] and [the Bank] expenditures within 30 days, or face a fine of up to $5,000. With the June Board meeting being 36 days from now, the Board would be in the position to proceed with an appropriate fine at the June 20 Board meeting, and determine whether it also desires to refer the matter to the [Attorney General's] office."

¶ 53 Q. May 15, 2017, Board Meeting

¶ 54 At a May 15, 2017, meeting, the Board addressed Cooke's complaint. Both Cooke and the Committee appeared through counsel. The Board's general counsel indicated he was concurring with the hearing officer's recommendations. The Board allowed the parties to present argument.

¶ 55 Cooke argued the Board should (1) address the merits of his complaint and (2) reject the recommendations as to whether the Committee willfully violated the Board's May 18, 2016, order concerning the disclosure of information on whether the Committee owned or leased any vehicles. After Cooke's argument, Chairman Scholz questioned the general counsel as to whether the sole issue concerned the Committee's failure to comply with the May 18, 2016, order. The general counsel stated:

"I believe what [the hearing officer] was doing with the testimony at the hearing-we had already established that [Happy's] and [the Bank] reporting was deficient all the way back from the closed hearing, and that led into our [May 18, 2016,] order * * * that the [Happy's] and [the Bank] reports should be amended.
Had they been amended, we wouldn't have had to go to public hearing. Having not been amended, we did proceed to public hearing.
I think [the hearing officer] was taking the deficiency as to the reporting on those two items as being sort of res judicata or already decided as a part of the matter, and he wasn't re-litigating them at the public hearing although both parties did put evidence in * * * that regard."

When asked again by other Board members as to the issue(s), the general counsel asserted the issue was whether or not the Committee had a valid defense for not complying with the Board's May 18, 2016, order. The Board's general counsel also confirmed "$5,000 [was] the maximum fine for failure to comply with a Board order."

¶ 56 After the Committee presented argument maintaining it had not willfully violated any part of the Board's May 18, 2016, order, Member William M. McGuffage expressed concern with issuing any ruling when a possible federal investigation was ongoing and recommended staying the matter. Member McGuffage stated, in part:

"Now, we shouldn't even have this thing here. I mean, I think there should be a hearing on the merits. There's some problems here. But I don't think we should be hearing on the-we should be conducting a hearing on the merits either today or later on."

Member McGuffage later stated:

"You know, we can-we can vote that they failed to comply with the Board order and issue a fine, but the other-as I said before, the only way we're going to get to the bottom of this-and I think that there are disclosure problems here-is through discovery subpoenas, and we're not going to get there.
* * *
You know, I think we're-we should not-I don't think at this point we can conduct a hearing on the merits. I really don't. And, you know, I voted for the motion to stay. You know, I'm going to vote against the follow-up motion that we're going to vote on today. I just think it shouldn't be here."

¶ 57 At another point during the hearing, Member McGuffage stated:

"We're not at a public hearing stage. We're only here like an interlocutory stage to decide whether or not [the Committee] violated a [Board] order."

Member Keith agreed with Member McGuffage characterization of the proceedings, noting:

"We're not finding that the [C]ommittee did or did not violate the Election Code if we adopt the recommendation of the hearing officer. We're finding that [it] failed to comply with a Board order."

Member McGuffage moved to stay the proceeding due to the reported federal investigation. The motion failed by a 5 to 3 vote.

¶ 58 After the Board addressed the Committee's failure to comply with its May 18, 2016 order, Cooke again requested the Board address the merits of his complaint. Chairman Scholz stated those issues were "not before the Board," and Member McGuffage stated "[t]his isn't a hearing on the merits." Cooke asserted:

"If this Board doesn't take action on [the complaint], that means that * * * we have to have another public hearing and then another hearing [officer] take-make a recommendation and then another Board meeting. This is just a waste of time."

Cooke maintained sufficient evidence was before the Board to address and issue rulings on his complaint.

¶ 59 The Board adopted the hearing officer's first and third recommendations but rejected the second, concluding the Committee did willfully fail to comply with the part of its order requiring it to disclose whether the Committee owned or leased any vehicles. The Board found it appropriate to impose a $5000 fine against the Committee.

¶ 60 After making its findings and rulings, the Board discussed referring the matter to the Attorney General's office. Member McGuffage maintained the matter could not be referred because there had been "no finding of a violation" on the complaint. Chairman Scholz agreed with Member McGuffage, noting "the only thing we've found is that the Board order wasn't complied with." Member William J. Cadigan noted "I think in the past we've made criminal referrals without making an actual finding on the merits." Member McGuffage maintained:

"Well, they violated our order to produce the documents, disclosures to clarify [the] reports as to, you know, where the expenditures actually went. That's what we're talking about. [The Committee] failed to comply with the order, and I understand I can understand because of the federal case why [it] failed to comply. But, you know, that-that-that's not the substance of this case.
This is like an interlocutory matter here, you know. [It] failed to comply. [It is] fined. Okay. And-but the beat goes on, you know. We need a hearing on the merits, a final determination, a final order before we can start discussing whether or not there's a criminal violation here and that the matter should be referred to a law enforcement agency."

By way of a 4 to 4 vote, the Board declined to forward the matter to the Attorney General's office.

¶ 61 R. Board's Order

¶ 62 On May 18, 2017, the Board issued a written order. The Board made the following relevant findings: (1) "[o]n May 18, 2016, the Board adopted the [h]earing [o]fficer's recommendation finding justifiable grounds for filing the complaint, and issued an [o]rder directing the [Committee] to amend its campaign disclosure reports to provide an accurate breakdown between gas and repair[s], indicate whether vehicles involved were owned or leased by the Committee or were privately owned, and identify the actual recipient of each itemized expenditure as well as the specific purpose for each one"; (2) "[t]he [Committee] did not file amended campaign disclosure reports as ordered, and * * * [a] [h]earing [o]fficer * * * was appointed for the purpose of holding a timely public hearing"; (3) "[o]n September 21, 2016, the Board denied * * * the [Committee's] [second] [m]otion to [s]tay * * * and remanded the matter back to the appointed [h]earing [o]fficer for public hearing"; (4) "[t]he evidence presented at public hearing established that the [Committee] violated [s]ection 9-8.10 of the * * * Election Code by filing disclosure reports that were insufficient with regard to documentation, amount and accuracy of reported expenditures to [the Bank] and [Happy's]"; and (5) "the evidence at the public hearing established * * * the [Committee] willfully violated the Board's [May 18, 2016,] [o]rder[ ] in the following particulars: (a) by failing to provide information regarding the ownership or lease of vehicles repaired or serviced with committee funds, (b) by failing to amend disclosure reports filed in 2014 and 2015 to reflect an accurate breakdown between gas and repair made to [Happy's], (c) by failing to amend disclosure reports filed in 2014 and 2015 to indentify the actual recipient of each itemized expenditure made to [Happy's], and (d) by failing to amend disclosure reports filed in 2014 and 2015 to identify the specific purpose of expenditures made to [the Bank]."

¶ 63 The Board ordered, in part, as follows: (1) "[the] [h]earing [o]fficer['s] and the [g]eneral [c]ounsel['s] recommendations numbered one and three are adopted"; (2) "[the] [h]earing [o]fficer['s] and the [g]eneral [c]ounsel['s] recommendation number two is not adopted"; and (3) "[f]or its willful violation of the Board's May 18, 2016[,] [o]rder ordering it to provide information as to the ownership or lease of repaired or serviced vehicles, and to amend its disclosure reports filed in 2014 and 2015 to reflect an accurate breakdown between gas and repairs made to [Happy's], and to identify the specific purposes of expenditures made to [the Bank], the [Committee] is hereby assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $5000.00."

¶ 64 S. Cooke's Motion to Reconsider

¶ 65 On May 24, 2017, Cooke filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the Board failed to address and issue rulings on the merits of his section 9-8.10(a)(2) and (a)(9) claims, which could subject the Committee to additional fines under section 9.8-10(b). Cooke argued his complaint was found to be filed on justifiable grounds, and therefore, he was entitled to a public hearing on those claims if the Committee did not amend its reports. Cooke noted a finding in the Board's May 18, 2017, written order referenced "[s]ection 9-8.10," but he maintained the substance of that finding indicated the Board's finding was in fact based on a violation of section 9-11(a). Cooke requested the Board address and rule on the merits of his section 9-8.10(a)(2) and (a)(9) claims or direct a hearing officer to conduct another public hearing on the matter.

¶ 66 T. The Committee's Response to Cooke's Motion to Reconsider

¶ 67 On June 7, 2017, the Committee filed a response to Cooke's motion to reconsider, maintaining the only issue that proceeded past the closed preliminary hearing was the sufficiency of its reports and not whether the expenditures were improper.

¶ 68 U. Hearing on Cooke's Motion to Reconsider

¶ 69 On June 20, 2017, the Board held a hearing on Cooke's motion to reconsider.

The Board's general counsel recommended the Board deny the motion to reconsider. The Board allowed Cooke to present argument on his motion and the Committee an opportunity to respond.

¶ 70 Cooke requested the Board address and rule on the merits of his section 9-8.10(a)(2) and (a)(9) claims and impose an appropriate penalty or direct a hearing officer to conduct another public hearing on the matter. The Committee maintained the Board had addressed all of the matters properly before it.

¶ 71 Member Andrew K. Carruthers moved to grant the motion to reconsider, stating:

"From reviewing the record, I believe that evidence was presented of these violations and that I don't think that the process is-I think that this is something that we could have done last month and simply didn't.
In an effort to bring it to a close and I think to address the underlying allegations of the complaint, I would move that we grant the motion to reconsider, that we readopt the same order that we made last month except we find additionally that the [C]ommittee violated section 9-8.10 by making payments to these vendors, [Happy's] and [the Bank], in excess of fair market value for the goods and services received and that it further violated this section by making payments for gas and other services for vehicles not owned or leased by the [C]ommittee, that we impose-for these violations we impose an additional fine of $5,000 to run concurrently with the fine that we imposed last month. So it wouldn't be an additional fine-we would find the violation and impose the fine, but it wouldn't be an additional five. It would run concurrently with the five that we approved last month. That's my motion."

¶ 72 The Board's general counsel indicated he recommended the Board deny the motion to reconsider on belief "that our finding that the [C]ommittee had violated [s]ection 9-8.10 adequately addressed the points that were raised."

¶ 73 Vice Chairman Gowen expressed concern with a finding the evidence was sufficient to support a violation of section 9-8.10(a)(9).

¶ 74 Following the discussion, the Board voted on Member Carruther's motion. The motion failed by a vote of 4 to 4. Cooke's motion to reconsider was denied.

¶ 75 V. Board's Order

¶ 76 On June 22, 2017, the Board issued a written order, denying Cooke's motion to reconsider.

¶ 77 W. Petition for Review

¶ 78 On June 28, 2017, Cooke filed a petition for review with this court.

¶ 79 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 80 Cooke argues we should remand the matter for the Board to address and issue rulings on the merits of his section 9-8.10(a)(2) and (a)(9) claims. Alternatively, Cooke contends, to the extent the Board issued rulings against him on those claims, we should find those rulings to be clearly erroneous based on the evidence presented.

¶ 81 The Committee contends this court lacks jurisdiction to address Cooke's arguments. The Committee does not dispute Cooke filed with the appropriate court a timely petition for review. Id. § 9-22(1), (2). Instead, it asserts we lack jurisdiction because Cooke was not "adversely affected" by the Board's decision. Id. ("Any party to a Board hearing, any person who files a complaint on which a hearing was denied or not acted upon within the time specified in Section 9-21 of this Act, and any party adversely affected by a judgment of the Board may obtain judicial review * * *."). In a related argument, both the Committee and the Board argue Cooke lacks standing to pursue his appeal because he prevailed before the Board and suffered no adverse effect from the Board's decision. That is, the Committee and the Board contend Cooke received a public hearing on the claims properly before the Board and the Board found Cooke had proved those claims.

¶ 82 The Committee's and Board's jurisdictional and standing arguments are premised on the underlying conclusion the Board allowed only Cooke's section 9-7 and 9-11 claims to proceed beyond the closed preliminary hearing but not his section 9-8.10 claims. Cooke disagrees with the Committee's and Board's premise, maintaining the record fails to show his section 9-8.10 claims were dismissed following the closed preliminary hearing. To resolve the Committee's and Board's arguments we must first resolve whether, based on the record presented, Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims advanced beyond the closed preliminary hearing.

¶ 83 In his complaint, Cooke alleged the Committee's expenditures to Happy's and the Bank violated section 9-8.10(a)(2). At the closed preliminary hearing, Cooke alleged the Committee's expenditures to Happy's violated section 9-8.10(a)(9). Following the closed preliminary hearing, the Committee filed a motion to strike and dismiss the complaint, alleging "each of the allegations contained in the [c]omplaint fails to state an offense or violation upon justifiable grounds." Cooke filed a response to the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss, again raising alleged violations of section 9-8.10(a)(9). The Committee noted, both at the closed preliminary hearing and in its reply to Cooke's response to its motion to strike and dismiss, Cooke had not raised his section 9-8.10(a)(9) claims in his complaint.

¶ 84 In his April 29, 2016, written recommendation, the hearing officer noted Cooke (1) had alleged the "Committee violated [s]ection * * * 9-8.10," generally and (2) "question[ed] the propriety of expenditures related to the automobiles for gas and/or repairs." In reviewing the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss, the hearing officer noted the complaint alleged specifically a violation of "[s]ection 9-8.10[ (a) ](2)." After finding Cooke had entered sufficient evidence to support his allegations and the Committee "was aware that the propriety of [the] expenditures was at issue," the hearing officer recommended the Board deny the Committee's motion to dismiss, without qualification. As to whether the complaint was filed upon justifiable grounds, the hearing officer found the expenditure reports "lack[ed] sufficient detail to determine if the breakdown is accurate." The hearing officer recommended the Board (1) find, without qualification, the "[t]he [c]omplaint is filed upon justifiable grounds" and (2) order the Committee to amend its reports to provide additional information, with the failure to do so resulting in "[t]he matter" proceeding to a public hearing. The Board's general counsel concurred with the hearing officer's recommendations but recommended the Board order the Committee provide specific information in the amended reports.

¶ 85 At the Board meeting, the Board's general counsel noted to the Board:

"[Cooke] is challenging the propriety * * * [of] the reported expenditures, and the relatively obvious poor quality of the reporting on these particular expenditures makes it difficult to draft a more focused complaint. The expenditures to [Happy's] lack sufficient detail breaking down the various payments as being for gas or repairs to particular vehicles and whether those vehicles are owned or leased by the [C]ommittee or are private vehicles. The expenditures to [the Bank] lack sufficient detail as to the specific purposes and ultimate recipients of the disbursements."

The Board, both in its oral pronouncement and written order, (1) outright denied the Committee's motion to dismiss; (2) found, without qualification, the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds; and (3) ordered the Committee to file amended reports with the failure to do so resulting in the matter, without any explicit limitation, proceed to a public hearing.

¶ 86 In summary, the record shows (1) Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims were presented to the Committee, the hearing officer, and the Board; (2) the Committee filed a motion to strike and dismiss the complaint in its entirety; (3) the hearing officer recommended the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss be denied outright; (4) the hearing officer recommended the complaint be found to be filed on justifiable grounds without qualification; (5) the Board outright denied the Committee's motion to strike and dismiss; (6) the Board found the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds without qualification; and (7) the Board ordered the matter, without any explicit limitation, proceed to a public hearing if the Committee did not amend its reports. We find the record does not show the Board dismissed Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims following the closed preliminary hearing.

¶ 87 We find additional support for this conclusion in the proceedings following the closed preliminary hearing. At no point during the later proceedings did the appointed hearing officer, the Board's general counsel, or the Board suggest a qualification or limitation existed as to the finding the complaint was filed upon justifiable grounds or the matter should proceed to a public hearing if the Committee failed to amend its reports. In fact, the Board and its officers reiterated on multiple occasions these findings without any qualification or limitation. Additionally, at the public hearing and subsequent board meeting, Cooke presented argument on his section 9-8.10 claims. While the hearing officer concluded he was not tasked with addressing the merits of Cooke's complaint, he cited section 9-8.10(a)(9) and (a)(2) as pertinent statutes in his written recommendation. Similarly, while the Board focused on the issue of whether the merits of the complaint was properly before it, at no time did any member suggest in response to Cooke's arguments his section 9-8.10 claims had been dismissed a year earlier following the closed preliminary hearing. Cooke further argued, both in a written motion to reconsider and at the Board meeting on that motion, the Board failed to address and issue rulings on his section 9-8.10 claims. Member Carruthers moved to grant the motion to reconsider, address the underlying allegations of the complaint, and find Cooke had established his section 9-8.10 claims. The Board's general counsel indicated he previously recommended the Board deny the motion to reconsider on belief its finding in the May 18, 2017, order indicating the Committee had violated section 9-8.10-a citation the parties now agree was in error-adequately addressed Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims. Vice Chairman Gowen expressed concern with a finding the evidence was sufficient to support a violation of section 9-8.10(a)(9). These statements and actions of the Board and its members support the conclusion Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims advanced beyond the closed hearing.

¶ 88 In reaching this decision, we recognize the Board's May 18, 2016, order made an explicit finding the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds only with respect to the allegations "that the expenditures made to [Happy's] and [the Bank] lack sufficient detail." Given the record presented, we conclude that finding alone does not show the Board dismissed the Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims. We also recognize Vice Chairman Gowen's comments at the meeting on the Committee's second motion to stay, indicating the Board's prior order directed the Committee to file amended reports, which was "a very limited obligation on [the] [c]ommittee, extremely limited." We find Vice Chairman Gowen's comments correctly note the Committee could have avoided a public hearing at that time had it complied with the Board's order to amend its reports. His comments, however, do not support a finding the Board dismissed Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims following the closed hearing.

¶ 89 Neither the Board nor the Committee dispute, where a claim advances beyond a closed preliminary hearing, the Board is required to address and rule on that claim. Here, it is clear the Board did not address or issue rulings on Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims following the closed preliminary hearing. We find Member Carruther's motion to grant Cooke's motion to reconsider-a motion that ultimately failed-is insufficient to show the Board addressed and issued rulings on Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims. Cooke's petition for direct review is properly before this court. Cooke has standing to raise the Board's failure to address and rule on his section 9-8.10 claims.

¶ 90 The Committee contends, even if this court has jurisdiction and Cooke has standing to pursue his appeal, we should reject Cooke's request to remand for the Board to address and rule on his section 9-8.10 claims because he cannot be accorded any additional relief. Specifically, the Committee contends Cooke cannot be accorded any additional relief because the Board already (1) ruled in his favor "on different claims" and (2) imposed the maxim possible penalty under section 9-10.

¶ 91 In support of its argument suggesting Cooke cannot be accorded any additional relief because the Board already ruled in his favor "on different claims," the Committee broadly asserts, parenthetically citing Matejczyk v. City of Chicago , 397 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 337 Ill.Dec. 166, 922 N.E.2d 24, 32 (2009), and Russell v. Good Shepherd Hospital , 222 Ill. App. 3d 140, 144, 164 Ill.Dec. 756, 583 N.E.2d 672, 675 (1991), "[i]t is well-established that a favorable decision on one count of a complaint will render the dismissal of other claims moot." The cases cited, however, do not support the Committee's broad assertion.

¶ 92 The Board found the Committee willfully failed to comply with parts of its May 18, 2016, order. The parties also agree the Board found the Committee violated sections 9-7 and 9-11. In support, the parties cite a finding in the Board's May 18, 2017, order, which stated "[t]he evidence presented at public hearing established that the [Committee] violated [s]ection 9-8.10 of the * * * Election Code by filing disclosure reports that were insufficient with regard to documentation, amount and accuracy of reported expenditures to [the Bank] and [Happy's]." The parties agree the Board's citation to section 9-8.10 was in error, and the substance of that finding shows the Board found the Committee violated sections 9-7 and 9-11.

¶ 93 We find Cooke's section 9-8.10 claims, if proved, would establish additional violations separate and apart from the Board's other findings. That is, Cooke can be accorded additional relief on his complaint. We decline to issue substantive findings on these claims for the first time on appeal. Additionally, on remand, the Board can address for the first time whether the Committee may be subject to additional fines under the Election Code if it finds in favor of Cooke on any of his section 9-8.10 claims.

¶ 94 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 95 We remand for the Board to address and issue rulings on the merits of Cooke's section 9-8.10(a)(2) and (a)(9) claims. We also direct the Board, based on the concessions of the parties, to amend its May 18, 2017, order to show the Committee violated sections 9-7 and 9-11 of the Election Code.

¶ 96 Remanded with directions.

Justices Holder White and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.