author: DAVID, Justice.

text:
    Jacqueline WISNER, M.D. and The South Bend Clinic, L.L.P., Appellants (Defendants below), v. Archie L. LANEY, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
    No. 71S03-1201-CT-7.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Dec. 12, 2012.

      Edward L. Murphy, Jr., Heidi K. Koeneman, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
    Timothy S. Schafer, Timothy S. Schafer, II, Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 71A03-1007-CT-382

DAVID, Justice.

In this case, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $1.75 million. The issues presented focus on two separate, but significant, matters.

The first is whether the trial court erred by denying defendants’ motion for a new' trial based upon the cumulative effect of plaintiffs counsel’s alleged unprofessional conduct dining the trial. The second issue is whether the trial court erred when it refused to grant plaintiff prejudgment interest.

We affirm the trial court, as did the Court of Appeals, on the denial of defendants’ motion for a new trial. Under the circumstances of this case, we defer to the judgment of the trial court. However, this decision does not lessen our dissatisfaction and frustration with the behavior of counsel during the trial, particularly plaintiffs counsel.

Professionalism and civility are not optional behaviors to be displayed only when one is having a good day. Professionalism and civility are the mainstays of our profession and the foundations upon which lawyers practice law. The public expects it. Fellow lawyers expect it. Our profession demands it.

Further, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the discretionary award of prejudgment interest.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2001, Archie Laney was at work when she became dizzy, lightheaded, weak, and had difficulty walking. She was sixty-six-years old. Laney called her daughter, who drove her to the South Bend Clinic where Laney’s primary care physician worked. When they arrived, Laney learned that instead of her primary care physician being on duty, Dr. Jacqueline Wisner was on duty that evening. Dr. Wisner conducted an examination consisting of an oral history of Laney’s symptoms and an examination of Laney’s eyes, ears, lungs, and stomach. Dr. Wisner further conducted an Accu-Check blood glucose test, as well as a hemocue test for anemia. Dr. Wisner observed considerable wax build-up in Laney’s ears. Dr. Wisner diagnosed Laney with vertigo due to an inner ear infection, and discharged her with medication for the dizziness and an antibiotic. Dr. Wisner advised Laney the medication could take up to three days to work and instructed Laney to return to her primary care physician if the symptoms continued.

Two days later, Laney called her daughter and told her she could not move her right arm or right leg. Her daughter drove Laney to the Emergency Room at St. Joseph Medical Center. Laney was evaluated that evening and diagnosed as having suffered an ischemic stroke affecting the right side of her body.

The stroke has rendered Laney unable to use her right side, thus Laney now struggles with independent living.

On November 26, 2002, Laney filed a complaint with the St. Joseph Superior Court alleging negligence by Dr. Wisner and The South Bend Clinic on eleven different counts, generally relating to the failed diagnosis of a transient stroke, which later caused Laney to suffer a disabling stroke. The complaint also alleged that Dr. Wisner or the Clinic negligently failed to maintain the medical record from Laney’s March 9, 2001 visit to the Clinic.

In 2006, the original complaint was dismissed without prejudice, pending the adjudication of the proposed complaint before the Indiana Department of Insurance, a statutory condition precedent to the filing of the court complaint, which plaintiff had not done here.

On August 6, 2007, Laney filed virtually the same complaint in the St. Joseph Superior Court, alleging negligence by the Clinic and Wisner. In March 2010, a five-day jury trial was held. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Laney and against Dr. Wisner and The South Bend Clinic in the amount of $1.75 million. The trial can best be described as hotly contested, not only as to the disputed facts but also to the rate of objection by the attorneys.

On March 12, 2010, Dr. Wisner and the clinic filed a motion for reduction of the verdict and judgment to the statutory maximum prescribed by the legislature in the amount of $1.25 million. Laney objected to the reduction and also asked for an award of $100,000 in prejudgment interest based on Indiana Code section 34r-51-4-7. On March 18, 2010, the trial court granted the motion to reduce the award and entered judgment in favor of Laney for the amount of $1.25 million, the maximum allowable under Indiana Code section 34-18-14-8, but on April 14, 2010, denied the motion for prejudgment interest.

On April 15, 2010, defendants filed a motion to correct error, requesting a new trial pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 59(J) and 60(B)(3). Trial Rule 59(J) allows for the court to correct any error it determines to be “prejudicial or harmful.” Ind. Trial Rule 59(J). Trial Rule 60(B)(3) allows for the court to relieve a party from a judgment for “fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” T.R. 60(B)(3). Specifically, defendants alleged the following: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to order a mistrial based on the consistent, unprofessional and prejudicial conduct of plaintiffs counsel, which deprived defendants of a fair trial; (2) the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to argue the missing 2001 record should be attributed to Dr. Wisner; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Campbell, after learning he violated a separation of witnesses order; and (4) the court erred in not admonishing plaintiffs counsel for asking voir dire questions that were in violation of the motion in limine order.

The trial court held a hearing and denied defendants’ motion to correct error. Defendants appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to correct error, and Laney cross-appealed on the issue of the propriety of the trial court’s order denying prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to correct error, but reversed the trial court’s order denying prejudgment interest. We granted transfer.

I. Behavior of Laney’s Counsel

Dr. Wisner and the clinic contend the behavior of plaintiffs counsel was so unprofessional and so permeated the entire trial that it tainted the proceedings and therefore the cumulative effect was prejudicial enough to warrant a mistrial. We review denial of a Trial Rule 60 motion for abuse of discretion. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind.2006). When the motion is based on Trial Rule 60(B)(3), the appellant must show that (1) misconduct occurred; (2) the misconduct prevented the appellant from fully and fairly presenting the case at trial; and (3) the appellant has a meritorious defense. Id. at 73-74. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind.1993).

Dr. Wisner and the clinic argue the trial court’s finding Laney’s counsel in contempt of court on day three of the trial and instructing the jury to disregard certain statements made by Laney’s counsel were insufficient remedies that failed to undo the cumulative effect and prejudice caused by such conduct. Defendants cite to several exchanges in the record that were particularly harmful to such a degree they claim that the harm could not be undone. The first are instances where Laney’s attorney asked specific questions in front of the jury in violation of the trial court’s order not to broach a certain subject.

While questioning plaintiffs daughter, plaintiffs counsel asked if Laney was still seeing a particular physician. This was met with an objection, which was sustained by the trial court. Immediately following the sustained objection, plaintiffs counsel asked another objectionable question and again the trial court sustained the objection and prohibited the inquiry.

Following an overnight break, counsel resumed questioning plaintiffs daughter along the very same lines that the trial court forbid the day before. Defendant’s counsel objected, and a side bar conference was held where the trial court again found the desired testimony to be irrelevant. Undeterred by the trial court judge, immediately following the side bar conference, plaintiffs counsel once again went right back to the same line of questioning, drawing yet another objection from defendant’s counsel and yet another side bar conference.

At the second side bar conference, the trial court made it clear that this prohibited area of inquiry would not be ventured into again by plaintiffs counsel. Nonetheless, plaintiffs counsel would pursue the prohibited testimony once again, this time attempting to solicit the prohibited testimony through the plaintiff herself. Ultimately, the court instructed the jury to disregard the previous questions and not to consider at all the questions that had been asked by plaintiffs counsel on this subject.

On the following day of trial, the trial judge held yet another side bar conference and warned plaintiffs counsel that if he brought up that particular issue again during the next witnesses cross-examination a fine of $500 would be imposed for contempt of court.

This example is one of many displays of inappropriate behavior of counsel. There were excessive objections by both counsel, over eighty by the defendant’s counsel and over thirty by plaintiffs counsel. While objections are clearly permitted if made in good faith and on sound substantive grounds, repeated objections despite adverse rulings already made by the trial court are not appropriate. However, far more problematic for the trial judge in this case was the unnecessary sparring and outright contemptuous conduct of each attorney directed toward the other.

The record reveals at least five instances where the trial court judge had to admonish the attorneys about their behavior. Furthermore, by any conservative measure there were at least ten instances of questionable behavior by each attorney during the trial. Examples are bountiful throughout the record, but a few examples are highlighted below.

Plaintiffs counsel stated during the trial,

“There was no discussion of the testimony here in court. He’s wasting our time, Judge. There’s no violation- I’ve about had it. Cut the scenes in front of the jury.... Yeah. Judge, this conduct’s got to stop by Mr. Murphy. This has got to stop.”
“We don’t want to hear about your unsolicited advice. I don’t care for your unsolicited advice.”
“What are you talking about Murph.... You’re slipping, Murph.”
“No, no. I never said that at all. That’s an outright lie.”
“Well, I must [be] wrong. I must be wrong for the fifth time, but I think I’m going to show Mr. Murphy has been wrong every time he’s objected and I’m going to show later on.... He keeps telling me I’m wrong, Judge. The record’s going to bear me out. How about this? Loser pays a thousand dollars it wasn’t faxed? ... There’s something unprofessional going on here, I’ll agree. It’s going to come back.”

[Tr. at 607, 98, 179, 192, 957, respectively.]

Defendants’ counsel stated during the trial,

‘Tour Honor, I think it’s really unfortunate that we start off with a misrepresentation to the Court.”
“He’s already violated it twice.”
“Are we going to put up with this?”
“I would prefer you not talk to me. You talk to the Judge. I’ll do the same.”
“Keep your hands off me. I don’t get with this, Judge.”

[Tr. At 14, 47, 737, 272, 286, respectively.]

We hope this is not the way attorneys conduct themselves at trial. As specifically found by the trial court judge, “the trial was replete with improper behavior, in this judge’s opinion, by both attorneys.” The trial court ultimately concluded there was no substantial prejudice resulting from counsel’s actions. The trial judge is in the best position to gauge the behavior of the attorneys and whether or not it impacts the jury and in what context. Strack & Van Til, Inc. v. Carter, 803 N.E.2d 666, 677 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We cannot conclude this decision was against the logic and facts before the court. Here, defendants failed to show the alleged misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case at trial.

The contentious nature of the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants’ counsel was evident at the beginning of trial. It apparently began during depositions with defendants’ counsel remarking that no competent lawyer would conduct a deposition in the manner plaintiffs counsel was. There were accusations of misrepresentations, lying, and not following the rules. The five-day jury trial was filled with unnecessary comments back and forth between counsel. Plaintiffs counsel did not care for defendants’ counsel’s unsolicited advice. The attorneys would frequently interrupt each other.

The trial judge even noted one time, “I don’t want you both to behave like this and I don’t want to embarrass you either because I’m not going to put up with it.” On another occasion, the trial judge remarked “I’m just concerned about what the jury is thinking right now. I think you guys are representing the legal profession and I don’t think you’re helping each other.”

Near the end of the trial, the trial judge even directed plaintiffs counsel to apologize to the jury for personal comments about defendants’ counsel. Even during the subsequent hearing on the motion to correct error, some four months later, the lawyers could not behave civilly toward each other.

A jury trial is not a free-for-all. It is a civil forum in which advocates represent their clients before a panel of citizens, in front of a judicial officer who is responsible for enforcing the rules of procedure and rules of evidence and assuring the proper behavior of everyone in the courtroom. It is similar to an athletic event with two opposing teams competing and a referee observing to ensure all of the rules are followed. In this trial, both plaintiffs counsel and defendants’ counsel committed fouls. Did plaintiffs counsel commit more fouls? Yes. However, defendants’ counsel also committed fouls. It is important that attorneys not lose control of their passion for their client or cause and become too emotionally involved and make the cause personal. In such circumstances they risk harm to their client, their reputation, and our profession.

All attorneys in Indiana take an oath and each and every statement in the oath is sacred. One particular statement is, “I will abstain from offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged.” Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 22. Our law schools are-trying to train our law students in certain core values of the legal profession, and some of the most important for the future of our profession are collegiality, professionalism and civility. At every trial, indeed at every moment of our practice, we have the opportunity to better our profession. Here, the trial judge presided over the entire trial and had the benefit of observing the overall conduct of both attorneys, not only in the presence of the jury, but outside their presence. The trial judge redirected both counsel on numerous occasions, admonished both counsel on occasions, and even used her contempt powers in an attempt to manage the conduct of counsel and ensure a fair trial. Again, the trial court judge is in the best position to determine when enough is enough and whether or not the behavior of counsel would warrant a new trial.

While we find that the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to correct error, we nonetheless express our displeasure with the conduct of counsel, particularly that of plaintiffs counsel.

Professionalism and civility must be the foundation of the practice of law. Upon this foundation we lay competency, honesty, dedication to the rule of law, passion, and humility. Every lawyer and every judge is charged with the duty to maintain the respect due to the courts and each other. Our clients and the public expect it. Our profession demands it.

II.Closing Argument

Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to correct error relating to the closing argument of Laney’s counsel. Their argument is that once the clinic was removed as an independent party from the case, any references to alleged misconduct in not producing the medical records should warrant a new trial, when taken together with the previous behavior by Laney’s counsel. The relevant portion of plaintiffs closing statement is as follows:

And what’s worse is there’s no records. The records are conspicuously missing. The one record on the one day we need just happens to be missing. And we would submit, ladies and gentlemen, if we had that record it would show exactly what was done, and more importantly, exactly what was not done in this case. Even more ironic is Dr. Wisner had no independent recollection of what happened. Very convenient. And we had no nurses called to try to rebut what we’re saying.
So none of the evidence they show was consistent with what their diagnosis was. They gave nothing whatsoever to support it. The one doctor said vertigo earlier today, remember, and it was gone. It was gone by the time she got to Monday. None of the other doctors ever diagnosed it, none of them. All the doctors that saw her at Saint Joe right after Sunday night, none of them found vertigo. None. Isn’t that something? It went away. Another coincidence. Missing record. Coincidence.
The evidence showed there was no treatment for TIA. The evidence will show there was absolutely no tests run to rule out a TIA. And the evidence showed that they failed to hospitalize and all the doctors said that’s what should have been done here. Instead, she was sent home without any additional medication, sent out the same way she came in and

We believe, as we have stated previously, the trial court was in a better position to determine any prejudicial affect from Laney’s counsel’s closing statements. We summarily affirm the analysis of the Court of Appeals, noting also that neither Wisner nor the Clinic objected to these statements and waived the issue. Wisner v. Laney, 953 N.E.2d 100, 108 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

III.Testimony of Laney’s Expert Witness

Defendants next contend the trial court erred by not granting a new trial due to a violation of the separation of witnesses order. Indiana Rule of Evidence 615 states, “at the request of a party, the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of or discuss testimony with other witnesses.” Ind. Evidence Rule 615. We do not disturb a trial court’s determination regarding a violation of a separation of witnesses order, absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind.1995). A review of the record reveals that any violation was merely accidental. The alleged violation stems from a chance encounter of Dr. Campbell and Laney, and one merely asking how the other was feeling. At no time did Dr. Campbell ask about their testimony or anything related to trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding no impropriety occurred. It is clear to this Court that no violation of separation of witnesses occurred. We are in agreement with the excellent analysis of the Court of Appeals.

IV.Voir Dire

Defendants further argue the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on questions by plaintiffs counsel during voir dire, about insurance coverage. We view this as another argument about the misconduct on the part of plaintiffs counsel. We note that plaintiffs counsel asked the prospective jurors whether they worked for ProAssurance Insurance Company or owned stock in that company. There was no objection from defendants’ counsel as this question was not inappropriate. Next, plaintiffs counsel asked if the jurors were opposed to injured parties asking for damages. Again, a proper question. Then counsel asked if anyone was employed in the healthcare industry. Again, a proper question. One prospective juror raised their hand and the following interaction took place:

[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL] Do you think that would anyway affect you, lean a little toward a healthcare side of this, or you heard stories about lawsuits or have feelings about lawsuits?
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR] Yes, I have.
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL] What have you heard?
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR] I’ve heard both sides where I don’t know how to put this in a general sense. Specifically, I don’t know of any specific suits, but the association with the different doctors and everything else, I’ve heard things said about how high the — what’s it called? The cost of their insurance and everything else is and how difficult it is for them to be in practice. This is just general stuff that I’ve heard. I don’t know anything specific.

Thereafter, a side bar conference was held to discuss the question before voir dire resumed, and defendants’ counsel dropped the subject. Defendants’ counsel did not move immediately for a mistrial or argue the jury pool had been tainted. He did not ask for any specific relief or otherwise give the judge an opportunity to cure any potential defect. For this reason, we believe this argument was ultimately waived. Notwithstanding waiver, we would note that “a question regarding a juror’s relationship, financial or otherwise, with a specific insurance company on voir dire examination is not error if the question is asked in good faith.” Stone v. Stakes, 749 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Again, the trial court was most certainly in the best position to make these determinations. In our review, absent any evidence of bad faith, the trial court’s decision to deny a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.

V. Prejudgment Interest

On cross-appeal, plaintiffs counsel challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant prejudgment interest. At issue is the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute (TPIS). Ind.Code § 34-51-4. An award of prejudgment interest is discretionary; accordingly, we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Hupfer v. Miller, 890 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind.2011).

Laney filed her original complaint with the trial court on November 26, 2002. She then filed a written settlement offer on April 6, 2005. In 2006, the original complaint was dismissed without prejudice. On August 6, 2007, Laney refiled her complaint in the St. Joseph Superior Court. The applicable statutory provision provides that for TPIS to apply, the plaintiffs (1) must make a written offer of settlement to a party against whom the claim is filed within one year of filing the claim in court; (2) the terms of the offer must provide for payment of the settlement offer -within sixty days after the offer is accepted; and (3) the amount of the offer does not exceed one and one-third the amount of the judgment awarded. Ind.Code § 34-51-4-6 (2008).

At issue is Laney’s April 6, 2005 letter, which states:

As a follow-up to our deposition of Dr. Wisner, it appears that there is liability against the clinic as well as Dr. Wisner for failure to properly diagnose Mrs. Laney’s condition and failing to properly treat her on March 9, 2001 resulting in a stroke three (3) days later and substantial and irreversible permanent impairment, specifically a stroke to the left side of her brain with resulting impairment to her right upper and lower extremities as well as impairment to her cognitive functions.
The clinic, as well as Dr. Wisner, can each be held liable for $250,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest up to four (4) years according to statute and case law for a total amount of $660,000.00. Please be advised my client has authorized me to settle this matter for a structured settlement in the amount of $250,000.00 with a present value of $187,001.00 which is the minimum structured settlement permitted to allow my client to proceed to the Patients’ Compensation Fund. I think it would be in the best interest of all parties to amicably resolve this matter without a trial on the merits since it is likely that Mrs. Laney would obtain a substantial verdict in light of her permanent injuries and the conspicuously missing medical records of the clinic regarding March 9, 2001 day in question.
Would you kindly discuss this matter with your clients as well as their insurance carrier and advise me as to your position within the next thirty (30) days. If we are able to resolve this matter at this time, it will avoid any further inconvenience to Dr. Wisner and eliminate her necessity to travel from Baltimore, Maryland to Indiana for a trial on the merits and thereby avoid any further litigation expense. I will await your response.

Laney argues her letter is clearly an offer to settle within the guidelines of TPIS.

There are two lines of analysis at play in this case. The first is whether this letter met the requirements of Indiana Code section 34-51 — 4-6. The second is whether prejudgment interest must be awarded if the statutory requirements are met.

Laney’s original complaint was filed November 26, 2002 and her settlement letter to Dr. Wisner was written on April 6, 2005. She then dismissed her suit in 2006, only to file it again on August 6, 2007. Laney argues we should not take into consideration the original complaint from 2002 in determining the timeliness of the letter because the lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice, and thus we should act as if the 2002 suit had never been brought at all. By doing this, plaintiff contends the letter of April 6, 2005 properly predated the subsequent lawsuit of 2007. This appears to be one way to attempt to bypass a failure to follow the prejudgment interest statute — dismiss the suit without prejudice, prepare a settlement letter, and file suit anew.

In order to seek prejudgment interest, Indiana Code section 34-51-4-6(1) requires a party to make their written settlement offer within one year of a claim being filed. The trial court determined “within one year” meant the settlement offer could not be made until the claim was filed and that it must be made within one year thereafter. In other words, the trial court found a starting line existed with the filing of a claim and ended one year later at the deadline. We disagree with the trial court’s analysis and instead we agree with the Court of Appeals analysis that the one-year requirement “defin[es] the deadline for the submission” of a settlement offer,

Not ... whether the settlement offer may be filed before or after the filing of a claim. In other words, the written offer of settlement may be submitted to the defendants before or after the filing of suit, but ... it may not be submitted later than one year after the filing of suit.

Wisner v. Laney, 953 N.E.2d 100, 113 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). Thus the Court of Appeals held there was no starting line, only a deadline, which was one year after the filing of a claim. If the statute is to be interpreted otherwise, it would serve to discourage settlement of lawsuits before a lawsuit is filed. Certainly the legislature did not intend to limit the effective use of the TPIS and settlement negotiations.

This position is further supported by the statute addressing when prejudgment interest begins to accrue. Under Indiana Code section 34-51-4-8(a), prejudgment interest may not exceed forty-eight months and “begins to accrue on the latest of the following dates:

(1) Fifteen (15) months after the cause of action accrues;
(2) Six (6) months after the claim is filed in court if IC 34-18-8 and IC 34-18-9 do not apply;
(3) One hundred eighty (180) days after a medical review panel is formed to review the claim under IC 34-18-10 (or IC 27-12-10 before its repeal).

Ind.Code § 34-51-4-8(a).

If subsection (3) permits prejudgment interest to begin accruing 180 days after the review panel is formed, regardless of the date a complaint is filed in court, then Indiana Code section 34-51-4-8 permits prejudgment interest to accrue before the filing of a complaint.

Thus, we hold today that a written settlement offer must be made within one year following the filing of a claim to be eligible for prejudgment interest. However, a settlement offer can also be made prior to the filing of a lawsuit. We believe this interpretation is broader and more in line with the legislature’s intent to facilitate and encourage settlement of claims amicably without legal recourse, but also to give real meaning and effect to the prejudgment interest statute. The trial court’s interpretation would potentially foreclose meaningful settlement talks until the filing of a complaint.

In addition to whether or not the settlement letter is timely filed, we must also examine whether the letter identifies the sixty-day settlement requirement period. In other words, does the letter itself comply with the statute. The case most closely on point is Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 546 (Ind.2000), where a letter stated the plaintiff was “offering to settle this claim now for $75,001.” This Court wrote on the sixty-day requirement,

The whole point of the statute is to address the cost of delay in payment. Accordingly, an offer to settle “now” is an offer to settle by payment within sixty days. The delay is solely for the benefit of the defendants, and the defendants had the power to accept [Plaintiffs] offer immediately.

Id. at 547. In our view, Laney’s offer to “resolve this matter at this time” meets the same threshold as we discussed in Cahoon. The key is to include the time-limiting language in the offer. However, rather than run the risk of a trial court being forced to decide whether a settlement letter did or did not comply with the requirements of Indiana Code section 34-51-4-6, we believe the better practice for lawyers in the future would be to cite the statute in the settlement letter and make it very clear that the letter is intended to invoke the statute, including the sixty-day settlement window and the possibility of prejudgment interest.

Despite the fact that the letter itself satisfied the statutory requirements as to content, it was untimely sent in this ease. The first complaint was filed with the trial court on November 26, 2002. La-ney’s counsel wrote a settlement letter two years and five months after the original claim was filed. This falls squarely outside the one year window as discussed previously. While plaintiff dismissed that original action, she failed to send a subsequent settlement letter and now attempts to rely on the settlement letter, which would have been untimely filed but for the dismissal of the previous lawsuit. Laney’s counsel should have sent a new settlement letter after the dismissal of the first lawsuit, either prior to the filing of the second, or within a year of the filing of the second. Neither was done in this case. The TPIS is not intended to serve as a trap for the unwary. It is designed to put the adverse party on notice of a claim and provide them with an opportunity to engage in meaningful settlement and if they do not do so, they run the risk of incurring the additional obligation of prejudgment interest.

Finally, had the settlement letter been timely sent, we note Laney is not automatically entitled to prejudgment interest. TPIS permits the trial court to award prejudgment interest, but does not require an award of prejudgment interest. See Ind.Code § 34-51-4-7 (“The court may award prejudgment interest as part of a judgment.”); Id. § 34-51-^4-8 (“If the court awards prejudgment interest, the court shall determine the period during which prejudgment interest accrues”) (emphasis added). Thus, an award of prejudgment interest is committed solely to the discretion of the trial court if the statutory prerequisites are satisfied. This is consistent with the TPIS serving as a tool for the trial court to encourage settlement and incentivize the expeditious resolution to cases.

Conclusion

Although plaintiffs counsel’s behavior was most troubling, both attorneys should have acted in a manner more becoming of our profession. The duty to zealously represent our clients is not a license to be unprofessional. Here the trial court determined that the conduct of counsel did not prevent the jury from rendering a fair and just verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ counsel’s request for a new trial. We also affirm the trial court denial of plaintiffs request for prejudgment interest. Laney’s 2005 letter did not meet the requirements for awarding of prejudgment interest. The awarding of prejudgment interest is not mandatory and is left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court was most certainly within its proper discretion in declining such an award.

DICKSON, C.J., and RUCKER, MASSA, and RUSH, JJ., concur.

      . The record indicates the St. Joseph Superi- or Court granted a motion for directed verdict and dismissed plaintiff’s claims of negligence against the South Bend Clinic, leaving them as a named defendant for purposes of respon-deat superior liability to Dr. Wisner. The record further indicates defendants’ counsel represented both South Bend Clinic and Dr. Wisner at trial and now on appeal.

      . This Court gave a detailed analysis of the steps taken in medical malpractice cases in Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Ind.2012).

      . The acrimony between plaintiff's and defendants’ counsel did not end at the trial. During the June 2010 hearing on the motion to correct error, the poor behavior began anew. Mr. Murphy accused Mr. Schaffer of bragging about his numerous sanctions having no effect on him, describing his conduct as unprofessional and making gestures during the trial, while Mr. Schaffer called Mr. Murphy an "outright liar” on two occasions.

      . Indiana Code section 34-51-4-6 also allows for a longer period of time than one year if the trial court determines it necessary and upon a showing of good cause.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DICKSON, Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Teresa MEREDITH, Dr. Edward E. Eiler, Richard E. Hamilton, Sheila Kennedy, Rev. Michael Jones, Dr. Robert M. Stwalley III, Karen J. Combs, Rev. Kevin Armstrong, Deborah J. Patterson, Keith Gambill, and Judith Lynn Failer, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Mike PENCE, in his official capacity as Governor of Indiana, and Glenda Ritz,* in her official capacity as Indiana Superintendent of Public Instruction and Director of the Indiana Department of Education, Appellees (Defendants), and Heather Coffy and Monica Poindexter, Appellees (Defendant-Intervenors).
    No. 49S00-1203-PL-172.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    March 26, 2013.

      Andrew W. Hull, Alice M. Morical, Hoover Hull, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, John M. West, Joshua B. Shiffrin, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, Washington, D.C., Alice O’Brien, Kristen L. Hollar, National Education Association, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Appellants.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General, Heather Hagan McVeigh, Ashley Tatman Harwell, Tamara Weaver, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
    J. Lee McNeely, McNeely Stephenson Thopy & Harrold, Shelbyville, IN, William H. Mellor, Robert W. Gall, Richard D. Komer, Institute for Justice, Arlington, VA, Attorneys for Intervenor Appellees.
    Eric M. Hylton, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Americans United for Separation of Church and State.
    Kevin D. Koons, Kroger, Gardis & Re-gas, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Eric Rass-bach, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C., for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.
    Michael A. Wilkins, Broyles Kight & Ricafort, Indianapolis, IN, Bryan H. Beau-man, Alliance Defense Fund, Paris, KY, Gregory S. Baylor, Alliance Defense Fund, Washington, D.C., John S. (Jay) Mercer, Mercer Belanger, Indianapolis, IN, Joshua D. Hershberger, Castor and Hershberger, Madison, IN, for The Christian Academy of Madison, Evansville Christian School, Heritage Christian School, Liberty Christian School, Lighthouse Christian Academy, Indiana Catholic Schools of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Indianapolis, Evansville, Fort Wayne-South Bend, Gary and Lafayette, and the Indiana Non-Public Education Association.
    Christopher J. Braun, Josh S. Tatum, Plews Shadley Racher & Braun, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for The Council of Christian Colleges and Universities, Holy Cross College, and Marian University.
    Geoffrey Slaughter, Peter J. Prettyman, Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice.
    Joel D. Hand, The Law Offices of Joel D. Hand, Indianapolis, IN, William R. Groth, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Lisa F. Tan-selle, Indiana School Boards Association, Indianapolis, IN, for The Indiana Coalition for Public Education, the Indiana School Boards Association, the Indiana Association of Public School Superintendents, and the Indiana Association of School Business Officials.
    David J. Hensel, Pence Hensel, LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Chance D. Weldon, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, for The Pacific Legal Foundation.

       Glenda Ritz was one of the original plaintiffs in this action. In the ensuing general election of November 2012, she defeated Tony Bennett, the incumbent Superintendent of Public Instruction, and thus Superintendent Ritz has been substituted for Superintendent Bennett as a defendant-appellee pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(C)(1) (“When a public officer who is sued in an official capacity dies, resigns or otherwise no longer holds public office, the officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.”). By function of the same rule, Governor Mike Pence was substituted for Governor Mitch Daniels. Following her taking office, Superintendent Ritz moved to withdraw from this appeal as a plaintiff-appellant, which motion we grant.

   On Transfer Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 56(A)

DICKSON, Chief Justice.

Asserting violation of three provisions of the Indiana Constitution, the plaintiffs challenge Indiana’s statutory program for providing vouchers to eligible parents for their use in sending their children to private schools. Finding that the challengers have not satisfied the high burden required to invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds, we affirm the trial court’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of the statutory voucher program.

As a preliminary matter, we emphasize that the issues before this Court do not include the public policy merits of the school voucher program. Whether the Indiana program is wise educational or public policy is not a consideration germane to the narrow issues of Indiana constitutional law that are before us. Our individual policy preferences are not relevant. In the absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of school choice are matters to be resolved through the political process.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment denying relief in an action brought by several Indiana taxpayers (collectively “plaintiffs”) against the Governor, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Director of the Department of Education of the State of Indiana who were joined by defendant-intervenors, two parents intending to use the program at issue to send their children to private elementary and high schools (collectively “defendants”). The plaintiffs’ lawsuit challenges the Choice Scholarship Program, a program enacted by the Indiana General Assembly, Ind.Code §§ 20-51-4-1 to -11, through which “the State provides vouchers called ‘choice scholarships’ to eligible students to attend private schools instead of the public schools they otherwise would attend.” Appellants’ Br. at 3. The plaintiffs contend that the school voucher program violates Article 8, Section l, and Article 1, Sections 4 and 6, of the Indiana Constitution “both because it uses taxpayer funds to pay for the teaching of religion to Indiana schoolchildren and because it purports to provide those children’s publicly funded education by paying tuition for them to attend private schools rather than the ‘general and uniform system of Common Schools’ the Constitution mandates.” Id. at 12. At the trial court, the plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors each moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted the defendant-intervenors’ motion. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendants filed a verified joint motion to transfer jurisdiction to this Court under Appellate Rule 56(A). After consideration, we granted the motion and assumed jurisdiction over the case. For reasons expressed below, we now find that the school voucher program does not violate Article 8, Section 1; Article 1, Section 4; or Article 1, Section 6. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

The plaintiffs contend that the voucher-program statute is unconstitutional on its face and thus embrace a heavy burden of proof. “When a party claims that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the claimant assumes the burden of demonstrating that there are no set of circumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally applied.” Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999). Moreover, in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, “every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality unless clearly overcome by a contrary showing.” Id. at 338; see also State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ind.1992) (“The burden is on the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute, and all doubts are resolved against that party.”). Our method of interpreting and applying provisions of the Indiana Constitution is well-established, requiring

a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it. Furthei’more, the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision. In order to give life to their intended meaning, we examine the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. In construing the constitution, we look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. The language of each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular deference, as though every word had been hammered into place.

Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind.2003) (quoting City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind.2001)); accord Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481, 484 (2006).

“In reviewing an appeal of a motion for summary judgment ruling, we apply the same standard applicable to the trial court.” Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc. v. OPC, Inc., 973 N.E.2d 1099, 1110 (Ind.2012) (citing Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200, 202 (Ind.2010)). Review is limited to those facts designated to the trial court, Ind. Trial Rule 56(H), and summary judgment shall be granted where the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” T.R. 56(C). “All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.2001). When faced with competing motions for summary judgment, our analysis is unchanged and “we consider each motion separately construing the facts most favorably to the non-moving party in each instance.” Presbytery of Ohio Valley, 973 N.E.2d at 1110 (quoting Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ind.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The issues presented by the parties’ motions are issues of law, not fact, and our review is limited accordingly.

2. The Challenged Legislation

The parties’ designated evidence reveals the following relevant facts. The school voucher program (denominated by the legislature as the “Choice Scholarship Program”) was enacted by the General Assembly in 2011, Pub. L. No. 92-2011, § 10, 2011 Ind. Acts 1024, and permits eligible students to obtain scholarships (also called “vouchers”) that may be used toward tuition at participating nonpublic schools in Indiana. See Ind.Code § 20-51-1^4.5 (defining “Eligible individual”); id. § 20-51-1-4.7 (defining “Eligible school”). To be eligible for the voucher program, a student must live in a “household with an annual income of not more than one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the amount required for the individual to qualify for the federal free or reduced price lunch program.” Id. § 20-51-1-4.5. The voucher amount is determined from statutorily defined criteria pegged to the federal free or reduced price lunch program with the maximum voucher being “ninety percent (90%) of the state tuition support amount,” id. § 20-51-4-4, designated for the student in the public “school corporation in which the eligible individual has legal settlement.” Id. § 20-51^4-5. To be eligible to receive program students, a nonpublic school must meet several criteria, including accreditation from the Indiana State Board of Education (“Board of Education”) or other recognized accreditation agency, administration of the Indiana statewide testing for educational progress (ISTEP), and participation in the Board of Education’s school improvement program under Indiana Code Section 20-31-8-3. Id. § 20-51-1-4.7. Participation in the program does not subject participating schools to “regulation of curriculum content, religious instruction or activities, classroom teaching, teacher and staff hiring requirements, and other activities carried out by the eligible school,” id. § 20-51-4-1 (a)(1), except that the school must meet certain minimum instructional requirements which correspond to the mandatory curriculum in Indiana public schools and nonpublic schools accredited by the Board of Education. Compare id. § 20-51-4-l(b) to (h) (providing the instructional requirements for voucher-program schools), with id. § 20-30-5-0.5 to - 19 (providing the mandatory curriculum for Indiana public schools and nonpublic schools accredited by the Board of Education). The requirements include instruction in Indiana and United States history and government, social studies, language arts, mathematics, sciences, fíne arts, and health. Id. § 20-51-4-l(b) to (h).

Participation in the school voucher program is entirely voluntary with respect to eligible students and their families. In order to participate, in addition to the eligibility requirements, students and schools must submit an application to the Indiana Department of Education (“Department”). See 512 Ind. Admin. Code 4-1-2, -3, available at http://www.in.gov/ legislative/iac/T05120/A00040.PDF; see also Ind.Code § 20-51-4-7 (requiring the Department to adopt rules to implement the voucher program). The fact that a student’s family might meet the statutory eligibility qualifications does not require them to participate in the voucher program and to select a program-eligible school. The parents of an eligible student are thus free to select any program-eligible school or none at all. The voucher program does not alter the makeup or availability of Indiana public or charter schools. In accepting program students, eligible schools are free to maintain and apply their preexisting admissions standards except that “[a]n eligible school may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.” Ind.Code § 20-51 — 4-3(a), (b). The program statute is silent with respect to religion, imposing no religious requirement or restriction upon student or school eligibility, see generally id. § 20-51-4-1 to -11; § 20-51-1-4.5, -4.7, and as of October 2011, most of the schools that had sought and received approval from the Department to participate in the voucher program were religiously affiliated, Appellants’ App’x at 209-14. When a voucher is awarded, the Department distributes the funds, provided that the distribution is endorsed by both the parent and the eligible school. Id. § 20-51 — 4-10; 512 I.A.C. 4-l-4(b). Once distributed, the voucher program places no specific restrictions on the use of the funds.

3. Article 8, Section 1

The plaintiffs contend that Article 8, Section 1, by directing the General Assembly “to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools,” prohibits the legislature from providing for the education of Indiana schoolchildren by any other means. In this respect, the plaintiffs argue that the specific directive for a system of public schools supersedes the other directive of Article 8, Section 1.

As we have previously stated, Article 8, Section 1 (“Education Clause”), articulates two distinct duties of the General Assembly with respect to education in Indiana.

After its precatory introduction stressing the importance of knowledge and learning to the preservation of a free government, the text of the Education Clause expresses two duties of the General Assembly. The first is the duty to encourage moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement. The second is the duty to provide for a general and uniform system of open common schools without tuition.

Bonner ex rel Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind.2009) (footnote omitted). We find this evident from the text of the Education Clause, which “is particularly valuable because it ‘tells us how the voters who approved the Constitution understood it, whatever the expressed intent of the framers in debates or other clues.’ ” Id. at 519-20 (quoting McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 983 (Ind.2000)). That clause states:

Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.

Ind. Const, art. 8, § 1 (emphasis added). The framers use of the conjunction “and” plainly suggests that the phrases are separate and distinct. That is, the Education Clause is logically read in this way: “it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage ...; and [it shall be the duty of the General Assembly] to provide....” Id.

This view is reinforced by a comparison of the present language to that used in Indiana’s first Constitution from 1816. The first section of the education provision of -the 1816 Constitution ends with the following directive:

The General Assembly shall from, [sic] time to time, pass such laws as shall be calculated to encourage intellectual, Sci-entifical, and agricultural improvement, by allowing rewards and immunities for the promotion and improvement of arts, sciences, commerce, manufactures, and natural history; and to countenance and encourage the principles of humanity, honesty, industry, and morality.

Ind. Const, of 1816, art. IX, § 1. This language bears a substantial similarity to the first duty articulated in the Education Clause of the 1851 Constitution and clearly expresses that the legislature “shall ... pass ... laws ” to carry out the directive. Id. (emphasis added). As we have previously noted, the second duty, the directive to the legislature to establish the system of common schools, was also adapted from the 1816 Constitution. Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 520-21; Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 487-88. However, that duty, in its 1816 form, was located in a different section. See Ind. Const. of 1816, art. IX, § 2. Additionally, this section contained discretionary language directing the legislature, “as soon as circumstances will permit, to provide, by law, for a general system of education.” Id, (emphasis added); see also Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 488 (discussing the removal of the phrase “as soon as circumstances will permit” from the 1851 education provision). Hence, the first duty (“to encourage”) could be fulfilled without simultaneously fulfilling the second duty (“to provide”). Accordingly, the framers and ratifiers of the 1816 Constitution could only have viewed these two duties as separate and distinct imperatives. The use of the conjunction “and” in the 1851 Constitution is a strong indication that this view, separate and distinct duties, was also intended by the framers and ratifiers of the current Education Clause. This distinction suggests that the General Assembly’s duty “to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement” is to be carried out m addition to provision for the common school system. Though we have observed that this duty is “general and aspirational” and not well suited to judicial enforceability, Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 520, this by no means lessens the efficacy of the imperative. In fact, broad legislative discretion appears to have been the framers’ intent through the inclusion of the phrase “by all suitable means.” The method and means of fulfilling this duty is thus delegated to the sound legislative discretion of the General Assembly, and where, as here, the exercise of that discretion does not run afoul of the Constitution, it is not for the judiciary to evaluate the prudence of the chosen policy.

As to the history and purpose of Article 8, we are guided by our previous reviews of the topic in Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 485-89, and Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 521-22. The history leading up to the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention and the debates at the Convention itself reveal that the framers sought to establish “a uniform statewide system of public schools that would be supported by taxation.” Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 489; see also Martha McCarthy and Ran Zhang, The Uncertain Promise of Free Public Schooling, in The History of Indiana Law 213, 215 (David J. Bodenhamer and Hon. Randall T. Shepard eds., 2006) (“The [1816] constitutional directive that the General Assembly provide for a general system of education ‘as soon as circumstances will permit’ was so flexible that there was little significant progress toward providing for such a system.”). The General Assembly has carried out this mandate by enacting “a body of law directed at providing a general and uniform system of public schools. It is detailed, comprehensive, and includes among other things provisions for revenue and funding sources, curriculum requirements, and an assortment of special programs and projects.” Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 491 (citing Indiana Code Titles 20 and 21). Under the school voucher program, this public school system remains in place.

The plaintiffs nevertheless contend that by “enacting a program that could divert to private schools as many as 60% of Indiana’s schoolchildren ... the General Assembly has departed from the mandate of a ‘general and uniform system of Common Schools.’ ” Appellants’ Br. at 31. However, that a significant number of students may be eligible for the voucher program does not mean that there is “no set of circumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally applied.” Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d at 337. Even if we were to apply the plaintiffs’ 60% hypothesis and assume that the families of all such program-eligible students utilize the program, so long as a “uniform” public school system, “equally open to all” and “without charge,” is maintained, the General Assembly has fulfilled the duty imposed by the Education Clause. The plaintiffs proffer no evidence that maximum participation in the voucher program will necessarily result in the elimination of the Indiana public school system. The school voucher program does not replace the public school system, which remains in place and available to all Indiana schoolchildren in accordance with the dictates of the Education Clause.

In challenging the voucher program under Article 8, Section 1, the plaintiffs rely heavily on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392 (Fla.2006), in which the court found that the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program, a program similar to Indiana’s school voucher program, violated Article IX, Section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 412. In its textual analysis of the constitutional provision at issue, the court focused on the second and third sentences of section 1(a), reading them in pari materia. Id. at 406-07. The court found that the second sentence, which states that it is the “paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders,” expressed a mandate to the legislature to provide education for Florida schoolchildren, while the third sentence, “[ajdequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education,” represented a restriction on the execution of that mandate by defining what was meant by “adequate provision.” Id. at 407. The court therefore held that the Florida program violated section 1(a) by “devoting the state’s resources to the education of children within [Florida] through means other than a system of free public schools.” Id.

The Florida Supreme Court distinguished its education article from the education article found in the Wisconsin Constitution, under which a similar challenge to a similar program had been brought. See id. at 407 n. 10. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program against a challenge under Article X, Section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis.2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992); see also Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis.2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998) (upholding expansion of the Wisconsin program). While acknowledging that the education article in Davis was similar to the third sentence of section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution, the Florida court emphasized the fact that the Wisconsin education article did not “contain language analogous to the statement in article IX, section 1(a) that it is ‘a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of children residing within its borders.’ ” Holmes, 919 So.2d at 407 n. 10.

Like the Wisconsin Constitution, the Indiana Constitution contains no analogous “adequate provision” clause. And while the in pari materia reading of the second and third sentences of Florida’s education article led the Florida Supreme Court to determine that the second sentence acted as a mandate and the third acted as a restriction, as noted above, we understand the imperatives of Article 8, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution as imposing two distinct duties on the General Assembly. See Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 520. Thus, the second duty of Article 8, Section 1, “to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools,” even when applied in pari mate-ria, cannot be read as a restriction on the first duty of the General Assembly to “encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement.” Because both the language and the method of analysis of Florida’s constitution differ from those of Indiana, we are not persuaded by any attempt to analogize the two education articles.

The plaintiffs further argue that the voucher program does not “comply with the additional mandates of [the Education Clause] that the schools be ‘uniform,’ ‘equally open to all,’ and ‘without charge.’ ” Appellants’ Br. at 34. However, as discussed above, the Education Clause directs the legislature generally to encourage improvement in education in Indiana, and this imperative is broader than and in addition to the duty to provide for a system of common schools. Each may be accomplished without reference to the other. Considering that the voucher-program statute does not alter the structure or components of the public school system, see generally Ind.Code §§ 20-51-4-1 to -11, it appears to fall under the first imperative (“to encourage”) and not the second (“to provide”). The General Assembly’s “specific task with performance standards (‘general and uniform,’ ‘tuition without charge,’ and ‘equally open to all’),” Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 520, falls under the second imperative, “to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of'Common Schools,” Ind. Const. art. 8, § 1, and is not implicated by the school voucher program.

We conclude that plaintiffs have not established that the school voucher program conflicts with Article 8, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution, and summary judgment for the defendants was thus proper as to this issue.

4. Article 1, Section 4

The plaintiffs assert that the school voucher program violates Article 1, Section 4, of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the voucher program is contrary to the decree that “no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 4.

We have previously held that the religious liberty protections in the Indiana Constitution “were not intended merely to mirror the federal First Amendment.” City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 446.

When Indiana’s present constitution was adopted in 1851, the framers who drafted it and the voters who ratified it did not copy or paraphrase the 1791 language of the federal First Amendment. Instead, they adopted seven separate and specific provisions, Sections 2 through 8 of Article 1, relating to religion.

Id. at 445-46 (footnote omitted). For the most part, these separate provisions, including Section 4, were adapted from the 1816 Constitution. With respect to Section 4, we are guided by our examination in City Chapel, where we found that “there is little from the convention debates to amplify our understanding of the language of Section 4.” Id. at 448. And thus the text of Section 4 is “our primary source for discerning the common understanding of the framers and ratifiers.” Id.

The plaintiffs’ argument under Section 4 focuses on the framers’ text declaring that “no person shall be compelled to ... support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 4 (emphasis added). The word “support,” the plaintiffs contend, “includes the compelled payment of taxes that are used for religious purposes,” whether the tax is a specific directive (e.g., forced contributions to a religious entity or a direct tax specifically earmarked for religious purposes), or general tax revenues used to “support” religious entities. Appellants’ Br. at 16; see also id. at 16-17 n. 14 (responding to the trial court’s ruling).

This argument improperly expands the language of Section 4 and conflates it with that of Section 6. The former explicitly prohibits a person from being “compelled to attend, erect, or support” a place of worship or a ministry against his consent. Tin's clause is a restraint upon government compulsion of individuals to engage in religious practices absent their consent. To limit the government’s taxing and spending related to religious matters, the framers crafted Section 6, which restrains government not as to its compulsion of individuals, but rather its expenditure of funds for certain prohibited purposes. (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 6.) The two clauses were drafted to specify separate and distinct objectives in their respective restraints upon government: Section 6 prohibiting expenditures to benefit religious or theological institutions, and Section 4 prohibiting compulsion of individuals related to attendance, erection, or support of places of worship or ministry. “Worship” is a distinctively ecclesiastical function, and “[tjhere is evidence that the noun ‘ministry,’ aside from its secular meanings, was understood at the time to mean ‘[e]cclesiastical function or profession; agency or service of a minister of the gospel or clergymen in the modern church, or priests, apostles, and evangelists in the ancient.’ ” Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 161 (plurality) (quoting Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 716 (1856)). We view these language distinctions between Sections 4 and 6 to be purposeful. See Warren v. Ind. Tel. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 101—02, 26 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1940) (citing State ex. rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 353, 21 N.E. 244, 245 (1889)) (“It has been said that the language of each provision of the Constitution is to be considered as though every word had been hammered into place.”); Noble, 118 Ind. at 353, 21 N.E. at 245 (“But written constitutions are the product of deliberate thought. Words are hammered and crystallized into strength, and if ever there is power in words, it is in the, words of a written constitution.”); accord Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 484; Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 160; City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 447. The religious liberty protections addressed by Section 4 prohibited government compulsion of individuals and was neither intended nor understood to limit government expenditures, which is addressed by Section 6.

We hold that Indiana’s school voucher program does not violate Article 1, Section 4, of the Indiana Constitution, and that summary judgment for the defendants was thus proper as to this issue.

5. Article 1, Section 6

The plaintiffs also assert that the school voucher program violates Article 1, Section 6, of the Indiana Constitution, which provides: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.” Ind. Const, art. 1, § 6. In assessing whether the program violates this clause, two issues are potentially implicated: (A) whether the program involves government expenditures for benefits of the type prohibited by Section 6, and (B) whether the eligible schools at which the parents can use the vouchers are “religious or theological institution[s]” as envisioned by Section 6. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the school voucher program independently satisfies each of these two concerns, and thus for each reason does not run afoul of Section 6.

A. Permissibility of Expenditures for Benefits

We first find it inconceivable that the framers and ratifiers intended to expansively prohibit any and all government expenditures from which a religious or theological institution derives a benefit— for example, fire and police protection, municipal water and sewage service, sidewalks and streets, and the like. Certainly religious or theological institutions may derive relatively substantial benefits from such municipal services. But the primary beneficiary is the public, both the public affiliated with the religious or theological institution, and the general public. Any benefit to religious or theological institutions in the above examples, though potentially substantial, is ancillary and indirect. We hold today that the proper test for examining whether a government expenditure violates Article 1, Section 6, is not whether a religious or theological institution substantially benefits from the expenditure, but whether the expenditure directly benefits such an institution. To hold otherwise would put at constitutional risk every government expenditure incidentally, albeit substantially, benefiting any religious or theological institution. Such interpretation would be inconsistent with our obligation to presume that legislative enactments are constitutional and, if possible, to construe statutes in a manner that renders them constitutional. Section 6 prohibits government expenditures that directly benefit any religious or theological institution. Ancillary indirect benefits to such institutions do not render improper those government expenditures that are otherwise permissible.

As to this “benefits” issue, the plaintiffs contend that the program is unconstitutional under the reasoning of Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d at 160-67 (plurality), in which we reviewed a Section 6 challenge to the use of public funds for programs in parochial schools. In Embry, four Indiana taxpayers brought suit challenging the Indiana dual-enrollment program. Id. at 158. The dual-enrollment program permitted “nonpublic school students enrolled in at least one specific class in the public school corporation to be counted in the [public school] corporation’s ADM [ (Average Daily Membership) ].” Id. at 159. This provided the participating public school corporations with additional funding (proportional to the increase in ADM) and provided “various secular instructional services to private school students, on the premises of the private school, ... [including] fitness and health, art, foreign language, study skills, verbal skills, music, and computer technology (including internet services).” Id. at 158-59. The plaintiffs in Embry contended that the dual-enrollment program “results in money being drawn from the state treasury to benefit parochial schools” in contravention of Article 1, Section 6, of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 160. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Embry asserted that “the dual-enrollment agreements provide specific benefits to parochial schools because they make it unnecessary for the schools to hire and pay as many teachers, and because the schools may use the resources thus saved to expand curriculum and attract students.” Id. at 166-67.

The holding in Embry was unanimous in concluding that the dual-enrollment program did not violate Section 6. Id. at 167 (three justices concurred in result). We noted that, in determining compliance with this clause, Indiana case law “has interpreted Section 6 to permit the State to contract with religious institutions for goods or services, notwithstanding possible incidental benefit to the institutions, and to prohibit the use of public funds only when directly used for such institutions’ activities of a religious nature.” Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 167 (plurality); see State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940); Ctr. Twp. of Marion Cnty. v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). It was this rubric that we applied in Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 166-67 (plurality).

We now recognize, however, that our language and holding in Embry was less than plain, and the division of our votes and separate opinions somewhat inconclusive. We thus take this opportunity to revisit and resolve the issue. Our use of the phrase “substantial benefits” in Embry was not intended, as the plaintiffs here appear to have understood it, to denote a measurable line after which any benefit to a religious or theological institution becomes unconstitutional. See id. at 167 (plurality) (“[T]he dual-enrollment programs permitted in Indiana do not confer substantial benefits upon any religious or theological institution.... ”). Such is neither conducive to judicial application nor a workable guide for the legislature. Rather than a quantifiable sum, “substantial benefit” was used in the context of determining the primary or direct beneficiary under the program at issue.

The plaintiffs assert that “the absence of any requirement that participating schools segregate the public funds they receive... necessarily will directly fund the religious activities that take place in these schools,” and that the voucher program “substantially” benefits these schools financially and by “promoting] these schools’ religious mission” by adding to their enrollment students who otherwise would not be able to afford the tuition. Appellants’ Br. at 20-21. We disagree because the principal actors and direct beneficiaries under the voucher program are neither the State nor program-eligible schools, but lower-income Indiana families with school-age children.

The direct beneficiaries under the voucher program are the families of eligible students and not the schools selected by the parents for their children to attend. The voucher program does not directly fund religious activities because no funds may be dispersed to any program-eligible school without the private, independent selection by the parents of a program-eligible student. Participation in the voucher program is entirely voluntary for parents of eligible students. Beyond the requirement that the non-public schools meet the benchmark curriculum requirements in order to be eligible to receive program students — eligibility which is in no way limited to religious schools — the State plays no role in the selection of program schools. The funds are provided for the eligible students’ education, and the parents determine where that education will be received. Thus, any benefits that may be derived by program-eligible schools are ancillary to the benefit conferred on families with program-eligible children. As the plaintiffs acknowledge, the tuition costs required to attend a nonpublic school generally foreclose the option for lower-income families. Id. at 21 (“[Education to children who otherwise would not have received it.... [C]hildren who otherwise would not be exposed to it”). The voucher program helps alleviate this barrier by providing lower-income Indiana families with the educational options generally available primarily to higher-income Indiana families. The result is a direct benefit to these lower-income famines — the provision of a wider array of education options, a valid secular purpose. Any benefit to program-eligible schools, religious or non-religious, derives from the private, independent choice of the parents of program-eligible students, not the decree of the State, and is thus ancillary and incidental to the benefit conferred on these families.

The plaintiffs respond- that the notion that the “State is simply giving away tax revenues to citizens who are free to make their own decisions about how to use those funds” is a “pretense” and “grossly misleading.” Id. at 27. They contend that the parents of program-eligible students “have no discretion” because the funds may only be used for tuition at program-eligible schools. Id. But the schools eligible under the program are not limited to religious schools. The parents are not limited to choosing religious schools. Nor are the parents required to participate in the voucher program, but may keep their children in a public or charter school. We find that the only direct beneficiaries of the school voucher program are the participating parents and their children, and not religious schools. The program does not contravene Section 6 by impermissibly providing direct benefits to religious institutions.

B. Schools As “Religious or Theological Institution[s]” Under Section 6

In Embry, the lead 'opinion began to explore whether the framers and ratifiers of Indiana’s 1851 Constitution intended the phrase “religious or theological institution[s]” to include schools and educational institutions. See Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 161-64 (plurality). In reviewing the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention and the context of its contemporaneous history, however, we did find that to the extent that primary and secondary education was available to Indiana children, it was predominantly provided by private or religious entities. Id. at 162 (quoting Donald F. Carmony, Indiana 1816-1850: The Pioneer Era 893 (1998)) (“By 1845-50, it is estimated that ‘less than half of the youth between ages five and twenty-one attended such schools for as much as three months in a year’ and ‘[n]umerous of these schools were private or denominational schools, recognized and in part financed from taxes and proceeds from public school funds.’ ”). It was generally accepted that the teaching of religious subject matter was an essential component of such general education. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for a General System of Common Schools, [etc.], 1865 Ind. Acts 1, § 167, reprinted in 1 Edwin A. Davis, Statutes of the State of Indiana 815 (1876) (“The bible shall not be excluded from the public schools of the state.”); Richard G. Boone, A History of Education in Indiana 267 (1892) (noting the Board of Education’s recommended textbooks in the 1850’s and 1860’s, which included The American School Hymn Book and The Bible); McCarthy & Zhang, supra, at 226-27. While certainly favorable to advancing the role of government in providing education through common schools, the framers did not manifest an intent to exclude religious teaching from such publicly financed schools. See, e.g., Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 163 n. 5.

We are also mindful that in 1851, when Indiana’s framers and ratifiers adopted Section 6, they were crafting the sole limits upon state government with respect to religion. The U.S. Constitution was not a factor. The First Amendment had not yet been extended to apply to state government. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250, 8 L.Ed. 672, 675 (1833) (“These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government — not against those of the local governments. In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in Congress, and adopted by the States. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply them.”).

In light of the prevailing social, cultural, and legal circumstances when Indiana’s Constitution was enacted, we understand Section 6 as not intended to prohibit government support of primary and secondary education which at the time included a substantial religious component. This interpretation is consistent with the presumption of constitutionality which we apply when reviewing a claim of statutory unconstitutionality.

For these reasons, we hold that the phrase “religious or theological institution[s]” in Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution was not intended to, nor does it now, apply to preclude government expenditures for functions, programs, and institutions providing primary and secondary education.

Thus, we separately and independently find as to each of the two issues that the school voucher program does not contravene Section 6. First, the voucher program expenditures do not directly benefit religious schools but rather directly benefit lower-income families with schoolchildren by providing an opportunity for such children to attend non-public schools if desired. Second, the prohibition against government expenditures to benefit religious or theological institutions does not apply to institutions and programs providing primary and secondary education. Summary judgment for the defendants was thus proper as to the plaintiffs’ Section 6 claims.

Conclusion

We hold that the Indiana school voucher program, the Choice Scholarship Program, is within the legislature’s power under Article 8, Section 1, and that the enacted program does not violate either Section 4 or Section 6 of Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

RUCKER, DAVID, MASSA, RUSH, JJ., concur.

      . [Article 8,] Section 1. Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.

      . [Article 1,] Section 4. No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.

      . [Article 1,] Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.

      . As taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional use of public funds, the plaintiffs have standing "under Indiana's public standing doctrine, an exception to the general requirement that a plaintiff must have an interest in the outcome of the litigation different from that of the general public.” Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 159-60 (Ind.2003) (citing Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind.2003); Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 n. 3 (Ind.1990); Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind.1985)).

      .Appellate Rule 56(A) provides:
      A. Motion Before Consideration by the Court of Appeals. In rare cases, the Supreme Court may, upon verified motion of a party, accept jurisdiction over an appeal that would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals upon a showing that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists requiring a speedy determination. If the Supreme Court grants the motion, it will transfer the case to the Supreme Court, where the case shall proceed as if it had been originally filed there. If a filing fee has already been paid in the Court of Appeals, no additional filing fee is required.
      Ind. Appellate Rule 56(A) (emphasis omitted).

      . A "facial challenge” is a claim that a statute, as written (i.e. "on its face”), cannot be constitutionally implemented. See Black’s Law Dictionary 261 (9th ed. 2009) (“A [facial challenge is a] claim that a statute ... always operates unconstitutionally.”). A statute may also be challenged "as applied," that is, that the "statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or in its application to a particular party.” Id.

      . Section 5 of the voucher-program statute specifies the baseline state tuition amount which is the total tuition support for the school corporation in which the eligible student lives (less some specific grants) divided by the average daily membership of the school corporation. Ind.Code § 20-51-4-5. Section 4 specifies how that baseline amount is applied to determine the voucher amount.
      Sec. 4. The maximum amount to which an eligible individual is entitled under this chapter for a school year is equal to the least of the following:
      (1) The sum of the tuition, transfer tuition, and fees required for enrollment or attendance of the eligible student at the eligible school selected by the eligible individual for a school year that the eligible individual (or the parent of the eligible individual) would otherwise be obligated to pay to the eligible school.
      (2) An amount equal to:
      (A) ninety percent (90%) of the state tuition support amount determined under section 5 of this chapter if the eligible individual is a member of a household with an annual income of not more than the amount required for the individual to qualify for the federal free or reduced price lunch program; and
      (B) fifty percent (50%) of the state tuition support amount determined under section 5 of this chapter if the eligible individual is a member of a household with an annual income of not more than one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the amount required for the individual to qualify for the federal free or reduced price lunch program.
      (3)If the eligible individual is enrolled in grade 1 through 8, the maximum choice scholarship that the eligible individual may receive for a school year is four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500).

        Id. § 20-51-4-4.

      . In order to be "eligible,” a school must not be "a charter school or the school corporation in which an eligible individual has legal settlement.” Ind.Code § 20-51-1-4.7(6). That is, the school must be outside the defined geographical boundary of the student’s charter or public school corporation.

      . To be eligible, students must be between five (5) to twenty-two (22) years of age. Ind. Code § 20-51-1-4.5(2). Thus, some eligible students, having reached the age of majority, may utilize the program of their own volition. However, common sense suggests that most eligible students will be minors and the actions and decisions regarding their school attendance will be made by their parent(s) or guardian(s). For ease of readability, we will thus refer to the decisions of parents and families throughout the remainder of this opinion.

      . The distinction here was aptly demonstrated by the brief of amicus curiae The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, which contended that the plaintiffs would have this Court read the Education Clause to say: "[I]t shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and-to-provide [by providing], by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all." See Friedman Found, for Educ. Choice Br. at 13. We note that the framers could have accomplished the same by including other simple language, such as "it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement [in the common schools]; .... ” We reject such an expansive reading as inconsistent with the words the framers chose and the people ratified.

      . As we noted in Bonner, the precatory language of the 1851 Education Clause also appears to have been adapted from its predecessors. See Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 520 n. 4 (noting the similarities in the precatory language of the education provisions in the 1851 and 1816 constitutions and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787).

      . "It shall be the duty of the General [A]s-sembly, as soon as circumstances will permit, to provide, by law, for a general system of education, ascending in a regular gradation. from township schools to a state university, wherein tuition shall be gratis, and equally open to all.” Ind. Const, of 1816, art. IX, § 2.

      . The plaintiffs’ contention appears to be founded, in part, upon the fact that the funding of an individual public school will be reduced commensurate to the number of voucher-program students withdrawing to attend other schools. However, this is equally so when a student transfers to another public or charter school, withdraws to attend a private school using personal funds, or withdraws to homeschool. See Ind.Code §§ 20-43-4-1 to -8 (providing the criteria for determining enrollment and calculation of the Average Daily Membership for public schools for purposes of determining tuition support).

      . Article DC, Section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution reads, in relevant part: "The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.”

      . Meaning "[o]n the same subject; relating to the same matter.” Black's, supra note 6, at 862. "It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject." Id.

      . Article X, Section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution states, in relevant part: "The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.”

      . Likewise, we are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention that we apply the canon of construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," or "the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” See Holmes, 919 So.2d at 407. First, the use of canons of construction is unnecessary where our constitutional analysis leads unmistakably to a given result. Second, as discussed above, the first mandate given to the General Assembly ("to encourage, by all suitable means ..."), Ind. Const. art. 8, § 1 (emphasis added), is a broad delegation of legislative discretion. We decline to so limit that discretion contrary to the framers’ intent.

      . The same is true with respect to the plaintiffs’ contention that the constitutional provision for the "Common School fund,” Ind. Const, art. 8, § 2, which funds may be "appropriated to the support of Common Schools, and to no other purpose whatever,” id, art. 8, § 3, implies that the General Assembly may only "fulfill its educational responsibility” through the public school system. Appellants’ Br. at 33-34. That the school fund may only be used for support of the public schools, in no way limits the legislature’s prerogative to appropriate other general funds to fulfill its duty to encourage educational improvement in Indiana.

      . [Article 1,] Section 4. No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.

      . We acknowledge that a dispute exists among other states with respect to similar provisions. See, e.g., Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 169 Vt. 310, 738 A.2d 539 (1999) (concluding that, where neither party disputed the meaning of "support,” reimbursements paid to a parochial school violated the "compelled support clause” of the Vermont Constitution because the schools were "places of worship”). However, the opposite conclusion was reached in Wisconsin, one of the states from whom our Section 6 was borrowed, see Journal of the Convention of the People of the State of Indiana to Amend the Constitution 964 (Austin H. Brown ed., 1851), based upon nearly identical constitutional language and arguments. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 622-23 ("The Respondents additionally argue that the amended [voucher program] violates the 'compelled support clause’ of art. I, § 18. The compelled support clause provides ‘nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry without consent....’ The Respondents assert that since public funds eventually flow to religious institutions under the amended [voucher program], taxpayers are compelled to support places of worship against their consent. This argument is identical to the Respondents' argument under the benefits clause. We will not interpret the compelled support clause as prohibiting the same acts as those prohibited by the benefits clause. Rather we look for an interpretation of these two related provisions that avoids such redundancy.” (omission in original)).

      . In Embry, Justice Dickson authored the lead opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justice Rucker in full, discussing without deciding whether religious schools were “institutions” within the meaning of Section 6 and ultimately deciding the case based upon the "for the benefit of” language of Section 6. Embry, 798 N.E.2d at 160-67. Chief Justice Shepard concurred in result without any written opinion. Id. at 167. Justice Sullivan concurred in result with respect to Section 6, and otherwise concurred in part, writing an opinion with respect to the issue of standing (which was joined by Chief Justice Shepard). Id. at 167-69. Justice Boehm concurred in result, with a written opinion (joined by Justice Sullivan), disagreeing “with the majority insofar as it concludes or implies” that religious schools are not "institutions” within the meaning of Section 6, id. at 169, but ultimately "agree[ing] that the legislation involved in this case is constitutional because it does not expend funds for the benefit of a religious institution,” id. at 170. We intend today’s opinion to bring resolution to these issues.