author: NAJAM, Judge. BRADFORD, Judge,

text:
    Gayle FISCHER, Appellant, v. Michael and Noel HEYMANN, Appellees.
    No. 49A02-1204-PL-340.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    June 7, 2013.

      Gary M. Selig, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    J. David Hollingsworth, Brent R. Borg, Church, Church, Hittle & Antrim Fishers, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
   OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Gayle Fischer brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s judgment against Michael and Noel Heymann for $93,972.18 in damages on her breach-of-contract claim. Fischer requests that we vacate the trial court’s findings and conclusions on her failure to mitigate and remand with instructions to award actual and consequential damages in the amount of $286,409.43. On cross-appeal, the Hey-manns assert that the trial court’s specific findings required the court to enter a damage award of $117 for Fischer. We consolidate the parties’ arguments and consider the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court’s findings that Fischer would not have been damaged had she agreed to make the repairs identified in the inspection report on or before February 18, 2006, means that Fischer failed in her duty to mitigate her damages; and
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it limited Fischer’s award for attorney’s fees and court costs in accordance with her failure to mitigate her damages.

We hold that the Heymanns committed an anticipatory breach of the purchase agreement on February 10, 2006; that, given the evidence and the trial court’s findings, Fischer’s duty to mitigate arose on February 11, 2006, when she learned of the Heymanns’ breach; and that Fischer failed to act with reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages at her first opportunity, which was no later than February 18, 2006. We also hold that the trial court acted within its discretion when it limited Fischer’s award for attorney’s fees and costs. Based on the undisputed evidence and the trial court’s finding that Fischer would have incurred virtually no damages had she taken reasonable steps to mitigate on or before February 18, 2006, we reverse the trial court’s judgment on damages and remand with instructions that the trial court amend Fischer’s damage award to $117, reasonable attorney’s fees commensurate with that award, and court costs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 4, 2006, the Heymanns entered into a purchase agreement to purchase a condominium (the “Property”) at the One West Horizontal Property Regime (“One West”) in Indianapolis from Fischer for $315,000, with a closing date of May 31, 2006. The Heymanns agreed to pay cash for the Property. They paid $5,000 in earnest money and, pursuant to paragraph 13 of the agreement, they had the right to terminate the agreement if, upon inspection, the Heymanns

reasonably believe[d] that the Inspection Report reveal[ed] a MAJOR DEFECT with the Property and [Fischer wa]s unable or unwilling to remedy the defect. ... ‘Defect’ means a condition that would have a significant adverse effect on the value of the Property that would significantly impair the health or safety of future occupants ... or ... would significantly shorten or adversely affect the expected normal life of the premises.

Fischer v. Heymann, 943 N.E.2d 896, 898 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted), trans. denied (“Fischer I ”). On February 6, the Heymanns timely exercised their right to have the Property independently inspected for defects pursuant to paragraph 13.

The Heymanns hired an inspection company. The company inspected the Property and submitted its report to the Hey-manns. In relevant part, the inspection report noted as a “Major Concern[ ]” that “[tjhere is no electrical power to the outlets in the half bathroom and second floor bathroom and exterior outlet on the balcony.” Id. at 899 (quotations omitted). The inspection report further stated that the “light over the sink in the half bathroom did not light properly.” Defs. Trial Exh. X at 12.

On February 10, the Heymanns submitted to Fischer a “Buyer’s Inspection Response” (the “February 10 demand”) in which they agreed to accept the property if Fischer resolved the following: “Electrical power to the outlets in the half bathroom and second floor bedroom and exteri- or balcony. Light over half bath sink does not work properly (probably bulb replacement).” Id. (quotations omitted). The Heymanns reserved the right to inspect the property again prior to closing, but they demanded that Fischer respond by February 13. Fischer responded on February 13 with an Amendment to Purchase Agreement, on which she checked a box that read “[t]he time for making any responses to inspections is extended to” and wrote in “February 28, 2006.” Id. (quotations omitted). On February 15, the Hey-manns responded with their own Amendment to Purchase Agreement, in which they checked a box that read: “The time for making any responses to inspections is extended to February 18, 2006” (the “February 15 demand”). Appellant’s Addendum to Brief at 25. While paragraph 13 of the purchase agreement did not require that Fischer respond to the Heymanns’ conditions, paragraph 18 stated: “Time is of the essence. Time periods specified in this Agreement and any subsequent Addenda to the Purchase Agreement are calendar days and shall expire at midnight of the date stated unless the parties agree in writing to a different date and/or time.” Id. at 19.

On February 17, the Heymanns prepared an offer on a different condominium unit at One West and executed a mutual release from their purchase agreement with Fischer. But the Heymanns instructed their agents not to deliver the offer or the release until February 19 and only in the event that Fischer did not respond to their demand for repairs by the February 18 deadline. See Fischer I, 943 N.E.2d at 899. As Mr. Heymann later testified, “had [there] been a response by [Fischer] by the 18th ... this piece of paper [the offer on the second condominium] ... would have gone in the wastebasket. It was always on the basis of if there continued to be no response.” Trial Transcript at 33.

After Fischer did not respond to the Heymanns’ demand for repairs by February 18, on February 19 the Heymanns’ agents tendered the mutual release to Fischer, which she refused to sign. Fischer’s electrician later resolved the electrical problems by pushing the ground fault interrupter (“GFI”) reset button on the face of the wall outlets, and Fischer replaced a light bulb. Fischer’s total cost to fix the electrical problems was $117.

On May 9, Fischer sued the Heymanns for specific performance or, in the alternative, damages. The Heymanns answered and raised a third-party indemnity claim against their agents. The trial court found for the Heymanns and against Fischer after a bench trial, but, on appeal, we reversed. In particular, we concluded:

The substantive findings in the inspection report do not support an objectively reasonable belief that the defect was major. The report indicates there was no electrical power to three outlets, which could be and in fact was easily repaired. Therefore, under an objective standard, this would not have a significant adverse effect on the property’s value or significantly impair the health or safety of occupants.

Fischer I, 943 N.E.2d at 901. Accordingly, we held that “the Heymanns’ attempted termination of the purchase agreement with Fischer was ineffective,” and we remanded to the trial court with instructions that it “determine the extent of damages the Heymanns owe Fischer,” including Fischer’s reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs. Id. at 903.

On remand, the trial court bifurcated the damages hearing between the Hey-manns and Fischer and the Heymanns’ indemnification claim against their agents. After an evidentiary hearing on the damages the Heymanns owed Fischer, the court entered the following relevant findings of fact:

Seller’s Failure to Mitigate On or Before February 18, 2006
12. On February 13, 2006, [Fischer] requested until February 28, 2006[,] to respond to the [February 10 demand].
13. On February 15, 2006, [the Hey-manns] responded by allowing [Fischer] until February 18, 2006[,] to respond to them and indicate whether [Fischer] would agree to fix the electrical problems identified in the inspection report.
14. [Fischer] did not respond to [the Heymanns] at all after February 15, 2006.
15. There was uncontroverted expert testimony that twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) hours is a reasonable time period to provide a seller to agree to fix this type of problem. The [Heymanns] gave [Fischer] more than a reasonable amount of time to agree to fix the identified electrical problems. [Fischer] offered no testimony, expert or otherwise, indicating that [the Heymanns’] request was either unreasonable or that it was impossible for [Fischer] to respond within the time period provided.
* * ⅛
17. Had [Fischer] remained in contact with [the Heymanns] and informed [them] that she would be making the changes prior to closing, [the Hey-manns] would have proceeded to closing, and [Fischer] would not have been damaged or incurred any attorney fees or costs associated with the sale of [the Property] whatsoever.
18. However, as determined by the Court of Appeals, the [Heymanns’] request to void the contract was not based on an objectively reasonable belief that the electrical problems constituted a “Major Defect”.... As a result, the Court concluded that [the Heymanns] breached the Purchase Agreement as of ... February 10, 2006. This court, therefore, must determine [Fischer’s] damages.
Seller’s Failure to Mitigate on February 16, 2007
19. There was uncontroverted expert testimony that [Fischer’s] offer price for the [Property] was unreasonably high from at least the beginning of 2007 to early 2011.
20. On February 16, 2007, Joe Johnson made an offer of [$240,000] or [$79.00] per square foot on the [Property].
21. Johnson’s offer was based on comparative listings and sales of other similar units around that time. In contrast, [Fischer’s] counteroffer of [$286,000] or [$95.00] per square foot was unreasonably high. Two units sold in 2006 for [$96.00] per square foot and [$89.00] per square foot respectively. No units sold in 2007. One unit sold in 2008 for [$58.00] per square foot. The Court notes that the [Heymanns] offered expert testimony on this issue, and [Fischer] in no way contradicted that testimony or otherwise offered any skilled or expert testimony of her own.
22. Johnson’s offer of [$240,000] was the largest offer Johnson made to [Fischer] after a series of negotiations lasting over two ... weeks, and the largest offer [Fischer] ever received after [the Heymanns’] breach. [Fischer] did not accept, nor counter this offer at a more reasonable price.

Appellant’s App. at 19-22 (emphases added; original emphasis removed).

Thus, the trial court determined both that Fischer failed to mitigate her damages on or before February 18, 2006, and that she again failed to mitigate her damages a year later, on February 16, 2007. The court then entered judgment for Fischer in the amount of $93,972.18. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review and Overview

Fischer appeals, and the Hey-manns cross-appeal, the trial court’s judgment that the Heymanns owe Fischer $93,972.18 in total damages. The trial court’s judgment is based on findings of fact and conclusions thereon following an evidentiary hearing. Our two-tiered standard of review from such judgments is well established:

we determine [first] whether the evidence supports the findings[ ] and[,] second, whether the findings support the judgment. In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Those appealing the trial court’s judgment must establish that the findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them de novo.

Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (emphases added; citations omitted). “[T]he reviewing court may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ind.1998).

In general, “the measure of damages in a contract action is limited to those actually suffered....’’ Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind.1993). However, as we have explained:

the non-breaching party is not entitled to be placed in a better position than he would have been if the contract had not been broken. Indeed, the nonbreaching party, as a general rule, must mitigate his damages, and the breaching party has the burden to prove that the non-breaching party has not used reasonable diligence to mitigate its damages. Where a party does mitigate its damages, the breaching party is entitled to set off the amount of damages mitigated.

Four Seasons Mfg., Inc. v. 1001 Coliseum, LLC. 870 N.E.2d 494, 507 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citations omitted). The duty to mitigate arises when the non-breaching party learns of the breach. See, e.g., Bedford Recycling, Inc. v. U.S. Granules Corp., 634 N.E.2d 1361, 1366 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (discussing efforts the alleged non-breaching party made to mitigate its damages “upon learning that [the other party] did not intend to complete the contract”), trans. denied; see also A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Drew, 978 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (“The duty to mitigate damages ... does not arise until the promisee learns that the contract has been breached.”).

As one leading authority has explained:

As an almost inflexible proposition, a party who has been wronged by a breach of contract may not unreasonably sit idly by and allow damages to accumulate. Such damages are not proximately caused by the breach. ...
Since the purpose of the rule concerning damages is to put the injured party in as good a position as full performance of the contract would have, and that this be done at the least necessary cost to the defendant, the plaintiff never should be awarded damages for losses that could have been avoided by reasonable effort without risk of other substantial loss or injury. Likewise, gains that the injured party could have made by reasonable effort and without risk of substantial loss or injury by reason of opportunities that would not have been available to the nonbreaching party but for the other party’s breach are deducted from the amount that the plaintiff could otherwise recover.

Corbin on Contracts § 57-11 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2012) (emphases added) (“Corbin on Contracts”).

An act is the proximate cause of an injury when the injury “is a natural and probable consequence, which[,] in light of the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated.” Florio v. Tilley, 875 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). “Liability may not be imposed on an original ... actor who sets into motion a chain of events if the ultimate injury was not reasonably foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission.” Pope v. Hancock Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 937 N.E.2d 1242,1247-48 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Thus, if one is under a duty to mitigate damages, she must act promptly and efficiently to do so. See Corbin on Contracts § 57-11. The damaged party cannot sit idly by, incur additional damages, and hold the original actor liable for the additional damages.

Here, we will address the Hey-manns’ contention that, as established by the trial court’s findings, Fischer had a duty to mitigate her damages on or before February 18, 2006, immediately following their breach, which would have resulted in $117 in total damages. Because we agree with the Heymanns that Fischer could have mitigated her damages in February 2006, we need not consider the trial court’s additional findings concerning Fischer’s subsequent failure to mitigate in February 2007 or Fischer’s contention that she was unable to mitigate her damages until November 2011. We also consider Fischer’s argument that her award of attorney’s fees and costs should not be limited by the date by which she could have mitigated her damages.

Issue One: Fischer’s Duty to Mitigate On or Before February 18, 2006

On cross-appeal, the Heymanns contend that the trial court’s findings demonstrate that Fischer did not use reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages between February 11, 2006, when she learned of their breach, and February 18, 2006. We agree. Paragraphs 12 through 17 of the court’s order, located under the trial court’s heading, “Seller’s Failure to Mitigate On or Before February 18, 2006,” state as follows:

12. On February 13, 2006, [Fischer] requested until February 28, 2006[,] to respond to the [February, 10 demand].
13. On February 15, 2006, [the Hey-manns] responded by allowing [Fischer] until February 18, 2006[,] to respond to them and indicate whether [Fischer] would agree to fix the electrical problems identified in the inspection report.
14. [Fischer] did not respond to [the Heymanns] at all after February 15, 2006.
15. There was uncontroverted expert testimony that twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) hours is a reasonable time period to provide a seller to agree to fix this type of problem. The [Heymanns] gave [Fischer] more than a reasonable amount of time to agree to fix the identified electrical problems. [Fischer] offered no testimony, expert or otherwise, indicating that [the Heymanns’] request was either unreasonable or that it was impossible for [Fischer] to respond within the time period provided.
17. Had [Fischer] remained in contact with [the Heymanns] and informed [them] that she would be making the changes prior to closing, [the Hey-manns] would have proceeded to closing, and [Fischer] would not have been damaged or incurred.any attorney fees or costs associated with the sale of [the Property] whatsoever.

Appellant’s App. at 19-20 (emphases added).

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. First, Fischer testified that she was aware as early as February 11 of the Heymanns’ February 10 demand that she agree to make the electrical repairs. See Transcript at 58-59. Paragraph 14 is supported by the testimony of one of the Heymanns’ agents, who stated that the Heymanns did not receive “any kind of response” from Fischer to the February 15 demand. Transcript at 122. Paragraph 15, in which the trial court found that the Heymanns gave Fischer “more than a reasonable amount of time to fix the identified electrical problems,” is supported by the testimony of one of the Heymanns’ expert witnesses. See Appellant’s App. at 20. That witness testified that forty-eight hours to respond to a request based on an inspection report is “typieal[ ]” and allowing eight days is “out of the norm.” Transcript at 140. And in paragraph 17, the court found that, “[h]ad [Fischer] remained in contact with [the Heymanns, they] would have proceeded to closingf] and [Fischer] would not have been damaged-” Appellant’s App. at 20. That finding is supported by the facts that the transaction was to be a cash transaction, the repairs in question were insignificant, and Mr. Heymann testified they would have closed on the Property had Fischer timely responded to their February 15 demand for repairs. Trial Transcript at 33.

Thus, Fischer acted unreasonably when she “did not respond to [the Heymanns] at all after February 15, 2006,” despite the fact that the Heymanns “gave [Fischer] more than a reasonable amount of time” to do so. Appellant’s App. at 20. And, had Fischer remained in contact with the Hey-manns and informed them that she would be making the repairs prior to closing, the transaction would have proceeded to closing and Fischer “would not have been damaged or incurred any attorney fees or costs associated with the sale of [the Property] whatsoever.” Id.

Still, after finding facts that demonstrate Fischer could have mitigated but failed to mitigate her damages in February 2006, the court went on to consider Fischer’s subsequent failed transaction with Johnson in February 2007, some twelve months later, which was the basis for the court’s damage award to Fischer. These additional findings were not only unnecessary but were incompatible with the initial findings that, with a little effort, Fischer could have mitigated her damages entirely in February 2006. Because the judgment is contrary to the court’s initial findings, the judgment is clearly erroneous and must be reversed.

On appeal, Fischer challenges numerous findings of the trial court on the ground that Fischer I and the law of the case doctrine barred the court from considering her response to the Hey-manns’ demands during the February 10 to 18 time period. But questions not conclusively decided in a prior appeal do not become the law of the case. Riggs v. Burell, 619 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.1993). In Fischer I, we held only that the Hey-manns’ February 10 demand that Fischer fix identified electrical problems was not based on an objectively reasonable belief that those problems were major defects under the parties’ purchase agreement. 943 N.E.2d at 901. We expressly declined to consider the effect, if any, of Fischer’s response to the Heymanns’ demands, stating that “it is unnecessary to address the trial court’s findings and judgment regarding Fischer’s response to the Heymanns’ repair request.” Id. at 903. The holding in Fischer I did not address the issue of damages following the breach. The only issue decided in Fischer I was that a breach occurred when, on February 10, 2006, the Heymanns demanded that Fischer make minor repairs as a condition for the sale. Thus, Fischer’s reliance on the law of the case doctrine is misplaced.

We agree with Fischer that she did not have a contractual obligation under the purchase agreement to respond to the Heymanns’ demand. In Indiana, an anticipatory breach of contract excuses the other party from further performance. Page Two, Inc. v. P.C. Mgmt., Inc., 517 N.E.2d 103, 106 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (citing Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Canithan, 62 Ind.App. 567, 109 N.E. 851 (1915)). And, as a general rule, courts may not require a party acting pursuant to a contract to be “reasonable,” “fair,” or show “good faith” cooperation. See First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind. v. Key Mkts., Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ind.1990). But Fischer’s contractual obligation under the purchase agreement is not the question presented here. The question in this appeal is whether, by not responding to the Heymanns’ demands for minor repairs, Fischer suffered more damages than she would have otherwise. In other words, entirely apart from the purchase agreement, as a matter of law it was incumbent on Fischer that she act promptly, efficiently, and with reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages once she learned of the Hey-manns’ breach. See Four Seasons, 870 N.E.2d at 507 (“reasonable diligence”); see also Corbin on Contracts § 57-11 (“reasonable effort”)

Fischer further contends the Heymanns did not breach the purchase agreement until February 19, 2006, when they tendered the mutual release to her. But the record is clear that the Heymanns’ February 10 demand was an anticipatory breach of the purchase agreement. As this court has explained:

The demanding of the other party a performance to which the [first] party has no right under the contract constitutes ... an anticipatory breach.
If one party to a contract, either willfully or by mistake demands of the other a performance to which he has no right under the contract and states definitely that, unless his demand is complied with, he will not render his promised performance, an anticipatory breach has been committed. Such a repudiation is conditional in character, but the condition is a performance to which the repudiator has no right.... Where two contracting parties differ as to the interpretation of a contract or as to its legal effects, an offer to perform in accordance with his own interpretation made by one of the parties is not in itself an anticipatory breach. In order to constitute such a breach, the offer must be accompanied by a clear manifestation of intention not to perform in accordance with any other interpretation ....

Eden United, Inc. v. Short, 573 N.E.2d 920, 929 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (quoting A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 973 at 961— 62 (One Vol. ed. 1952)) (emphasis added), trans. denied.

As we stated in Fischer I, on February 10 the Heymanns submitted to Fischer a “Buyer’s Inspection Response” in which they demanded that Fischer agree to make minor repairs as a condition for closing the transaction, contrary to the purchase agreement. 943 N.E.2d at 901-03. In doing so, as the trial court expressly found on remand, the Heymanns “indicated they would accept the [Property] if [Fischer] agreed to fix the electrical power to the outlets.” Appellant’s App. at 20. That is, the Heymanns made a demand of Fischer to make minor repairs, which they had no right to demand under the contract, and they made clear that they would not close on the transaction unless Fischer agreed to make the repairs. As such, their repudiation of the contract was positive, absolute, and unconditional, and it constituted an anticipatory breach. See Ralph E. Koressel Premier Elec., Inc. v. Forster, 838 N.E.2d 1037, 1045 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). And the natural and probable consequence of the Heymanns’ breach was that Fischer would incur costs to make minor repairs that the contract did not require her to assume. Thus, the law of anticipatory breach supports the trial court’s recognition of February 10, 2006, as the date the agreement was breached. See Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d at.923. Fischer’s argument that the breach did not occur until February 19 is incorrect.

In sum, the conclusion that Fischer failed to act with reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages by February 18, 2006, is supported by the trial court’s findings and the evidence that supports those findings. The Heymanns breached the contract on February 10, 2006; Fischer testified that she knew of the Heymanns’ breach on February 11, 2006; and the trial court found, based on the evidence, that Fischer had a full week, which was “more than a reasonable amount of time,” to mitigate her damages on or .before February 18, 2006. Appellant’s App. at 20. And, as we explained when we ruled in Fischer’s favor in Fischer I, the Heymanns’ breach was a minor breach. But, instead of acting promptly and efficiently to address that minor breach, Fischer allowed a trivial repair issue to scuttle her transaction with the Heymanns. As a result, the Property sat on the market for nearly six more years, from February of 2006 until November of 2011. A small effort by Fischer would have placed her in “as good a position as full performance of the contract would have.” Again, “the plaintiff never should be awarded damages for losses that could have been avoided by reasonable effort without risk of other substantial loss or injury.” Corbin on Contracts § 57-11.

The common law and common sense are aligned on these facts. The Heymanns’ breach of the contract proximately caused Fischer $117 in damages, and Fischer could have limited her damages accordingly if she had agreed to make a de minimis expenditure by February 18, 2006, to save the $315,000 transaction. See Corbin on Contracts § 57-11. Any further damages that Fischer incurred were proximately caused by her own failure to mitigate, not by the Heymanns’ breach. See id. Hence, we reverse the trial court’s conclusion that Fischer did not fail to mitigate her damages until February 16, 2007, and, pursuant to the trial court’s initial findings, we hold that Fischer’s duty to mitigate arose on February 11, 2006, when Fischer first learned of the Heymanns’ breach, and that she had ample time to mitigate her damages by a reasonable effort, without risk of other substantial loss or injury, on or before February 18, 2006.

Issue Two: Attorney’s Fees

Fischer also asserts that the trial court’s limitation of her award for attorney’s fees and court costs in accordance with her failure to mitigate her damages is contrary to law because she would have incurred all of her fees and costs regardless of her failure to mitigate. In particular, Fischer argues that, even if she had mitigated her damages, “the [Heymanns] denied that they breached the Purchase Agreement and litigation still would have ensued.” Appellant’s Br. at 14-15.

As we have explained:

Generally, Indiana follows the American Rule, which requires each party to pay his or her own attorney fees. Thus, although parties to litigation typically pay their own attorney fees, they may certainly agree by contract to do otherwise. When reviewing an award or denial of attorney fees, we note that the trial court is empowered to exercise its sound discretion, and any successful challenge to its determination must demonstrate an abuse thereof. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.

Delgado v. Boyles, 922 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citations omitted), trans. denied. Here, the trial court awarded Fischer attorney’s fees and court costs pursuant to the following provision of the purchase agreement: “Any party to this Agreement who is the prevailing party in any legal or equitable proceeding against any other party brought under or with relation to the Agreement or transaction shall be additionally entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees from the non-prevailing party.” Appellant’s App. at 33.

We have considered such contract language before. In Madison Area Educational Special Services Unit v. Daniels by Daniels, 678 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, we explained:

In cases where plaintiffs enjoy only limited success, the plaintiffs may be considered “prevailing parties” for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in the litigation, thereby achieving some of the benefit the plaintiff sought in bringing the action. The degree of success is relevant to the amount of a fee, not to eligibility for afee award.

(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)

We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited Fischer’s award for attorney’s fees and costs in accordance with her failure to mitigate her damages. Because Fischer is the prevailing party based on this court’s holding in Fischer I, she was eligible for an award of fees and costs pursuant to the purchase agreement. However, the contract language does not entitle her to a certain amount of fees and costs. See id. Rather, it was within the trial court’s discretion to limit the amount of Fischer’s award based on her “degree of success,” and Fischer’s degree of success was severely limited by her own failure to promptly act with reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages. See id. Thus, as the prevailing party and in light of the trial court’s rationale, Fischer is entitled to attorney’s fees but only in an amount commensurate with her “degree of success,” which is $117. See id.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s rationale for limiting Fischer’s attorney’s fees and costs, but we reverse the amount entered based on that rationale. That is, we vacate the trial court’s award for Fischer’s attorney’s fees, and we remand for the court to enter an award for reasonable attorney’s fees commensurate with Fischer’s recovery on the merits and court costs.

Conclusion

In sum, the trial court’s findings do not support the $93,972.18 damage award. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings that, after the Heymanns had breached the purchase agreement, Fischer could have easily mitigated her damages by indicating her agreement to make minor electrical repairs. The expense for those repairs caused by the breach was only $117. Instead, after having learned of the breach, Fischer failed to mitigate her damages, and since filing suit in 2006 she has sought to expand her small claim into a large money judgment. Whatever additional damages Fischer may have incurred through 2007 or 2011 were caused by her own failure to mitigate in 2006. Thus, on the facts of this case, Fischer is not entitled to the $286,409.43 in damages that she claims on appeal. We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter a damage award for Fischer of $117, plus attorney’s fees commensurate with her recovery, and costs.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.

BRADFORD, J., dissents with separate opinion.

BRADFORD, Judge,

dissenting.

Because I do not believe the majority opinion is an appropriate application of the mitigation of damages doctrine, I respectfully dissent. I would reject the Hey-manns’ argument that Fischer failed to mitigate her damage on February 18, 2006, by not responding to the Heymanns’ inspection response, affirm the trial court’s holding that Fischer failed to mitigate her damages on February 16, 2007, by not accepting Johnson’s offer to purchase the home for $240,000.00, and affirm the court’s judgment for Fischer in the amount of $93,972.18.

I. Fischer’s Duty to Mitigate on February 18, 2006

Although I agree that, on February 18, 2006, Fischer had a duty to mitigate her damages resulting from the Heymanns’ anticipatory breach, I do not believe this required her to surrender to the very demand which generated that breach. “In Indiana, an anticipatory breach of a contract excuses the [non-breaching] party from further performance, permits [him] to treat the contract as terminated, and allows [him] to immediately sue for damages.” Page Two, Inc. v. P.C. Mgmt., Inc., 517 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (citing Ind. Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan (1915), 62 Ind.App. 567, 109 N.E. 851, trans. denied). The non-breaching party, however, may also “elect to stand upon his contract and perform, or offer to perform, all the conditions thereof required of him, and then, when the day of performance arrives, proceed to enforce his contract.” Carnithan, 62 Ind.App. 567, 109 N.E. at 854. The majority opinion would take away the former option and compel the latter, contrary to longstanding Indiana law.

The majority opinion emphasizes that Fischer’s contractual obligations are not at issue in this case. Op. 1160-61. But to require that Fischer proceed to closing, the terms of the purchase agreement must be given effect, and the purchase agreement incorporates any terms subsequently agreed to in the Buyer’s Inspection Response. Had Fischer assented to the Inspection Response, she would have been obligated to make the designated minor repairs, but such actions would have been in performance of the purchase agreement, not in mitigation of damages. Absent her assent, the purchase agreement did not obligate Fischer to repair minor defects in the home, Fischer v. Heymann, 943 N.E.2d 896, 901 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied, and courts will not require a party acting pursuant to a contract to be “reasonable.” First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind. v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ind.1990).

In a departure from the typical notion of mitigating damages, the majority opinion requires the non-breaching party to take actions with and advantageous to the breaching party which, but for that adversary’s breach, she was under no obligation to take. I believe this application of the doctrine is contrary to law and, in the present context, licenses buyers to demand minor repairs with impunity, rendering moot the “major defect” provisions found in countless real estate contracts.

II. Fischer’s Duty to Mitigate on February 16, 2007

In light of my belief that Fischer did not fail to mitigate her damages on February 18, 2006,1 would reach the issue of whether she failed to do so on February 16, 2007. The trial court held:

30. Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, [Fischer] could have mitigated her damages on February 16, 2007, by accepting Johnson’s offer of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($240,000.00).

Appellant’s App. p. 23. This conclusion is supported by the trial court’s findings that “Johnson’s offer was based on comparative listings and sales of other similar units around that time” (ie., that the offer was reasonable) and, had Fischer accepted Johnson’s offer, “the Johnson sale would have proceeded to closing[.]” Appellant’s App. p. 21.

Fischer argues that the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s offer was reasonable is clearly erroneous. Specifically, Fischer claims the evidence shows that $240,000.00, or $79.00 per square foot, was below the “fair market value” of $89.00 per square foot for comparable units at the time. Appellant’s Br. p. 9. I would disagree. As the Heymanns contend, the trial court made no finding regarding the home’s fair market value, and the evidence does not necessarily reflect $89.00 as the appropriate figure. The evidence shows that, in 2006, two units sold for $96.00 and $89.00 per square foot, respectively; in 2007, no units sold; and in 2008, one unit sold for $58.00 per square foot. Additionally, Johnson’s realtor, Carol Ayres, testified that a reasonable price in February of 2007 would have been “well under” $110 per square foot, Tr. p. 133, and the Hey-manns’ expert witness, Real Estate Broker Michael Fox, testified that $75.00 per square foot would have been “a reasonable offer to work with.” Tr. p. 111. Fischer’s claim is merely invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010).

Fischer also challenges the trial court’s finding that, had she accepted Johnson’s $240,000.00 offer, “the Johnson sale would have proceeded to closing.” Appellant’s App. p. 23. Fischer claims that this finding is clearly erroneous because it relies on pure speculation. Realtor Ayers, however, testified that Johnson was “willing and able” to close on the home at $240,000.00, and it was within the trial court’s discretion to credit this testimony. Gates v. Houston, 897 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). Moreover, had Fischer accepted the offer, Johnson would have been contractually bound to close on the home whether he ultimately did so or not. Fischer’s claim is therefore without merit.

Because I believe that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and that these findings support its judgment, I would affirm the trial court’s holding that Fischer failed to mitigate her damages on February 16, 2007. Accordingly, I would also affirm its judgment for Fischer in the amount of $93,972.18, representing $75,000.00 in damages,- $15,109.68 in carrying costs, and $3862.50.in, attorney’s fees, all calculated as of the date Fischer failed to mitigate.

      . We held oral argument in this matter on Marchó, 2013.

      . Nothing in the Appellant's Addendum to Brief, which consists exclusively of trial exhibits, justifies their binding and filing together in a submission separate from the Appellant’s Appendix. Pursuant to our appellate rules, "short excerpts from the Record on Appeal ... such as essential portions of a contract ... that are important to a consideration of the issues raised on appeal” are to be included in the Appendix. Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(g).

      . The "Trial Transcript” refers to the transcript from the February 2010 trial on the question of the Heymanns' breach of the contract.

      . Judge Brown dissented from the majority's holding and stated that "there is no valid reason advanced why it was not objectively reasonable for the Heymanns to rely on the inspector and his report.” Fischer I, 943 N.E.2d at 903 (Brown, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Brown dissented on the grounds that, "by its terms, the Purchase Agreement expired at midnight on February 18, 2006,” when Fischer failed to timely respond to the Heymanns' February 15 demand. Id. at 904 (Brown, J., dissenting).

      .The trial court has stayed the Heymanns' indemnification claim pending resolution of this appeal.

      . The Heymanns concede this figure as Fischer's cost to fix the electrical issues. See Ap-pellees’ Br. at 11 n. 5. The Heymanns also suggest that they owe Fischer the $5,000 in earnest money, but we do not agree. First, the paragraph describing the earnest money in the purchase agreement was not a liquidated damages clause. A liquidated damages clause “applies to a specific sum of money that has been expressly stipulated by the parties to a contract as the amount of damages to be recovered by one party for a breach of the agreement by the other....” Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind.2004). According to the purchase agreement: "If this offer is accepted and Buyer fails or refuses to close the transaction, without legal cause, the earnest money shall be retained by Seller for damages the Seller has or will incur, and Seller retains all rights to seek other legal and equitable remedies.” Appellant’s Addendum to Brief at 16. That provision describes the earnest money as a pool of money to be applied the Seller's actual damages, not as a specific sum of money stipulated by the parties as the amount of damages.
      Second, the trial court expressly found that, had Fischer mitigated her damages by February 18, 2006, the parties “would have proceeded to closing, and [Fischer] would not have been damaged....” Appellant’s App. at 20. Had the parties closed, the earnest money would have been factored into the closing statement.

      . In light.of her proposed date of mitigation, Fischer asks that we "remand with instructions to award damages in the amount of $147,333.89, plus $139,075.54 consequential damages,” along with another $22,103.04 for fees and costs. Appellant’s Br. at 16.

      . Among her arguments, Fischer disputes the trial court's finding in paragraph 14 of its order that "[Fischer] did not respond to [the Heymanns] at all after February 15, 2006.” Appellant’s App. at 20. Specifically, Fischer asserts that her agent told the Heymanns' agent that Fischer was going to fix the problems and that Fischer did not consider them "a big issue.” See Trial Transcript at 63. But whatever oral communications may or may not have occurred between the parties’ agents, the purchase agreement unambiguously required any addenda to be in writing, and the evidence is undisputed that Fischer never responded to the Heymanns in writing after February 15, 2006.

      . In her brief and a post-oral argument supplemental citation of authority, Fischer also asserts that Fischer I prohibits consideration of the February 10-18 timeframe under the doctrine of issue preclusion. But issue preclusion only applies to a "subsequent lawsuit,” not a subsequent appeal in the same lawsuit. See Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149, 158 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. And, in any event, as discussed below the issues in this appeal were not decided in Fischer I nor could they have been since no facts relevant to Fischer’s damages had yet been considered by the trial court or this court. See Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (noting that issue preclusion applies "where some fact or question has been determined and adjudicated in the former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in the subsequent suit between the same parties”).

      . Fischer additionally argues that the Hey-manns "had already taken action to terminate the contract on February 17 [by making an offer on a second condominium, which] infers they had no intention of closing” on the Property. Fischer's Reply Br. at 4. But this argument is contrary to the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. Again, Mr. Hey-mann testified that he had instructed their agent not to deliver either the second offer or the mutual release until February 19 and only in the event that Fischer did not respond to the Heymanns’ demand by February 18. See Trial Transcript at 33; see also Fischer I, 943 N.E.2d at 899. To be effective, a written offer must be made, executed, arid delivered. There is no evidence that the offer on the second condominium was delivered until after February 18.

      . Moreover, Fischer’s contention that her duty to mitigate did not arise until the Hey-manns tendered the mutual release on February 19 would allow her to avoid her obligation to use reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages once she had learned of the Heymanns' breach on February 11. See, e.g., Bedford Recycling, Inc., 634 N.E.2d at 1366.

      . The trial court awarded Fischer $3,862.50 for attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Fischer asserts that she is entitled to an award of at least $22,103.04.

      . See, e.g., Hampton v. Morgan, 654 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (suggesting damages from lost real estate sale can be mitigated by finding a replacement buyer); Sandor Dev. Co. v. Reitmeyer, 498 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (requiring landlord to make reasonable efforts to re-let a rental property following tenant's abandonment); Salem Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Richman, 406 N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (requiring non-breaching party to an employment contract to make a reasonable attempt to find work of a similar nature).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BROWN, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Daniel J. HOLLEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 62A04-1211-MI-636.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    June 25, 2013.

      Daniel J. Hollen, Tell City, IN Appellant Pro Se.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

BROWN, Judge.

Daniel J. Hollen appeals the trial court’s denial of his Petition to Remove Registration Act, Sexual Violent Predator Status, and Global Positioning Satellite. Hollen raises nine issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in denying his petition. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 18, 2000, by an Amended Information, the State charged Hollen with four counts of child molesting as class B felonies. The charging information alleged that the offenses occurred between July 4, 1994, and September 30, 1995. On January 21, 2000, a jury found Hollen guilty of two counts of child molesting. The Knox Circuit Court sentenced Hollen to fifteen years for each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutive to each other for an aggregate sentence of thirty years. Hollen v. State, No. 42A01-0005-CR-150, slip op. at 2-3, 741 N.E.2d 811 (Ind.Ct.App. January 23, 2001). On direct appeal, Hollen argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for child molesting and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing enhanced and consecutive sentences, and this court affirmed. Id. at 2.

On July 11, 2012, Hollen, pro se, filed a “Petition to Remove Registration Act, Sexual Violent Predator Status, and Global Positioning Satellite” in the Perry Circuit Court. Appellant’s Appendix at 95. Hol-len argued in part that his classification as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) was contrary to the ex post facto clause of the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution. Hollen contended that “[t]he IDOC is retroactively punishing [him] by requiring him to register as [an] SVP or to register at all for the rest of his life” and that “at the time of [the] offense: (‘Sometime in the summer of 1994[’]) the Zachary Law I.C. 11-8-8-22 was not enacted [and] thus cannot be applied to [him] now under ex-post factor [sic] laws.” Id. at 96. Hollen also cited Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.5(c) and stated that the trial court did not determine whether he was an SVP by consulting with a board of experts consisting of two board certified psychologists or psychiatrists who had expertise in criminal behavioral disorders. Hollen also argued that the “IDOC classification of [him] as [an] SVP was made without affording him a hearing to determine] whether he posed a future danger, thereby denying him procedural due process.” Id. at 97. He asserted that he was “being restricted from areas which are legal and [had] been approved by Parole Agent Gina Boyer, because IDOC equipment is failing to function with satellite^] violating [his] basic rights under Indiana Laws.” Id. Hollen also alleged that the State was without authority to argue this action because the prosecutor did not file an appearance.

The Perry Circuit Court entered an order on Hollen’s petition which stated that “the relief requested by [Hollen] is an attack on the judgments entered” in Cause Number 42C01-9707-CF-008 (“Cause No. 8”), that “pursuant to Rule PCl(c), this matter should be transferred to the Knox Circuit Court,” and ordered that further proceedings on the petition be transferred to the Knox Circuit Court under Cause No. 8. Id. at 92. In a letter dated August 30, 2012, the Knox Circuit Court informed the Perry Circuit Court that petitions for removal from the registry must first be filed in the county in which the individual resides and that the Knox Circuit Court was “sending venue of this matter back to Perry County” because Hollen lives in Perry County. Id. at 62. The letter also attached a document from the Division of State Court Administration which discussed Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22.

On October 8, 2012, the case was transferred back to the Perry Circuit Court. Hollen filed a “Motion for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment is Issued as a Matter of Law” in the Perry Circuit Court. Id. at 49. Hollen requested that the court “find the State Of Indiana in Default on the Petition to Remove Registration Act, Sexual Violent Predator Status, and Global Positioning Satellite, and to issue a Default Judgment / Summary Judgment on the motion as granted.” Id. On October 30, 2012, the court denied Hol-len’s earlier petition filed on July 11, 2012. Id. at 52. On November 2, 2012, Hollen filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied on November 8, 2012.

DISCUSSION

The issue is whether the court erred in denying Hollen’s “Petition to Remove Registration Act, Sexual Violent Predator Status, and Global Positioning Satellite.” Id. at 95. Before discussing Hollen’s allegations of error, we note that although he is proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. Hollen’s arguments are scattered throughout his statement of issues and statement of the case. Indeed, the section of his brief labeled “Argument” consists of only two pages of his thirty-eight page appellant’s brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-35. While Hollen raises nine issues in his statement of issues, he has only four arguments in the argument section of his brief. To the extent that he fails to put forth a cogent argument, cite to authority, or cite to the record, we conclude that most of Hollen’s arguments are waived. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 834 n. 1 (Ind.2006) (holding that the defendant’s contention was waived because it was “supported neither by cogent argument nor citation to authority”); Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 398 n. 3 (Ind.1999) (holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument).

To the extent that Hollen develops cogent arguments, we will address them on the merits. He appears to argue that the requirement that he register as an SVP constitutes an ex post facto law because he committed the offenses prior to the effective date of the Sex Offender Registration Act. Specifically, he asserts that “all amendments to P.L. 11-19% are illegal to the appellant, because no notice was given to [him] in 1994 for acts that was in violation of laws, Ind. Const, art. I sect. 28, because no notice was posted and [he] was not aware such acts were punishable under the law, and they are ex post facto to [him] U.S. CONST. ART. I SECT. 10, and IND. CONST. ART. I, SECT. ⅝” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Hollen also argues that “the SVP status as applied to [him] which changes the status in law is ex post facto.” Id. at 36. He further suggests that the State cannot make any arguments on appeal because the State did not file an appearance below.

The State contends that Hollen’s petition did not comply with’all of the requirements of Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22 because it was not verified and did not list each jurisdiction where Hollen is required to register and that even if Hollen’s petition was sufficient, he is not entitled to relief under the statute. The State asserts that Hollen does not have an ex post facto claim because his crimes occurred after Indiana’s Sex Offender Registry Act went into effect on July 1, 1994. The State argues that Hollen’s other arguments are waived for either lack of merit or failing to raise them below.

Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22 governs petitions to remove designations or to register under less restrictive conditions. “A person to whom this section applies may petition a court to: (1) remove the person’s designation as an offender; or (2) require the person to register under less restrictive conditions.” Ind.Code § ll-8-8-22(c). “After receiving a petition under this section, the court may: (1) summarily dismiss the petition; or (2) give notice to [various entities] and set the matter for hearing.” I.C. § ll-8-8-22(d).

We observe that Hollen’s petition did not meet the requirements of Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22 as the petition was not submitted under the penalties of perjury nor did it explicitly list each jurisdiction in which the offender is required to register as a sex offender or a violent offender. See Ind.Code § ll-8-8-22(k). But even assuming that Hollen’s petition was sufficient to constitute a petition under the statute, we cannot say that reversal is required.

With respect to his argument that the State was required to file an appearance and, failing to do so, that the State cannot make any arguments on appeal, we observe that Ind.Code § ll-8-8-22(e) provides that “[ajfter receiving a petition under this section, the court may ... (1) summarily dismiss the petition; or (2) give notice to ... the prosecuting attorney ... and set the matter for hearing.” (Emphasis added). Further, Ind.Code § 11 — 8— 8-22(f) provides that “[i]f a court sets a matter for a hearing under this section, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the action is pending shall appear and respond.... ” Based upon the provision of IncLCode § 11-8-8-22, we cannot say that the State was required to enter an appearance or is precluded from making arguments on appeal.

Turning to Hollen’s arguments regarding whether his registration and status as an SVP violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution, we observe that Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law.” Article 1, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o ex post facto law ... shall ever be passed.”

A law is ex post facto if it substantially disadvantages a defendant because it increases his punishment, changes the elements of or ultimate facts necessary to prove the offense, or deprives a defendant of some defense or lesser punishment that was available at the time of the crime. Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind.2011). The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give people fair warning of the conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties. Id.

To the extent that Hollen argues that the Sex Offender Registration Act (the “Act”) is ex post facto because he committed the offenses prior to the effective date of the Act of July 1, 1994, we observe that Hollen suggests that the offenses occurred during Memorial Day Weekend of 1994 and argues that “[t]his is supported by Affidavit and the earliest testimony by the State of Indiana witnesses.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. However, Hollen cites to pages 132-134 of the Appellant’s Appendix which contains the charging information alleging that the offenses occurred between July 4, 1994 and September 30, 1995, and the jury found Hollen guilty of two of these charges. Thus, to the extent that Hollen argues that the Act constitutes an ex post facto law because he committed the offense prior to the effective date of July 1, 1994, we do not find his argument persuasive.

To the extent that he challenges the amendments to the Act, we observe that the initial version of the Act took effect on July 1, 1994. Pub. L. No. 11-1994, § 7 (eff. July 1, 1994) (codified as Ind.Code §§ 5-2-12-1 to 5-2-12-13) (current version at Ind.Code §§ 11-8-8-1 to 11 — 8—8— 22). In 1994, the Act, among other things, required probationers and parolees convicted of child molesting on or after June 30, 1994 to register as sex offenders. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind.2009), reh’g denied; Ind.Code § 5-2-12-14 (1994) (defining an “offender”); Ind.Code § 5-2-12-5 (1994) (requiring that an offender register with each local law enforcement agency). The Act contained both registration and notification provisions, i.e., sex offenders were required to take affirmative steps to notify law enforcement authorities of their whereabouts, and that information was then disseminated to the public. 905 N.E.2d at 375. In 1994, the crime of child molesting triggered the status as a sex offender. See id.; Ind.Code § 5-2-12^1 (1994) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 140-2006, § 41 and Pub.L. No. 173-2006, § 55). “Originally the duty to register was prospective only, and terminated when the offender was no longer on probation or discharged from parole.” 905 N.E.2d at 375 (citing Ind.Code § 5-2-12-13 (1994)).

The Act has been amended several times and we will review some of the amendments. “[I]n 1995 the duty to register expanded to ten years after the date the offender was released from prison, placed on parole, or placed on probation, whichever occurred last.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 5-2-12-13 (1995)). In 1998, the legislature defined a “sexually violent predator” as “an individual who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to repeatedly engage in any of the offenses described in section 4 of this chapter.” Ind.Code § 5-2-12-4.5 (1998); Pub. L. No. 56-1998, § 7 (eff. July 1, 1998). That same year, the legislature amended Ind. Code § 35-38-l-7.5(c) to provide that “[a]t the sentencing hearing, the court shall determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator. Before making a determination under this section, the court shall consult with a board of experts consisting of two (2) board certified psychologists or psychiatrists who have expertise in criminal behavioral disorders.” See Pub. L. No. 56-1988, § 17 (eff. July 1, 1998). In 2003, the legislature amended Ind.Code § 5-2-12-13 to provide that “[a]n offender who is found to be a sexually violent predator by a court under IC 35-38-l-7.5(b) is required to register for life.” Pub. L. No. 222-2003, § 1 (eff. July 1, 2003). In 2007, the legislature amended Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.5(b) to provide that “a person is a sexually violent predator by operation of law if an offense committed by the person satisfies the conditions set forth in subdivision (1) or (2) and the person was released from incarceration, secure detention, or probation for the offense after June 30, 1994.” Pub. L. No. 216-2007, § 37 (eff. May 10, 2007).

Every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until that presumption is clearly overcome by a contrary showing. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378. The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against the party. Id. If two reasonable interpretations of a statute are available, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we will choose that path which permits upholding the statute because we will not presume that the legislature violated the constitution unless the unambiguous language of the statute requires that conclusion. Id.

In Wallace, the Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had concluded that the State of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registry Act, which is very similar to Indiana’s Act, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-106, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003)). In considering whether Indiana’s Act violates the Indiana Constitution’s ex post facto provision, the Indiana Supreme Court applied the “intent-effects” test, which is the same analytical framework the United States Supreme Court uses to evaluate federal ex post facto claims. Id. at 378-379. In applying the test, the court first considers whether the legislature meant to establish civil proceedings. Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 810. If instead its intention was to impose punishment, then the inquiry ends. Id. However, if the legislature intended a non-punitive regulatory scheme, then we must examine the Act’s effects to determine whether they are in fact so punitive as to transform the regulatory scheme into a criminal penalty; if so, then retroactive application of the law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.

As recognized in Wallace and Harris, it is difficult to determine any intent given the lack of legislative history and purpose statement. Nevertheless, the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and in this case, Hollen has not cited any evidence of a punitive intent on the part of the legislature. Thus, we will presume that the legislature’s intent was civil and regulatory in relation to Hollen’s claim that application of the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 810.

Having found no punitive intent on the part of the legislature, we turn to whether the effects of applying the regulatory scheme are punitive as to Hollen. We are guided by seven factors: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind.2013). No one factor is determinative. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 317. We address each factor in turn, noting that our task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them. Id.

1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint

The first factor is whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint. The Indiana Supreme Court has found that the Act imposes significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on those to whom it applies. Id. (citing Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 811; Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 391 (Ind.2009); Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379). The duties imposed by the Act and extension of the duties to a lifetime requirement weigh in favor of treating the effects of the Act as punitive. See id.; Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 811.

2. Sanctions That Have Historically Been Considered Punishment

The next factor, whether the sanction has historically been regarded as a punishment, which involves the dissemination and widespread availability of offenders’ personal information, has been found to resemble the historical punishment of shaming. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 317-318. By extending the duration of the registration requirement, the Act has the effect of increasing shame on Hollen, which weighs in favor of punitive treatment. See id. at 318; Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 811.

3. Finding of Scienter

In applying the third factor, whether the statute comes into play only on a finding of scienter, our focus is whether the sanction is linked to a showing of mens rea. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 318. If so, it is more likely to be considered punishment. Id. In this case, Hollen’s qualifying offense is one of the few offenses included in the Act for which there is no, scienter requirement. See Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 812 (observing that there is no scienter requirement for the offense of child molesting where there is sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a child under the age of fourteen). Thus, it seems that this factor would not be punitive as applied to Hollen, although the Indiana Supreme Court has been “reluctant in the past to conclude that the few non-scienter exceptions imply a no'npunitive effect as a whole.” Id.

4. Traditional Aims of Punishment

The fourth factor considers whether the statute’s operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 318. The more the Act promotes these traditional aims of punishment, the more likely it is to be punitive. Id. Although lifetime registration required by the Act has a likely deterrent effect and promotes community condemnation of offenders, it also serves a valid regulatory function by providing the public with information related to community safety. Id. Under the circumstances, this factor weighs in favor of treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive. See id.; Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 812 (offense required registration both before and after the 2007 amendments to the Act and factor favored non-punitive treatment).

5. Applicability Only to Criminal Behavior

The fifth factor for consideration is whether the behavior to which the statute applies is already a crime. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 318. Although the registration requirement is triggered exclusively by criminal behavior, Hollen’s offense of child molestation was already a registration-triggering offense at the time of commission. The Indiana Supreme Court has weighed this factor in favor of treating the enhanced registration period as non-punitive as applied in analogous circumstances. See id. at 318-319; Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 812.

6. Advancing Non-Pmitive Interest

Under the sixth factor, we determine whether an alternative purpose to which the statute may rationally be connected is assignable for it. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 319. Because the Act advances the legitimate regulatory purpose of protecting the public from repeat sexual crime offenders, our cases have consistently treated this factor as non-punitive. Id. Likewise, here, this factor weighs in favor of treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive. See id.

7. Excessiveness in Relation to Articulated Purpose

The seventh and final factor to be considered is whether the statute appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has reached differing results based on the outcome of this final factor. In Wallace, the Court determined the seventh factor to be punitive for a defendant convicted and released prior to the Act’s 1994 passage. Id. In so doing, the Court “found it significant that ‘the Act provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure. Offenders cannot shorten their registration or notification period, even on the clearest proof of rehabilitation.’ ” Id. (quoting Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384).

In Jensen, the Court found that the effects of the Act applied differently to Jensen than they had to Wallace. The Court first noted that the 2006 amendments had changed nothing with regard to Jensen’s actual disclosure requirements; they had changed only the duration of the requirement. Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 394. Second, Jensen, unlike Wallace, was able to petition the court after ten years for reconsideration of his status as an SVP. Id. The Court concluded that the seventh factor weighed in favor of non-punitive treatment. Id.

Here, we acknowledge that the Act was less restrictive in 1994 when Hollen committed the offenses. See Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 319 n. 6 (noting that at the time the defendant committed his crime in 1996, the Act was less restrictive than it was at the time of Jensen’s crime in 1998, because in 1996 limited information was available on offenders, the verification process was minimal, and the availability of information to the public was limited, and observing that amendments to the Act in 1998 imposed heavy restraints on offenders related to notification requirements and verification of the disclosed information). However, like the defendants in Jensen and Harris, Hollen is an SVP. Under Indiana law, there are two avenues by which a sex offender may qualify as an SVP. Id. at 319. “First, a person can qualify as an SVP by reason of a ‘mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense.’ ” Id. at 319-320 (quoting Ind.Code § 35 — 38—1—7.5(a)). Second, a person may become an SVP by virtue of the offense committed. Id. (citing Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.5(b)).

Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.5(b) provides:

A person who ... being at least eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense described in ... IC 35-42-4-3 as a Class A or Class B felony ... is a sexually violent predator. Except as provided in subsection (g) or (h), a person is a sexually violent predator by operation of law if an offense committed by the person satisfies the conditions set forth in subdivision (1) or (2) and the person was released from incarceration, secure detention, or probation for the offense after June 30,1994.

Here, Hollen committed child molestation as a class B felony which is a qualifying offense under Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.5(b). As noted by the Court in Harris, the fact that Hollen’s acts could not have qualified him as an SVP at the time he committed them because the status was not yet in existence does not mean that the Act is any more punitive as applied to him. See Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 812 n. 19 (“The fact that Harris’s acts could not have qualified him as an SVP at the time he committed them because the status was not yet in existence does not mean that the Act is any more punitive as applied to him ... we are mostly concerned with the imposition of a life-time-registration requirement, not the stigma associated with the SVP status.”).

The availability of meaningful review of an offender’s future dangerousness is therefore germane to the determination of whether a statute’s effects are excessive. Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 320. As an SVP, Hollen has an available channel through which he may petition the trial court for review of his future dangerousness or complete rehabilitation. Specifically, Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.5(g) provides in part:

A person who is a sexually violent predator may petition the court to consider whether the person should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator. The person may file a petition under this subsection not earlier than ten (10) years after:
(1) the sentencing court or juvenile court makes its determination under subsection (e); or
(2) the person is released from incarceration or secure detention.
A person may file a petition under this subsection not more than one (1) time per year. A court may dismiss a petition filed under this subsection or conduct a hearing to determine if the person should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator. If the court conducts a hearing, the court shall appoint two (2) psychologists or psychiatrists who have expertise in criminal behavioral disorders to evaluate the person and testify at the hearing. After conducting the hearing and considering the testimony of the two (2) psychologists or psychiatrists, the court shall determine whether the person should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator under subsection (a). If a court finds that the person should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator, the court shall send notice to the department of correction that the person is no longer considered a sexually violent predator. Notwithstanding any other law, a condition imposed on a person due to the person’s status as a sexually violent predator, including lifetime parole or GPS monitoring, does not apply to a person no longer considered a sexually violent predator.

Under the circumstances, we find that the seventh factor weighs in favor of treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive and conclude that the Act is non-punitive when applied to Hollen. See Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 812-813 (finding the seventh factor non-punitive due to availability of individualized review of SVP status under Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.5(g) and holding that the defendant’s status as an SVP had changed by-operation of law and that the Act as applied did not violate Indiana’s prohibition on ex post facto laws); Vickery v. State, 932 N.E.2d 678, 682-683 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that the Act as applied to a defendant that had committed child molesting in 1995 did not violate the Indiana constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and rejecting the petitioner’s argument that his due process rights were violated because he was classified as an SVP with no opportunity to be heard on the issue).

With respect to his motion for default judgment, Hollen argues that the “Perry County Judge violated the law when [she] transferred to county of conviction, because I.C. ll-8-8-22(d) states [he] must file in County of residence which was and is Perry County.” Appellant’s Brief at 30. He asserts that Ind. Criminal Rule 2.3(A) “states that ‘permission’ must be given from receiving court, which was not done in this action.” Id. Hollen then argues that “[t]hese illegal acts which violated Indiana Laws and Court Rules means the 30 days to rule on case was not extended by this illegal act and the Motion For Default Judgment and Summary Judgment Be Issued As A Matter Of Law was a valid motion within Perry Circuit Court and the clerk violated my basic due process rights to the judgment that [he] was entitled to under the law T.R. 8(D).” Id.

The record reveals that Hollen filed his Petition to Remove Registration Act, Sexual Violent Predator Status, and Global Positioning Satellite on July 11, 2012, in the Perry Circuit Court, that the Perry Circuit Court subsequently transferred the case to the Knox Circuit Court, that the case was transferred back to the Perry Circuit Court on October 8, 2012, and that the Perry Circuit Court denied Hollen’s petition on October 30, 2012. While the Perry Circuit Court erred in initially transferring the case to the Knox Circuit Court, Hollen has failed to develop a cogent argument on this basis and thus the error is waived, and reversal is not warranted under the circumstances.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hollen’s petition.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J„ concur.

      . Ind.Code § 35-42-4-3.

      . The record does not contain a copy of the transcript of Hollen’s trial or sentencing hearing.

      . Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A) governs the arrangement and content of an appellant's brief.

      . For example, Hollen states, without citation to the record, that he has had seven parole agents since his release and that "[t]his is outrageous, and a true danger in public safety!” Appellant’s Brief at 25. He also argues that a transcript of an interview of J.H., the victim, by Knox County Sheriff's Detective Doug Vantlin labeled as Defendant’s Exhibit A in Appellant’s Appendix, was an "illegal document,” was "not signed by any party” or certified, and was "NEVER admitted into evidence. ...” Id. at 20. In the interview, J.H. indicated that the offenses occurred after July 4, 1994. Hollen argues that ”[t]he fact it was NEVER admitted into evidence shows how lax the Judge was and total incompetence and ineffective counsel in this case for the defendant.” Id. However, Hollen later cites the interview to suggest that his "time of Memorial Weekend is more than probable as the correct date of crime.” Id. at 28. He also appears to suggest for the first time on appeal that he "would have been too hurt to have been camping during” the time frame that the offenses allegedly occurred. Id. at 21.

      . In its entirety, Ind.Code § 11 — 8—8—22(d) provides:
      After receiving a petition under this section, the court may:
      (1) summarily dismiss the petition; or
      (2) give notice to:
      (A) the department;
      (B) the attorney general;
      (C) the prosecuting attorney of:
      (i) the county where the petition was filed;

        (ii) the county where offender was most recently convicted of an offense listed in section 5 of this chapter; and
      (iii) the county where the offender resides; and
      (D) the sheriff of the county where the offender resides;
      and set the matter for hearing. The date set for a hearing must not be less than sixty (60) days after the court gives notice under this subsection.

      . Ind.Code § 1 l-8-8-22(k) provides:
      (k) A petition filed under this section must:
      (1) be submitted under the penalties of perjury;
      (2) list each of the offender’s criminal convictions and state for each conviction:
      (A) the date of the judgment of conviction;
      (B) the court that entered the judgment of conviction;
      (C) the crime that the offender pled guilty to or was convicted of; and
      (D) whether the offender was convicted of the crime in a trial or pled guilty to the criminal charges; and
      (3)list each jurisdiction in which the offender is required to register as a sex offender or a violent offender.

      . Hollen also contends that his petition should have been granted pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 8(D), which provides that "[ajver-ments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, except those pertaining to amount of damages, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Aver-ments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.” Given that the trial court summarily dismissed the petition, we cannot say that the prosecutor was required to file a responsive pleading. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22.

      . The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the various amendments to the Act in Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 806-807; and Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 375-377.

      . Subdivision 1 provided that "A person who: (1) being at least eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense described in ... IC 35-42-4-3 as a Class A or Class B felony....” Subdivision 2 is not germane to this appeal.

      . As noted by the Court in Gonzalez, the primary aim of punishment is rehabilitation under the Indiana Constitution. 980 N.E.2d at 318 n. 5 (citing Ind, Const, art. 1, § 18).

      . Ind. Criminal Rule 2.3(A) provides:
      Transfer of Cases from City and Town Courts. In all counties where there are circuit, superior, county or juvenile courts, and where there also exist in the same county a city or town court, the judge of the city or town court may, with the consent of the judge of such circuit, superior, county or juvenile court, transfer to the circuit, superior, county or juvenile court any cause of action filed and docketed in such city or town court. Transfer may occur by transferring to the receiving court all original pleadings and documents and bail bonds filed in such cause of action. The cause of action shall be redocketed in the receiving court and disposed as if originally filed with the receiving court, provided that the receiving court has jurisdiction over the matter.

      . Ind. Trial Rule 8(D) provides: "Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, except those pertaining to amount of damages, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.”