source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WYNN, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Thomas Alexander PORTER; Anthony Bernard Juniper; Mark Lawlor; Ricky Jovan Gray, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Ivan Teleguz, Plaintiff, v. Harold W. CLARKE; David Zook, Defendants-Appellees. The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Virginia, Inc.; The Rutherford Institute, Amici Supporting Appellants.
    No. 16-7044
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: January 25, 2017
    Decided: March 24, 2017

      ARGUED: Kathryn Marshall Ali, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C.; Victor M. Glasberg, VICTOR M. GLASBERG & ASSOCIATES, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Margaret Hoehl O’Shea, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Elizabeth C. Lockwood, W. David Maxwell, Ryan Stephenson, Washington, D.C., Parker D. Thomson, HOGAN LO-VELLS US LLP, Miami, Florida; Steven D. Rosenfield, Jeffrey E. Fogel, Char-lottesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. David W. DeBruin, Carrie F. Apfel, Kelly M. Morrison,. Washington, D.C., Jeffrey A. Atteberry, JENNER & BLOCK, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Virginia, Inc. and The Rutherford Institute. Hope R. Amezquita, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA, INC., Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Virginia, Inc. John W. Whitehead, Doug R. McKusick, THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amicus The Rutherford Institute.
    Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
   WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Thomas Porter, Anthony Juniper, and Mark Lawlor (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) — three inmates on Virginia’s death row — alleged that their conditions of confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After Plaintiffs filed their complaint, Defendants Harold Clarke, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (“Director Clarke”), and Darren Zook, Warden of Sussex I State Prison (‘Warden Zook,” and collectively with Director Clarke, “Defendants”), substantially changed the policies governing the conditions of confinement for inmates on Virginia’s death row, addressing virtually all of the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint. The district court concluded that Defendants’ changes to the challenged policies mooted Plaintiffs’ action.

But as Plaintiffs contend, Defendants’ voluntary cessation of the challenged practice has not yet mooted this action because Defendants failed to meet the Supreme Court’s requirement of showing that “it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Indeed, Defendants repeatedly have refused to rule out a return to the challenged policies. Accordingly, we must agree with Plaintiffs that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ action as moot.

I.

On November 20, 2014, the date Plaintiffs filed their complaint, two Corrections Department policies governed the conditions of confinement for inmates on Virginia’s death row: Local Operating Procedure 460.A, entitled “Security of Offenders Under the Sentence of Death,” effective March 1, 2010, and “Institutional Rules and Regulations for Offenders — Death Row,” effective February 3, 2010. J.A. 709. Under the two policies, Plaintiffs, as death row inmates, “spen[t] almost all of [their] time alone” — approximately twenty-three hours per day — in seventy-one-square-foot prison cells furnished with only a steel bed, a small desk, and a single fixture that doubled as a commode and a sink. J.A. 20. The policies required separation of each Plaintiff from other death row inmates by at least one cell. Athough the Corrections Department’s policies permitted Plaintiffs to receive visitors, visitation opportunities were limited to non-contact visits, with Plaintiffs and their visitors separated at all times by a plexiglass partition. Death row inmates could request contact visitation with immediate family members only under unspecified “extreme circumstances,” with the warden maintaining unconstrained discretion to grant or deny sucli requests. Porter v. Clarke, No. 1:14-cv-1588, 2016 WL 3766301, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2016) (quoting Local Operating Procedure 460.A); see also J.A. 915.

The policies further barred Plaintiffs from “join[ing] general population inmates for vocational, educational, or behavioral programming, [ ]or ... attending] group religious services.” J.A. 21. Also unlike the general prison population, Plaintiffs were “not allowed to use the gymnasium or prison yard, nor [were they] given an opportunity for [indoor] recreation.” J.A. 20. And although Corrections Department policy allowed Plaintiffs one hour of outdoor recreation approximately five days a week, Plaintiffs were limited to exercising in an outdoor cell — similar in size to their indoor cells — with a concrete floor and no exercise equipment.

On August 6, 2015, nearly a year after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, Warden Zook approved interim rules and regulations relaxing the conditions of confinement for inmates on death row. The interim rules and regulations allowed Plaintiffs: (1) 1.5 hours of contact visitation with immediate family members, once a week; (2) 1.5 hours of non-contact visitation with approved visitors on weekends and holidays; (3) a minimum of 1.5 hours of outdoor recreation, five days per week; (4) at least one hour of indoor recreation with up to three other inmates, daily; and (5) a fifteen-minute shower, daily. The Corrections Department also constructed a new outdoor recreation yard for death row inmates to allow for unrestrained, outdoor group recreation, as well as a multipurpose dayroom to allow death row inmates to engage in indoor group recreation activities and religious services, behavioral programming, and employment opportunities. The Corrections Department spent approximately $2 million planning, designing, and constructing the new facilities.

Following Warden Zook’s approval of the interim rules and regulations, Defendants moved to stay proceedings in the district court for ninety days pending implementation of the interim rules and regulations and to refer any remaining disagreements to a magistrate judge for mediation. The district court granted the unopposed motion on August 12, 2015. On November 13, 2015, after partial implementation of the interim rules and regulations, the parties filed a joint status report informing the court that they had participated in settlement proceedings but were ultimately unable to resolve the action.

On December 21, 2015, Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants’ motion did not argue that the change in policies warranted or required dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action as moot. On the contrary, Defendants stated that they were not seeking “outright dismissal on the grounds of mootness” because of the “heavy burden” a defendant must satisfy to demonstrate that its voluntary cessation of a challenged policy rendered an action contesting that policy moot. J.A. 1082-83; see also Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 497 (4th Cir. 2014).

Nevertheless, during a hearing on the motions on January 29, 2016, the district court observed that “it looks as though most of the issues [in the case] have been essentially resolved.” J.A. 1158. Plaintiffs responded that they were not challenging their conditions of confinement under the interim rules and regulations, “so the only challenge that’s before the Court relates to the conditions prior to the implementation of the August 2015 interim regulations.” J.A. 1158-59. To that end, Plaintiffs represented that they were seeking “an injunction that would require [Defendants] to essentially keep these improvements in place unless there is a specific reason as to a particular inmate or ... an institutional reason why they couldn’t stay in place,” as well as a declaration that the conditions on death row prior to the August 2015 policy changes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. J.A. 1159.

The court then asked the parties why, given the policy changes, they had been unable to agree to a consent decree that would ensure the policy changes remained in place going forward. Plaintiffs informed the court that the parties had failed to come to an agreement because Plaintiffs had not “received ... reasonable assurances that any of [the revised policies] will remain in place” and that, even if the policies were kept “in place, ... there’s no guarantee that those policies will be followed in practice, and ... there’s nothing stopping the government from revoking those policies immediately.” J.A. 1160-61. Defendants concurred with Plaintiffs’ explanation as to why the parties had not been able to reach an agreement, stating that the Corrections Department “didn’t want anything in place- that would necessarily bind , [them] to act in one manner or another.” J.A. 1162. Defendants’ counsel further explained:

I don’t think the [Corrections Department] has any intent whatsoever to go back to the way things were, but the department can’t be blind to the fact that things might change in the future. If there’s an attempted escape next month, the department might need to temporarily go back on lockdown status so that they could assess why that happened and fix the circumstances, and having the consent decree in place would hamper their ability to go and make these security considerations.

J.A. 1164^65.

On May 20, 2016, the district court ordered Defendants to “provide an update as to the status of the regulations on death row, specifically explaining whether the interim regulations have been finalized.” J.A. 1196. Two weeks later, on June 3, 2016, Defendants filed an affidavit from Warden Zook affirming that a new operating procedure had been signed into effect on June 2, 2016, replacing former Local Operating Procedure 460.A and the August 2015 interim rules and regulations previously in effect. Under the new policy, Operating Procedure 425.A, death row inmates are afforded: (1) at least 1.5 hours of outdoor recreation, five days per week; (2) at least one hour of indoor recreation in groups of up to four inmates, daily; (3) showers for a maximum of fifteen minutes; (4) 1.5 hours of contact visitation with immediate family members and one approved non-family member, once a week; (5) non-contact visitation on weekends and holidays; and (6) the opportunity to request extended visitation periods, to be granted by the assistant warden on a case-by-case basis. Operating Procedure 425.A also requires the Corrections Department to review the policy annually and rewrite it no later than three years after the effective date.

On July 8, 2016, the district court issued a memorandum opinion holding that “the improvements voluntarily made by defendants have rendered plaintiffs’ claims moot.” Porter, 2016 WL 3766301, at *11. In reaching this conclusion, the district court found that “defendants here decline to explicitly acknowledge that the pre-20.15 conditions of confinement were unconstitutional or to offer explicit guarantees that the [Corrections Department] will not return to those conditions,” id. at *9, but nonetheless concluded that the challenged practices “ ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur’ ” in light of Defendants’ “policy and procedural changes[ as well as] physical changes to the death row facilities,” see id. (quoting Wall, 741 F.3d at 497). In an accompanying order, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion as moot, and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II.

The principal question on appeal is whether the district court erred in holding that the changes to Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement resulting from the revisions to the Corrections Department’s policies rendered Plaintiffs’ action moot. When, as here, the relevant jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, we review a district court’s dismissal based on mootness de novo. See S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 789 F.3d 475, 482 (4th Cir. 2015); Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd., 772 F.3d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We review de novo the legal issue of whether, based on the facts, a case is moot. Here the facts are undisputed, so our review of the only matter at issue — the legal effect of the undisputed facts — is de novo.”)

“[T]he doctrine of mootness constitutes a part of the constitutional limits of federal court jurisdiction,” Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 2008)), which extends only to actual cases or controversies, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. When a case or controversy ceases to exist — either due to a change in the facts or the law — “the litigation is moot, and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction ceases to exist also.” S.C. Coastal Conservation League, 789 F.3d at 482. Put differently, “a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (“Mootness has been described as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’ ” (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980))).

The district court concluded that the Corrections Department’s revisions to the policies governing the conditions of confinement of death row inmates rendered Plaintiffs’ claim moot because the revisions addressed all of the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Porter, 2016 WL 3766301, at *8. There is, however, a well-recognized exception to the mootness doctrine holding that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982); see also United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) (“[V]olun-tary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the ease, i.e., does not make the case moot.”).

The voluntary cessation exception “traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior.” City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1, 121 S.Ct. 743, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001). Accordingly, the ex ception seeks to prevent “a manipulative litigant immunizing itself from suit indefinitely, altering its behavior long enough to secure a dismissal and then reinstating it immediately after.” ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 721, 727, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013)); see also Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2287, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012) (“The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.”). To that end, “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693.

The Supreme Court has held that a defendant satisfies this heavy burden when, for example, it enters into an “unconditional and irrevocable” agreement that prohibits it from returning to the challenged conduct. Already, LLC, 133 S.Ct. at 728. Likewise, we have held that a governmental entity’s change of policy renders a challenge moot when the governmental entity “has not asserted its right to enforce [the challenged policy] at any future time.” Telco Commc’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1231 (4th Cir. 1989). In the context of conditions of confinement cases, in particular, courts have found that a change that “completely and irrevocably eradicate^] the effects” of the condition or policy subject to challenge renders an action moot. Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)) (finding challenge to adequacy of prison library mooted by replacement of library with larger facility); see also Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that transfer of plaintiff inmate from unit or location where he is subject to challenged policy to unit or location where he cannot be subject to challenged policy renders challenge to policy to moot).

By contrast, a defendant fails to meet its heavy burden to establish that its allegedly wrongful behavior will not recur when the defendant “retains the authority and capacity to repeat an alleged harm.” Wall, 741 F.3d at 497; see also Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 316-17 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a governmental entity’s change to a challenged policy does not moot an action when the government retains authority to “reassess ... at any time” the change and revert to the challenged policy). And courts have been particularly unwilling to find that a defendant has met its heavy burden to establish that its allegedly wrongful conduct will not recur when the defendant expressly states that, notwithstanding its abandonment of a challenged policy, it could return to the contested policy in the future, see Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 394 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013), or when the defendant’s “reluctant” decision to change a policy reflects “a desire to return to the old ways,” Citizen Center v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900, 908 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010)). In the context of litigation regarding the policies governing prisoners’ conditions of confinement, in particular, courts have refused to find a challenge to an abandoned policy or practice moot when the prison refuses either to “promise! ] not to resume the prior practice,” Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 526, 532 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jager v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1989)), or to otherwise “unambiguously terminate! ]” the challenged practice, Doe v. Wooten, 747 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2014).

Here, nothing bars the Corrections Department from reverting to the challenged policies in the future. And given Operating Procedure 425.A’s requirement that the Corrections Department review the policy governing Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement annually and rewrite that policy no later than three years after the current policy’s effective date, it is more than a “mere possibility” that Defendants will alter Plaintiffs’ current conditions of confinement. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894; see also Wall, 741 F.3d at 497 (finding change in policy did not moot action when there was “some degree of doubt that the new policy will remain in place for long”).

More significantly, throughout the course of this litigation, Defendants have refused to commit to keep the revised policies in place and not revert to the challenged practices. On the contrary, as the district court found, Defendants repeatedly have “decline[d] to explicitly acknowledge that the pre-2015 conditions of confinement were unconstitutional or to offer explicit guarantees that the [Corrections Department] will not return to those conditions.” Porter, 2016 WL 3766301, at *9; see also, e.g., J.A. 1162 (stating that Corrections Department refused to agree to consent decree keeping revised policies in place because it “didn’t want anything in place that would necessarily bind [it] to act in one manner or another”); J.A. 1164-65 (“[T]he [Corrections Department does not] ha[ve] any intent whatsoever to go back to the way things were, but the department can’t be blind to the fact that things might change in the future.”). Indeed, during oral argument, Defendants’ counsel said the Corrections Department could not foreswear a return to the challenged policies because it “doesn’t have a crystal ball that will enable [it] to know what might happen on death row ten years from now. ... lithe director had stood up and sworn that we were never going to go back, period, I don’t think that is a statement that he could make without making a misrepresentation to the court.” Oral Arg. 24:27-57.

We do not question the Corrections Department’s penological rationale for refusing to guarantee that it will not revert to the challenged policies if conditions so require. But given that the Corrections Department (1) “retains the authority and capacity” to return to the challenged policies, Wall, 741 F.3d at 497, (2) refuses to “promise[ ] not to resume the prior practice,” Rich, 716 F.3d at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jager, 862 F.2d at 833-34), and (3) has suggested circumstances may require re-imposing the challenged policies, Defendants cannot meet their “formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693. Indeed, the facts of the present case closely track those in Wall, in which we found that the Corrections Department’s revision of a challenged policy after the initiation of litigation did not moot the case when: the Corrections Department failed to establish that it would not reinstate the policy following completion of the lawsuit; the Corrections Department did not suggest it was barred or considered itself barred from reinstating the policy if it so chose; and there was “some degree of doubt that the new policy w[ould] remain in place for long.” 741 F.3d at 497. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ action as moot.

III.

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . Ricky Jovan Gray, another plaintiff involved in this appeal, was executed by the State of Virginia on January 18, 2017, rendering his appeal moot.

      . On appeal, Plaintiffs also argue that the district court's failure to notify the parties that it was intending to decide the case on mootness grounds sua sponte violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2), which states that "[ajfter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may ... grant [a summary judgment] motion on grounds not raised by a party.” Because we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the action as moot, we need not — and thus do not— decide whether the district court violated Rule 56(f).

      . A voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must be “at least somewhat related” to the pending litigation for the voluntary cessation exception to apply. Wall, 741 F.3d at 498 n.8. Defendants contend that the exception does not apply here because the district court found that the changes to the challenged policies "were contemplated prior to the initiation of litigation,” and that finding was not clearly erroneous. Appellees’ Br. at 29. We do not agree that the district court engaged in any such factfinding, and in any event, the record was not sufficient to support a determination that the exception did not apply. Most critically, regardless of when the policy changes were first considered, the changes were made only after this case was initiated and they came after Defendants’ vigorous resistance to changes for several years. Additionally, the interim rules and regulations that effected a repeal of the challenged policies were promulgated only after this suit was initiated and the district court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss. And the interim rules and regulations were not made final until after the district court ordered a status update regarding whether the rules and regulations had been finalized.

      . Defendants argue that "this case also fails for lack of an effective remedy.” Appellees’ Br. at 27; see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (“Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right."); see also id. § 3626(g)(7) (defining "the term ‘prospective relief [to] mean[] all relief other than compensatory monetary damages”). This argument also underlies Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed under the doctrine of prudential mootness. The district court, however, did not address the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunc-tive relief, see Porter, 2016 WL 3766301, at *11 (noting that, because it concluded the case was moot, "it would be inappropriate ... to invoke the injunction authority of the Court”), and therefore we decline to do so now, see Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1182 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007) (”[L]ike the district court, we have decided only the mootness question; we offer no opinion on the merits of [the plaintiff’s] claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.”). If Defendants so request, the district court can address Plaintiffs’ entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief on remand. See Sheely, 505 F.3d at 1182 n.10 ("Even though a case is not moot, that does not mean that injunctive relief follows automatically .... Therefore, nothing in this opinion should be read to preclude the district court on remand, and after appropriate review, from deciding that equitable relief is not warranted.” (citation omitted)); Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1047 n.19 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by L.A. Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.4th 352, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 993 P.2d 334, 350 (2000) ("On remand in this case, the city may attempt to show that the likelihood of its (Continued) engaging in similar constitutional violations is sufficiently remote to make in-junctive relief unnecessary.”). For the same reason, we also decline to find Plaintiffs’ action equitably moot.


author: AGEE, Circuit Judge:

text:
    LVNV FUNDING, LLC, its successors and assigns as assignee of CitiFinancial, Inc., Creditor-Appellant, v. Derrick Allen HARLING; Teresa Stevens Harling, Debtors-Appellees, v. Pamela Simmons-Beasley; Joy S. Goodwin; U. S. Trustee’s OFFICE, Trustees. Pamela Simmons-Beasley; National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Amici Supporting Appellees. LVNV Funding, LLC, its successors and assigns as assignee of Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Creditor-Appellant, v. Jeffrey Jerel Rhodes, a/k/a Jeff Rhodes, a/k/a Jeffery Jerel Rhodes, Debtor-Appellee, v. Gretchen D. Holland; U. S. Trustee’s Office, Trustees. Pamela Simmons-Beasley; National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Amici Supporting Appellees.
    No. 16-1346, No. 16-1347
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: January 24, 2017
    Decided: March 30, 2017
    Amended: April 6, 2017

      ARGUED: Adam C. Bach, ELLER TONNSEN BACH, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jane H. Downey, MOORE TAYLOR LAW FIRM, P.A., West Columbia, South Carolina, for Appel-lees. ON BRIEF: Robert H. Cooper, THE COOPER LAW FIRM, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee Jeffrey Jerel Rhodes. John B. Butler, III, Columbia, South Carolina, for Amicus Pamela Simmons-Beasley. Tara Twomey, Allan L. Gropper, NATIONAL CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS CENTER, San Jose, California, for Amicus National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys.
    Before AGEE, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
   AGEE, Circuit Judge:

LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV’) appeals from orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina, which disallowed its claims as an unsecured creditor in two proceedings under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). See generally 11 U.S.C. ch. 13. On appeal, LVNV contends that the bankruptcy court’s Chapter 13 plan confirmation orders (the “Confirmation Orders”) barred the objections to LVNV’s claims because those objections were filed after entry of the Confirmation Orders. For the reasons set out below, we disagree with LVNV and affirm the judgments of the bankruptcy court.

I.

A.

This appeal arises out of two separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings that followed a similar pattern. On July 11, 2014, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Rhodes”) filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13. Rhodes’ Chapter 13 plan was confirmed on October 17, 2014. On June 26, 2015, Derrick and Teresa Harling (the “Harlings”; collectively with Rhodes, the “Debtors”) filed in that same court their own Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court confirmed the Harlings’ Chapter 13 plan on August 20, 2015.

The Debtors used “form” Chapter 13 plans, which are utilized by the bankruptcy courts in the District of South Carolina. In their respective plans, the Debtors scheduled their secured debts individually, naming each of their secured creditors, the value of each secured creditor’s claim, the value of the lien each secured creditor held in the collateral securing the Debtors’ particular obligation, and the amount of each secured creditor’s claim that was unsecured by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 506. In contrast to the specific provisions for secured creditors, each plan provided for treatment of unsecured creditors as a single class, so that: “General unsecured creditors shall be paid allowed claims pro rata by the trustee to the extent that funds are available after payment of all other allowed claims.” E.g., J.A. 158. In addition, the Debtors’ plans contained a provision reserving the right to object to claims after plan confirmation: “Confirmation of this plan does not bar a party in interest from objecting to a claim.” E.g., J.A. 157 (a “reservation of rights” clause).

B.

LVNV filed proofs of claim in each case before entry of the Confirmation Orders. In Rhodes’ case, LVNV filed proof of an unsecured claim in the amount of $761.44 on August 1, 2014. In the Harlings’ case, LVNV filed proof of an unsecured claim in the amount of $3,878.86 on July 8, 2015. Neither the Debtors, nor their trustees, took any action regarding LVNV’s claims before the respective Confirmation Orders were entered.

As is typical in Chapter 13 proceedings, the claim bar date in each case was later than the date of plan confirmation. Under the Bankruptcy Code’s timeline in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, plan confirmation and the deadline to file proofs of claim are set relative to the § 341 meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 341; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(a). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2003(a) sets the § 341 meeting twenty-one to fifty days after the debtor’s petition for relief. Under § 1324, the plan confirmation hearing follows twenty to forty-five days after the § 341 meeting, 11 U.S.C. § 1324(b), while the claim bar date is ninety days after the creditor’s meeting, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c). As a consequence, it is common in a Chapter 13 proceeding that the bar date to file claims by unsecured creditors occurs after plan confirmation. In Rhodes’ case, the claim bar date was November 13, 2014, almost a month after his Confirmation Order was entered. In the Harlings’ case, the bar date was October 26, 2015, more than two months after the Confirmation Order was entered.

Rhodes filed his objection to LVNV’s proof of claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502 on October 9, 2015, contending that claim was barred by the relevant statute of limitations. Likewise, on August 27, 2015, one week after the Confirmation Order in their case was entered, the Harlings objected to LVNV’s proof of claim on the same ground.

LVNV conceded in the bankruptcy court, as it does here, that its claims would ordinarily be barred by the statute of limitations. However, LVNV interposed the defense that the Debtors’ objections were invalid and of no effect under the doctrine of res judicata. According to LVNV, the Confirmation Orders were final judgments on the validity of LVNV’s claims and, therefore, res judicata precluded the Debtors’ later objections. The bankruptcy courts disagreed with LVNV and sustained the Debtors’ objections to LVNV’s claims in reliance on the reservation of rights clauses in the respective Chapter 13 plans. As a consequence, LVNV’s claims were barred by the applicable state statute of limitations, and it will not receive any distribution from the Debtors’ Chapter 13 estates.

LVNV now appeals from both decisions. In Rhodes’ case, the parties jointly moved the bankruptcy court for leave to bypass the district court and appeal directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A), representing the case presented a question of law as to which there was no controlling decision and that resolution of the issue presented would materially advance the progress of Rhodes’ individual case. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and we accepted jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 5; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006.

Meanwhile, LVNV appealed the Har-lings’ case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Shortly after filing its notice of appeal in the district court, however, LVNV and the Harlings filed a joint motion for leave to appeal directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). The district court granted the motion, and again we accepted jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 5; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006.

We consolidated the Debtors’ cases for purposes of this appeal, over which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).

II.

On appeal, LVNV contends that the bankruptcy court erred in approving the Debtors’ objections to its unsecured claims, thereby disallowing those claims, because the Debtors’ objections came after entry of the Confirmation Orders. LVNV maintains that confirmation of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan has a res judicata effect on all creditor claims filed prior to issuance of the confirmation order. We find that LVNV’s position does not satisfy the requirements for the application of res ju-dicata and contradicts the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and the plan set out by Congress governing Chapter 13 proceedings.

We review the bankruptcy court’s application of res judicata de novo. First Union Commercial Corp. v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough (In re Varat Enters., Inc.), 81 F.3d 1310, 1314 (4th Cir. 1996).

A.

A debtor’s bankruptcy ease “involves an aggregation of individual controversies, many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard, v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1686, 1692, 191 L.Ed.2d 621 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). In view of this unique status, a bankruptcy case may contain many “final decisions” that do not necessarily fit squarely into the conventional formulation of res judicata, which is a product of “ordinary civil litigation.” See id. at 1691-92. Nonetheless, Chapter 13 confirmation orders have a preclusive effect on those issues litigated by or determined at confirmation, as the plan confirmation order is a “final determination” as to those matters it actually addresses. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (“The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.”); In re Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he confirmation order constitutes a final judgment on the merits with res judicata effect.”).

In bankruptcy, “[w]e look to res judicata principles developed in our own case law to determine whether an earlier federal judgment, including the judgment of a bankruptcy court, bars a claim asserted in a later action.” Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, 472 (4th Cir. 2003). Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a prior judgment between the same parties can preclude subsequent litigation on those matters actually and necessarily resolved in the first adjudication.” In re Varat, 81 F.3d at 1314-15. Res judicata applies where three conditions are met: (1) there is a prior judgment, which was final, on the merits, “and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of due process”; (2) the parties to the second matter are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the first action; and (3) “the claims in the second matter are based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier proceeding.” Covert v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 779 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2015) .(internal quotations omitted). A judgment satisfying those three factors is both “claim” and “issue” preclusive. See In re Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315; see also Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 352, 358 n.2, 196 L.Ed.2d 242 (2016) (stating that “res judicata ... embraces both claim and issue preclusion”). LVNV contends the Confirmation Orders meet the three requirements of res judicata so that the Debtors’ objections, coming after the Confirmation Orders were entered, are thus barred. The query before us in this case is what issues were determined by the Confirmation Orders, and, specifically, did the bankruptcy court adjudicate the merits of any individual unsecured creditor’s claim? It is to that question that we now turn.

B.

The determination of the application of res judicata begins with the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory scheme. That scheme reflects a careful and structured framework set out by. Congress. Section 1325 lays out the requirements for plan confirmation. Under that statute, the bankruptcy court “shall confirm” a debt- or’s Chapter 13 plan if it meets the specific requirements therein and “complies with the [other] provisions of’ Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Consequently, Chapter 13 plans must comply with the plan content requirements set forth in § 1322, meaning the plan: (1) must be proposed in good faith; (2) must not “discriminate unfairly” between different classes of unsecured creditors; and (3) must be in the best interest of the debtor’s creditors. See, e.g., id. §§ 1322, 1325(a)(3), (4), (7). These requirements are statutory mandates, and the bankruptcy court lacks the authority to impose additional requirements. See Petro v. Mishler, 276 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[B]y creating a finite list of ... affirmative requirements necessary for a plan’s confirmation, we assume that Congress intended to exclude other requisites from being grafted onto section 1325(a).”).

Section 1322 allows a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan to treat unsecured creditors as a single class. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (allowing the plan to “designate a class or classes of unsecured claims”). When the plan does so, as do the Debtors’ plans here, the bankruptcy court examines only the “pool” of funds available to the class as a whole during plan confirmation. See id. § 1322(a)(3) (stating that a debtor’s proposed Chapter 13 plan must “provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class”). Most Chapter 13 plans propose to pay the class of unsecured creditors only to the extent the funds of the bankruptcy estate are available after the plan obligations to secured or priority creditors are satisfied. Accordingly, in confirming a Chapter 13 plan, the bankruptcy court need only determine that the funds available to the class of unsecured creditors are equivalent to or greater than the amount that class would be paid in the course of a Chapter 7 proceeding. See, e.g., In re Cole, 548 B.R. 132, 142 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016) (“[Section 1325(a)(4)] requires that creditors receive payments having a present value at least equal to what they would receive in a [CJhapter 7 ease.”).

In other words, the Bankruptcy Code requires the proposed plan to address at plan confirmation only the collective amount that all the Chapter 13 debtor’s unsecured creditors as a class will receive after satisfaction of any secured or priority debts. No provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the determination of the merits of an individual unsecured claim within the class of unsecured claims as part of plan confirmation. To the contrary, as discussed below, that function is reserved by statute for the claims allowance procedure, which stands separate and apart under the Bankruptcy Code from plan confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-502.

Chapter 13 plan confirmation as to unsecured creditors contrasts with the treatment and determination of secured claims. Unlike the general provision for the class of unsecured creditors, a Chapter 13 plan must address the rights of each secured creditor individually by setting out the mode of satisfying that claim in relation to the secured creditor’s collateral. Id. § 1325(a)(5) (requiring an analysis for “each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan”). Of significance is that Chapter 13 plan confirmation requires that “the holder of such [secured] claim has accepted the plan.” Id. § 1325(a)(5)(A). No parallel provision exists for unsecured creditors’ claims, so whether an unsecured creditor “consents” to a Chapter 13 plan is irrelevant for purposes of plan confirmation. Thus, as a matter of statutory direction, the treatment of each individual secured creditor’s claim is bound up in plan confirmation, while an individual unsecured creditor’s claim is not.

As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code sets out a specific claim determination process for adjudicating contested claims. Upon filing, a claim is “deemed allowed” under § 502(a). At that point, the debtor, trustee, or other interested party may file an objection, and the bankruptcy court proceeds under § 502 to adjudicate the validity and amount of the claim vel non. Nothing in either § 502, § 1325, or elsewhere in the 'Bankruptcy Code ties adjudication of the allowance of an unsecured creditor’s claim to the process or event of Chapter 13 plan confirmation.

An unsecured creditor’s claim, if filed before plan confirmation, has already been “deemed allowed” under § 502(a) without any action of the bankruptcy court. Thus, there is nothing under the Bankruptcy Code for the bankruptcy court to adjudicate at plan confirmation regarding an individual unsecured creditor’s claim. That matter can only arise should an objection be made under § 502, which sets in motion a determination process under that statute and the Bankruptcy Rules with no relation to plan confirmation.

With this statutory structure of the Bankruptcy Code in mind we now turn to the application of res judicata based on the effect of a Chapter 13 plan confirmation order.

C.

For res judicata to apply, there must be an initial final judgment involving the same parties as are present in a later proceeding that is based upon the same cause of action as in the first proceeding. In re Varat, 81 F.3d at 1314-15. The Debtors and LVNV agree that the Confirmation Orders are final judgments as to their subject matter and that the Debtors and LVNV were before the bankruptcy court when the Confirmation Orders were entered. Thus, the first two elements of res judicata are met: a prior final judgment with the same parties as now contest an issue in a later proceeding. The question to resolve is whether the objections to LVNV’s claims by the Debtors raise the same cause of action as before the bankruptcy court in plan confirmation. The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and clear structure of the bankruptcy process set out by Congress confirm that they do not.

When the bankruptcy court entered the Confirmation Orders, it was required to determine whether the respective plans met the requirements of § 1322 and § 1325. If so, the bankruptcy court was required to confirm the plans. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Thus, the “cause of action” in the first proceeding was whether the Debtors’ plans met the requirements for plan confirmation. They did. Indeed, LVNV did not contend before the bankruptcy court, and does not contend now, that the Debtors’ plans failed to meet any of the requirements for plan confirmation. Accordingly, the issue for res judicata purposes is whether the “cause of action” in the later proceeding — the validity of the Debtors’ objections to LVNV’s claims— was any part of the cause of action in the first proceeding, plan confirmation. As to unsecured creditors, it was not. All the bankruptcy court adjudicated in the Confirmation Orders as to unsecured creditors was whether, as a class, that class would be paid “to the extent that funds [wejre available after payment of all other allowed claims.” E.g., J.A. 95.

As foreshadowed in the earlier discussion, this conclusion is compelled by the plain language of the Bankruptcy. Code and Rules, which govern the allowance of claims and “contested matters.” Upon filing, a claim or interest is “deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). Thus, LVNV’s claims were already “deemed allowed” by the Bankruptcy Code when they were filed before plan confirmation. This “deemed allowance” was subject to statutory divestiture under § 502(b) if an objection was filed and then sustained by the bankruptcy court. Only when an objection to a claim is filed does the bankruptcy court “determine the amount of such claim” and “allow [that] claim in such amount.” See id. § 502(b). The filing of an objection to claim begins a “contested matter,” governed by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 and 9014. See, e.g., Gentry v. Siegel, 668 F.3d 83, 92 (4th Cir. 2012) (observing that a contested matter arises once “an objection to [a] claim has been interposed”). See generally Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007(a) (establishing the procedure for filing objections to claims); id. 9014 (establishing the procedure for the adjudication of “contested matters”). Under the plain text of the relevant rules and statutes, there is no deadline for the initiation of such an objection. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code ties contested matters for unsecured claims to a timeline related to plan confirmation.-

This specific statutory structure for the adjudication of objections to claims leads to the conclusion that Congress has made Chapter 13 plan confirmation and claim-allowance on contested unsecured claims to be separate and distinct actions within a debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding. See Bullard, 135 S.Ct. at 1692 (observing that bankruptcy involves the “aggregation of individual controversies”). The Chapter 13 plan confirmation only adjudicates whether the plan meets the requirements of § 1322 and § 1325. Neither statute vests in the bankruptcy court the adjudication of the merits of an individual unsecured creditor’s claim as part of plan confirmation. Such a determination is specifically allocated by the Bankruptcy Code to a separate proceeding under § 502. Thus, for res judi-cata purposes, a bankruptcy court’s later § 502 determination to allow or disallow an unsecured creditor’s claim is not based on any matter that was before the bankruptcy court as part of plan confirmation. In effect, whether an objection to an unsecured creditor’s claim is filed before or after plan confirmation makes no difference in the plan confirmation proceeding.

There is no “prior judgment,” final or otherwise, “on the merits” as to any individual unsecured creditor’s claims in the Confirmation Orders. The second cause of action — the determination of the validity of LVNV’s claims — could' not be based on the same cause of action in the plan confirmation proceeding because the issue of claim allowance was never before the court. See In re Varat, 81 F.3d at 1314-15 (setting out the requirements for res judicata in a bankruptcy case). At no point in the § 502 contested matter regarding the allowance of LVNV’s claims was the bankruptcy court required, or even asked, to reconsider the matters decided by the Confirmation Orders: the fulfillment by the Debtors’ plans of the § 1322 and § 1325 requirements. As a consequence, the Confirmation Orders cannot be res judicata as to an unsecured creditor’s claim because an essential element of res judicata is absent.

LVNV’s argument conflates the separate and distinct proceedings of § 1325 plan confirmation and a § 502 contested claim. Congress purposefully created these events as two separate and distinct proceedings. The Confirmation Orders only affected those matters that were decided under § 1325 as part of the plan confirmation, which did not consider anything regarding the validity of a contested individual unsecured claim regardless of when that claim was filed. Thus, considered under the clear - framework of the Bankruptcy Code, res judicata cannot apply to bar the Debtors’ objections to LVNV’s claims.

D.

Notwithstanding this statutory framework, LVNV contends that our opinion in Covert v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 779 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2015), and the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in D & K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 112 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1997), compel a different conclusion. LVNV argues these cases stand for the proposition that confirmation of a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan is a final adjudication on the merits of all creditor claims filed prior to entry of the confirmation order, not just the claims of secured creditors. We disagree.

In Covert, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit in federal district court against LVNV under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and other consumer-protection statutes. 779 F.3d at 244-45. The plaintiffs alleged that, in their prior individual bankruptcy proceedings, LVNVs proofs of claim violated the FDCPA and gave them a cause of action against LVNV. Id. However, the plaintiffs never objected to LVNVs unsecured claims in their bankruptcy proceedings and did not include the FDCPA claim as an asset of their Chapter 13 estates. See id. Instead, the plaintiffs waited for their Chapter 13 plans to pay out and obtained § 1328 discharges for any liability to LVNV before making their claims outside the bankruptcy court against LVNV. See id. at 245, 247-49. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against LVNV, and we affirmed based on the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 245.

In effect, the Covert plaintiffs raised outside of the bankruptcy court a defense to LVNVs proof of claim — a defense that could and should have been asserted through the claims-allowance process under § 502, but also an asset that should have been included as part of the plaintiffs’ bankruptcy estates. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 1306(a)(1). For res judicata purposes, Covert reflects only that debtors who do not object to proofs of claim during their bankruptcy proceeding are precluded from later litigating the subject matter of those claims for personal gain outside the Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding as a way to avoid including the claim as an asset in their bankruptcy estate. Had the Covert plaintiffs met their obligations as Chapter 13 debtors, the FDCPA claims would have been part of their Chapter 13 estates and included in the § 1325(a)(4) determination — whether the debtors’ proposed plans were in the “best interest” of their creditors — by the bankruptcy court in plan confirmation. However, the Covert plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code for their Chapter 13 plans. Therefore, the Court in Covert was correct to reject the plaintiffs’ claims.

Here, the Debtors have timely objected to LVNVs claim in the bankruptcy court. And they have not brought a proceeding outside of the bankruptcy court to circumvent the requirements of their Chapter 13 plans to obtain a personal benefit to the detriment of their other creditors.

Likewise, D & K Properties is neither on point nor persuasive. There, the Seventh Circuit recognized that a debtor’s collateral suit against one of its secured creditors was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. See D & K Props., 112 F.3d at 259-60. D & K Properties sued one of its secured creditors, Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Mutual Life”), in an Illinois state court, alleging, in essence, a breach of contract and bad faith. Id. at 258-59. When D & K Properties later filed for bankruptcy, Mutual Life removed D & K Properties’ suit to the bankruptcy court, which ruled in favor of Mutual Life on the merits. Id. at 259. D & K Properties did not appeal that ruling, but instead paid Mutual Life’s claim as part of its bankruptcy plan. Id. As in Covert, after D & K Properties received a discharge from bankruptcy, it again brought suit against Mutual Life in an Illinois state court, alleging the same breach of contract, as well as a related tortious interference with contract claim. Id. Mutual Life removed the case to federal district court, which held that D & K Properties’ suit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that res judicata “ordinarily would bar [D & K Properties] from bringing the action after the confirmation of the plan.” Id.

Again, the case at bar has no correlation to D & K Properties. LVNV is an unsecured creditor, not a secured creditor, which would be bound by a confirmed Chapter 18 plan. More importantly, D & K Properties represents classic res judicata. D & K Properties’ post-bankruptcy action in district court clearly covered the prior cause of action actually litigated to a final, prior judgment in a contested matter by the bankruptcy court. No such connection is present in the case before us.

⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜

In sum, we hold that the Debtors’ objections to LVNV’s proofs of claim as an unsecured creditor are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. When the bankruptcy court confirmed the Debtors’ Chapter 13 plans, it only considered treatment of unsecured creditors as a single class. There was no adjudication of the claim of any individual unsecured creditor as part of plan confirmation. Determining the validity of individual unsecured claims is a distinctly separate process under § 502 both in procedure and timing. Therefore, an essential element for application of res judicata — that the later proceeding is the same cause of action as in the prior case— is simply absent from the Chapter 13 plan confirmation as to unsecured creditors like LVNV. Thus, res judicata cannot be said to apply in the bankruptcy court’s later determination of contested unsecured claims under § 502.

III.

Based on the foregoing, the judgments of the bankruptcy court are

AFFIRMED.

      . On November 9, 2016, Rhodes filed a notice of conversion to Chapter 7 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a). Any issues in Rhodes’ Chapter 7 case are not before us and are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

      . If a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan divides unsecured creditors into more than one class, each class must be considered on its own. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).

      . Further illustrating the dissonance between LVNV’s position and Congress’ intent, as expressed in the Bankruptcy Code, is the fact that LVNV would create two classes of unsecured creditors from the single class of unsecured creditors set out in the Debtors’ confirmed plans — a result at odds with the terms of the Confirmation Orders, as well as 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) and (b)(1). On the one hand, LVNV would create a class of favored unsecured creditors whose claims were filed prior to plan confirmation and made final at that point in its view. On the other hand, LVNV would create a separate class of disfavored unsecured creditors whose claims are filed after confirmation and, therefore, are open to challenge at any time prior to the debtor's § 1328 discharge, which may come several years after plan confirmation. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code authorizes that result and contradicts the single class of unsecured creditors approved by the bankruptcy court in the Confirmation Orders. To its credit, LVNV has abandoned the argument that plan confirmation would be res judicata as to all unsecured creditors’ claims, even those filed after
        plan confirmation. That argument would lead to the absurd result that plan confirmation would be res judicata for claims not yet filed when the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan.

      . Both the parties and the bankruptcy court addressed the res judicata issue in terms of the adequacy of the reservation of rights clauses. For the reasons noted above, we find it unnecessary to address the issue in that way as the application of res judicata is plainly answered under the text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.


author: BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge: DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge,

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald T. HILL, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-4639
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: January 25, 2017
    Decided: March 30, 2017

      ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen Eugene Anthony, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Before DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
   BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Donald Hill pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of statements he made during a traffic stop and of a firearm that was seized during the stop. Hill argues that the police officers’ actions exceeded the lawful scope of the stop, and that the stop was prolonged unjustifiably beyond the time needed to execute the relevant tasks, violating his Fourth Amendment rights described in Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).

Upon our review, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion, because the traffic stop did not exceed the time reasonably required to complete the tasks incident to the mission of the stop. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I.

On October 20, 2014, Richmond City police officers Ryan Taylor and Jason McClendon were patrolling a neighborhood in Richmond in their police cruiser. The officers saw a vehicle (the car) travel-ling at an estimated speed slightly exceeding the posted speed limit, and observed the car cross a yellow, double-solid line marker in the center of the roadway. After Officer Taylor activated the cruiser’s emergency lights and siren, the car turned into a driveway of a residence. The officers parked their cruiser at the end of the driveway behind the car, and initiated a traffic stop about 6:01 p.m.

The driver of the car, Jeremy Taylor (the driver), immediately stepped out of the car. The officers thought that the driver might be attempting to abscond from the scene, but the driver complied when ordered by Officer McClendon to return to the car.

As the officers approached the car, Officer Taylor recognized both occupants of the vehicle. Officer Taylor testified that he knew the driver as someone who had been “hanging with” individuals “connected with” robberies. Officer Taylor also recognized Hill, the passenger in the vehicle, from a prior traffic stop, and was aware that Hill had been a victim in a prior stabbing incident.

At Officer Taylor’s request, the driver produced identification but Hill was unable to do so. Officer Taylor returned to the police cruiser, and entered the names of both the driver and Hill into computer databases operated by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Officer Taylor took this action to confirm the men’s identities, to ascertain whether there were any warrants outstanding for their arrest, and to determine whether the driver had a valid operator’s license.

After about three minutes had passed, the NCIC database returned an “alert” notifying Officer Taylor that both men had been associated with drug trafficking and were “likely armed.” Officer Taylor also learned that the driver had a suspended operator’s license. Accordingly, about 6:04 p.m., Officer Taylor began writing two summonses for the driver, one for reckless driving and one for driving with a suspended operator’s license. Officer Taylor also requested that a K-9 unit be sent to the scene.

Officer Taylor interrupted writing the summonses in order to enter the men’s names into an additional computer database known as PISTOL, which tracks every person who has had prior contacts with the police in Richmond. Officer Taylor testified that using PISTOL can be a lengthy process because after an officer enters an individual’s name into the system, PISTOL produces a list of all individuals with the same name. In this case, after PISTOL produced a list of eight or nine individuals with the same name as the driver, Officer Taylor spent between three and five minutes reviewing that information. Once Officer Taylor had located both the driver and Hill in the PISTOL system, Officer Taylor resumed writing the two summonses. Both officers testified that it typically takes about four or five minutes to write a single summons.

While Officer Taylor searched the databases and continued to write the summonses in the police cruiser, Officer McClendon remained standing next to the passenger side of the car “[mjaking small talk” with the driver and Hill. During their conversation, Officer McClendon asked the men a total of three times whether there were any drugs or firearms in the car. Following the third inquiry, Hill responded that he had a firearm on his person. Officer McClendon immediately shouted “gun,” prompting Officer Taylor to return to the car to assist in securing Hill and recovering the firearm.

Meanwhile, the K-9 unit had arrived at the scene. However, at the time Officer McClendon yelled “gun,” the K-9 unit dog was still in the unit’s vehicle and had not begun its anticipated “sniff’ of the area around the car. The district court found that a total of about 20 minutes had elapsed from the time the officers initiated the stop to the moment that Officer McClendon shouted “gun.”

Hill was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress both the firearm and the statements he made during the traffic stop. After a suppression hearing, the district court found that the officers had testified credibly, and accepted as true the officers’ description of the events. The court also found that the stop was not extended for any reason, including Officer Taylor’s request for a K-9 unit. The court accordingly concluded that the officers had acted lawfully, and denied Hill’s motion to suppress.

Hill later entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge on appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Hill now appeals from the district court’s denial of that motion.

II.

Hill argues that Officers Taylor and McClendon unlawfully extended the duration and scope of the traffic stop, in violation of Hill’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. In particular, Hill challenges Officer McClendon’s decision to talk with him and the driver, rather than to assist Officer Taylor with searching the databases and writing the summonses. Hill also challenges Officer Taylor’s decisions to request a K-9 unit and to search the PISTOL database. Hill asserts that as a cumulative effect of these decisions, the officers improperly extended the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the purpose of the stop in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1609. We disagree with Hill’s arguments.

A.

When a district court has denied a motion to suppress, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2016). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the prevailing party in the district court. United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015).

A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and is subject to review for reasonableness. Id. To satisfy the reasonableness requirements for an investigative detention, a traffic stop must be legitimate at its inception, and the officers’ actions during the stop must be “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop. Id. (citation omitted); see generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because Hill does not argue that the traffic stop was unjustified at its inception, our analysis is limited to the second question, namely, whether the “manner of execution [of the stop] unreasonably infringe[d]” on Hill’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005).

If a traffic stop is extended in time beyond the period that the officers are completing tasks related to the traffic infractions, the officers must either obtain consent from the individuals detained or identify reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the extension of the stop. Williams, 808 F.3d at 245-46. The “[ajuthority for the seizure ... ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are — or reasonably should have been — completed.” Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. The Supreme Court recently has clarified that extending a stop by even a de minimis length of time violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1615-16; see also Williams, 808 F.3d at 246-47.

The “acceptable length of a routine traffic stop,” however, “cannot be stated with mathematical precision.” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rodriguez, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492. In evaluating the reasonableness of a stop, we consider “what the police in fact do,” and whether the officers acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances presented to them. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616; Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 509. Thus, an officer need not employ “the least intrusive means conceivable” in executing a stop, but he still must be reasonably diligent and must use “the léast intrusive means reasonably available.” United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507); see also Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616.

An officer may engage in certain safety measures during a traffic stop, but generally must focus his attention on the initial basis for the stop. Palmer, 820 F.3d at 649. An officer may engage in “ordinary inquiries incident to” the traffic stop, such as inspecting a driver’s identification and license to operate a vehicle, verifying the registration of a vehicle and existing insurance coverage, and determining whether the driver is subject to outstanding warrants. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615.

While diligently pursuing the purpose of a traffic stop, officers also may engage in other investigative techniques unrelated to the underlying traffic infraction or the safety of the officers. Id. at 1614-15 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) and Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834). Such unrelated activity is permitted under the Fourth Amendment only as long as that activity does not prolong the roadside detention for the traffic infraction. Id. For example, an officer may question the occupants of a car on unrelated topics without impermissibly expanding the scope of a traffic stop. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781; Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507. An officer also may engage a K-9 unit to conduct a “dog sniff’ around a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop in an attempt to identify potential narcotics. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-09, 125 S.Ct. 834. However, because such a “sniff’ or investigative questioning is intended to detect “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” these actions may not prolong the duration of the traffic stop absent consent of those detained or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16 (citation omitted); see also Ca-balles, 543 U.S. at 407-09, 125 S.Ct. 834; Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781.

B.

With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the conduct of Officers Taylor and McClendon in the present case. Initially, we observe that the record does not contain evidence showing that either officer acted in a manner that delayed the completion of the traffic stop. The district court accepted as credible Officer McClen-don’s testimony that the traffic stop did not take longer than a typical stop would take in these circumstances, as well as Officer Taylor’s statement that he did not engage in any action that caused the stop to be extended in duration. Both officers also testified that it typically takes about 10 minutes to write two summonses, and Officer Taylor estimated that in this case it took about eight additional minutes to search the DMV, NCIC, and PISTOL databases. Thus, the officers directly accounted for their activity during about 18 minutes of the stop. And, as noted above, the district court found that the entire stop took about 20 minutes.

Based on the present record, this two-minute time difference, between the estimated time required to complete the officers’ described activities and the total length of the stop, does not support an inference that the stop was extended unlawfully for a de minimis amount of time in violation of Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16. The district court found that the duration of the traffic stop was not extended for any purpose beyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop, and Hill has not pointed to any evidence showing that this finding was clearly erroneous. Additionally, the record plainly shows that Officer Taylor had not finished writing the summonses when Officer McClendon yelled “gun.” Officers are not required to estimate with “mathematical precision” the duration of each discrete task undertaken during a traffic stop. See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 511. Moreover, the holding in Rodriguez does not render unlawful a traffic stop in which there are brief periods unaccounted for, as long as the stop was not prolonged for purposes beyond the mission of the stop, and the officers executed their tasks with reasonable diligence.

Although defense counsel introduced evidence that Officers Taylor and McClendon had completed other traffic stops that day in a shorter period of time, such a comparison is irrelevant to our analysis. This evidence regarding other stops did not show whether the circumstances were comparable to those presented here, including whether any occupants of other vehicles were deemed “likely armed,” whether the officers wrote multiple summonses, or whether they took other action. We therefore conclude that the 20-minute length of the traffic stop did not itself render the stop unreasonable in duration.

We further conclude that none of the officers’ individual actions suggested a lack of diligence in pursuing the stop or were otherwise unreasonable. Although Officer Taylor could have executed the stop without using PISTOL, and instead have relied exclusively on the DMV and NCIC databases, his decision to search this additional database did not violate Hill’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. As noted above, the Fourth Amendment “does not require that the officer employ the least intrusive means conceivable” in effectuating a traffic stop. Palmer, 820 F.3d at 649 (emphasis added). In our view, an officer reasonably may search a computer database during a traffic stop to determine an individual’s prior contact with local law enforcement, just as an officer may engage in the indisputably proper action of searching computer databases for an individual’s outstanding warrants. See id. at 651 (explaining that, in the interest of officer safety, officers are “entitled to inquire into a motorist’s criminal record after initiating a traffic stop”); Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16; see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 30, 683 S.E.2d 316, 318 (2009) (explaining that PISTOL includes information helpful for officers to assess their safety in the field), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Smith, 281 Va. 582, 709 S.E.2d 139 (2011). An officer may take such measures with respect to both the driver and passengers of a stopped vehicle to ensure officer safety. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a traffic stop for officer safety reasons); see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[W]hen the stop involves one or more passengers, that fact ‘increases the possible sources of harm to the officer,’ as ‘the motivation of a passenger to employ violence is every bit as great as that of the driver.’ ”) (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14, 117 S.Ct. 882) (internal alterations omitted).

We also decline Hill’s invitation that we find unreasonable as a matter of law Officer McClendon’s decision to stand next to the ear during most of the stop, rather than to assist Officer Taylor in completing the database searches in the police cruiser. As noted above, the NCIC database returned an alert that the two men were “likely armed.” This situation illustrates the concerns that the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized, namely, that because “[tjraffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers,” those officers may “take certain negligibly burdensome precautions” to ensure the safe completion of the stop. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Palmer, 820 F.3d at 651 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, given the inherent risks involved in such traffic stops, we conclude that the decision here by the two officers to allocate duties at the scene of the traffic stop, so that one remained in the immediate proximity of the vehicle’s occupants at all times, was not unreasonable.

Officer McClendon’s conversation with the driver and Hill similarly did not violate the Fourth Amendment. As set forth above, officers may engage in questioning unrelated to the traffic violations as long as the conversation does not extend the length of the stop. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (citing Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781). Given the absence of any contrary evidence, the record before us uniformly shows that Officer McClendon’s actions did not cause the stop to be prolonged.

And finally, we conclude that Officer Taylor’s decision to request a K-9 unit did not violate the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16. The district court made a factual finding that Officer Taylor’s decision to place a call requesting the K-9 unit did not extend the time period of the stop, and Hill has not identified any evidence demonstrating that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. To the contrary, the record shows that at the time Officer McClendon shouted “gun,” the narcotics-detection dog was still in the K-9 unit’s car. Thus, the record before us shows only that the presence of the K-9 unit on the scene was contemporaneous with the officers’ diligent pursuit of the mission of the stop. Compare Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1612-13 (traffic stop unlawfully extended when officers conducted “dog sniff’ after traffic warning was issued, and dog did not “alert” to narcotics until seven or eight minutes after the purpose of the traffic stop was complete).

In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez does not require courts to second-guess the logistical choices and actions of a police officer that, individually and collectively, were completed diligently within the confines of a lawful traffic stop. We emphasize, however, that we are not confronted here with an officer’s decision to execute a traffic stop in a deliberately slow or inefficient manner, in order to expand a criminal investigation within the temporal confines of the stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or consent of those detained. In such a case, an officer’s actions delaying the completion of a stop may compel a different conclusion than the one we reach here. In the present case, however, we hold that because the evidence shows that the officers acted with reasonable diligence in executing the tasks incident to the traffic stop, and the stop was not impermissibly expanded in scope or time beyond the pursuit of the stop’s mission, the district court did not err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

Respectfully, I dissent. I would reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.

Appellant Donald Hill was not a motorist. He was a passenger in a vehicle the operation of which violated the rules of the road because: (1) the operator’s driver’s license had been suspended and (2) the operator appeared to exceed slightly the posted speed limit and was observed to cross the double yellow line dividing the travel lanes of the roadway. Hill had nothing whatsoever to do with these violations. As a passenger in the vehicle who had not committed any violation of Virginia law, Hill had no obligation to identify himself to Officer Taylor (who apparently recognized him in any event) and failed (or declined, as was his right) to identify himself to the officer upon request. Thus, the proper timeline for the sole “mission” of the traffic stop in this case was to identify Jeremy Taylor (the driver) and issue whatever warnings or violation notices that Officer Taylor, in his discretion, chose to issue.

What, then, could possibly justify Hill’s prolonged detention? The clear answer to this question is well known to all of us. This was no mere traffic stop. Rather, it was a narcotics and firearms investigation, undertaken in the absence of reasonable suspicion (to say nothing of probable cause) that a narcotics or firearms violation was taking place. Violent drug dealers have the sympathy of none of us; we rightly applaud, respect, and deeply appreciate the brave law enforcement officers who put their lives on the line every day to keep us safe from such violence. But the ill-fated “War on Drugs” has a sometimes overlooked and unmentioned casualty: the Fourth Amendment. Here, the district court’s flawed findings easily satisfy the “clearly erroneous” standard because every minute Officer Taylor spent seeking to confirm Hill’s identity unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).

      . Because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we recount the facts in accordance with the officers' testimony at the suppression hearing. See United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Hill does not challenge the district court's determination that both officers testified credibly.

      . The driver testified at the suppression hearing that he was not attempting to run from the car, but the district court discredited the driver's testimony.

      . PISTOL stands for “Police Information System Totally On Line,” Commonwealth v. Smith, 281 Va. 582, 709 S.E.2d 139, 140 (2011), and "is a database that advises officers of the 'nature of the contact’ a suspect has had with the Richmond Police Department, any prior arrests, and whether the suspect might be armed,” Marshall v. Commonwealth, No. 2053-15-2, 2016 WL 7094219, at *1 n.1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished).

      . Additionally, we observe that Officer Taylor requested the K-9 unit only after being notified by NCIC that the driver and Hill were “likely armed” and had been involved in drag trafficking activity.