author: TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

text:
    HELPING HAND TOOLS; Rob Simpson, Petitioners, v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; Gina McCarthy, in her capacity as Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Deborah Jordan, in her capacity as Director of the Air Division of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region IX, Respondents, Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc., Respondent-Intervenor. Center for Biological Diversity, Petitioner, v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Gina McCarthy, in her official capacity as Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency; Jared Blumenfeld, in his official capacity as Regional Administrator of Region 9 of the United States Environmental Protection Agency; Deborah Jordan, in her official capacity as Director of the Air Division of Region 9 of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents, Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc., Respondent-Intervenor.
    No. 14-72553, No. 14-72602
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 19, 2016, San Francisco, California
    Filed September 2, 2016
    Amended December 23, 2016

      Kevin P. Bundy (argued), San Francisco, California; Brendan R. Cummings, Joshua Tree, California; Anna Moritz, Woodinville, Washington; as and for Petitioner Center for Biological Diversity.
    Andrew S. Kingdale (argued), Law Office of Andrew S. Kingdale, San Francisco, California, for Petitioners Helping Hand Tools and Robert Simpson.
    Dustin J. Maghamfar (argued); John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General; Environmental Defense Section, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C.; Brian Doster, Mark Kataoka, Nora Greenglass, and John Krallman, United States EPA, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C.; Kara Christen-son, United States EPA, Region IX, Office of Regional Counsel, San Francisco, California; for Respondents.
    Joseph R. Palmore (argued), Marc A. Hearron, and Lena Hughes, Morrison <& Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.; William M. Sloan, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, California; for Respondent-In-tervenor.
    Roger R. Martella, Jr., Joel F. Visser, and James R. Wedeking, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Wood Counsel and National Alliance of Forest Owners.
    Before: SUSAN P. GRABER and RICHARD C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and NANCY G. EDMUNDS, Senior District Judge.

       The Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

   ORDER

The opinion filed on September 2, 2016, is amended as follows:

1. On page 28 of the slip opinion, “The environmental impact report (“EIR”) prepared by EPA ...” is changed to, “The environmental impact report (“EIR”) prepared by a consultant for the Shasta County Department of Resource Management ...”
2. On page 28 of the slip opinion, “EPA therefore conducted the EIR assuming ...” is changed to, “The consultant therefore conducted the EIR assuming ...”
3. On page 30 of the slip opinion, “The Bioenergy BACT Guidance EPA applied to the greenhouse gas emissions from Sierra Pacific’s new facility is rational and thoroughly consistent with EPA’s prior guidance” is changed to, “The Bioenergy BACT Guidance, as applied by EPA to the greenhouse gas emissions from Sierra Pacific’s new facility, is rational and is consistent with EPA’s prior practice.”

With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny Center for Biological Diversity’s petition for panel rehearing.

Judges Graber and Tallman have voted to deny Helping Hand Tools’ petition for rehearing en banc and Judge Edmunds so recommends.

The full court has been advised of Helping Hand Tools’ petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc will be entertained.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Helping Hand Tools (“Helping Hand”) and Center for Biological Diversity (“Center”) petition for review of a final decision of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) granting Sierra Pacific Industries (“Sierra Pacific”) a prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) permit for construction of a new biomass-burning power plant at its lumber mill in California. Plaintiffs contend that EPA issued the PSD permit in violation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q. This is the first time we have reviewed EPA’s doctrine of “redefining the source.” It also appears to be the first time that EPA’s framework for evaluating the best available control technology for greenhouse gas emissions from facilities burning biomass fuels is considered by any circuit in the United States. We hold that EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting a PSD permit to Sierra Pacific pursuant to that framework.

I

Sierra Pacific owns and operates a lumber manufacturing facility in Anderson, California, situated at the northern end of the Central Valley in Shasta County. On March 29, 2010, Sierra Pacific filed an application for a PSD permit with EPA in order to construct a new cogeneration unit at its mill. The new unit was designed to burn biomass fuels in a boiler to produce steam used to turn turbine blades to generate 31 megawatts of electricity and to heat existing lumber dry kilns. Fuel for the unit would come primarily from wood wastes from Sierra Pacific’s own lumber mills, as well as other readily available sources of agricultural and urban wood wastes. The new boiler replaces a smaller existing boiler at the Anderson Facility. The smaller boiler could burn only 60,000 bone-dry tons (“BDT”) of the 160,000 BDT of wood waste the Anderson Facility annually produces. The new boiler has the increased capacity to burn up to 219,000 BDT of wood waste. Additionally, the boiler will utilize natural gas for the limited purpose of startup, shutdown, and flame stabilization.

To understand the process by which Sierra Pacific sought approval by EPA to build the new boiler and the resulting litigation that ensued first requires an examination of the statutory and regulatory framework underlying the permitting process and then an examination of how EPA employed that process with Sierra Pacific’s particular permit application.

A

The Clean Air Act establishes a comprehensive program for controlling and improving air quality. As part of this program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 require new and modified major emitting facilities, like Sierra Pacific’s new boiler, to seek a PSD permit prior to construction. Id. § 7475(a). These permits are required in geographical regions designated to meet particular national ambient air quality standards. Id. § 7471. Critically, in order to obtain a PSD permit, the applicant must demonstrate that the proposed facility utilizes the best available control technology (“BACT”) for every pollutant subject to regulation by the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7475(a)(4). BACT is defined as

an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation ... from any major emitting facility, which [EPA], on a case-by-case basis, ... determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant.

Id. § 7479(3). In every case-by-case analysis, EPA will consider “energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.” Id.

In 1990, in the absence of any clear guidance from Congress on how to evaluate BACT for a particular pollutant, EPA developed a five-step, “top-down” approach. See Environmental Protection Agency, New Source Review Workshop Manual, Chapter B (1990) (hereinafter “NSR Manual”). PSD permit applicants must engage in this analysis .for every regulated pollutant with a significant emissions increase. Id. at B.4.

Briefly, the top-down analysis begins at Step 1 when the applicant lists all available control technologies. Id. at B.5. Control technologies are those technologies that have “a practical potential for application' to the emissions unit and the regulated pollutant under evaluation.” Id. This list is meant to be comprehensive and include all options applicable to the particular pollutant even though the option may be eliminated in later steps. Id. at B.5-7. At Step 2, the applicant eliminates any technically infeasible options and must clearly document why the particular control option cannot be used. Id. at B.7. At Step 3, the applicant ranks the remaining control options against each other in order of overall effectiveness. Id. at B.7-8. Then, based on this ranking, at Step 4, the applicant evaluates each control option to consider the energy, environmental, and economic impacts. Id. at B.8. If the top candidate is unfavorable for any of these reasons, then the applicant evaluates the impacts of the next available control option. Id. at B.8-9. The most effective control option that is not eliminated at Step 4 is then chosen as BACT at Step 5. Id. at B.9.

EPA supplemented the top-down approach as it applied to greenhouse gases in March 2011 when it issued new guidance. See Environmental Protection Agency, PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases (2011) (hereinafter “GHG Permitting Guidance”). At the same time, EPA issued more specific BACT guidance for carbon dioxide emissions from facilities that use biomass as a primary fuel source. See Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance for Determining Best Available Control Technology for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production (2011) (hereinafter “Bioenergy BACT Guidance”). The Bioen-ergy BACT Guidance describes how each step of the five-step BACT. analysis should be approached when a facility proposes to use mostly biomass as a fuel. Id. at 10-11. It does not supersede prior guidance, id. at 4, and agencies must still consider each PSD application on a case-by-case basis, id. at 5.

EPA promulgated a .more particular BACT framework because carbon dioxide emissions from biomass fuels participate in the carbon cycle differently than other fuels, and biomass fuel stocks replenish more quickly than fossil fuel stocks. Id. at 6. Trees are a classic example of this phenomenon in nature. The short regenerative time means that new growing plant matter, biomass carbon stocks, can absorb excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere more quickly than fossil fuel carbon stocks. Id. Additionally, photosynthesis from a well-managed biomass carbon stock, such as a well-managed forest, can act as a carbon sink, thereby decreasing the net carbon dioxide released from burning biomass as fuels. Id. “Biogenic [carbon dioxide] emissions are distinct from other regulated pollutants at bioenergy facilities because, unlike other pollutants and other [greenhouse gases], [carbon dioxide] emissions can participate directly in the global carbon cycle through photosynthesis.” Id. at 7. Therefore, EPA modified the steps of the traditional BACT analysis in particular ways to account for the unique properties of biomass.

Of particular relevance, at Step 1, EPA notes that “it will be important to address the extent to which the BACT analysis for [greenhouse gases] should include” an evaluation of other fuel types. Id. at 15. However, if utilization of biomass is the primary purpose of the project, then the agency can rely on that purpose to determine that another fuel would redefine the project. Id. If a facility relies primarily on biomass as fuel, the options at Step 1 “may be limited to (1) utilization of biomass fuel alone, (2) energy efficiency improvements, and (3) carbon capture and sequestration.” Id.

Skipping to Step 4, the Bioenergy BACT Guidance notes that the traditional Step 4 analysis is “an environmental, economic, and energy impacts analysis that includes both direct and indirect (i.e., collateral) considerations.” Id. at 18. EPA emphasizes that indirect environmental impacts and benefits are better suited to analysis in Step 4, id. at 21, and burning different biomass fuel stocks will not have a differential impact on- emissions at the facility but at the forest or region where the biomass fuel is taken, id. at 22.

In holding that facilities like Sierra Pacific’s were subject to PSD permit requirements for greenhouse gas emissions, the Supreme Court expressly refrained from deciding whether to approve or endorse EPA’s current approach for determining BACT for greenhouse gases. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2449, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014). To our knowledge, no other court has evaluated EPA’s approach. We examine it here as it was used to grant Sierra Pacific its PSD permit.

B

EPA’s consideration of Sierra Pacific’s permit application took place in two phases. During the first phase in September 2012, EPA proposed to issue a PSD permit to Sierra Pacific that required the use of add-on control technologies and inherently lower-emitting controls as BACT for the pollutants analyzed. EPA did not consider BACT for greenhouse gases because it was not then required. EPA accepted Sierra Pacific’s cap on natural gas use of no more than 10% of the total fuel required, because it was to be used, only for limited purposes' during startup, shutdown, and flame stabilization.

After public comment, EPA issued the PSD permit, and Helping Hand petitioned the Environmental Appeals Board (“the Board”) for review. On July 18, 2013, the Board remanded the PSD permit to EPA for further proceedings on a single ground — that EPA'had abused its discretion in not holding a public hearing. The Board held that EPA did not abuse its discretion in approving the permit on all other issues, two of which are relevant to the current petition before us.

First, the Board held that EPA did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the inclusion of solar power as a fuel source or a greater percentage of natural gas because it would impermissi-bly redefine the- source. In making this determination, the Board reviewed the administrative record and determined that the primary purpose of the project was to allow Sierra Pacific “to put to use the hundreds of thousands of bone-dry tons of wood waste the company has in the Shasta County region, for the production of lumber and electricity.” The Board then held that “requiring [Sierra Pacific] to burn fewer tons of wood waste so that it could generate solar power or burn more natural gas instead would plainly disrupt the project’s ‘basic business purpose’ of using as much surplus biomass as possible” to get rid of the byproduct and to generate steam to dry lumber in kilns and produce electricity for use on site and for sale to the electrical grid.

Second, the Board held that EPA did not abuse its discretion in limiting the mix of fuel to 90% biomass and 10% natural gas. The Board held that Sierra Pacific’s prudent use of natural gas for startup, shutdown, and flame stabilization was a valid reason to limit the quantity of natural gas used and “not evidence of a project design ‘derived for reasons of air quality permitting.’ ”

The second phase of consideration occurred when, just a few days before the Board’s decision, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated EPA’s rule deferring BACT determinations for greenhouse gases emitted from facilities like Sierra Pacific’s boiler. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2013). As a result, EPA conducted a supplemental BACT analysis on Sierra Pacific’s new biomass facility. EPA. considered public comments on the supplemental analysis, and the Center contended that EPA could not consider the burning of biomass fuel alone as a control option at Step 1 and should have directly compared the environmental impacts of different biomass fuel stocks at Step 1.

EPA nonetheless issued a final PSD permit notice on April 25, 2014. The Center appealed to the Board and the Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, in its July 2013 decision, the Board specifically stated that, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19ffi(2)(iii), it would not require or accept an appeal after the remand. Helping Hand and the Center then filed the petitions for review now before us. Because all available administrative remedies have been exhausted, we have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

II

EPA’s decision is reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act and may be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496-97, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d 967 (2004). EPA must “articulate[ ] a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001)).

“[W]e do not simply review whether it was arbitrary or capricious” for the Board to reject a petitioner’s claims that EPA clearly erred. Citizens for Clean Air v. EPA, 959 F.2d 839, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1992). “Rather, we conduct a deferential review of the entire agency action,” including whether approval of the PSD permit is based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law. Id. at 846.

Ill

First, we address the claims raised by Helping Hand that EPA was required to consider solar power and a greater natural gas mix as clean fuel control technologies in the BACT analysis. This is an issue of first impression in our circuit, but our opinion is guided by well-reasoned decisions of the Board and the Seventh Circuit. Because EPA properly took the requisite hard look at Sierra Pacific’s proposed design and the key purpose of burning its own biomass waste, we hold that EPA reasonably concluded that consideration of solar or increased natural gas would disrupt that purpose and redefine the source.

A

Though failure to consider all available control alternatives in a BACT analysis constitutes clear error, EPA does not have to consider control alternatives that would “redefine the source.” See, e.g., In re Desert Rock Energy Co., 14 E.A.D. 484, 526 (E.A.B. 2009); see also NSR Manual at B.13. In essence, a control .alternative redefines the source if it requires a complete redesign of the facility. In a classic and simple example, a coal-burning power plant need not consider a nuclear fuel option as a “cleaner” fuel because it would require a complete redesign of the coal-burning power-plant. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2007). Considering control technologies is rarely so simple, however, and EPA engages in a two-step process to determine whether a control technology will redefine the source.

First, “the permit applicant initiates the process and ... defines the proposed facility’s end, object, aim or purpose — that is the facility’s basic design.” In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 22 (E.A.B. 2006), aff'd sub nom Sierra Club, 499 F.3d 653; accord Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530; In re N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, 14 E.A.D. 283, 301-02 (E.A.B. 2009) (hereinafter “NMU”). The purpose must be “objectively discernable.” Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 22. Additionally, the applicant’s proposed definition “must be for reasons independent of air permitting” and cannot be motivated by cost savings or avoidance of risks. Id. at 23 n.23; see also Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530; NMU, 14 E.A.D. at 302 n.28.

Second, EPA takes a “hard look” at the proposed definition to determine which design elements are inherent to the applicant’s purpose and which elements can be changed to reduce pollutant emissions without disrupting the applicant’s basic business purpose. Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530 (remanding a permit back to the agency because it failed to take a “hard look” when the agency determined a particular technology would redefine the source even though the applicant had considered the technology in its application); see also Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 25-26; NMU, 14 E.A.D. at 302. This determination and “[rjefining [of] the statutory definition of ‘control technology’ ... to exclude redesign is the kind of judgement by an administrative agency to which a reviewing court should defer.” Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. Our examination of this two-step process for Sierra Pacific’s PSD permit is guided significantly by the reasoning of our sister circuit in Sierra Club in which it denied the petition arising from Prairie State.

When a fuel source is co-located with a facility, EPA need not consider in the BACT analysis fuel sources that are not readily available, because it would redefine the source. Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 28. In Prairie State, Prairie State Generating Company filed an application for a PSD permit with EPA to build a coal-burning electrical plant in southern Illi-nois. Id. at 4-5. The proposed facility was a “mine-mouth” plant in which the plant is located at the site of the coal mine which fuels it. Id. at 16. However, the mine only produced high-sulfur coal, which emits more sulfur dioxide pollution than low-sulfur coal from other outlying mines. Id. at 15. EPA did not list low-sulfur coal as a control technology in Step 1 of the BACT analysis, however, because low-sulfur coal would have to be shipped in by rail from long distances. Id. EPA explained that “it would be inconsistent with the scope of the project to use coal from other regions of the country.” Id. at 16.

In making this determination, EPA noted that “the project that must be addressed when evaluating BACT is the project for which an application has been submitted.” Id. In this instance, the construction of a “mine-mouth” plant. Id. EPA found that “use of a particular coal supply is an inherent aspect of the proposed project.” Id. EPA broadly considered alternative coal supplies but rejected a more detailed analysis because it was beyond the scope of the project. Id. at 18.

The ultimate dispute before the Board lay in determining how to define the basic purpose of the project and whether Prairie State could include use of coal from a particular source as part of that purpose. Id. at 21-22. “The permit issuer must be mindful that BACT, in most cases, should not be applied to regulate the applicant’s objective or purpose for the proposed facility.” Id. at 23. The Board specifically rejected petitioners’ assertion that the facility’s business purpose must be viewed broadly as the production of electricity from coal because “we have frequently recognized that an electric generating facility’s purpose may be more narrowly defined.” Id. at 25. The Board held that, in defining the scope of a project, EPA could consider if a particular fuel source was an inherent part of the project design. See id. (“It has also been long-standing EPA policy that certain fuel choices are integral to the electric power generating station’s basic design.” (citing NSR Manual at B.13)).

Additionally, the Board rejected the petitioners’ argument that a purpose that includes a particular fuel source “would allow a permit applicant to avoid all BACT review by including its preferred fuel ... and hide behind the claim that requiring anything different would unlawfully ‘redefine’ the proposed source.” Id. at 27. Because Prairie State could narrowly define its purpose as burning a particular fuel source, EPA needed only to review the facility proposed, and that meant reviewing a facility that burned co-localized, high-sulfur coal. The Board examined EPA’s review of the proposed facility and was satisfied that EPA had taken a hard look at whether further emissions reductions were possible. Id. Therefore, the Board concluded, EPA did not err when it “determined that consideration of low-sulfur coal, because it necessarily involves a fuel source other than the co-located mine, would require Prairie State to redefine the fundamental purpose or basic design of its proposed Facility” and, as a result, EPA properly rejected low-sulfur fuel from Step 1 of the BACT analysis. Id. at 28.

In denying the petition arising out of Prairie State, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Board and EPA were struggling to draw the line between where “control technology ends and redesign of the ‘proposed facility’ begins.” Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. The court noted that if EPA had to consider all clean fuels, it would be required to consider a nuclear plant rather than a coal-fired one, and it was clearly not required to do that. See id. (“That approach would invite a litigation strategy that would make seeking a permit for a new power plant a Sisyphean labor, for there would always be one more option to consider.”). Because it was not as clear cut, the Seventh Circuit characterized its case as lying on the borderline between control technology and redesign. Id. at 656.

That borderline, defining the distinction between considering alternative fuels to be control technologies or to redefine the facility, is a product of EPA’s framework for evaluating BACT. The Seventh Circuit therefore held that “it makes sense to let the EPA, the author of the underlying distinction, draw it, within reason.” Id. at 655. In the facility proposed in Sierra Club, the court noted that, in isolation, the difference between low-sulfur and high-sulfur coal as a fuel source is a difference in control technology. Id. at 657. But “the difference between a plant co-located with a coal mine and a plant that obtains its coal from afar” is a difference in design. Id. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit upheld the BACT determination because EPA reasonably drew the line between control technology and redefining the source. Id.

The reasoning of Prairie State and Sierra Club has been applied to subsequent cases from the Board. In NMU, relating to the construction of a power plant on a college campus, the Board remanded a PSD permit back to the agency when it rejected the assertion that considering a different proportion of a coal and wood fuel mix would impermissibly redefine the source. 14 E.A.D. at 301-03. Particularly, the Board noted that NMU locked onto a particular fuel combination without any logic or data to justify the choice. Id. at 303; see also id. at 297 (“[Although the record reflects that other coal ... will produce the lowest sulfur emissions, [the agency] proceeds without explaining why these sources are unavailable or not technologically feasible.”). Notably relevant to the current appeal, NMU did not fully analyze the possibility of natural gas as a fuel source when the permit application stated that it would be used for boiler startup and as a backup fuel source. Id. at 297 n.17; see also In re Cash Creek Generation LLC, 2009 WL 7513857 (E.P.A. 2009) (remanding the permit to the applicant because the record was insufficient to justify a determination that an exclusive use of natural gas, a secondary fuel for the project, would impermissibly redefine the source).

B

Adopting the two-step analysis promulgated by the Board and approved by the Seventh Circuit, we must now determine whether EPA erred in determining that using solar power or a greater natural gas mix in Sierra Pacific’s proposed facility would impermissibly redefine the source.

First, we look at how Sierra Pacific itself defined its facility. In its application description, Sierra Pacific explicitly stated that it intended to build a power plant “that would burn biomass fuels in a boiler to produce steam that would be used to generate electricity and to heat existing lumber dry kilns at the facility.” Sierra Pacific then went on to define more particularly that its biomass fuel source would come from the existing Sierra Pacific mills, in-forest materials from timberlands owned by Sierra Pacific, and other readily available sources of agricultural and urban wood wastes. Sierra Pacific would use natural gas only for the limited purposes of startup, shutdown, and flame stabilization. Capped at 10%, Sierra Pacific estimated its annual usage of natural gas to be significantly below that limit.

Next, we must determine if EPA took the appropriate “hard look” at how Sierra Pacific defined the facility and whether EPA appropriately determined that the burning of biomass was an inherent element of the facility or whether it could be changed to reduce emissions. In the PSD permit issued by EPA, the project description stated that fuel for the power plant would be generated on-site or received from other local sources to produce steam in the new facility. The steam was then to be used to dry lumber and to power a steam turbine to generate electricity for use onsite or for sale to the northern California power grid.

Helping Hand argues that the Board improperly deferred to Sierra Pacific’s purpose of “burning biomass ‘as much as possible’ ” and read “clean fuels” out of the Clean Air Act. Sierra Pacific’s purpose, according to Helping Hand, is only to generate steam for lumber drying kilns and to make electricity. However, Sierra Pacific’s purpose need not be so limited, see Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 25, and Helping Hand concedes that “Sierra Pacific arguably can have a basic business purpose of ‘primarily’ burning a dirtier fuel that is readily available to it.” Just as the Prairie State facility was co-located with its fuel source, a high-sulfur coal mine, Sierra Pacific’s facility is co-located with its fuel source, waste from its lumber manufacturing operations. Therefore, EPA took a “hard look” at the record and how Sierra Pacific defined its facility and reasonably determined that use of a co-located fuel source was an inherent part of the facility’s design.

Having determined that biomass fuel was an inherent part of the design, we finally examine whether the two proposed alternative clean fuels were control alternatives that should have been considered or would impermissibly redefine the source, keeping in mind the deference EPA must be afforded in making such a determination. Like the petitioners in Sierra Club, Helping Hand essentially argues that “if a plant is capable — with redesign— of burning a clean fuel, it must undergo a ‘best available control technology’ analysis.” 499 F.3d at 656. Requiring a solar component just because it is a cleaner fuel than biomass is the same as requiring Sierra Pacific to consider the nuclear option. See id. Sierra Pacific and EPA are not required to take on the “Sisyphean” task of considering every possible clean fuel alternative. See id. at 655. Therefore, EPA properly dismissed solar as a control technology.

The Board noted, correctly, that consideration of a greater natural gas mix was a closer question. Sierra Pacific’s proposed project falls on the borderline discussed in Sierra Club. However, unlike the applicant in Sierra Club, Sierra Pacific is not considering two fuel sources as control options: one an off-site “clean” fuel, one an on-site “dirty” fuel. In this instance, Sierra Pacific has access to two on-site fuel sources: “clean” natural gas and “dirty” biomass. Though this typically would suggest that Sierra Pacific must consider a greater mix of natural gas, even when an alternative fuel is available, it need not be considered at Step 1 if it disrupts the business purpose. GHG Permitting Guidance at 28 (“[Gjreater utilization of a fuel that the applicant is already proposing to use in some aspect of the project design should be listed as an option in Step 1 unless it can be demonstrated that such an option would disrupt the applicant’s basic business purpose for the proposed facility.”). Here, a greater use of natural gas would disrupt Sierra Pacific’s intent to burn the biomass waste it produces from mill operations.

Notably, unlike the facilities in NMU and Cash Creek, Sierra Pacific does not propose to use natural gas as a “secondary” or backup fuel source but only for strictly limited purposes. And unlike the facilities in NMU and Cash Creek, Sierra Pacific gave valid reasons for imposing a 10% cap: that its purpose was to burn as much of its own biomass waste as possible, and that it expected to burn much less than 10% natural gas because it was being used for such a limited purpose. Burning natural gas is therefore incidental to Sierra Pacific’s business purpose of using its on-site source of biomass as fuel for the new facility. Declining to consider greater use of an incidental fuel is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Drawing the line between control technology and redefining the source is a technical determination to which a court should defer to EPA, see Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655, and there was sufficient justification in the record for EPA to determine that primarily burning biomass from Sierra Pacific’s own wood waste, a co-localized source, was an inherent aspect of the facility’s design. Requiring EPA and Sierra Pacific to consider solar power, a completely different fuel source, or a greater percentage of natural gas, an incidental fuel source, would redefine the source. EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and Helping Hand’s petition is denied.

IV

Next we address the claims raised by the Center in response to the supplemental greenhouse gas BACT analysis. The Center contends that EPA could not consider burning of biomass fuel alone as a control option at Step 1 and that it erred in weighing the effects of different biomass fuel stocks at Step 4 instead of directly comparing them at Step 1. Because EPA was largely relying on its own guidance, acting at the frontiers of science, we defer to the agency’s determination. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983).

A

We review questions of statutory interpretations of the Clean Air Act by the two-step process of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2004). If Congress has not directly spoken to the precise issue, or the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court must determine if the agency’s construction is- permissible. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. When Congress has not provided clear guidance in a statute, an agency may fill the gap and its construction is to be given “controlling weight unless ... arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (deferring to EPA’s interpretation of “source” in the Clean Air Act); see also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1584, 1603-07, 188 L.Ed.2d 775 (2014) (deferring to EPA’s interpretation of “amount” in the Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act).

“[T]he weight that we are to give an administrative interpretation not intended by an agency to carry the general force of law is a function of that interpretation’s thoroughness, rational validity, and consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements.” Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). However, when an agency is acting “within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science,” the court should “be at its most deferential.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 103, 103 S.Ct. 2246; see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 384 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (‘Where scientific and technical expertise is necessarily involved in agency decision-making, ... a reviewing court must be highly deferential to the judgment of the agency.”).

What level of deference we must show EPA’s BACT guidance is unclear. The publications are not intended to carry the force of law because EPA must still analyze each application on a case-by-case basis. However, all the publications were promulgated by EPA in order to bring meaning to the BACT statute which Congress has not defined any further than it did in 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). EPA promulgated these policies specifically to carry out Congress’s intent. We need not resolve the issue here, however, because, as discussed below, under either standard EPA’s actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

B

Ultimately, the Center’s concerns are not particular to the Sierra Pacific permit but attack the Bioenergy BACT Guidance. The Bioenergy BACT Guidance builds on the NSR Manual that EPA has used for decades and proposes a more detailed analysis for a particular pollutant — greenhouse gas emissions from biomass fuels— because the emissions from this particular fuel source have unique environmental consequences. Nothing prohibits EPA from refining its top-down BACT approach for particular pollutants — particularly when the refinement is heavily dependent upon the agency’s own scientific expertise. Following the Bioenergy BACT Guidance is therefore thorough, rational, and consistent with EPA’s prior practice. See Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1068. And as explained above, we must defer to EPA agency expertise and not disturb the analysis set forth in the Bioenergy BACT Guidance.

In particular, the Center contends that utilization of biomass fuel alone cannot be considered a control technology for the burning of biomass fuel at Step 1 of the BACT analysis because it does not “control” biomass emissions. EPA argues, however, that the option is used as a baseline to which all other options are compared and is not inconsistent with the traditional top-down approach. Moreover, EPA did not ultimately choose this option but selected other control technologies including: combustion of specific biomass fuel stocks; energy efficient design, operation, and maintenance; and employing good combustion practices and efficient operation as a cogeneration unit. In the end, EPA chose the same control measures as five other facilities. Providing a baseline in the BACT analysis does not make the ultimate determination arbitrary, capricious, or even unreasonable.

The Center further argues that the effect of burning different biomass fuel stocks should be considered at Step 1 of the analysis. EPA does not disagree in theory. But EPA currently lacks the scientific data at this time to make such a quantitative determination and is actively collecting the data to do in the future the type of analysis desired by the Center. See Bioenergy BACT Guidance at 23. Furthermore, because the same amount of carbon dioxide will be released at the facility no matter which biomass fuel stock is burned, any difference in environmental consequences is indirect. Id. at 22. Therefore, consistent with the NSR Manual, these indirect environmental impacts and benefits are better suited to analysis in Step 4.

Acknowledging the differences in the environmental impact of different biomass fuel stocks, however, EPA responded to the Center’s comment by clarifying the fuel restrictions in the final permit. Notably, Sierra Pacific and EPA were particularly proactive in ensuring the appropriate fuel restrictions were written into the PSD permit. Sierra Pacific’s initial application contemplated the use of co-localized mill waste as well as in-forest materials from Sierra Pacific’s timber operations and other readily available agricultural and urban wood wastes.

The environmental impact report (“EIR”) prepared by a consultant for the Shasta County Department of Resource Management noted that there were different estimates of the type of biomass fuel blend Sierra Pacific planned on using, ranging from 100% mill wastes to a blend supplementing mill wastes with biomass from forest-harvesting operations, forest-thinning operations, agricultural waste from the Sacramento Valley, and urban wood waste. The consultant therefore conducted the EIR assuming a “worst-case” scenario in which 35% of the biomass used was not co-loealized with the facility. The supplemental Statement of Basis and Ambient Air Quality Impact Report also assumed a biomass fuel mix of 75% mill residue and 25% in-forest residues, agricultural residues, and urban wood residues.

Based on the EIR, EPA drafted a PSD permit restricting fuel to “clean cellulosic biomass” allowing Sierra Pacific to burn an extensive list of biomass fuels at the facility. Sierra Pacific commented on the draft asking for more restrictive limitations on the types of biomass fuel it would be allowed to use in its facility because it was more consistent with the original application. EPA adopted Sierra Pacific’s modifications in another draft of the permit, which was then further modified in response to the Center’s comments.

Though it was not prepared at the time to compare the environmental impacts of sawmill residue versus other biomass wastes, EPA ensured that Sierra Pacific would not log timber solely for the purpose of using it as biomass for the new facility. EPA limited Sierra Pacific to only the particular biomass fuels readily available to the facility: mill residues, untreated wood debris from urban areas such as pallets and crates, agricultural crops and residues, forest residues, and non-merchantable forest biomass. The only trees that can be burned in Sierra Pacific’s facility, therefore, are those that would be removed from the forest anyway as part of Sierra Pacific’s ongoing forest management and forest-thinning operations.

Though the Center argues that EPA is equipped to proceed with a quantitative analysis of different biomass fuel stocks at Step 1, EPA says it cannot do that based on the current state of the science. Because the agency is acting at the frontiers of science, we must defer. See Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103, 103 S.Ct. 2246. The Center does not clearly explain how EPA’s analysis here is not thorough, rational, and consistent with EPA’s prior guidance on BACT. Sierra Pacific is restricted to the forms of biomass waste readily available to it and cannot clear cut forests just to produce electricity for its lumber mills. EPA did consider the environmental impacts of different biomass fuel stocks, just not in the manner or the level of detail the Center would prefer. Because we must defer to EPA’s interpretation of BACT and its scientific expertise, EPA’s analysis is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and we deny the Center’s petition.

Y

Sierra Pacific’s application went through an extensive process to issue a reasoned PSD permit for its new biomass burning boiler. EPA properly defined the project and rejected control technologies that redefined the project with thoughtful and reasonable explanations. The Bioenergy BACT Guidance, as applied by EPA to the greenhouse gas emissions from Sierra Pacific’s new facility, is rational and is consistent with EPA’s prior practice. The guidance relies extensively on the continually evolving analysis of the environmental effect of different biomass fuels in the ever-developing field of climate-change science. It is not our place to interfere with EPA’s expertise when the record shows that its endeavors were reasonable.

Costs are awarded to Respondents.

The petitions for review are DENIED.

      . Cogeneration units produce both electrical power and heat. See, e.g., In re N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, 14 E.A.D. 283, 285 (E.A.B. 2009).

      . Used interchangeably with the terms "bioenergy” and "biogenic,” biomass fuels in-elude wood waste such as chips and bark from sawmill operations, forest residue, agricultural residue, crops, grasses, standing trees, and waste from landfills or water treatment. 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490-01, 43,493 (July 20, 2011).

      . A BDT is 2,000 pounds of wood pulp with a zero percent moisture content.

      . Flame stabilization is necessary when optimal operations of the boiler are upset by fuel variability, such as from burning wet wood waste fuel. At these times, the optimal cpm-bustion of the wood waste is not occurring and natural gas is used to stabilize combustion and to maximize efficiency by returning the boiler to desired high temperature operations.

      . “Greenhouse gases” are considered a single pollutant comprised of the aggregate of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, hydro-fluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.

      . Though the extent to which EPA can require particular facilities to comply with BACT requirements for greenhouse gases has been heavily litigated, the Supreme Court recently held that "EPA's decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is” permissible. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2448, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014). The cogeneration power plant proposed by Sierra Pacific is such a facility and neither party disputes EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from that facility.

      . Steps 2 and 3 are conducted in the same manner as promulgated in the NSR Manual. Bioenergy BACT Guidance at 16-17.

      . To illustrate the point, burning a dead tree that has fallen in the forest, instead of a live tree, will have a different impact on the environment. Burning the dead tree releases the same amount of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere that would be released anyway as the tree decomposed. But the emissions occur faster and at the facility, not in the forest. Burning the live tree, which uses carbon dioxide for photosynthesis, removes a carbon dioxide absorbing source from the forest and also releases carbon dioxide emissions at the facility. The facility emits carbon dioxide in either case but the environmental impact at the forest — the benefit of removing a carbon dioxide emitting decomposing tree or the harm in removing a carbon dioxide absorbing live one — are an indirect result of burning biomass fuel at the facility. However, a comparison of different biomass fuel stocks, such as comparing the effects of burning mill waste to the effects of burning a dead tree, is a much more technical endeavor that EPA is actively trying to calculate at present. Bioen-ergy BACT Guidance at 23. The problem, according to the agency, is the current inability of the available science to quantify the tradeoff. Id. Where the agency is acting on the frontiers of developing science, our deference is at its highest level. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983).

      .At the time, EPA had issued a rule deferring regulation of biogenic carbon sources in order to examine the science behind biogenic carbon dioxide emissions from stationary sources like power plants. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The District of Columbia Circuit later vacated this rule. Id. at 412.

      . Though not disputed by EPA, because this is the first time the case is before an Article III court, Helping Hand and the Center must establish standing. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 762 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2014). We are satisfied that, through the declarations of its members, both Helping Hand and the Center have associational standing to bring the current petition. See id. at 976-78 (discussing that "[a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right” and further discussing the factors demonstrating that the individual members had standing to pursue Clean Air Act claims (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      . This conclusion is supported by evidence in the record that Sierra Pacific produces more waste than could be consumed by the proposed generator.

      . Petitioners seize upon Sierra Pacific’s admission that it limited natural gas to 10% to avoid the nitrous oxide limiting requirements of the New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS”). See 40 C.F.R. § 60.44b(d). Limiting natural gas to avoid a nitrous oxide emission limit is not a design decision "independent of air permitting.” The Board erroneously held that such a self-imposed cap was acceptable because it was "federally enforceable.” Deciding whether or not to impose a cap of 10% natural gas to avoid NSPS requirements does not exclude consideration of greater utilization of natural gas in the BACT analysis. See NSR Manual at B.12 ("The only reason for comparing control options to an NSPS is to determine whether the control option would result in an emissions level less stringent than the NSPS."). Though troubling, this error does not ultimately undermine the key fact that Sierra Pacific’s basic business purpose and facility design is to use a co-localized source of biomass fuel, its own wood wastes, to generate steam and electricity for its mill and limited use of natural gas is incidental to that purpose. For that reason, any error in justifying the 10% cap is harmless.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Abdul Kadir MOHAMED, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; Rasier, LLC, Defendants-Appellants, and Hirease, LLC, Defendant. Ronald Gillette, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. Abdul Kadir Mohamed, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Uber Technologies, Inc.; Rasier, LLC, Defendants, and Hirease, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-16178, No. 15-16181, No. 15-16250
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 16, 2016, San Francisco, California
    Filed September 7, 2016
    Amended December 21, 2016

      Theodore Boutrous, Jr. (argued), The-ane D. Evangelis, and Brandon J. Stoker, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Ange-les, California; Joshua S. Lipshutz and Kevin J. Ring-Dowell, Gibson, Dimn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California; Rod M. Fliegel, Littler Mendelson P.C., San Francisco, California; Andrew M. Spurchise, Littler Mendelson P.C., New York, New York; for Defendants-Appellants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC.
    Pamela Devata (argued) and Nicholas R. Clements, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, California; Timothy L. Hix, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant Hirease, LLC.
    Laura Ho (argued), Andrew P. Lee, and William Jhaveri-Weeks, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho, Oakland, California; Robert Ahdoot, Tina Wolfson, and Theodore Maya, Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, West Hollywood, California; Meredith Desautels, Dana Isaac Quinn, and Elisa Della-Piana, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, San Francisco, California; Monique Olivier, Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier LLP, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    Kevin Ranlett, Archis A. Parasharami, Evan M. Tager, and Andrew J. Pincus, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Warren Postman and Kate Comerford Todd, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
    Matthew C. Koski, National Employment Lawyers Association, Oakland, California; David H. Seligman, Towards Justice, Denver, Colorado; Jahan C. Sagafí, Outten & Golden LLP, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project, National Employment Lawyers Association, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Towards Justice.
    Before: RICHARD C. TALLMAN, RICHARD R. CLIFTON, and SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER

The opinion filed on September 7, 2016, is hereby amended as follows:

1. On page 18 of the slip opinion, in footnote 6, the last sentence (and related citations) should be deleted.

We note that Plaintiffs also raised the argument that the class and collective action waivers in the arbitration agreements may violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for the first time in a sur-reply. That untimely submission waived the argument. See, e.g., United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Generally, an appellee waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief.”).

With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. The Petition for Rehearing En Banc has been circulated to the full court, and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition rehearing en banc is DENIED. No further petition for rehearing may be filed.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellees Abdul Mohamed and Ronald Gillette, former Uber drivers, filed an action in district court alleging on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of other drivers that Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Hirease, LLC, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and various state statutes. Gillette has also brought a representative claim against Uber under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) alleging that he was misclassified as an independent contractor rather than an employee. The district court denied Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of the claims. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, 109 F.Supp.3d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Uber argues on appeal (1) that the district court erroneously considered whether the arbitration provisions were enforceable when that question was clearly delegated to an arbitrator, and (2) that even if the district court properly considered arbitrability, it erred in concluding that the arbitration provisions were invalid and in declining to compel arbitration.

We conclude that the district court erred at the first step and improperly assumed the authority to decide whether the arbitration agreements were enforceable. The question of arbitrability as to all but Gillette’s PAGA claims was delegated to the arbitrator. Under the terms of the agreement Gillette signed, the PAGA waiver should be severed from the arbitration agreement and Gillette’s PAGA claims may proceed in court on a representative basis. All of Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments, including both Mohamed’s challenge to the PAGA waiver in the agreement he signed and the challenge by both Plaintiffs to the validity of the arbitration agreement itself, are subject to resolution via arbitration.

I. Background

Plaintiff Abdul Mohamed began driving for Uber’s black car service in Boston in-2012, and for UberX around October 2014., Like all Uber drivers, Mohamed used a smartphone to access the Uber application while driving, which enabled him to pick up customers.

In late July 2013, Mohamed was required to agree to two new contracts with Uber (the “Software License and Online Services Agreement” and the “Driver Addendum”; jointly, the “2013 Agreement”) before he was allowed to sign in to the application. The 2013 Agreement provided that it was governed by California law. It included an arbitration provision requiring Uber drivers to submit to arbitration to resolve most disputes with the company. It also included a provision requiring drivers to waive their right to bring disputes as a class action, a collective action, or a private attorney general representative action. Drivers could opt out of arbitration by delivering notice of their intent to opt out to Uber within 30 days either in person or by overnight delivery service. Mohamed accepted the agreements and did not opt out.

Nearly a year later, in June 2014, Uber released an updated version of the Software License and Online Services Agreement and the Driver Addendum (jointly, the “2014 Agreement”). The 2014 Agreement also provided that it was governed by California law. It included an updated arbitration provision with an easier opt-out procedure that enabled drivers to opt out via e-mail as well as in person or by delivery service. It also included a provision requiring all disputes with the company “to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration on an individual basis only, and not by way of court or jury trial, or by way of class, collective, or representative action.” Mohamed accepted these agreements and did not opt out. In early October 2014, Mohamed accepted a similar agreement with Rasier, a wholly owned subsidiary of Uber (“Rasier Software Sublicense & Online Services Agreement” (Rasier Agreement)).

In late October 2014, shortly after he began driving for UberX, Mohamed’s access to the app was cut off due to negative information on his consumer credit report, effectively terminating his ability to drive for Uber.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Gillette began driving for Uber in the San Francisco Bay Area in March 2013. Like Mohamed, he was required to agree to the 2013 Agreement before signing into the Uber application in late July 2013. Also like Mohamed, he did not opt out. In April 2014, Gillette’s access to the app was cut off because of negative information on his consumer credit report. This effectively terminated his relationship with Uber.

On November 24, 2014, Mohamed filed a class action in the Northern District of California against Uber, Rasier, and Hi-rease, an independent company that conducted background checks. Mohamed alleged that the use of his consumer credit report violated the FCRA, the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Reporting Act (MCCRA), and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA). Two days later, on November 26, 2014, Gillette filed a separate lawsuit against Uber, also in the Northern District of California. Gillette alleged that the company’s use of his consumer credit report violated the FCRA and the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA). He also alleged that Uber had misclassified him and other employees as independent contractors in violation of California’s PAGA statute.

Uber moved to compel arbitration in both lawsuits, arguing that Gillette was bound by the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement and Mohamed by the arbitration provision in the 2014 Agreement. The district court denied both motions, Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1190, and Uber now appeals.

II. Discussion

We review de novo an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).

Both the 2013 and the 2014 Agreements contained provisions that provided, using very similar language, that disputes would be resolved by arbitration and, further, that any dispute as to arbitrability (with one exception discussed below) would be resolved by the arbitrator. These provisions stated:

Except as it otherwise provides, this Arbitration Provision is intended to apply to the resolution of disputes that otherwise would be resolved in a court of law or before a forum other than arbitration. This Arbitration Provision requires all such disputes to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.
Such disputes include without limitation disputes arising out of or relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Provision, including- the enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Provision or any portion of the Arbitration Provision.

The 2014 Agreement continued: “All such matters shall be decided by an Arbitrator and not by a court or judge.”

Both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements also contained provisions that required drivers to waive the right to bring class, collective, and representative actions (including claims under the PAGA statute), either in court or in arbitration. The 2013 Agreement, but not the 2014 Agreement, carved out challenges to these waivers from the general delegation provision: “Notwithstanding any other clause contained in this Agreement, any claim that all or part of the Class Action Waiver, Collective Action Waiver or Private Attorney General Waiver is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable may be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.”

The district court concluded that the delegation clauses in both the 2013 and the 2014 Agreements were ineffective because they were not clear and unmistakable. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1198-1204. The court also concluded that even if the delegation clauses were clear and unmistakable, they were unenforceable because they were unconscionable. Id. at 1204-16. We disagree. The 2013 Agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated .the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator except as pertained to the arbitrability of class action, collective action, and representative claims. The 2014 Agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of ar-bitrability to the- arbitrator under all circumstances. Neither delegation provision was unconscionable. Thus, all of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, save Gillette’s challenge to the enforceability of the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement, should have been adjudicated in the first instance by an arbitrator and not in court.

A. Delegation of the issue of arbitrability

“[U]nlike the arbitrability of claims in general, whether the court or the arbitrator decides arbitrability is ‘an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’ Oracle Am., 724 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002)). “In other words, there is a presumption that courts will decide which issues are arbitrable; the federal policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to deciding questions of arbitrability.” Id. Clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability “might include ... a course of conduct demonstrating assent ... or ... an express agreement to do so.” Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 79-80, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).

In Momot, we held that language “delegating to the arbitrators the authority to determine the validity or application of any of the provisions of the arbitration clause[ ] constitutes an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.” Id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2772) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, both the 2013 and the 2014 Agreements delegated to the arbitrators the authority to decide issues relating to the “enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Provision or any portion of the Arbitration Provision.” This language is similár to but more expansive than the language at issue in Momot, and thus also “clearly and unmistakably indicates [the parties’] intent for the arbitrators to decide the threshold question of arbitrability.” Id.

The district court determined that the delegation provisions themselves were “unambiguous,” but it nonetheless held that they conflicted with venue provisions elsewhere in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1199. Both venue provisions stated that “any disputes, actions, claims, or causes of action arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or the Uber Service or Software shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the City and County of San Francisco.” The district court concluded that the language in the venue provisions granting state or federal courts in San Francisco “exclusive jurisdiction” over “any disputes, actions, claims or causes of action arising out of or in connection with this Agreement” was “inconsistent and in considerable tension with the language of the delegation clauses, which provide[d] that ‘without limitation’ arbitrability will be decided by an arbitrator.” Id. at 1201. The court also identified an inconsistency between the “without limitation” language and the carve-out provision in the 2013 Agreement granting courts jurisdiction over challenges to the PAGA waiver. Id. at 1201-02.

These conflicts are artificial. The clause describing the scope of the arbitration provision was prefaced with “[e]xcept as it otherwise provides,” which eliminated the inconsistency between the general delegation provision and the specific carve-out in the 2013 Agreement. As for the venue provision, the California Court of Appeal has observed that “[n]o matter how broad the arbitration clause, it may be necessary to file an action in court to enforce an arbitration agreement, or to obtain a judgment enforcing an arbitration award, and the parties may need to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to obtain other remedies.” Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater, 124 Cal.App.4th 547, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 328 (2004), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 28, 2004). It is apparent that the venue provision here was intended for these purposes, and to identify the venue for any other claims that were not covered by the arbitration agreement. That does not conflict with or undermine the agreement’s unambiguous statement identifying arbitrable claims and arguments.

The delegation provisions clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of ar-bitrability to the arbitrator for all claims except challenges to the class, collective, and representative action waivers in the 2013 Agreement. In accordance’ with Supreme Court precedent, we are required to enforce these agreements “according to their terms” and, in the absence of some other generally applicable contract defense, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-scionability, let an arbitrator determine arbitrability as to all but the claims specifically exempted by the 2013 Agreement. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 67, 130 S.Ct. 2772.

B. The delegation provisions were not unconscionable

The district court also held that, even if the delegation provisions were clear and unmistakable, they were both unenforceable due to unconscionability. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1204-16. Under California law, “ ‘unconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 88, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (2000) (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114, 121-22 (1982)). Both substantive and procedural unconscionability must be present in order for a court to find a contract unconscionable, but “they need not be present in the same degree.” Id. Recently, the California Supreme Court has emphasized that “unconscionability requires a substantial degree of unfairness beyond ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.’” Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal.4th 1237, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 7, 367 P.3d 6, 12 (2016) (quoting Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal.4th 1109, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 311 P.3d 184, 202 (2013)). Rather, unconscionable contracts are those that are “so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’ ” Id., 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 7, 367 P.3d at 11 (quoting Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal.4th 223, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 282 P.3d 1217, 1232 (2012)). When considering an unconscionability challenge to a delegation provision, the court must consider only arguments “specific to the delegation provision.” Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 73, 130 S.Ct. 2772

The district court concluded that the delegation provisions in both the 2013 and 2014 Agreéments were procedurally and substantively unconscionable. For the 2013 Agreement, the court concluded that the provision was procedurally unconscionable because it was “hidden in a prolix printed form,” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Flores v. Transamerica Home-First, Inc., 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 376, 381 (2001)), and because there was no meaningful opportunity for the drivers to reject the contract. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1205-06. For the 2014 Agreement, the court concluded that the delegation provision was procedurally unconscionable because “the 2014 agreement[ ] utterly failed to notify drivers of a specific drawback of the delegation clause — namely, that drivers may be required to pay considerable forum fees to arbitrate arbitrability,” and' because employees likely felt at least some pressure not' to opt out of arbitration despite the presence of a clear opt-out provision. Id. at 1215-16. The court also concluded that both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements were substantively unconscionable because they required arbitration costs and fees to be shared equally between Uber and the driver. Id. at 1206-10, 1216. As a result, it concluded that both delegation provisions should be invalidated. Id. at 1210, 1216.

Uber argues that the delegation provisions could not have been procedurally unconscionable because both agreements gave drivers an opportunity to opt out of arbitration altogether. The district court agreed with Uber that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, “the existence of a meaningful right to opt-out of [arbitration] necessarily renders [the arbitration clause] (and the delegation clause specifically) procedurally conscionable as a matter of law.” Id. at 1212. As to the 2013 Agreement, the court concluded that the right to opt out was not “meaningful” because drivers were required to opt out either in person at Uber’s San Francisco offices or by overnight delivery service, both of which were so burdensome as to make the opt-out right “illusory.” Id. at 1206. As to the 2014 Agreement, which contained a much less burdensome opt-out procedure, the court held that our precedent “failed to apply California law as announced by the California Supreme Court,” and as such, declined to apply it. Id. at 1212.

The district court does not have the authority to ignore circuit court precedent, and neither do we. “Binding authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so.” Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001); see Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (identifying the limited, circumstances when a three-judge panel of this court is not bound by our precedent). In Nagrarn-pa, we determined that “[t]he threshold inquiry in California’s unconscionability analysis is ‘whether the arbitration agreement is adhesive.’ ” 469 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d at 690). In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, we held that an arbitration agreement is not adhesive if there is an opportunity to opt out of it. 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Taken together, these two principles compel us to find that the 2014 Agreement, at least, is not adhesive, which supports our holding that the delegation provision is not unconscionable.

The district court’s conclusion that the right to opt out of the 2013 Agreement was illusory fares no better. “An illusory promise is one containing words ‘in promissory form that promise nothing’ and which ‘do not purport to put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor.’ ” Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co., 335 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 2 Corbin on Contracts 142 (rev. ed. 1995)). While we do not doubt that it was more burdensome to opt out of the arbitration provision by overnight delivery service than it would have been by e-mail, the contract bound Uber to accept opt-outs from those drivers who followed the procedure it set forth. There were some drivers who did opt out and whose opt-outs Uber recognized. Thus, the promise was not illusory. The fact that the opt-out provision was “buried in the agreement” does not change this analysis. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1205. As we noted in Ahmed, “one who signs a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the instrument.” 283 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal.3d 699, 131 Cal.Rptr. 882, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185 (1976)).

The delegation provisions were not procedurally unconscionable in either the 2013 or the 2014 Agreements. Because the agreements were not procedurally unconscionable, and because both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for an agreement to be unenforceable, see Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745,6 P.3d at 690, we need not reach the question whether the agreements here were substantively unconscionable. The district court should have ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute over arbitrability (with a narrow exception for the argument over the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement, as discussed below), and we remand with instructions that it do so.

C. The effective vindication doctrine

Plaintiffs also argue that even if the delegation provisions are otherwise enforceable, they are invalid because both ■the 2013 and 2014 Agreements contain a fee term requiring drivers to split the costs of arbitration equally with Uber and thus preclude drivers from effectively vindicating their federal statutory rights. Effective vindication provides courts with a means to “invalidate, on ‘public policy’ grounds, arbitration agreements that ‘op-erat[e] ... as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to -pursue statutory remedies.’ ” Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2310, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)). In Italian Colors, the Supreme Court stated that effective vindication may “cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.” Id. at 2310-11; see also Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the effective vindication doctrine was implicated when “administrative and filing costs, even disregarding the cost to prove the merits, effectively foreclose pursuit of the claim”). Evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs suggests that the costs of arbitration in this case may exceed $7,000 per day.

However, Uber has committed to paying the full costs of arbitration. So long as Uber abides by this commitment, the fee term in the arbitration agreement presents Plaintiffs with no obstacle to pursuing vindication of their federal statutory rights in arbitration. As a result, we decline to reach the question of whether the fee term would run afoul of the effective vindication doctrine if it were enforced as written.

D. The PAGA waiver

Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provisions in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements were invalid under California law because they both contained unenforceable, unsev-erable waivers of Plaintiffs’ claims under the California PAGA statute. Because we conclude that the district court should not have reached the question of whether the arbitration agreements were enforceable in the first place, it is not necessary to address this argument pertaining to the 2014 Agreement. Plaintiffs’ challenges to the enforceability and severability of the PAGA waiver in the 2014 Agreement fall to the arbitrator to decide.

As noted above, however, the 2013 Agreement specifically required the district court, and not the arbitrator, to consider certain challenges to the arbitration provision, including challenges to the enforceability of the PAGA waiver. Because of that carve-out, it remains for us to consider on the merits whether the PAGA waiver in that agreement is enforceable, and what effect the waiver has on the arbitration provision as a whole.

The district court concluded that the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was adhesive, oppressive, and a surprise to drivers who accepted the agreement, and that it was substantively unconscionable because it contained a PAGA waiver that was unenforceable under California law. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1217-18. The district court also concluded that the PAGA waiver was unseverable from the remainder of the agreement and that “the entirety of the arbitration agreement fails because the PAGA waiver fails.” Id. at 1218. For the reasons stated above, the district court’s holding on uneonscionability was erroneous.

Perhaps recognizing that the district court’s uneonscionability analysis ran counter to existing Ninth Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs argue on appeal that even if the district court erred in finding that the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement was unconscionable, the PAGA waiver was still invalid under California law and unseverable from the remainder of the arbitration provision under the terms of the contract. Plaintiffs argue that the invalid PAGA waiver thus dooms the entire arbitration provision, such that claims governed by that agreement (i.e., all of Gillette’s claims) must be litigated in court. Although we agree that the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement was invalid under California law, we conclude that it is sever-able from the remainder of the 2013 agreement.

In Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129 (2014), the California Supreme Court held that where “an employment agreement compels the waiver of representative claims under the PAGA, it is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.” Id., 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d at 149. We have held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt this rule. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 2015). Uber attempts to distinguish this case from Iskanian because drivers were able to opt out of the 2013 Agreement, but its effort is unavailing. Drivers presented with the 2013 Agreement were required to make the decision whether or not to opt out within 30 days of receipt, and Iskanian made clear that, while employees “are free to choose whether or not to bring PAGA actions when they are aware of Labor Code violations,” it is “contrary to public policy for an employment agreement to eliminate this choice altogether by requiring employees to waive the right to bring a PAGA action before any dispute arises.” 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d at 149. Because the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement required employees to make a decision as to whether or not they .would preserve their right to bring PAGA claims before they knew any such claims existed, it is unenforceable under Iskanian and Sakkab.

The PAGA waiver is severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement, however. In Section 14.1, the agreement provided that “[i]f any provision of the Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable, such provision shall be struck and the remaining provisions shall be enforced to the fullest extent under law.” In Section 14.3(v), the agreement further provided:

There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a private attorney general representative action (“Private Attorney General Waiver”). The Private Attorney General Waiver shall not be severable from this Arbitration Provision in any case in which a civil court of competent jurisdiction finds the Private Attorney General Waiver is unenforceable. In such instances and where the claim is brought as a private attorney general, such private attorney general claim must be litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

While this provision is hardly a model of clarity, the third sentence stated explicitly that PAGA claims are subject to litigation in court, contrary to the district court’s conclusion that the PAGA waiver was un-severable from the remainder of the agreement. Finally, in Section 14.3(ix), the agreement provided that “[ejxcept as stated in subsection v, above, in the event any portion of this Arbitration Provision is deemed unenforceable, the remainder of this Arbitration Provision will be enforceable.” Reading these ambiguous provisions together, we conclude that in stating that the PÁGA waiver and the arbitration provision are not severable, the contract provides that, if the PAGA waiver turned out to be invalid, the arbitration provision would also be invalid as to any PAGA representative claim. Thus, while Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim must be litigated in court, the PAGA waiver does not invalidate the remainder of the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement, and it should be enforced according to its terms.

E. Hirease cannot compel arbitration

Plaintiff Mohamed (but not Gillette) named independent background-check company Hirease in his complaint alongside Uber. Hirease moved to join Uber’s motion to compel Mohamed into arbitration, though Hirease was not identified as a party or a signatory to the agreement between Uber and the drivers. The district court denied Hirease’s joinder in Uber’s motion to compel on the same grounds that it denied Uber’s motion, without separately discussing the question of whether Hirease was covered by the arbitration provisions. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1237.

On appeal, Hirease argues that it should be covered by the arbitration agreement because: (1) Mohamed has alleged an agency relationship between Hirease and Uber, see, e.g., Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2013); (2) Hirease and Uber share an “identity of interest,” see, e.g., Jones v. Jacobson, 195 Cal.App.4th 1, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 537 n.9 (2011); and (3) the cause of action alleged against Hirease is “intimately founded in and intertwined with” underlying contract obligations, Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013)).

Hirease’s first argument rests on the wording of Mohamed’s complaint, which alleged generally that Defendants — defined to include Hirease, Uber, Rasier, and unknown Does — knowingly violated the FCRA, MCRA, and CCRAA by failing to provide job applicants and employees with adequate notice regarding the use of their consumer credit reports for employment purposes. The complaint also included allegations that “each named Defendant and DOES 1-50 were the employees, agents, or representatives of each other” and that “[e]ach Defendant has ratified and approved the acts of its agents.” Hirease argues that under California law, “a plaintiffs allegations of an agency relationship among defendants is sufficient to allow the alleged agents to invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by their principal even though the agents are not parties to the agreement.” Thomas v. Westlake, 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 114, 121 (2012).

As the California Court of Appeal has noted elsewhere, however, “[c]om-plaints in actions against multiple defendants commonly include conclusory allegations that all of the defendants were each other’s agents or employees and were acting within the scope of their agency or employment.” Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler, 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 567, 571 (2013). If Hirease were correct that such allegations were sufficient to establish an agency relationship for the purpose of compelling arbitration, “in every multi-defendant case in which the complaint contained such boilerplate allegations of mutual agency, as long as one defendant had entered into an arbitration agreement with the plaintiff, every defendant would be able to compel arbitration, regardless of how tenuous or nonexistent the connections among the defendants might actually be.” Id. As such, generalized allegations of an agency relationship made in a complaint are not, by themselves, a sufficient ground on which to compel arbitration when “the mutual agency of all defendants is not a judicially admitted fact.” Id. at 573. There has been no such judicial admission here.

There is no specific indication of an actual agency relationship between Uber and Hirease, either in the complaint or elsewhere in the record. An agency relationship “requires that the principal maintain control over the agent’s actions.” Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1232. Mohamed did not allege any facts suggesting that Uber maintained control over Hirease’s actions, or vice versa. Indeed, while the complaint stated four causes of action, Hirease was named in only one of them, for a violation of the MCRA. This claim alleged (1) that Hirease failed to deliver a copy of the consumer report to Plaintiff and other members of the MCRA class as required by Massachusetts General Laws (MGL) ch. 93 § 60, and (2) that Defendants failed to advise members of the putative MCRA class of their rights under MGL ch. 93 § 62. Hirease’s alleged violation of MGL ch. 93 § 60 was predicated on its own failure to act, and there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that failure was influenced or controlled by Uber. Nor is there any indication that Hirease had any role in or control over the alleged failure to advise members of the putative MCRA class of their rights under MGL ch. 93 § 62, which applies to “user[s] of ... consumer credit reports” such as Uber. Because Hirease “has presented no evidence, on appeal or before the district court, that [Uber] controlled its behavior in ways relevant to [Mohamed’s] allegations,” Hirease is not entitled to compel arbitration as Uber’s agent. Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1233.

In the same vein, there is no indication in the complaint that Uber and Hirease share an identity of interest, which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[a] relationship between two parties who are so close that suing one serves as notice to the other.” (10th ed. 2014). Because Hirease’s liability stems from its own alleged violation of Massachusetts law, independent of any actions Uber may or may not have taken, there is no such relationship here.

Finally, the allegations Mohamed leveled against Hirease were not “intimately founded in and intertwined with” the underlying contract obligations established in the 2014 Agreement. Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Kramer, 705 F.3d at 1128). The rule requiring enforcement of an arbitration agreement under such circumstances “reflects the policy that a plaintiff may not, ‘on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory hable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.’ ” Id. (quoting Goldman v. KPMG LLP, 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 543 (2009)). Non-signatories can enforce arbitration agreements when they are being sued “for ‘claims that are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims,’ ” id. at 1231 (quoting Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Envtl. Org. P’Ship, 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 328, 334 (2003)), but

[m]ere allegations of collusive behavior between signatories and non[-]signatories to a contract are not enough to compel arbitration between parties who have not agreed to arbitrate: those allegations of collusive behavior must also establish that the plaintiffs claims against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the obligations imposed by the contract containing the arbitration clause. Id. (quoting Goldman, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d at 545). Here, the claims against Hirease arise under the MCRA and not out of obligations imposed by the 2014 Agreement. Therefore, the rule that an arbitration agreement can be enforced by a non-signatory when the allegations against the non-signatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with underlying contract obligations does not apply.

III. Conclusion

We affirm in part and reverse the district court’s order denying Uber’s motions to compel arbitration and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We affirm the district court’s order denying Hirease’s joinder in the motion to compel.

All parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

      . An Uber black car is a commercially registered livery car that passengers can access using the Uber smartphone application. UberX is a lower-cost alternative in which drivers use their own cars to pick up passengers via the app.

      . Except where necessary, this opinion refers to Uber and Rasier collectively as "Uber.” The Rasier Agreement contained terms similar to those in the Software License and Online Services Agreement, and neither party has- alleged any arguments specific to the Ra-sier Agreement. Thus, we treat it as part of the 2014 Agreement.

      . In the 2014 Agreement, this sentence read: "This Arbitration Provision requires all such disputes to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration on an individual basis only and not by way of court or jury trial, or by way of class, collective, or representative action.

      . The arbitration agreements may not have clearly and unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator the authority to decide the question of waiver by litigation conduct. See Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. July 21, 2016). But that question is not at issue in this litigation.

      . The district court order cited several of our decisions, culminating with Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), acknowledging that they supported Uber’s position. Mohamed, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1212. Nonetheless, the order stated that the district court "cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority." Id. The California authority cited in the order preceded our decision in Kilgore, so the court’s decision to ignore our precedent cannot be explained by any intervening California authority.

      . We note that Plaintiffs also raised the argument that the class and collective action waivers in the arbitration agreements may violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for the first time in a sur-reply. That untimely submission waived the argument. See, e.g., United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Generally, an appellee waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief.”).

      . MGL ch. 93 § 60 requires consumer reporting agencies under certain circumstances to:
      notify the consumer of the fact that public record information is being reported by the consumer reporting agency, together with the name and address of the person to whom such information is being reported; or maintain strict procedures designed to insure that whenever public record information which is likely to have an adverse effect on a consumer’s ability to obtain employment is reported it is complete and up to date.
      It also requires consumer reporting agencies to "enter into an agreement with the user of such consumer report which provides that no consumer report may be requested by the user until and unless the user has provided written notice to the employee or prospective employee that a consumer report regarding the employee will be requested.” Id.

      . ' MGL ch. 93 § 62 provides in relevant part that "[w]henever ... employment involving a consumer is denied or terminated ... because of information contained in a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency, the user of the' consumer report shall ... notify such consumer in writing against whom such adverse action has been taken.”