author: REYNA, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Conley F. MONK, Jr., Claimant-Appellant v. David J. SHULKIN, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee
    2015-7092, 2015-7106
    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: April 26, 2017

      John Giammatteo, Liang Shu, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, New Haven, CT, argued for claimant-appellant. Also represented by Michael Joel Wish-nie, Mario Gazzola, Jason Parkin, Jessica Purcell.
    Agatha Koprowski, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by Benjamin C. Mizer, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Martin F. Hockey; Brian D. Griffin, Amanda Blackmon, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
    Jonathan Freiman, Wiggin and Dana LLP, New Haven, CT, for amici curiae William Gunn, Mary Lou Keener. Also represented by Lora Johns.
    Barton F. Stichman, National Veterans Legal Services Program, Washington, DC, for amici curiae The National Veterans Legal Services Program, Veterans Law Institute, The American Legion, The Military Order of the Purple Heart, Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, Vietnam Veterans of America, Hispanic American Veterans of Connecticut.
    Jason L. Lichtman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, New York, NY, for amici curiae Administrative Law Professors, Complex Litigation Law Professors. Also represented by Jonathan D. Selbin.
    Before NEWMAN, DYK, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
   REYNA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns whether the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has authority to certify a class for class action or for similar aggregate resolution procedures. Conley F. ,Monk, Jr., petitioned the Veterans Court to certify a class action and to otherwise aggregate for adjudication the claims of thousands of veterans whose claims were similarly situated to his own. The Veterans Court denied the request on grounds that it lacks authority to certify classes of claims, or to adjudicate disability claims on an aggregate basis. We hold that the Veterans Court has the authority to certify a class for a class action and to maintain similar aggregate resolution procedures. We reverse the judgment of the Veterans Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

.Mr. Monk served in the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. In February 2012, Mr. Monk filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Regional Office in Hartford, Connecticut. His claim stems from what he alleges are service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder, diabetes, hypertension, and strokes. In early 2013, the VA notified Mr. Monk that his claim had been denied because his Marine Corps discharge was “other than honorable.” J.A. 138.

Mr. Monk challenged the VA decision by filing with the VA a Notice of Disagreement (“NOD”) and requesting a hearing before a decision review officer. Separately, Mr. Monk applied to the Board of Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR”) to upgrade his discharge status.

In February 2014, the regional office held the requested hearing. In March 2015, the VA informed Mr. Monk that it could not process his appeal until it received records from the BCNR regarding his discharge status.

On April 6, 2015, Mr. Monk filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”). He requested the Veterans Court to order the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“Secretary”) to promptly adjudicate both his disability benefits application and the applications of similarly situated veterans. Mr. Monk also requested that the Veterans Court certify a class under a class action or similar aggregate resolution procedure. He proposed that a class be formed of all veterans who had applied for VA benefits, had timely filed an NOD, had not received a decision within twelve months, and had demonstrated medical or financial hardship as defined by 38 U.S.C. §§ T107(a)(2)(B)—(C). Mr. Monk proposed that members of the class include veterans in all stages of the VA appeals process that otherwise met these requirements, from those awaiting a Statement of the Case to those awaiting Board adjudication. J.A. 18, ¶ 43.

Mr. Monk further alleged that members of the proposed class shared questions of law and fact, including whether the VA’s delay in rendering decisions on disability benefits claims violated the veterans’ due process rights. On April 9, 2015, another veteran, Harold William Van Allen, filed a motion to join Mr. Monk’s petition as a class member.

On May 8, 2015, the Veterans Court issued a non-dispositive order both denying Mr. Monk’s request for class certification and ordering the Secretary to respond to the part of Mr. Monk’s petition regarding his appeal of the VA’s denial of his personal claim for disability benefits.

On May 27, 2015, in order to permit Mr. Monk to immediately appeal the class certification denial, the Veterans Court replaced the non-dispositive order with a dispositive order denying class certification and a non-dispositive order requiring the Secretary to respond to Mr. Monk’s individual mandamus petition. In the same order, the Veterans Court denied Mr. Van Allen’s motion to join Mr. Monk’s proposed class.

In May 2015, the BCNR granted Mr. Monk’s application for an upgraded discharge status which resulted in an honorable discharge status for Mr. Monk. In July 2015, the Veterans Court issued an order denying Mr. Monk’s individual petition for mandamus relief. It found that the VA’s delay in adjudicating Mr. Monk’s disability claim resulted, at least in part, from the VA’s need for certain BCNR records.

The Veterans Court also rejected Mr. Monk’s request for a class action or other aggregate relief on grounds that it lacks authority to maintain class actions. The Veterans Court stated that “Mr. Monk fails to appreciate the [Veterans] Court’s long-standing declaration that it does not have the authority to entertain class actions.” J.A. 3. The Veterans Court concluded that “[i]n the absence of such authority, no other arguments matter.” J.A. 4.

On May 27, 2015, and July 10, 2015, Mr. Monk filed two timely appeals before this court, one challenging the Veterans Court’s decision to deny his individual disability claim and the other to appeal the Veterans Court decision denying his request for a class action. Though separate appeals, the class certification appeal (No. 15-7092) was consolidated with the individual petition appeal (No. 15-7106).

After Mr. Monk appealed to this court, the Secretary determined that Mr. Monk was eligible for full disability benefits for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder and diabetes. On or after November 19, 2015, Mr. Monk filed before the VA administration a new NOD arguing that the Secretary erred in determining the effective date for his individual disability benefits. The action concerning this NOD remained pending as of the date of oral argument in this case.

JURISDICTION

We first review as a preliminary issue the Secretary’s assertion that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Our jurisdiction over appeals of decisions of the Veterans Court is limited. We may only review Veterans Court decisions with respect to the validity of a decision of the Veterans Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the Veterans Court in making the decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). This appeal raises a question of legal interpretation that is clearly within our jurisdiction. Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We review the Veterans Court’s interpretations of statutes de novo. Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

The Secretary asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction because Mr. Monk’s appeal has been rendered moot. As noted above, after Mr. Monk filed his appeals, the VA awarded Mr. Monk a one hundred percent (100%) disability rating, the highest rating possible. The Secretary argues that because the disability benefits award resolved Mr. Monk’s claim, there exists no justiciable controversy.

Article III of the Constitution limits our jurisdiction to cases and controversies. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. The case-or-controversy requirement ensures that federal court adjudication is limited to actual and concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have a direct consequence on the parties. Camphell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 663, 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Caraco Pham. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

A case is said to lack an actual or concrete dispute where the relief sought by a plaintiff is satisfied or otherwise rendered moot. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (“The controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be ‘definite and concrete’ and no longer ‘touch(es) the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’ ”) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937)). A case is moot when it no longer presents live issues or “the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McComack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).

The Secretary argues that once Mr. Monk obtained full relief, he no longer possessed a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the appeal. We agree that Mr. Monk’s appeal concerning his individual disability claim is rendered moot. We disagree, however, that Mr. Monk’s appeal of the Veterans Court decision on class certification is also moot.

The issue of mootness in the context of class actions has a long history. In particular, significant litigation has focused on whether a class action suit can be maintained by a class representative whose own substantive claim has been satisfied. See, e.g., Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. 1202; Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

The Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in Geraghty, holding that a class action “does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. 1202. This decision is applicable to this case because, as in Geraghty, Mr. Monk’s individual substantive claim was satisfied after the Veterans Court denied the request for class certification to form a class.

In Geraghty, the Court reasoned “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed class representative the right to have a class certified.” Id. at 403, 100 S.Ct. 1202. The Court explained that the purpose of the personal stake requirement in the class action context is to assure that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. Id. Here, the question on appeal is the Veterans Court decision that it did “not have the authority to entertain class actions” and that in “the absence of such authority, no other arguments matter.” J.A. 3-4. This question exists independent of Mr. Monk’s disability award and it persists in the context of the appeal raised by Mr. Monk. It is a question presented “in a form fairly capable of judicial resolution.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403, 100 S.Ct. 1202.

The Secretary argues that Geraghty is inapposite because there, the personal stake in obtaining class certification was derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which does not apply in the Veterans Court. In support, the Secretary cites Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1530, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013). In Genesis, the Supreme Court found that a plaintiffs class certification request under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where Rule 23 did not apply, was rendered moot once the plaintiffs individual claim was mooted. Id. The Court reasoned that “essential to our decisions in Sosna and Geraghty was the fact that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certified under Rule 23.” Id. at 1530. The Secretary reasons that since Rule 23 does not apply in Veterans Court, once Mr. Monk’s individual claim was mooted, the potential for any independent legal status for the purported putative class was eliminated.

Genesis is distinguishable on an important factor. The primary reason the Court declined to extend Geraghty was because the Genesis plaintiffs claim was mooted before any decision on class certification was rendered: “Here, respondent had not yet moved for ‘conditional certification’ when her claim became moot, nor had the District Court anticipatorily ruled on any such request. Her claim instead became moot prior to these events, foreclosing any recourse to Geraghty.” Id. at 1530. Here, as in Geraghty, Mr. Monk’s claim became moot after class certification was sought and denied. This is also a situation in which Mr. Van Allen moved to join Mr. Monk’s proposed class (and was denied by the Veterans Court), unlike in Genesis where no other individuals had joined the class. 133 S.Ct. at 1527.

In any event, even if Geraghty were viewed as limited only to situations where Rule 23 is applicable, Genesis itself recognized that in cases such as this, where the relief sought is forward-looking, a claim is not moot if it is capable of repetition and yet evades review. A “class-action claim is not necessarily moot upon the termination of the named plaintiffs claim” in circumstances in which “other persons similarly situated will continue to be subject to the challenged conduct,” but “the challenged conduct was effectively un-reviewable, because no plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for litigation to run its course.” Id. at 1530-31 (internal quotations omitted). Data presented to the court indicate that veterans face, on average, about four years of delay between filing an NOD and receiving a final Board decision. According to the Board’s Annual Report Fiscal Year 2014, veterans who filed an NOD waited an average of 330 days before receiving a Statement of the Case. Veterans then waited an average of 681 days for the VA to certify appeals to the Board, and then an average of 357 days for the Board to decide their appeals. Thousands of veterans seeking benefits are still awaiting results of their appeals. Indeed, Mr. Monk himself has filed another NOD challenging the effective date of his disability benefits, and will likely be subject to the same average delay. On these facts, it would appear that the case is not moot because it is “capable of repetition, yet evad[es] review.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398, 100 S.Ct. 1202 (“[W]here the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with respect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue notwithstanding the named plaintiffs current lack of a personal stake.”) (citations omitted).

Veterans Court’s Authority

The Secretary concedes that the Veterans Court has authority to certify a class for class action or similar aggregate resolution procedure. Oral Arg. at 14:40-20:19; 22:58-23:07, http://oralargum.ents. cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-7092.mp3. Indeed, the Secretary did not argue that the Veterans Court lacks authority to aggregate claims, but rather, that the Veterans Court merely decided that aggregation was not appropriate in this instance. See, e.g., Resp. Br. 19-22; 33-35. But the Veterans Court in unquestionable terms held that it lacked authority to entertain class actions and that in “the absence of such authority, no other arguments matter.” J.A. 3 (emphasis added). As reviewed below, we conclude that the Veteran’s Court decision that it lacks authority to certify and adjudicate class action cases was an abuse of discretion. We hold that the Veterans Court has such authority under the All Writs Act, other statutory authority, and the Veterans Court’s inherent powers.

1. The Ml Writs Act

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

Under the All Writs Act, the authority of the Veterans Court “is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction already acquired by appeal but extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been perfected.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943). The All Writs Act is a “legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve ‘the rational ends of law.’” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969)). It permits federal courts to fill gaps in their judicial power where those gaps would thwart the otherwise proper exercise of their jurisdiction. Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41, 106 S.Ct. 355, 88 L.Ed.2d 189 (1985).

The All Writs Act unquestionably applies in the Veterans Court. Cox, 149 F.3d at 1363. In Cox, we held that the Veterans Court has the power to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction under the Ml Writs Act, such as ordering the Board to issue a final determination in a case where it had not already done so. Id. We see no limitation in the All Writs Act precluding it from forming the authoritative basis to entertain a class action.

Indeed, the Ml Writs Act has provided authority to aggregate cases in various contexts. For example, in United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, the Second Circuit found that a district court properly main-tamed a class action under the All Writs Act. 506 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (2d Cir. 1974). The district court aggregated claims under the All Writs Act, as opposed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, because the case involved habeas proceedings where Rule 23 did not apply. Id. The Second Circuit explained that the All Writs Act permits courts to create “appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage.” Id. at 1125 (quoting Harris, 394 U.S. at 299, 89 S.Ct. 1082).

The Second Circuit found that creating a class action procedure was appropriate for a number of reasons. Id. at 1125-27. The court explained that although Rule 23 did not apply, the standards for determining whether a Rule 23 class action was appropriate provided support for maintaining a class action. Id. at 1126-27. Specifically, the court found that the class was so numerous that joinder of all members was impracticable, that common questions of law or fact existed, that the claims of the representative parties were typical for the class, and that the representative parties would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Here, the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction extends to “compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2). We see no principled reason why the Veterans Court cannot rely on the All Writs Act to aggregate claims in aid of that jurisdiction.

2. Other Statutory Authority

In addition to the All Writs Act, other statutory authority provides the Veterans Court the authority to aggregate claims for class actions. Congress created the Veterans Court as part of the Veterans Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”). Pub. L. 100-687, Div. A, Title III, § 301(a), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4113, §§ 4052, 4061, and 4066. Before the VJRA, “a veteran whose claim was rejected by the VA was generally unable to obtain further review.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988)). Congress enacted the VJRA to vest the newly created Veterans Court with authority to review Board decisions adverse to veterans. Id. There is no indication that Congress intended such review authority to not include class actions.

Before the VJRA, veterans seeking to enforce veterans benefit statutes were able to file class actions in some circumstances. For example, in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974), the Supreme Court exerted its authority to review a class action in which conscientious objectors who performed mandatory alternative civil service challenged the veterans benefits statutory provisions excluding them as beneficiaries. See also Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 628 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978) (reviewing a class action suit brought on behalf of all veterans enrolled in college education program); Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (granting motion for class certification for class of veterans exposed to certain chemicals); Giusti-Bravo v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 853 F.Supp. 34 (D.P.R. 1993) (putative class action including veterans with benefits related to mental disorders).

Under 38 U.S.C. § 7264(a), “[t]he proceedings of the [Veterans Court] shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure as the Court prescribes.” This express grant authorizes the Veterans Court to create the procedures it needs to exercise its jurisdiction.

Other tribunals have relied on statutes with similar language as 38 U.S.C. § 7264 to aggregate claims and create class action procedures, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Amicus Br. of 15 Admin. Law, Civil Procedure, and Fed. Courts Professors at 10-11 (noting that the EEOC was granted authority to “issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)). Under this authority, the EEOC adopted a class action resolution procedure. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204; see, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 12,634 (Apr. 10, 1992); Wade v. Donahoe, No. CIV.A. 11-3795, 2012 WL 3844380, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012) (“Pursuant to [its 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) ] authority, the EEOC has promulgated regulations for class actions.”).

On the basis of the express statutory authority of the Veterans Court to prescribe “rules of practice and procedure,” the Veterans Court may prescribe procedures for class actions or other methods of aggregation.

3. Absence of Statutory Restriction

The Veterans Court relies on Harrison v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 438 (1991) (en banc), to conclude that it lacks authority to entertain class actions. J.A. 3. The Harrison court relied on three statutory provisions to conclude it lacked class action authority. 1 Vet.App. at 438. It first noted that 38 U.S.C. § 7252 “limits the jurisdiction of this Court to the review of [Board] decisions.” Id. Next, 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) states that “[i]n no event shall findings of fact made by the Secretary or the Board of Veterans’ Appeals be subject to trial de novo by the Court.” 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c). Finally, under 38 U.S.C. § 7266, “each person adversely affected by such a [Board] decision must file a notice of appeal.” 1 Vet.App. at 438. Thus the Harrison decision reflects a concern that the Veterans Court would exceed its jurisdiction if, for example, it certified a class that included veterans that had not yet received a Board decision or had not yet filed a notice appealing a Board decision. The Veterans Court adopted this reasoning and further recognized that the Veterans Court has “previously declined to permit class actions because to do so would be unmanageable and unnecessary.” J.A. 3.

We disagree that the Veterans Court’s authority is so limited. Congress expressly gave the Veterans Court the authority to “compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2). While there was legislative history that the focus should be on individual claimants, see Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 1, 4-5 (2007), we find no persuasive indication that Congress intended to remove class action protection for veterans when it enacted the VJRA. Rather, Congress gave the Veterans Court express authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for its proceedings.

Class actions can help the Veterans Court exercise that authority by promoting efficiency, consistency, and fairness, and improving access to legal and expert assistance by parties with limited resources. In Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 201, 215 (2012), Judges Lance and Hagel explained that the VA’s delay in adjudicating appeals evades review because the VA usually acts promptly to resolve mandamus petitions. 25 Vet.App. at 215; see note 3, supra. They stated that when the Veterans Court orders the VA to respond to a petition “set[ting] forth a well-pleaded complaint that the processing of a claim has been improperly delayed,” the “great majority of the time” the VA “responds by correcting the problem within the short time allotted for a response, and the petition is dismissed as moot because the relief sought has been obtained.” Id. Case law is replete with such examples. Thus a claim aggregation procedure may help the Veterans Court achieve the goal of reviewing the VA’s delay in adjudicating appeals.

Class actions may help the Veterans Court consistently adjudicate cases by increasing its prospects for precedential opinions. The Veterans Court issues only a small number of precedential opinions each year. See Amicus Brief of Former General Counsels of the VA at 7. Permitting class actions would help prevent the VA from mooting claims scheduled for precedential review. See Amicus Brief of American Legion at 18-25 (providing two examples of instances where the VA offered full benefits to a veteran whose case was scheduled for precedential review, while denying other veterans benefits on the same grounds).

In addition, a class action rule would permit the Veterans Court “to serve as lawgiver and error corrector simultaneously, while also reducing the delays associated with individual appeals.” Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 483, 521 n.231 (2007). Similarly, class action suits could be used to compel correction of systemic error and to ensure that like veterans are treated alike. Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: The VA Is Brought Kicking and Screaming into the World of Meaningful Due Process, 46 Me. L. Rev. 43, 65 (1994).

We see no reason why the Veterans Court cannot use class actions to promote efficiency, consistency, and fairness in its decisions. The Veterans Court is no different in this respect from, for example, the EEOC or bankruptcy courts that have adopted class action mechanisms to promote similar concerns.

Accordingly, we determine that the Veterans Court has authority to certify a class for class action or similar aggregate resolution procedure. We decline to address whether certification of a class would be appropriate here, or the nature of procedures that the Veterans Court may establish for such actions.

Conclusion

We hold that the Veterans Court has the authority to establish a class action mechanism or other method of aggregating claims. We reverse the Veterans Court’s contrary decision and remand for the Veterans Court to determine whether a class action or other method of aggregation would be appropriate here.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Costs

Costs to Mr. Monk.

      . The appeal process at the VA begins with the veteran filing a notice of disagreement. J.A. 71. The regional office must then issue a Statement of the Case. Id. The veteran may seek a hearing with a decision review officer, after which the veteran may seek review by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals ("Board”). Id.

      . This is not to say that Mr. Monk’s NOD claim before the VA administration concerning the effective date of the disability is moot.

      . The provision codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7261 was formerly codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4061. This provision remains unchanged since the court in Harrison cited it, except that in place of "Administrator,” the provision now states "Secretary.” 38 U.S.C. § 4061(c) (1988).

      . A Congressional Budget Office cost estimate released shortly before the VJRA was enacted suggests that Congress intended that the Veterans Court would have the authority to maintain class actions. H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, pt. 1, at 41-42 (1988) (discussing potential litigation challenges to VA regulations, stating, "Again according to SSA, most challenges to regulations are class actions, involving large groups of beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries.”).

        . See, e.g., Seller v. McDonald, No. 16-2768, 2016 WL 5828055, at *2 (Vet. App. Sept. 30, 2016) (withdrawing a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the VA to adjudicate an appeal because the VA adjudicated the appeal at an unspecified time within a month and a half of the petition’s filing); Dotson v. McDonald, No. 16-2813, 2016 WL 5335437, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 23, 2016) (dismissing as moot a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the VA to adjudicate an appeal because the VA adjudicated the appeal seven days after the petition was filed); Dalpiaz v. McDonald, No. 16-2602, 2016 WL 4702423, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 8, 2016) (dismissing as moot a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the VA to adjudicate an appeal because the VA adjudicated the appeal at an unspecified time within about a month of the petition’s filing).

      . In 2014, the Veterans Court decided 1,615 appeals in single-judge non-precedential decisions, and only 35 appeals were decided by a precedential multi-judge panel or the full court.

      . In a non-precedential opinion, this court had previously agreed with the Veterans Court that it lacked the authority to establish a class action procedure. Spain v. Principi, 18 Fed.Appx. 784, 786 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We agree that the Veterans Court did not have the authority to ... establish class action procedures ....”). More recently, this court stated, in another non-precedential opinion, that the Veterans Court’s position on this issue was "at a minimum, not clearly incorrect.” Adeyi v. McDonald, 606 Fed.Appx. 1002, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To the extent these prior non-precedential rulings diverge from our holding today, any perceived conflict is superseded by today’s precedential authority.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    RECOGNICORP, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. NINTENDO CO., LTD., Nintendo of America, Inc., Defendants-Appellees
    2016-1499
    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: April 28, 2017

      Jonathan Daniel Baker, Farney Daniels PC, San Mateo, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by David P. Swenson, Minneapolis, MN.
    Mark S. Parris, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Seattle, WA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by Donald E. Daybell, Irvine, CA; Marc Shapiro, New York, NY; Will Melehani, San Francisco, CA.
    Before LOURIE, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
   REYNA, Circuit Judge.

ReeogniCorp sued Nintendo for patent infringement. The district court found that RecogniCorp’s patent claims ineligible subject matter and, based on that finding, granted Nintendo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. ReeogniCorp appeals. The patent’s claims are directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding image data, and the claims do not contain an inventive concept sufficient to render the patent eligible. Therefore, we affirm.

Background

1. The ’303 Patent

U.S. Patent No. 8,005,303 (“’303 patent”) patent is en-titled “Method and Apparatus for Encoding/Decoding Image Data.” J.A. 17. It teaches a method and apparatus for building a composite facial image using constituent parts. See, e.g., J.A. 27 (col. 1 ll. 30-56 and col. 2 ll. 19-28); J.A. 28 (col. 4 ll. 35-45).

Prior to the invention disclosed in the ’303 patent, composite facial images typically were stored in file formats such as “bitmap,” “gif,” or “jpeg.” But these file formats required significant memory, and compressing the images often resulted in decreased image quality. Digital transmission of these images could be difficult. The ’303 patent sought to solve this problem by encoding the image at one end through a variety of image classes that required less memory and bandwidth, and at the other end decoding the images.

For purposes of this appeal, we find amended claim 1 to be representative. It recites:

1. A method for creating a composite image, comprising:
displaying facial feature images on a first area of a first display via a first device associated with the first display, wherein the facial feature images are associated with facial feature element codes;
selecting a facial feature image from the first area of the first display via a user interface associated with the first device, wherein the first device incorporates the selected facial feature image into a composite image on a second area of the first display, wherein the composite image is associated with a composite facial image code having at least a facial feature element code and wherein the composite facial image code is derived by performing at least one multiplication operation on a facial code using one or more code factors as input parameters to the multiplication operation; and
reproducing the composite image on a second display based on the composite facial image code.

J.A. 35 (US 8,005,303 Cl, col. 1 ll. 23-40) (Reexamination Certificate for ’303 patent).

2. District Court Litigation and Reexamination

The ’303 patent issued on August 23, 2011. J.A. 17. It later was assigned to ReeogniCorp, LLC (“ReeogniCorp”). In 2012, ReeogniCorp filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Nintendo of America, Inc. (together, “Nintendo”) for infringement of several claims of the ’303 patent. J.A. 49,196. In 2012, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

The district court stayed the case in 2013 pending a reexamination by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). The reexamination focused on obviousness and resulted in several amended claims, including claim 1. See J.A. 35. The amended claims all contain similar language regarding multiplication operations. Specifically, the limitation “wherein the composite facial image code is derived by performing at least one multiplication operation on a facial code using one or more code factors as input parameters to the multiplication operation” (or a limitation substantially identical) was added to the independent claims. J.A. 4. In light of these amendments, the PTO issued a reexamination certificate for the ’303 patent. Upon completion of the reexamination in 2014, the district court lifted the stay.

In March 2015, Nintendo filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the claims were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 provides that “[wjhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor....” There is an exception to that general principle: subject matter directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas is not patent-eligible. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014). The Supreme Court has established a two-step test to determine whether patent claims are directed to ineligible subject matter. In the first step, “we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. at 2355. If the answer in step one is yes, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’ ” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1297, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012)). In other words, step two asks whether the patent claims an “ ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294, 1298).

In December 2015, without issuing a claim construction ruling, the district court granted Nintendo’s motion. At Alice step one, the district court concluded that the asserted claims are “directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding composite facial images using a mathematical formula.” J.A. 8. According to the district court:

[The claims] boil down to: (1) displaying potential input variables (the facial features and their modifications), (2) selecting and manipulating the inputs, (3) deriving an output code by performing a “multiplication operation” on the inputs, and (4) outputting the original inputs on another device by performing the sequence in reverse on another device.

J.A. 8. The district court analogized the process to “paint by numbers.” J.A. 8.

At Alice step two, the district court found that the ’303 patent contains no inventive concept. J.A. 11. It stated that “the entirety of the ’303 Patent consists of the encoding algorithm itself or purely conventional or obvious pre-solution activity and post-solution activity insufficient to transform the unpatentable abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” J.A. 14 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Based on these findings, the district court granted Nintendo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

RecogniCorp timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

Discussion

1. Standard of Review

We review procedural aspects of motions for judgment on the pleadings using regional circuit law, which in this case is the Ninth Circuit. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit reviews motions for judgment on the pleadings de novo. Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). We review § 101 patent eligibility determinations de novo. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1311.

2. Analysis

A. Alice Step One

Under the first step of Alice, we decide whether the claims are directed to ineligible subject matter, such as an abstract idea. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312; Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The inquiry often is whether the claims are directed to “a specific means or method” for improving technology or whether they are simply directed to an abstract end-result. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

While “generalized steps to be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity” are abstract, Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), not all claims in all software patents are necessarily directed to an abstract idea, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, we have held that software patent claims satisfy Alice step one when they are “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts,” such as an improvement in the functioning of a computer. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338-39.

We find that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding image data. It claims a method whereby a user displays images on a first display, assigns image codes to the images through an interface using a mathematical formula, and then reproduces the image based on the codes. See J.A. 35 (col. 1 11. 23-40). This method reflects standard encoding and decoding, an abstract concept long utilized to transmit information. Cf. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (organizing, displaying, and manipulating data encoded for human- and machine-readability is directed to an abstract concept). Morse code, ordering food at a fast food restaurant via a numbering system, and Paul Revere’s “one if by land, two if by sea” signaling system all exemplify encoding at one end and decoding at the other end. Even the ’303 patent describes “a common technique for synthesizing single images of faces involving] horizontally dividing the image of a face into bands for different features,” such that “[pjaper strips containing exemplary features [can] then be combined to form a composite drawing of a face.” J.A. 27 (col. 1 11. 37-43).

RecogniCorp invokes Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981), to support its argument that claiming the use of a mathematical formula does not necessarily render a patent ineligible. RecogniCorp is correct. In Diehr, the Supreme Court held that despite a method claim’s recitation of a mathematical formula, “a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Id. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048. In confirming pat-entability, the Supreme Court focused not on the presence of a mathematical formula but on the subject matter of the claims as a whole. Id. at 192, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (“[A] claim containing a mathematical formula” satisfies § 101 when it “implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect.”). Here, the relevant inquiry does not turn one way or the other just on claim l’s use of multiplication. See J.A. 35 (’308 Reexamination Certificate, col. 1 11. 34-38). Rather, the focus is on the claim as a whole. Diehr is distinguishable because, outside of the math, claim 1 of the ’303 patent is not directed to otherwise eligible subject matter. Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea (encoding and decoding) does not render the claim non-abstract.

RecogniCorp argues that, as in Enfish, “the district court mischaracterized the invention using an improperly high level of abstraction that ignored the particular encoding process recited by the claims.” Appellant’s Op. Br. 11. In Enfish, we warned that “describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.” 822 F.3d at 1337. But the district court did not make that mistake regarding the ’303 patent. The claims of the ’303 patent are clearly directed to encoding and decoding image data. Unlike Enfish, claim 1 does not claim a software method that improves the functioning of a computer. See id. It claims a “process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1336.

This case is similar to Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). There, the claims of the challenged patent were directed to the abstract idea of organizing information through mathematical correlations. Id. at 1350-51. We explained that the claim at issue “recites a process of taking two data sets and combining them into a single data set” simply by organizing existing data into a new form. Id. at 1351. A process that started with data, added an algorithm, and ended with a new form of data was directed to an abstract idea. Id. In this case, the ’303 patent claims a method whereby a user' starts with data, codes that data using “at least one multiplication operation,” and ends with a new form of data. We discern no material difference between the Alice step one analysis in Digitech and the analysis here.

We proceed to the second step of Alice because the ’303 patent claims are directed to an abstract idea.

B. Alice Step Two

In step two of the Alice inquiry, we search for an “ ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.’” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355). To save a patent at step two, an inventive concept must be evident in the claims. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357 (“[W]e must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept.’” (emphasis added)); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The § 101 inquiry must focus on the language of the Asserted Claims themselves.”).

RecogniCorp argues that the claims of the ’303 patent contain an inventive concept sufficient to render them patent-eligible. Specifically, it contends that the combination of claim elements, i.e., the “particular encoding process using the specific algorithm disclosed” in the patent “transforms” the abstract idea into a patentable invention. RecogniCorp also points out the “facial feature element codes” and “pictorial entity symbols” disclosed in the ’303 patent claims. We find that these claim elements do not transform the'nature of the ’303 patent claims into a patent-eligible application. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312.

In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., we found that the patent claims satisfied Alice step two because “the claimed solution amounts to an inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-centric problem.” 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Claim 1 of the ’303 patent contains no similar inventive concept. Nothing “transforms” the abstract idea of encoding and decoding into patent-eligible subject matter. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357. Nor does the presence of a mathematical formula dictate otherwise. Claims that are directed to a non-abstract idea are not rendered abstract simply because they use a mathematical formula. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048. But the converse is also true: A claim directed to an abstract idea does not automatically become eligible merely by adding a mathematical formula. See, e.g., Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., — Fed. Appx. -, 2017 WL 992528, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2017). As we explained above, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding. The addition of a mathematical equation that simply changes the data into other forms of data cannot save it.

In BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the patent owner “alleged that an inventive concept can be found in the ordered combination of claim limitations that transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of that abstract idea.” 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We found the allegation sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, where all facts had to be construed in the patent owner’s favor. Id. Here, RecogniCorp has not alleged a particularized application of encoding and decoding image data. Indeed, claim 1 does not even require a computer; the invention can be practiced verbally or with a telephone. J.A. 28 (col. 4 ll. 59-63); J.A. 32 (col. 11 ll. 53-59). Independent claim 36 claims the use of a computer, but it does exactly what we have warned it may not: tell a user to take an abstract idea and apply it with a computer. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

In sum, the claims of the ’303 patent lack an inventive concept that transforms the claimed subject matter from an abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357.

Conclusion

The claims of the ’303 patent are directed to encoding and decoding image data, an abstract idea. The claims provide no inventive concept to render them eligible under § 101. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of Nintendo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

AFFIRMED

Costs

No costs.

      . ReeogniCorp argued before the district court that “each asserted claim must be analyzed separately.” J.A. 3 n.l. ReeogniCorp does not maintain this argument on appeal; it therefore is waived. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We discuss limitations of other claims where appropriate.


author: STOLL, Circuit Judge.

text:
    NICHIA CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant v. EVERLIGHT AMERICAS, INC., Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd., Defendants-Cross-Appellants Zenaro Lighting, Inc., Defendant
    2016-1585
    2016-1618
    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: April 28, 2017

      Robert P. Parker, Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, P.C., Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Martin Moss Zoltick, Michael Jones, Daniel McCallum, Steven Paul Weihrouch.
    Jerry Robin Selinger, Patterson & Sheridan LLP, Dallas, TX, argued for defendants-cross-appellants. Also represented by Jayme Partridge, Barden Todd Patterson, Houston, TX; Eric W. Benisek, Jeffrey T. Lindgren, Robert McArthur, Stephen C. Steinberg, Richard C. Vasquez, Vasquez Benisek & Lindgren, LLP, Lafayette, CA.
    Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
   STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Nichia Corporation sued Everlight Electronics Co., LTD., Everlight Americas, INC., and Zenaro Lighting, Inc. (collectively, “Everlight”) for infringement of three of its patents. Following a bench trial, the district court found Everlight infringed all three patents and' had not proved them invalid. The court denied, however, Nichia’s request for a permanent injunction against Everlight. Nichia appeals the district court’s refusal to enter an injunction against Everlight. Everlight cross-appeals the court’s judgment that it infringes Nichia’s patents and that it failed to prove the patents invalid. We affirm.

Background

I.

Nichia Corporation is an LED company that manufactures and supplies LEDs in markets around the world. Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., No. 02:13-CV-702, 2016 WL 310142, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2016) (“Nichia”). Both parties agree that “Nichia is the world’s largest supplier of LEDs.” J.A. 2113, ¶ 154. It sells LEDs in America through its subsidiary Nichia America Corp. Nichia also researches and develops LED technology, including the technology disclosed in the three patents Nichia asserted in this case.

Everlight buys chips from suppliers and packages them into LEDs. Nichia, 2016 WL 810142, at *1. It sells LEDs in the U.S. directly to customers and through its subsidiaries. Id.

II.

Nichia accused Everlight of infringing three of Nichia’s patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 8,530,250, 7,432,589, and 7,462,870. All three disclose package designs and methods of manufacturing LED devices. All three patents use a shared set of vocabulary known in the art, as shown below on a common configuration of an LED:

Id. at *4; J.A. 11. The court explained that this LED includes the following parts:

(i) the “leads,” which are used to conduct the electrical current to the LED chip;
(ii) the “resin housing,” which is made out of a reflective resin and includes a recess in which the LED chip is placed;
(iii) the “LED chip” or “LED die” (about the size of a grain of salt), which is mounted in the recess typically by using an adhesive material in a process known as die bonding; (iv) one or more “bond wires” that connect the LED chip to the leads; and (v) an “encapsulation material” that encapsulates the LED chip and protects it from the environment.

Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *4.

The LEDs in suit are miniscule; they are typically smaller than 1 millimeter in height. Id. They are used in LCD back-lights, video displays, automotive applications, and general lighting applications. Id.

The court found that LED design technology is a complex technological space, where many design considerations pull in different directions simultaneously. It found that “LED package design involves the simultaneous integration and balancing of multiple design considerations, including electrical, optical, thermal, and mechanical design challenges.” Id. The court emphasized that:

[mjultiple challenges must be addressed when de-signing an LED package: (i) electrical design challenges: We have to conduct a relatively high-current density through the small LED chip and connect the LED chip to the leads; (ii) optical design challenges: The intensities are very high, because the LED chip is very small and the power emitted by the LED is quite' high. And, therefore, we need to handle a very high-optical radiation density; (iii) thermal design challenges: The LED chip inevitably creates heat, and this heat needs to be conducted away; and (iv) mechanical design challenges: includes protecting the LED chip from any external effect, such as moisture or mechanical intrusion. These multiple requirements can be contradictory and can pull the design in different directions.

Id. (internal emphases, citations, and quotations omitted).

The district court held a bench trial and found that Everlight infringed all three patents and had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims of the three patents are invalid. Id. at *1. Despite finding the patents valid and infringed, the court refused Nichia’s request for prospective relief in the form of a permanent injunction. Id. The court explained that “Niehia has not demonstrated that Defendants’ past and continuing infringement of Nichia’s Patents has caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable harm to Niehia.” Id. It also reasoned that monetary damages could adequately compensate Niehia for Everlight’s infringement. The court thus concluded that Nic-hia was not entitled to injunctive relief. Id.

Niehia timely appealed, and Everlight cross-appealed. Niehia appeals the district court’s refusal to grant the injunction. Ev-erlight cross-appeals the district court’s judgment that Everlight infringes and that it failed to prove the patents invalid with respect to all of the asserted claims of Nichia’s three asserted patents. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2).

Discussion

I.

We begin with Everlight’s appeal of the district court’s finding that Everlight infringed the asserted claims of Nichia’s three patents and its conclusion that Ever-light failed to prove those claims invalid by clear and convincing evidence.

We review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). “Where the district court’s claim construction relies only on intrinsic evidence, the construction is a legal determination reviewed de novo.” Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols., LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. — v. Sandoz, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 831, 841, — L.Ed.2d (2015)). Infringement is a question of fact. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying questions of fact.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

A.

We begin with the ’250 patent. The district court found claims 1, 7, 17, 19, and 21 of the patent infringed and not proven invalid. Everlight first challenges the court’s construction of the claim term “lead” and its finding of infringement under its proposed construction. Second, it challenges the court’s construction of “planar” and the court’s finding of infringement under either its proposed construction or the court’s. Finally, Everlight challenges the court’s conclusion that it failed to prove the patent obvious.

1.

The ’250 patent is directed to a process for manufacturing LEDs that purportedly improves production efficiency. The patent describes making a continuous sheet of LEDs and separating, or “singulating,” them to make the final product. ’250 patent col. 2 11. 49-58. During singulation, LEDs often break. So to reduce breakage, the patent suggests manufacturing LEDs by fitting a lead frame between an upper and lower mold, filling the molds with resin, and then singulating the LEDs. This, the patent suggests, is a “simple and low-cost method for manufacturing, in a short time, multiple light emitting devices which ha[ve] high adhesion between a lead frame and a thermosetting resin composition.” Id. The district court noted' that, “[b]e-tween 2010 and 2013, Nichia’s sales of the products that practice the ’250 patent increased from three percent of Nichia’s total sales volume, to 27 percent.” Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *24. The court also explained that, “[i]n 2013, Nichia sold over 13.9 billion units, with revenues of $1.7 billion.” Id.

The ’250 patent’s first claim is reproduced below:

1. A method of manufacturing a light emitting device, the method comprising:
providing a lead frame comprising at least one notch;
plating the lead frame;
after plating the lead frame, providing an upper mold on a first surface of the plated lead frame and a lower mold on a second surface of the plated lead frame, and transfer-molding a thermo-setting resin containing a light reflecting material in a space between the upper mold and the lower mold to form a resin-molded body; and
cutting the resin-molded body and the plated lead frame along the at least one notch to form a resin package, the resin package comprising a resin part and at least one lead, and the cutting step being performed such that an outer surface of the resin part and an outer surface of the at least one lead are planar at an outer side surface of the resin package,
wherein the plated lead frame is cut so as to form an unplated outer side surface on the lead.

’250 patent col. 19 ll. 37-55.

2.

Everlight argues that the court misconstrued the term “lead” when it interpreted “lead” to mean “the portion of the device that conducts electricity.” J.A. 10054-55. Everlight contends that a lead must be more than simply conductive, it must be “the conductive portion of the device that makes an electrical connection to a structure outside of the device.” J.A. 10054 (originally proposing this construction). The district court rejected Everlight’s request to add a requirement that the lead electrically connect to a structure outside of the device because, while the court “generally agree[d] with the conductive portion of [Everlight’s] construction,” it found “the remaining language problematic and not as concise as the Court’s construction.” J.A. 10056.

We agree with the district court that a lead, as employed in the asserted claims of the ’250 patent, is “the portion of the device that conducts electricity.” The specification discloses leads 22 in Figure 1:

Fig. 1

’250 patent, Fig. 1. The specification explains that “[t]he light emitting element 10 is electrically connected with the leads 22 through wires 50.” Id. at col. 6 11. 20-21. It explains that the lead frame “is formed using an electrical [sic] good conductor such as iron, phosphor bronze or a copper alloy.” Id. at col. 9 11. 21-22. These disclosures explain that the claimed leads conduct electricity. But we find no compelling support in the intrinsic evidence for Ever-light’s proposed requirement that the leads conduct electricity from outside the device. We thus agree with the district court that the person of ordinary skill would understand a lead to be “the portion of the device that conducts electricity.”

Because we agree with the court’s construction, and because Everlight does not challenge the court’s finding of infringement under that construction, we affirm the court’s finding that the accused products meet this limitation.

3.

We next turn to Everlight’s contention that the district court misconstrued “planar” when it interpreted the term “planar” as “in a substantially same plane.” J.A. 10069. The ’250 patent’s claims require that “at least one lead [be] planar at an outer side surface of the resin package.”

Everlight argues that “planar” means that there is “no measurable surface variation.” J.A. 10068. Everlight asserts that this construction is mandated by the specification’s distinction between “planar” and “in the same plane.” Everlight Br. 23. Namely, the patent uses “in a substantially same plane” in the specification but “planar” in the claims. The specification states that “a resin part and a lead are formed in a substantially same plane in an outer side surface.” ’250 patent col. 2 l. 63 - col. 3 l. 1. The claims, however, recite “an outer surface of the resin part and an outer surface of the at least one lead are planar at an outer side surface.” Id. at col. 19 ll. 50-52 (claim 1) (emphasis added). Everlight argues that the patent owner’s choice to use “in a substantially same plane” in the specification but “planar” in the claims mandates that we treat the two terms differently.

We disagree. First, Everlight’s argument implies a rule that we decline to adopt here, namely, that if different words are used in the claim and specification, then we must read that distinction as an intended difference. We recognize that, in some patents, a distinction between terms may imply a difference in meaning, but this is no hard-and-fast rule. Rather, some inventors might use one term in the specification to inform the meaning of another term in the claims. See SAS Inst, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For one word to inform the meaning of another, the words need not be identical. See id. For example, in SAS Institute, we held that the term “graphical representation of a data flow” in the claims and the term “data flow diagram” in the specification were commensurate in scope. Id. So too here. Reading the claims in light of the specification, we conclude that the claimed term “planar” is commensurate in scope with the specification’s discussion of “in a substantially same plane.” We therefore agree with the court’s conclusion that “planar” means “in a substantially same plane.”

Because we agree with the court’s construction, we next consider Everlight’s argument that it does not infringe even under that construction. Everlight Br. 23. Everlight argues that “the outer side surfaces of the three package groups are not ‘planar’ because each of the outer side surfaces of the LED packages has a significant con-cave portion.” Id. at 23-24 (citing J.A. 10347-57). Everlight presents three cross-sectional views of the alleged infringing devices, each showing two leads with flat sections connected by slight concavities.

We find Everlight’s argument unconvincing. Under the correct construction, the leads need not be perfectly flat; they need only be “in a substantially same plane” as the outer surface of the resin. The leads here are “in a substantially same plane” as the outer surface of the resin; slight concavities do not mandate a finding other-wise. We thus see no clear error in the court’s finding that Everlight’s accused products infringe the “planar” limitation.

4.

Everlight also argues it proved the ’250 patent invalid for obviousness, despite the district court’s holding otherwise. Specifically, Everlight asserts that the patent is rendered obvious by “Hitachi,” Japanese Patent Pub. Tokukai No. 2007-235085, in combination with “Sanyo,” Japanese Patent Pub. Tokukaihei 2011-191562, or “Glenn,” U.S. Patent No. 6,433,-277.

Hitachi discloses a method for producing a semiconductor device on a circuit board or lead frame. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *8. The district court found that Hitachi failed to disclose several elements of the ’250 patent’s claims. Claim 1 requires a “notch” and “cutting the resin-molded body and the plated lead frame along the at least one notch to form a resin package,” ’250 patent col. 19 ll. 47-48 (claim 1), neither of which Hitachi discloses. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *17. These findings are supported by expert testimony, J.A. 20797-98 (Schubert), and by Hitachi itself, J.A. 10249 (Fig. 6, showing dicing lines, 20). Indeed, Hitachi is criticized in the ’250 patent’s specification for having a design that results in detachment of the packaging resin from the lead frame during singulation. See ’250 patent col. 2 ll. 18-19, 30-35 and Fig. 19(a) (reproduced from Hitachi). The ’250 patent solves this problem by providing a manufacturing method and LED device in which the lead frame has “notchfes]” and “the thermosetting resin is filled in the notch parts, and therefore an adhering area between the lead frame and the thermosetting resin becomes large, so that it is possible to improve adhesion.” Id. at col. 3 ll. 8-12. We thus conclude that, despite Everlight’s arguments to the contrary, these findings are not clearly erroneous.

Everlight argues that it would have been obvious to combine Hitachi with Glenn and Sanyo to achieve the claimed invention. Glenn discloses a method of making packages for integrated circuit dies. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *19. Sanyo is directed to a method for producing a semiconductor device. Id.

The court found that a person of ordinary skill would not have considered Glenn or Sanyo to modify Hitachi because “the different considerations in the design and manufacture of electronic and optoelectronic [e.g., LED] devices result in substantial differences in the manufacturing processes and materials used in the different technologies,” and “a change in the design or manufacture of an LED or other optoelectronic device requires the consideration of factors — including factors such as light emission, and the effects of heat and emitted radiation on different resins and other materials — that are not relevant to the design and manufacture of electronic semiconductor devices.” Id. at *21.

These findings are supported by expert testimony, including Everlight’s expert’s admission that electronic device technology is not particularly relevant to LED technology. J.A. 20543-44. Because the weight of the evidence supports the court’s finding that there was no motivation to combine these references, we affirm the court’s conclusion that Everlight failed to prove that the ’250 patent would have been obvious.

B.

We next examine the ’870 patent. Again, Everlight challenges the district court’s determination that it infringes and that it did not prove the patent obvious.

1.

The ’870 patent discloses an LED design that purportedly minimizes structural problems caused by components expanding and contracting at different rates during thermal cycling. ’870 patent col. 111. 38-49. The design is a molded package with “a specific feature, a wall portion,” that separates the positive and negative leads. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *36 (internal quotation omitted). “[T]his wall portion improves structural integrity, particularly if the device is subject to temperature variations so that package cracking, detachment of the encapsulation material, and warping of the package is reduced or avoided.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The package also includes a semiconductor, such as a light emitting semiconductor. Claim 7 is reproduced below:

7. A light emitting device comprising: a light emitting element;
a molded member having a recess formed therein by a bottom surface and a side surface so as to mount said light emitting element in substantially a center of the recess;
a positive lead electrode partially disposed on the bottom surface and adjacent to the side surface in the recess and extending outwardly from said molded member;
a negative lead electrode partially disposed on the bottom surface and adjacent to the side surface in the recess and extending outwardly from said molded member;
means for electrically connecting said light emitting element to said positive lead electrode, and said light emitting element to said negative lead electrode;
wherein a portion of said positive lead electrode and a portion of said negative lead electrode in the recess are separated from each other by a wall portion; wherein said wall portion extends inwardly in a direction toward the center of the recess.

’870 patent col. 35 ll. 22-42.

2.

Everlight argues that its products do not meet the ’870 patent’s requirement that its positive and negative lead electrodes are “partially disposed” on the bottom surface of a recess. Specifically, Ever-light claims that the court wrongly defined the “bottom” of the recess in its products. The recess’s bottom, it argues, extends to the uppermost extension of resin. This bottom is a flat line. Everlight does not dispute, however, that shallow gaps in the resin expose the leads.

The court repeatedly rejected Ever-light’s position and found the disputed element met. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *39-48. In reaching this conclusion, the court repeatedly credited Nichia’s expert. See, e.g., id. at *30. We discern no clear error in the court’s conclusion. But even more, we find Everlight’s position belied by the patent itself. The ’870 patent discloses several embodiments where the bottom of the recess is multi-featured. See, e.g., ’870 patent Figs. 1, 6, 11. Despite Everlight’s claim to the contrary, the recess is not flat. See id. The bottom of the recess, then, is also not flat. Everlight’s straight-line recess oversimplifies the analysis — the recess need not be perfectly flat. In turn, the court correctly concluded that Everlight’s products infringe where the leads are exposed through gaps in the resin. Everlight’s products include these gaps, and thus the district court properly concluded that the products meet this claim limitation. As Everlight brings no other challenge on this issue, we affirm the district court as to Everlight’s infringement of the ’870 patent.

3.

Everlight also challenges the court’s conclusion that it failed to prove the ’870 patent invalid. Everlight had asserted that the ordinary artisan would have combined ‘Waitl,” U.S. Patent No. 6,624,491, and “Nitta,” U.S. Patent No. 6,747,293, to render the ’870 patent claims obvious. Everlight first challenges the court’s conclusion that Waitl does not disclose all of the claim elements. It second challenges the court’s conclusion that the artisan would not have looked to Nitta to remedy Waitl’s deficiencies.

Waitl notes that separation can result when different materials expand at different rates, so it teaches designs to help minimize separation. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *49. Entitled “diode housing,” Waitl “is directed to problems in the operation of a device stemming from delamination — a situation in which the ‘window1 en-capsulant material separates from the metal frame of the device.” Id.

Waitl’s device includes a lead electrode with a single exposed area, id., but the claims require the lead electrode to have two exposed portions, one positive and one negative, separated by a wall. The court found that Waitl failed to disclose elements related to these positive and negative electrodes as claimed in the ’870 patent. Ever-light does not challenge the court’s reading of Waitl.

Everlight instead argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Waitl in light of Nitta to achieve the claimed invention. Nitta appears to disclose a wall between two electrodes, as it is directed to a light emitting device with a “plurality of chips efficiently disposed” in a housing with a “lead having a slit formed between a portion for bonding a wire to and a portion for mounting chips on, thereby to prevent extrusion of an adhesive and eliminate defective bonding.” Id. at *50 (quoting Nitta, Abstract).

But the court found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had no motivation to modify Nitta in light of Waitl. We agree. The court found that the references disclose different structures, resolve dissimilar problems, and propose dissimilar solutions. Id. at *51-53. The court’s conclusion derives further support from its earlier finding that artisans in this field face myriad design challenges because small design changes may cause unpredictable results and because design considerations often pull in multiple directions. Id. at *4. We determine that the court’s finding on motivation to combine is not clearly erroneous. We thus affirm the district court’s conclusion that Everlight failed to prove the ’870 patent invalid as obvious.

C.

We now reach the ’589 patent, the third and final patent Nichia asserted against Everlight. The court found Everlight infringed claims 1 and 2 of the ’589 patent and that Everlight had failed to prove the patent invalid. Everlight again appeals the court’s holdings on infringement and validity.

1.

The ’589 patent is also directed to the design of a semiconductor device. The disclosed design seeks to prevent adhesive from overflowing into other areas of the device. Specifically, the ’589 patent states that “an object of the present invention is to provide a semiconductor device wherein the adhesive components do not overflow nor leak to the wire bonding area even when ... adhesive components having low surface tension [are] used in the adhesive layer for die bonding, and the overflow and leak preventing function can be maintained satisfactorily even when the device is made smaller and thinner.” ’589 patent col. 2 11. 60-67. Claim 1 of the ’589 patent requires the following:

1. A semiconductor device comprising:
a semiconductor element having a pair of electrodes;
a housing having a recess for accommodating the semiconductor element;
a first lead electrode and a second lead electrode exposed on the bottom surface of said recess;
an adhesive layer for die bonding between the semiconductor element and the first lead electrode; and
electrically conductive wires for wire bonding between one electrode of the pair of electrodes of the semiconductor element and the first lead electrode and between the other electrode and the second lead electrode;
wherein the housing has at least one wall formed to extend across the bottom surface of the recess so as to divide the surface of the first lead electrode into a die bonding area and a wire bonding area;
the first lead electrode has a notch which is formed by cutting off a portion of an edge of the first lead electrode and located at least just below the wall; and
the wall and the bottom portion of said housing are connected to each other through the notch.

Id. at col. 15 l. 59 — col. 16 l. 13.

2.

Everlight challenges the court’s finding that it infringes the ’589 patent with the same arguments that it made against its infringement of the ’870 patent. Everlight Br. 32-33. For the same reasons we affirmed the court’s infringement finding with respect to the ’870 patent, we affirm its finding of infringement with respect to the ’589 patent. See, supra, Discussion B.2.

3.

Everlight also challenges the court’s conclusion that it did not prove the ’589 patent invalid by asserting that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in light of “Nakashima,” U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2004/0256706, and “Kim,” U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2006/0170083.

Nakashima discloses “a molded package for an LED device that reduces the likelihood of delamination — that is, detachment of the encapsulating resin from the package.” Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *32. The device has a circular recess and three exposed metal members. Id. The court found that Nakashima failed to disclose a wall that divides the surface of a lead electrode, a notch in the lead, and a few other claimed features. Id. at *33.

Kim discloses a side-view LED designed to enhance the flow of resin into the side wall. Id. at *34. Kim explains that, to achieve these dimensions, “endeavors have been made to reduce the thickness of the upper and lower wall parts around an LED window. However, reducing the wall part thickness is an extremely difficult task. This task also potentially weakens wall strength thereby failing to ensure reliability.” Id. (quoting Kim, ¶ [0006]). The court found Kim failed to meet several of the ’589 patent’s claimed features, including having a wall across the bottom of the recess. Id. at *34-35.

The court also found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine Nakashima and Kim. Specifically, it found that the two references “are not directed to similar packages,” and “describe different structures”: “Kim relates to thin, side-view LEDs, while Nakashima relates to a top-view LED with a recess that includes three metal members partially covered by a wall portion.” Id. at *35. Moreover, the court found that the two references “address different problems in packaging structures and disclose different solutions”: “Kim contemplates that the structure that promotes resin flow will be embedded in the body of the package itself,” while “Nakashima is concerned about dela-mination of the encapsulant material as a result of different coefficients of thermal expansion among the different package materials.” Id. We conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous and are supported by the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., J.A. 20785-86. We thus affirm the district court’s conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine these two references and thus the references did not render the ’589 patent obvious.

II.

Finally, Nichia challenges the district court’s decision to deny its request for permanent injunctive relief. The district court held that Nichia failed to show that it had suffered irreparable harm and that remedies at law provided Nichia inadequate compensation. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *65-67. Nichia challenges both conclusions. Because we affirm the court’s conclusion on irreparable harm, we do not reach the adequacy of monetary damages.

A.

We review a district court’s grant or denial of a permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “We may find an abuse of discretion on a showing that the court made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly erroneous factual findings.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A permanent injunction is an equitable remedy. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). “It ‘is not a remedy which issues as of course,’ or ‘to re-strain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling.’” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38, 53 S.Ct. 602, 77 L.Ed. 1208 (1933) and Consol. Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 177 U.S. 296, 302, 20 S.Ct. 628, 44 L.Ed. 777 (1900)).

“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). A party seeking an injunction must demonstrate: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Id.

Historically, “courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.” Id. at 395, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (Roberts, J., concurring). That this long history exists “is not surprising” given the nature of patent rights. Id. Patent rights are proper ty rights, and central to those rights is the right to exclude. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642-43, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 740-52 (1998) (discussing the “primacy of the right to exclude”). The Supreme Court often reaffirms this principle — that “the right to exclude others” is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987). Our court has similarly observed that “[w]hile a patentee is not entitled to an injunction in every case, ‘it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.’ ” Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1149).

But an injunction in patent law must be justified like any other: “the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). The movant must prove that it meets all four equitable factors. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010). And it must do so on the merits of its particular case. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837.

B.

Nichia challenges the district court’s finding that it failed to establish that it will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. The court’s conclusion relied on several findings, each weighing against Nichia. Specifically, the court found that “[t]he record shows an absence of meaningful competition.” Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *65. It found that Nichia had “failed to establish past irreparable harm, or the likelihood of irreparable harm in the future based on lost sales” or “based on price erosion.” Id. at *66. It found that Nichia’s licensing of the patents to major competitors suggested that harm from “in-Mngement of the patents-in-suit is not irreparable.” Id. And it found that Nichia’s licensing practices have made “multiple low-priced non-infringing alternatives from competitors available to replace the accused Everlight products if such products were not available.” Id. Nichia contests these findings.

Nichia first argues that the court abused its discretion when it found a lack of “meaningful competition” between the parties. Nichia asserts that the court should have deferred to the parties’ stipulation that “Nichia and Everlight are competitors.” J.A. 2112, ¶ 148. It further claims that the trial record “abounds” with Ever-light documents identifying Nichia as a competitor. Nichia Br. 34. It points to internal Everlight documents identifying Nichia as a competitor, J.A. 2222, 2466-69, 3007-08, and an Everlight Annual Report identifying Nichia as a “major competitor,” J.A. 2783-84, 2788. And it argues that Everlight stipulated that it targeted some of Nichia’s customers with offers to sell infringing products. J.A. 2113-14, ¶¶ 158— 64. Nichia contends that these showings undermine the district court’s finding that Nichia and Everlight are not meaningful competitors.

Nichia also argues that the court misunderstood the LED market. Nichia claims that this market is a “design-win” market where customers require suppliers like Ev-erlight and Nichia to “design-in” a product before receiving an order. J.A. 20254-61 (Swenson); J.A. 20424 (Kammerer); J.A. 20304 (Liu) (“For the end customer, there — there has to be some sort of design-in before there’s an order.”); J.A. 20315 (Liu) (“You — you have to get designed-in to be able to get an order.”). During the “design in” process, customers test and certify LEDs, which leads to a reticence to substitute competing LEDs for the product’s life cycle. Nichia argues that this characteristic of the LED market makes it likely that infringement will cause long-term, irreparable harm.

We disagree, not because we question the facts as Nichia presents them, but because the court heard these arguments as the original finder of fact and concluded to the contrary, carefully weighing both parties’ evidence. The court found that Nichia is an LED chip manufacturer as well as a packager, “while Everlight is solely an LED packager.” Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *53. The court also found that the two companies generally sell to different parties: “Everlight generally sells to distributors rather than directly to customers, as Nichia does.” Id. Moreover, despite the parties’ stipulation that they competed in the same market, J.A. 2112, ¶ 148, the court found that Nichia failed to prove that this competition was meaningful, Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *65. The court explained that Everlight’s competition accounted for “the proverbial ‘drop in the bucket,’ ” when compared to Nichia’s total sales. Id. Nichia identified 516 sales opportunities, with Everlight as a competitor in only 3. Id. In light of these findings, the court noted that there was “a very small area of possible competition,” but it concluded that there was an “absence of actual competition.” Id. The court closed its market-competition analysis by observing that the “justification for an injunction is remote indeed.” Id.

The court also disagreed with Nichia’s contention that it would suffer future irreparable harm because of past lost sales. Id. at *66. The court found that Nichia “failed to establish that [Everlight was] responsible for causing a single lost sale in the U.S.” Id. Nichia claimed one in-stance of a lost sale, but the court concluded that the evidence showed “several other formidable, lower-priced, and licensed competitors for the same opportunity.” Id. Additionally, Nichia’s expert “admitted he made no attempt to establish ‘but for’ causation that Nichia America would have made the sale ... in the absence of Ever-light’s claimed infringement.” Id. In short, Nichia did not prove that it had suffered even a single lost sale from Everlight’s infringement.

Nichia also had alleged that it suffered price erosion because of Everlight’s infringement in a sale to General Electric. While Nichia eventually won the GE contract, it sold its products at a price lower than it originally offered. J.A. 20266-69. Nichia presented evidence that it had lowered its price to compete against Ever-light’s infringement and that this infringement caused this price erosion.

The court disagreed. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *66. It explained that Nichia’s lower-price sale to GE had been required by GE, so “Nichia was going to have to lower its prices, regardless of Everlight’s competition.” Id. Further, the court found that several licensed competitors had offered products at lower prices, independent of Everlight, which drove down prices. The court further pointed to Nie-hia’s admission that it had already sold LEDs at the lower price to GE’s competitors in the same period and that this lower price made it “impossible to maintain” a higher price with GE. Id. And the court credited Nichia’s expert’s admission that the evidence was insufficient to establish price erosion and that he did not attempt a price-erosion analysis. The court concluded that, in light of these evidentiary deficiencies, Nichia “cannot establish that Ever-light was the ‘but for’ cause of its claimed price erosion.” Id. We find no clear error in the court’s finding that Nichia failed to establish price erosion from Everlight’s infringement.

Nichia further contests the court’s findings with respect to Nichia’s licensing activities. Nichia argues that the court wrongly found that its licensing activities precluded a finding of irreparable harm. Nichia argues that the court’s decision is contrary to settled law, as it applies a categorical rule that licenses preclude irreparable harm.

To the extent the court adopted a categorical rule, we agree with Nichia; such a rule would run afoul of our precedent. We have explained, for example, that “[a] plaintiffs past willingness to license its patent is not sufficient per se to establish lack of irreparable harm if a new infringer were licensed.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 393, 126 S.Ct. 1837).

But to the extent that the court found that Nichia’s prior licenses weighed against a finding of irreparable harm, we countenance that approach. While evidence of licensing activities cannot establish a lack of irreparable harm per se, that evidence can carry weight in the irreparable-harm inquiry. We have previously explained that “[t]he fact of the grant of previous licenses, the identity of the past licensees, the experience in the market since the licenses were granted, and the identity of the new infringer all may affect the district court’s discretionary decision concerning whether a reasonable royalty from an infringer constitutes damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.” Id. The court’s findings on licensing traversed these considerations. The court found that several of Nichia’s licenses were to “significant competitors” who posed “major threats” to Nichia’s flagship products. Nichia, 2016 WL 310142, at *66. And the court found that these licenses changed the market by making available “multiple low-priced non-infringing alternatives.” Id. These findings, the court concluded, supported a finding that “Nichia ha[d] failed to establish it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.” Id.

In any event, regardless of the court’s analysis of the licenses, we note that the court treated Nichia’s licenses as an independent ground for denying the injunction. Id. It did not rely on Nichia’s licenses in its earlier analysis of irreparable harm, but rather found the licenses to further bolster its prior finding. Id. The court’s licensing analysis thus does not undermine its separate findings that Nichia failed to establish market competition, lost sales, and price erosion, and that these failures all weigh against a conclusion that Nichia would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. Id.

We discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that Nichia failed to prove that it would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction. On that traditional equitable factor, Nichia did not bear its burden. See W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894. Because Nichia failed to establish one of the four equitable factors, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nichia’s request for an injunction.

Conclusion

We discern no error in the court’s conclusions that Everlight infringed all asserted claims and failed to prove those claims invalid by clear and convincing evidence. We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nichia’s request for a permanent injunction. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED

Costs

No costs.

      . The district court's opinion contains a thorough background of this case and explanation of LED manufacturing technology. See Nichia, 2016 WL 310142. This opinion includes an abbreviated recitation of the facts relevant to our disposition.

      . Everlight also argues that the district court wrongly found it infringed claims 1 and 7 under § 271(g). Because Everlight's products directly infringe claims of the '250 patent under § 271(a), we do not reach whether Everlight also infringed claims under § 271(g).