source: Caselaw Access Project

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text:
    IN RE MARRIAGE OF Jaime SANCHEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, and Martha SANCHEZ-ORTEGA, Respondent
    (Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, Intervenor-Appellee).
    No. 1-17-1075
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIFTH DIVISION.
    Opinion filed: March 23, 2018
    Jaime Sanchez, of Chicago, appellant pro se.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Honor K. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for intervenor-appellee.
   JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner-appellant, Jaime Sanchez, appeals pro se from two postdissolution orders: one that denied a motion to vacate a plenary order of protection entered against him and a second that denied his motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to abate child support payments. His former spouse, respondent Martha Sanchez-Ortega, has not participated in the appeal. Intervenor-appellee, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Department) is a party to this appeal only as it relates to the child support issues. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to abate child support payments, as we lack appellate jurisdiction, and we affirm the order denying the motion to vacate the plenary order of protection.

¶ 2 We note at the outset that the record on appeal is insufficient. It lacks, for example, key pleadings and orders, as well as transcripts of the proceedings at issue. However, we will set forth that much of the relevant background that may be gleaned from the scant record presented on appeal.

¶ 3 On August 22, 2008, Jaime filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Martha. Jaime and Martha are the parents of Ju. S., born May 13, 2001, and Ja. S., born May 15, 2004. It appears that, during the divorce proceedings, issues relating to abuse and visitation arose. For example, on October 22, 2008, an order of protection was entered against Jaime, which protected Martha and the children, and that order remained in effect for the pendency of the initial divorce action. In 2010, the court suspended Jaime's supervised visitation with the children.

¶ 4 On April 15, 2011, the circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage following a trial. At that time, the court ordered Jaime to pay $785 per month for child support and entered judgment against him for an $11,775 arrearage on previously-ordered child support payments. Jaime's child support obligation was determined based on the income he derived from his home services business. Pursuant to a custody judgment, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, Martha was granted sole custody of the children, and Jaime was granted supervised visitations. After finding that there was a continuing need for Martha to be protected against future abuse and harassment by Jaime, the dissolution judgment provided Martha and the children with a two-year plenary order of protection, which was to terminate on April 15, 2013. Martha later moved to extend that order of protection.

¶ 5 Jaime appealed after the circuit court denied his motion to reconsider the dissolution judgment or, in the alternative, to re-open proofs. We affirmed the judgment for dissolution after finding that Jaime had failed to provide a record sufficient to address his claims of error, in violation of the requirements espoused in Foutch v. O'Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984), or to adequately support his arguments in his brief with proper citation to the record or pertinent legal authority, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008). See In re Marriage of Sanchez , 2012 IL App (1st) 112898-U, ¶¶ 6-7, 2012 WL 6963358.

¶ 6 Thereafter, the parties engaged in various postdissolution proceedings. For example, Jaime's visitation was suspended by the court on September 28, 2015. On June 22, 2016, with the Department's involvement in the case, the court entered a uniform order of support finding that Jaime's imputed net income was $1965 per month and that, as of January 14, 2015, he was $42,503.50 in arrears as to his child support obligation. Jaime was then ordered to pay $550 per month in child support and $100 per month as to the arrears through the State Disbursement Unit. Pursuant to a motion brought by the Department, the June 22, 2016, order vacated a December 9, 2015, order, which had directed the Secretary of State to release the suspension on Jaime's driver's license caused by his failure to make child support payments, or to issue Jaime a driving permit.

¶ 7 On October 11, 2016, after a hearing on both Martha's petition for plenary order of protection and Jaime's motion for visitation, the circuit court entered a two-year plenary order of protection against Jaime, which protected Martha and the children. The plenary order of protection suspended Jaime's visitation with the children until further order of the court "per [a] 12/28/15 order" and prohibited Jaime from communicating with Martha and the children. A separate order entered on that date stated that the court had heard the parties' testimony and considered the evidence at the hearing on both the petition for plenary order of protection and the motion for visitation. The order allowed Jaime to send cards and letters to the children (to be addressed to Martha) and provided that, should the children wish to see Jaime, they could "communicate their wishes in writing to him."

¶ 8 On November 10, 2016, Jaime filed a motion to vacate the plenary order of protection. The court set a briefing schedule on the motion to vacate and set the matter for hearing on January 11, 2017. On December 20, 2016, Martha filed a combined response and motion to strike and dismiss Jaime's motion to vacate.

¶ 9 Additionally, as to a separate matter, on October 3, 2016, the Department brought a petition for a rule to show cause why Jaime should not be held in indirect civil contempt, alleging that Jaime had willfully failed to make the child support payments that were ordered on June 22, 2016. As a result, the court entered an order issuing a rule to show cause why Jaime should not be held in indirect civil contempt for his failure to pay child support, which was set for hearing on January 11, 2017.

¶ 10 In an apparent response to the rule to show cause, Jaime filed a motion for abatement or suspension of child support on December 12, 2016. In his motion, Jaime asserted that he was unemployed and, as a result, could not make the court-ordered child support payments. Jaime explained that (1) he was unable to pay the renewal fee for his contractor's license and it had lapsed, (2) his driver's license had been suspended for his failure to pay child support, and (3) both licenses were necessary for him to operate his business. He maintained that the Illinois Secretary of State would "release" his license if the court entered an order stating that he did not "owe money to the [I]llinois department of health and family services." Jaime further contended that the court, in a prior order relating to child support, had directed the Secretary of State to release his driver's license, but his driver's license had not been released. For relief, Jaime requested that his child support obligation be abated or suspended in full and be contingent on his obtaining full-time employment "or re[-]establishing * * * [his] business" and then calculated at the statutory rate. Jaime asked "[t]hat any suspension or abatement of child support * * * be effective immediately."

¶ 11 On January 11, 2017, the circuit court entered an order finding Jaime to be in indirect civil contempt for his willful failure to pay child support. The order stated that Jaime's commitment for the contempt finding was stayed until February 22, 2017. However, the order did not include the imposition of any period of commitment. In that same order, the Department was granted 28 days to respond to Jaime's motion to abate child support. The Department, however, did not file a response before the hearing on that motion, scheduled for February 22, 2017. Nevertheless, a hearing was held on that date, and the court denied Jaime's motion to abate child support. The court granted Jaime leave to file a motion to modify child support and continued the matter for a hearing on March 22, 2017.

¶ 12 On March 21, 2017, instead of filing a motion to modify child support, Jaime filed a motion to vacate the denial of his motion to abate, arguing that he was entitled to "judgment by default" because the Department had not filed a response to his motion prior to the February 22 hearing, as had been ordered by the court.

¶ 13 That same day, the Department filed a response to Jaime's motion to abate child support insofar as it requested reinstatement of his driver's license. The Department explained that Jaime was a delinquent obligor, as he was behind in his child support payments in violation of section 10-17.6 of the Illinois Public Aid Code ( 305 ILCS 5/10-17.6 (West 2016) ), and section 7-702(c) of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law ( 625 ILCS 5/7-702(c) (West 2016) ). As a result, his driver's license had been suspended in January 2014. The Department noted that, on December 9, 2015, the circuit court had ordered the Secretary of State to release the suspension of Jaime's driver's license, or issue him a judicial driving permit. However, that order had been vacated on the Department's motion, which had argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address Jaime's driver's license.

¶ 14 The Department maintained that Jaime was required to request a driving permit from the Department, and only then could the Department direct the Secretary of State to issue a permit. The Department further explained that, should it deny any request by Jaime for a permit, he would then be able to seek administrative review of that decision in the circuit court. The Department argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reinstate Jaime's driver's license in light of Jaime's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

¶ 15 On March 22, 2017, the circuit court entered an order regarding the status of the contempt proceeding, which included a finding that Jaime had not remained current in his child support obligations. The circuit court ordered Jaime to pay $555.20 per month in child support, $100 per month in arrears, and to make a $450 lump sum payment. The circuit court continued the matter to April 12, 2017, and denied Jaime's request to reinstate his driver's license due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 16 On April 5, 2017, the circuit court denied "with prejudice" Jaime's motion to vacate the February 22, 2017, order, which had denied his motion to abate his child support obligations. The circuit court noted that, on February 22, it had conducted "a full hearing with all parties present" and "[a]ll sides were heard." The order stated: "This is a final and appealable order." On May 1, 2017, Jaime filed a notice of appeal from that specific order only.

¶ 17 On April 12, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on Jaime's November 10, 2016, motion to vacate the plenary order of protection and entered an order denying the motion "with prejudice." As to the contempt matter, the circuit court entered a separate order updating the amounts that Jaime then owed in child support and scheduled the matter for a follow-up hearing on May 24, 2017.

¶ 18 On May 4, 2017, Jaime filed an amended notice of appeal, which added the April 12, 2017, order to his appeal.

¶ 19 Following the filing of Jaime's amended notice of appeal, the circuit court held a hearing on the status of the contempt. The matter was then continued to June 28, 2017. The record does not indicate what happened on that date, or whether the contempt matter has been finally resolved.

¶ 20 As discussed, the Department (but not Martha) is a party to this appeal, but only as to Jaime's appeal from the order denying his motion to vacate the denial of his motion to abate his child support. The Department has expressed concern as to whether we have jurisdiction to review that order, in that the contempt proceeding against Jaime was still pending below at the time Jaime filed an appeal from that order. In his jurisdictional statement, Jaime contends that we have appellate jurisdiction over his appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). As this court has a duty to determine whether jurisdiction exists, we will consider the issue. Palmolive Tower Condominiums, LLC v. Simon , 409 Ill. App 3d 539, 542, 350 Ill.Dec. 931, 949 N.E.2d 723 (2011). An appeal must be dismissed where our jurisdiction is lacking. Id. (citing Mund v. Brown , 393 Ill. App. 3d 994, 996, 332 Ill.Dec. 935, 913 N.E.2d 1225 (2009) ).

¶ 21 "Appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of final judgments unless an order falls within a statutory or supreme court exception." Cole v. Hoogendoorn, Talbot, Davids, Godfrey & Milligan , 325 Ill. App. 3d 1152, 1153, 259 Ill.Dec. 630, 759 N.E.2d 110 (2001) (citing Pekin Insurance Co. v. Benson , 306 Ill. App. 3d 367, 375, 239 Ill.Dec. 640, 714 N.E.2d 559 (1999) ). In order to be considered final, an order must dispose of the rights of the parties, either upon the entire controversy or some definite and separate part of it. In re Guardianship of J.D. , 376 Ill. App. 3d 673, 676, 315 Ill.Dec. 915, 878 N.E.2d 141 (2007).

¶ 22 However, a final order is not necessarily immediately appealable. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) provides:

"If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. * * * In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties."

¶ 23 Thus, prior to the resolution of all claims with respect to all parties, any order entered in a case, even if final as to any one party or claim, is not appealable unless the order contains a finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal, in compliance with Rule 304(a). The orders that are the subject of this appeal do not include a Rule 304(a) finding.

¶ 24 On January 11, 2017, the court found Jaime to be in indirect civil contempt. However, a contempt order is not final or appealable until the party in contempt has been sanctioned or committed. In re Marriage of Dianovsky , 2013 IL App (1st) 121223, ¶ 33, 374 Ill.Dec. 692, 996 N.E.2d 139. Here, when Jaime filed his original notice of appeal from the order denying his motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to abate and amended notice of appeal (collectively referred to as notices of appeal), he had neither been sanctioned nor committed with respect to the finding of contempt. Indeed, the circuit court held status hearings on the finding of contempt while this appeal was pending. Thus, the postdissolution contempt proceeding was not final or appealable before the notices of appeal were filed.

¶ 25 The Department correctly notes that the appellate court is divided as to whether an order, which disposes of a postdissolution matter, is final and appealable without the requisite finding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), when other postdissolution claims remain pending. This split of authority turns on whether each petition or motion in a postdissolution proceeding is considered (1) a separate action or (2) a new claim in the same action. In re Marriage of Demaret , 2012 IL App (1st) 111916, ¶ 26, 358 Ill.Dec. 87, 964 N.E.2d 756. "[I]f the postdissolution petition under consideration is construed as a separate action from the original dissolution proceeding, then appellate court jurisdiction exists upon a final resolution of that petition under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), regardless of the pendency of an unrelated petition." Id. The Third District, in In re Marriage of A'Hearn , 408 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1097, 349 Ill.Dec. 696, 947 N.E.2d 333 (2011), and the First District, in In re Marriage of Carr , 323 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485, 257 Ill.Dec. 1, 752 N.E.2d 1181 (2001), have construed postdissolution petitions in this fashion. However, if a postdissolution petition is instead considered a new claim within the same action, then appellate jurisdiction would exist to review a final decision on that petition, while another petition remained pending, only where there has been a Rule 304(a) finding. In re Marriage of Demaret , 2012 IL App (1st) 111916, ¶ 26, 358 Ill.Dec. 87, 964 N.E.2d 756. The Second District, in In re Marriage of Alyassir , 335 Ill. App. 3d 998, 999-1000, 270 Ill.Dec. 419, 782 N.E.2d 978 (2003), and the Fourth District, in In re Marriage of Gaudio , 368 Ill. App. 3d 153, 157-58, 306 Ill.Dec. 239, 857 N.E.2d 332 (2006), adopted this position.

¶ 26 This court, in In re Marriage of Teymour , 2017 IL App (1st) 161091, 416 Ill.Dec. 828, 86 N.E.3d 1113, recently examined this split of authority. After a thoughtful and extensive discussion and review of the case law, the Teymour court determined that it would "join the Second and Fourth Districts and adhere to Rule 304(a)'s mandate that a final order disposing of one of several claims may not be appealed without an express finding that there is no just cause for delay." Id. ¶ 41. In so holding, the Teymour court declined to follow an earlier line of First District cases, which held that a Rule 304(a) finding is not required to appeal an order resolving "one of several postdissolution matters so long as the matters still pending below are unrelated to the matter on appeal." Id. ¶ 35 (citing In re Marriage of Knoll , 2016 IL App (1st) 152494, ¶ 46, 408 Ill.Dec. 402, 65 N.E.3d 878, and In re Marriage of Baumgartner , 2014 IL App (1st) 120552, ¶¶ 34-36, 380 Ill.Dec. 841, 9 N.E.3d 91 ).

¶ 27 We find the analysis of Teymour to be well-reasoned and convincing. In conformity with that decision, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction to consider the order denying the motion to reconsider the denial of Jaime's motion to abate child support payments, as that order was not accompanied by the requisite Rule 304(a) finding. While the order did state "[t]his is a final and appealable order," that language was not sufficient to support appellate jurisdiction under Rule 304(a). Palmolive , 409 Ill. App 3d at 544, 350 Ill.Dec. 931, 949 N.E.2d 723 ("A circuit court's declaration that an order is 'final and appealable,' without reference to the justness of delay, or even reference to immediate appealability, evinces no application of the discretion Rule 304(a) contemplates. [Citation.] Instead, absent some other indication from the record that the court intended to invoke Rule 304(a) [citation], a circuit court's declaration that an order is 'final and appealable' amounts to nothing more than a nonbinding interpretation.").

¶ 28 However, even if we followed the earlier line of First District cases, which held that a Rule 304(a) finding is not required " 'so long as the matters still pending below are unrelated to the matter on appeal' " (supra ¶ 26), we would still find that we lack appellate jurisdiction over this matter. The contempt proceeding, which remained pending in the circuit court after the notices of appeal were filed, deals with Jaime's failure to meet his court-ordered child support responsibilities. Jaime's motion to abate explained his reasons for not meeting his child support obligation and sought to immediately abate or suspend those payments, relief which would assist Jaime in defending the contempt proceeding. Jaime filed the motion to abate shortly after the court issued the rule to show cause, and the Department was involved in the litigation of both matters. Thus, Jaime's attempt to abate the court-ordered child support payments was directly related to, and intertwined with, the contempt proceedings, which remained pending below when he filed this appeal.

¶ 29 For these reasons, we conclude that Jaime's appeal from the denial of his motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to abate must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

¶ 30 Moreover, dismissal is appropriate for yet other reasons. Jaime's briefs do not cite the record on appeal and do not present coherent arguments with supporting authority as to any error in the court's decisions with regard to the abatement matter, as required by subsections (h)(4)(ii), (h)(6) and (7) of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). The appendix to Jaime's appellant's brief includes copies of court records that are not part of the record on appeal, but does not include a table of contents of the record on appeal, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 31 "The procedural rules governing the content and format of appellate briefs are mandatory." Ammar v. Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, LLP , 2017 IL App (1st) 162931, ¶ 11, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- (citing Voris v. Voris , 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8, 356 Ill.Dec. 379, 961 N.E.2d 475 ). Where an appellant fails to meet the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) as to the content and format of briefs, this court has the authority to dismiss the appeal. Ammar , 2017 IL App (1st) 162931, ¶ 11, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ----.

¶ 32 The problems caused by Jaime's failure to present a compliant brief are exacerbated by the state of the record. The record on appeal does not contain any of the pleadings that gave rise to the June 22, 2016, order regarding child support. There are no transcripts or suitable substitutes, such as bystander's reports, of the proceedings relating to the June 22, 2016, child support order, or the hearings on the motion to abate and motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to abate. The record is bereft of the proof upon which Jaime's child support was originally determined by the circuit court in the dissolution judgment. Therefore, we cannot fully examine any change in the circumstances of Jaime's employment or other factors that may be relevant to the issue of abatement. As the appellant, Jaime has the responsibility to present a sufficiently complete record to this court, including transcripts, to support his claims of error on appeal. Foutch , 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958.

¶ 33 We now turn to Jaime's appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate the plenary order of protection. Before doing so, we again consider whether there is appellate jurisdiction over this order in light of the fact that the contempt proceedings were pending below at the time the appeal was filed.

¶ 34 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2016) allows an appeal from an interlocutory order "granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction."

An order of protection is injunctive in substance. In re T.H. , 354 Ill. App. 3d 301, 308, 289 Ill.Dec. 902, 820 N.E.2d 977 (2004) ; In re Marriage of Fischer , 228 Ill. App. 3d 482, 486, 170 Ill.Dec. 168, 592 N.E.2d 604 (1992). A motion to vacate a protective order is considered one seeking to dissolve or modify an injunction. Fischer , 228 Ill. App. 3d at 488-89, 170 Ill.Dec. 168, 592 N.E.2d 604. Therefore, even if the postdissolution order denying Jaime's motion to vacate the plenary order of protection is interlocutory, in that the contempt proceeding remained pending below, it is appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). Jaime filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of his motion to vacate and therefore we have appellate jurisdiction to review that order under Rule 307(a)(1). See Doe v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation , 341 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1059, 275 Ill.Dec. 639, 793 N.E.2d 119 (2003).

¶ 35 The central issue in a proceeding to obtain an order of protection is whether the petitioner has been abused. Best v. Best , 223 Ill. 2d 342, 348, 307 Ill.Dec. 586, 860 N.E.2d 240 (2006). If the preponderance of the evidence establishes that abuse occurred, the circuit court is compelled to issue an order of protection. Id. ; 750 ILCS 60/214(a) (West 2016). A decision as to whether to dissolve an injunctive order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Debowski v. Shred Pax Corp. , 45 Ill. App. 3d 891, 899, 3 Ill.Dec. 794, 359 N.E.2d 204 (1977).

¶ 36 Jaime has not presented a sufficient record for us to determine whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the plenary order of protection. The petition for plenary order of protection is not contained in the record, and we therefore do not know the claims or allegations made by Martha when she sought the protective order. There are no transcripts of the proceedings as to the hearings on the emergency order of protection that preceded the plenary order of protection, the plenary order of protection, or the motion to vacate the plenary order of protection. Therefore, we are without the evidence and arguments that were considered by the circuit court in reaching its decisions.

¶ 37 As we previously noted, as the appellant Jaime has the duty to present a sufficient record to allow this court to review his challenge to the order denying his motion to vacate the plenary order of protection. Foutch , 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958. Without such a record, we must presume that the circuit court's order was in conformity to the law and the findings were based on the evidence presented. Watkins v. Office of the State Appellate Defender , 2012 IL App (1st) 111756, ¶ 19, 364 Ill.Dec. 109, 976 N.E.2d 387. We therefore affirm the denial of the motion to vacate the plenary order of protection.

¶ 38 Furthermore, Jaime has once again failed to present any coherent arguments with supporting authority as to any error regarding the plenary order of protection or the denial of his motion to vacate it. He has not provided a proper statement of facts or procedural history and does not cite the record on appeal. Therefore, his brief does not comply with the provisions of Rule 341. For this additional reason, we must affirm the order denying his motion to vacate the plenary order of protection.

¶ 39 We note that Jaime has proceeded pro se on this appeal, but was nevertheless required to meet all procedural requirements. Ammar , 2017 IL App (1st) 162931, ¶ 16, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- ("Where a party has chosen to represent himself, he is held to the same standard as a licensed attorney and must comply with the same rules."). This is no insignificant task, and Jaime's failures in this regard have proven fatal with respect to the issues he raises in this appeal. In his prior appeal, we explained to Jaime the necessity of complying with appellate requirements, both as to his briefs and with respect to presenting a sufficient record on appeal. Sanchez , 2012 IL App (1st) 112898-U, ¶¶ 6-7. The warnings appear to have been of little assistance.

¶ 40 Our supreme court has recognized the growing number of self-represented litigants in our trial and appellate courts and the challenges that are presented thereby. The court's website includes aids for self-represented litigants in the appellate courts, including a self-help guide that includes a timeline and check lists. Guide for Appeals to the Illinois Appellate Court For Self-Represented Litigants , Illinois Courts (Feb. 16, 2018), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/CivilJustice/ Resources/Guide_for_Appeals_to_the_IL_Appellate_Court_rev_093016.pdf. Additionally, in order to assist unrepresented parties in filing compliant briefs, standardized briefs-provided as fillable forms in a PDF format-are available on the court's website. Approved Statewide Forms , Illinois Courts (Feb. 16, 2018), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Forms/approved/.

¶ 41 In light of the serious consequences flowing from a lack of compliance with the relevant appellate requirements, we truly hope that these self-help aids will become both more well-known and better utilized by unrepresented litigants. They represent an important effort to balance the requirement that unrepresented litigants be held to the same standard as a licensed attorney with the reality of the serious challenges faced by the growing number of self-represented litigants in our appellate courts.

¶ 42 In conclusion, we dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion to reconsider the denial of Jaime's motion to abate child support, and we affirm the order denying his motion to vacate the plenary order of protection.

¶ 43 Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Hall concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Our discussion of this issue speaks broadly of the need for Rule 304(a) language in order to appeal otherwise final orders that do not resolve all postdissolution claims, as did the discussion in Teymour . Of course, while none are relevant here, there are a number of specific types of final orders that-while they do not resolve all postdissolution claims-could potentially be entered in a postdissolution context and are nevertheless appealable without any such language. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).


text:
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-9, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Estate of Vincent SCHOENBERG; Midwest Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee u/t/a Dated January 18, 1979 and Known as Trust Number 79-01-2857; North Bank; University Park Condominium Association ; Vincent G. Schoenberg a/k/a Vincent G. Schoenberg III; Emily Schoenberg; unknown beneficiaries of the Midwest Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee u/t/a Dated January 18, 1979 and Known as Trust No. 79-01-2857; unknown Heirs and Legatees of the Estate of Vincent Schoenberg; unknown Owners and Non-Record Claimants, Defendants
    (Midwest Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee u/t/a Dated January 18, 1979 and known as Trust Number 79-01-2857, Defendant-Appellant).
    No. 1-16-0871
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.
    March 26, 2018
    Zane D. Smith & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (Zane D. Smith, of counsel), and Law Office of Sheila A. Genson, Ltd., of Schaumberg (Sheila A. Genson, of counsel), for appellant.
    Kluever & Platt, LLC, of Chicago (David C. Kluever and Jason D. Altman, of counsel), for appellee.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal arises out of a mortgage foreclosure action. Defendant Midwest Bank and Trust Company., as trustee under a trust agreement dated January 18, 1979, and known as trust No. 79-01-2857 (Midwest), appeals from the Cook County circuit court's orders (1) granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9 (Deutsche Bank), (2) entering a judgment of foreclosure and sale, (3) dismissing Midwest's affirmative defenses, and (4) entering an order approving the report of sale and distribution. On appeal, Midwest contends that (1) the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, (2) Deutsche Bank was not the proper party plaintiff, (3) Deutsche Bank failed to comply with the circuit court's order for reinstatement after Deutsche Bank voluntarily dismissed its complaint, (4) the circuit court erred in granting Deutsche Bank's motions for summary judgment and to dismiss Midwest's affirmative defenses, and (5) the circuit court erred by granting Deutsche Bank's motion to confirm the report of sale and distribution, approve the judicial sale of the property, and for an order of possession. We find no error and affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In August 2006, Vincent G. Schoenberg executed a promissory note payable to 21st Century Mortgage Bankers (21st Century), secured by a mortgage on two condominium units located at 1451 East 55th Street, Chicago, Illinois (the property). Vincent was the sole borrower and mortgagor identified by the mortgage. The mortgage identified 21st Century as the "Lender" and Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (MERS), as the mortgagee. The mortgage further provided that MERS was acting "solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." In September 2006, Vincent executed a "Warranty Deed in Trust" that conveyed his interest in the property to an Illinois land trust with Midwest acting as trustee. In December 2008, Vincent died.

¶ 4 On February 17, 2009, Deutsche Bank filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against Vincent and Midwest. Attached to the complaint were copies of the mortgage and note executed by Vincent. Also attached to the complaint was an allonge executed by 21st Century specially indorsing the note to Washington Mutual Bank, as well as a separate page bearing a blank indorsement by Washington Mutual Bank. An attorney filed an appearance on behalf of Vincent and Midwest. On August 17, 2009, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Deutsche Bank's complaint pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2008) ), "with leave to reinstate upon [m]otion supported by [a]ffidavit, filed and presented within one * * * year of this dismissal, if [d]efendant(s) default on the loan modification, repayment plan, or other settlement agreement."

¶ 5 Deutsche Bank moved to reinstate the foreclosure action on July 28, 2010. The motion stated that defendants were being evaluated for loss mitigation eligibility by the loan servicer in March 2009 but that defendants failed to submit the proper documentation and that Deutsche Bank wished to proceed with the foreclosure. The motion was supported by an affidavit. The attorney who previously filed an appearance on behalf of Vincent and Midwest responded to the motion to reinstate and moved for summary judgment, arguing that Deutsche Bank lacked standing. No mention was made of Vincent's death. The circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment and granted Deutsche Bank's motion to reinstate.

¶ 6 On October 31, 2013, Midwest moved to dismiss Deutsche Bank's complaint. Midwest argued that Deutsche Bank lacked standing and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Vincent was deceased. Deutsche Bank filed a response to Midwest's motion to dismiss and filed a motion to appoint a special representative for Vincent. On December 9, 2013, the circuit court denied Midwest's motion to dismiss and appointed Cary Rosenthal as special representative for Vincent. Rosenthal filed a report on April 29, 2014, reflecting that Vincent was deceased and that the special representative gave notice of the action to Vincent's wife Brenda and son Vincent Jr., both of whom were purportedly living in the property.

¶ 7 On July 22, 2014, the circuit court granted Deutsche Bank's motion to approve Rosenthal's report and Deutsche Bank's motion for leave to file a first amended complaint naming "The Estate of Vincent Schoenberg" as a defendant, along with Brenda and Vincent Jr. On November 19, 2014, Deutsche Bank was granted leave to file a second amended complaint removing Brenda as a defendant because she was deceased and adding as defendants Emily Schoenberg and unknown beneficiaries of the Midwest trust. Attached to the second amended complaint were the mortgage, note, and allonge, along with an assignment of mortgage recorded by the Cook County Recorder of Deeds on March 9, 2009, reflecting that MERS as nominee for 21st Century assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. The assignment of mortgage stated, "This instrument serves to memorialize the transfer of this loan which has previously taken place."

¶ 8 Midwest moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. Midwest argued that 21st Century was dissolved on May 8, 2008, and that any action it took after that date "is of no effect and is void." Midwest argued that Deutsche Bank lacked standing and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Vincent was a necessary party, he was deceased, and there was no appointed special representative. Midwest further argued that Deutsche Bank had not complied with section 13-209(c) of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/13-209(c) (West 2014) ), because it failed to have a personal representative appointed. The circuit court denied Midwest's motion to dismiss and ordered Midwest to answer the complaint. Midwest's answer denied all of the allegations in Deutsche Bank's complaint and asserted a 74-paragraph affirmative defense restating the substance of Midwest's motion to dismiss.

¶ 9 Deutsche Bank moved for summary judgment on its second amended complaint and moved to dismiss Midwest's affirmative defense. On September 3, 2015, the circuit court set a briefing schedule on the motions. The scheduling order reflected that counsel for Midwest was present in court on that date and was granted until October 1, 2015, to respond to Deutsche Bank's motions. A hearing was scheduled for October 28, 2015. On October 26, 2015, Midwest filed a "Notice of Motion" that it would appear on October 28, 2015, "and then and there present and move in accordance with [d]efendant's [a]nswer" to Deutsche Bank's motions. The only filing that accompanied the notice of motion was Midwest's 25-page "answer" to Deutsche Bank's motions.

¶ 10 On October 28, 2015, the circuit court (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank on its second amended complaint, (2) dismissed Midwest's affirmative defense with prejudice, (3) entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of Deutsche Bank, (4) appointed a selling officer, (5) granted Deutsche Bank's oral motion to dismiss ''Estate of Vincent Schoenberg'' as a defendant, (6) denied Midwest's "motion/answer" to Deutsche Bank's motions, and (7) denied Midwest's oral motion for a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 11 The property was sold at a judicial sale on January 29, 2016, and Deutsche Bank was the successful bidder at the sale. Deutsche Bank then filed a motion for orders approving the report of sale and distribution, confirming the judicial sale, and for possession. On February 26, 2016, Midwest filed a "Motion in Accordance with 735 ILCS 1508 [sic ] and Supreme Court Rule 113(i)." Midwest again asserted the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Vincent was deceased, that a mortgagor is a necessary party and no special representative had been appointed, and that Deutsche Bank lacked standing. The circuit court set both parties' motions for a hearing. At that hearing, the circuit court made it clear that it was considering Midwest's motion as a response to Deutsche Bank's motion for confirmation of the judicial sale. On March 3, 2016, the circuit court heard oral argument on the motions and granted Deutsche Bank's motion for orders approving the report of sale and distribution, confirming the judicial sale, and for possession. Midwest's motion was denied.

¶ 12 On March 29, 2016, Midwest filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court's October 28, 2015, judgment and dismissal orders and the March 3, 2016, order confirming the judicial sale.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, Midwest argues that (1) the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Vincent was the mortgagor and therefore a necessary party but that the second amended complaint failed to name a special representative for Vincent, (2) the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction because neither Vincent nor a special representative was served with a summons or complaint, (3) Deutsche Bank was not the proper party plaintiff, (4) Deutsche Bank failed to comply with the circuit court's August 17, 2009, order for reinstating the foreclosure action, (5) Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment should have been denied, (6) Midwest's affirmative defense should not have been dismissed, and (7) Midwest's "Motion in Accordance with 735 ILCS 1508 [sic ] and Supreme Court Rule 113(i)" should not have been denied.

¶ 15 Midwest's first argument is that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Vincent was deceased at the time Deutsche Bank initiated this action in February 2009 and that Deutsche Bank failed to appoint a special representative for Vincent in the second amended complaint. Midwest contends that a suit against a dead person is a nullity and that it does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the circuit court. Midwest relies on ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. McGahan , 237 Ill. 2d 526, 342 Ill.Dec. 7, 931 N.E.2d 1190 (2010) to argue that when a mortgagor is deceased, the circuit court must appoint a special representative. Midwest further relies on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 113(i) (eff. May 1, 2013), which provides that where a mortgagor is deceased and no estate has been opened, the circuit court "shall * * * appoint a special representative to stand in the place of the deceased mortgagor(s) who shall act in a manner similar to that provided by section 13-209 of the [Code] ( 735 ILCS 5/13-209 [ (West 2012) ] )." Midwest argues that Deutsche Bank knew sometime in July 2012 that Vincent was deceased but did not file an amended complaint until August 2014, which added "The Estate of Vincent Schoenberg" as a defendant, but then Deutsche Bank never attempted to serve the estate. Finally, Midwest contends that Deutsche Bank failed to comply with section 13-209(c) of the Code because it did not act with any diligence in dismissing Vincent and appointing a special representative.

¶ 16 We find Midwest's arguments unpersuasive and conclude that Deutsche Bank's complaint conferred subject-matter jurisdiction upon the circuit court. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the circuit court's "power to hear and to determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs." Urban Partnership Bank v. Chicago Title Land Trust Co. , 2017 IL App (1st) 162086, ¶ 12, 417 Ill.Dec. 222, 87 N.E.3d 974. The Illinois Constitution provides that "Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters" except for two exceptions not present here. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. "Generally, a justiciable matter is a controversy appropriate for review by the [circuit] court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relationship of parties having adverse legal interests." Urban Partnership Bank , 2017 IL App (1st) 162086, ¶ 12, 417 Ill.Dec. 222, 87 N.E.3d 974. Generally speaking, mortgage foreclosure cases fall squarely within the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Neighborhood Lending Services, Inc. v. Callahan , 2017 IL App (1st) 162585, ¶ 20, 417 Ill.Dec. 871, 89 N.E.3d 790.

¶ 17 First, Midwest relies on McGahan for the general proposition that a mortgagor is a necessary party to a foreclosure action. In McGahan , our supreme court held that a mortgage foreclosure action is a quasi in rem proceeding and that a mortgagee seeking to foreclose on a mortgage must proceed against a party, not just the mortgaged property. McGahan , 237 Ill. 2d at 535, 342 Ill.Dec. 7, 931 N.E.2d 1190. The court explained that

"the mortgagor, the person whose interest in the real estate is the subject of the mortgage, is a necessary party defendant to the foreclosure proceedings. 735 ILCS 5/15-1501(a)(i) (West 2004); Lane v. Erskine , 13 Ill. 501, 503-04 (1851) (mortgagor is an indispensable party in a foreclosure action). As such, the proceeding must be brought against a named party and a foreclosure action must be a quasi in rem action." Id. at 535-36, 342 Ill.Dec. 7, 931 N.E.2d 1190.

¶ 18 McGahan , however, involved a situation where the deceased mortgagor held an interest in the property at the time of her death. Id. at 528, 342 Ill.Dec. 7, 931 N.E.2d 1190. The court, therefore, had no occasion to consider whether a special representative is necessary where the mortgagor no longer holds an interest in the property at the time of his death or where the mortgagor's interest in the property has fully passed to another person or entity. Here, Vincent transferred his interest in the property to a land trust prior to his death. "In an Illinois land trust, both legal and equitable title to real property rests in the trustee, while the interest of the beneficiary of the trust is personal property." Urban Partnership Bank , 2017 IL App (1st) 162086, ¶ 19, 417 Ill.Dec. 222, 87 N.E.3d 974. Beneficiaries of a land trust are permissible parties, not necessary parties, to a mortgage foreclosure action. Id. ¶ 20 ; 735 ILCS 5/15-1501(b)(3) (West 2016). Vincent relinquished his legal and equitable interests in the property prior to his death by conveying his interest to a land trust, of which he was a beneficiary. He was therefore a permissive party to the foreclosure action, and whether he was named as a defendant had no bearing on the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1501(a) (West 2016) ("The [circuit] court may proceed to adjudicate [the interests of the necessary parties], but any disposition of the mortgaged real estate shall be subject to (i) the interests of all other persons not made a party or (ii) interests in the mortgaged real estate not otherwise barred or terminated in the foreclosure."). Additionally, we note that the Second District reached a similar conclusion in an unpublished order affirming the dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition, concluding in part that no special representative was necessary for a mortgagor who held no interest in the property at the time of her death. See Wachovia Mortgage FSB v. Stoller , 2016 IL App (2d) 150645-U, ¶ 32, 2016 WL 4179751. Midwest's argument that the failure to appoint a special representative deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction fails because Vincent was a permissible rather than a necessary party to the foreclosure action.

¶ 19 Furthermore, while this matter was pending in the circuit court, our legislature enacted Public Act 99-0024 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Section 5 of Public Act 99-24 amended section 15-1501(h) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure Law) ( 735 ILCS 5/15-1501(h) ), to provide that the circuit court is not required to appoint a special representative for a deceased mortgagor if there is a trust that was conveyed title to the property by the deceased mortgagor prior to death. Pub. Act. 99-0024 § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 735 ILCS 5/15-1501(h)(1)-(5) ). We conclude that the legislative amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law is retroactively applicable to this case.

¶ 20 To determine whether a statute applies retroactively, we follow the approach set forth by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27, 37-39, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001). We first determine whether our legislature prescribed the amended statute's temporal reach to include events predating the statute. Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak , 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246 (2006). If so, we apply the amendment retroactively. If the legislature did not prescribe the temporal reach of the amended statute, section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016) ) supplies the default rule that amendments "that are procedural may be applied retroactively, while those that are substantive may not." Allegis , 223 Ill. 2d at 331, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246. A change in the law is substantive if it creates, defines, or regulates rights, whereas a change is procedural if it regulates the machinery for carrying on a suit or proceeding. See GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. v. Poniewozik , 2014 IL App (1st) 132864, ¶ 18, 387 Ill.Dec. 833, 23 N.E.3d 525.

¶ 21 Here, the amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law is procedural because it regulates the process by which a mortgagee forecloses on a mortgage where a deceased mortgagor either had no interest in the property at the time of his death or the interest has fully passed to another person or entity. The amendment does not create, define, or regulate the rights of the parties to a foreclosure action but instead provides for the orderly adjudication of existing rights and remedies. The amendment does not modify the mortgagee's rights with respect to the foreclosure action, and has no bearing on the deceased mortgagor's former property rights. In other words, the amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law regulates the foreclosure proceedings by providing that the circuit court need not appoint a special representative when the property rights that would be protected by such appointment already belong to a person or entity capable of being sued. A special representative is not necessary when the deceased mortgagor no longer has any interest in need of protection because the mortgagee can proceed directly against the person or entity holding the decedent's former property interest. This amendment does not create, define, or regulate any rights of the parties to the action but instead regulates the procedural question of when a special representative must be appointed. The amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law is procedural and may be applied retroactively.

¶ 22 The amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law complements rather than conflicts with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 113(i). The committee comments to Rule 113 state, "Paragraph (i) addresses the issue of a deceased mortgagor and the subject-matter jurisdiction issues addressed in ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. v. McGahan , 237 Ill. 2d 526, 342 Ill.Dec. 7, 931 N.E.2d 1190 (2010), which have not been specifically addressed by remedial legislation." Ill. S. Ct. R. 113, Committee Comments (adopted Feb. 22, 2013). As discussed above, McGahan only addressed the situation where the mortgagor is fully possessed of an interest in the property at the time of her death. The legislative amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law addresses issues not contemplated by either McGahan or Rule 113(i). Therefore, we see no reason why the amendment to section 15-1501(h) of the Foreclosure Law should not be applied retroactively.

¶ 23 Here, it was undisputed that Vincent did not have any interest in the property at the time of his death because he had transferred his interest to a land trust. The circuit court was not required to appoint a special representative for Vincent since Midwest-the entity with legal and equitable title to the property-was a named defendant. The circuit court therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction over Deutsche Bank's complaint to foreclose on the mortgage.

¶ 24 Next, Midwest argues that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction because neither Vincent nor a special representative was served a summons or complaint. However, the circuit court could never obtain personal jurisdiction over Vincent because he was deceased. Furthermore, as we discussed, no special representative was required, and thus any failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the special representative would have no bearing on the validity of the circuit court's judgments.

¶ 25 Midwest next argues that Deutsche Bank was not a proper party plaintiff because no allegations in the second amended complaint connect Deutsche Bank to the mortgage and note. Deutsche Bank attached to the second amended complaint (1) a copy of the mortgage identifying MERS, as nominee for 21st Century, as the mortgagee, (2) a copy of the indorsed note, (3) an "Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage" transferring "all right, title, and interest in and to a certain mortgage executed by Vincent G. Schoenberg" to "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company'', and (4) an undated allonge indorsing the promissory note from 21st Century to Washington Mutual Bank (Washington Mutual). Midwest asserts that 21st Century was dissolved on May 8, 2008, and therefore could not have effectuated any transfers. Furthermore, Midwest argues that the second amended complaint contained no allegations referencing Deutsche Bank and that the exhibits to the complaint "have no allegations explaining their import." Midwest concludes that Deutsche Bank "is not an entity that is capable of having a judgment rendered in its favor. Therefore, the judgment is void."

¶ 26 Midwest fails to cite any authority in support of these arguments, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), which results in forfeiture. Forfeiture aside, Midwest's position is contrary to well-settled law. Midwest's argument is essentially that Deutsche Bank lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action. This court has regularly stated that standing is an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove. Bank of America, N.A. v. Adeyiga , 2014 IL App (1st) 131252, ¶ 61, 390 Ill.Dec. 431, 29 N.E.3d 60. Here, Midwest's affirmative defense asserted in part that Deutsche Bank lacked standing. The circuit court struck that pleading with prejudice. Midwest fails to assert a coherent argument as to whether it properly pleaded an affirmative defense of standing and fails to point to any evidence in the record to establish any question of fact regarding Deutsche Bank's standing. These omissions also result in forfeiture. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016).

¶ 27 Regardless, the record is clear that Deutsche Bank attached to its complaint a copy of the note and allonge reflecting that 21st Century specially indorsed the note to Washington Mutual and that Washington Mutual indorsed the note in blank. A promissory note is an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money and is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder. HSBC Bank USA, National Ass'n v. Rowe , 2015 IL App (3d) 140553, ¶ 21, 394 Ill.Dec. 321, 36 N.E.3d 254. "If an indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special indorsement, it is a 'blank indorsement'. When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer * * *." 810 ILCS 5/3-205(b) (West 2016). It is well settled that "possession of bearer paper is prima facie evidence of title thereto" and is sufficient "to entitle the plaintiff to a decree of foreclosure." Joslyn v. Joslyn , 386 Ill. 387, 395, 54 N.E.2d 475 (1944). The mere fact that a copy of the note is attached to the complaint is itself prima facie evidence that the plaintiff owns the note. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen , 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 24, 377 Ill.Dec. 771, 2 N.E.3d 1052. As the legal holder of the note, Deutsche Bank was entitled to pursue the foreclosure action. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Barnes , 406 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 346 Ill.Dec. 118, 940 N.E.2d 118 (2010).

¶ 28 Here, Deutsche Bank attached a copy of the note to each iteration of its complaint. By attaching copies of the mortgage, note, allonge, and assignment of mortgage, Deutsche Bank presented prima facie evidence that it owned the note and that it had the right to pursue a foreclosure action against Midwest. Midwest failed to present any contrary evidence that might call into question whether Deutsche Bank had standing. We therefore reject Midwest's argument that Deutsche Bank was not the proper party plaintiff, and we conclude that Deutsche Bank had standing to pursue the foreclosure action. Furthermore, our discussion shows that the circuit court's dismissal of Midwest's affirmative defense of standing was proper and is therefore affirmed.

¶ 29 Midwest next contends that Deutsche Bank failed to comply with the circuit court's August 17, 2009, order dismissing the foreclosure action with leave to reinstate. Midwest failed to include this order in its notice of appeal, but we have jurisdiction to consider it because the reinstatement order was a step in the procedural progression leading to the judgments identified in the notice of appeal. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Hoeft , 2015 IL App (1st) 150459, ¶ 8, 395 Ill.Dec. 773, 39 N.E.3d 240. But while we have jurisdiction to consider the reinstatement order, we find that Midwest forfeited its argument. Midwest argues for the first time on appeal that Deutsche Bank's motion for reinstatement and accompanying affidavit contained false information. However, in the circuit court, Midwest's sole response to the motion to reinstate was that Deutsche Bank lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action. Issues not raised in the circuit court are forfeited on appeal. In re Marriage of Minear , 181 Ill. 2d 552, 564, 230 Ill.Dec. 250, 693 N.E.2d 379 (1998). Additionally, Midwest fails to cite any authority in support of its argument, in violation of Rule 341(h)(7). Finally, Midwest fails to assert that the circuit court abused its discretion in reinstating the foreclosure within one year of the original dismissal. See Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. JS II, LLC , 2012 IL App (1st) 063420, ¶ 92, 364 Ill.Dec. 709, 977 N.E.2d 198 ("[T]he decision to vacate [a] dismissal order is at the discretion of the trial court, which triggers a review for an abuse of discretion."). Midwest's attempt to raise an argument for the first time on appeal and its failure to develop an argument with citations to authority results in forfeiture. We have no basis from which to conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by reinstating the foreclosure and therefore affirm the circuit court's reinstatement order.

¶ 30 Midwest next argues that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank. Midwest did not respond to Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Midwest makes no argument that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Midwest the opportunity to file a late response to the motion. We have already disposed of Midwest's arguments regarding jurisdiction and standing and therefore have no basis from which to conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact to preclude entry of judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank. The circuit court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank is affirmed.

¶ 31 Finally, Midwest argues that the circuit court erred by confirming the judicial sale. The only argument Midwest advances is that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and that Deutsche Bank's motion for confirmation of the judicial sale should have been denied under section 15-1508(b)(iv) of the Foreclosure Law ( 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)(iv) (West 2016) ). Under section 15-1508 of the Foreclosure Law, the circuit court must confirm a judicial sale unless the circuit court finds that "(i) a notice required in accordance with subsection (c) of Section 15-1507 was not given, (ii) the terms of sale were unconscionable, (iii) the sale was conducted fraudulently, or (iv) justice was otherwise not done." 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2016). We have already concluded that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and Midwest fails to identify any other basis that might preclude the entry of an order confirming the judicial sale. We therefore find no error and affirm the circuit court's order approving the report of sale and distribution, confirming the judicial sale, and granting possession in favor of Deutsche Bank.

¶ 32 CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

Justices Harris and Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      The mortgage was also executed by Brenda L. Schoenberg "for the sole purpose of waiving homestead rights."

      North Bank, University Park Condominium Association, and unknown owners and non-record claimants were also named as defendants.

      The circuit court's briefing schedule order provided that briefs were limited to 15 pages and that the circuit court would not consider requests for extensions of time made on the hearing date.