author: NAJAM, Judge.

text:
    Larry Michael CARAWAY, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 47A04-1205-CR-265.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Oct. 31, 2012.

      Lorinda Meier Youngcourt, Lawrence County Public Defender, Bedford, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Katherine Modesitt Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Larry Michael Caraway appeals his sentence for murder, a felony, following an open guilty plea. Caraway asks that we review and revise his sentence taking into consideration his remorse, guilty plea, and history of alcoholism. He presents a single issue for review: whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts underlying Caraway’s conviction are set out in his first appeal of his sentence:

On October 7, 2009, Caraway shot Denise Caraway, his wife of almost twenty-six years, seven times resulting in her death in their home in Lawrence County, Indiana. That day, Caraway had been drinking “very heavily,” having consumed “15-18 beers” by about 4:00 pm, then drinking “a few beers and some Ja[e]germeister at another bar, then drinking “a couple of beers when [he] got home.” Appellant’s Appendix at 58. Caraway also “ate 4 Valiums at 4:10 pm” on the day he killed Denise. Id.
On October 9, 2009, Caraway was charged with Count I, murder; and Count II, altering the scene of death[,] as a class D felony. On April 6, 2010, Caraway and the State filed a plea agreement in which the State agreed to dismiss Count II in exchange for his guilty plea. After a number of continuances, on February 11, 2011, the trial court took Caraway’s guilty plea, and in doing so instructed him that the sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with fifty-five years being the advisory sentence and forty-five years being a non-suspendible minimum.
On March 8, 2011, the court held a sentencing hearing and identified Caraway’s criminal history consisting mainly of alcohol-related incidents as an aggravating circumstance because it considered his drinking on the night of the incident to have “aggravated the whole evening” and that it “was probably part of the main reason this occurred,” and therefore it directly related to this crime. Transcript at 26. The court also identified Caraway’s position of trust with his wife and the nature and circumstances of the crime, in which Denise was shot “several times in the stomach, once in the face, and once ... in the arm,” at close range by a person “she loved behind the weapon,” which the court found “very disturbing,” as aggra-vators. Id. at 28. The court found as a mitigator that Caraway showed some remorse, found that the aggravators clearly outweighed the mitigators, and sentenced him to sixty-five years in the Department of Correction.

Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied (“Caraway I ”). Caraway appealed his sentence, arguing that it was inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). On appeal we reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion when it had not acknowledged his guilty plea as a mitigator. Id. at 854.

On remand, the trial court resentenced Caraway, again ordering that he serve sixty-five years in the Department of Correction. The trial court’s order provides in relevant part:

The court adopts all of its prior aggravating and mitigating circumstances from the previous sentencing hearing, along with the sentencing statement it made orally on the record. The court further adds and acknowledges the mitigating circumstance that the defendant did enter a plea of guilty in this matter. The court[,] however, gives little weight to this mitigating factor for the following reasons:
1.) The defendant did receive some benefit from this plea by having the class D felony altering the scene of a death dismissed[. A]lthough not highly substantial, it is a felony and to be taken [into] account when considering the totality of this mitigating factor.
2.) The plea agreement was signed on April 6th, 2010[,] however the actual plea of guilty was not entered into until February 11, 2011. The record shows that the court had originally set this matter for change of plea on May 17th, 2010. It was then continued by the defendant to June 22, 2010. This matter was then reset for trial as a number one setting on November 9, 2010[,] which was continued by the defendant. Again reset for trial as a number one setting on February 15, 2011[,] as a number one setting [sic] and again continued by the defendant. The court then reset the matter for jury trial on March 7th, 2011[,] as a number one setting with a hearing set on all final motions on March 1[,] 2011. The judge was informed, while out of town, that the defendant had decided to follow through with the plea agreement he had entered into on April 6, 2010. The court arranged for Judge Sleva to act as pro tern and accept the plea on February 11, 2011[,] in order to ensure the hearing took place. Any prior observation that the plea agreement was filed six months after the crime was committed, and that the defendant did not plead on the eve of trial, although somewhat true, is not an accurate reflection of the record and the lengthy process, number of continuances and number of other matters that were moved in order to deal with this case that was set as a number one trial on three different occasions.
3.) I also reference Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) [, tram, denied, ] holding that a guilty plea does not rise to the level of a significant mitigat[or] where the evidence against the defendant is such that the decision to plead guilty is merely a pragmatic one. Here the defendant admitted that he shot his unarmed wife multiple times in the face and abdomen killing her. They were alone in the home. The wounds were not self[-]inflicted. Therefore, the court finds there is additional mitigation to the defendant’s sentence in that he did enter a plea of guilty, but does not give it significant weight. Further, the court’s original finding that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators still remains and the court finds it[s] original sentence on the charge of murder to 65 years in the Indiana Department of Correction is still appropriate.

Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. Caraway now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Caraway argues that his sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate and seeks a revision to the advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize! ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

Moreover, “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind.2008). Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

We first consider whether Caraway’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense. The State contends that Caraway waived any argument that the nature of the offense warrants revision of his sentence because he made no specific argument to that effect. However, Caraway acknowledges in his brief that he shot his wife several times, causing her death and afterward tried to cover it up.. We reject the State’s waiver argument.

That said, Caraway has not shown that his sentence is an outlier given the nature of the offense. After drinking all day and ingesting Valium, Caraway was home alone with his wife of twenty-six years when they began to argue about an unpaid utility bill. During the argument, Caraway shot his wife several times in the abdomen, once in the face, and once in the arm, continuing to shoot her even after she had collapsed from the initial shots. His wife died as a result of her wounds. And after the shooting he put the gun in his wife’s hand to make it look like the wounds were self-inflicted. Caraway’s sixty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.

Caraway also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. In particular, he contends that his remorse, his guilty plea, and his addiction to alcohol require review and revision of his sentence. We cannot agree. At sentencing the trial court acknowledged Caraway’s remorse and his longstanding problem with alcohol. The court assigned aggravating weight to the drinking, noting it was the basis for much of his criminal history, including the murder of his wife. The trial court also observed that, despite a history of thirty years of drinking and offenses dating back to 1980, there was no evidence that Caraway had ever sought treatment.

On remand the trial court acknowledged Caraway’s guilty plea. But the court found the weight of the guilty plea to be diminished by three factors. First, while Caraway had signed the plea agreement in April 2010, his actual guilty plea was not entered for another ten months, in February 2011. Caraway’s failure to enter his guilty plea and his multiple requests for continuances required several first choice trial settings and significantly delayed the actual entry of his plea. Also, the decision to plead guilty was likely a pragmatic one, given the weight of the evidence against Caraway. See Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. And finally, Caraway received a small benefit from his guilty plea when the State dismissed the charge of altering the scene of a death, a Class D felony.

After acknowledging the guilty plea on remand and assigning it little weight, the trial court again found that the aggrava-tors, namely Caraway’s drunken state at the time of the offense and that he was in a position of trust, outweighed the miti-gators and sentenced him to sixty-five years. We agree. Caraway has not shown that his sentence is an outlier given the nature of the offense or his character. As such, we affirm his sentence.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., and MAY, J., concur.

      . Caraway correctly included a copy of the order appealed in his Appellant's Brief pursuant to Appellate Rule 46(A)(10). However, Caraway should have also included a copy of the appealed order or judgment in the Appellant's Appendix pursuant to Appellate Rule 50(2)(b).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WENTWORTH, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    WENDT LLP, Petitioner, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVENUE, Respondent.
    No. 02T10-0701-TA-2.
    Tax Court of Indiana.
    Oct. 30, 2012.

      Robert L. Nicholson, Carson Boxberger, Mark E. Witmer, Adam L. Hand, Beck-man Lawson, LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Petitioner.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jessica E. Reagan, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Respondent.
   WENTWORTH, J.

This case concerns the applicability of Indiana’s public transportation sales and use tax exemption to purchases of a licensed common carrier. The Indiana Department of State Revenue determined that just a portion of Wendt LLP’s 2001 through 2004 purchases of tangible personal property were entitled to the public transportation exemption. The Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

FACTS

Wendt, a licensed common carrier headquartered in Wabash, Indiana, is in the business of intrastate, interstate, and international relocation of oversized factory machinery. (See Jt. Stip. at ¶ 1; Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 4-8, 12-13.) Wendt provides its relocation services within a public transportation process that includes several component services that the Court describes generally in four operational phases.

1. Project Planning. Wendt begins planning relocation by preparing estimates for potential customers, considering, among other things, the costs of labor, machinery disassembly, fuel consumption, and equipment requirements. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 15-18, 27-28.) Once hired, Wendt plans the most expeditious route, taking into account the overall size of the loads as well as certain state and federal highway regulations, and also procures travel permits from federal and state authorities. (See Trial Tr. at 44-45; Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 14-15, 152-58.)

2. Pre-transport Preparations. Next, Wendt’s moving crews travel to the customer’s factory to prepare the machinery for transport. First, the crews lay steel plates down to protect the factory floors and facilitate the machinery’s movement. (See Resp’t Stip. Pet’r Contentions (hereinafter “Resp’t Stip.”) at 2.) Next, the crews disassemble the machinery to make it suitable for transport based on state and federal size mandates, fork-lift capacities, and entryway and shipping container dimensions; label the pieces for reassembly; disconnect electrical components; drain certain liquids; and clean dirty parts. (See Trial Tr. at 46-48; Resp’t Stip. at 2.) Once the machinery is in a transportable size, the crews use fork trucks with hydraulic booms to lift it, rig it to semitrailers, and then cover it with tarps. (See Resp’t Stip. at 2 (footnote added).)

8. Transportation. During the actual transportation of machinery on public highways, both state and federal regulations require Wendt to escort the load, which Wendt does using its own pick-up trucks or by hiring escort vehicles to accompany the machinery throughout all or a portion of the transport. (See Trial Tr. at 47, 64-65.) Wendt also uses its pick-up trucks to transport its crews, their tools, and other equipment to the relocation site so they can unload the machinery upon arrival.

4. Reassembly. This fourth phase of Wendt’s public transportation process begins after its crews unload the machinery at the relocation site. During this phase, Wendt provides machinery installation services, which mainly include the reassembly and setting/leveling of the machinery. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 19-20; Trial Tr. at 58; Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 18,124-26.)

In addition to its general public transportation process, Wendt also provided several optional services such as warehouse storage and transport-for-repair services during the years at issue. Wendt offers these services in association with one or more of the phases of its general public transportation process or on a stand-alone basis.

Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2004, the Department conducted a sales tax audit of Wendt for the 2002 through 2004 tax years. During the course of the audit, Wendt filed two refund claims seeking to recover the sales and use tax remitted on purchases made during the 2001 through 2004 tax years (the years at issue),claiming they were exempt. The audit concluded that some of Wendt’s purchases were completely exempt, but others were either partially or fully taxable. As a result, the Department denied Wendt’s claims for refund and issued proposed assessments.

In late June 2006, Wendt protested the proposed assessments and the refund claim denials. On September 11, 2006, the Department denied Wendt’s protest of the proposed assessments in part and its refund claims in their entirety.

Wendt filed this original tax appeal on January 5, 2007. The Court conducted a trial on October 15, 2009, and heard oral arguments on June 4, 2010.

ISSUE

The issue before the Court is whether Wendt’s purchases of tangible personal property were predominantly used in providing public transportation and thus exempt under the public transportation exemption for the years at issue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews final determinations of the Department de novo. Ind.Code § 6 — 8.1—5—l(i) (West 2012). Accordingly, the Court is not bound by the evidence or the issues presented at the administrative level. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 865 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. Tax Ct.2007) (citation omitted), review denied.

Transactions subject to Indiana’s sales or use tax may be relieved of tax liabilities if they qualify for a statutory exemption. See generally Ind.Code 6-2.5-5-1 et seq. (2012). “It is well-settled that tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to the exemption.” Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, LP v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 789 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Tax Ct.2003) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, a court may not apply an exemption so narrowly that it fails to give effect to the Legislature’s purpose for enacting the exemption. Indiana Dep’t of Revenue v. Kitchin Hospitality, LLC, 907 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (Ind.2009) (citation omitted).

LAW

Direct Use

The Legislature enacted the public transportation exemption to encourage the development, maintenance, and efficient provision of public transportation. Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 512 N.E.2d 906, 908 (Ind. Tax Ct.1987), aff'd by 550 N.E.2d 1277 (Ind.1990) (footnote added). The exemption states:

Transactions involving tangible personal property and services are exempt from the state gross retail [sales] tax, if the person acquiring the property or service directly uses or consumes it in providing public transportation for persons or property.

Ind.Code § 6-2.5-5-27 (2001) (emphasis added). Cases construing the words emphasized in the above statute, commonly referred to as the “single directness standard,” require property to be a “necessary and integral” part of the transportation service to qualify for exemption. See Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 460 N.E.2d 170, 177 (Ind.Ct.App.1984); see also USAir, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 623 N.E.2d 466, 471-72 (Ind. Tax Ct.1993); USAir, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 542 N.E.2d 1033, 1036 (Ind. Tax Ct.1989), aff'd by 582 N.E.2d 777 (Ind. 1991). The public transportation exemption, therefore, applies more broadly than exemptions measured by the double directness standard, e.g., manufacturing exemptions. See, e.g., Indianapolis Pub. Transp., 512 N.E.2d at 908-09; Harbor Belt, 460 N.E.2d at 172; Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Indianapolis Transit Sys., Inc., 171 Ind.App. 299, 356 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (1976). Moreover, the exemption extends to property used within a taxpayer’s continuous process of furnishing public transportation because providing effective public transportation may involve a system in which all the elements of the system must be furnished:

An item need not be in direct contact with the rails to be directly used or consumed in the rendering of public transportation. A railroad is a system and, in order for the railroad to provide effective transportation, all elements of that system must be furnished including, but not limited to, maintaining railroad lines, transporting workers, and maintaining supply and repair facilities.

Harbor Belt, 460 N.E.2d at 175. See also Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Cave Stone, Inc., 457 N.E.2d 520, 522-26 (Ind. 1983); Guardian Auto. Trim, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 811 N.E.2d 979, 982-85 (Ind. Tax Ct.2004), review denied; General Motors Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 578 N.E.2d 399, 401-04 (Ind. Tax Ct.1991), aff'd by 599 N.E.2d 588 (Ind.1992) (all discussing taxpayers’ integrated production processes).

Predominant Use

The public transportation exemption is an all-or-nothing exemption that does not permit the grant of partial exemptions. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 741 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. Tax Ct.2001), review denied. Furthermore, the exemption statute has been construed to require an item to be predominantly used, not exclusively used, in public transportation to be exempt. See Carnahan Grain, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 828 N.E.2d 465, 468-69 (Ind. Tax Ct.2005); Panhandle, 741 N.E.2d at 818-19; Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Calcar Quarries, Inc., 182 Ind. App. 84, 394 N.E.2d 939, 941 n. 1 (1979).

ANALYSIS

The parties agree about how Wendt uses the property at issue, and they agree that Wendt is generally in the business of providing public transportation. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 4-5, 25-26.) The essence of the parties’ dispute focuses on the proper way to determine whether Wendt’s purchases of tangible personal property are entitled to the public transportation exemption. Wendt claims the property at issue is entitled to exemption because it is predominantly used or consumed within its integrated public transportation process, while the Department counters that none of the property at issue is exempt because it is not directly used to furnish public transportation.

Wendt claims that nearly all of its purchases of tangible personal property at issue are exempt because it uses or consumes the property to provide public transportation in its unique, integrated public transportation process. (See Pet’r Br. at 21-22 (footnote added).) Wendt describes its integrated process as encompassing a bundle of services made up of several integrated, indivisible, and continuous steps that are all necessary or immediately linked to its provision of public transportation. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 6, 23; Pet’r Reply Br. at 1-2; Pet’r Br. at 18-20.) Wendt contends that each phase of its integrated process, beginning at the moment a customer calls for an estimate and ending with the reassembly of the machinery at the destination, involves the provision of public transportation. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 4-11.)

The Department responds, however, that Wendt’s services are provided not as an integrated public transportation process, but as nothing more than a unique, all-in-one business model that offers a menu of a la carte services, some that are public transportation and some that are not. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 32-38, 41-42; Resp’t Br. at 5-6 (footnote added).) Explaining, the Department states that Wendt’s competitors provide many of the same services on a stand-alone basis, but the property used to provide those individual services is ineligible for exemption; thus, Wendt’s similar services must be ineligible. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 23, 32, 36-41; Resp’t Br. at 3, 5 (footnote added).) The Department concludes that given individual scrutiny, not evaluation based on the relationship to Wendt’s core activity of transporting machinery on the highways, the property at issue is not exempt because it is not “directly used or consumed in providing public transportation.” (See Oral Argument Tr. at 23, 36-39 (footnote added)); see also I.C. § 6-2.5-5-27.

Direct Use

As discussed above, Wendt’s property will qualify for exemption if the evidence shows that it is “necessary and integral” to Wendt’s provision of public transportation services. See USAir, 542 N.E.2d at 1036. Moreover, the exemption extends to items directly used in a continuous, integrated public transportation process. See Harbor Belt, 460 N.E.2d at 175. Accordingly, the critical question here is whether Wendt’s property is necessary and integral to Wendt’s integrated public transportation process.

Phase 1: Project Planning

As detailed in the facts above, Wendt claims its public transportation process begins when it prepares estimates for potential customers. Wendt’s estimates are better characterized as sales activity, however, because they are intended to present the lowest bid and obtain a customer. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 27-28.) Thus, while Wendt’s estimates may be connected to its provision of public transportation, they do not always garner a customer and therefore are not necessary and integral to furnishing public transportation. Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with those portions of the public transportation regulations that deem property used for sales and other non-operational activities, such as cost projections, ineligible for exemption. See 45 Ind. Admin. Code 2.2-5-61(e), (m) (2001); see also 45 Ind. Admin. Code 2.2-5-62(f), (k) (2001). Accordingly, the Court finds that preparing estimates is not part of Wendt’s public transportation process and, therefore, property used in providing these services is not necessary and integral to Wendt’s integrated public transportation process.

In this phase, Wendt also plans transportation routes and obtains travel permits. Both are necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process because Wendt could not legally haul oversized machinery over the highways without travel permits for the route being traveled. Moreover, the public transportation regulations deem a common carrier’s purchases of items to comply with federal and state mandates, as reasonably necessary to the rendering of public transportation. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2—5—61(d); see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(e). Therefore, property used to plan the routes and obtain the travel permits is necessary and integral to Wendt’s integrated public transportation process.

Phase 2: Pre-transportation Preparations

As stated in the facts above, Wendt’s pre-transportation preparations involve the disassembly, loading, and securing of oversized machinery onto the flatbed trucks for transport. Disassembly and loading are necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process because without disassembly, the machinery would be too heavy for loading and too large for legal road transport. As just mentioned, a common carrier’s activities to comply with legal requirements are necessary and integral to furnishing public transportation. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2 — 5—61(d); see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(e); USAir, 582 N.E.2d at 778 (explaining that the public transportation exemption extends to items that are legally required for continued operations). Furthermore, although pre-transportation activities generally are excluded from the definition of public transportation, property used for the “loading and unloading of persons or property into or from transportation vehicles” is expressly included within the scope of public transportation. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2 — 5—61(f), (j); see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(g). Thus, the Court finds that Wendt’s property used to disassemble, load, and secure its customer’s machinery for subsequent movement over the highways is necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process.

Phase 3: Transportation

This phase involves the seminal activities of Wendt’s public transportation process. Wendt hauls its customers’ machinery on the highways, provides escort services, and unloads the machinery at the customer’s destination. Hauling oversized machinery over the state and federal highways is necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process because it embodies the very essence of public transportation: the movement of another’s property for consideration. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61 (b), (f); 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(c), (g). Escort services are required by federal and state law and thus are necessary and integral to the provision of public transportation. See, e.g., http:www.in.gov/dor/files/ m204.pdf (detailing Indiana’s escort vehicle requirements). In addition, unloading property from transportation vehicles is expressly included within the scope of public transportation. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(f), (j); see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(g). Accordingly, the Court finds that Wendt’s property used to transport, escort, and secure its customers’ machinery is necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process.

Phase /: Reassembly

As described in the facts above, Wendt reassembles the oversized machinery inside the customer’s new factory location. Wendt performs its reassembly services post-delivery, and reassembly services have no apparent link to any federal or state mandates. Accordingly, Wendt’s reassembly services are a convenience for its customers that are incidental to its provision of public transportation and, thus, they fall outside the ambit of public transportation. See USAir, 582 N.E.2d at 779 (affirming the denial of exemption on certain food items that were “incidental” to the taxpayer’s transportation service). Moreover, this finding is also consistent with the public transportation regulations that do not include post-transportation activities in the definition of public transportation. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-6-61(0; 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(g).

Optional Services

During the years at issue, Wendt also provided warehouse storage exclusively for the temporary storage of its customers’ in-transit property. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 82-85.) “[T]empo-rary storage is considered to be an integral part of rendering public transportation.” 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(g). Therefore, all tangible personal property used to provide warehouse storage services falls within the scope of public transportation.

Wendt also transported its customers’ machinery to third party locations for repair services. (See Trial Tr. at 59-61.) When a common carrier moves another’s property over the highways for consideration, it is providing public transportation. 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61 (b); 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(c). Therefore, the property used to provide Wendt’s transport-for-repair services also falls within the scope of public transportation.

In this case, the evidence shows that Wendt’s services are generally provided as a continuous, integrated process of transporting its customers’ oversized equipment on the highways. Wendt’s process is integrated because each phase of Wendt’s business is interrelated and dependent upon the others. For instance, without disassembling the machinery, it would be too large for road transport; without escorts accompanying the oversized loads along the highway, the equipment could not lawfully travel the roads; without using ties to secure the equipment to the trucks, efficient transportation could not be accomplished. Moreover, an argument that others could not qualify for exemption by providing one of Wendt’s component services on a stand-alone basis does not persuade the Court to disqualify individual elements of an integrated public transportation process from eligibility for exemption.

Predominant Use

Having decided what property Wendt uses for exempt and non-exempt purposes, the Court now considers whether Wendt has shown that it predominately used the tangible personal property at issue in providing public transportation. The Court has acknowledged that there are many ways to show that items are predominantly used in an exempt manner. See Indiana Waste Systems Ind., Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 644 N.E.2d 960, 961-62 (Ind.Tax Ct.1994). For example, predominate use may be shown by providing credible testimony, providing the ratio of income derived from the property’s exempt use to the income derived from its non-exempt use, providing the ratio of the time spent using the property, in an exempt manner to the time it is used in a non-exempt manner, or providing a similar ratio calculation based on volume. See id.; Calcar Quarries, 394 N.E.2d at 941.

Here, the evidence at trial established how Wendt used its property with respect to its public transportation process and optional services. {See, e.g., Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 10-89; Ex. 24 at 5-6, 10-12.) Furthermore, the uncon-troverted testimony of Mr. Jere Wendt, one of Wendt’s founding partners, established that, during the years at issue, 70 percent of the jobs Wendt performed in-volved the provision of public transportation. (See Trial Tr. at 39-40, 61-73.) The Court not only finds. Mr. Wendt’s testimony to be credible, but also finds that his testimony is corroborated by the Department’s audit findings. The auditor’s block sample shows that nearly 70 percent of Wendt’s jobs involved the exclusive provision of public transportation. Accordingly, the evidence before the Court leads to only one reasonable conclusion: between the 2001 and 2004 tax years, Wendt predominately used its property in providing public transportation, and the Department erred in concluding otherwise.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Department’s determination that the items predominately used for estimate preparations, machinery reassembly, and lawn care were not entitled to the public transportation exemption. All of the Department’s remaining determinations, however, are REVERSED. Accordingly, the Court REMANDS the matter to the Department and ORDERS it to make the necessary determinations in accordance with this opinion.

      . In the transportation industry, the process of securing machinery to fork trucks, booms, and semi-trailers is called “rigging” or "rigging out.” (See Resp't Stip. Pet'r Contentions (hereinafter “Resp't Stip.”) at 2.)

      . Wendt also provides equipment rental and in-house relocation services; these services, however, are not at issue because Wendt admits they are not associated with its provision of public transportation. (See Pet'r Reply Br. at 3; Pet'r Br. at 22.) In addition, Wendt offers conveyor and blue steel installation and industrial fabrication services, which also are not at issue because Wendt did not provide these services during the years at issue. (See Resp't Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 9-11, 32-34, 130-32.)

      . The Department also argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Wendt's two refund claims because neither was appealed within the statutorily prescribed 90-day period. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 43-45.) See Ind.Code § 6 — 8.1—9—1(c)(2) (2006) (amended 2007). The Department, however, denied Wendt's refund claims in its September 11, 2006 Letter of Findings and Wendt appealed exactly 116 days later. Therefore, Wendt timely appealed the denial of its refund claims pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-8.1-5-1 (g). See Ind.Code § 6 — 8.1—5—1(g) (2006) (providing litigants with 180 days to appeal denials of refund claims) (amended 2006).

      . A common carrier provides public transportation when it "move[s], transports], or carr[ies] persons and/or property for consideration.” See 45 Ind. Admin. Code § 2.2-5-61(b) (2001).

      . A complementary exemption from use tax applies to tangible personal property that is stored, used, or consumed in Indiana if the property is "acquired in a transaction that is wholly or partially exempt from the state gross retail [sales] tax under any part of IC 6-2.5-5, except IC 6-2.5-5-24(b), and the property is being used, stored, or consumed for the purpose for which it was exempted.” Ind. Code § 6-2.5-3-4(a)(2) (2001).

      . The Department promulgated 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61 and 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62 to conform with the decision in Harbor Belt, which construed Indiana Code § 6-2.5-5-27; nonetheless, these regulations apply to all public transportation systems. See USAir, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 623 N.E.2d 466, 471-72 (Ind. Tax Ct.1993). Moreover, the Court notes that these regulations condition qualification for exemption on whether the tangible personal property is "reasonably necessary” or "indispensable and essential” to the rendering of public transportation. See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(c); 45 Ind. Admin. Code 2.2-5-62(d) (2001). The regulations, however, must be construed harmoniously with the "necessary and integral” standard established by case law. See USAir, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 542 N.E.2d 1033, 1036 (Ind. Tax Ct.1989), aff’d by 582 N.E.2d 111 (Ind. 1991).

      . Wendt concedes that its purchases of greeting cards, Camaro tires, certain magazine subscriptions, and certain beams are taxable. (See Trial Tr. at 70-78, 82-83; Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 68-69, 74, 89-90.)

      . The Department also claims that because Wendt admitted, during the administrative proceedings, that some of its services did not involve public transportation, all property predominately used in providing those services is taxable. (See Resp’t Br. at 4-5 (citing Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 1, Ex. 10 at 2).) The Department is incorrect because admissions made at the administrative level are not binding here. See Horseshoe Hammond, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 865 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. Tax Ct.2007), review denied.

      .The Department also suggests that including Wendt's public transportation process and optional services within the scope of the public transportation exemption provides Wendt with an unfair business advantage over its competitors and treats Wendt differently than other taxpayers. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 32-34.) The Department, however, has not supported its implied equal protection claim with any analysis; therefore, the claim is waived. See Scopelite v. Indiana Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 939 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. Tax Ct.2010) (explaining that poorly developed and non-cogent arguments are subject to waiver).

      . Common carriers that fail to obtain permits for the transport of oversized and overweight loads are subject to fines. See Ind. Code § 9-20-6-1 et seq. (2001) (oversized/overweight permits); see also Ind.Code § 9-20-5-1 et seq. (2001) (regarding Indiana’s heavy and extra-heavy duty highways); Motor Carrier Services Commercial Motor Vehicle Guidebook, available at http://www.in.gov.dor/4194. htm; Oversized/Overweight (OSW) Vehicle Permitting Handbook, available at http:// www.in.gov.dor/4194.htm.

      . See, e.g., Ind.Code § 9-20-3-1 et seq. (2001) (width, length, and height restrictions); Ind.Code § 9-20-4-1 et seq. (2001) (weight restrictions); 23 C.F.R. § 658.5 (2012) (defining non-divisible load); 23 C.F.R. §§ 658.13, 658.15, 658.17 (2012) (length, width, and weight restrictions).

      . During disassembly, Wendt labels the pieces of the machinery to facilitate reassembly. Although done at the time of disassem-bly, the property used to provide this service will be treated in the same manner as other items used in reassembly.

      . As an initial matter, and as previously explained, the public transportation exemption does not permit the grant of partial exemptions; consequently, the Department erred in granting Wendt a partial exemption. See Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 741 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. Tax Ct.2001), review denied.

      . More precisely, the auditor used a block sample of Wendt’s January 2004 through March 2004 receipts, which consisted of 261 separate invoices, that he allocated in whole or in part to eight categories of exempt and non-exempt services. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 1, Exs. 6-7.) The auditor’s workpapers show that 177 invoices were associated with the provision of exempt services (i.e., disas-sembly, rigging/repair services, trucking, loading, and warehouse storage), and 84 of the invoices involve either the exclusive or partial provision of non-exempt services (i.e., equipment rental/parts fabrication, load/trans-pori/unload/set & level, and in-house reloca-tions). (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 1, Ex. 7.) The resulting ratio is 68% exempt to 32% non-exempt.