source: Caselaw Access Project

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text:
    Terrell JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 1-17-0710
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.
    May 31, 2018
    Michael O'Malley Kurtz, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Frederick J. Sudekum III, Florence M. Schumacher, and Siobhan L. Dower, of Sudekum, Cassidy & Shulruff, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellee.
   JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Generally, if a party to an action in the circuit court is sent to mandatory arbitration and does not prevail-or does not prevail to its satisfaction-that party may reject the award and demand a trial. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 93 (eff. Jan. 1, 1997) gives that party 30 days after the filing of the award to file a rejection. Since 2014, by local rule, the circuit court of Cook County has instituted a mandatory arbitration program (for certain commercial cases valued at $75,000 or less) that allows a party only seven business days to reject the arbitration award and demand.

¶ 2 The threshold question here is whether that local rule, seemingly in conflict with an Illinois Supreme Court rule, is thus invalid. We hold that the rule is valid, because the Illinois Supreme Court authorized the Cook County mandatory arbitration program and thus approved any deviations between that program's rules and the supreme court's rules.

¶ 3 We further hold that plaintiff, who failed to object within seven day of the award's entry, is thus bound by that judgment and may not voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit to avoid that result.

¶ 4 We affirm the circuit court's judgment in all respects.

¶ 5 I

¶ 6 A

¶ 7 Plaintiff Terrell Jones obtained an automobile insurance policy in October 2014 from defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). A few months later, plaintiff filed a claim, stating that his insured vehicle and personal property in the vehicle had been stolen. State Farm ultimately denied the claim, based on what it alleged to be intentional misrepresentations and concealments made by plaintiff concerning the claim.

¶ 8 Plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging breach of contract and bad-faith denial of insurance coverage. The case was assigned to a commercial calendar in the circuit court's law division. After the bad-faith count was dismissed, the case was referred to commercial calendar mandatory arbitration. On December 2, 2016, an award in favor of defendant was entered. Nineteen days later, on December 21, 2016, plaintiff filed his rejection of that award.

¶ 9 On December 30, 2016, plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff's rejection of the award was untimely, and he thus did not have a right either to proceed to trial or to voluntarily dismiss his case. The court entered judgment on the arbitration award. This appeal followed.

¶ 10 B

¶ 11 The mandatory arbitration system was first authorized by the General Assembly in 1986 (Pub. Act 84-844 (eff. Jan. 1, 1986) (adding Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, ¶ 2-1001A, now codified at 735 ILCS 5/2-1001A ) ) and implemented the following year by the Illinois Supreme Court via the adoption of Illinois Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95. See Stemple v. Pickerill , 377 Ill. App. 3d 788, 790-91, 316 Ill.Dec. 654, 879 N.E.2d 1042 (2007) ; Kolar v. Arlington Toyota, Inc. , 286 Ill. App. 3d 43, 45, 221 Ill.Dec. 539, 675 N.E.2d 963 (1996), aff'd sub nom ., Cruz v. Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc. , 179 Ill. 2d 271, 227 Ill.Dec. 960, 688 N.E.2d 653 (1997). See generally Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 86 to 95 (eff. June 1, 1987). Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 86(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1994), the supreme court may approve a judicial circuit's request to implement a mandatory arbitration program and, in fact, may direct judicial circuits to do so even if they do not so request.

¶ 12 The circuit court of Cook County first chose to implement a mandatory arbitration program in 1990, with the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court. See Cruz , 179 Ill. 2d at 273, 227 Ill.Dec. 960, 688 N.E.2d 653. That program, governed by part 18 of the Circuit Court Rules of Cook County, is not at issue in this appeal. See generally Cook County Cir. Ct. Rs. 18.1 to 18.11.

¶ 13 In 2014, Cook County proposed a mandatory arbitration program for certain commercial cases. In an order dated September 25, 2014, the Illinois Supreme Court approved the request of the circuit court of Cook County to implement a two-year pilot program of mandatory arbitration for commercial cases assigned to the commercial calendar section of the law division, where the amount in controversy was $75,000 or less. See Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 9166 (eff. Oct. 1, 2014).

¶ 14 Following the supreme court's approval, the local rules implementing this program were adopted by a majority of the judges of the circuit court of Cook County on November 26, 2014, and made effective December 1, 2014. See Cook County Cir. Ct. R. 25.17 (Dec. 1, 2014). The rules are found in part 25 of the Circuit Court Rules of Cook County, titled "Law Division Mandatory Arbitration, Commercial Calendar Section." Cook County Cir. Ct. Rs. 25.1 to 25.17 (Dec. 1, 2014).

¶ 15 Among these rules in part 25, local rule 25.11 provided that "[e]ither party may reject the [arbitration] award if the rejecting party does so within seven business days after receiving the notice of the award from the Administrator." Cook County Cir. Ct. R. 25.11 (Dec. 1, 2014).

¶ 16 Roughly two years later, the Illinois Supreme Court issued an order providing that the two-year pilot program "shall continue on a permanent basis until further order of the Court" and that it "shall continue to be administered through local rules." Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 9166 (eff. Oct. 1, 2016).

¶ 17 It is undisputed that since the adoption of local rule 25.11 in 2014, the language of that rule has remained the same-it has always provided for a seven-business-day window for rejecting arbitration awards in these Cook County commercial cases.

¶ 18 II

¶ 19 A

¶ 20 The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying, as untimely, plaintiff's rejection of the arbitration award. Specifically, plaintiff claims that local rule 25.11's seven-day window is invalid, because it conflicts with the provisions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 93(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1997), which provides a disappointed party 30 days to reject an award. Our review is de novo , as our task is to interpret local and Supreme Court rules and determine their compatibility. See Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas , 226 Ill. 2d 334, 342, 314 Ill.Dec. 778, 875 N.E.2d 1065 (2007).

¶ 21 Like any other statute, ordinance, or rule, local court rules have the force of law and are presumed to be valid unless the challenging party carries its burden of establishing otherwise. See, e.g. , Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. American National Bank of Chicago , 276 Ill. App. 3d 816, 834, 213 Ill.Dec. 128, 658 N.E.2d 877 (1995) ; People v. Joseph , 113 Ill. 2d 36, 41, 99 Ill.Dec. 120, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n , 86 Ill. 2d 60, 71, 55 Ill.Dec. 552, 426 N.E.2d 877 (1981).

¶ 22 Plaintiff's argument is straightforward. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 86(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 1994) provides that "[e]ach judicial circuit court may adopt rules for the conduct of arbitration proceedings which are consistent with these rules ." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2008), speaking more generally to all local rules adopted, requires that local rules be "consistent with" Illinois Supreme Court rules. Cook County's local rule 25.11 (Cook County Cir. Ct. R. 25.11 (Dec. 1, 2014) ), providing only seven business days to reject an arbitration award, is plainly inconsistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 93(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1997), which requires a rejection "[w]ithin 30 days after the filing of an award." Thus, plaintiff reasons, Supreme Court Rule 93 trumps local rule 25.11, and the latter's seven-business-day deadline may not be validly enforced against plaintiff.

¶ 23 Plaintiff is correct that local rule 25.11 is inconsistent with Supreme Court Rule 93(a). No principle of construction could allow us to read a seven-business-day deadline as compatible with a 30-day one. Nor is there any doubt that a local rule must yield to a conflicting Illinois Supreme Court rule. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley , 119 Ill. 2d 485, 491, 116 Ill.Dec. 683, 519 N.E.2d 898 (1988) ; Phalen v. Groeteke , 293 Ill. App. 3d 469, 470-71, 228 Ill.Dec. 95, 688 N.E.2d 793 (1997).

¶ 24 State Farm's response is just as simple: Cook County's local rules for this arbitration program, including local rule 25.11, are valid because the Illinois Supreme Court said so-at least once, if not twice. The supreme court first approved the implementation of this mandatory arbitration program in 2014, as a pilot program, and then ordered its permanent implementation in 2016. That approval, says State Farm, subsumed not only the mandatory arbitration program in general but the specific local rules governing it, as well.

¶ 25 If State Farm is correct that the supreme court approved these local rules, and not just the mandatory arbitration program generally, our inquiry is at an end. There is no question that the supreme court has the authority to permit or mandate the implementation of a court program that otherwise would be incompatible with its own rules.

¶ 26 The Illinois Constitution vests the supreme court with general administrative and supervisory authority over all courts. People v. Peterson , 2017 IL 120331, ¶¶ 29, 31, 423 Ill.Dec. 776, 106 N.E.3d 944 (supreme court "retains primary constitutional authority over court procedure"); Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16. This authority "extends to 'the adjudication and application of law and the procedural administration of the courts.' " City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B. , 211 Ill. 2d 456, 470, 286 Ill.Dec. 75, 813 N.E.2d 132 (2004) (quoting Kunkel v. Walton , 179 Ill. 2d 519, 528, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047 (1997) ). Its authority is " 'unlimited in extent' " and " 'undefined in character.' " People v. Lyles , 217 Ill. 2d 210, 217, 298 Ill.Dec. 752, 840 N.E.2d 1187 (2005) (quoting McDunn v. Williams , 156 Ill. 2d 288, 302, 189 Ill.Dec. 417, 620 N.E.2d 385 (1993) ). It permits the court to take action that is otherwise inconsistent with Illinois Supreme Court rules. McDunn , 156 Ill. 2d at 301, 189 Ill.Dec. 417, 620 N.E.2d 385 (supervisory authority is "extraordinary power" that is "hampered by no specific rules or means for its exercise" (internal quotation marks omitted) ).

¶ 27 For example, though Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) provides that an appellate court loses jurisdiction of an appeal if no petition for rehearing is filed within 21 days after judgment, the supreme court, in its discretion, could reinstate the appeal and allow a late petition for rehearing. Lyles , 217 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 298 Ill.Dec. 752, 840 N.E.2d 1187. The appellate court may not excuse noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 367, but the supreme court reserves the supervisory authority to do so where appropriate. Id. Likewise, though the appellate court could not allow a late notice of appeal in light of the applicable Illinois Supreme Court rules on direct criminal appeals, the supreme court, in the exercise of its supervisory authority, could. See People v. Moore , 133 Ill. 2d 331, 339-40, 140 Ill.Dec. 385, 549 N.E.2d 1257 (1990) ; Lyles , 217 Ill. 2d at 217, 298 Ill.Dec. 752, 840 N.E.2d 1187 (discussing Moore ).

¶ 28 The supreme court possesses no less authority to excuse noncompliance with Rule 93's 30-day rejection period than it did in excusing noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 367 or noncompliance with its rules governing the timing of criminal appeals. We find nothing in the Illinois Constitution or in precedent suggesting that our supreme court lacks the authority to approve a circuit's mandatory arbitration program even if, as here, one or more of the provisions of the program were incompatible with certain Illinois Supreme Court rules.

¶ 29 But plaintiff says that, even if the supreme court had the authority to approve these local Cook County rules, there is no indication that, in fact, it did so. In plaintiff's view, the supreme court did "nothing more than authorize the creation of a program" and did not specifically approve Cook County's local rules for that program.

¶ 30 The initial order the supreme court entered on September 25, 2014, reads, in full:

"Effective October 1, 2014, the request of the Circuit Court of Cook County for approval of a mandatory arbitration pilot program for commercial cases assigned to the Commercial Calendar Section of the Law Division where the amount in controversy is $75,000 or less is approved. The program is approved as a two-year pilot program. The program will be administered through local rules." Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 9166 (eff. Oct. 1, 2014).

¶ 31 As plaintiff notes, the order does not specify whether Cook County's "request"

included a set of proposed rules, as opposed to a more general request for this mandatory arbitration program, rules unseen and unknown. And the local rules themselves were not adopted by the circuit court of Cook County until two months after the supreme court's order-November 26, 2014-which only makes sense, as there would have been no reason to even consider formally adopting rules until the supreme court had given the program the green light. Still, as plaintiff argues, there is no affirmative indication that the supreme court was presented with any proposed rules regarding this pilot program before the supreme court approved the program. We have been directed to no source answering this question one way or the other, nor have we found any independently.

¶ 32 But for the reasons we explain below, plaintiff has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the supreme court did not approve these Cook County local rules.

¶ 33 First, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2008) requires that, when a judicial circuit adopts rules, those local rules "shall be filed with the Administrative Director within 10 days after they are adopted." The "administrative director," or the director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (AOIC), is appointed by the supreme court, reporting directly to the chief justice, and is "generally responsible for the enforcement of the rules, orders, policies and directives of the Supreme Court and the chief justice relating to matters of administration." Ill. S. Ct. R. 30(b) (eff. July 1, 2017); see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16. So at the very least, the supreme court received the rules within 10 days of their adoption-that is, in December 2014-if not directly, then through its administrative arm, the AOIC.

¶ 34 And second, as we have noted, after the program had been up and running for two years, the supreme court issued an order making the program permanent. See Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 9166 (eff. Oct. 1, 2016) (directing that Cook County's two-year pilot program "shall continue on a permanent basis until further order of the Court"). The order also directed that the program "shall continue to be administered through local rules." Id.

¶ 35 The supreme court, in that 2016 order, could have directed Cook County to follow the Illinois Supreme Court rules directly, or to adopt rules that were consistent with the relevant supreme court rules to the letter. If the supreme court had been concerned with the fact that certain of these local rules were inconsistent with the supreme court mandatory arbitration rules, it defies belief that the court would have passed on the opportunity to say so at that time.

¶ 36 The only other possible explanation is that the Supreme Court did not know that these local rules were incompatible with the Illinois Supreme Court rules when it ordered the program's permanent implementation in 2016. Plaintiff's counsel assured us, at oral argument, that plaintiff is not making that claim. And for good reason: The supreme court carefully oversees the mandatory arbitration programs in the various circuits, in various ways.

¶ 37 For example, the AOIC's court services division includes a program unit, which is responsible for "[o]versight and support of all Mandatory Arbitration Programs, including the guidance and collection of arbitration program statistics." See Administrative Office Divisions-Court Services , Illinois Courts, http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Administrative/CtServ.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). The supreme court has also created the Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinating Committee (ADR Committee), which "monitors and assesses court-annexed mandatory arbitration and civil mediation programs approved by the Supreme Court" and, "[a]long with the [AOIC] *** tracks statistics for each ADR program to monitor program effectiveness and trends." Judge Mark S. Goodwin, Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinating Committee , in 2016 Annual Report of the Illinois Courts Administrative Summary 21 (2016), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2016/2016_Admin_Summary.pdf. That committee "also makes recommendations for new or amended Supreme Court Rules that improve each program's process and performance." Id.

¶ 38 Because the supreme court approved these local rules, notwithstanding their various conflicts with the Illinois Supreme Court rules, and because the supreme court's supervisory and administrative authority vested it with the authority to do so, local rule 25.11 is valid and enforceable. The circuit court correctly enforced that local rule in deeming plaintiff's rejection of the arbitration award, filed 19 days after its entry, untimely.

¶ 39 B

¶ 40 We next consider whether the trial court, having denied plaintiff's rejection of the arbitration award as untimely, erred in denying plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss his suit.

¶ 41 The right to a voluntary dismissal is not absolute. The supreme court has held, for example, that a motion to dismiss based on lack of diligence in service of process must be considered before allowing a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss its action and re-file it. O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital , 112 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 97 Ill.Dec. 449, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986). The court reasoned that the requirement of due diligence is embodied in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 1982), while the right to voluntarily dismiss and re-file are provided by statute ( Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, ¶¶ 2-1009, 13-217 ), and the supreme court's rule controlled over the statutory provisions. O'Connell , 112 Ill. 2d at 281, 97 Ill.Dec. 449, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (" '[W]here a rule of this court on a matter within the court's authority and a statute on the same subject conflict, the rule will prevail .' " (Emphasis in original.) (quoting People v. Cox , 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274, 45 Ill.Dec. 190, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980) ) ); see also Bochantin v. Petroff , 145 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 163 Ill.Dec. 848, 582 N.E.2d 114 (1991) (noting that O'Connell "was based on the conflict between the legislatively enacted Code of Civil Procedure and this court's rules").

¶ 42 As such, this court has twice held that a plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss a complaint to avoid an arbitration award it failed to reject. In George v. Ospalik , 299 Ill. App. 3d 888, 889, 234 Ill.Dec. 328, 702 N.E.2d 982 (1998), the plaintiffs did not reject an arbitration award and, more than 30 days later, sought to voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit, arguing that section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 1996) ) allowed them to voluntarily dismiss at any time. We held that this right to dismiss was not absolute, and that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 93(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1997) required the plaintiffs to reject the award within 30 days of its entry. George , 299 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90, 234 Ill.Dec. 328, 702 N.E.2d 982. We agreed with the defendant that "allowing a voluntary dismissal without a rejection of the arbitration award would render the mandatory arbitration process meaningless." Id. at 890, 234 Ill.Dec. 328, 702 N.E.2d 982.

¶ 43 In a similar vein, we held that a plaintiff could not voluntarily dismiss a suit after waiving her right to reject an arbitration award by failing to appear at the arbitration. Arnett v. Young , 269 Ill. App. 3d 858, 861, 207 Ill.Dec. 178, 646 N.E.2d 1265 (1995). Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 91 (eff. June 1, 1993), the plaintiff's failure to appear at the arbitration constituted a waiver of her right to reject, and we reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to avoid this result through a voluntary dismissal would "obliterate the substance of Rule 91" and "permit a party to ignore the arbitration hearing without any cost to herself." Arnett , 269 Ill. App. 3d at 861, 207 Ill.Dec. 178, 646 N.E.2d 1265. We also emphasized that the Illinois Supreme Court rule controlled over the statute in the event of conflict. Id.

¶ 44 In each of these cases, the disappointed plaintiff waived the right to reject the arbitration award, either by failing to do so within 30 days or by failing to attend the arbitration hearing. Likewise, here, plaintiff's failure to reject the arbitration award within seven business days constituted a waiver of his right under local rule 25.11(c). See Cook County Cir. Ct. R. 25.11(c) (Dec. 1, 2014) ("Failure to timely and properly reject the award as provided herein will constitute a waiver of the party's right of rejection.").

¶ 45 Plaintiff acknowledges this body of law but says that this case is different, because here, the voluntary-dismissal statute does not conflict with an Illinois Supreme Court rule-it conflicts with a local rule. It is true that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2008) provides that local rules adopted by a circuit court shall be "consistent with these rules and the statutes of the State." The case law so provides, as well. See, e.g. , People v. Atou , 372 Ill. App. 3d 78, 82, 310 Ill.Dec. 113, 865 N.E.2d 437 (2007) (local court rules "may not abrogate, limit or modify existing law," including statutory speedy-trial provision (internal quotation marks omitted) ). Thus, plaintiff reasons, local rule 25.11 must yield to the statutory right to voluntarily dismiss under section 2-1009.

¶ 46 But not all local rules need be approved by the supreme court. Mandatory arbitration programs, on the other hand, require supreme court approval. Ill. S. Ct. R. 86(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1994). And our holding above-that the supreme court approved Cook County's local rules for this mandatory arbitration program-takes these local rules beyond the general doctrine that local rules cannot conflict with state statutes and into the related rule that the supreme court's authority over court procedure supersedes any conflicting statutory provision on the same subject. It makes no difference whether the supreme court exercised its authority to adopt a rule of its own on this subject or whether, as here, it entered an order approving a local rule on that subject. The supreme court's word in this regard is the final one.

¶ 47 We thus adhere to our holdings in George and Arnett . Plaintiff was not entitled to a voluntary dismissal to avoid an arbitration award he failed to timely reject. If we permitted plaintiff to avoid the consequences of his failure to timely reject the award via a voluntary dismissal, we would significantly impair the mandatory arbitration process. The traditional rule of waiver for failure to timely reject would have no teeth, easily thwarted by a non-suiting of the action. It would also render the process quite one-sided, as a disappointed plaintiff would possess a statutory "out" to avoid an unfavorable arbitration award while leaving a defendant-having no similar ability to voluntarily dismiss-without the same option. When the supreme court approved these local rules, we cannot imagine it would have countenanced such a result.

¶ 48 The circuit court correctly denied plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss the action.

¶ 49 III

¶ 50 The court's judgment is affirmed in all respects.

¶ 51 Affirmed.

Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Gordon concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      We may judicially notice reports and data officially provided by our supreme court and the AOIC. See, e.g. , Gundlach v. Lind , 353 Ill. App. 3d 677, 683, 289 Ill.Dec. 493, 820 N.E.2d 1 (2004) ; Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 (2003).


text:
    IN RE LIQUIDATION OF LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
    (People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Jennifer Hammer, Director of Illinois Department of Insurance, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, an Illinois domestic property and casualty mutual company, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, an Illinois domestic property and casualty mutual company, and American Motorists Insurance Company, an Illinois domestic stock insurance company, Defendants,
    (California Insurance Guarantee Association, Claimant-Appellee)).
    No. 1-17-0996
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SIXTH DIVISION.
    Opinion filed: June 1, 2018
    Joel A. Haber, James L. Oakley, and Patrick Morales-Doyle, of Thompson Coburn LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Rowe W. Snider, Hugh S. Balsam, Ashlee M. Knuckey, and Alyssa M. Falk, of Locke Lord LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.
    Eric M. Madiar, of Madiar Government Relations, of Springfield, and Office of the California Attorney General, of Los Angeles, California (Lisa W. Chan, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel), for amicus curiae Dave Jones, Insurance Commissioner of the State of California.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Jennifer Hammer, Director of Insurance (Director), brought this action against the defendants, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, and American Motorists Insurance Company (collectively referred to as "Lumbermens"), seeking to liquidate Lumbermens' assets. The Director filed a petition for the interim allowance of claims for administrative expenses of certain guaranty associations. The claimant, California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), objected on grounds that the petition improperly required it to reimburse itself from funds held in a special deposit. The circuit court sustained CIGA's objection, finding that California law prohibited CIGA from using special deposits to pay for general administrative expenses. The Director filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 304(b)(2) ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(2) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) ), seeking reversal of that order. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 The facts giving rise to the instant appeal are not in dispute. Lumbermens is a multi-state property and casualty insurance company organized under the laws of Illinois. Among other things, it provided workers' compensation insurance services to California residents. California insurance law required Lumbermens to "deposit cash instruments" or "interest bearing securities" at a California bank (hereinafter referred to as a "special deposit"), which would be held in trust for the benefit of "workers in [that] state" as a condition to Lumbermens writing workers' compensation insurance in California. See Cal. Ins. Code § 11691 (West 2012). By requiring insurance carriers to maintain such special deposits, California ensures that adequate funds are available to pay compensable workers' compensation claims in the event that the insurer becomes insolvent.

¶ 3 For many years, Lumbermens was successful and earned profits from its insurance operations and, by year-end 2000, it ranked among the top 20 largest property and casualty insurance companies and the top 5 largest workers' compensation insurers in the United States with $2.7 billion in net premiums and more than $2 billion in surplus. The four largest states for its insurance business were California, Illinois, New York, and Texas, which collectively comprised more than 40% of the insurance group's insurance business. Beginning in 2003, however, Lumbermens began suffering from certain financial difficulties and, in July 2003, the company agreed to operate under a runoff plan subject to "corrective orders" issued by the Director. See 215 ILCS 5/186.1 (West 2002). During this time, the Director issued over 500 corrective orders and Lumbermens' liability was reduced from nearly $7 billion to just under $1 billion.

¶ 4 Nonetheless, in August 2012, the Director filed a complaint for rehabilitation pursuant to section 192 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code) ( 215 ILCS 5/192 (West 2012) ). The Director alleged that Lumbermens' financial condition rendered further transaction of business by the company hazardous to its policyholders, its creditors, and the public. The board of directors of Lumbermens voted to submit voluntarily to rehabilitation proceedings, and on August 16, 2012, an agreed order was entered appointing the Director rehabilitator of the company.

¶ 5 On March 8, 2013, the Director filed a complaint for liquidation with a finding of insolvency pursuant to section 188 of the Code ( 215 ILCS 5/188 (West 2012) ). On May 8, 2013, the circuit court entered an order of liquidation with a finding of insolvency and authorized the Director to liquidate Lumbermens. The liquidation order triggered the statutory obligations of state guaranty associations, such as CIGA, to pay the covered claims of Lumbermens' insureds located within their respective states.

¶ 6 On May 28, 2013, shortly after the circuit court entered the liquidation order, the Commissioner of the California Department of Insurance issued an administrative order pursuant to section 11698(a) of the California Insurance Code ( Cal. Ins. Code § 11698(a) (West 2012) ), directing that the funds held in Lumbermens' special deposit be immediately transferred to CIGA and held in a segregated account. Tracking the language of section 11698.3(b), the administrative order states, in pertinent part, as follows:

"AND, FURTHER, that CIGA shall use the proceeds of the workers' compensation deposit and any interest earned thereon * * * solely in accordance with the provisions of CIC section 11698.3(b) for the payment of compensable workers' compensation claims arising under the insolvent insurer's policies and which are otherwise covered claims, * * * and all expenses related thereto."

Finally, the administrative order provides that "CIGA shall return the surplus to the Liquidator of [the Lumbermens Estate]."

¶ 7 In the months following entry of the liquidation order, guaranty associations began adjusting claims under Lumbermens' policies and also began submitting claims to the Director for reimbursement of administrative expenses related to the payment of covered claims.

¶ 8 On November 19, 2014, the Director filed a petition for the interim allowance of claims for administrative expenses of certain state guaranty associations pursuant to section 205(1)(a) of the Code ( 215 ILCS 5/205(1)(a) (West 2014) ). A key element in the Director's petition was the treatment of guaranty associations that had access to Lumbermens' special deposits. Some guaranty associations, such as CIGA, had access to the special deposit that Lumbermens posted as a condition of entering that state's insurance marketplace. Other guaranty associations, however, did not have access to special deposits or, if they did, had either returned the deposit to Lumbermens or already used the funds by paying covered claims.

¶ 9 Relevant here, the Director's petition provides that the amount distributed to a guaranty association for administrative expenses would be reduced by the amount that the guaranty association has received, or can receive, from a special deposit. In other words, guaranty associations such as CIGA would be required to exhaust the funds held in their state's special deposit before they could receive disbursements for administrative expenses from the general assets of the Lumbermens estate. The Director sought to prevent guaranty associations from receiving a preference by virtue of having access to a special deposit.

¶ 10 In January 2016, CIGA filed the instant objection to the Director's petition. It argued that, under California law, it could not use the special deposit to reimburse itself for general administrative expenses such as rent, postage, telephone, lighting, cleaning, heating, and electricity because those expenses are not "related" to the payment of a "compensable workers' compensation claim." More specifically, CIGA argued that, pursuant to section 11698.3(b) of the California Insurance Code, special deposits shall only be used to pay "compensable workers' compensation claims" and "all expenses related thereto." Cal. Ins. Code § 11698.3(b) (West 2012). According to CIGA, the phrase "all expenses related thereto" applies to "allocated loss adjustment expenses" (ALAE), which are expenses attributable to the processing of specific insurance claims. CIGA argued that the imposition of an exhaustion requirement is not only contrary to California law, but defeats the purpose of the special deposit-namely, to protect California residents who had workers' compensation insurance with Lumbermens. Second, CIGA argued that the Director is required under Illinois law to "promptly pay the guaranty associations' expenses out of estate assets within [her] control " (emphasis in original), and may not discriminate or give preferential treatment to guaranty associations based on whether or not they have access to a special deposit. The record reflects that CIGA had submitted over $8 million in general administrative expenses for which it sought reimbursement.

¶ 11 In response, the Director argued that special deposits are general assets of the Lumbermens estate and, because she has title to those funds, it is appropriate for the circuit court to approve her petition requiring guaranty associations with access to special deposits to reimburse themselves for administrative expenses. The Director also disputed CIGA's claim regarding the use of funds held in California's special deposit. She asserted that the phrase "all expenses related thereto" in section 11698.3(b) of the California Insurance Code is plain and unambiguous and applies to both ALAE and general administrative expenses incurred by CIGA in adjusting workers' compensation claims by Lumbermens policyholders.

¶ 12 Following a hearing on the objection, the circuit court entered a written order on March 22, 2017, finding that section 11698.3(b) of the California Insurance Code did not authorize CIGA to use special deposit funds to reimburse itself for general administrative expenses. In so holding, the court agreed with CIGA's argument that the phrase "all expenses related thereto" applies only to ALAE. In so holding, the court reasoned that section 11698.3(b) should be "harmonized" with section 11698.02 of the California Insurance Code ( id. § 11698.02 ), which similarly restricts the use of special deposit proceeds to the payment of "compensable workers' compensation claims" and "allocated claims expense[s] necessary to pay those claims." It further reasoned that the Director's broad interpretation of section 11698.3(b) would produce a result inconsistent with "clearly expressed legislative intent of [the California Insurance Code], as millions of dollars would go to overhead costs of CIGA and not to insured workers of California for whom the funds are reserved." Therefore, the circuit court sustained CIGA's objection to the Director's petition for the interim allowance of claims of certain guaranty associations for administrative expenses. The Director filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 304(b)(2) ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(2) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) ), seeking reversal of that order.

¶ 13 In urging reversal of the circuit court's order, the Director contends that the funds held in special deposits are "general assets" of the Lumbermens estate and, therefore, are subject to distribution under the priority scheme set forth in section 205(1)(a) of the Code. In addition, she argues that the circuit court erred in construing section 11698.3(b) of the California Insurance Code.

¶ 14 The disposition of this appeal hinges on our construction of articles XIII and XIII½ of the Code, as well as article 1 of the California Insurance Code. Article XIII of the Code provides the basic mechanism for the liquidation of Lumbermens. 215 ILCS 5/187 et seq. (West 2012). Article XIII½, commonly referred to as the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA), governs "the affairs of delinquent domestic companies" that have assets and liabilities in multiple states. 215 ILCS 5/221.1 et seq. (West 2012). Meanwhile, article 1 of the California Insurance Code governs special deposits by workers' compensation insurers. "Because the construction of a statute presents a question of law, we review the underlying judgment de novo ." Manago v. County of Cook , 2017 IL 121078, ¶ 10, 419 Ill.Dec. 1, 92 N.E.3d 412. "In construing a statute, our goal is to effectuate the intent of the legislature, with the plain and unambiguous language enacted providing the most reliable indicator of that intent." Id. Whenever possible, courts must enforce clear and unambiguous statutory language as written, without reading in unstated exceptions, conditions, or limitations. People ex rel. Glasgow v. Carlson , 2016 IL 120544, ¶ 17, 410 Ill.Dec. 954, 72 N.E.3d 340.

¶ 15 In order to put this dispute into perspective, we begin our analysis by setting forth the statutory framework governing the liquidation of multi-state insurance companies. The liquidation of insurance companies doing business in multiple states presents unique problems that have been alleviated in many states, to some extent, by the adoption in one form or another of the UILA. The UILA was created to facilitate coordination among the states for the orderly resolution of insolvent insurance companies. Because insurers are barred from seeking federal bankruptcy protection, the UILA establishes an alternative statutory scheme and provides a uniform method for processing claims against, and distributing assets of, insolvent insurance companies with assets and policyholders in multiple jurisdictions throughout the United States. See 215 ILCS 5/221.10 (West 2012) (the purpose of the UILA "is to promote uniformity in the liquidation, rehabilitation, reorganization or conservation of insurers doing business in more than one state."). One of the core "embarrassments" that the UILA sought to remedy was "the ineffective administration of the liquidation process caused by differences in the laws of the various States regarding the title and right to possession of the property of a defunct nonresident insurer." Murphy Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co. , 54 N.Y.2d 69, 76-77, 444 N.Y.S.2d 592, 429 N.E.2d 111 (1981). The UILA employs two primary mechanisms to accomplish its uniform scheme. First, it provides a uniform set of laws to determine issues such as preference and control and title to assets. Second, and more relevant to the analysis here, the UILA establishes a receivership system to enhance cooperation between reciprocal states in which the insolvent insurance company did business.

¶ 16 Under the UILA, when an insurer is declared insolvent, a domiciliary receiver will be appointed to assume possession and control of the insurer and its assets in the state where the insurer is incorporated or organized. 215 ILCS 5/221.1(4) (West 2012). The domiciliary receiver is then entitled to recover the assets, "except as to special deposits," of the insurer in reciprocal states. Id. § 221.2. If the insurer has sufficient assets located within another state, however, an ancillary receiver may be appointed in that state with the sole right to recover the assets of the insurer located within that state and to settle certain claims related to such domestic assets of the insurer that are under the ancillary receiver's control. Id. Under the UILA, ancillary proceedings in reciprocal states are intended to resolve claims related exclusively to special deposit claims and secured claims in those states, with all remaining assets to be transferred to the domiciliary receiver. Id. § 221.8.

¶ 17 Illinois's policy regarding the domiciliary receiver's authority over the general assets of an insolvent insurance company's estate, and the ancillary receiver's authority over special deposits, is consistent with the policy in California, which adopted the UILA in article 14.3 of the California Insurance Code. See Cal. Ins. Code § 1064.1 et seq. (West 2012). The provisions of California's UILA concerning interstate relations mimic those of Illinois's. By adopting the UILA, both states seek to secure equal treatment for all creditors of defunct insurance companies, wherever situated.

¶ 18 With this framework in mind, we now turn to the Director's contention that funds held in special deposits are "general assets" of the Lumbermens estate and, thus, subject to the distribution scheme set forth in section 205(1) of the Code. In support of her argument, the Director cites to section 187(6) of the Code, which defines "assets" as "all deposits and funds of a special or trust nature." 215 ILCS 5/187(6) (West 2012). The definition relied upon by the Director, however, is taken from article XIII of the Code and is expressly limited to the provisions of that article. See id. ("The word 'assets' as used in this Article includes all deposits and funds of a special or trust nature." (Emphasis added.) ). Because Lumbermens is a domestic insurance company with assets and liabilities in multiple states, and since the special deposit in question is located in California, a reciprocal state, the provisions of article XIII½ (i.e. , the UILA) apply. See 215 ILCS 5/221.1 ("this Article shall apply to the administration by the Director of the affairs of delinquent domestic companies with respect to matters affecting or related to reciprocal states"). Therefore, we rely upon the definition of "general assets" appearing in the UILA.

¶ 19 Section 221.1(6) of the UILA defines "[g]eneral [a]ssets" as "all property, real or personal, not specifically * * * deposited as security or otherwise encumbered , and as to such specifically encumbered property[,] the term includes all [funds held] in excess of the amount necessary to discharge the sum or sums secured." (Emphasis added.) Id. § 221.1(6). The funds in question in this case are held in a special deposit as security for the payment of workers' compensation claims in California and, based on the statutory language, are expressly excluded from the general assets of the Lumbermens estate. Nowhere in the definition of "general assets" in section 221.1(6) does it state that funds held in special deposits are included within the ambit of the term. As a result, because these funds were "deposited as security" for the special benefit of local policyholders in California, they are not "general assets" of the Lumbermens estate. See State ex rel. Ingram v. Reserve Insurance Co. , 303 N.C. 623, 629, 281 S.E.2d 16 (1981) (special deposits "constitute a trust for the benefit of * * * policyholders and are not assets of the insolvent insurance company" (emphasis in original) ).

¶ 20 Indeed, this construction comports with other provisions of the UILA, which routinely distinguishes between general assets and special deposits, and recognizes the right of ancillary receivers (not domiciliary receivers) to liquidate claims against special deposits. For example, unlike general assets, which are subject to the priority scheme set forth in section 205(1) of the Code, funds held in special deposits must be distributed "in accordance with the provisions of the statutes requiring the creation and maintenance of such special deposits." 215 ILCS 5/221.6 (West 2012). Thus, whatever section 11698.3 of the California Insurance Code provides relating to the priority of special deposit claims, controls. Moreover, section 221.8 of the Code distinguishes between general assets and special deposits by providing that, only after all claims have been paid, does any surplus or excess amount remaining in a special deposit become part of the general assets of the estate and shall be transferred to the domiciliary receiver. 215 ILCS 5/221.8 (West 2012). Applying the Director's broad understanding of the term "general assets" to include special deposits would render the provisions in sections 221.6 and 221.8, meaningless. We conclude, therefore, that the funds held in special deposits are not general assets of the Lumbermens estate.

¶ 21 Having found that the funds held in special deposits are not general assets of the Lumbermens estate, resolution of this appeal requires us to address two issues: First, we must address the parties' disagreement as to whether section 11698.3 of the California Insurance Code ( Cal. Ins. Code § 11698.3 (West 2012) ) bars CIGA from using special deposit funds to pay for general administrative expenses. Second, we must decide whether the Director's petition, which seeks to impose an exhaustion requirement on some guaranty associations, violates the priority scheme set forth in section 205(1)(a) of the Code ( 215 ILCS 5/205(1)(a) (West Supp. 2017) ). We address each issue in turn.

¶ 22 To determine the proper construction of section 11698.3 of the California Insurance Code, we must look to California case law. Magee v. Huppin-Fleck , 279 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87, 215 Ill.Dec. 849, 664 N.E.2d 246 (1996). A search of California cases reveals that its courts have not, as yet, construed the statute. "Where a statute has not been construed by the courts of the State in which it was enacted, a court of another jurisdiction in which a question with respect to the effect of such statute arises may place its own construction thereon." Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc. v. Cummins , 12 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 146 N.E.2d 42 (1957). However, "[b]ecause rules for statutory construction are [a] means for ascertaining substance, those employed in the enacting State are most relevant." Magee , 279 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 215 Ill.Dec. 849, 664 N.E.2d 246. Accordingly, in construing section 11698.3 of the California Insurance Code, we turn to principles of statutory construction adhered to by California courts. See id. (applying the "principles of statutory construction adhered to by Oregon courts" to construe an Oregon statute).

¶ 23 The California Supreme Court has set forth the following principles for interpreting statutes. The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group , 48 Cal. 4th 104, 110, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 404, 225 P.3d 538 (2010). Legislative intent is best derived from the language of the statute itself, which, if unambiguous, should be enforced as written, without resorting to extrinsic aids for construction. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court , 19 Cal. 4th 1036, 1047, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 968 P.2d 539 (1999). Additionally, the entire statute must be read as a whole, considering all relevant parts. McCarther , 48 Cal. 4th at 110, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 404, 225 P.3d 538. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and no provision should be rendered useless or superfluous. Id. As a general rule, courts accord deference to the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration. Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park and Open-Space District , 46 Cal. 4th 282, 292, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 369, 206 P.3d 739 (2009). However, an agency's interpretation is not binding and will be rejected if it is erroneous. Id.

¶ 24 CIGA was created in 1969 with the purpose of protecting residents in California who make claims under policies issued by insurers that have become insolvent. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n v. W.C.A.B. , 112 Cal. App. 4th 358, 363, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 127 (2003). It "issues no policies, collects no premiums, makes no profits, and assumes no contractual obligations." California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board , 153 Cal. App. 4th 524, 532, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 (2007). Rather, its role is limited to paying the amount of covered claims of an insolvent insurer. Id. Because CIGA is a statutory entity, it depends on the California Insurance Code for its existence and for a definition of the scope of its powers, duties, and protections. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n , 112 Cal. App. 4th at 363-64, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 127.

¶ 25 Here, the parties dispute the interpretation of section 11698.3 of the California Insurance Code, which governs CIGA's use of special deposit funds where a member insurer is subject to an order of liquidation with a finding of insolvency. Section 11698.3 provides as follows:

"(a) If the insurer is a member insurer of [CIGA] and has been the subject of an order of liquidation or receivership with a finding of insolvency which has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction [CIGA] then becomes obligated to pay compensable workers' compensation claims arising under the insurer's policies, which are otherwise "covered claims" * * *. The commissioner shall immediately take control or possession of the deposit required pursuant to Section 11691 and shall transfer the deposit to [CIGA].
(b) [CIGA] shall use the proceeds of the deposit and any interest earned thereon, for the payment of compensable workers' compensation claims arising under the insolvent insurer's policies and which are otherwise covered claims, * * * and all expenses related thereto ." (Emphasis added.) Cal. Ins. Code § 11698.3(a) - (b) (West 2012).

The Director argues, as she did before the circuit court, that the phrase "all expenses related thereto" authorizes CIGA to use special deposit funds to pay for all expenses , including general administrative expenses. We disagree.

¶ 26 In our view, the words in section 11698.3(b) are clear, and the language is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Section 11698.3(b) plainly states that special deposit proceeds must be used solely for the payment of compensable workers' compensation claims arising under Lumbermens' policies and all expenses related thereto . The legislature's use of the phrase "related thereto" limits the type of expenses that CIGA may pay to those directly related to the payment of compensable workers' compensation claims. As noted by CIGA, these types of expenses are commonly referred to as "allocated claims expenses," "loss adjustment expenses," and "allocated loss adjustment expenses" or ALAE. See Woodliff v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n , 110 Cal. App. 4th 1690, 1694, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (2003) ("In the insurance industry, the phrase 'loss adjustment expenses' generally means the expense incurred by the insurer to investigate and settle a claim."); 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Garamendi , 8 Cal. 4th 216, 250, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 878 P.2d 566 (1994) (defining allocated loss adjustment expenses or ALAE as "the costs associated with the adjustment of specific claims"). Expenses related to the payment of compensable workers' compensation claims typically includes, for example, court costs; attorney fees; costs of undercover and detective services; fees of independent medical examiners; costs of employing expert witnesses; court reporter costs; and costs of depositions. See, e.g. , Huff v. Integral Insurance Co. , 354 S.W.3d 228, 231-32 (2011) ; Planet Insurance Co. v. Mead Reinsurance Corp. , 789 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1986). General administrative expenses, in contrast, are "expense[s] incurred in running a business, as distinguished from * * * expense[s] incurred in manufacturing or selling; overhead. Examples include executive and clerical salaries, rent, utilities, and legal and accounting services." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Huff , 354 S.W.3d at 232 (noting that "the salaries of officials, administrators or other employees or normal overhead charges such as rent, postage, telephone, lighting, cleaning, heating or similar expenses" are excluded from the definition of ALAE). Put simply, general administrative expenses are not related to the payment of a specific workers' compensation claim. As a consequence, CIGA is not authorized to use the funds held in the special deposit to pay for general administrative expenses.

¶ 27 The Director argues that, if the California legislature sought to limit the type of expenses payable from special deposit proceeds, it could have easily done so by removing the phrase "all expenses related thereto" and inserting the phrase "allocated claims expense" as it did in section 11698.02 of the California Insurance Code. See Cal. Ins. Code § 11698.02 (West 2012) ("The proceeds of the deposit * * * shall be used solely to pay compensable workers' compensation claims under the insured or reinsured policies, allocated claims expense necessary to pay those claims, and expenses connected with all proceedings * * * in furtherance of the payment of those claims * * *." (Emphasis added.) ). According to the Director, the phrase "all expenses related thereto" is broad and evinces the legislature's intent that special deposit proceeds be used to pay for both ALAE and general administrative expenses. The Director appears to argue that if the legislature uses certain words in one instance and different words in another, it intends different results. We are not persuaded.

¶ 28 As noted by CIGA, the California Insurance Code uses several terms interchangeably when referring to the types of expenses payable from special deposit funds. See, e.g. , id. § 1063.2(d) ("allocated claims expense"); id. § 11691(a)(1) ("loss adjustment expenses"); id. § 11698.02 ("allocated claims expense" and "expenses connected with all proceedings"). All of these phrases, however, mean the same thing-namely, expenses related to the investigation and settlement of covered claims. We can discern no reason why the minor differences in the statutory phrases "expenses related thereto," "expenses connected with all proceedings," "loss adjustment expenses," and "allocated claims expense" should require different interpretations. See Delaney v. Baker , 20 Cal. 4th 23, 41-42, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986 (1999) (where the same, or substantially the same, words or phrases appear in different parts of the same statute they will be given a generally accepted and consistent meaning, where the legislative intent is not clearly expressed to the contrary). Our reading does not raise concerns about redundancy or surplusage sometimes associated with reading dissimilar terms to mean the same thing. Only one reasonable interpretation of these phrases exists-CIGA may use special deposit funds to pay for expenses related to the payment of covered claims, which includes compensable workers' compensation claims. By giving the same meaning to the phrases "all expenses related thereto," "allocated claims expense," and "loss adjustment expenses," we give meaning and effect to both sections 11698.3(b) and 11698.02 of the California Insurance Code.

¶ 29 In light of the California Insurance Code's salutary policy of protecting policyholders of insolvent insurers, which is clearly and repeatedly expressed throughout its many articles, we reject any argument that the California legislature intended section 11698.3(b) to authorize CIGA to use special deposit funds to pay for general administrative expenses. Accordingly, we hold that section 11698.3(b) of the California Insurance Code does not authorize CIGA to use funds held in Lumbermens' California special deposit to pay for general administrative expenses.

¶ 30 Next, we address the issue of whether the Director's petition requiring CIGA to reimburse itself for general administrative expenses from Lumbermens' California special deposit violates the priority scheme set forth in section 205(1)(a) of the Code ( 215 ILCS 5/205(1)(a) (West Supp. 2017) ).

¶ 31 Article XIII of the Code provides the basic mechanism for the liquidation of Lumbermens. Our supreme court has long recognized that the object of article XIII is to secure a ratable distribution of an insolvent insurance company's assets. People ex rel. Jones v. Chicago Lloyds , 391 Ill. 492, 498, 63 N.E.2d 479 (1945), rev'd on other grounds , Morris v. Jones , 329 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488 (1947). It was designed to provide a comprehensive, orderly and efficient procedure for liquidating insurance companies while protecting the rights of interested parties.

In re Liquidation of Security Casualty Co. , 127 Ill. 2d 434, 447, 130 Ill.Dec. 446, 537 N.E.2d 775 (1989). To avoid preferential treatment of creditors, article XIII protects individual policyholders and other claimants without permitting certain classes of creditors to place themselves in a superior position. In re Liquidation of Coronet Insurance Co. , 298 Ill. App. 3d 411, 418, 232 Ill.Dec. 507, 698 N.E.2d 598 (1998). Section 205(1) of the Code establishes the following priority of distribution of an insolvent insurance company's assets:

"(a) The costs and expenses of administration, including, but not limited to the following:
(i) The reasonable expenses of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund * * * and of any similar organization in any other state, including overhead, salaries, and other general administrative expenses allocable to the receivership (administrative and claims handling expenses and expenses in connection with arrangements for ongoing coverage) * * *.
* * *
(b) Secured claims * * * that are secured by liens perfected prior to the filing of the complaint.
(c) Claims for wages actually owing to employees for services rendered within 3 months prior to the date of the filing of the complaint, * * *.
(d) Claims by policyholders, beneficiaries, insureds and liability claims against insureds covered under insurance policies and insurance contracts issued by the company * * *.
(e) Claims by policyholders, beneficiaries, and insureds, the allowed values of which were determined by estimation under paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of Section 209.
(f) Any other claims due the federal government.
(g) All other claims of general creditors * * *.
(h) Claims of guaranty fund certificate holders, guaranty capital shareholders, capital note holders, and surplus note holders.
(i) Proprietary claims of shareholders, members, or other owners." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/205(1)(a)-(i) (West Supp. 2017).

Section 205(1) establishes a rule of absolute priority in which no succeeding class of claimants may share in the distribution of assets until the allowed claims of all senior interests have been satisfied in full. In re Liquidations of Reserve Insurance Co. , 122 Ill. 2d 555, 558, 120 Ill.Dec. 508, 524 N.E.2d 538 (1988).

¶ 32 The language of section 205(1)(a) is plain, unambiguous, and expansive. It states that guaranty associations are entitled to recover their "reasonable expenses" including "overhead, salaries, and other general administrative expenses," (215 ILCS 5/2015(1)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2017) ), which are precisely the types of expenses for which CIGA seeks reimbursement from the general assets of the Lumbermens estate. Nothing in section 205(1)(a) requires the exhaustion of a special deposit fund before guaranty associations are entitled to a distribution from the estate for the payment of general administrative expenses.

¶ 33 The Director nevertheless seeks to circumvent our rules of statutory construction by improperly adding a condition-i.e. , an exhaustion requirement-to section 205(1)(a)(i)'s clear and unambiguous terms. If the legislature intended to impose an exhaustion requirement on guaranty associations with access to special deposits, it could have readily done so. Indeed, during the pendency of this appeal, section 205 was amended by the Illinois General Assembly (see Pub. Act 100-410, § 5 (eff. Aug. 25, 2017) ), and is now far more detailed than it once was. Prior to the amendment, section 205(1)(a)(i) simply provided that guaranty associations were entitled to reimbursement of "[t]he costs and expenses of administration." Section 205 now provides that guaranty associations may recover "[t]he reasonable expenses * * *, including overhead, salaries, and other general administrative expenses allocable to the receivership (administrative and claims handling expenses and expenses in connection with arrangements for ongoing coverage)." 215 ILCS 5/2015(1)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2017). The expansive language added to section 205(1)(a)(i) refutes any claim that the legislature intended to create a limitation on guaranty associations that have access to funds in a special deposit.

¶ 34 The Director contends, however, that absent an exhaustion requirement, guaranty associations such as CIGA, which has access to special deposits, will place themselves in a superior position over guaranty associations in states that have little or no funds in their special deposits. The Director asserts that her proposed plan "equalizes" treatment of all guaranty associations by preventing CIGA from using the special deposit solely for the benefit of Lumbermens' policyholders in California. We disagree.

¶ 35 This court considered and rejected a similar argument in In re Conservation of Alpine Insurance Co. , 318 Ill. App. 3d 457, 251 Ill.Dec. 776, 741 N.E.2d 663 (2000). In that case, the Director engaged in discussions with Alpine regarding a possible plan for rehabilitation. Alpine proposed dividing its policyholders into two classes: (1) those having insurance through Alpine (Alpine-only insured); and (2) those having additional insurance through other carriers (Alpine multiple policy insureds). According to the plan, Alpine would first pay the claims of Alpine-only insureds. As to the other class, the proposed plan required that they exhaust their other insurance coverage before seeking to recover on Alpine's policies. Id. at 459, 251 Ill.Dec. 776, 741 N.E.2d 663. Alpine argued that its plan was the only way to ensure that the claims of its policyholders would be paid in full. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the Director and Alpine appealed. Id. at 460, 251 Ill.Dec. 776, 741 N.E.2d 663. On appeal, this court affirmed. We reasoned that:

"Alpine's proposed rehabilitation plan creates a new class of claimants altogether, namely Alpine multiple policy insureds, and subordinates those claims to those of Alpine-only insureds in direct contravention of the Illinois supreme court's holding that '[s]ection 205(1) establishes a rule of absolute priority.' [Citation.] Section 205(1)(d) simply does not provide for the subordination of the claims of multiple policy claimants to those of single policy claimants. In other words, the Code does not provide for the punishment of multiple policy insureds based on the fortuitous circumstance of their seeking out additional coverage." Id. at 462, 251 Ill.Dec. 776, 741 N.E.2d 663.

We concluded that Alpine's proposed rehabilitation plan was "impermissibly discriminatory and therefore illegal." Id. at 463, 251 Ill.Dec. 776, 741 N.E.2d 663.

¶ 36 Similarly, here, the effect of the Director's petition-imposing an exhaustion requirement on guaranty associations with access to special deposit funds-is to subordinate their claims for administrative expenses to the claims of guaranty association without access to special deposits. By imposing an exhaustion requirement on some guaranty associations, but not others, the Director has effectively created a new, sub-class of guaranty associations, which contradicts the statutory goal of "equivalent distribution to creditors of the same class of priority." See In re Liquidation of Security Casualty Co. , 127 Ill. 2d at 444, 130 Ill.Dec. 446, 537 N.E.2d 775 ; In re Liquidation of Pine Top Insurance Co. , 322 Ill. App. 3d 693, 705, 255 Ill.Dec. 529, 749 N.E.2d 1011 (2001).

¶ 37 We are not insensitive to the plight of guaranty associations and citizens of states who have and will continue to suffer financially as a result of the lack of special deposits. However, this court is not tasked with evaluating and setting public policy ( Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital , 2011 IL 108656, ¶ 79, 353 Ill.Dec. 254, 955 N.E.2d 1065 ); that job is reserved for our respective, duly elected, legislatures ( Blumenthal v. Brewer , 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 80, 410 Ill.Dec. 289, 69 N.E.3d 834 ). Indeed, we lack any objective standards or procedures to assist us in weighing the relative merits of such widely divergent public policy interests. See id. ¶ 77 (the legislature alone possesses the necessary investigative and fact-finding abilities). The Director's dissatisfaction with the UILA and article XIII does not furnish authority for us to rewrite this legislation. We decline the Director's invitation to look outside the plain and unambiguous statutory language to weigh the merits of the allegedly competing public policy interests underlying article XIII and the UILA.

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 39 Affirmed.

Justices Cunningham and Delort concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Pursuant to the runoff plan, Lumbermens could not issue any new policies; rather, it could only collect premiums and pay claims under existing policies.

      By statute, the Director serves as the receiver of insolvent insurance companies domiciled in Illinois. 215 ILCS 5/191 (West 2012). As the domiciliary receiver, the Director "shall be vested by operation of law with the title to all property, contracts and rights of action of the company as of the date of the order directing * * * liquidation." Id. Section 193 of the Code grants the Director broad powers to "immediately proceed to liquidate the property, business, and affairs of the company." 215 ILCS 5/193 (West 2012).

      The Director's petition alleged that 9 of 29 guaranty associations whose claims are being recommended for allowance at level (a) of the priority schedule have access to their state's special deposit. An additional eight guaranty associations, whose claims are either under review or have not yet been submitted, also have access to their state's special deposit. The record reflects that California holds a Lumbermens special deposit in the amount of $167 million.

      According to the affidavit of Tony Kennedy, CIGA's director of finance, as of March 31, 2016, CIGA paid approximately $48 million in workers' compensation claims and ALAE. He expects that CIGA's liability for covered claims and ALAE to reach $326 million, which far exceeds the $167 million held in the special deposit.

      Because the circuit court found that California law barred CIGA from using special deposit funds to pay for general administrative expenses, it did not address whether the Director's proposed distribution was authorized under the priority scheme set forth in section 205(1)(a) of the Code (215 ILCS 5/205(1)(a) (West 2014) ).

      "Reciprocal State" is defined by the UILA as any other state in which the "substance and effect the provisions of Sections 221.1 to 221.10, both inclusive are in force." Id. § 221.1(1)(b). Both parties acknowledge that California has enacted the UILA and is a reciprocal state.

      Section 205(3) states that the "changes made in this Section by this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly apply to all liquidation, * * * proceedings that are pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act * * * and to all future liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation proceedings." 2015 ILCS 5/205(3) (West Supp. 2017).


text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamison L. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 2-16-0277
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed June 6, 2018
    Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Paul J. Glaser, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
    Tricia L. Smith, State's Attorney, of Belvidere (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Steven A. Rodgers, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Jamison L. Moore, was convicted of burglary ( 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2014) ) and retail theft (id. § 16-25(a)(1) ). The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 10 years for burglary and a 6-year extended term for retail theft. He appeals, contending that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary where he entered a Walmart store during regular business hours and remained in publicly accessible areas of the store; (2) the State failed to prove that he intended to commit a theft when he entered the store or that he was accountable for the conduct of his cousin, Adrian Moore, who stole merchandise from the store; and (3) if we affirm both convictions, we must vacate the extended-term sentence for retail theft. We agree only with defendant's final contention. Thus, we vacate the extended-term portion of the retail-theft sentence but affirm in all other respects.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 7, 2015, Michael Eby took a break from his job as a manager at the Belvidere Walmart to go outside for a cigarette. As he left the store, two men, later identified as Adrian and defendant, caught his attention. Adrian was carrying a diaper bag although neither man had a baby with him. Eby watched the men enter the store. He went to check on them and found them in the liquor department. Adrian left the store alone, carrying the diaper bag with liquor bottles in it. He walked past the cash registers without paying for the liquor.

¶ 4 Eby followed Adrian to the parking lot, where he got in a black sport-utility vehicle (SUV) being driven by a black woman. Eby yelled at two employees in the parking lot to get the vehicle's license number while he called 911. The SUV backed up and left the parking lot rapidly. Eby saw defendant leave the store a short time later. Defendant walked by Eby, then headed back toward the store before running to the road and out of sight.

¶ 5 Eby went back to the store to pull up the surveillance video. He saw that four bottles of liquor had been taken.

¶ 6 According to Eby, the video showed that Adrian followed defendant into the liquor department. Defendant then returned to the department's entrance and remained there for a few seconds. When another couple approached the department, defendant walked away. He walked past the self-check registers and remained on the sales floor for about 30 seconds.

¶ 7 Eby later viewed other portions of the video. One such portion showed defendant and Adrian being dropped off just outside the store entrance, then entering the store together. Once they entered the liquor department, the two men made eye contact but, as the video had no sound, Eby could not tell what if anything was said. The video showed Adrian immediately take four bottles of vodka from the top shelf, put them in the bag, and leave. Defendant, meanwhile, walked toward the service desk, turned a corner, looked at an ATM, then turned and left the store by the same door through which they entered.

¶ 8 Belvidere police officer Richard Zapf apprehended defendant at the corner of Genoa Road and Chrysler Drive, near the Walmart, at around 7 p.m. Defendant was sweating, breathing heavily, and nervous. He said that he had walked to the Walmart to do some shopping.

¶ 9 Officer Michele Bogdanas arrived. She handcuffed defendant and returned him to the front of the Walmart. Defendant's wallet contained a few cards, but no cash. According to Bogdanas, the license number of the SUV that drove away from the store was registered to Tannah Moore, defendant's wife.

¶ 10 Officer Todd Moore also responded to the scene. Defendant told Officer Moore that he walked to the store to get some snacks but forgot his wallet at home. He initially said that he went to the store alone. When asked who the "other guy" was, he said that his name was James.

¶ 11 Defendant later told police that he went to the store with a cousin but did not want to give the cousin's name. The next day, after receiving a call from defendant's wife, Officer Moore spoke with defendant at the county jail. Defendant said that his cousin's name was Adrian Moore. He showed Adrian where the liquor section was because Adrian had never been in that Walmart before. Defendant said that he then went to buy snacks and did not know what Adrian was doing.

¶ 12 The jury found defendant guilty of burglary and retail theft. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment for burglary with a concurrent 6-year, extended-term sentence for retail theft. The court denied defendant's posttrial motion and motion to reconsider the sentence. Defendant timely appeals.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 A. Without Authority

¶ 15 Defendant argues first that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the Walmart store "without authority." 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2014). He maintains that he never exceeded the scope of his authority to be in the store, given that he entered during regular business hours, never entered an area of the store that was off-limits to the public, and left while the store was still open. For the following reasons, we follow longstanding authority and reject defendant's argument.

¶ 16 Although defendant frames the issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, he acknowledges that the real question is the construction of the burglary statute. The construction of a statute is an issue of law, which we review de novo . Hall v. Henn , 208 Ill. 2d 325, 330, 280 Ill.Dec. 546, 802 N.E.2d 797 (2003).

¶ 17 Section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides, in part, that "[a] person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, * * * or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft." 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2014). Thus, under the statute, one can commit a burglary in one of two ways: (1) by entering without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft or (2) by remaining without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft. Id. Defendant was charged with, and convicted of, the first type of burglary-burglary by unauthorized entry.

¶ 18 For more than 100 years, the supreme court has recognized that entering a retail establishment with the intention of committing a theft constitutes burglary. See People v. Kelley , 274 Ill. 556, 558, 113 N.E. 926 (1916) (reversing burglary conviction only because there was no evidence of the defendant's intent when he entered the store). In People v. Weaver , 41 Ill. 2d 434, 435, 243 N.E.2d 245 (1968), the defendant was spotted inside a laundromat, standing near a vending machine, the door of which was open. Police found keys to the vending machine inside vehicles belonging to the defendant and his codefendant, as well as more than $50 in coins in the defendant's pocket. Id. at 435-36, 243 N.E.2d 245. The defendant was convicted of burglary, possession of burglary tools, and theft. Id. at 435, 243 N.E.2d 245. The defendant appealed to the supreme court, arguing that he was not proved guilty of burglary, given that the laundromat was open to the public. The court rejected the defendant's argument, holding that evidence that the defendant entered a place of business in order to commit a theft is sufficient to satisfy the "without authority" element of burglary by unauthorized entry. Id. at 438-39, 243 N.E.2d 245. The court explained that the "authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open." Id. at 439, 243 N.E.2d 245. Thus, patrons of a business lack the authority to enter if they intend to commit a theft inside the establishment. Id. Consequently, evidence that the defendant entered the building intending to steal from the vending machine was sufficient to convict him of burglary by unauthorized entry. Id.

¶ 19 Subsequently, numerous decisions have applied Weaver to cases of burglary involving the unauthorized entry of a retail establishment. See, e.g. , People v. Rudd , 2012 IL App (5th) 100528, ¶¶ 13-14, 361 Ill.Dec. 214, 970 N.E.2d 580 ; People v. Durham , 252 Ill. App. 3d 88, 91, 191 Ill.Dec. 420, 623 N.E.2d 1010 (1993) ; People v. Stager , 168 Ill. App. 3d 457, 459, 119 Ill.Dec. 150, 522 N.E.2d 812 (1988) ; People v. Patterson , 1 Ill. App. 3d 724, 726, 274 N.E.2d 218 (1971).

¶ 20 Defendant relies on People v. Bradford , 2016 IL 118674, ¶¶ 25, 31, 401 Ill.Dec. 630, 50 N.E.3d 1112, where the supreme court declined to extend Weaver to a case of burglary by unlawfully remaining. There, the defendant was convicted of burglary by unlawfully remaining in a Walmart store with the intent to commit a theft. In the supreme court, the defendant argued that he never exceeded the scope of his authority to be in the store and that burglary by remaining was never intended to apply to such a situation, which amounted to no more than ordinary shoplifting. The State contended that the burglary statute could also apply where a defendant entered a store lawfully, then subsequently formed the intent to commit a theft, but remained in the store longer than necessary to steal the items.

¶ 21 The supreme court, however, agreed that the defendant's was the "only reasonable reading of the burglary statute." Id. ¶ 25. The court held that the State's proposed test (1) was unworkable (due to the difficulty of proving precisely when the defendant's authority to be in the store was revoked and whether he "remained" in the store for some period of time after completing the theft), (2) could lead to absurd results (by arbitrarily distinguishing between a defendant who steals one item and leaves immediately thereafter and one who steals more than one item or lingers in the store before leaving), and (3) was not consistent with the retail-theft statute (which was enacted 14 years after the burglary statute's "remaining within" provision and would be effectively negated by the State's reading) and the historical development of the burglary statute (which reflected that the addition of the "remaining within" provision incorporated the former crime of "burglar found in building" and where the term "found" necessarily refers to an area closed to the defendant or the public). Id. ¶¶ 25-30. In sum, the court held that a defendant "commits burglary by remaining in a public place only where he exceeds his physical authority to be on the premises." Id. ¶ 31. This includes situations where the defendant "enters a public building lawfully but, in order to commit a theft or felony, (1) hides and waits for the building to close," "(2) enters unauthorized areas within the building," "or (3) continues to remain on the premises after his authority is explicitly revoked." Id. However, the court clarified that a person who lawfully enters a building, shoplifts within areas open to the public, and then leaves during business hours is guilty of retail theft. Id.

¶ 22 Defendant contends that Bradford 's rationale should also apply to cases of burglary by unauthorized entry. We disagree. Bradford addressed only the second type of burglary: burglary by remaining. The supreme court's concerns about establishing when authority is revoked and when a defendant has remained in the store longer than necessary to complete the theft are simply not present in a case like this one. Further, as noted, the historical development of the crime of burglary by remaining, the court emphasized, includes only scenarios where the defendant is discovered in a place where he or she is not authorized to be. Id. ¶ 30. Finally, nothing in Bradford purports to overrule Weaver , where the court held that the burglary statute applied to the entry of an establishment otherwise open to the public ( Weaver , 41 Ill. 2d at 438-39, 243 N.E.2d 245 ).

¶ 23 We find support for our conclusion in the Fourth District's decision in People v. Burlington , 2018 IL App (4th) 150642, 421 Ill.Dec. 333, 99 N.E.3d 577, which the State urges us to follow. There, the court followed longstanding precedent (most significantly, Weaver ) and affirmed the defendant's burglary conviction after he entered a Menard's store with the intent to commit a theft. Id. ¶ 31. Burlington observed that Bradford did not affect the holding of Weaver and its progeny. Id. ¶ 27. The court further noted that, even after the passage of the retail-theft statute, the supreme court had held that burglary and retail theft constituted separate offenses ( id. ¶ 28 (citing People v. Miller , 238 Ill. 2d 161, 176, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498 (2010) ) ), thus "undermining the assertion the first type of burglary eviscerates the retail theft statute." Id. The Fourth District noted that the defendant's assertion that the intent to commit a theft does not remove one's authority to enter a retail establishment would eliminate other types of burglary, such as when one enters an establishment intending to commit forgery. Id. ¶ 29 (citing People v. Drake , 172 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1028, 123 Ill.Dec. 56, 527 N.E.2d 519 (1988) ). Finally, the court noted that, in the 50 years since Weaver was announced, the legislature has never amended the burglary statute to eliminate its application to cases of that type. Id. ¶ 30.

¶ 24 We agree with Burlington that the history and nature of the burglary-by-remaining provision distinguish it from burglary by unauthorized entry such that Bradford 's rationale cannot be mechanically applied to the latter provision. The distinction is further justified by the fact that one who enters a store with a preconceived plan to steal merchandise is at least arguably more culpable than one who, once inside a store, impulsively takes merchandise. See Durham , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 191 Ill.Dec. 420, 623 N.E.2d 1010 (no evidence that the defendant "was carrying out some previously devised plan rather than taking advantage of an opportunity presented by the circumstances").

¶ 25 In People v. Johnson , 2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶ 35, 419 Ill.Dec. 751, 94 N.E.3d 289, a case upon which defendant relies, the Third District came to a different conclusion than the Fourth District in Burlington . In Johnson , the Third District held that Bradford changed longstanding law and applies to cases of burglary by unauthorized entry. Id. The court concluded that " Bradford 's physical authority test applies to all retail theft cases, regardless of when the defendant forms the intent to shoplift." Id.

¶ 26 We disagree with and do not follow Johnson . The court's primary concern there appears to have been that allowing the same act to be charged as either burglary or retail theft (or both) gives prosecutors "unbridled discretion."

Id. ¶ 30. We, however, do not find that limiting a prosecutor's discretion to charge a defendant when his or her conduct falls under one or more provisions is a basis to depart from more than 100 years of precedent. The state's attorney has the responsibility of evaluating evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what, if any, offense should be charged. People v. Williams , 147 Ill. 2d 173, 256, 167 Ill.Dec. 853, 588 N.E.2d 983 (1991) (citing People v. Rhodes , 38 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 231 N.E.2d 400 (1967) ). Thus, the prosecutor is vested with wide discretion in enforcing the criminal laws. Id. (citing Marcisz v. Marcisz , 65 Ill. 2d 206, 210, 2 Ill.Dec. 310, 357 N.E.2d 477 (1976) ). Further, as the Burlington court noted, "[c]oncerns over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion cannot alter the plain language of a statute." Burlington , 2018 IL App (4th) 150642, ¶ 32, 421 Ill.Dec. 333, 99 N.E.3d 577.

¶ 27 Johnson also seemed to express concern that allowing shoplifting to be charged as unauthorized-entry burglary would effectively nullify the retail-theft statute: "We suspect that it is a miniscule percentage of shoplifters who form the intent to steal only after entering a store." Johnson , 2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶ 33, 419 Ill.Dec. 751, 94 N.E.3d 289. The court cited no authority for its "suspicion." Further, it missed the point: unlawful-entry burglary requires the concurrent intent to commit a theft or felony. Given the difficulty of proving a defendant's intent at the moment he or she enters a store, it is more probable that the vast majority of cases are charged as retail theft (because the State has insufficient evidence of intent at entry). See Kelley , 274 Ill. at 558, 113 N.E. 926 ; Durham , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 191 Ill.Dec. 420, 623 N.E.2d 1010 ; People v. Boose , 139 Ill. App. 3d 471, 474, 94 Ill.Dec. 211, 487 N.E.2d 1088 (1985) (burglary convictions reversed due to lack of evidence of the defendants' intent upon entering). In any event, these are policy arguments best directed to the legislature. Thus, we follow Burlington.

¶ 28 B. Intent and Accountability

¶ 29 Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he entered the store intending to commit a theft or that he was accountable for Adrian's conduct after they entered the store. Defendant discusses this issue primarily as it relates to his burglary conviction, but he also asks us to reverse his retail-theft conviction. Entering without authority is not an element of retail theft. See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a) (West 2014). However, to establish guilt of retail theft, the State had to prove that defendant was accountable for Adrian's conduct (because there was no evidence that defendant personally stole anything from the Walmart). For the following reasons, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant entered the store intending to commit a theft and that he was accountable for Adrian's conduct after they entered the premises.

¶ 30 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Ortiz , 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 256 Ill.Dec. 530, 752 N.E.2d 410 (2001). It is the trier of fact's function to judge the witnesses' credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw conclusions based on all the evidence. People v. Titone , 115 Ill. 2d 413, 422, 105 Ill.Dec. 923, 505 N.E.2d 300 (1986). To prove that a defendant was accountable for another's criminal conduct, the State must establish that the defendant (1) solicited, ordered, abetted, or agreed or attempted to aid another in the planning or commission of the offense; (2) participated before or during the commission of the offense; and (3) had the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2014); People v. Jaimes , 2014 IL App (2d) 121368, ¶ 37, 386 Ill.Dec. 738, 21 N.E.3d 501. "To prove intent, the State must present evidence that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal or that there was a common criminal design." Jaimes , 2014 IL App (2d) 121368, ¶ 37, 386 Ill.Dec. 738, 21 N.E.3d 501.

¶ 31 Here, Eby observed defendant and Adrian enter the store together. Video confirms that they were dropped off together and entered the store almost simultaneously. Video shows that Adrian, who was inexplicably carrying a diaper bag, entered the liquor department. Defendant entered seconds later, and the two briefly conversed or at least made eye contact. Defendant then left the area and embarked on a circuitous journey around the front of the store. At no time was he seen examining merchandise as if shopping, and except for a brief foray through the women's-wear department, he never entered another area of the store containing merchandise. From this, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant served as a lookout while Adrian stuffed the diaper bag with liquor. Defendant's conduct was not "that of a shopper browsing through various racks and displays." Durham , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 92, 191 Ill.Dec. 420, 623 N.E.2d 1010.

¶ 32 Moreover, defendant ran after leaving the store. When apprehended a short time later, he appeared sweaty, out of breath, and nervous. He gave the investigating officers conflicting stories. His flight and false exculpatory stories could both be viewed as evidence of consciousness of guilt. See People v. Harris , 52 Ill. 2d 558, 561, 288 N.E.2d 385 (1972) (evidence of flight admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt); People v. McQueen , 115 Ill. App. 3d 833, 837, 71 Ill.Dec. 233, 450 N.E.2d 921 (1983) (false exculpatory statement admissible to establish consciousness of guilt).

¶ 33 Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant and Adrian entered the store intending to commit a theft and, moreover, that defendant was accountable for Adrian's conduct after they entered the premises. We affirm defendant's convictions.

¶ 34 C. Extended-Term Sentence

¶ 35 Defendant's final contention is that his extended-term sentence for retail theft is unauthorized. The State confesses error.

¶ 36 Extended-term sentences may be imposed only for offenses within the most serious class of offense of which a defendant is convicted. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2014); People v. Jordan , 103 Ill. 2d 192, 207, 82 Ill.Dec. 925, 469 N.E.2d 569 (1984). Defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class 2 felony ( 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2014) ), and retail theft, a Class 4 felony as charged here (id. § 16-25(f)(1) ). Thus, as the State concedes, defendant could not receive an extended-term sentence for retail theft. Accordingly, we reduce defendant's sentence for retail theft to three years' imprisonment, the maximum nonextended term for a Class 4 felony. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2014).

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 The judgment of the circuit court of Boone County is affirmed as modified. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v. Nicholls , 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178, 15 Ill.Dec. 759, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978).

¶ 39 Affirmed as modified.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.