author: BAUER, Circuit Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-1105
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued September 22, 2016
    Decided November 22, 2016

      Christopher V. Párente, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Carol A. Brook, John F. Murphy, Attorneys, Office of the Federal Defender Program, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before BAUER, POSNER, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
   BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant, Edward Thompson, was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the cocaine that was seized after he gave his consent for law enforcement to search his apartment. He argued that a series of Fourth Amendment violations led to the discovery of the contraband and that his consent was not voluntary. The district court denied Thompson’s motion. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The district court held a suppression hearing, during which it heard testimony from six witnesses. Thompson’s account of the events differed in various respects from that of the law enforcement officers involved. In his written opinion denying Thompson’s motion, Judge Shadur did not set forth all of his factual findings in great detail; he did however, make clear that his analysis was based on his determinations that “Thompson’s version of the events is not at all believable” and that there is “no reason to credit” his testimony. The following is a synopsis of the relevant facts based on those determinations.

On March 6, 2013, a joint task force of the Drug Enforcement Agency and Chicago Police Department was conducting surveillance on the residence of Armando Soto in Cicero, Illinois, as part of an ongoing investigation into a drug trafficking organization. The agents (for the sake of ease, we refer to all law enforcement officials involved as “agents”) received information that a man named Marvin Bausley would be arriving at Soto’s house to pick up some or all of ten kilograms of cocaine. Shortly before noon, agents observed Bausley drive into the alley behind Soto’s house and enter the garage. After approximately ten minutes, Bausley left the garage and, with agents following, drove to an apartment building in Chicago, Illinois.

Bausley parked on the street outside the building, and a man, later identified as Thompson, came out of the building wearing a backpack and entered Bausley’s car. Bausley drove once around the block and again stopped outside the apartment building, at which time Thompson exited the car and reentered the building. The agents who saw Thompson go into the.building communicated this to Special Agent David Reynolds, who was on the scene, but could not see Thompson. Agent Reynolds quickly entered the apartment building, but saw no one in the lobby. He recalled that an apartment at this address had been of interest in their ongoing investigation; he believed the relevant apartment number was 901.. He saw that the elevator door was open so he rode, it to the ninth floor.

' When Agent Reynolds arrived on the ninth floor, he saw Thompson and a woman waiting for the elevator. Agent Reynolds had not seen Thompson earlier and did not recognize him as the man that had been in Bausley’s car.

Agent Reynolds exited the elevator, and Thompson and the woman entered. As he looked around the ninth floor common area, other agents notified Agent Reynolds that the man who was in Bausley’s car was now in the lobby. Thompson did not have the backpack he was wearing earlier. Agent Reynolds returned to the lobby, approached Thompson, and asked him if he lived in' the building. Thompson said he did not and that he was only there to visit a friend on the fourth floor. Agent Reynolds then asked if Thompson had just been on the ninth floor, and again, Thompson sáid no.

Agent Reynolds told Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he was not required to speak to the agents. Agent Reynolds conducted a patdown to ensure that Thompson had no weapons. He found no weapons, but he retrieved Thompson’s key ring. Agent Reynolds testified that he could not recall whether the keys were in Thompson’s pocket or in his hand. The key ring held Thompson’s, apartment keys, as well as an electronic fob that was required for access to the building’s elevators. Again, Agent Reynolds .asked whether Thompson had just been on the ninth floor and whether Thompson lived in the building. Thompson again answered “no” to both questions.

At this point, Agent Reynolds asked Thompson if he would speak to the agents on the ninth floor, and Thompson agreed. Using the fob on the key ring, Agent Reynolds accessed the elevatoi-, and Thompson and the agents went to the ninth floor. Thompson did not ask for his keys back at any point, and Agent Reynolds testified that Thompson was not handcuffed.

Because Agent Reynolds believed that unit 901 was relevant to their investigation, the agents knocked on that door with guns drawn. The resident of that unit answered and agents ordered him to get on the floor, while they quickly swept his apartment. After approximately a minute, the agents realized this was the wrong unit and returned to the hallway.

Agent Reynolds then asked Thompson if he lived in unit 902, and Thompson said he did not. Agent Reynolds tried Thompson’s key on the lock of 902 and the door opened. He then asked Thompson if there was anyone inside the apartment, and Thompson did not respond. Agent Reynolds and one other agent performed a sweep of the apartment, which lasted approximately 30 to 45 seconds, to ensure no one else was present. Finding no one in the apartment, the agents returned to the hallway. Agent Reynolds then asked Thompson if they could speak inside the apartment, and Thompson agreed.

Once inside, Agent Reynolds again told Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the agents. He then asked Thompson for consent to search the apartment. Agent Reynolds produced a written consent form and read it to Thompson. He handed it to Thompson to allow him to read it himself, and Thompson signed the form. Thompson then told the agents that there was a gun in the TV stand and that there were drugs and cash elsewhere in the apartment. The agents recovered the gun, a kilogram of cocaine, and $10,000 in cash. Thompson was not arrested that day and agreed to cooperate with the agents in their investigation moving forward. A number of days later, when Thompson stopped answering calls from the agents, he was arrested.

Thompson was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)'. Thompson filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered at his apartment, as well as statements he made to the agents. The district court held a suppression hearing, after which it denied Thompson’s motion. Thompson pleaded guilty, but preserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, which he does now.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Thompson argues that, before he provided consent to search his apartment, the DEA agents committed a series of Fourth Amendment violations. He argues that the evidence recovered was the fruit of those violations and, as such, it should have been suppressed. He also argues that his consent was not voluntary. The district court did not find that any constitutional violations occurred and held that Thompson’s consent was knowing and voluntary. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Bernitt, 392 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2004). “In the context of a motion to suppress evidence, we give special ■ deference to the district court’s rulings due to the fact-specific nature of the proceeding.” United States v. Griffin, 150 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Stribling, 94 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1996)).

A. Initial Stop

Thompson first complains of his initial encounter with law enforcement. When he exited the elevator in the lobby, a number of agents stopped him. Thompson argues that this encounter constituted an unlawful seizure because the agents did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and question him. This argument is meritless. A law enforcement officer may briefly stop an individual for investigative purposes if the officer “has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

Here, the agents had ample reason to believe that Thompson was engaged in criminal activity. Minutes prior to the encounter in the lobby, the agents witnessed Thompson get into a car with Bausley, who they had reason to believe had just picked up a large amount of cocaine. They watched Thompson enter the car wearing a backpack, circle the block with Bausley, go back into the apartment building, and then return to the lobby without the backpack. These facts were more than sufficient for the agents to form a reasonable suspicion that Thompson was engaged in criminal activity, which justified their encounter with him in the lobby.

B. Agent Reynolds’ Frisk

Thompson’s next contention is that Agent Reynold’s frisk of Thompson in the lobby was an unconstitutional search. An officer conducting a lawful Terry stop may not automatically frisk the subject of the stop. United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)). Such a frisk is lawful only When the officer has some articulable suspicion that the subject might be armed and dangerous. Id. As we just explained, by the time Agent Reynolds encountered Thompson, he clearly had reason to believe that Thompson was participating in a drug trafficking operation. Based on that belief, it was reasonable for Agent Reynolds to suspect that Thompson was armed because guns are known tools of the drug trade, as our cases have recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.”); see also United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the “inherent danger in stopping those suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are known tools of the trade.”). Moreover, Agent Reynolds knew that Thompson had just lied to him about being on the ninth floor, which likely raised his suspicion even higher. These circumstances could have reasonably led Agent Reynolds to believe that Thompson might be armed, and therefore, justified the patdown.

C.Thompson’s Keys and Trip to Ninth Floor

Thompson then argues that by taking his keys and accompanying him to the ninth floor, Agent Reynolds committed an unlawful seizure and converted the encounter into an unlawful arrest without probable cause. Prior to taking his keys, Agent Reynolds told Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to speak to the agents. Additionally, before using the keys to access the elevator, Agent Reynolds asked Thompson if he would speak with the agents on the ninth floor and Thompson agreed. Agent Reynolds testified that Thompson was never handcuffed. Thompson never asked for his keys back and voluntarily accompanied the agents to the ninth floor. Based on these facts, we are not convinced that Thompson was under arrest prior to, or upon arriving on the ninth floor.

But, even if we assume that Thompson was in fact under -arrest at this point, we find no constitutional violation because Agent Reynolds had probable cause to arrest him. Prior to frisking him and taking his keys, Agent Reynolds knew that Thompson had lied to him about not being on the ninth floor. Thompson repeated this lie once more before they entered the elevator. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), “[mjaking a materially false statement to a federal agent is a crime.” United States v. Beltran, 752 F.3d 671, 678 (7th Cir. 2014). When Thompson told Agent Reynolds, he was not on the ninth floor, Agent Reynolds had probable cause to arrest him for violating that statute. Thompson’s lies were material because they had the obvious intention of. misdirecting Agent Reynolds and his investigation. See United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When statements are aimed at misdirecting agents and their investigation, ... they satisfy the materiality requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.”). It does not matter whether Agent Reynolds actually had this statute in mind at the time that Thompson lied. See Beltran, 752 F.3d at 678 (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)). What is important for our analysis is whether, given the facts Agent Reynolds knew at the time, he could have reasonably believed that Thompson made a false statement to him in violation of that statute. Id. That was clearly the- case here.

D. Sweep of Thompson’s Apartment

Finally, Thompson contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Agent Reynolds put the key in the lock of unit 902 and performed a sweep of the apartment before obtaining Thompson’s consent. We have previously characterized the placement of a key in a lock as a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991). However, because the privacy interest in the information held by a lock (ie., the verification of the key owner’s address) is so small, officers do not need a warrant or probable cause to perform such a search. See id. at 1173 (noting that law enforcement is entitled to learn a suspect’s address without a warrant and can do so in numerous ways).

As to the initial sweep of Thompson’s apartment, we agree with the district court that this was not an unlawful search. “A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). An officer may perform a “cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding” if he has a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, “that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer, or others.” Id. The inquiry as to the reasonableness and validity of a protective sweep is necessarily fact-specific. United States v. Burrows, 48 F.3d 1011, 1016 (7th Cir. 1995). “The less intrusive a search, the less justification is required.” United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1086 (7th Cir. 1995). “The question posed by the fourth amendment is not whether it would have been reasonable to get a warrant, but whether the search itself was reasonable.” Id. (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)).

Here, the agents were involved in a long term investigation of a large scale drug trafficking organization. As we have established, guns are known tools of the drug trade and interactions with those suspected of drug -trafficking present an inherent danger to law enforcement. As the door was opening, Agent Reynolds asked Thompson whether anyone was inside and received no response. Thompson had already lied to Agent Reynolds about being on the ninth floor and when he used the key on the lock, he knew that Thompson had lied again about living in the building. Those facts are sufficient to give a reasonable agent cause to take precautions. He and one other agent performed a sweep for 30 to 45 seconds, during which time they did not move any items or search inside any containers or compartments. They did not find any: contraband in this initial sweep and did not linger in the apartment any longer than needed to secure it. Upon completing the sweep, they exited the apartment to obtain Thompson’s consent to perform a search. The agents’ actions here were minimally intrusive and reasonable under the circumstances. See id.

Thompson also contends that this was an illegal search because a protective sweep can only be valid if it is performed incident to an arrest. Ignoring that this stands in contrast to his earlier argument that he was under arrest, when the agents accompanied him to the ninth floor, his argument fails for other reasons. First, this Court has held that an arrest is not a requirement for a valid protective sweep. United States v. Starnes, 741 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Thus the constitutionality of a protective sweep does not depend on whether that sweep is incidental to a search warrant, an arrest warrant, or a consensual search.”). Second, as already discussed, the agents had probable cause for Thompson’s arrest before they entered the apartment.

E. Voluntariness of Thompson’s Consent

We now turn to the voluntariness of Thompson’s consent to search his apartment, Thompson argues that his consent was tainted by the constitutional violations committed by the agents leading up to that consent. See, e.g., United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2003) (setting forth the factors used to determine whether consent to search is tainted by an initially illegal search (citation omitted)). We need not address this argument, however, because, as explained above, we do not find any Fourth Amendment violations' that could have tainted Thompson’s consent.

Therefore, we need only determine-whether the district court correctly found that Thompson’s consent to search his apartment was given voluntarily. “Whether an individual’s consent to search was voluntary is a factual question, which we review for clear error.” United States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2014). The following factors are considered in determining whether consent is voluntary: (1) the age, education, and intelligence of the individual; (2) whether he was advised of his rights; (3) whether he was in custody; (4) how long the individual was detained prior to consenting; (5) whether consent was given immediately or after several requests; and (6) whether the officers used physical coercion. Id. at 848. “Our determination does not depend on a single controlling factor, but carefully considers ‘all of the surrounding circumstances.' ” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).

Thompson argues, unpersuasively, that the district court did not make findings of fact sufficient to support its determination that Thompson’s consent was voluntary. It is true that the district court did not explicitly address each of the above listed factors in its written opinion. However, it is clear from the record that the court heard testimony regarding all of the factors and “all of the surrounding circumstances.”

There was no contention that Thompson’s age or level of intelligence prevented him from providing voluntary consent. Pri- or to giving his consent, Thompson was told twice (once in the lobby and once in the apartment) that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to speak to the agents. By Thompson’s own estimation, the entire ordeal lasted approximately 30 minutes. Thompson was asked, and agreed, to go with the agents to the ninth floor. After the protective sweep, and while he and all of the agents were standing outside the' apartment, Thompson was asked, and agreed, to speak with agents inside his apartment. There, Agent Reynolds read him the consent form, Thompson read it himself, and then proceeded to fill it out and sign it. Thompson did not claim that he was asked more than once to provide his consent. There was no contention that any of the agents used or threatened physical force against Thompson. After providing his consent, Thompson voluntarily directed the agents to the locations of the contraband in his apartment. Given “all of the surrounding circumstances,” the district court did not commit clear error in determining that Thompson’s consent was voluntary.

III. CONCLUSION

The agents did not commit any violations of Thompson’s Fourth Amendment rights that could have tainted his consent to search his apartment. We do not find clear error in the district court’s determination that Thompson’s consent was given voluntarily. Therefore, we AFFIRM the denial of his motion to suppress.

      , Thompson argues that we must remand on this point because the district court did not address its argument that the sweep constituted an unlawful search. We disagree. The district court’s written opinion states, "In brief, this Court credits the government's position that no search of Thompson's residential apartment was conducted, even after he had given oral consent to such a search, until Thompson was presented with and signed the consent-to-search form.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Maria N. GRACIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIGMATRON INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-3311
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued September 8, 2016
    Decided November 29, 2016

      Hall Adams, III, Attorney, Law Offices of Hall Adams LLC, Chicago, IL, Kathryn E. Korn, Attorney, Kathryn E. Korn Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Tiffany Carpenter, Attorney, Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Chicago, IL, Michael O. Fawaz, Attorney, Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Royal Oak, MI, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
   ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Maria Gracia sued her employer, Sigma-Tron, International, Inc., for sexual harassment and for terminating her in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. A jury found in favor of SigmaTron on the claim of sexual harassment but returned a verdict for Gracia on the retaliation count. SigmaTron challenges both the judgment in Gracia’s favor and the amount of damages awarded by the jury. We affirm.

I.

Maria Gracia entered the workforce at the age of sixteen. After holding jobs at Burger King, Dollar Tree and various staffing companies, Gracia began working on the assembly line for the defendant, SigmaTron, in 1999. SigmaTron is an international, publicly-traded company that manufactures printed circuit board assemblies. The company has approximately 2500 employees at manufacturing facilities in the United States, Mexico, Taiwan and Vietnam. Its products are used in aviation, home appliances and medical devices, among other applications. A highly regarded employee at SigmaTron, Gracia was promoted multiple times over the years until she achieved the position of assembly supervisor in 2004 or 2005.

In her capacity as assembly supervisor, Gracia was responsible for product output and quality, for scheduling personnel and for directing team members in their'work, among other things. Team members on the assembly line connected electronic components to circuits boards according to the customers’ requirements. Solder, the material used to attach components to circuit boards, may be made with lead or without lead. In some instances, customers requested that a particular solder be employed, and it was the assembly supervisor’s job to make sure that all customer requirements were met. . .

Gracia reported to Patrick Silverman, a production manager. In late 2007, Silver-man began engaging in problematic conduct towards Gracia. He sent her a series of emails containing graphic photographs of partially nude women in degrading poses. In early 2008, he sent Gracia an email with a photo of her younger sister on which someone had superimposed an image of a male co-worker dressed as a baby, with the caption, “Mother, milk please,” in Spanish. Gracia testified that the unwelcome pictures made her feel embarrassed, uncomfortable and upset. But she did not object to Silverman when he sent the photos and did not inform the company’s human resources department because Silver-man was her boss. Gracia had noticed that Silverman and the company’s executive vice-president, Greg Fairhead, were good friends, and she feared she would lose her job. Greg Fairhead is the brother of Gary Fairhead, the CEO of SigmaTron.

In mid-2008, Silverman started writing Gracia up for tardiness. Gracia did not deny that she had been late on multiple occasions, sometimes as little as a minute and at times for longer intervals. But Sil-verman had not previously objected to her schedule and prior to mid-2008, -Gracia’s attendance record had been described by Silverman as “excellent.” One evening in the fall,of 2008, Gracia received a series of late night calls at home from Silverman. He asked her to join him at-a party with David Niemi, a man who had previously worked at SigmaTron.- She declined the invitation. On October 15, a few weeks ■after she declined Silverman’s late-night party invitation, several months after receiving the explicit emails, and after years of being an exemplary employee, Gracia was suspended for two days for tardiness. When she returned to work after the suspension, she requested a meeting with Sig-maTron’s corporate human resources manager, Sandra Miedema.

At the October 20 meeting, Gracia told Miedema for the first time about the late-night phone calls from Silverman and that Silverman had been treating her differently. She explained that he had begun writing her up for tardiness even though her timeliness had not been an issue before. Miedema noticed that Gracia’s appearance had deteriorated since she had’ seen her last, that she looked dull and lacked luster. Even her clothing, jewelry and makeup had changed. Four days later, Miedema called Gracia in for a second meeting. Gra-cia again discussed the late-night phone calls and told Miedema that Silverman had been treating her differently and that he was sexually harassing her. Miedema asked Gracia, “Is he sweet on you?” and Gracia replied, ‘Tes.” Miedema also asked Gracia if she was on drugs. Gracia denied that she was taking drugs and offered to undergo drug testing. Miedema then dropped the subject.

At the end of that second meeting, Mie-dema bypassed her own supervisor and brought Gracia to the office of Greg Fair-head, SigmaTron’s executive vicé-presi-dent. Miedema said that she did not like the idea of Silverman “pushing at Maria.” Gracia repeated to Fairhead that Silver-man had subjected her to multiple unwanted late-night- phone calls at home. Fair-head replied that Silverman had called her only once. Gracia tried to tell Miedema and Fairhead more about Silverman’s inappropriate conduct but Fairhead spoke over her and gave her no chance to interject. After a break in the meeting, during which Miedema and Fairhead spoke privately to Silverman, Gracia was brought back in to speak with Miedema, Silverman and Fair-head. Ultimately, Gracia was told to shake hands with Silverman and work together.

Dissatisfied with the company’s response to her claim of sexual harassment, Gracia filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging sex and national origin discrimination. SigmaTron received a copy of the EEOC charge on November 19, 2008. Approximately two weeks later, on December 4, Silverman purportedly told Fairhead that he had received a report from Eduardo Trujillo, another SigmaTron supervisor, that Gracia had allowed an employee to use the wrong solder on a customer’s order, using unleaded solder on a board that called for solder with lead. Sil-verman claimed that when Trujillo pointed out the problem to Gracia, she had not taken the matter seriously. Silverman asserted that when Trujillo told him about the problem, he (Silverman) went to the production floor, segregated the contaminated product and took care of the problem. After Silverman conveyed this purported sequence of events to Fairhead, Trujillo confirmed Silverman’s story to Fairhead. The next day, approximately six weeks after Gracia’s first complaint to Miedema about Silverman’s sexual harassment and two weeks after the company received Gracia’s EEOC charge, Sigma-Tron terminated Gracia’s employment.

At trial, however, Trujillo, a SigmaTron supervisor, denied making any report to Silverman about Gracia or employees on her assembly line, and did not recall Gra-cia speaking to him about the soldéring incident. Instead, Trujillo testified that he was called into Fairhead’s office ’ on December 5 and asked “about the wrongdoing of boards being soldered.” He responded to Fairhead that he “was aware, as well as the whole group of inspectors.” According to Trujillo, employees often used the wrong solder on circuit boards at Sigma-Tron, and that to the best of his knowledge, no one had ever been fired because of the inadvertent use of the incorrect solder on a circuit board. Trujillo also testified that, approximately one month before Gracia was fired, Silverman advised Trujillo to stay away from Gracia because he (Silverman) was “throwing bombs at” her.

Gracia testified that, on December 4, Trujillo brought, to her attention that an employee was using the wrong solder, and that she addressed the problem immediately and appropriately. She removed the products from the employee applying the wrong solder and delivered them to the correct area. She also determined which employee had made the mistake, a group leader who accepted responsibility. According to Gracia, Silverman never came to the production floor and was not involved in rectifying the problem. As we discuss below, because Gracia prevailed at trial on her retaliation claim, we credit the version of the facts that support the jury’s verdict. The jury was free to believe Gra-cia and Trujillo, and, correspondingly free to determine that Silverman and Fairhead had lied about the incident.

In response to the retaliation claim, Sig-maTron asserted at trial that the company terminated Gracia’s employment because she had allowed an assembly line worker to use the wrong solder, did not resolve the problem and did not take the matter seriously. As for the harassment claim, the company argued that Silverman’s alleged conduct did not meet the standard for hostile work environment, that Gracia had little evidence corroborating her claims, and that Gracia did not avail herself of the company’s sexual harassment policy because she never informed her employer that Silverman had done anything other than invite her to a party and treat her differently by writing her up for tardiness. The jury found in favor of SigmaTron on the sexual harassment claim and in favor of Gracia on the retaliation claim. The jury-awarded Gracia $57,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. SigmaTron appeals.

II.

On appeal, SigmaTron contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. SigmaTron also maintains that the compensatory and punitive damages awards are unsupported by the evidence, and that the punitive damages are both disproportionate to the harm suffered by Gracia and out of line with damages awarded in similar cases. Finally, in the alternative, SigmaTron argues that it is entitled to a new trial..

A.

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 822 (7th Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. In its opening brief, SigmaTron asserted that we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted, in this instance, Sigma-Tron. The company’s statement of the standard is incorrect and in fact inverts the true standard. Once a jury has spoken, reviewing the record as a whole, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Moreover:

the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. .., That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unim-peached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Empress Casino, 831 F.3d at 822 (in reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we construe the trial evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed before the jury); Tart v. Illinois Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2004) (once a jury has spoken, the court is obliged to construe the facts in favor of the parties who prevailed under the verdict). We will affirm if a reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient eviden-tiary basis to find for the party on a particular issue. Empress Casino, 831 F.3d at 822. See also Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that we will affirm a jury’s finding on causation when that finding cannot be said to be unreasonable).

On the retaliation count, Gracia prevailed at trial and so we must credit the evidence in her favor on that claim and disregard all evidence favoring SigmaTron that the jury was not required to believe. Employing that standard, Gracia easily prevails on her retaliation claim, and the district court was right to deny Sigma-Tron’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In order to make out a claim for retaliation, Gracia was required to prove (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) that the protected activity and the adverse employment action are causally connected. Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 881 (7th Cir. 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For the causation factor, Gracia was required to demonstrate that “the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” University of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). “This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id. at 2533.

There is no doubt that Gracia engaged in statutorily protected • activity when she complained to SigmaTron’s human resources manager that her supervisor was sexually harassing her and when she filed her charge with the EEOC. Nor is there any question that SigmaTron took an adverse employment action against her when it terminated her employment. The company concedes these first two factors. Instead, SigmaTron argues that Gracia failed to demonstrate that she was fired became she engaged in protected activity. The company contends instead that she was terminated because of her record of tardiness and because she allowed an employee. to use unleaded solder on a leaded circuit board.

“[Retaliatory motive may be established through circumstantial evidence such as suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, evidence that the stated reason for the employment decision is pretex-tual and” other evidence from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn. Ripberger, 773 F.3d at 881. See also Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). We may dispense with SigmaTron’s first explanation for the termination easily. Sig-maTron did not rely on tardiness as a reason for the termination at trial. In fact, F airhead, the person who decided to terminate Gracia, conceded at trial that he did not fire her on account of tardiness or attendance problems.' R. 190, at 364 (“Q: You did not fire Maria on account of tardiness or attendance problems, did you? A: I did not.”). In pre-trial proceedings, the company assured the court that it was not relying on tardiness as a cause of the termination but was instead focusing solely on the “soldering incident.” In light of the company’s pre-trial concession and the unequivocal admission by the decision-maker at trial, SigmaTron’s repeated argument on appeal that tardiness was a cause for the termination is puzzling. With Sigma-Tron having conceded the point to the jury at trial, we may ignore the purported tardiness rationale on appeal.

We turn to SigmáTron’s claim that Fair-head terminated Gracia because she allowed an employee to use the wrong solder and failed to respond appropriately when the problem was pointed out to her. Wé detailed SigmaTron’s version of events above, namely, that Trujillo approached Silverman and reported that Gracia had refused to fix a soldering error, that Sil-verman then fixed the problem and reported the situation to Fairhead, who then interviewed Trujillo and decided to fire Gracia. But Gracia testified that when Trujillo told her an employee was using lead-free solder on a leaded board, she stopped the employee, segregated the product, redirected employees and sought out the source of the problem. She confirmed that Silverman never came to the production floor to address the incident. Trujillo denied that he ever spoke to Silverman about the incident and denied telling Fairhead that Gracia made the error. Both Trujillo and Gracia denied that, Gracia ever took the matter lightly or said it was “no big deal” (as, Silverman claimed she said to Trujillo) or that it “doesn’t matter” (as Fairhead claimed Silverman reported to him). The jury was free to credit the testimony of Trujillo and Gracia and conclude that Gracia did not mishandle the incident and that no one had reported that Gracia mishandled.it.

Moreover,- even if Gracia had allowed the use of unleaded solder on a leaded circuit board, she presented evidence that such an error occurred with regularity at SigmaTron, at times with the tacit approval of the company’s management. She also presented evidence that the company had never terminated an employee on that ground. Michael Murphy, a former engineering manager at SigmaTron, testified that, although the company strived to use materials according to customer specifications, leaded parts were sometimes used on unleaded circuit boards or vice versa. Inadvertent substitutions occurred on the assembly line and, at times, the wrong parts were used because of supply issues. He explained that, when the company had a supply of leaded parts and that lead-free versions had not yet come in, .they would simply use the leaded parts in order to avoid wasting an expensive supply of leaded parts. Nevertheless, during Murphy’s tenure, which overlapped with Gracia’s, incorrect parts were sometimes used and customers received fudged certifications representing that the correct parts had been used. Murphy testified that it was not a “big deal” to use unleaded solder on leaded boards but that it might present an ethical problem for the reverse to occur, ie., to use leaded solder on an unleaded board. To his knowledge, no one had ever been fired for using the wrong solder. This was consistent with testimony from Trujillo and Gracia that no one had ever been fired for using the wrong solder.

The jury was free to believe Gracia, Trujillo and Murphy, and it is apparent from the verdict that the jury credited their testimony on the retaliation claim. Equally importantly, the jurors were free to disbelieve Silverman, Fairhead and Mie-dema and conclude that their explanation for the termination was a pretext. Gracia presented substantial evidence that she did not engage in the misconduct of which she was accused and that, even if she did, that conduct was not generally seen as cause for termination at the company. When a jury concludes that the employer’s stated reason for the termination is a pretext, the jury may consider that pretextual explanation as evidence of retaliatory motive. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”).

In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as “affirmative evidence of guilt.” ... Moreover, once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal citations omitted). The jury could reasonably conclude that SigmaTron’s stated reason for the termination was a pretext, and.it was then free to infer that the company gave a false reason in order to cover up a discriminatory purpose.

Gracia also provided circumstantial evidence of the company’s retaliatory motive through the timing of her discharge. Although suspicious timing alone is rarely enough to create an inference of retaliatory motive, it can sometimes raise an inference of a causal connection, especially in combination with other evidence. Magyar v. St Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2008); O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). “We have rejected any bright-line rule about how close the events must be to establish causation, but in cases where there is ‘corroborating evidence of retaliatory motive,’ an ‘interval of a few weeks or even months may provide probative evidence of the required causal nexus.’ ” Castro, 786 F.3d at 565. In this, instance, only two weeks after SigmaTron received Gracia’s EEOC charge, the company terminated her, claiming falsely that she had engaged in misconduct. Addition ally, Murphy testified that others had engaged in similar conduct (using incorrect parts) or worse (certifying falsely to customers that correct parts had been used) and had not been fired. Gracia thus presented all three kinds of circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive mentioned in the case law: suspicious timing, a. pre-textual explanation for the termination, and evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently. Castro, 786 F.3d at 565. That was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could find retaliatory motive. Empress Casino, 831 F.3d at 822.

For the sake of completeness, we add that the person who brought Gracia’s supposed infraction to Fairhead’s attention was none other than the manager Gracia had accused of sexual harassment only weeks earlier in her EEOC charge and in her conversations with Miedema and Fair-head. Although the company was aware that Gracia had accused Silverman of sexual harassment, Fairhead conducted a perfunctory investigation into Silverman’s claim that Gracia had allowed the use of the wrong solder and had refused to take the incident seriously. Although Trujillo did not confirm Silverman’s story, Fair-head terminated the highly regarded employee almost immediately. All of this evidence was more than sufficient to prove the causal link between Gracia’s protected conduct and the company’s decision to terminate her employment.

B.

The jury awarded Gracia $57,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. Because the statute caps total damages at $300,000 for a defendant with more than 500 employees, and because the parties agreed that any reduction should be made to the compensatory part of the award, the district court remitted the compensatory damages to $50,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). SigmaTron argues that the district court erred when it failed to order a further remittitur of both the compensatory and punitive damages awards, which the company characterizes as excessive, unjustified by the evidence and inconsistent with awards in similar cases. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to grant a motion for remittitur of compensatory damages. E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2013); Thompson v. Memorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 408 (7th Cir. 2010); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 496 (7th Cir. 2008). We review challenges to punitive damages de novo when constitutional issues are raised. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001); Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 534 (7th Cir. 2004). If no constitutional issue is raised, our review of punitive damages is for abuse of discretion. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433, 121 S.Ct. 1678. It is unclear whether SigmaTron’s challenge to the punitive damages award is based on constitutional or non-constitutional grounds. In this instance, however, the standard of review does not affect the outcome.

We begin with the challenge to the compensatory damages award. In reviewing the district court’s refusal to remit compensatory damages, we consider, among other things, whether the award is “monstrously excessive,” whether there is a rational connection between the award and the evidence, and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases. AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 833; Thompson, 625 F.3d at 408; Marion Cty. Coroner’s Office v. E.E.O.C., 612 F.3d 924, 930-31 (7th Cir. 2010). See also Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2006). SigmaTron asserts that Gracia’s only evidence of non-economic damages was her statement to the jury, “It was hard. I was just depressed. I have always been used to working.” SigmaTron suggests that the award be remitted to $0 or at least be reduced significantly.

“An award for nonpecuniary loss can be supported, in certain circumstances, solely by a plaintiffs testimony about his or her emotional distress.” Tullis v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 243 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001); Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1996). Juries are responsible for evaluating the credibility of witnesses who testify to emotional distress, and we do not disturb those credibility determinations on appeal. Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1068; Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 857 (7th Cir. 2001). The jurors here were able to observe Gracia as she testified and they apparently found her testimony to be sincere and sufficient to convince them that she merited the award they gave her. Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1068. Moreover, as the district court noted, the jury considered her testimony in the context of other evidence presented at trial: Gracia testified that she had worked continuously from the age of sixteen; SigmaTron’s own witnesses conceded that, prior to her termination, Gra-cia had been a spectacular employee at the company; and after her termination, at the height of the recession, Gracia remained unemployed for sixteen months despite her extensive efforts to find another job. Even if Gracia’s testimony regarding her distress was succinct and to the point, “brevity and self-control in a judicial proceeding need not be interpreted as a weak case, and the jury and trial judge were entitled to take that view.” Deloughery v. City of Chicago, 422 F.3d 611, 620 (7th Cir. 2006). It was the jury’s job to gauge Gracia’s distress and determine an appropriate amount to compensate her. SigmaTron has given us no reason to disturb the jury’s determination.

The district court also correctly concluded that the compensatory damages awarded to Gracia were roughly comparable to other Title VII awards. In making the comparison, courts are not required to “completely analogize the damage award in this case to an identical case with either a similar or dissimilar verdict.” Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 566.

Awards in other cases provide a reference point that assists the court in assessing reasonableness; they do not establish a range beyond which awards are necessarily excessive. Due to the highly fact-specific nature of Title VII cases, such comparisons are rarely dispositive.

Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 566. Both the plaintiff and the defendant proposed cases to the court that they contended were comparable, as they did on appeal. The district court concluded that the damages awarded here were in line with those awarded in Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1067-68 (affirming an award in excess of $80,000 for retaliatory discharge that caused a dedicated employee who remained out of work for ten months to feel “low” and “degraded”); Deloughery, 422 F.3d at 620 (affirming $175,000 award of compensatory damages for emotional distress in a failure to promote case where a highly motivated female police officer with a family heritage in law enforcement was frustrated in her quest for greater responsibility simply because she asserted her right to be free from discrimination); Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 377 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming compensatory damages in range of $50,000 to $150,000 for emotional distress for African American employees denied promotions on account of race); and David v. Caterpillar, 185 F.Supp.2d 918, 923-24 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (remitting compensatory damage award to $50,000 for plaintiff who felt depressed, robbed and cheated by a discriminatory failure to promote). SigmaTron did not even attempt to distinguish the cases on which the district court relied. “Abuse of discretion exists only where the result is not one that, could have been reached by a reasonable jurist or where the decision of the trial court strikes us as fundamentally wrong or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful.” Greviskes v. Universities Research Ass'n Inc., 417 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2005). A reasonable jurist could refuse to grant a further remittitur on compensatory damages in this case and so we must affirm.

We turn to the punitive damage award of $260,000. In reviewing punitive damages, the Supreme Court has set forth three guideposts to assess the award: the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; the disparity between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and the difference between the award in this case and the penalties imposed in comparable cases. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996); Kapelanski, 390 F.3d at 534. The BMW case involved a fraud claim in a staté where there was no statutory cap on punitive damages. We have noted that, when “Congress sets a limit, and a low one, on the total amount of damages that may be awarded, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in a particular award ceases to be an issue of constitutional dignity[.]” Lust, 383 F.3d at 590.

The purpose of placing a constitutional ceiling on punitive damages is to protect defendants against outlandish awards, awards that are not only irrational in themselves because out of whack with any plausible conception of the social function of punitive damages but potentially catastrophic. for the defendants subjected to them and, in prospect, a means of coercing settlement. That purpose falls out of the picture when the legislature has placed a tight cap on total, including punitive, damages and the courts honor the cap.

Lust, 383 F.3d at 590-91. A “statutory cap suggests that an award of damages at the capped maximum is not outlandish.” AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 840, In assessing punitive damages on appeal,, “[t]he judicial function is to police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).

SigmaTron notes that Gracia requested a total of $200,000 in punitive damages for both her sexual harassment and retaliation claims. Although the jury found in favor of SigmaTron on the sexual harassment claim, it awarded Gracia $50,000 more in punitive damages than she requested in total. SigmaTron cites that disparity as evidence that the award is the result of bias. The company asserts that the award should have been remitted to $0 or to a far lesser sum than $250,000. The company also argues that its conduct was not reprehensible or malicious, continuing to assert that Gracia was terminated not in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment but because she knowingly allowed employees to use the incorrect solder. SigmaTron also argues that the award is disproportionate te the harm Gracia suffered, suggesting that the jury erroneously awarded punitive damages for both of Gracia’s claims even though she succeeded only on the retaliation claim. Finally, the company contends that the award is inconsistent with those assessed in comparable cases.

We must begin by pointing out again that SigmaTron does not come to terms with the facts as found by the jury. Any argument that Gracia was terminated for allowing an employee to use the wrong solder was soundly rejected by the jury. SigmaTron’s continued refusal to acknowledge the appropriate standard of review on appeal, even after the plaintiff cited the correct standard in her brief, is puzzling. We must assess the reprehensibility of SigmaTron’s conduct by viewing the facts as the jury found them. The jury had more than enough evidence to conclude that Sig-maTron .terminated Gracia because she complained about sexual harassment and filed a charge with the EEOC. Upper management then created documents falsely accusing Gracia of wrongdoing and asserting that the cause of termination was legitimate. The company persisted in asserting that false reason for the termination and the false accusation of wrongdoing throughout the litigation. The jury was also aware that when Gracia tried to explain the extent of Silverman’s conduct to Fairhead in th.e October 24th meeting, he spoke over her, denying her an opportunity to fully report the conduct. Fairhead’s response to Gracia’s complaint was to ignore the claim and force her to shake hands with her harasser. A scant two weeks ’after Gracia filed an EEOC charge asserting that Silverman sexually harassed her, Silverman himself falsely accused Gracia of wrongdoing. And Fairhead claimed to have accepted the truth of that suspect accusation, falsely claiming that Trujillo had confirmed Silverman’s story. Although it was undisputed that Silverman repeatedly’Sent Gracia photos , of partially nude women in degrading poses, the company never disciplined Silverman for this deplorable conduct towards a female subordinate. Yet it quickly terminated a stellar female employee on trumped up charges shortly after she filed a charge of sexual harassment with the EEOC.

And that version of the facts adequately supports the jury’s award' of punitive damages. A complaining party may recover punitive damages in a Title VII cáse by demonstrating that the employer “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). “Applying this standard in the context of § 1981a, an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118. Fairhead’s conduct in response to the report of sexual harassment- in ..the October 24th meeting and the EEOC charge meets the statutory standard for punitive damages. As the district court noted, this standard is met when the employer engages in the act of retaliatory discharge and then makes efforts to hide it, in this case creating a false paper trail that included manufactured details of reports and meetings with Trujillo and other managers in an effort to hide the true nature of the discharge. One of the purposes of punitive damages is to limit the defendant’s ability to profit from its wrongful conduct by escaping detection. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677. See also Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 2003) (where the evidence supports a finding that the employer engaged in a coverup in flagrant violation of Title VII, a large punitive damage award is warranted). Gracia thus meets the first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility of.the defendant’s conduct.

The1 second guidepost asks us to assess the disparity between the harm the plaintiff suffered (as indicated by the compensatory damages) and the punitive damage award. As we noted, when Congress sets a limit on the total amount of damages that may be awarded, “the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in a particular award ceases to be an issue of constitutional dignity.” Lust, 383 F.3d at 590. In this case, the jury awarded Gracia punitive damages that are five times the amount of compensatory damages. A 5:1 ratio is well within the range we have approved in other cases. See Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Kapelanski, 390 F.3d at 534 (finding a 3.3:1 ratio easily permissible); Lampley, 340 F.3d at 485-86 (finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable). As we have noted, Title VII cases are very fact-specific, . and we will' not normally disturb an award of damages at or under the statutory cap because the decision is largely within the province of the jury. Lampley, 340 F.3d at 486; Fine v. Ryan International Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2002).

Finally, we .are, aware of no rule prohibiting a jury from awarding more in damages than a plaintiff requests and SigmaTron cites no authority for this claim. See, e.g., Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1447 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming a jury award, that exceeded the plaintiffs request). So long as the award has a reasonable basis in the evidence, a jury has wide discretion in determining damages. Id. “This is especially so where the trial judge, who had the opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the jury, has seen fit to uphold the award in the face of a post-trial challenge.” Id. We also note that it is unlikely the jury was biased in Gracia’s favor as it found against her on the sexual harassment claim. Apparently, the jury simply had a different view than the plaintiff regarding the amount necessary to punish Sigma-Tron’s conduct and deter future wrongdoing. Merriweather, 103 F.3d at 581 (noting that we will set aside an award of punitive damages only if it exceeds an amount necessary to serve the objective of deterrence and punishment). We see no reason to disturb the jury’s award here.

C.

Finally, in kitchen-sink fashion, Sigma-Tron argues that it is entitled to a new trial because (1) the jury awarded excessive damages; (2) the district court permitted a venire person to remain on the jury who should have been stricken for cause; (3) SigmaTron was wrongly prohibited from presenting a witness; and (4) Gracia presented a doctored and prejudicial exhibit to the jury. None of these issues has any merit and we will address them summarily.

As we have just concluded, the jury did not award excessive damages. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the prospective juror because nothing the juror said evinced an irrational or unshakeable' bias that would prevent him from ruling impartially on the case. Griffin v. Bell, 694 F.3d 817, 826 (7th Cir. 2012). Nor did the court abuse its discretion in barring SigmaTron from presenting a witness whose testimony the court deemed cumulative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Moreover, Sigma-Tron failed to preserve the alleged error for appeal when it failed to make an offer of proof regarding the excluded witness’s expected testimony. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 758 F.3d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 2014); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). And finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Gracia to present the challenged exhibit. The exhibit consisted of one of the explicit photos that Silverman had emailed to Gracia, but for the trial version of the email, the plaintiff had removed the forwarding chain in order to hide the fact that Gracia had forwarded the email to her attorney. The court remedied the matter by allowing the defendant to present the full email and cross-examine the plaintiff on the matter. Any error in allowing the exhibit into evidence was harmless in light of the court’s corrective actions. There is no merit in any of SigmaTron’s remaining arguments and no new trial is warranted.

AFFIRMED.

      . SigmaTron’s corporate human resources manager, Sandra Miedema, described Gracia as "absolutely great at her job,” "terrific,” and "excellent” prior to the events at the core of this case. Patrick Silverman, her manager, testified that, prior to the second half of 2008, Gracia’s attendance was excellent, her cooperation was good, her initiative was very good, her job knowledge was excellent, her work quality was good to excellent, and her work quantity or output was good.

      . Silverman conceded at trial that he sent these photographs to Gracia because he found them "humorous.” After the litigation commenced and SigmaTron became aware that Silverman had sent these photographs to a female subordinate, he was advised in general not to use work email for non-business reasons. As of the time of the trial, no one at the company had mentioned these particular emails or photographs to him and no one at SigmaTron had ever disciplined him for sending these photographs. Miedema testified at trial that, although she found the pictures "disgusting,” she did not think they were sexual in nature. She refused to say that a male supervisor sending these photographs to a female subordinate violated the company’s sexual harassment policy.

      .Gracia testified extensively about additional harassing actions allegedly taken by Silver-man. For example, she testified that Silver-man repeatedly asked her out on dates. She declined each time but was afraid to say more. She also testified that Silverman once pulled away the neck of her turtleneck shirt in front of a,co-worker and asked her if she was hiding bite marks. According to Gracia, Sil-verman attempted to invite himself to her apartment for an overnight stay, suggesting that he would rather stay with Gracia after attending a Cubs game than drive home to Rockford, a distant suburb. On occasion, he sent her texts or emails asking her to go out to dinner or meet him at a bar. Each time, she declined. Gracia did not report this conduct to her employer. Because the jury found for SigmaTron on the sexual harassment claim, we will not credit. Gracia!s testimony on this issue unless her testimony is unopposed, We include her testimony to provide context for her claim of retaliation.

      .Gracia could not recall the exact date of the late-night calls but testified that they occurred approximately one month before two October 2008 meetings that she had with Sandra Mie-dema, the company's human resources manager.

      . Silverman denied making any call, saying that Niemi made one call to Gracia from a party using Silverman’s phone. Niemi denied at trial that he made any call to Gracia from a ' party. SigmaTron insists that any such call took place in 2004, but the jury was entitled to believe Gracia on this point. It was also entitled to credit Niemi and Gracia over Sil-verman. Neither Fairhead nor Miedema called Niemi to check out Silverman’s story.

      . The defendant vehemently denies in its briefs that Gracia complained to Miedema about sexual harassment. But at trial, Gracia responded affirmatively to a question about whether she "explicitly complainfed] about sexual harassment” to Miedema in the October 24th meeting. As we explain in section II.A. below, in reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we construe the facts in favor of the party that prevailed at trial. And so we credit Gracia’s version of the facts on the retaliation claim.

      . Fairhead memorialized his explanation for the termination in a memo, claiming that Gracia was fired for "not following the strict standard on solder technology.” The memo also stated that Trujillo brought the error to Gracia's attention and that she did nothing to stop the work, instead telling Trujillo, "I have done this many times before and nobody ever found out.” According to the memo, Trujillo reported the error to Silverman who then rectified the situation. Fairhead represented in the memo that he questioned Trujillo, who confirmed Silverman’s report.

      . As we will discuss below, Gracia presented additional evidence that the company’s stated reason for her termination was a pretext.

      . In keeping with the statutory cap, the compensatory damages award was remitted to $50,000. The total amount of damages awarded was $300,000.

      . Both Miedema and Fairhead conceded at trial that, when Gracia told them about Sil-verman's unwelcome late night party invítation, neither investigated Silverman’s claim that it was David Niemi and not Silverman who had placed the call.


author: PER CURIAM. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,

text:
    Seyon R. HAYWOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jody HATHAWAY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-1678
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued October 30, 2013
    Decided November 29, 2016

      Barry Levenstam, Attorney, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Clifford Berlow, Attorney, Jenner & Block LLP, Mary Ellen Welsh, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

Seyon Haywood, formerly an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused his auto mechanics teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty and ordered him transferred to segregation for two months; the panel also revoked one month of good-time credit. After these events he was transferred to a different prison, where he remains in custody.

Haywood contends in this proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that these penalties violate his right to speech, protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment (applied to states by the Fourteenth). He also alleges that the conditions of his confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment (again applied via the Fourteenth). The district court dismissed the first claim on the pleadings and granted summary judgment to defendants on the second. The only defendant against whom- Haywood still seeks damages is Jody Hathaway, Shawnee’s Warden during Haywood’s time there.

The district court dismissed the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), that § 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction that remains in force. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), extends this approach to prison discipline. Haywood offers two responses: first, that his good-time credits have now been restored, and, second, that he has waived any challenge to the duration of his confinement and therefore (he contends) should be allowed to seek damages.

Although Haywood maintains that his good-time credits were restored while this appeal has been pending, the forms that Haywood has submitted show only the Department of Corrections’s calculation of his projected release date, not whether the disciplinary board’s decision has been vacated in the manner Heck and Edwards require. At all events, things that happen after a district court’s decision do not demonstrate that the court erred. Heck and Edwards hold that a § 1983 claim does not accrue until the conviction or discipline had been set aside. Once that occurs, the prisoner has the time allowed by the statute of limitations (two years in Illinois) to commence suit. A dismissal under Heck and Edwards is without prejudice to litigation after a conviction or disciplinary sanction is annulled.

As for his waiver of any challenge to the duration of confinement: that’s irrelevant because no matter what a prisoner demands, or waives, § 1983 cannot be used to contest the fact or duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). From its outset, this suit has been a quest for money damages. That’s not all. The holding of Heck and Edwards is that a claim under § 1983 does not accrue as long as it would imply the invalidity of a conviction or disciplinary sanction that affects the duration of custody. If the claim has not accrued, it cannot matter what relief a prisoner seeks. Yet if it is possible to seek damages while waiving other relief, this must mean that the claim accrues immediately and the statute of limitations runs from the time of the events said to be wrongful. That would surprise the many prisoners, who wait patiently until they are entitled to sue under Heck, for if Haywood is right the time to do so could have expired.

Haywood relies on Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2006), which held that a prisoner who foreswears any contest to the length of his confinement may . use § 1983 to seek damages. The Second Circuit understood “the purpose of the Heck favorable termination requirement [to be] to prevent prisoners from using § 1983 to vitiate collaterally a judicial or administrative decision that affected the overall length of their confinement”. 467 F.3d at 104. To disavow any collateral attack on the conviction or revocation of good-time credits is to take the situation outside Heck, the court concluded. We do not agree with that conclusion, which no other circuit has adopted (though none has expressly rejected it, either).

Heck and Edwards say that a challenge is not possible as long as it is inconsistent with the validity of a conviction or disciplinary sanction. See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004): “a § 1983 suit for damages that would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact of an inmate’s conviction, or ‘necessarily imply5 the invalidity of the length of an1 inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction or sentence.” This is a version of issue preclusion (collateral estop-pel), under which the outstanding criminal judgment or disciplinary sanction, as long as it stands, blocks any inconsistent civil judgment. See Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1999). It is a rationale considerably different from the one that Peralta attributed to the Court.

In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 392, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), the Justices emphasized another of Heck's rationales:

[Heck] ■ analogized [the § 1983] suit to one for malicious prosecution, an element of which is -the favorable termination of criminal proceedings. [512 U.S.] at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364. We said:
“[I]n. order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id., at 486-487 [114 S.Ct. 2364] (footnote omitted).”
We rested this conclusion upon “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for' challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id., at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. “ ‘Congress,’ ” we said, “ ‘has determined that habeas corpus is the1 appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact, or length of their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983.’ ” Id., at 482, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)).

Nothing in Heck, Edwards, or any of the Court’s later decisions suggests that the “favorable termination” element that the Court thought essential can be elided by a plaintiffs disavowing a kind of relief that Preiser holds is never available under § 1983 in the first place. The approach taken in Peralta is incompatible with Heck and its successors; Peralta is functionally what would happen if the whole sequence were overruled and only Preiser left standing.

Peralta is incompatible not only with the Supreme Court’s decisions but also with McCurdy v. Sheriff of Madison County, 128 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1997), which held that a plaintiff cannot sidestep Heck by conceding a conviction’s validity. Our decision in Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 435-36 (7th Cir. 2012), which holds that a prisoner cannot avoid Heck by waiting until the sentence expires and it is too late to file a collateral attack, also is irreconcilable with the Second Circuit’s view that a § 1983 suit for damages is permissible whenever it cannot end in a decision that changes the length of a person’s confinement. We decline to follow Peralta, which did not mention McCurdy and therefore created a conflict among the circuits, perhaps unintentionally. We shall stick with the established law of this circuit.

Haywood’s Eighth Amendment claim is unaffected by Heck. He contends that the cell in which he was held during his 60-day term of segregation had a broken window and that, when the prison’s power failed during a storm in January 2010, the heat went off and the • temperature fell below freezing. Haywood maintains that the guards refused to repair the window or provide adequate clothing and blankets. Instead, he asserts, the guards made conditions worse by turning on the ventilation system (which he calls “the blowers”). Wind aggravates the effect of cold by increasing the speed at which heat is removed from exposed skin.

According to Haywood, power and heat were off for four days, and when power was restored the cell remained frigid and the guards continued to ignore his request to fix the window or provide blankets, a coat, or any other means of warmth. If circumstances were as Haywood asserts, then the prison violated his constitutional rights. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997); Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing standards of liability under' the Eighth Amendment in medical-care situations). There may be reasons to doubt Haywood’s account—if the cell was as cold and his clothing as skimpy as he relates, he would have suffered frostbite or death, yet he is alive and whole—but on motion for summary judgment we must accept the declarations in his affidavit.

. The district court granted summary judgment not because it discounted Haywood’s evidence or thought the conditions acceptable, but because of the identity of the sole defendant: the warden. Haywood did not sue (or, if he did sue, did not serve) the guards and other persons responsible for climate control. He sued only the top of the organization, and the district court concluded that the warden cannot be personally liable under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173. L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), that organizational heads and other supervisors are not vicariously liable for their subordinates’ misdeeds. They are liable for their own acts but not derivatively liable for other persons’ acts.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), supplies the substantive rule of decision. There “the Supreme Court held that prison officials have a- duty to ‘ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’ ” Estate of Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 882, 114 S.Ct. 1970). To determine whether an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by a deprivation, we examine the alleged violation both objectively and subjectively. First, the deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious. Second, the mental state of the prison official must have been one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The first element is satisfied when the plaintiff shows that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001). There is no question that the circumstances described by Haywood satisfy this element.

To meet the, second element, a plaintiff must show that “ ‘the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’ ” Estate of Miller, 680 F.3d at 989 (quoting Sanville, 266 F.3d at 734. A plaintiff need not “prove that his complaints ...' were ‘literally ignored,’; rather, he must show only that defendants’ responses to it were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his needs.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000))). Our en banc decision in Petties took this approach to medical-care claims, and ⅜ is equally applicable to related claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

Haywood brought forth evidence in opposition to Warden Hathaway’s motion for summary judgment that Warden Hathaway knew both of the extreme cold in the segregation unit and the causes of that cold. Specifically, the warden knew of the ice storm that caused the prison to lose power, see R.87-4 (Warden Hathaway’s answers to • interrogatories) at 16; he was apprised that Haywood could not shut his window, see R.l at 19 (Emergency Grievance attached as exhibit to Complaint) (“There is lots of air coming in through the windows because the seals on the outside are broken.”); and he personally toured the" segregation unit at least once between January and March 2009, see R.87-4 at 22 (“Defendant did go to Segregation during this time frame [between January 9, 2009, and March 9, 2009].”).

The extent of the warden’s response to this information, however, was that he “enured [sic] that the generators were operating properly and had maintenance perform periodic temperature checks.” Id. at 23. Nothing in the record indicates how frequently Warden Hathaway had maintenance perform temperature checks, whether those were performed during or after the power outage, or, indeed, whether any were performed apart from the check of the unit on January 23—one of the warmest days of the winter. Moreover, the fact that the generators were operational would have little effect on the temperature of the unit if, as Haywood testified, the windows in the unit would not close. The warden’s “plainly inappropriate” responses to Hathaway’s grievance, to the extreme weather, and to the situation in the segregation unit allow the inference that he was deliberately indifferent to the extreme cold suffered by Haywood and the other prisoners. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 524.

Our dissenting colleague reads Iqbal and Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), to support- a contrary result. We do not believe, however, that Iqbal or Vance alters the standards set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, Indeed, Iqbal recognizes that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In Iqbal, the Bivens claim alleged was “invidious discrimination” on the basis of race, religion, and national origin “in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments.” Id, In such situations, the Court explained, “our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose,” id, and “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory .purpose” is not sufficient, id. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Iqbal simply did not speak to standards of liability for Eighth Amendment violations, for Iqbal had not made a claim under that provision, and the Court certainly gave no indication of discontent with the settled law set forth in Farmer. Moreover, even if it had signaled an intent to depart from Farmer, the Supreme Court'has admonished us not to anticipate its future steps. See, e.g., Bosse v. Oklahoma, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1, 196 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (collecting authority).

This court’s decision in Vance is not without its ambiguities. But one thing is clear; it must be read to conform to Farmer, the governing authority. It cannot be read, as the dissent does, as altering the standards of Farmer. In Vance, the plaintiffs alleged “torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, ,.. presented as Fifth Amendment substantive due process claims,” Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated en banc, 701 F.3d 193, and sought damages from the former Secretary of Defense. The specific question béfore the court was “whether the federal judiciary should create a right of action for damages against soldiers (and others in the chain of command) who abusively interrogate or mistreat military prisoners, or fail' to prevent improper detention and interrogation.” Vance, 701 F.3d at 195. We answered this question in the negative. We further observed that “[e]ven if we were to create a common-law damages remedy against military personnel and'their civilian superiors, former Secretary Rumsfeld could not be held liable.” Id. at 203. We observed that

Farmer rejected a contention that wardens (or guards) can be liable just because they know that violence occurs in prisons and don’t do more to prevent it on an institution-wide basis. To get anywhere, Vance and Ertel would need to allege that Rumsfeld knew of a substantial risk to security contractors’ employees, and ignored that risk bécause he wanted plaintiffs (or similarly situated persons) to be harmed.

Id. at 204. This dicta overstates Farmer ⅛ holding. Farmer instructs that the deliberate indifference standard “is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result”:

We hold ... that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

In any event, the standard articulated in Vance is satisfied here. The evidence showed that Warden Hathaway had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather conditions, that he had been apprised of the specific problem with the physical condition of Haywood’s cell (i.e., the windows would not shut), and that, during the time period of Haywood’s complaint, the warden toured the segregation unit himself. These facts establish- that Warden Hathaway’s response was not simply “plainly inappropriate,” but that Haywood’s complaints “literally [were] ignored” by the individual in the position to remedy them. Hayes, 546 F.3d at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted). .

In short, there simply is no evidence that,' in Iqbal, the Supreme Court overruled or limited Farmer. See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 132 S.Ct. 617, 625, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012) (noting Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard). Vance, as well, has no direct application to this case. Vance concerned the possibility of holding the cabinet, secretary of a federal department responsible for the implementation of policy at the individual level—a far cry from holding the administrator of a single facility liable for known deficiencies that directly threatened the welfare of prisoners for whom he was responsible. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2 (“A chief administrative officer shall bé responsible for all persons assigned to the institution or facility.”). Vance did not alter—nor could it alter—the standards set forth in the Court’s Eighth Amendment caselaw. .Indeed, since Vance, we have continued to apply Farmer to allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Farmer .to claims brought against the warden and other prison officials who were involved in the decision to impose a behavior action plan that resulted in unconstitutional .conditions of confinement).

Consistent With our approach in Townsend, other courts of appeals have determined that, post-Iqbal, Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard continues to govern claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement brought against supervisory prison officials. See Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-20 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that deliberate indifference standard “for imposing supervisory liability based on an Eighth Amendment violation is consistent with Iqbal” and collecting cases), reversed on other grounds under the name Taylor v. Barkes, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015) (holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits); see also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard to evaluate liability of prison official post-Iqbal).

The judgment is affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,

dissenting in part.

I agree with the court’s disposition of Haywood’s First Amendment claim but not with its conclusion that Warden Hathaway can be personally liable for cold temperatures in his cell.

Haywood seeks to hold the warden directly (rather than derivatively) liable on the theory that he filed two grievances alerting the warden to the cold. But Iqbal concludes that knowledge is not enough.

[Respondent argues that supervisors] can be liable for “knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees.” Iqbal Brief 45-46. That is to say, respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s [misconduct] amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that [supervisors] may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts of them servants—the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.

556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937. We applied this principle in Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), when holding that notice to the Secretary of Defense about subordinates’ misconduct did not expose the Secretary to damages for failing to ensure that it stopped. The Secretary may be liable for unlawful policies but does not guarantee that lawful policies are carried out correctly. See also, e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009), which holds that prison officials who receive and respond to prisoners’ grievances do not become vicariously liable just because they fail to ensure that the grievances are properly redressed. Just as a prison’s warden in Illinois is responsible for all employees, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2, so a Secretary of Defense has full authority over all of his subordinates. 10 U.S.C. § 113(b). Yet Vance held that insufficient to make the Secretary liable for failing to prevent their misconduct.

No one contends that Warden Hathaway had a policy that authorized, or even tolerated, subjecting prisoners to freezing temperatures. To the contrary, it is undisputed that, when he received Haywood’s first grievance, he directed one of the prison’s engineers to find out what was happening. The engineer told the warden that the temperature in Haywood’s cell was 75° F, and the warden then dismissed the grievance. If the engineer was lying, he might face liability, but it is impossible to see how the warden himself could be liable—and that conclusion would hold even if Iqbal had come out the other way and held that supervisors can be liable just because they know that subordinates are misbehaving. Haywood’s description of the blowers as “torture” does not add anything, because air movement at 75° is hardly an intolerable condition of confinement. And Haywood’s second complaint to the warden also does not add anything, not only because of Iqbal but also because the record shows that it did not reach the warden’s desk until March 9, 2010, the day that Haywood was returned to the general population. Nothing the warden did, or omitted, in response to the second grievance could have affected Haywood.

Prisoners need to sue the persons responsible for the conditions of which they complain. A warden is an easy target—his name is known, and it is easy to achieve service of process. But decisions such as Iqbal and Vance mean that liability rests with the people who injure prisoners; the top of a bureaucratic hierarchy is the wrong person to sue, unless the claim concerns the prison’s formal policies or other decisions that the warden took personally.

I do not read Iqbal or Vance as incompatible with Farmer, which did not address the question whether supervisors can be liable for failing to cure problems created or ignored by their subordinates. By contrast, Iqbal and Vance do address that situation. We observed in Vance that a supervisor does not become liable just because someone sends him a message notifying him that bad things are going on. That’s what plaintiffs alleged in Vance, and a panel held the allegation sufficient, but the en banc court held it legally insufficient. 701 F.3d at 203-05. (Part IV of Vance, which announces this conclusion, cannot be dismissed as dictum; it was an alternative holding. The fact that a court gives two independently sufficient reasons for a disposition does not mean that each is dictum because the other would have sufficed; on that approach, the whole opinion could be dismissed as dictum.)

Vance shows that supervisors are entitled to delegate. The top of an organization must be able to allocate duties without being personally .liable if subordinates mess up.'Warden Hathaway delegated. He sent an engineer to diagnose the situation and fix any problem. The engineer reported that there was no problem. Haywood chose not to sue the engineer, the engineer’s subordinates, or the personnel who should have repaired any broken window, but Haywood’s choice cannot-.mean that the warden becomes personally liable for his subordinates’ inaction.or ineptitude.

My colleagues are among many federal judges who prefer an approach under which notice to a supervisor is enough to create personal liability. The Supreme Court encountered such an approach in Iqbal and disapproved it. When a panel of this court adopted that approach in Vance, the court took the case en banc and disapproved it. As my colleagues observe, decisions in other circuits have continued to impose supervisory liability when notice does not lead to a remedy. They cite Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d Cir. 2014), and Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014), and might have added a citation to Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, rehearing en banc denied, 808 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2015). Barkes has been reversed on immunity grounds, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015), and the Justices did not tell us their view of the merits; Colwell concerned supervisors’ policies and not just failure to control subordinates, so its bearing on our dispute is doubtful; but Turkmen deals with both policy-creation and subordinate-control in one package.

The grants of certiorari in Turkmen set the stage for a new look at the question whether and when supervisors (including Hasty, a prison’s warden) can be liable for failing to prevent or rectify misconduct by guards and other subordinates. See Ziglar v. Turkmen, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 292, 196 L.Ed.2d 211 (2016) (consolidated with Ashcroft v. Turkmen, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 293, 196 L.Ed.2d 211 (2016), and Hasty v. Turkmen, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 293, 196 L.Ed.2d 211 (2016)). The sort of dispute represented by Haywood’s Eighth Amendment claim is now in the hands of the Supreme Court. Turkmen may be decided on other grounds (the lead argument is that the Second Circuit erred in implying a Bivens remedy against supervisors, while § 1983 supplies an express remedy in our case), but even so Turkmen may reflect on the circumstances under which heads of organizations who are alerted to problems but don’t fix them can be liable for that failure. They ducked in Barkes, a summary reversal, but may conclude that resolution is due in Turkmen, which will be briefed and argued.-