author: DICKSON, Chief Justice. SULLIVAN and MASSA, JJ.,

text:
    The PRESBYTERY OF OHIO VALLEY, INC., d/b/a The Presbytery of Ohio Valley, d/b/a Ohio Valley Presbytery, and The Synod of Lincoln Trails of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Inc., d/b/a The Synod of Lincoln Trails, Inc., Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. OPC, INC., f/k/a Olivet Presbyterian Church, Inc., d/b/a Olivet Presbyterian Church, d/b/a Olivet Evangelical Presbyterian Church, d/b/a Olivet Presbyterian Church of Evansville, and Olivet Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Evansville, Inc., and The Evangelical Presbyterian Church, d/b/a Evangelical Presbyterian Church of America, Appellees (Defendants below).
    No. 82S02-1105-MF-314.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    July 31, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 2012.

      Judy L. Woods, Bose, McKinney & Evans, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Ross E. Rudolph, Rudolph, Fine, Porter, & Johnson, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
    Brian P. Williams, Kahn, Dees, Donovan, & Kahn, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
    John C. Duffey, Stuart & Branigin, LLP, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Amicus Curiae American Anglican Council.
    David E. Gray, Paul E. Black, Bowers Harrison, LLP, Evansville, IN, Forrest Norman, Cleveland, OH, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Presbyterian Lay Committee.
   DICKSON, Chief Justice.

This case involves a property dispute between an individual church congregation, the Olivet Presbyterian Church (“Oli-vet”), and the denominational organization with which it was previously affiliated, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (“PC(USA)”), and the latter’s subsidiary organizations, the plaintiffs in this action— the Presbytery of Ohio Valley and the Synod of Lincoln Trails of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Inc. (collectively, “Presbytery”). The trial court granted summary judgment rejecting the Presbytery’s claims of express and implied trust and holding that the disputed property is solely owned by Olivet. The Presbytery appealed both the denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of Olivet’s motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment in favor of the Presbytery. Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc. v. OPC, lnc., 940 N.E.2d 1188, 1197 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). We granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Ind.App. R. 58(A)(2). We hold that genuine issues of material fact arise from the inferences flowing from the stipulated designated evidence and that neither Olivet nor the Presbytery is entitled to the full relief sought in their respective motions for summary judgment.

Olivet, formerly the Olivet Presbyterian Church of Evansville and the Olive Street Presbyterian Church, was affiliated in 1900 with an ancestor of the current PC(USA), which was not formed until the early 1980s when the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. combined with the Presbyterian Church of the United States to become the PC(USA). In 1968, Olivet acquired the real estate and built its church building using its own resources. Beginning at least as far back as 1994, the Olivet congregation began to have doctrinal disputes with the PC(USA), “including disputes about church policies and positions on abortion, ordination, Christology and theology.” Stipulated Statement of Facts ¶ 50 [hereinafter Stip. Facts]. Olivet in 2006 (with a 98% approval vote of its congregation) decided to disassociate from the PC(USA) when the General Assembly of the PC(USA) was considering substantial alterations to its denominational policy and religious doctrine, among them: “1) the deity of Christ, 2) the essentials of salvation, and 3) the Bible as the infallible word of God.” Stipulated Documentary R. 48 [hereinafter Stip. Ex.]. In response, the PC(USA), through its Presbytery, offered to “release” Olivet from membership in the PC(USA) on condition that, while negotiations continue regarding “the issue of the disposition of the church and its real property,” Olivet must agree to treat the building as leased from the Presbytery for eight months and pay $1.00 as lease consideration and, if a settlement is not agreed, then for up to one more year “at the current market value for such space in Evansville, Indiana.” Stip. Ex. 61. Olivet did not accept this proposal.

When Olivet declined to relinquish ownership of its church property, the Presbytery filed this action claiming a trust on Olivet’s property in favor of the PC(USA) and seeking a declaratory judgment divesting Olivet from all right, title, and interest in its property. As explained by the trial court, the “PC(USA) seeks through this litigation to take control of the building and real property at 5600 Oak Hill Road as well as the congregation bank accounts and any other property.” Entry of Final Judgment with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellants’ App’x at 13-14. The trial court, faced with competing motions for summary judgment, determined that the property belonged exclusively to Olivet; that the Presbytery, its associated plaintiff, and the PC(USA) had no rights in the property; that the property was not held in trust — expressly, impliedly, or constructively — in favor of the PC(USA) or its associated entities, the plaintiffs; and that Olivet had not been unjustly enriched nor had it converted property belonging to the PC(USA) or the plaintiffs. The Presbytery instituted this appeal requesting both the entry of summary judgment in its favor and reversal of the trial court’s judgment for Olivet. Additional facts will be provided as needed.

1. Neutral Principles of Law

As a general matter, it is clear that Indiana courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over Indiana church-property disputes. Ramsey v. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 431, 91 N.E. 344, 346 (1910); see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3024-25, 61 L.Ed.2d 775, 783-84 (1979) (“There can be little doubt about the general authority of civil courts to resolve [church property] question[s]. The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.”). However, ‘the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes’” and “prohibit[s] civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. at 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d at 784 (quoting Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658, 665 (1969) [hereinafter Hull ]). The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to adopt a “particular method” for states to follow in resolving church property disputes. Id. Rather, “a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.” Id. (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S.Ct. 499, 500, 24 L.Ed.2d 582, 584 (1970) [hereinafter Sharpsburg II ] (Brennan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The parties dispute which method Indiana courts should apply in such cases. The Presbytery contends that the “preferred” approach is the polity approach (also termed the “hierarchical deference rule”) enunciated by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). Appellants’ Br. at ISIS. Olivet contends that the better method is the neutral-principles-of-law approach which was approved by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-04, 99 S.Ct. at 3025-26, 61 L.Ed.2d at 784-85. We agree with Olivet.

The polity approach was developed by the Supreme Court to settle a property dispute resulting from a schism in a local church. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 726-27, 20 L.Ed. at 676. Rejecting the “English” rule, which required inquiry into the “true standard of faith in the church organization” and then into which schismatic faction was most loyal to that standard, the Court determined that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest ... church judicatories ..., the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.” Id. at 727, 20 L.Ed. at 676. The polity approach first inquires into the organizational structure of the denomination and, if found to be “hierarchical,” requires the civil courts to defer to the determination of the denominational church organization. Id. This amounts to a “rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church property disputes.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 605, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 786 (responding to the dissenters contention that states should be required to apply Watson in all cases). As the Court noted in Jones, in some instances “this task would not prove to be difficult,” but in others such a determination “would appear to require ‘a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.’” Id. (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2387, 49 L.Ed.2d 151, 170). This may be especially true where, as here, the parties dispute the structural form of the denominational church organization. Moreover, the polity approach cannot be applied to all church-property cases, for instance, where the organizational structure of the denomination is “connectional” or “congregational” resort must be made to “the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.” Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725, 20 L.Ed. at 675. This would result in two rules, one for “hierarchical” churches (polity approach) and another for all other churches (“ordinary principles,” i.e., neutral principles of law). See id. at 725-27, 20 L.Ed. at 675-76.

The neutral-principles approach is “completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. at 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d at 784-85. The neutral-principles approach was first developed by Maryland and Georgia. See id. at 602-04, 99 S.Ct. at 3025-26, 61 L.Ed.2d at 784-85. In reviewing the application of the approach in those states, the Court noted that when determining whether a trust had been created, the state courts considered the “language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property.” Id. But, the Court cautioned that, where civil courts undertake an examination of “certain religious documents, such as a church constitution,” they “must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms.” Id. at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 785. In this respect, the civil courts will give effect to the intention of the parties, “provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.” Id. at 606, 99 S.Ct. at 3027, 61 L.Ed.2d at 786. This allows “States, religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.” Id. at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 785 (quoting Hull, 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. at 606, 21 L.Ed.2d at 665) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The lesson of Jones is that, subject to the limitations of the First Amendment, states are free to apply their own “well-established concepts of trust and property law” to church property disputes. Id. at 602-03, 99 S.Ct. at 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d at 784-85 (“Subject to these limitations, however, the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes.”). Because the neutral-principles-of-law approach permits greater fairness, consistency, and equality of application to all church property disputes regardless of the structure of the denominational church organization, we adopt the neutral-principles-of-law approach for settling property disputes between religious organizations in Indiana.

In the application of this approach, Indiana courts may consider Indiana statutes, the language of the deeds and conveyances, the local church charters or articles of incorporation, the constitution of the denominational church organization, and any other relevant and admissible evidence provided they “scrutinize the[se] document[s] in purely secular terms” consistent with Indiana law. See id. at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 785. In this respect, Indiana courts should apply neutral principles of Indiana trust and property law without regard to the organizational structure of the religious denomination, id. at 605, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 786 (“The neutral-principles approach ... obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes.”), whether interpreting the language of a deed or conveyance or determining whether there exists an express or implied (constructive or resulting) trust.

2. Indiana Trust Law

An express trust must be evidenced by a writing signed by the owner of the property (i.e., the settlor). Ind. Code § 30-4-2-l(a). The burden of proof rests on the party seeking to impose the trust. See Matthews v. Adoniram Grand Lodge, 129 Ind.App. 395, 403, 154 N.E.2d 806, 809 (1958) (“It is the law in Indiana that when an attempt is made to impress a trust upon real property when legal title is held by another, that the burden of establishing said trust is upon the one asserting, or claiming the benefit of the trust....”), trans. denied; see also Webster v. Webster, 135 Ind.App. 53, 55, 184 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1962) (stating that plaintiff-appellant bore the burden of proving existence of oral trust), trans. denied. Certain terms are essential to the creation of a trust and must be “sufficiently definite” and “ascertained with reasonable certainty” from the writing(s), otherwise the trust must fail: (1) the trust property; (2) the settlor; (3) the identity of the trustee; (4) the identity of the beneficiary; and (5) the purpose of the trust. Ind.Code § 30-4-2-1 (b); see also id. cmt. (b) (“This subsection retains the existing law.”); Baker v. Gordon, 130 Ind.App. 585, 596, 164 N.E.2d 118, 124 (1960), trans. denied; Holsapple v. Shrontz, 65 Ind.App. 390, 397, 117 N.E. 547, 549 (1917), trans. not sought. These terms may be set forth in multiple writings so long as they are sufficiently “referred to and connected with” the signed writing such that they may be read as single transaction, Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 400, 53 N.E. 767, 769 (1899); cf. Ross v. Thompson, 128 Ind.App. 89, 100, 146 N.E.2d 259, 265 (1957) (“[Such] [w]rit-ings... are to be read in their setting, and the court may be aided by oral evidence as to the position, situation, circumstances, and surroundings of the party at the time of the execution of the deed and the writings”), trans. not sought, provided that there is a “clear and unequivocal” demonstration of the settlor’s intent to create a trust, Richards v. Wilson, 185 Ind. 335, 368, 112 N.E. 780, 790 (1916); see also Holsapple, 65 Ind.App. at 397, 117 N.E. at 549 (stating that the intent to create a trust must be “clear”). Such heightened proof is necessary to protect the sanctity of property ownership against trust claims not intended by the settlor (i.e., the owner).

Implied trusts are “creatures of equity, imposed to do justice,” and, in Indiana, they arise in two forms: constructive trusts and resulting trusts. Melloh v. Gladis, 261 Ind. 647, 655-56, 309 N.E.2d 433, 438-39 (1974). Constructive trusts are generally imposed when legal title is gained through wrongful means (e.g., fraud, duress, undue influence, theft, etc.). Id. We need not consider the existence of a constructive trust here because no claim is made that Olivet acquired its property through wrongful means. As such, we need only consider the possibility of a resulting trust, which is generally imposed in three circumstances: “(1) where an express trust fails in whole or in part; (2) where an express trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; (3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at his direction the vendor conveys the property to another person.” Id. at 655, 309 N.E.2d at 438 (quoting 5 Scott on Trusts § 404.1). It is only the first of these circumstances, the failure of an express trust, that is implicated by the facts of this case. Such a resulting trust is created by operation of law to give effect to the parties’ intentions when they have otherwise failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for creating an express trust. See id. And, as in the case of express trusts, the party seeking to impose the trust bears the burden of proof. See Workman v. Douglas, 419 N.E.2d 1340, 1345 (Ind.Ct.App.1981), trans. not sought. As with express trusts, the settlor’s intent is crucial to the resulting trust analysis. Flying Squadron Found. v. Crippen, 201 Ind. 482, 524, 169 N.E. 843, 857 (1930).

3. Competing Motions for Summary Judgment

The parties’ separate motions for summary judgment each designate the same stipulated statement of facts and stipulated exhibits.

In reviewing an appeal of a motion for summary judgment ruling, we apply the same standard applicable to the trial court. Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200, 202 (Ind.2010). Summary judgment is appropriate where the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Review is limited to those facts designated to the trial court, T.R. 56(H), and “[a]ll facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dept. of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.2001). The fact that each party sought summary judgment does not alter our analysis. See Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ind.2005). Rather, we “consider each motion separately construing the facts most favorably to the non-moving party in each instance.” Id.

The parties’ stipulations reveal the following relevant facts. The Olivet congregation first joined the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in 1900. In 1906, Olivet became a member of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (“UPCUSA”) when it merged with the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. In 1968, Olivet purchased the property and built the church building that is the subject of dispute in this case. The property was conveyed by warranty deed to “Olivet Presbyterian Church of Evansville, Indiana,” Stip. Facts ¶ 21, and has at all relevant times been titled and recorded as the property of Oli-vet. The real estate and church building were acquired entirely with monies donated to or borrowed by Olivet. The Presbytery, and its associated plaintiff, contributed no monies to the purchase of the real estate.

In the early 1980s, the UPCUSA and the Presbyterian Church of the United States merged to become the PC(USA)— the parent organization of the Presbytery and its associated plaintiff. In 1981, shortly before this merger was finalized, the UPCUSA, the predecessor of the PC(USA), amended its constitution, which consists of two documents, the Book of Confessions (principally expressing tenets of faith, totaling nearly 300 pages) and the Book of Order (covering the government, worship, and discipline within the PC(USA), consisting of 39 chapters and 6 appendices, totaling nearly 400 pages). See generally Book of Confessions (2004); Book of Order: 2005-2007 (2005). The 1981 amendment inserted into the nearly 700 pages of governing documents two paragraphs that serve as the basis of the Presbytery’s claim of a trust on Olivet’s property:

All PropeHy Held in Trust
All property held by or for a particular church, a presbytery, a synod, the General Assembly, or the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), whether legal title is lodged in a corporation, a trustee or trustees, or an unincorporated association, and whether the property is used in programs of a particular church or of a more inclusive governing body or retained for the production of income, is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
Property Used Contrary to Constitution
Whenever property of, or held for, a particular church of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) ceases to be used by that church as a particular church of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in accordance with this Constitution, such property shall be held, used, applied, transferred, or sold as provided by the presbytery.

Book of Order: 2005-2007 §§ G-8.0201, G-8.0301. When the merger was finalized in 1983, these provisions became a part of the PC(USA) Constitution, and Olivet became a member of the newly-formed PC(USA) by default as result of its membership with the predecessor UPCUSA.

Olivet amended its bylaws several times during its affiliation with the PC(USA) and its predecessors. The most recent of these occurred in 1978, 1998, and 2000. The 1978 bylaws, which went into force before the inclusion of the trust provisions in the denominational organization’s constitution, included a provision stating that the PC(USA) Constitution “is in all its provisions obligatory upon it and its members.” Stip. Ex. 37-E (this document contains the signatures of Olivet’s then-pastor and of the then-Clerk of Session). The only other signed document is the minutes of the August 25, 1983, Olivet Session meeting. These minutes include one relevant entry, which states: “The clerk was requested to edit the By-Laws of Olivet Presbyterian Church to bring them in line with the Book of Order changes as a result of the Reunion of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Presbyterian Church in the United States.” Stip. Ex. 37-F. The 1998 and 2000 bylaws state that Olivet “recognizes the constitution of [the PC(USA) ] as the authority for the governance of the church and its congregations” but are silent as to whether Olivet adopts or recognizes the PC(USA) Constitution as the authority controlling property ownership. Stip. Exs. 42, 45.

In 1994, Olivet filed articles of incorporation with the Indiana Secretary of State. These corporate articles included language that would apply in the event of a future corporate dissolution, specifically that “[a]ll assets become the property of Ohio Valley Presbytery upon dissolution of this church.” Stip. Ex. 38. The record also reveals that in 1998 the Presbytery made two separate loans totaling $65,000 to Oli-vet. Each loan was secured by separate mortgages on Olivet’s real estate.

After over a decade of deliberation, Olivet, in 2006, (with a 98% approval vote of its congregation) decided to disassociate from the PC(USA). Olivet requested to be released from the PC(USA) “with property and finances, to the Evangelical Presbyterian Church.” Stip. Facts ¶ 60. In response, the PC(USA), through its Presbytery, offered to “release” Olivet from membership in the PC(USA) on condition that, while negotiations continue regarding “the issue of the disposition of the church and its real property,” Olivet must agree to treat the building as leased from the Presbytery for eight months and pay $1.00 as lease consideration and, if a settlement is not agreed, then for up to one more year “at the current market value for such space in Evansville, Indiana.” Stip. Ex. 61. Olivet did not accept this proposal, and the Presbytery instituted this litigation. Following the summary judgment motions filed by Olivet and the Presbytery, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Olivet and the Presbytery appealed, requesting both (a) the reversal of the judgment for Olivet and (b) the grant of the Presbytery’s motion for summary judgment.

A. Olivet’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Presbytery contends on appeal that the trial court erred in granting Olivet’s motion for summary judgment. In this motion, Olivet contends that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that, as a matter of law, the designated evidence demonstrates that no trust on its property, express or implied, exists in favor of the PC(USA).

As noted above, an express trust must be evidenced by a writing which is signed by the owner (settlor). Here, the only signed document, contemporaneous to the insertion of the trust provision in the PC(USA) Constitution, is the signed minutes of the August 25, 1988, Olivet session meeting, which note that the “clerk was requested to edit the By-Laws of Olivet Presbyterian Church to bring them in line with the Book of Order changes as a result of the Reunion of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Presbyterian Church in the United States.” Stip. Ex. 87-F (emphasis added). The minutes do not establish, however, that such “request” was anything more than a request of a single member of the session; nor that the request was formulated as a motion or was voted upon and approved by the session, Olivet’s governing body; nor that such request was ever implemented as a formal bylaw revision being proposed and approved by the session. See Stip. Ex. 37 (“No copy of changes found.”).

The Presbytery separately argues that these 1983 session minutes, when read in conjunction with Olivet’s bylaws from 1998 and 2000 and combined with the property trust provisions added to the Book of Order almost twenty years earlier, “effectuate an express trust under Indiana law.” Appellants’ Br. at 32. While the terms of a trust may be set forth in multiple writings so long as they are “referred to and connected with” the signed writing such that they are “a part of the [same] transaction,” Ransdel, 153 Ind. at 400, 53 N.E. at 769, the three writings are not “sufficiently definite” to establish an express trust “with reasonable certainty.” Ind.Code § 30-4-2-l(b). The bylaws of Olivet from 1998 and 2000 state that Olivet “recognizes the constitution of [the PC(USA) ] as the authority for the governance of the church and its congregations” and that the bylaws “shall not be amended so as to conflict with the Constitution of the [PC(USA) ].” Stip. Exs. 42, 45 (emphasis omitted). The PC(USA) Constitution includes the Book of Order and its 1981 trust provisions. However, the 1983 session minutes and the 1998 and 2000 bylaws do not refer and connect with each other such that they can be read as part of the same transaction. See Ransdel, 153 Ind. at 400, 53 N.E. at 769. Furthermore, even assuming that Olivet’s 1983 session minutes and its 1998 and 2000 bylaws could constitute a signed writing, the relevant language in these documents is not a “clear and unequivocal” statement of Olivet’s intent to create a trust on its property. Richards, 185 Ind. at 368, 112 N.E. at 790.

We find from the designated evidence and its resulting inferences, construing them favorable to the Presbytery as non-movant, that there is no genuine issue of fact and that neither Olivet’s 1983 session minutes nor its bylaws from 1998 or 2000, whether considered separately or together, are sufficient acts by Olivet to declare its intention to create an express trust on its property in favor of the PC(USA). For this reason, as to the Presbytery’s claim of express trust, Olivet was entitled to partial summary judgment.

In addition to the Presbytery’s claim of express trust, however, it alternatively seeks the imposition of an implied trust on Olivet’s property. The Presbytery contends that a “lengthy history and a deep relationship between Olivet and the [PC(USA) ] ... should result in imposition of a trust on the Property” as a matter of equity. Appellants’ Br. at 83. As discussed above, upon the failure of an express trust, a resulting trust may be implied by operation of law to give effect to the intent of the parties when they have otherwise failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for creating an express trust. See Melloh, 261 Ind. at 655, 309 N.E.2d at 438. As with express trusts, the settlor’s intent is crucial to the resulting trust analysis. Crippen, 201 Ind. at 524, 169 N.E. at 857.

As noted in Part 2, a resulting trust may be imposed by operation of law to give effect to the parties’ intentions when there has been a failure to satisfy the statutory requirements for creating an express trust. Olivet must demonstrate that the designated evidence and its reasonable inferences undisputedly establish the absence of a mutual intent on the part of Olivet and the Presbytery to create the claimed trust. With respect to the PC(USA), its intention to create the trust is supported by the 1981 trust provisions of the Book of Order. See Book of Order: 2005-2007 §§ G-8.0201, G-8.0301. With respect to Olivet, however, the issue is less clear. We must consider Olivet’s recognition of the PC(USA) Constitution “as the authority for the governance of the church and its congregations,” Stip. Exs. 42, 45 (bylaws of 1998. and 2000), and Olivet’s continuance as a member of the PC(USA) from 1983 until 2006. Viewing the designated evidence in favor of the non-moving party, as required on summary judgment, while Olivet’s 1998 and 2000 bylaws do not discuss property ownership, a finder of fact could find conflicting inferences from the fact that Olivet remained a member of the PC(USA) for nearly twenty-five years after insertion of the trust provisions. It is possible that inferences from the designated evidence may be drawn to support either of two opposite conclusions: that Olivet did or did not intend to create a trust on its property. The result is a disputed issue of material fact, and thus there remains a genuine issue of fact for trial, rendering summary judgment improper. This disputed issue of fact precludes summary judgment for Olivet as to the Presbytery’s claim of an implied resulting trust in favor of the PC(USA).

B. The Presbytery’s Motion of Summary Judgment

The Presbytery argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for summary judgment seeking to impose a trust on Olivet’s property in favor of the PC(USA) as a matter of law. To succeed, the Presbytery must show from the designated evidence that the undisputed facts conclusively establish either an express or an implied resulting trust. As to the claim of express trust, we have already concluded to the contrary in Part 3, A. We have found from the designated facts and their resulting inferences that Olivet’s 1983 session minutes are not sufficiently connected with its bylaws from 1998 or 2000 to constitute a signed writing and that, even if they were, the relevant language in these documents is not a “clear and unequivocal” statement of Olivet’s intent to create a trust on its property. Richards, 185 Ind. at 368, 112 N.E. at 790. Therefore, the Presbytery was not entitled to summary judgment on its claim of express trust.

With respect to the Presbytery’s claim of implied resulting trust, summary judgment is likewise not appropriate on the evidence. Even when reviewing the designated evidence and inferences most favorable to the Presbytery on Olivet’s motion for summary judgment, we determined that reasonable inferences lead to a disputed issue of material fact thus precluding summary judgment on the claim of implied resulting trust. Because this issue is one on which there remains a genuine issue of fact for trial, summary judgment is improper.

4. Conclusion

We hold that neither the Presbytery nor Olivet are entitled to summary judgment completely resolving this case in their favor. Genuine issues of disputed fact, resulting from varying inferences possible from the designated evidence, must be resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment. With respect to the Presbytery’s claim of express trust, the designated evidence and its reasonable inferences show that there is no genuine issue of fact and that, as a matter of law, Olivet did not create an express trust upon its property in favor of the Presbytery or the PC(USA). As to the Presbytery’s claim of implied resulting trust, reasonable inferences are possible and thus produce a genuine issue of material fact regarding the requisite unequivocal intent of Olivet to create a trust. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

RUCKER and DAVID, JJ., concur.

SULLIVAN and MASSA, JJ.,

dissent, believing the decision and analysis of the Court of Appeals in this case, 940 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), to be correct.

Attachment A

Source: Family Tree of Presbyterian Denominations, Presbyterian Historical Society, The National Archives of the PC(USA), http://www.history.pcusa.org/ history/denominations.cfm (last visited July 19, 2012).

      . The first and second named defendants, for purposes of this case, both constitute the congregation of Olivet. During the course of Olivet’s separation from the PC(USA), Olivet amended its articles of incorporation and became known as "OPC, Inc.” Stipulated Statement of Facts ¶ 11. Olivet then formed a second corporation, "Olivet Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Evansville, Inc.” Id. ¶ 12. The two entities then merged. Id. ¶ 13. The third named defendant, the Evangelical Presbyterian Church, is the denominational organization with which Olivet is now affiliated. Id. ¶ 14. The Evangelical Presbyterian Church remains a named party to this suit but "claims it has no beneficial or legal interest in the Property at issue in this dispute.” Id. ¶ 16.

      . In the PC(USA) there are four governing bodies or "judicatories,” and each is answerable to the next highest body. Book of Order: 2005-2007 §§ G-4.0301, G-9.0101, G-9.0103 (2005). These bodies, in ascending order, are the session, the presbytery, the synod, and the General Assembly. Id. § G-9.0101. A local church (or "particular church”) is governed by its session, which consists of the church's ministers and elders elected by the congregation. Id. §§ G-7.0103, G-10.0101. A presbytery then consists of "all the churches and ministers ... within a certain district,” as well as at least one elder from each session within the district. Id. § G-l 1.0101 (endnote omitted). A synod oversees three or more presbyteries in a specified geographic region and consists of "commissioners elected by the presbyteries.” Id. § G12.0101. The General Assembly is the highest judicatory "and is representative of the unity of the synods, presbyteries, sessions, and congregations of the [PC(USA)].” Id. § G-13.0101. It meets annually and is composed of a number of elders and ministers elected by each presbytery proportional to each presbytery’s membership. Id. § G-13.0102.

      . The general history of Presbyterianism in the United States is replete with numerous splits and reunifications. See Stipulated Statement of Facts n.7 (referring the Court to the website of the Presbyterian Historical Society); Family Tree of Presbyterian Denominations, Presbyterian Historical Society, The National Archives of the PC(USA), http://www.history.pcusa.org/history/denominations.cfm (last visited July 19, 2012) (appended as Attachment A).

      . The trial court’s decision, titled "Entry of Final Judgment with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” does not refer to summary judgment. After the trial court noted that the summary judgment motions were being taken under advisement, the parties each filed proposed entries of final judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court’s "Final Judgment” resulted. It is clear, however, that the relief sought by the parties was entry of summary judgment and that is the relief requested by the Presbytery on appeal, we thus address only the question of whether summary judgment is appropriate and apply the summary judgment standard of review.

      . That is, the local church "is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.’’ Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23, 20 L.Ed. at 674.

      . That is, "a religious congregation which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority." Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722, 20 L.Ed. at 674.

      . Some state courts have apparently read Jones as an affirmative rule requiring the imposition of a trust whenever the denominational church organization enshrines such language in its constitution. See, e.g., Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408, 28 A.3d 302, 325 (2011) (“Jones thus not only gave general churches explicit permission to create an express trust in favor of the local church but stated that civil courts would be bound by such a provision, as long as the provision was enacted before the dispute occurred.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2773, 183 L.Ed.2d 653 (2012); Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., 290 Ga. 272, 719 S.E.2d 446, 454 (2011) ("[T]he fact that a trust was not created under our state’s generic express (or implied) trust statutes does not preclude the implication of a trust on church property under the neutral principles of law doctrine.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2772, 183 L.Ed.2d 638 (2012). We do not understand Jones as creating such a rule. First, such a rule would result in de facto compulsory deference by enforcing the claim of the denominational church organization merely because the trust claim is added to the denominational church organization’s constitution and regardless of any contrary evidence or state law. Not only did the Court reject imposing a "compulsory deference” rule in all cases, Jones, 443 U.S. at 605, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 786, the Court specifically approved Justice Brennan's assertion in Sharpsburg II that states may resolve church property disputes under any method so long as that approach does not abridge the First Amendment. Id. at 602, 99 S.Ct. at 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d at 784 (quoting Sharpsburg II, 396 U.S. at 368, 90 S.Ct. at 500, 24 L.Ed.2d at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring)) (“[T]he First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes. Indeed, 'a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.' "). Second, the Court approved the neutral-principles approach as an acceptable means of applying state property and trust law. See id. at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 785 (“The neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in Georgia (emphasis added)). Thus, the Court's expression that "the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church” organization, was one example of a means by which parties may be able to express their intent, “provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form” under state law. See id. at 606, 99 S.Ct. at 3027, 61 L.Ed.2d at 786. As explained below, under Indiana trust law, whether under an express or implied trust theory, the intent of the owner (settlor) to create a trust must be demonstrated. See Flying Squadron Found. v. Crippen, 201 Ind. 482, 524, 169 N.E. 843, 857 (1930); Richards v. Wilson, 185 Ind. 335, 368-69, 112 N.E. 780, 790 (1916); see also Holsapple v. Schrontz, 65 Ind.App. 390, 397, 117 N.E. 547, 549 (1917), trans. not sought. Thus, under Indiana law, a claim of trust by the purported beneficiary (e.g., insertion of a trust clause into a denominational church organization's constitution), without indicia of intent on the part of the owner (settlor), is insufficient to impose a trust.

      . The Supreme Court ultimately remanded Jones for determination of whether Georgia "was adopting a presumptive rule of majority representation” when the identity of the local church is disputed (i.e. when separate factions of a local church schism each claim the corporate designation associated with the identity of the local church). Jones, 443 U.S. at 606-10, 99 S.Ct. at 3027-29, 61 L.Ed.2d at 787-89. Because the corporate membership of Olivet is not disputed by the parties, we decline to address this issue today.

      . The Supreme Court also stated that there may be cases where these documents incorporate "religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d at 785 (emphasis added). But the Court also noted that this scenario "should be gradually eliminated as recognition is given to the obligations of ‘States, religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.’ ” Id. (quoting Hull, 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. at 606, 21 L.Ed.2d at 665) (alteration in original). We likewise think such circumstances should be few. And, regardless, Indiana courts should first seek to interpret these provisions in secular terms applying neutral principles of Indiana law. Only when certain terms or provisions may not be understood without interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrine and those terms or provisions are needed to apply Indiana law, should resort be made to the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Moreover, such resort should be limited to those specific terms or provisions necessary to give the documents effect under neutral principles of Indiana law.

      . We acknowledge that prior Indiana cases have used a variety of approaches to resolve church property disputes. See, e.g., Smart v. Ind. Yearly Conference of Wesleyan Methodist Church of Am., 257 Ind. 17, 271 N.E.2d 713 (1971); Ind. Annual Conference Corp. v. Lemon, 235 Ind. 163, 131 N.E.2d 780 (1956); Emberry Cmty. Church v. Bloomington Dist. Missionary and Church Extension Soc’y, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 288 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. not sought; Hinkle Creek Friends Church v. W. Yearly Meeting of Friends Church, 469 N.E.2d 40 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), trans. denied; Grutka v. Clifford, 445 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), trans. denied; Marich v. Kragulac, 415 N.E.2d 91 (Ind.Ct.App.1981), trans. denied; Draskovich v. Pasalich, 151 Ind.App. 397, 280 N.E.2d 69 (1972), trans. denied; United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Indep. Methodist Church, 150 Ind.App. 574, 276 N.E.2d 916 (1971), trans. not sought; Price v. Merryman, 147 Ind.App. 295, 259 N.E.2d 883 (1970), trans. denied; Presbytery of Indianapolis v. First United Presbyterian Church, 143 Ind.App. 72, 238 N.E.2d 479 (1968), amended on denial of reh’g, 143 Ind.App. 271, 240 N.E.2d 77 (1968), trans. denied.

      Several of these cases (e.g., Smart, Lemon, Draskovich, St. Louis Crossing, Merryman, and Presbytery of Indianapolis) were decided without the benefit of the Supreme Court's elucidation of the neutral-principles approach in Jones v. Wolf and were attempting to anticipate the Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of the issue. A few other cases were decided after Jones v. Wolf but either failed to apply it (Emberry) or applied it inconsistently (Hinkle Creek Friends, Grutka, and Marich); In Emberry, 482 N.E.2d at 292-93, the Court of Appeals made no mention of Jones, relying instead on the pre-Jones decisions of Lemon and St. Louis Crossing. In Hinkle Creek Friends, 469 N.E.2d at 41-44, the Court of Appeals applied both the hierarchical-deference approach and the neutral-principles approach to uphold the trial court’s order vesting ownership of all property in the denominational church organization where the property deed contained an express reservation in favor of the denominational church organization. In Grutka, 445 N.E.2d at 1018-22, 1025, the Court of Appeals applied the neutral-principles approach in reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the existence of a trust on cemetery property and remanded for a factual determination of the title-holder’s intent to create a trust but applied a hierarchical-deference approach to determine the distribution of property if the trial court determined that the trust was not formed. In Marich, 415 N.E.2d at 101, the Court of Appeals remanded for a factual determination of the "hierarchical structure” of the denominational church organization based upon "neutral principles of law.” To the extent that these cases may be understood as divergent from our holding today, they are disapproved.

      . Olivet also designated affidavits from various individuals in support of its motion for summary judgment. The Presbytery challenged the admissibility of these affidavits before the trial court and challenges them again on appeal. However, we need not separately address their admissibility because our con-elusions are not altered even if we consider the facts asserted in these affidavits.

      . The Presbytery also claims a trust over certain personal property held by Olivet, including various bank accounts.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    COMMISSIONER OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Appellant, v. Tim BLACK, as Husband and Personal Representative of KAY BLACK, Deceased, Appellee.
    No. 64S05-1206-CT-305.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Sept. 11, 2012.
   PUBLISHED ORDER

By order dated June 4, 2012, the Court granted transfer of jurisdiction over this appeal and vacated the Court of Appeals opinion. The parties have now filed a motion to dismiss this appeal because they have reached a settlement. See “Report of Settlement and Joint Motion To Dismiss Appeal and to Remove Oral Argument From the Court’s Calendar.”

Being duly advised, the motion is GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED. The oral argument setting for September 10, 2012, was vacated by prior order. Per Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A), the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reported as Comm’r. of Ind. Dep’t. of Ins. v. Black, 962 N.E.2d 675 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), remains vacated and is not precedent.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to all counsel of record, and to post this order to the Court’s website. Thomson Reuters is directed to publish this order in the bound volumes of this Court’s decisions.

All Justices concur.


author: FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

text:
    Dale BRENON, Appellant, v. The FIRST ADVANTAGE CORP. d/b/a Omega Insurance Services, Appellee.
    No. 93A02-1202-EX-108.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    July 27, 2012.

      Robert M. Edwards, Jr., Jones Oben-chain, LLP, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Kathryn A. Moll, Nation Schoening Moll, Fortville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
   OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

Dale Brenon appeals from a decision of the Worker’s Compensation Board of Indiana (the Board) dismissing his Application for Adjustment of Claim (the Application) in favor of The First Advantage Corporation d/b/a Omega Insurance Services (Omega). The sole issue presented for our review is: Did the Board properly dismiss Brenon’s Application?

We reverse.

In August 2003, Brenon, then a resident of Wisconsin, was hired by Omega to perform investigative services wherever Omega transacted business. On October 8, 2003, Omega gave Brenon two investigative assignments that required him to travel to Indiana to conduct surveillance. On October 9, 2003, Brenon, while driving in Lakeville, St. Joseph County, Indiana, crossed the center line and caused a head-on collision with another vehicle.

On June 21, 2004, Brenon filed a worker’s compensation claim against Omega in Wisconsin. In that action Omega challenged whether Brenon was acting in the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, whether Omega had worker’s compensation insurance coverage in Wisconsin, and whether the Wisconsin Worker’s Compensation Division had jurisdiction over Brenon’s worker’s compensation claim. Ultimately, however, Omega negotiated settlement agreements with two of its worker’s compensation carriers (Zenith Insurance Company and Zurich American Insurance Company) for a total lump-sum payment of $100,000 compensation to Bre-non to settle his worker’s compensation claim in Wisconsin, so those matters were never litigated. The limited compromise agreement between Brenon and Omega and Zenith Insurance Company was presented to and approved by the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Worker’s Compensation Division on August 10, 2006. Subsequently, Omega and Zurich American Insurance Company executed a “Full and Final Compromise Agreement” with Brenon that was presented to and approved by the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Worker’s Compensation Division on January 11, 2007.

On October 3, 2005, prior to the acceptance of the settlement agreements in Wisconsin, Brenon filed his Application with the Board seeking worker’s compensation benefits from Omega for the same motor vehicle accident. On May 14, 2009, Omega filed a motion to dismiss Brenon’s Indiana worker’s compensation claim, asserting that Brenon’s Indiana claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or claim preclusion in light of his submission to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin and the settlement of his worker’s compensation claim in that State. On March 29, 2010, the single hearing member dismissed Brenon’s claim without issuing findings of fact or conclusions of law. The Board adopted the single hearing member’s decision in an order dated October 1, 2010.

Brenon appealed, and, in a memorandum decision, another panel of this court remanded the matter to the Board for “a statement of the specific findings of basic fact which support its findings of ultimate fact and conclusion of law.” Brenon v. Advantage Corp., 93A02-1010-EX-1172, slip op. at 3, 2011 WL 1457249 (Ind. Ct. App. April 15, 2011). The Board then remanded the matter for a hearing before a single hearing member. The parties waived the hearing before the single hearing member, but presented additional evidence and arguments that were ultimately used by the single hearing member in crafting findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The single hearing member concluded that Brenon’s claim for worker’s compensation was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Board affirmed the single hearing member’s decision. The Board’s findings and conclusions pertinent to our review follow:

13. Plaintiff Dale Brenon chose to first pursue his claim against his employer Omega Insurance Services for worker’s compensation benefits in Wisconsin. While his claim for worker’s compensation benefits against his employer was pending in Indiana, he chose to conclude his litigation against that employer in Wisconsin by entering into a settlement agreement which according to Wisconsin law was submitted to the State of Wisconsin, Department of Workforce Development, Worker’s Compensation Division for its approval. That approval from the State of Wisconsin was issued and plaintiff received $100,000.00 from his employer and its worker’s compensation insurance carriers in Wisconsin. Thus, plaintiff Dale Brenon chose to submit to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin and its worker’s compensation system and laws in concluding his claim in Wisconsin through settlement approved by the Wisconsin Worker’s Compensation Division.
14. In both Wisconsin and Indiana, plaintiff is making a claim for worker’s compensation benefits for the same motor vehicle accident and both claims are against his employer Omega Insurance Services which was the defendant or respondent both in Wisconsin and in Indiana. Different insurance carriers for Omega Insurance Services are involved in each state.
15. Indiana Courts have recognized that insurance is defined as a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. Thus, Mr. Brenon’s claim for worker’s compensation benefits is against defendant employer Omega Insurance Services and not against individual insurance carriers....
16. The issue of whether the payment or settlement of a worker’s compensation claim under the statute of one state bars a claim for worker’s compensation benefits in Indiana is a matter of first impression as the Indiana Workers Compensation Act and Indiana case law is silent on this question.
17. Courts in other states have recognized that when an employer or its worker’s compensation insurance carrier through unilateral initiative of the employer and/or the worker’s compensation carrier and without the employee’s knowledge or understanding, makes voluntary payments, those voluntary payments do not bar the employee from making a worker’s compensation claim for the same injury under the law of another state. See, Industrial Track Builders of America v. Lemaster, 429 S.W.2d 403 (Ky.1968).
18. In this case, Mr. Brenon’s attorney and the insurance carriers for Omega Insurance Services in Wisconsin negotiated a lump sum settlement of the claim pending in Wisconsin and obtained approval of that settlement pursuant to pursuant to Wisconsin law. The Administrative Law Judge of the State of Wisconsin, Department of Workforce Development, Workers Compensation Division issued an Order approving the settlement. Thus, the settlement of Mr. Bre-non’s claim was not simply a “voluntary payment” as discussed in the Lemaster case, supra.
19. Having submitted to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin and obtaining approval of his settlement said approval being issued through an Award issued by an Administrative Law Judge of the State of Wisconsin, Department of Workforce Development, Workers Compensation Division, Brenon elected to submit his worker’s compensation claim under Wisconsin’s jurisdiction.
20. Based upon the foregoing, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would apply to preclude the re-litigation of this claim which plaintiff Dale Brenon has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the other worker’s compensation claim he filed in Wisconsin against the same parties on the same claim. Plaintiff Dale Brenon had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the facts and issues in his Wisconsin claim and chose to negotiate and enter into a settlement agreement with Omega Insurance Services through its worker’s compensation insurance carriers in Wisconsin whereby he was paid a lump sum of $100,000.00. Thus, Mr. Brenon had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and facts in his Wisconsin claim before he proceeded to negotiate a settlement of that claim for a lump sum payment to him. Mr. Brenon and his attorney acquiesced to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin in seeking approval of the Administrative Law Judge of the State of Wisconsin, Department of Workforce Development, Workers Compensation Division pursuant to the Wisconsin worker’s compensation laws....

Appellant’s Appendix at 7-10. Brenon now appeals the Board’s dismissal of his claim against Omega for worker’s compensation benefits in Indiana.

When the Board’s decision is challenged as contrary to law, the reviewing court conducts a two-part inquiry into “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” Ind.Code Ann. § 22-4-17-12(f) (West, Westlaw current through legislation effective May 31, 2012). Where, as here, the facts are not in dispute and the matter for our review is primarily a legal question, we do not grant the same degree of deference to the Board’s decision as we would if the issue were of fact, because law is the province of the judiciary and our constitutional system empowers the courts to draw legal conclusions. Roberts v. ACandS, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Walker v. Muscatatuck State Dev. Ctr., 694 N.E.2d 258 (Ind.1998)).

We begin by considering the case of Indus. Track Builders of Am. v. Lemaster, 429 S.W.2d 403 (Ky.Ct.App.1968), that the Board relied upon for the proposition that unilateral, voluntary payments made by the employer or employer’s worker’s compensation insurance carrier to and without the knowledge or understanding of the injured employee is the only circumstance where an employee can pursue a worker’s compensation claim for the same injury under the laws of another state. Applying that principle to the facts of this case the Board concluded that payment pursuant to the settlement agreements did not constitute voluntary, unilateral payments, and therefore, Brenon was foreclosed from pursuing his worker’s compensation claim in Indiana.

Having reviewed the Lemaster ease, we conclude that it stands for more than the proposition relied upon by the Board. In that case, Lemaster was a resident of Indiana but his employer was located in Kentucky. The employer had construction projects in Indiana as well as Kentucky and Lemaster worked about 75% of the time in Indiana. Lemaster was injured while working on a construction project in Indiana. Lemaster signed an agreement with his employer’s worker’s compensation carrier to accept a stated amount of compensation in accordance with the worker’s compensation laws of Indiana. He then filed a claim for worker’s compensation benefits in Kentucky. The worker’s compensation board in Kentucky dismissed Lemaster’s claim, finding that he had submitted to the jurisdiction of Indiana.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the law with respect to whether an award of worker’s compensation benefits in one state precludes recovery in another state. The court found that the crux of the argument was whether, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, an award in one state precludes recovery in another state. The Lemaster court observed that starting with Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943), the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that an award of worker’s compensation benefits in Texas precluded recovery of a second and additional award in Louisiana for the same injury. The Lemaster court further observed, however, that four years later, in Indus. Comm’n of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 67 S.Ct. 886, 91 L.Ed. 1140 (1947), the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly overruled Magnolia Petroleum, and answered the same question by considering the intent of the worker’s compensation statutes and judicial decisions in the state of the first award. Indus. Track Builders of Am. v. Lemaster, 429 S.W.2d 403 (citing Bowers v. Am. Bridge Co., 43 N.J.Super. 48, 127 A.2d 580 (1956)). The generally accepted view has thus become that “ ‘unless the statute or decisions of the state of the first award expressly disallow a later award in another state which has an adequate interest in the subject matter such an award may be made if credit is given for payments on the first award.’ ” Indus. Track Builders of Am. v. Lemaster, 429 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting Bowers v. Am. Bridge Co., 127 A.2d at 589).

Contrary to the Board’s conclusion, the issue cannot be disposed of simply because Brenon’s receipt of worker’s compensation benefits was the result of negotiated settlement agreements rather than a unilateral, voluntary payment by Omega and Zenith Insurance Company/Zurich American Insurance Company. The statutes and judicial opinions of the state of the first award must be examined to determine if they expressly disallow a later award in a different state.

Here, the parties have not provided us with any analysis of judicial opinions or statutes in Wisconsin regarding whether such preclude an additional award in another state. Our research has likewise revealed no judicial opinions or statutes in Wisconsin (or Indiana for that matter) that prohibit claims in multiple states.

Our best guidance comes from the McCartin case, cited in Lemaster, which is proeedurally similar to the situation presented in this case. In McCartin, as in this case, the employer and employee entered into a negotiated settlement agreement that was approved by the Industrial Commission of Illinois. That settlement agreement, like the settlement agreements in this case, expressly reserved the employee’s right to assert any claims the employee might have under the Worker’s Compensation Act of the state of Wisconsin. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the reservation clause was consistent with the worker’s compensation act of Illinois in that the type of award (i.e., through a settlement agreement) did not foreclose an additional award under the laws of another state. The employee could therefore pursue a worker’s compensation claim in Wisconsin.

Here, the settlement agreements executed and approved in Wisconsin specifically preserved Brenon’s claims against Omega in Indiana. To be sure, the limited compromise agreement between Brenon and Omega and Zenith Insurance Company provided:

1) It is expressly understood and agreed that this compromise agreement does not provide a release or compromise of liability to Omega Insurance Services solely to the extent that Omega Insurance Services has coverage for payment of benefits pursuant to any worker’s compensation insurance policy provided by Kemper Insurance Companies, Zurich Insurance Companies, or any other workers compensation insurer not previously released herein.

Appellant’s Appendix at 23. Further, the following language was included in the “Full and Final Compromise Agreement” between Brenon and Omega and Zurich American Insurance Company:

The parties further stipulate and agree that this full and final compromise agreement closes out any and all claims or potential claims the applicant has against only these respondents, (OMEGA INSURANCE SERVICES, THE FIRST AMERICAN CORP., FIRST ADVANTAGE CORP., ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY), in all jurisdictions including, but not limited to Wisconsin, Indiana and Florida. In consideration for the above settlement, applicant has agreed to withdraw his Florida claim and will not amend his pending Indiana claim to include The First American Corporation or Zurich or its affiliated companies. The only claims that remain open would be claims for which there is insurance coverage for the employer by insurance companies not related to or owned by Zurich. All other claims are hereby closed. For example claims against Lumbermens or Kemper shall remain open in all jurisdictions.

Id. at 34. We have found no law, judicial or otherwise, that is inconsistent with the reservation clauses. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements, Bre-non can pursue his claim in Indiana and the Board is free under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to grant an award of compensation in accord with the worker’s compensation laws of the State of Indiana. See Indus. Comm’n of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 67 S.Ct. 886.

We further note that the Board made no findings with respect to these reservation of rights clauses found in the Wisconsin settlement agreements. Further, no challenge has been made to the validity and/or enforceability of the settlement agreements. Omega was part of the negotiations that resulted in the settlement agreements and could have sought to include a provision therein that would have precluded Brenon from pursuing his worker’s compensation claim in Indiana. Instead, the settlement agreements that were negotiated by Omega contained express provisions preserving Brenon’s right to pursue his worker’s compensation claim in Indiana.

We further conclude that the Board erred in relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a basis for dismissing Brenon’s claim. “Collateral estop-pel operates to bar a subsequent relitigation of the same fact or issue where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit and the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit.” Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Bowman, 652 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (quoting Sullivan v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind.1992)).

The Board concedes in its brief that there was no adjudication of facts leading to the award of benefits in Wisconsin. Indeed, the award of benefits to Brenon was pursuant to negotiated settlement agreements executed between Brenon and Omega and its worker’s compensation insurance carriers in Wisconsin. Brenon did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in Wisconsin. There is therefore no basis for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In summary, the Board’s decision dismissing Brenon’s claim for worker’s compensation benefits is not sustainable under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the laws of the State of Wisconsin, or Supreme Court precedent. Further, the Board’s decision gave no effect to the reservation of rights clauses contained in the settlement agreements. We therefore reverse the Board’s dismissal of Brenon’s claim and remand for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed.

MAY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

      . In Indiana, Omega had worker's compensation coverage through Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company.


author: MATHIAS, Judge.

text:
    Edward Lee JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 82A01-1110-CR-00445.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Aug. 1, 2012.
    Ordered Published Sept. 5, 2012.

      Matthew J. McGovern, Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Eric P. Babbs, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

MATHIAS, Judge.

Edward Lee Jackson (“Jackson”) was convicted in Vanderburgh Circuit Court of murder and attempted murder. Jackson appeals and presents two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court’s admission of an autopsy photograph of the victim’s heart was unfairly prejudicial; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Jackson’s willingness to plead guilty to a habitual offender enhancement as a mitigating factor.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Jackson and Rosalie Clark Myers (“Rosalie”) had an “off and on” relationship for “eight or nine” years. Tr. p. 74. Jackson and Rosalie cohabitated for parts of this time. Tr. p. 75. At some point in February 2011, Jackson was banned from Rosalie’s room at the Esquire Inn (“the Inn”), where she resided. Rosalie saw Jackson a couple of times subsequent to Jackson’s expulsion from the Inn; however, these meetings occurred “somewhere else.” Tr. p. 108.

On the night of March 10, 2011, Jackson came to Rosalie’s room at the Inn uninvited. Tr. p. 76. Specifically, Jackson “walked up behind [Rosalie] as [she] was unlocking her door and he came in behind [her].” Id. Kevin Malicoat (“Malicoat”), a friend of Rosalie’s and fellow Inn resident, was with Rosalie when Jackson arrived. Tr. p. 77. Rosalie was “scared” by the way that “[Jackson] came up on [her],” but she did not ask Jackson to leave at that time. Id. Jackson spent most of the evening with Rosalie. Tr. p. 79. Malicoat “ran in and out” of the room “all night.” Id. During this time, Jackson and Rosalie consumed alcohol, used methamphetamine, and engaged in sexual activity. Tr. pp. 79-80, 117-18, 121-123. The conversation between Jackson and Rosalie during this time was often confrontational and Rosalie exited the room on multiple occasions to “cool off.” Tr. pp. 79-80, 131. On one occasion, Rosalie left with Malicoat to take him back to his room. Tr. p. 81.

Shortly after 5:00 a.m. on March 11, 2011, Rosalie returned to her room with David Scott Devine (“Devine”), another friend and Inn resident. Tr. pp. 81-82. When Rosalie questioned Jackson about a second purchase of methamphetamine, Jackson informed her that he had consumed the second purchase in its entirety. Tr. p. 83. An argument ensued and Rosalie informed Jackson “either you leave or I leave.” Id.

Jackson then stood up and stabbed Rosalie multiple times. Id. Devine stood up to confront Jackson. Tr. p. 85. Jackson then “turned around and started stabbing [Devine] from behind.” Id. Rosalie’s neighbor “heard a man screaming ... [and] a bunch [of] struggling.” Tr. p. 329. In addition, the neighbor heard Jackson state “I’ll stab you to death mother f* *ker.” Tr. p. 331. Jackson stabbed De-vine twelve times. Ex. Vol. III., State’s Ex. 15. p. 1. Rosalie called 911 while Jackson was stabbing Devine. Tr. p. 91; Ex. Vol. Ill, State’s Exhibit 11. During the 911 call, Rosalie identified Jackson as the attacker. Id. Jackson then threw the knife on the bed, directed an expletive at Rosalie, and exited Rosalie’s room. Tr. p. 99.

The responding officer, Cara Messmer (“Officer Messmer”), arrived at the Inn shortly after 5:30 a.m. She found Rosalie on the bed clenching her chest and covered in blood and Devine dead on the floor next to the bed. Tr. pp. 21-22. Rosalie told Officer Messmer that Jackson was the assailant. Tr. p. 46. Officer Messmer also observed a “switchblade” knife present on the bed. Tr. pp. 48-49. Rosalie was transported to a nearby hospital where she received treatment for her injuries. Tr. p. 89.

Meanwhile, Jeff Kingery (“Officer King-ery”), another patrol officer, “canvassed the area” in search of Jackson. Officer Kingery was informed that Jackson was traveling on a bicycle. Tr. pp. 56-57. When Officer Kingery located Jackson, his t-shirt, arms, and hands were covered in blood. Tr. pp. 59, 64. Officer Kingery ordered Jackson to stop. Id. Jackson failed to comply with the order and Officer Kingery testified that Jackson “saw [Officer Kingery] ... tr[ied] to evade ... [cut] back across the street and ... through a corner of a yard. Tr. pp. 59-60. Officer Kingery disabled Jackson by “knock[ing] [Jackson] off his bicycle ... and took him into custody.” Tr. p. 60.

Devine received stab wounds to his head, neck, chest, abdomen, arm, and shoulder. Ex. Vol. III., State’s Ex. 15 p. 1. Specifically, Devine died from a “stab wound to [his] heart.” Id. at 2. Devine also suffered multiple other stab wounds, some of which could have been independently fatal. Tr. pp. 226-29, 231.

Rosalie also suffered multiple stab wounds. Id. Specifically, she received a laceration to her liver, cuts to her interior chest wall, a partially collapsed lung, and a cut to her brachial artery. Some of her injuries were potentially fatal. Id. At the time of her admission to the hospital, she had alcohol, methamphetamine, and cocaine in her system. Tr. p. 244.

DNA analysis was performed on samples taken from the knife and clothing of Rosalie, Devine, and Jackson. Tr. pp. 255-56, 270, 287, 307. DNA analysis of the knife handle indicated mixed profiles from which Jackson, Devine, nor Rosalie could be excluded. Analysis of the bloodstained portion of the knife concluded that absent an identical twin, Devine was the source of the “major DNA profile to a reasonable] degree of scientific certainty.” Tr. p. 268. Multiple DNA samples from Jackson’s clothing matched Devine’s DNA profile. Tr. p. 310. The DNA analyst testified that “[she] would expect to find the DNA from the people bleeding mostly.” Tr. p. 290.

On March 15, 2011, the State charged Jackson with the murder of Devine and the attempted murder of Rosalie. Appellant’s App. p. 2. On April 7, 2011, the State alleged that Jackson was a habitual offender. Id. at 18. A jury trial was held in August 2011. At trial, Jackson claimed and testified that Devine attacked him with the knife and that he stabbed Devine in self-defense. Tr. pp. 406-15, 424. Jackson denied stabbing Rosalie, but also indicated that he never saw Devine stab her. Tr. pp. 424, 450. Also at trial, State’s Exhibit 14(K) was admitted into evidence over the objection of the defense. It is a photograph of Devine’s heart into which Dr. Griggs inserted a probe to identify the location of the “stab wound into [Devine’s] left pumping chamber of [his] heart.” Tr. p. 232. Jackson was found guilty of murder and attempted murder. Appellant’s App. pp. 40-41. Jackson then pleaded guilty to being a habitual offender.

A sentencing hearing was held on September 6, 2011. Sent. Tr. p. I. The trial court noted the aggravating circumstances it considered in sentencing Jackson: his criminal history; the nature of the crime including multiple victims and wounds; and his flight from the scene of the crime. The trial court also referenced Jackson’s undocumented indication of a bipolar condition as a mitigating factor and noted his guilty plea to the habitual offender enhancement. Sent. Tr. pp. 15-18. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of sixty years for murder and forty years for attempted murder. Sent. Tr. pp. 18-19. The murder sentence was enhanced by thirty years for Jackson’s habitual offender status; thus, the total sentence was ninety years. Id. Jackson now appeals.

I. Admission of Autopsy Photograph

Jackson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 14(K), an autopsy photograph of Devine’s heart, into evidence. Specifically, Jackson argues that the purpose of exhibit 14(K) was to “inflame the jury ... by showing them a gory photograph of an autopsy.” Tr. pp. 213-14.

The admission and exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 627 (Ind.2002). We review the admission of photographic evidence for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind.1999); Amburgey v. State, 696 N.E.2d 44, 45 (Ind.1998)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 7, 17 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).

Indiana Evidence Rules 401 through 403 govern relevancy of evidence. Relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant evidence is not. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make any “fact that is of consequence to the determination” of the action more or less probable. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Relevant evidence can be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403.

“Generally, photographs that depict a victim’s injuries or demonstrate the testimony of a witness are admissible.” Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 958 (Ind. 2009). “Even gory and revolting photographs may be admissible as long as they are relevant to some material issue or show scenes that a witness could describe orally.” Ambwrgey, 696 N.E.2d at 45. However, manipulation of a corpse leads to concern that the work of a pathologist could be attributed to a defendant. Swingley v. State, 739 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Ind.2000). Therefore, autopsy photographs that depict the body in an altered state are generally inadmissible. Id. (citing Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 776 (Ind.1997)). See also Loy v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Ind.1982) (“Such a display may impute the handiwork of the physician to the accused assailant and thereby render the defendant responsible in the minds of the jurors for the cuts, incisions, and indignity of an autopsy.”). However, situations arise when the manipulation of a corpse is “necessary to demonstrate the testimony given.” Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 627 (quoting Swingley, 739 N.E.2d at 133-34).

State’s Exhibit 14(K) is an autopsy photograph of Devine’s open chest. In the photo, Dr. Elmer Griggs, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, is using his right hand to grasp the decedent’s heart and in his left hand is a metal probe with which he is indicating the stab wound to the heart. The trial court admitted the exhibit into evidence and found that the exhibit had “relevancy” and “significance” due to its depiction of the cause of death. Tr. p. 214. The trial court concluded that the exhibit’s “probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.” Id.

Jackson relies heavily upon Swingley v. State to support his claim that the trial court erred in admitting the autopsy photograph. In Swingley, the victim died from exsanguination as a result of a cut in the neck. Swingley, 739 N.E.2d at 133-34. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of three autopsy photographs. Id. at 133. Two photographs showed open wounds to the victim’s neck; the third depicted the victim’s larynx, which had been removed from the body. Id.

In Swingley, our supreme court found that the first two autopsy photographs were admissible and that the

record is unclear as to the extent the body was altered so that the wound was open, but even if the body was positioned in such a way as to open the wound more than it was originally, the positioning was necessary to show the extent of the wound and the cause of death.

Id. at 134. Our supreme court found the third photograph, which showed the “victim’s windpipe or larynx removed from the body and lying on a sheet” was “unnecessary” and that “other photographs depicted the extent of the victim’s wounds and the cause of his death.” Id.

Jackson asserts that State’s Exhibit 14(K) is akin to the third, inadmissible picture in Swingley because “the State in this case presented another photograph of the wound depicted on Devine’s heart in State’s Exhibit 14(K).” Appellant’s Br. at 14. We disagree. Rather, the two admissible photographs in Swingley are similar to State’s Exhibit 14(K). The pathologist in Swingley testified that he “had opened the wound to show the blood vessels that had been cut (resulting in death).” Swingley, 739 N.E.2d at 134. Similarly, the pathologist who testified in this case stated that State’s Exhibit 14(K) was intended to show the cause of death:

STATE: You listed, what did you list as the cause of death?
DR. GRIGGS: That he had cardiac arrhythmia ... due to compression of the heart from blood in the sac around the heart ... and he was stabbed in the heart, one of the stab wounds actually went into the left ventricle which is the main pumping chamber of the heart and blood rushed out of the heart and it filled the sac around the heart and then that compressed the heart and then it caused the heart to stop beating[.]
STATE: So, it’s your expert opinion that one of the wounds in his chest stabbed his heart.
DR. GRIGGS: Yes.
STATE: This is 14k, what does it show?
DR. GRIGGS: This shows his heart ... and I am holding his heart here and I’m putting this probe into this hole, and this is a hole in the left ventricle, it’s a stab wound into the left pumping chamber of the heart.
STATE: With these injuries, can you give us an estimation of how long you would expect somebody to live?
DR. GRIGGS: Not very long, it would just be a matter of minutes, I think, or less.

Tr. pp. 231-32.

Jackson asserts that State’s Exhibit 14(E), an external photograph that depicts the chest wound corresponding to the laceration on Devine’s heart, is “the same wound.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. However, State’s Exhibit 14(E) merely shows a stab wound to the victim’s chest. It is difficult to differentiate this exhibit from other photographs showing separate stab wounds to Devine’s chest. State’s Exhibit 14(K) was the only photograph specifically indicating the wound to the heart. Therefore, State’s Exhibit 14(K) is not duplica-tive of other admitted evidence.

Jackson also argues that the autopsy photograph is similar to the improperly admitted photograph in Turben v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind.2000). In that case, a photograph of “gloved hands manipulating a bloody mass with a probe” that “barely resembles a human form” was improperly admitted by the trial court. Id. at 1247. The victim in Turben was strangled and the “bloody mass” purportedly showed “the victim’s head with the skin and bones cut open and peeled back to expose the interior of the victim’s neck.” Id. In Turben, our supreme court “doubt[ed] the jury was further enlightened concerning the cause of death by viewing this gruesome spectacle” and because the gruesome photograph was only marginally relevant, its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. Id. '.

In this case, State’s Exhibit 14(K), coupled with the pathologist’s testimony, was detailed, specific, and necessary to demonstrate the testimony given by the pathologist regarding the cause of death. Also, although graphic, State’s Exhibit 14(K) clearly depicts both the victim’s heart and the stab wound and clearly resembles a human form. The trial court was within its discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, even if we were to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence, we will only reverse if “the error is inconsistent with substantial justice” or if “a substantial right of the party is affected.” Payne, 854 N.E.2d at 17; see also Combs v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. If a conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt which satisfies the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction, the error is harmless. Morales v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). “Harmlessness is ultimately a question of likely impact of the evidence on the jury.” Combs, 895 N.E.2d at 1258 (quotation omitted).

Under this standard of review, even if State’s Exhibit 14(K) was improperly admitted, the error would be harmless, because the conviction is supported by such substantial evidence of guilt that there is no substantial likelihood that it contributed to the conviction. Rosalie testified in court that Jackson was her attacker and indicated the same during the 911 call. Rosalie’s neighbor heard Jackson state that he would stab Devine to death. De-vine and Rosalie had multiple stab wounds, but Jackson was uninjured aside from an apparent nick to his finger. Jackson fled from the scene. Thus, any error in the admission of State’s Exhibit 14(K) was, at worst, harmless error.

II. Sentencing

The trial court sentenced Jackson to sixty years for Count I (murder) and forty years for Count II (attempted murder). Sent. Tr. p. 18. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court identified the following aggravating circumstances: Jackson’s criminal history, his flight from the scene, and multiple stab wounds and victims. The court also considered Jackson’s bipolar condition as a mitigating factor, and “not[ed] the defendant’s plea of guilty on ... the [enhancement.” Sent. Tr. pp. 17-18. Additionally, the trial court imposed a thirty-year habitual offender enhancement on Count I. Therefore, the aggregate sentence was ninety years. Jackson appeals his sentence and argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider his willingness to plead guilty to the habitual offender enhancement as a significant mitigating factor.

Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s sentencing decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.2007) (quoting In re L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind.Ct.App.1985)). The trial court must enter a statement that includes the reasons for imposing a sentence. Id. at 491. If the statement indicates mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the court must identify those circumstances it finds significant and “explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. at 490.

A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) does not “enter a sentencing statement[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence — including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any — but the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91.

The trial court does not abuse its discretion by declining to find alleged mitigating factors that are “highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance.” Rawson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1049, 1056 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. And “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse” of discretion. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

A guilty plea can be a significant mitigating factor when the State reaps a substantial benefit from the defendant’s act of pleading guilty; this act conserves the State’s resources and relieves the victim’s family of the pain associated with trial. Cloum v. State, 779 N.E.2d 84, 89-90 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Jackson, while admitting to a legal status, did not accept responsibility for the crime. His guilty plea to his habitual offender status was subsequent to his murder trial; therefore, his guilty plea did not provide the same benefits to the State and victims as would a guilty plea to the underlying crime. In this case, Jackson’s admission only relieved the State of its burden of proving the nature and chronology of Jackson’s prior convictions, a burden that involves far fewer resources than a murder trial. In addition, the trial court specifically noted Jackson’s willingness to admit his habitual offender status as a factor it would consider in sentencing. Sent. Tr. p. 15. Because the weight assigned to this factor is not reviewable for an abuse of discretion, see Gellenbeck v. State, 918 N.E.2d 706, 712 (Ind.App.2009) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491), appellate review of the weight assigned to this factor would invade the trial court’s discretion, which we will not do.

Conclusion

The trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the probative value of State’s Exhibit 14(K) outweighed its prejudicial effect. Moreover, any error in the admission of this exhibit was harmless. The trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion when considering Jackson’s guilty plea to the habitual offender allegation.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.

      . Stating that an individual’s DNA cannot be excluded from a sample means that an individual’s DNA is neither unequivocally present nor absent given how rare the presence of their alleles are relevant to the remainder of the

      . Scientific certainty refers to the odds (1:330,000,000,000 regarding DNA analysis) that another individual in the general population has the same DNA profile. Heidi Haas of the Indiana State Police Laboratory testified that “it was over 1:330,000,000,000 chance that someone else has [Devine's]’’ specific DNA profile. Tr. p. 269.

      . The court reporter prepared a separately-bound, paginated transcript of the sentencing proceedings.

      . See also Fentress v. State, 702 N.E.2d 721 (Ind.1998), where our supreme court held that the probative value of two photographs depicting the victim's skull with the hair and skin pulled away from it outweighed the prejudicial effect. A pathologist testified to the alterations he made and that they were necessary to determine the extent of the victim’s injuries.

      . "A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. "A person who commits a Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and fifty (50) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. Attempted murder is a Class A felony. Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1.

      . See Fentress v. State, 702 N.E.2d 721 (Ind.1998) ("The legislature has fixed the habitual enhancement for murder at 30 years.”); Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-3, -8.