author: HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.

text:
    EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLAMBEAU, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 16-1402
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued September 15, 2016
    Decided January 25, 2017

      Anne Noel Occhialino, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Stephen A. DiTullio, Attorney, Dewitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Dara Smith, Attorney, AARP Foundation Litigation, Washington, DC, for Ami-cus Curiae American Association of Retired Persons.
    Michael S. Burkhardt, Attorney, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Amicus Curiae HR Policy Association.
    Robert P. Charrow, Attorney, Laura M. Klaus, Attorney, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Business Roundtable.
    Before FLAUM, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
   HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.

On the merits, this Americans with Disabilities Act case would turn on the interplay between the ADA’s prohibition on involuntary medical examinations and its insurance safe-harbor provision. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(4) and 12201(c). Defendant Flambeau, Inc. adopted an employee wellness program. It required its employees, as a condition of receiving employer-subsidized health insurance, to fill out a medical questionnaire and to undergo biometric testing. One employee did not meet those requirements in time for the 2012 benefit year. As a result, he and his family were briefly without health insurance. He filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the EEOC then filed this suit against Flambeau. The EEOC contends that Flambeau’s requirement violated the ADA’s ban on involuntary medical examinations in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Flambeau’s motion and dismissed the case. The EEOC has appealed.

On the merits, the parties have taken ambitious positions on appeal. Flambeau argues that wellness programs are largely exempt from the limits on medical examinations because the ADA does not “restrict .'.. [an] organization ... administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2). The EEOC replies that this insurance safe harbor simply does not apply to wellness programs so that the prohibition on involuntary medical examinations applies. Both sides also offer narrower grounds for deciding the case.

We conclude that the statutory debate should not be resolved in this appeal. The relief the EEOC seeks is either unavailable or moot. The employee resigned several years ago, before suit was filed. He did not incur damages as a result of Flam-beau’s policy, and he is not entitled to punitive damages. In addition, Flambeau abandoned its wellness program requirements for reasons unrelated to this litigation. Because the undisputed facts show that the EEOC is not entitled to any relief, we affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the case but without reaching the merits of the parties’ statutory debate.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In general, employer wellness programs use a set of benefits, incentives, and/or penalties to improve employee health and lower health insurance costs. For example, a wellness program might include discounted gym memberships, higher insurance premiums for smokers, and monetary rewards for weight loss. Flambeau offered such a wellness program to its employees.

That program included a health risk assessment in which employees answered questions about their medical histories. They also were measured for health indicators such as weight, cholesterol levels, and blood pressure. Each employee received his or her individual test results. Flambeau received aggregated and anonymous results. In 2012 and 2013, Flambeau pushed employees to participate in the wellness program by requiring participation as a condition of the employer’s contributions to an employee’s health insurance premiums.

Dale Arnold, a Flambeau employee, was unable to complete the assessment and testing before the 2012 benefit year deadline. Flambeau terminated his insurance coverage but gave him the option of buying continuing coverage under COBRA. Mr. Arnold did not take that option, so his health insurance lapsed.

Mr. Arnold then filed complaints with the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. After discussions with the Department of Labor, Flambeau agreed to reinstate Mr. Arnold’s health insurance retroactively so long as he completed the testing and paid his own share of the premiums. Mr. Arnold did so, and Flam-beau restored his insurance.

Before the 2014 benefit year began, Flambeau’s management ended the mandatory testing program, finding that it was not cost-effective. Mr. Arnold resigned his job at Flambeau in March 2014. Six months later, in September 2014, the EEOC filed this suit against Flambeau alleging that its mandatory assessment and testing violated the ADA prohibition on involuntary medical examinations in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4).

Flambeau moved for summary judgment. It argued that its wellness plan was covered by the ADA’s insurance safe harbor, a provision of the Act that limits the interpretation of (among other provisions) the ban on involuntary medical examinations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). The safe harbor says that ADA provisions, including Subchapter I, which contains the ban on involuntary medical examinations, “shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict ... [an] organization ... from ... administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan....” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) <& (c)(3). The safe harbor also provides that it “shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes” of the ADA provisions on employment and public accommodations and services. § 12201(c). Flambeau argued in the alternative that the health testing and assessments were voluntary because they were not conditions of employment. The EEOC filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to liability, arguing that the insurance safe harbor did not apply to save the Flambeau program.

The district court granted Flambeau’s motion and denied the EEOC’s. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F.Supp.3d 849, 857 (W.D. Wis. 2015). It decided that the safe harbor could cover at least some wellness programs and that this was one such program. Id. at 855-56.

The parties’ briefing on appeal addressed the statutory issue whether the insurance safe harbor should be interpreted to apply to wellness programs generally and to Flambeau’s in particular. After oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing on whether the case is moot. Having received and considered that briefing, we conclude that the EEOC’s claim for injunc-tive relief is moot and that undisputed facts foreclose its claims for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of Mr. Arnold.

II. Analysis

Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction, our power to speak the law, to “cases” and “controversies.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. -, -, 136 S.Ct. 663, 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016). A “live controversy” must exist at “all stages of review.” Brown v. Bartholomew Consolidated School Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006). Federal courts therefore lack jurisdiction over moot cases, cases in which “one of the parties lacks a personal stake” in the suit’s outcome. Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1992). The EEOC offers two theories for holding that this case is not moot. First, it argues that Mr. Arnold has a personal stake in the suit’s outcome because he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. Second, the EEOC argues that it can seek injunctive relief because the “voluntary cessation” exception to mootness applies in this case.

We disagree with the EEOC’s “voluntary cessation” analysis, finding that the exception does not apply and that its claim for injunctive relief is moot. There is a live controversy between the parties over Mr. Arnold’s entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages. The undisputed facts, including information provided to us in response to our question about available relief, show however that Mr. Arnold cannot recover either compensatory or punitive damages. There would be no point in a remand for further exploration of those issues or other aspects of the case.

A. Mr. Arnold’s Personal Stake

The EEOC offers three grounds for awarding monetary damages to Mr. Arnold at an eventual trial: he is entitled to recover $82.02 in out-of-pocket medical expenses that Flambeau should have paid; he is entitled to emotional distress damages; and he is entitled to punitive damages. Mr. Arnold could not recover any of these damages.

1. Out-of-Pocket Expenses

Mr. Arnold claims a right to reimbursement for $82.02 of medical expenses incurred while he did not have insurance coverage. But Mr. Arnold also frankly admits never paying that money: those bills were either written off or paid by third parties. He has no right to be repaid.

2. Emotional Distress Damages

When the only evidence of emotional distress comes from the injured party’s testimony, “he must reasonably and sufficiently explain the circumstances of his injury and not resort to mere eoncluso-ry statements.” Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298, 1304 (7th Cir. 1990). In this case, the only evidence of Mr. Arnold’s emotional distress is his deposition testimony. When asked to explain his emotional pain, Mr. Arnold repeated the events of his case: “when they took my insurance away, and my kids didn’t know what’s going on, and I couldn’t go to the doctor and stuff like that.” We “appreciate that it can be hard to articulate emotional upset.” Biggs, 892 F.2d at 1304. Mr. Arnold need not show that he took medication, underwent therapy, or sought any medical attention. Still, his testimony does not even reach the level of conclusory statements of emotional distress and is insufficient to show he could be entitled to such damages. Cf. Catalan v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 629 F.3d 676, 696 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing summary'judgment where plaintiffs “described their emotional turmoil in reasonable detail”).

3. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are available for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act if the defendant discriminated “with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l). The EEOC argues that it can show that Flambeau acted with reckless indifference to Mr. Arnold’s federally protected rights against involuntary physical examinations.

“The terms ‘malice’ and ‘reckless’ ” focus on the employer’s “state of mind.” Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). But even “intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive damages” where the “underlying theory of discrimination” is “novel or otherwise poorly recognized.” Id. at 536-37, 119 S.Ct. 2118.' That description fits this case. The EEOC’s theory of discrimination assumes that the ADA’s insurance safe harbor does not cover at least some wellness plans. Whether that is true, and for what kinds of wellness plans it might be true, were open questions at relevant times in 2012 and 2013. They remain open even today.

The statute’s plain text does not resolve either question. The parties and their ami-ci have shown as much in their excellent briefs on this appeal. When Flambeau acted to terminate Mr. Arnold’s health insurance, the EEOC had not yet proposed the relevant regulations. See Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31126-01, 31128 (May 17, 2016) (EEOC published relevant notice of proposed rulemaking in 2015 for rule that became 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)). The only ease law was adverse to the EEOC’s position. See Seff v. Broward County, 691 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s finding that safe harbor covered county’s wellness plan). Even today, and even counting this- lawsuit, cases raising those questions can be counted on one hand. See EEOC v. Honeywell International, Inc., No. 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 5795481, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2014) (denying EEOC’s motion for preliminary injunction, and noting “great uncertainty” surrounding wellness plans); EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., — F.Supp.3d -, No. 14-CV-1019, 2016 WL 5107019, at *6-7 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 19, 2016) (finding that safe harbor does not apply to wellness programs).

That legal uncertainty at the relevant time distinguishes this case from cases approving punitive damages for well-understood violations of the ADA and other antidiscrimination laws. See Williamson v. Handy Button Machine Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The complete rule ... may be that intentional, illegal conduct may support an award of punitive damages when the application of the law to the facts at hand was so clear at the time of the act that reasonably competent people would have agreed on its application.”); compare EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 835-36 (7th Cir. 2013) (approving punitive damages award in ADA case where defendant’s disability coordinator “was dismissive” of plaintiffs repeated accommodation requests); Hertzberg v. SRAM Corp., 261 F.3d 651, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming punitive damages where supervisors knew harasser’s jokes and touching were “inappropriate” and “incorrect”); Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 859-60 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing judgment as a matter of law denying punitive damages because supervisors who demoted plaintiff after he reported harassment were familiar with Title VII and their employer’s antidiscrimination policy), with EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., 731 F.3d 444, 468 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (defendant entitled to judgment as a matter of law overturning punitive damages because court “had not directly addressed whether a plaintiff could rely on evidence of gender-stereotyping in a same-sex discrimination case”).

The unsettled legal landscape also makes it unsurprising that when Flambeau consulted its attorneys about the benefit plan’s compliance with state and federal law, they did not raise this problem. Flam-beau’s director of human resources, Mark Rieland, also consulted an attorney in January 2012 after Mr. Arnold filed a grievance with his union about his loss of insurance coverage. Rieland sent Flambeau’s attorney an article outlining the EEOC’s position on wellness programs: if employees were required to participate, the program was not voluntary. The attorney advised Rieland to “continue to deny the grievance.” Rieland’s repeated consultations with an attorney regarding Mr. Arnold’s federally protected rights are inconsistent with reckless indifference to those rights, absent some reason to doubt he provided the attorney with all relevant information. See Farias v. Instructional Systems, Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 102 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[Ajction taken pursuant to advice that the action is consistent with the law is insufficient to support an award of punitive damages under the standard articulated in Kolstad.”).

The EEOC emphasizes a later part of Rieland’s 2012 consultation with the attorney. After the attorney advised Rieland to continue denying the grievance, Rieland mentioned that the grievance indicated Mr. Arnold had contacted “Employee Benefits, [U.S.] Department of Labor.” His attorney explained that the grievance probably referred to the Employee Benefits Security Administration, which was “not likely” to tell Mr. Arnold that Flam-beau was wrong. Mr. Arnold would, he added, “have gotten a different reaction if he had contacted the EEOC.”

The EEOC sees in that exchange a reckless indifference to its position, which was best expressed at that time in its enforcement guidance, which said: “A wellness program is ‘voluntary1 as long as an employer neither requires participation nor penalizes employees who do not participate.” Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, (July 27, 2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ guidance-inquiries.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).

We recognize that that was the EEOC’s position and that the EEOC’s guidelines are an important “body of experience and informed judgment” entitled to some deference. They are not, however, controlling law. Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 693 n.7 (7th Cir. 1998), quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304, 1308 n.2 (10th Cir. 1998). An employer’s or its attorney’s disagreement with EEOC guidance does not by itself support a punitive damages award, at least where the guidance addresses an area of law as unsettled as this one.

B. Injunctive Relief and Voluntary Cessation

Even if Mr. Arnold has no monetary stake in the controversy’s outcome, the EEOC argues that it can seek injunc-tive relief. But that claim for relief is moot: Flambeau halted its mandatory wellness program, so there is nothing to enjoin.

The EEOC argues that the controversy survived the employer’s voluntary cessation of the challenged practice. “[A]s a general rule, ‘voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not ... make the case moot.’” Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979), quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). That general rule does not apply when both: (1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will reoccur; and (2) interim events “irrevocably eradicated” the alleged violation’s effects. Id. We explained above how the effects of Flambeau’s policy have been eradicated or never existed. There is also no reasonable expectation now that Flambeau will reinstitute its mandatory wellness program. See EEOC v. North Gibson School Corp., 266 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming mootness determination where “EEOC has not identified a currently discriminatory plan nor ,.. has a reasonable expectation that a discriminatory plan will be adopted”), abrogated in part on other grounds by EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002).

The voluntary cessation exception to mootness is important. “Otherwise, a defendant could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 721, 727, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Invista B.V., 473 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2006) (voluntary cessation doctrine “aims to eliminate the incentive for a defendant to strategically alter its conduct in order to prevent or undo a ruling adverse to its interest”). This record does “allow us to determine fairly” the reasons for Flambeau’s change in policy. Cf. Ciarpaglini v. Norwood, 817 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2016) (remanding for limited fact-finding on mootness where record did not allow appellate court to determine whether defendant’s change in conduct was a “broader policy change”).

Manipulation is not a concern here. Flambeau made its wellness program non-mandatory well before this lawsuit began, and it did so for reasons unrelated to the lawsuit. That is important evidence that the conduct is unlikely to reoccur. See Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 251 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“A defendant who ceased the challenged conduct for reasons unrelated to the litigation may have an easier time showing the challenged conduct is unlikely to reoccur.”).

The evidence of Flambeau’s reasoning also supports that determination. It stopped requiring the biometric testing and the assessment because their costs outweighed their benefits. That was true in part because Flambeau found that its employees were not using the test results to change their behavior. We should not expect human nature to change too rapidly. Cf. Ciarpaglini, 817 F.3d at 546 (change in government policy appeared to render case moot, despite theoretical possibility that it “might someday” change back); Adams v. Bowater Inc., 313 F.3d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 2002) (case not moot because new case law might “easiljf’ make resuming challenged conduct “in defendants’ interest”).

The reasons for Flambeau’s change were not speculation or opinion and were not based on the lawsuit. The policy was not changed quickly or lightly. Flambeau required the testing for two years. It knew, based on that experience, the program’s costs and benefits. A decision supported by less evidence or less thought might more reasonably be expected to recur. Cf. Rich v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 716 F.3d 525, 532 (11th Cir. 2013) (voluntary resumption of kosher prison meal program did not moot case when defendant could “simply end” program as it had in the past).

Norman-Bloodsaw v, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998), involved such a decision. The defendants in that case argued that the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against its mandatory employee medical screenings was moot because they had ceased those screenings after deciding they were not cost-effective. Id. at 1274. But they did not explain why their views had changed, so the court determined that the case was not moot. Id.

The EEOC argues that Flambeau’s economic reasons cannot support a finding of mootness. It cites Norman-Bloodsaw and United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968), to argue that no decision based on cost-effectiveness can support a mootness determination. Like Norman-Bloodsaw, Concentrated Phosphate is distinguishable. In Concentrated Phosphate, the Supreme Court said that defendants’ “own statement that it would be uneconomical for them” to continue their conduct, “standing alone, cannot suffice” to show mootness. 393 U.S. at 203, 89 S.Ct. 361. Flambeau’s statement does not stand alone. Flambeau’s conduct supports its claim: it ended the mandatory testing program before the EEOC even filed suit. Moreover, in Concentrated Phosphate there was evidence that defendants’ economic claims were false. Id. at 202-03, 89 S.Ct. 361 (explaining how the regulatory change that allegedly rendered plaintiffs’ claims moot did not apply to all defendants or all relevant conduct). No such evidence exists here.

The core requirement of the case-or-controversy standard is that the parties “have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit throughout its duration.” Wisconsin Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 149 (7th Cir. 2011). They do not in this case. But we add this: at least in close cases, mootness can be in part a prudential doctrine. Id. (“Mootness doctrine is ... premised on constitutional requirements and prudential considerations.”); Adams, 313 F.3d at 614 (Supreme Court did not mean “woodenly to exclude ... equitable or other considerations” from mootness analysis when likelihood of conduct’s recurrence is “very hard to estimate”).

Prudence weighs against reaching to decide the merits of this case. The questions of statutory interpretation are difficult, at least in the absence of interpretive regulations. Those questions affect the 75% of firms offering health benefits that also offer wellness programs. Kristin Madison, Employer Wellness Incentives, the ACA, and the ADA: Reconciling Policy Objectives, 51 Willamette L. Rev. 407, 412-13 (2015) (citing the results of a Kaiser Family Foundation survey of employers). This case also presents the statutory questions in an outdated legal landscape. The relevant EEOC regulations were issued after this case’s events. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (effective July 18, 2016) (providing that medical examinations would be deemed involuntary under ADA if employee’s participation has effect of greater than 30% of total cost of “self-only” health coverage, and that insurance safe harbor does not apply to wellness programs). Most important, neither party to this case has any longer a serious stake in its outcome. The genuine statutory issues should be decided by a court in a case where the answers will matter to the parties.

The judgment of the district court dismissing the action is AFFIRMED for the reasons stated in this opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: POSNER, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Thomas M. JAMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lorenzo ELI and Nicolas P. Villanustre, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-3034
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Submitted December 21, 2016
    Decided January 25, 2017
    Thomas James, Pro Se.
    Adriana Katzen, Attorney, Bleeke Dillon Crandall, PC, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Lorenzo Eli, Doctor.
    Gerald Coleman, Attorney, Coleman Stevenson & Montel, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Nicolas P. Vil-lanustre, Doctor.
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
   POSNER, Circuit Judge.

James, a former inmate of Indiana’s New Castle Correctional Facility, appeals from an adverse judgment, following the district judge’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two doctors who he contends were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical treatment for an infected toenail and an injury to his jaw.

In October 2007, not long after his transfer to the New Castle prison from another prison, James completed a medical-request form for treatment of an ingrown toenail that he said was both bleeding and pushing into the left side of the toe. Dr. Lorenzo Eli, one of the two defendants in James’s suit, examined him the next day, diagnosed the nail as infected, ordered antibiotics for treatment of the infection, and referred him to a foot specialist. A week later, when James saw him again because of continued pain in his toe, Dr. Eli prescribed additional drugs. Almost a month after that visit the doctor removed the infected toenail.

The following month, James, who was taking a narcotic prescribed to deal with continued pain from the foot that had had the infected toenail and that was healing from the surgery to remove it, fell while “hopping up the steps” to his housing unit, and hurt his jaw. Thrice he submitted forms requesting emergency treatment of the jaw but they went unanswered. About a month later his jaw “cracked” while he was eating. He reported the injury to Dr. Eli, who told him to fill out another medical-request form, and he did so (and the doctor signed it), requesting x-rays of his jaw as soon as possible. The x-rays were taken and revealed a fractured left mandible (i.e., lower jaw bone on the left side of the mouth).

Consultation with a plastic surgeon was advised, and Dr. Nicolas Villanustre, the other defendant in this case, who is a plastic surgeon, examined James and advised against surgery because of the passage of time since his jaw injury and what Dr. Villanustre deemed to be the “good function” of James’s jaw, but recommended a soft diet for James for two weeks and a follow-up appointment at the end of that period.

That was that for the time being. But two years later James filed the present suit, a pro se suit against a variety of medical and other prison personnel, whom he accused of deliberate indifference to his infected toenail and broken jaw because of their failure to provide emergency treatment for those injuries. He contended that Dr. Eli’s failure to obtain timely treatment for the toenail had resulted in a staph infection and unnecessary suffering, that the failure to perform surgery on his jaw had been motivated by what the surgery (which would have been performed in a hospital rather than in the prison infirmary) would have cost the prison, and that— seven years later—he still suffers pain and temporomandibular joint dysfunction from the jaw injury. (Temporomandibular joint disorder (TMD) is a congeries of conditions that affect jaw muscles, joints, and nerves, causing facial pain, sometimes chronic. Symptoms may occur on one or both sides of the face, head or jaw, or develop after an injury. See Know Your Teeth: “Temporomandibular Joint Disorder,” Nov. 2008, www.knowyourteeth.com/ infobites/abc/article/?abc==t&iid=334& aid=1351 (visited Jan. 24, 2017). The district judge eventually dismissed all the defendants except Eli and Villanustre.

James had asked the district judge to recruit a lawyer for him, pointing out that he was now the inmate of a prison in a different state, far from Indiana (the prison is in Arizona), and was suffering from daily migraine headaches. He also said he needed a medical expert to assist him in his case, and added that he had limited access to legal materials, limited education, and no litigation experience, and that he had tried to obtain a lawyer but had not succeeded. He had been treated in Arizona by a dental surgeon named Dr. Ronald Quintia and had tried but failed to obtain his medical record from the doctor for possible use in his case.

In Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2013), we reversed the district court for declining to try to recruit a lawyer for a prisoner who needed help to locate and depose witnesses while housed in another prison more than 300 miles away (in James’s case, more than a thousand miles away, for remember that he is in prison in Arizona). The district judge in the present case said that James “is within the spectrum of ‘most indigent parties’ because he has had a meaningful opportunity to present his claims, he has demonstrated familiarity with his claims and the ability to present them, because the issues presented by his claims are not complex, and because this does not appear to be a case in which the presence of counsel would make a difference in the outcome.” Without a lawyer and a medical expert, however, James would be totally outclassed by the defense, just like the plaintiff in Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015), an Indiana state prisoner claiming deliberate indifference by prison medical staff to his gastroesophageal reflux disease, but unable to obtain counsel or a medical witness, resulting in the district judge’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. We reversed and told the judge to try to recruit counsel for the plaintiff and find a medical expert to assist him. (The case was then settled.)

Despite the focus in James’s case on his medical treatment, he was never able to obtain a full set of the medical records regarding his jaw injury, and prison staff kept taking away boxes of his legal materials during the case. His discovery requests to Drs. Villanustre and Eli yielded nothing. At summary judgment the judge remarked that when informed of James’s jaw injury Dr. Eli had provided “timely and appropriate care,” but without his medical records James had no opportunity to make a case that the care he’d received hadn’t been timely and appropriate. A lawyer would have been particularly helpful with discovery in James’s case. Moreover, the facts on which James bases his suit are straightforward; assisting him with discovery would not have been an onerous task for a lawyer.

We are mindful that there is no right to an appointed lawyer in civil litigation. We are mindful too that despite lawyers’ ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor to afford counsel, there may be a dearth of lawyers in a district who are willing and able to serve in this sort of case, and 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize a district court to command unwilling lawyers to represent prisoners. Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310, 109 S.Ct 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989). When there is a scarcity of willing lawyers, a trial judge can and should exercise discretion to assign those lawyers to cases in which they are most needed. But we have also recognized (and not only in Rowe v. Gibson) that lawsuits involving complex medical evidence are particularly challenging for pro se litigants. See, besides Rowe, Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2014); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2014); and Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010). If a pro se plaintiff in such a case is unable despite his best efforts to obtain a lawyer and a medical expert, and if the case would have a chance of success were the plaintiff represented by counsel, the trial judge should endeavor to obtain them for him. Rowe v. Gibson, supra, 798 F.3d at 631-32; Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 2015); Henderson v. Ghosh, supra, 755 F.3d at 566; Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2002).

Without an expert witness James could challenge the defendants’ assertions that they had provided adequate care only by offering his own opinion on the matter—an offer the district court thrice dismissed as mere “disagreement [by a lay person] with medical professionals.” In his final order refusing to recruit counsel for James the judge invoked James’s “well-written submissions,” “awareness of the facts,” and “understanding of the applicable legal standard” to conclude that he could litigate effectively without counsel’s assistance. But none of these supposed “assets” could transform James into a medical expert or find him medical evidence to establish that reputable medical professionals would have strongly disagreed with the treatment that he received for his injuries.

Now it is possible that, more than nine years having elapsed since the injury to his jaw, the plaintiff is incorrectly attributing his present pain and jaw dysfunction to the injury; and it is also possible that he received adequate treatment from the two defendant doctors and wouldn’t have bene-fitted from surgery on his jaw. Yet he says he still experiences jaw pain and dysfunction (difficulty eating, sleeping, etc.) and recently he’s been diagnosed with a tumor in his neck, which he attributes to his jaw injury because the tumor is close to his jaw. That may be mistaken, but it definitely is possible that he has a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim if his current difficulty with his jaw is attributable to the injury and if there was some type of treatment or surgery that could have prevented it, which he would have received had he been given adequate medical treatment. On the basis of the record compiled so far, all we know is that he may have suffered terribly because of inadequate treatment and may have sustained permanent injury.

We close by noting that this suit began in 2009 and will soon be in its eighth year even though it should have been apparent from the start that the plaintiff would need counsel and a medical expert witness in order to get to first base. We are vacating the judgment of the district court for the reasons explained in this opinion, and we urge the district court on remand to expedite the litigation.

Vacated and Remanded


author: FEINERMAN, District Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ANGLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-3625
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued November 7, 2016
    Decided January 25, 2017
    Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 2, 2017

      Jonathan H. Koenig, Attorney, Kelly B. Watzka, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Joseph Aragorn Bugni, Attorney, Federal Defender Services of Wisconsin, Inc., Madison, WI, Anderson M. Gansner, Attorney, Federal Defender Services of Eastern Wisconsin, Incorporated, Daniel W. Stiller, Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Michael Anglin, Pro Se.
    Before EASTERBROOK and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and FEINERMAN, District Judge.

       Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

   FEINERMAN, District Judge.

A jury found Michael Anglin guilty of Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (the Hobbs Act robbery) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and related offenses. The district court sentenced him to 230 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.

Anglin appeals, pressing three challenges. First, he contends that the police arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of the arrest’s fruits. Second, he contends that his § 924(c) conviction was improper because Hobbs Act robbery is not a qualifying crime of violence. Third, he contends that his sentence is improper in vai'ious respects. Except for his challenge to the supervised release conditions, Anglin’s arguments are without merit, so we affirm in large part and vacate and remand only as to that component of his sentence.

I. Background

On December 9, 2013, three men robbed an automobile repair shop in Milwaukee: our defendant, Michael Anglin (“Anglin”); his brother, Dave Anglin (“Dave”); and Michael Green, an associate of theirs who at all relevant times lived at the same federal halfway house as Dave. During the robbery, Anglin shot a repair shop employee in the abdomen.

The next day, Green turned informant. He called the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), identified himself, and reported that the Anglin brothers were plotting to commit robberies and wanted him to join them. ATF registered Green as a “confidential informant” and assigned Special Agent Rick Hankins to lead its investigation.

Hankins met with Green three days later, on December 13. Green reported that he had befriended Dave at the halfway house and become a trusted confidant of both Anglins. Green said that the Anglins recently invited him to commit robberies with them. According to Green, Dave needed cash and was impatient to commit “any kind of robbery.” Green said that he had ridden in Anglin’s SUV several times, once accompanying the brothers to Ang-lin’s residence. Green also said that on December 7 or 8, the Anglins showed him two assault rifles and a .pistol inside the SUV.

For informing on the Anglins, Green sought early termination of his supervised release and/or moving expenses for his family, but he received no promises of either. Green did not tell Hankins about the December 9 robbery that he and the Anglins committed. Hankins asked Green to tell the Anglins that he knew somebody who could help identify a target, so that ATF could insinuate an undercover agent into the group.

During this initial conversation, Green provided cell phone numbers for both Ang-lins, a description of Anglin’s car (“a silver or grey crossover SUV’), the general whereabouts of Anglin’s residence (“on the edge of town”), the race and nickname of Dave’s girlfriend (“a black female named ‘Star’”), and a description of her car (a white Escalade). He also referred to the Anglins as “convicted felons.”

Hankins and his colleagues corroborated most of those details. They discovered that the Anglins’ mother was the registered owner of a silver Acura MDX SUV and lived just inside Milwaukee’s western border. While monitoring Dave’s comings and goings at the halfway house, they saw him enter a white Escalade registered to Star-miqua Broom. They verified that Dave was serving a federal prison sentence for bank robbery and that Anglin had a state felony conviction for gun possession.

Hankins and Green met again on December 16. Green reported that the Ang-lins, wary of outsiders, preferred not to add a fourth participant and intended to select a robbery target themselves. They also intended to act quickly; their plan was to rob “something” within the next several days. Green also revised one aspect of his December 13 statement: the Anglins showed him two guns, not three, in the SUV on December 7 or 8—an assault rifle and a pistol.

Hankins showed Green a photo of the apartment complex where the Anglins’ mother lived and a generic image- of a silver Acura MDX from the same model year as hers. Green confirmed that the former depicted the residence he visited with the Anglins and that the latter matched the appearance of Anglin’s SUV. Before departing, Hankins gave Green a digital recorder to surreptitiously capture future conversations with the Anglins.

At 5:00 a.m. the next morning, Hankins noticed a text message from Green: “They trying to do something in the morning what I do.” Hankins immediately called Green. Green reported that the Anglins had planned an armed robbery, to be carried out by the trio sometime after 8:00 a.m., which was the earliest that Dave and Green could leave the halfway house. Han-kins told Green to go along with the plan and keep ATF apprised of the Anglins’ movements.

Hankins and another agent went to the mother’s residence. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., they saw Anglin leave the residence and drive off in the Acura, which was parked outside. A short while later, Green called Hankins to report that Dave left the halfway house just after 8:00. According to Green, the plan was for Anglin to pick up Green at or near the halfway house, and then meet Dave “out on the street.” Green relayed further information about the planned robbery: the target was a drug house somewhere near 74th Street and Capitol Drive, about three miles from the halfway house. Green did not know the exact address.

Green further reported that Dave told him to look out for a black Dodge Charger parked near the halfway house that looked like a “fed.” Green later called Dave and told him that the Charger appeared to be watching a different house down the street. To be safe, the Anglins and Green changed Green’s pickup location from the halfway house itself to the corner of Center Street and Fond du Lac Avenue, a few blocks away. This, too, Green told the agents.

At some point, the team tailing Anglin lost track of him in the Acura. Hankins, meanwhile, joined federal agents and Milwaukee police officers in unmarked cars near the new rendezvous point. At 8:40 a.m., Hankins observed Green standing on the north side of Center near Fond du Lac. Hankins contacted Green and instructed him to turn on his recorder.

At 8:48 a.m., the Acura approached Green from the' east and pulled up to the curb, with Anglin behind the wheel. Green got into the passenger seat. The Acura then turned right on Fond du Lac, heading northwest in the general direction of 74th and Capitol. Hankins and the rest -of the surveillance team followed the Acura at an inconspicuous distance for several minutes, but found it difficult to stay close in rush hour traffic. Concerned about the threat to public safety that an armed robbery might pose if the Acura eluded them, Hankins asked city police to pull over the vehicle. A marked Milwaukee Police Department squad car was summoned, pulled behind the Acura, and activated its lights and sirens. Anglin did not stop; instead, he made a U-turn and headed back southeast on Fond du Lac. The Acura stopped only once a second police vehicle blocked its path. Anglin and Green were taken into custody.

At approximately 10:15 a.m., police located Dave at Broom’s house and arrested him. The Acura was impounded and searched pursuant to a warrant, yielding a nine-millimeter pistol under the passenger seat. Agents also searched the Ang-lins’ mother’s residence, finding a box of ammunition among Anglin’s personal effects. Over the course of several debriefing interviews, Green admitted to having committed other robberies while at the halfway house, including the December 9 repair shop robbery, in which he implicated the Anglins.

Anglin was initially charged only with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his arrest (presumably the gun found in the Acura, though he did not specify), arguing that the officers who pulled over the Acura lacked probable cause to arrest him. The magistrate judge recommended suppression, and then reaffirmed that recommendation after the district judge requested further consideration in light of Navarette v. California, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014). The district judge rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation, holding that there was probable cause to arrest Anglin based on Green’s tip, and denied his motion.

A grand jury returned a five-count superseding indictment against Anglin, charging him with: (1) Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (2) discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A) (iii); (3) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm; and (5) being a felon in possession of ammunition. A jury found Anglin guilty on all counts in April 2015. His post-trial motions were denied— including, as relevant here, a renewed motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss the § 924(c) charge in light of Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), which was decided after the verdict.

At sentencing, Anglin faced a 120-month mandatory minimum term on the § 924(c) count, to be followed by consecutive sentence for the other counts, which carried an advisory guidelines range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment. The government asked for a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range (257 months in total), pointing to Anglin’s criminal record, his lack of remorse, and lasting harms to the person he shot.

Defense counsel sought a sentence well below the guidelines range. Noting that during plea negotiations the two sides memorialized an agreement that seven to ten years would be an appropriate total sentence, he argued that the government’s 257-month recommendation penalized him for going to trial. The district judge interjected, telling counsel he “can rest assured that there will be no additional punishment imposed in this case just because your client went to trial,” and stating that he does not “take into account any negotiations between the government and the defendant that do not result in a recommendation that is jointly urged upon the Court.” Defense counsel next argued that, because Anglin would be 35 years old by the time the ten-year minimum term expired, the court should sentence him far below the guidelines range on the remaining counts. He explained:

The 924(c) here means that you’re not punishing a 25-year-old man who doesn’t get it. You’re punishing a 35-year-old man. And you’re punishing that 35-year-old man each additional year. And you’re saying we have no hope for you at 36 you’re gonna make it; at 37 you’re gonna do a better job; 38 I don’t know if I can trust you....
And when this court considers what’s sufficient but not greater than necessary, what’s appropriate under all the circumstances, I’m looking at a 35-year old man. I’m looking at someone who has just done 10 years in prison, who has hopefully gotten all of the benefits of it.

The court imposed a 230-month sentence—the 120-month mandatory minimum for the § 924(c) count, plus a consecutive term of 110 months, the low end of the guidelines range for the remaining offenses. In justifying the sentence, the court cited the “long-lasting” effect on the shooting victim and the need to deter others “looking to make a quick buck,” while also emphasizing the need not to “overly punish.” In particular, the court said that it would “take into account that there is a mandatory minimum sentence” as “was underscored in the arguments of’ defense counsel, and that it “will not and should not penalize a defendant for going to trial.” The judge added that defense counsel’s arguments “reminded [him] of a recent book written by Professor Michelle Alexander which is called ‘The New Jim Crow.’ And so this court does not approach sentencing blindly or without due regard for the consequences of substantial incarceration, particularly in a case like this with a young man age 25.”

The presentence report recommended a supervised release term and proposed numerous supervised release conditions. Neither side addressed supervised release in its briefs or otherwise objected to the proposed conditions. At the sentencing hearing, the government asked for four to five years of supervised release. Defense counsel did not discuss supervised release in his arguments.

The court imposed a three-year term of supervised release, explaining as follows:

[THE COURT:] With regard to supervision, the Court is imposing the mandatory terms of supervision as discussed in the presentence report for the reasons discussed in the presentence report.
The Court is likewise imposing conditions over and above those—the additional conditions of supervision as discussed in the presentence report except as follows:
With regard to paragraph 3 in part B of the presentence report, the defendant shall follow the instructions of his probation officer and answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer subject to his right under the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination.
The Court does believe that supervision in this case is warranted particularly in light of the defendant’s criminal history and failure to successfully complete state supervision prior to committing the crime in this case.
Is there any reason to articulate these grounds for supervision any further?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
[THE GOVERNMENT]: No, Your Hon- or.

The court closed the hearing by asking, “Is there anything else or any argument that you believe the Court has not taken into account fully, [defense counsel]?” Defense counsel answered, “I can’t think of any right now, Your Honor.”

II. Discussion

A. Probable Cause to Arrest

We first consider whether there was probable cause to arrest Anglin. Our review is de novo. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2015).

Probable cause determinations are exercises in holistic, commonsense de-cisionmaking. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). “Police officers have probable cause to arrest when the totality of the facts and circumstances within their knowledge at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable person in believing the person has committed a crime.” Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015). “Probable cause is a fluid concept that relies on the commonsense judgment of the officers based on the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006). Additionally, “[p]robable cause only requires that a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity exists; it does not require the existence of criminal activity to be more likely true than not true.” Mucha v. Vill. of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 2011).

In determining whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Anglin, we do not write on a blank slate: this court already found probable cause to arrest Dave on essentially the same facts when his appeal—Dave and Anglin were prosecuted separately—was before us. See United States v. Dave Anglin, 626 Fed.Appx. 181, 185 (7th Cir. 2015). In Dave’s case, too, the challenged seizure was predicated primarily on Green’s tip, which we found sufficient. “[Although the officers were unable to corroborate allegations of criminal activity until after the stop,” we explained, “they were able to corroborate numerous innocuous details, including the vehicle driven by [Dave] Anglin’s girlfriend, the residence of [Michael Anglin], and [Dave] Anglin’s criminal history,” Id. at 184. We further noted that Green “disclosed details that only someone close to [the Anglins] would know,” such as their phone numbers, and that “the officers corroborated information about Anglin’s future actions—including the brothers’ locations on the morning of the planned robbery.” Id. at 184-85. Finally, we noted that Green “made himself accountable if the tip turned out to be false” by giving his identity and agreeing to record his conversations with the Ang-lins. Ibid. These facts, we held, gave the officers reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Dave and pat him down; significantly, we added that “the same information that supported the officers’ reasonable suspicion”—i.e., Green’s statements—“also gave them probable cause to arrest.” Ibid.

Although our order in Dave’s case is not precedential, see Cir. R. 32.1(b), our holding was correct, and we see no reason to reach a different conclusion here. Anglin argues that probable cause was absent because Green was untested and untrustworthy. But the facts known to the agents at the time of Anglin’s arrest established Green’s credibility well enough for his tips to supply probable cause, even though they could not yet know with certainty whether he was telling the truth.

For starters, the agents had confirmed most of the details Green provided: the fact that both Anglins had felony records, the identity of Dave’s girlfriend, the make and model of her car, the location of Ang-lin’s residence, and the description of Ang-lin’s car. Green would not have known these things if he did not have some genuine familiarity with the Anglins. See United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that corroboration of an informant’s statements regarding the suspect’s residence, vehicle, and criminal history helped establish probable cause based on the informant’s tip); United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1995) (similar). In particular, Green’s accurate (if somewhat imprecise) descriptions of Anglin’s car and. the location of his residence were consistent with his claim to have spent time with the Ang-lin brothers away from the halfway house. Cf. United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the officers lacked probable cause where, “even though [the informant] stated that she was Peck’s girlfriend, she was unable to give any information regarding Peck other than that he was a black male”). Moreover, the agents observed Anglin following the itinerary that Green relayed, to the point of watching him pick Green up and drive off with him. After that, there could be no doubt that Green knew, the Anglins personally, was familiar enough with their affairs to accurately predict their behavior, and—crucially—was in fact personally involved with whatever they were up to that morning. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245-46, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (holding that specific predictions of the defendants’ future movements, later proven accurate, bolstered an anonymous tip’s credibility because they established the tipster’s bona fides as a confidant of the defendants); United States v. Huebner, 356 F.3d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Consistent with the informant’s predictions, on the day of the controlled buy, agents observed Huebner leaving his residence and stopping at another location very close to his home. Insofar as Hueb-ner’s actions mirrored [the informant’s] prediction of this event, it became clear that [the informant] indeed possessed ‘inside information,’ further establishing his reliability.”).

The agents had another reason to regard Green as generally credible. Green was under federal sentence and therefore faced serious consequences if caught lying to federal investigators. The agents knew his name and where he lived: a halfway house where he was obliged to spend every night. If Green lied, he would be easy to find. See Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1689 (holding that using 911 to make a report is an “indicator of veracity” because it has “features that allow for identifying and tracing callers”).

Finally, Green’s key assertions, if fabricated, could and likely would have been exposed as falsehoods. Green told agents the approximate time and location of an imminent armed robbery, enabled them to tail the Acura in order to observe the crime unfolding, and said that he was recording his conversations in the SUV. If this were an elaborate ruse, that would have become apparent soon enough. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the agents to conclude that Green was being honest with them.

Anglin argues that Green’s account of the planned robbery was vague, shifting, and therefore dubious, but Green’s imprecision was consistent with the rest of what he told the agents. The Anglins led the operation and were parsimonious with details, so it was no surprise that Green could not give a specific address for the planned robbery or a detailed account of how it would transpire. See United States v. Booker, 612 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that an informant’s inability “to predict many aspects of’ a planned drug transaction did not defeat probable cause). That is especially true where, as here, Green promptly relayed additional details about the plan as he learned them,

Anglin identifies two specific inconsistencies that he believes should have given the agents pause. First, on December 13, Green said the Anglins showed him three guns, but on December 16, he revised that to two guns. That minor discrepancy hardly compelled the conclusion that Green was untrustworthy. If anything, the agents could reasonably have seen it as a sign of good faith that he went out of his way to set the record straight on an unverifíable detail.

Second, Anglin asserts that Green did not accurately predict how the morning in question would unfold. This argument relies on the inaccurate premise that Green told the agents that he and Anglin would pick up Dave from his girlfriend’s house, which was in the opposite direction from the robbery’s location. But Hankins was clear on this point: even though Dave was headed to his girlfriend’s house when he left the halfway house, Green told agents that the plan was for Dave to meet Anglin and Green somewhere “out on the street,” not at her house. Doc. 34^4 at 620. Driving in the general direction of the robbery target was consistent with that plan.

Although unnecessary, it bears mention that the agents had one final data point by the time of the arrest, and it derived not from Green’s say-so, but from direct observation of Anglin. A traffic stop of Ang-lin’s vehicle required only reasonable suspicion. See Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014); Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687. Anglin concedes that Green’s tips sufficed for that purpose. Doc. 18 at 17, 24, But by the time the officers arrested Anglin, which required probable cause, they had seen him respond to the attempted traffic stop by making a U-turn and traveling some distance in the opposite direction, not stopping until a second police vehicle blocked his path. That evasive conduct was an additional factor supporting probable cause. See Shields, 789 F.3d at 746 (“[T]he officers had at least reasonable suspicion at the time of their initial encounter with Mr. Shields and acquired additional bases for probable cause when Mr. Shields fled and removed the firearm from his pocket.”).

Given the totality of the circumstances, the officers had ample probable cause to arrest Anglin. It follows that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress.

B. Conviction Under § 924(c)

Anglin next challenges his § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii) conviction for possessing and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, contending that Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 924(c)(l)(A)(iii) prohibits discharging a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” Section 924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” to include any felony that either “(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” (the elements clause, also known as the force clause), or “(B) by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used” (the residual clause). Anglin was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), for the December 9 repair shop robbery, during which he discharged his gun. The question, then, is whether a Hobbs Act robbery conviction can serve as a predicate “crime of violence” under either prong of § 924(c)(3).

Anglin argues that the § 924(e)(3)(B) residual clause is invalid under Johnson, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569. In this, he is right. See United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e hold that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is ... unconstitutionally vague.”). That leaves the question whether Hobbs Act robbery falls within the § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause. We recently found it unnecessary to decide that issue, see Davila v. United States, 843 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2016), but here we must confront it.

The Hobbs Act defines robbery, in relevant part, as the taking of personal property “by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Committing such an act necessarily requires using or threatening force. Pressing the opposite view, Anglin asserts that a robber hypothetically could put his victim in “fear of injury5’ without using or threatening force. This argument is contrary to our precedents.

In United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2016), we considered whether the § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause encompassed federal attempted armed bank robbery as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)—which can be accomplished “by intimidation” or by “assault,” with “assault” defined as “an intentional attempt to inflict or threat to inflict, bodily injury ... that creates in the victim a reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm” and that “may be committed without actually touching, striking, or injuring the other person.” Id. at 908-09. We answered yes, reasoning that a “victim’s fear of bodily harm is necessarily fear of violent physical force.” Id. at 909.

We also held in Armour that Indiana robbery, which similarly can be accomplished by “putting any person in fear,” satisfied the identical “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” requirement in § 4B1.2(a)(l) of the Sentencing Guidelines. 840 F.3d at 907. In so holding, we rejected the argument that Anglin makes here, that “ ‘putting any person in fear’ does not necessarily involve ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’ ” Ibid. And we rejected similar arguments in United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In the ordinary case, robbery by placing a person in fear of bodily injury under Indiana law involves an explicit or implicit threat of physical force and therefore qualifies as a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).”), and in United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005) (equating “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” with “putting any person in fear” of physical injury).

For these reasons, Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 923(c)(3)(A). In so holding, we join the unbroken consensus of other circuits to have resolved this question. See United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 140-44 (2d Cir. 2016); In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Howard, 650 FedAppx. 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2016); cf. United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141-44 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that Hobbs Act robbery may constitute a § 924(c) “crime of violence” where, as here, the two crimes are contemporaneous, but not deciding whether Hobbs Act robbery categorically fits the elements clause); id. at 150-51 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (concluding that Hobbs Act robbery categorically fits the elements clause). And because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause, it was a valid predicate for Anglin’s § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction.

C. Sentencing

Anglin argues that the district court committed a variety of sentencing errors.

1. Custodial Sentence

First, Anglin asserts that the district court erred by failing to address his argument that the government’s recommended 257-month sentence unfairly punished him for going to trial. That is wrong, as the court did address the argument.

At the hearing, Anglin’s counsel reiterated at some length the argument from his sentencing brief that the government’s recommendation sought to impose a “trial penalty.’’ The court responded, cutting in after several minutes: “[T]his court does not enhance a defendant’s sentence merely because he or she has asked for a trial. I never have and I never will. So you can rest assured that there will be no additional punishment imposed in this case just because your client went to trial.” That promise acknowledged—indeed, agreed with—the thrust of Anglin’s argument, and the judge later reiterated it in announcing and justifying the sentence.

As proof that the district court refused to consider his ai'gument, Anglin points to the judge’s explanation of how he would ensure that the sentence did not reflect a trial penalty: “I don’t take into account any negotiations between the government and the defendant that do not result in a recommendation that is jointly urged upon the Court.” Anglin would have preferred that the judge take a different tack, heeding his request that the court consider the inchoate plea agreement (which, as noted, would have recommended an overall sentence of seven to ten years) and discount the government’s recommendation. But that goes to the substantive merit of the judge’s response, not its procedural adequacy—which is all Anglin challenges here. The fact that Anglin did not get the answer he sought does not mean the judge refused to consider his argument. See United States v. Lott, 468 Fed.Appx. 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the judge did consider Lott’s family circumstances argument, and his reason for rejecting it is clear.”); United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he sentencing transcript reveals that the district court did consider this factor; unfortunately for Jackson, it happens to cut against him in this case.”).

Next, Anglin contends that the district judge failed to consider his “diminishing returns” argument, which posited that additional years beyond Anglin’s proposed twelve- or thirteen-year sentence would have limited marginal value, given that Anglin would be in his late thirties by the time he served them. The parties dispute whether Anglin preserved this objection, a question we need not resolve because here, too, the judge adequately engaged with the argument.

Anglin’s argument for leniency on the non-§ 924(c) counts boiled down to a generic point about the diminishing marginal returns of long prison sentences—a “stock” argument that virtually all defendants can make in some form or another. Sentencing courts “need not explicitly discuss” stock arguments. United States v. Eberts, 829 F.3d 882, 885 (7th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Garcia-Oliveros, 639 F.3d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We have recognized that the need for explanation typically is diminished ... when the arguments in mitigation are obviously without merit or so routine as to be ‘stock.’”); United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may pass over, without discussion, arguments that are made as a matter of routine.”); United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The other [arguments] are nothing more than stock arguments that sentencing courts see routinely: things like Tahzib’s family ties, how his criminal history category over-represents the seriousness of his prior conviction, and the extent to which he accepted responsibility. They are the type of argument that a sentencing court is certainly free to reject without discussion.”).

In any event, a fair reading of the transcript shows that the judge did address this argument, albeit somewhat obliquely. See United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 456 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e will not find a sentence to be procedurally unreasonable as long as the totality of the record establishes that the district judge considered the arguments in mitigation, even if implicitly and imprecisely.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Citing Professor Alexander’s seminal work on mass incarceration, the judge assured Anglin that he “does not approach sentencing blindly or without due regard for the consequences of substantial incarceration, particularly in a case like this with a young man age 25.” In the next breath, the judge acknowledged his obligation under § 3553(a) to impose a sentence that is “no greater than necessary.” That level of engagement with Anglin’s generic argument was plenty, especially given that he received a guidelines sentence—indeed, at the bottom end of the range. See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 864 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[L]ess explanation is typically needed when a district court sentences within an advisory guidelines range.”).

2. Supervised Release

Anglin also challenges the supervised release conditions, which he contends were substantively unreasonable and procedurally defective. Because Anglin did not raise his concerns before the district court, we must first determine whether he waived or merely forfeited his challenges.

“A waived claim ... is one that a party has knowingly and intelligently relinquished; a forfeited plea is one that a party has merely failed to preserve.” Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 n.4, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012); see also United States v. Wesley, 422 F.3d 509, 520 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A forfeiture is basically an oversight; a waiver is a deliberate decision not to present a ground for relief that might be available in the law.”). If Anglin merely forfeited his objections to the supervised release conditions, we review for plain error, but if he waived them, then the waiver “leaves no error for us to correct on appeal.” Wesley, 422 F.3d at 520; see also United States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Waiver .., precludes judicial review- by extinguishing the- error.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our decisions set forth the line between waiver and forfeiture in this context. In United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016), we held that the defendant waived his objection to the supervised release conditions where the court asked, “Counsel, do you have any legal objection to the sentence I have proposed or request any further elaboration of my reasons under Section 3553(a) both as to the term of imprisonment or the conditions of supervised release?” and defense counsel responded, “no.” Id. at 1083. Likewise, in United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014), the defendant argued that the judge failed to address a key argument in mitigation. Id. at 937. We disagreed, noting that the judge “closed the sentencing hearing by asking counsel whether they had any objection to the sentence or required ‘any further elaboration’ of the judge’s reasons,” and holding that defense counsel’s failure to object to the sufficiency of the judge’s explanation was a waiver. Id. at 939, 941.

Lewis and Donelli reflect the settled principle that, when the judge invites counsel to raise objections on a particular topic and counsel déclines the -invitation, appellate review is waived. See United States v. Ortiz, 843 F.3d 294, 297 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]hough Ortiz was told by - the district judge at the hearing that this was Ortiz’s chance to question the conditions of supervised release, Ortiz did not do so. So he waived objections to . the conditions .... ”); United States v. Raney, 842 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When the district court allows the defendant an opportunity to challenge conditions of supervised release, the defendant waives any objection to conditions to which he fails to object.”); United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding waiver where the district judge “wam[ed] the parties in writing that failure to object to conditions recommended in the presen-tence report could be treated as waiver,” and “later the lawyer said no when asked if she had ‘any objections to those conditions’ ”); United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873-74 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding waiver as to all but one of the supervised release conditions where the defendant was given the opportunity to review the proposed conditions before the hearing, had a chance to object to them, and objected to only one); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1079 (“Before sentence was actually imposed, the court expressly invited objections and requests for further findings or elaboration. The defense expressly declined the invitation. That was waiver.”); United States v. Maxfield, 812 F.3d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen the court asked counsel if any argument in mitigation had been overlooked, counsel said no. Having passed up the chance for elaboration, Maxfield waived the argument, and cannot now argue that the court’s explanation was inadequate.”); United States v. Rodgers, 610 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Rodgers filed no objections to the factual findings in the [presentence report]. When asked on the record at sentencing if he had any such objections, his counsel stated, ‘No, we do not.’ This amounts to the intentional relinquishment of a known right which extinguishes any error and precludes appellate review.”); cf. United States v. O’Malley, 739 F.3d 1001, 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding waiver where the defendant “affirmatively stated that he had ‘no objection’ to” a proposed jury instruction).

By contrast, we have cautioned that giving the same response to a general question like “anything else?” effects no waiver, is merely a forfeiture, and thus allows for plain error review. See United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In the context of supervised release, a defendant’s response to a general inquiry at the end of sentencing, unaccompanied by either (1) an explicit approval of the condition or (2) a strategic reason to forgo the argument at the hearing, does not constitute waiver.”); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083 (“The judge’s inquiry here was not a vague ‘anything else?’ ”); United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 857-58 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding no waiver where the district court simply asked if there was “anything unclear or confusing”).

In our case, the district judge stated that he was “imposing the mandatory terms of supervision as discussed in the presentence report for the reasons discussed in the presentence report” and “the additional conditions of supervision as discussed in the presentence report,” but modified one of the conditions to read, “the defendant shall follow the instructions of his probation officer and answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer subject to his right under the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination.” The judge explained that he “believe[d] that supervision in this case is warranted particularly in light of the defendant’s criminal history and failure to successfully complete state supervision prior to committing the crime in this case.” The judge then asked, “Is there any reason to articulate these grounds for supervision any further?” to which defense counsel answered, “No, Your Honor.”

Anglin complains that the judge did not orally pronounce each supervised release condition, and instead (with one exception) incorporated by reference the probation office’s proposed conditions. Our decisions teach that the sentencing judge must “orally pronounce” each supervised release condition “from the bench.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 862; see also United States v. Orozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 847-48 (7th Cir. 2016). There is an exception, however, where the defendant “had a chance [before sentencing] to review the [proposed] supervised release conditions as well as the reasons for imposing them,” he “was given a meaningful opportunity to object,” the judge “incorporated those proposed conditions by reference during its oral pronouncement,” and “the oral pronouncement and written judgment do not conflict.” Bloch, 826 F.3d at 872. In Bloch, the district court circulated its own proposed conditions before sentencing, but the exception also applies where the proposed conditions and grounds are circulated by the probation office. After all, if the probation office proposes supervised release conditions and the grounds therefor, the defendant is on ample notice that the judge will consider each of those conditions. See United States v. Thomas, 840 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2016) (in applying Bloch, treating “written notiee ... prepared by the probation office” as the equivalent of the judge’s own written notice); United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that “most judges, in deciding what conditions of supervised release to impose, rely heavily on the recommendations of the federal probation service”).

The Bloch exception does not quite apply here. True, Anglin does not argue that the supervised release conditions proposed in writing by the probation office and then orally incorporated by reference by the judge conflict with the conditions set forth in the written judgment. But the judge did not give Anglin “a meaningful opportunity to object” to the conditions he imposed. Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872. Asking defense counsel whether there was “any reason to articulate these grounds for supervision any further” is best understood as offering to elaborate on the justifications for the conditions, not as an invitation to substantively object to the conditions themselves. Given this, counsel’s failure to ask the judge to orally pronounce each supervised release condition forfeits, not waives, the issue, and the judge’s failure to make that oral pronouncement or to invite substantive objections to the conditions was plain error, warranting a remand. See United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The district court neither stated all the conditions orally nor obtained a waiver for doing so, and did not provide any explanation for many of the conditions. In addition, some of the specific conditions imposed here have been found too vague or otherwise improper_ Based on the logic of our recent cases, we must remand the case.”).

That said, it is important not to make a fetish of orally pronouncing each supervised release condition, at least under the circumstances that prevailed in Bloch. A federal sentencing is the worst day of most defendants’ lives, and the judge’s announcement of the custodial sentence— particularly where the sentence is substantial—is the worst individual moment of the experience. The judge of course must turn to the supervised release conditions after announcing the custodial sentence. But if all the judge plans to do is to impose the supervised release conditions that have already been circulated (by the court or the probation office) and reviewed by the defendant, and if the judge gives the defendant a meaningful opportunity to make substantive objections, it can be gratuitously cruel to then make the defendant sit (or stand) through a five-, ten-, or at times fifteen-minute recitation of and justification for those conditions. If the defendant or his counsel wants that recitation, so be it, but otherwise, what possibly could be the point? After Anglin had just heard and was in the initial stages of coming to terms with the stark and awful reality of his 230-month custodial sentence, we very much doubt that he cared to endure the judge’s taking several minutes to tell him what he already knew, which is that that, upon his release in the early 2030s, he will have 72 hours to inform his probation officer of any change in his place of residence, or that he will have to submit to a drug test within fifteen days of his release and two tests within the following year, or that he will be unable to leave the judicial district without the court’s or the probation officer’s permission, or (unless he really loves irony) that he will need the court’s permission before entering into any agreement to act as an informer or special agent of a law enforcement agency.

Having presented and prevailed on this issue at the appellate level, Anglin will have the opportunity to hear the judge orally recite the supervised release conditions, unless he chooses to waive it. And because we are vacating the supervised release conditions, there is no need to resolve Anglins’ substantive challenges to them. See United States v. Plada, 628 Fed.Appx. 443, 444 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding it unnecessary, when remanding because of procedural errors, to address substantive challenges to the supervised release conditions). To provide guidance on remand, however, we offer the following observations. See United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2016) (after remanding to fix two improper supervised release conditions, discussing problems with a third defective condition); United States v. Ortiz, 817 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[Sjince ... the case has to be remanded because of errors in some of the conditions that were challenged, we’ll address errors in [unchallenged conditions] as well in order to prevent confusion in the district court on remand.”).

One challenged condition required Anglin to “notify the probation officer at least 10 days prior to any change in his place of residence or in his place of employment.” We have held that this condition “fails to indicate whether change in employment means changing employers or also includes changing from one position to another for the same employer.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted). In its stead, the judge might consider a condition requiring Anglin to “notify Probation at least ten days prior to or as soon as you know about any changes in residence and any time you leave a job or accept a job.” United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Another challenged condition required Anglin, at the probation officer’s direction, to “notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or characteristics.” We have held that this condition impermissibly gives “no indication of what is meant by ‘personal history’ and ‘characteristics’ or what ‘risks’ must be disclosed to which ‘third parties.’ ” Id. at 934 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that this condition is “impermissibly vague”). In its stead, the district judge might consider imposing a condition that “specifies] limitations,” such as the parties to be notified and the risks to be disclosed, “such that it is sufficiently clear to [Anglin] what conduct is allowed and disallowed.” Poulin, 809 F.3d at 934. Or, the judge eould craft a condition that simply requires Anglin to permit the probation officer to provide notification to third parties. See United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528 (7th Cir. 2016).

The other challenged conditions are satisfactory. The condition requiring Anglin to “report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency as directed by the court or probation officer” is acceptable. See Ortiz, 843 F.3d at 297 (holding that this condition was “vague, to be sure, but given that it will be years before Ortiz is released from prison, it is impossible to be more specific”); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 932 (approving that condition); United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). Although it is important that the manner and frequency of the required reporting be “reasonable,” see United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 2016), routine administrative conditions like this one are “necessary incidents of supervision” that we may “fairly presume” the probation officer will implement “in a reasonable manner.” United States v. Warren, 843 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 2016). The same is true of the condition that Anglin “shall follow the instructions of the probation officer.” If during the supervised release term Anglin believes that the probation officer is issuing unreasonable instructions, he can bring the matter to the district court. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 857-58 (“[I]f a particular probation officer exercises his or her discretion in an unreasonable manner, this exercise will be subject to review by the district court.”).

The final challenged condition, that Ang-lin “use his best efforts to find and hold lawful employment, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons (e.g., childcare, eldercare, disability, age, or serious health condition),” also passes muster. The condition does not require Anglin to work despite an inability to do so, see Hill, 818 F.3d at 345; it merely requires him to use his best efforts, unless excused for any number of reasons.

The question remains whether we should vacate the entire sentence and remand for a complete resentencing, or vacate only the supervised release conditions and limit the remand to modifying and orally pronouncing those conditions. We believe the better course is to vacate and remand only as to the supervised release conditions. See United States v. Ray, 831 F.3d 431, 439 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Sometimes it is sensible to fix problems in the supervised release portion of the sentence and let the rest stand. Whether to proceed that way is a decision committed to this court, applying the principles we have developed in our precedents”) (citations omitted); Sainz, 827 F.3d at 604 (“We affirm the restitution order, but we order a limited remand to correct some issues of vagueness and overbreadth in the conditions of supervised release.”); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 936 (vacating the defendant’s supervised release conditions in light of flaws with some of them, and remanding for resen-tencing as to supervised release conditions only); Siegel, 753 F.3d at 717 (“So the prison sentences in both our cases stand, but the cases must be remanded for reconsideration of the conditions of supervised release that we have determined to be inappropriate_”).

Anglin argues that vacatur of the supervised release conditions warrants a complete resentencing. We disagree. We do not think it plausible that orally pronouncing the conditions and slightly modifying some of them would induce the district judge to reconfigure other aspects of the sentence, particularly the imprisonment term. We remand for full resentencing only when such cross-cutting effects are within the realm of possibility. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 867 (remanding for a complete resentencing where “the balance struck by the sentencing judge might be disrupted [by the vacated supervised release conditions] to a degree where the judge would wish to alter the prison term and/or other conditions”); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 382 (7th Cir. 2015) (remanding four cases for complete resentencing where reconsideration of certain conditions “may conceivably induce one or more of the judges to alter the prison sentence that he imposed”). They are not here.

III. Conclusion

The district court’s judgment is affirmed, with the exception of the supervised release conditions, which are vacated. We remand for the limited purpose of amending and orally pronouncing the supervised release conditions.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.