text:
    JULIA REALTY, LTD., Appellant, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION et al., Appellees.
    No. 2016-0541
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted April 10, 2018 Decided June 27, 2018
    Jesse R. Mann, L.L.C., and Jesse R. Mann; and Aryeh I. Dori, for appellant.
    Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Saundra Curtis-Patrick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Cuyahoga County Board of Revision and Cuyahoga County Fiscal Officer.
    Brindza, McIntyre & Seed, L.L.P., Cleveland, and David H. Seed, for appellee Cleveland Municipal School District Board of Education.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is a real-property tax case on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA"). Appellant, Julia Realty, Ltd., the property's owner, challenges the BTA's application of collateral estoppel to its continuing complaint for tax years 2013 and 2014.

{¶ 2} In February 2013, Julia Realty purchased the property at issue through an auction sale for $367,500. In its original complaint for tax year 2012 (a reappraisal year in Cuyahoga County), Julia Realty contended that the purchase price constituted the value of the property. Both appellee Cuyahoga County Board of Revision ("the BOR") and the BTA retained appellee Cuyahoga County fiscal officer's valuation of $1,408,700. In affirming the BOR's determination, the BTA relied on the then-recent decision of this court in Olentangy Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision , 141 Ohio St.3d 243, 2014-Ohio-4723, 23 N.E.3d 1086, and held that Julia Realty had not adequately demonstrated that the auction-sale price constituted the property's true value.

{¶ 3} Julia Realty invoked the BOR's continuing-complaint jurisdiction for tax years 2013 and 2014 and presented additional evidence that the auction-sale price reflected the true value of the property. But appellee Cleveland Municipal School District Board of Education ("the BOE") argued that it was too late to present additional evidence regarding the nature of the sale, because Julia Realty was bound by the earlier determination for tax year 2012 that the sale was not at arm's length. The BOR agreed and retained the original value for tax years 2013 and 2014. On appeal, the BTA held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied, thereby barring Julia Realty from relitigating the arm's-length-sale issue on the continuing complaint. We hold that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in applying collateral estoppel, and we therefore affirm.

I. Background

{¶ 4} On April 1, 2013, Julia Realty filed a complaint challenging the 2012 reappraisal value determined by the fiscal officer, arguing that the purchase price of the property at an auction sale constituted its value. The BOE filed a countercomplaint. After conducting a hearing, the BOR decided to retain the fiscal officer's valuation, as the BOE had requested.

{¶ 5} The BOR issued its decision on October 22, 2013, and Julia Realty appealed to the BTA on November 21, 2013. During the pendency of the BTA appeal, we issued our decision in Olentangy Local Schools , 141 Ohio St.3d 243, 2014-Ohio-4723, 23 N.E.3d 1086, in which we held that " R.C. 5713.04 establishes a presumption that a sale price from an auction is not evidence of a property's value" but the presumption "may be rebutted by evidence showing that the sale occurred at arm's length between typically motivated parties," id. at ¶ 40.

{¶ 6} The BTA rendered its decision without holding a hearing; that decision was issued on February 2, 2015. BTA Nos. 2013-6048 and 2013-6049, 2015 WL 750599 (Feb. 2, 2015). Relying on Olentangy Local Schools , the BTA noted that the sale at issue involved an auction and that under Olentangy LocalSchools , Julia Realty had the burden to show that the sale was at arm's length, which it failed to do. 2015 WL 750599 at *2. The BTA therefore affirmed the BOR's decision retaining the fiscal officer's original valuation.

{¶ 7} Julia Realty did not appeal the BTA's decision, nor did it seek a rehearing with respect to the tax-year-2012 value. Instead, Julia Realty invoked the BOR's continuing-complaint jurisdiction for tax years 2013 and 2014 by sending request letters dated March 3 and 4, 2015, which were file-stamped as received on March 5 and 9, 2015. On May 13, 2015, the BOR held a hearing on the continuing complaint, at which Julia Realty presented the testimony of its principal regarding the circumstances of the sale plus some documentation regarding that transaction. The BOE argued that Julia Realty was precluded from relitigating the arm's-length character of the sale, and the BOR members' delegates expressed a similar concern. Accordingly, on May 18, 2015, the BOR ordered no change in value due to "res judicata."

{¶ 8} Julia Realty appealed to the BTA. At the BTA hearing, Julia Realty's counsel explained the company's decision not to appeal in the earlier case but instead to present new evidence regarding the auction sale in conjunction with the continuing complaint. Julia Realty's arguments at the hearing made clear that it was solely relying on the auction-sale price to establish the property's value. Holding that collateral estoppel barred Julia Realty from relitigating the arm's-length nature of the sale, the BTA affirmed the BOR's decision retaining the fiscal officer's valuation. BTA Nos. 2015-657 and 2015-658, 2016 WL 2907613, *3-4 (Mar. 14, 2016). In addition, the BTA held that some of the new evidence presented was hearsay that deserved no weight. Id. at *3.

{¶ 9} Julia Realty has appealed.

II. Analysis

A. The BTA properly applied collateral estoppel

{¶ 10} Under its second proposition of law, Julia Realty contests the BTA's application of collateral estoppel. When properly applied, collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, " 'precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.' " Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 152 Ohio St.3d 277, 2017-Ohio-8845, 95 N.E.3d 359, ¶ 9, quoting Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. , 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 112, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds, Grava v. Parkman Twp. , 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). "Collateral estoppel may apply in deciding whether a particular sale is arm's length in nature, because it is an issue that may be common in successive tax years." Id.

{¶ 11} Here, Julia Realty argues that applying collateral estoppel is improper because at the time of the BOR hearing in the proceedings that addressed the 2012 tax year, this court had not yet clarified that Julia Realty bore the burden of rebutting the presumption that the auction-sale price it paid for the property in that sale was not indicative of market value. That clarification occurred during the pendency of Julia Realty's first BTA appeal when we issued our decision in Olentangy Local Schools , 141 Ohio St.3d 243, 2014-Ohio-4723, 23 N.E.3d 1086.

{¶ 12} We acknowledge that collateral estoppel should not be applied if "intervening [court] decisions" have established that the earlier result was erroneous. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co. , 466 U.S. 353, 362, 104 S.Ct. 1837, 80 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984), vacating and remanding Hooven & Allison Co. v. Lindley , 4 Ohio St.3d 169, 447 N.E.2d 1295 (1983). Nor does the intervening caselaw have to effect an outright reversal of legal principles to defeat the application of collateral estoppel. Rather, "a judicial declaration intervening between the two proceedings may so change the legal atmosphere as to render the rule of collateral estoppel inapplicable." Commr. of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen , 333 U.S. 591, 600, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948). In Sunnen , the subsequent development of the caselaw did not involve a dramatic change but rather a sufficiently "substantial * * * amplification of [the basic] concept [so] as to justify reconsideration of earlier [United States] Tax Court decisions reached without the benefit of the expanded notions." Id. at 607, 68 S.Ct. 715.

{¶ 13} With our approval, the BTA has applied the principles of Sunnen and similar cases to restrict the application of collateral estoppel based on intervening developments in Ohio tax law generally. Am. Soc. for Metals v. Limbach , BTA No. 87-A-807, 1990 WL 111429, *3 (Mar. 23, 1990) (declining to apply collateral estoppel in part because "even given the same parties, same subject matter, and same questions, the different tax years become important if there has been an intervening change in the legal atmosphere"), aff'd, 59 Ohio St.3d 38, 39, 569 N.E.2d 1065 (1991) ; accord Hubbard Press v. Limbach , BTA No. 87-E-730, 1992 Ohio Tax LEXIS 723, *4 (June 26, 1992), aff'd sub nom. Hubbard Press v. Tracy , 67 Ohio St.3d 564, 565, 621 N.E.2d 396 (1993).

{¶ 14} We also acknowledge that our decision in Olentangy Local Schools constituted the type of "change in the legal atmosphere" that would, in a proper case, justify a refusal to apply collateral estoppel. That is so because, although R.C. 5713.04 has long provided that "[t]he price for which such real property would sell at auction or forced sale shall not be taken as the criterion of its value" (emphasis added), our previous caselaw had applied that provision to auctions that were associated with foreclosures and forced sales but not necessarily to auction sales generally.

{¶ 15} Indeed, in Olentangy Local Schools itself, we stated that the question whether R.C. 5713.04 controlled the analysis of voluntary auction sales had previously been left open. 141 Ohio St.3d 243, 2014-Ohio-4723, 23 N.E.3d 1086, at ¶ 27-28, citing Walters v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Revision , 47 Ohio St.3d 23, 546 N.E.2d 932 (1989), and Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision , 127 Ohio St.3d 63, 2010-Ohio-4907, 936 N.E.2d 489. And in Cincinnati School Dist. , we had distinguished between auction sales that involved foreclosures and those that did not-the former were presumed to be transactions that were involuntary and not at arm's length, but the presumption did not necessarily apply to auction sales that did not involve foreclosures. Id. at ¶ 31-33.

{¶ 16} Thus, Olentangy Local Schools made clear for the first time that all auction sales give rise to a presumption against using the sale price as the property's value, subject to rebuttal if the proponent proves the voluntary and arm's-length character of the sale. And in light of the former caselaw, Julia Realty could reasonably have assumed at the time the BTA hearing was held concerning the value for tax year 2012 that the auction-sale price (which was not the result of a foreclosure sale) would be presumed to indicate the property's value, with the BOE bearing the burden to rebut the presumption. See, e.g. , Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, 83 N.E.3d 916, ¶ 9, 33 (a recent arms-length sale price is the best evidence of a property's value).

{¶ 17} It follows that if our decision in Olentangy Local Schools had intervened between the BTA's decision rendered for tax year 2012 and Julia Realty's invocation of continuing-complaint jurisdiction, collateral estoppel would not apply in the later proceedings for tax years 2013 and 2014. The problem for Julia Realty, however, is that we issued our decision in Olentangy Local Schools on October 28, 2014, more than three months before the BTA issued its decision for tax year 2012 on February 8, 2015-and, indeed, the BTA relied on Olentangy Local Schools in determining the property's value for tax year 2012. As a result, Olentangy Local Schools is not an "intervening" decision that bars the application of collateral estoppel in the proceedings on the continuing complaint.

{¶ 18} Julia Realty emphasizes that this court's decision in Olentangy Local Schools was issued after Julia Realty had already presented evidence in the initial case regarding tax year 2012; in that sense, Julia Realty argues that the Olentangy Local Schools decision "intervenes" between the hearing during the proceedings for tax year 2012 and the initiation of the continuing complaint for tax years 2013 and 2014. To be sure, it is safe to assume that Julia Realty presented less evidence at the BOR hearing for tax year 2012 than it otherwise would have presented because it did not at that time know the standard this court would later articulate in Olentangy Local Schools . Moreover, collateral estoppel should not bar relitigating an issue if the litigant who would be barred "lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the first action, or * * * other circumstances justify according him an opportunity to relitigate that issue." Hicks v. De La Cruz , 52 Ohio St.2d 71, 74, 369 N.E.2d 776 (1977) ; accord Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), quoting Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) ("collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case").

{¶ 19} For these reasons, we do not disagree with the general point underlying Julia Realty's argument regarding its entitlement to a fair opportunity to present evidence and to receive a new hearing to attempt to satisfy the standard announced in Olentangy Local Schools . See Sunnen , 333 U.S. at 600, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898 (a "supervening [court] decision cannot justly be ignored by blind reliance upon the rule of collateral estoppel"). The problem here, however, is that Julia Realty could have sought a new hearing during the proceedings that determined the value of the property for tax year 2012 in order to be accorded that very opportunity, but it failed to do so.

{¶ 20} Specifically, about three months elapsed between our issuance of our decision in Olentangy Local Schools and the BTA's issuance of its decision relying on it, and during that time period, Julia Realty could have sought a new hearing before the BTA in light of the new precedent. Moreover, during the 30-day appeal period following the BTA's decision, Julia Realty could have moved for rehearing. See Natl. Tube Co. v. Ayres , 152 Ohio St. 255, 89 N.E.2d 129 (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus ("The Board of Tax Appeals has control over its decisions until the actual institution of an appeal or the expiration of the time for an appeal"); compare 1495 Jaeger, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 132 Ohio St.3d 222, 2012-Ohio-2680, 970 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 15 (enforcing the principle that the BTA loses jurisdiction over a case after expiration of the appeal period). Had Julia Realty taken either of these steps and been denied a new hearing, it would have a much stronger argument that it was not accorded the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the arm's-length-sale issue during the earlier proceedings.

{¶ 21} As matters stand, however, Julia Realty's complete failure to take reasonable action in the proceedings in the tax-year-2012 case to obtain a new hearing creates a situation in which collateral estoppel applies. Indeed, applying collateral estoppel here preserves the bright-line principle that in order for a development in the caselaw to "render the rule of collateral estoppel inapplicable," the "judicial declaration" must "interven[e] between the two proceedings." Sunnen , 333 U.S. at 600, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898. When, as here, the change in the law occurred after the hearing in the earlier proceedings but before the BTA issued its decision, a new hearing in the earlier proceedings should have been requested. A contrary ruling here would create broad uncertainty about the applicability of collateral estoppel, which would effectively become a case-by-case weighing of equities. We decline to engage in that kind of weighing under these circumstances.

{¶ 22} The same logic applies to Julia Realty's first proposition of law, in which it claims that its due-process rights were violated in this situation. Had Julia Realty taken advantage of its opportunity to satisfy the newly articulated burden of rebuttal during the proceedings for tax year 2012 , the BTA likely would have granted its request and thereby would have afforded Julia Realty all the process that it argues was constitutionally due. Because Julia Realty failed to ask for that rehearing, it cannot now establish that applying collateral estoppel in the proceedings for tax years 2013 and 2014 violated its right to due process.

{¶ 23} In the last analysis, the doctrine of collateral estoppel "provides a necessary degree of finality to decisions rendered by our courts," and that finality "is a desirable objective in administrative proceedings as well." Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. v. Lindley , 62 Ohio St.2d 133, 135, 403 N.E.2d 996 (1980). Finality, in turn, is important because it removes the cloud of uncertainty and allows parties to take action based on the settled judgment. See Allen , 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 ("res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication"). Applying collateral estoppel in this case serves those objectives and is appropriate in light of the omissions on Julia Realty's part.

B. R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) is irrelevant to the collateral-estoppel issue

{¶ 24} Under its third proposition of law, Julia Realty argues that R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) is relevant to the collateral-estoppel issue in this case. It is not. R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) sets forth the circumstances under which the same person, board, or officer can file a second valuation complaint within the same triennium; it states a general prohibition and then creates exceptions. The statute concerns the jurisdiction of a board of revision over a second complaint, but it is not relevant in determining whether collateral estoppel applies in the present case.

{¶ 25} Julia Realty points out that a sale of the property that was not considered in the proceedings on the first complaint constitutes a basis for filing a second complaint under R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a). But that does not help Julia Realty here for several different reasons, including that the auction sale was taken into account and was rejected for tax year 2012 due to the lack of evidence of its arm's-length character.

C. Julia Realty's fourth proposition of law states no claim for relief on appeal

{¶ 26} Julia Realty's fourth proposition of law invokes Soyko Kulchystsky, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 141 Ohio St.3d 43, 2014-Ohio-4511, 21 N.E.3d 297, in which we held that "the applicability of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) should be determined as of the date the second-filed complaint was filed," id. at ¶ 30. Julia Realty's argument explaining its reliance on this holding is obscure.

{¶ 27} Julia Realty's reliance on Soyko Kulchystsky is unavailing here because that decision addressed an issue not presented in this case: whether a second complaint may be filed for a later year during the same triennium. Soyko Kulchystsky simply has no relevance to the issue whether collateral estoppel can properly be applied in later proceedings.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA.

Decision affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

Kennedy, J., concurs in judgment only.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The STATE EX REL. FULLER, Appellant, v. EPPINGER, Warden, Appellee.
    No. 2017-1386
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 23, 2018 Decided July 10, 2018
    Michael Fuller, pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Maura O'Neill Jaite, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Fuller, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus that he filed against appellee, LaShann Eppinger, warden of the Grafton Correctional Institution, where Fuller is incarcerated. We affirm.

Background

{¶ 2} In December 1990, Fuller was convicted of one count of robbery and two counts of aggravated burglary. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Fuller to 3 to 15 years' imprisonment for the robbery and 5 to 25 years' imprisonment for the aggravated burglaries, all to be served concurrently. In October 1991, the trial court suspended Fuller's sentences and placed him on probation. While on probation, Fuller committed additional crimes. The trial court revoked his probation in 1992 and ordered the original sentence into execution.

{¶ 3} On June 8, 1992, Fuller was convicted of rape, aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and attempted felonious assault in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. The court sentenced him to an indefinite aggregate prison sentence of 25 to 75 years.

{¶ 4} At the time of Fuller's convictions, the Ohio Revised Code placed a limit on consecutive indefinite terms of imprisonment:

Consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed shall not exceed:
* * *
(2) An aggregate minimum term of fifteen years * * * when the consecutive terms imposed are for felonies other than aggravated murder or murder.

Former R.C. 2929.41(E), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 258, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1308, 1439-1440. In State v. White , 18 Ohio St.3d 340, 341, 481 N.E.2d 596 (1985), we held that the statute was self-executing and that therefore a minimum sentence imposed in excess of the statutory limit was not reversible error.

{¶ 5} On direct appeal from his 1992 convictions, Fuller challenged his 25-year minimum sentence as a violation of former R.C. 2929.41(E). The court of appeals agreed, but citing White , it held that there was no reversible error because " R.C. 2929.41(E)(3) [sic] is a self-executing statute which automatically limits the aggravated [sic] minimum term to fifteen years." State v. Fuller , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga. Nos. 63987 and 63988, 1993 WL 437596, *10 (Oct. 28, 1993).

{¶ 6} On April 8, 2016, Fuller filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Ninth District Court of Appeals, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release because his aggregate minimum sentence for his 1992 convictions exceeded the allowable limit under former R.C. 2929.41(E). Fuller and Eppinger each filed a motion for summary judgment, and Eppinger filed a motion to dismiss. Eppinger's summary-judgment motion included a letter from the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's Bureau of Sentence Computation, dated July 16, 2015, indicating that it had properly capped Fuller's aggregate minimum sentence at 15 years.

{¶ 7} On September 15, 2017, the Ninth District Court of Appeals granted Eppinger's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Fuller appealed.

Analysis

{¶ 8} Habeas corpus is generally available only when the petitioner's maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully.

Heddleston v. Mack , 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 214, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998). An inmate is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus upon completion of his minimum sentence. State ex rel. Lockhart v. Sheldon , 146 Ohio St.3d 468, 2016-Ohio-627, 58 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 5. Fuller's entire argument appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the difference between an aggregate minimum sentence and an aggregate maximum sentence.

{¶ 9} Given that Fuller has not completed his aggregate maximum sentence, the court of appeals correctly dismissed his petition for failure to state a claim.

Judgment affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    The STATE EX REL. NEIL, Appellant, v. FRENCH, Judge, Appellee.
    No. 2017-1221
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 23, 2018 Decided July 11, 2018.
    Miguel E. Neil, pro se.
    Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Benjamin D. Humphrey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Miguel Neil, appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of procedendo against appellee, Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge Jenifer French. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Background

{¶ 2} On April 6, 2017, Neil filed a complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of procedendo against Judge French. Neil alleged that he had filed a petition for postconviction relief on February 3, 2016, that Crim.R. 35(C) requires that a ruling be issued on a postconviction petition within 180 days of its filing, and that Judge French had not yet ruled on the petition.

{¶ 3} Neil filed an affidavit of indigency with his complaint and requested that the court waive its filing fee. In the affidavit, he attested that he is incarcerated, that he nets only $13.50 a month for his job assignment, and that he has no assets or property.

{¶ 4} The court of appeals referred the case to a magistrate. On April 27, 2017, the magistrate recommended that the court of appeals dismiss the complaint sua sponte because Russell had failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C). R.C. 2969.25(C) requires two things of an inmate who seeks a waiver of a court's filing fees when instituting a suit in the court of appeals against a government actor: (1) a statement setting forth the balance in the inmate's account for each of the preceding six months and (2) a statement that sets forth all other cash and things of value owned by the inmate at the time of filing. Neil submitted the statement of assets but not the mandatory inmate-account statement.

{¶ 5} Neil did not object to the magistrate's recommendation. After a review of the record, the court of appeals adopted the recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Neil appealed.

Analysis

{¶ 6} In his merit brief, Neil changes the theory of the merits of his request for a writ of procedendo. He now asserts that "on October 31, 2016, the trial court rendered a decision but [Neil] was never served notice of the judgment entry, preventing him from appealing to a superior court." Neil's admission that the trial court did in fact issue a judgment entry is a concession that his procedendo complaint is moot. State ex rel. Poulton v. Cottrill , 147 Ohio St.3d 402, 2016-Ohio-5789, 66 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 1-2 (holding that "[p]rocedendo will not compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed" and that in such circumstances, the complaint is moot). Instead, Neil implies that he is seeking relief because the court's failure to serve the judgment properly cost him his opportunity to appeal. But Judge French agrees that he was not properly served with a decision and that Neil therefore "can proceed with an appeal of the trial court's ruling."

{¶ 7} However, "[t]he requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory and failure to comply with them requires dismissal of an inmate's complaint."

State ex rel. Hall v. Mohr , 140 Ohio St.3d 297, 2014-Ohio-3735, 17 N.E.3d 581, ¶ 4. In his first proposition of law, Neil argues that the court should excuse his noncompliance with a single technicality because there has been " 'some semblance of compliance,' " Coleman v. Davis , 4th Dist. Jackson No. 10CA5, 2011-Ohio-506, ¶ 14, 2011 WL 345772. However, R.C. 2969.25(C) does not permit substantial compliance. State ex rel. Manns v. Henson , 119 Ohio St.3d 348, 2008-Ohio-4478, 894 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 4.

{¶ 8} Neil argues that "[i]t is unconstitutional to deny one party judgment due to a single technicality." (Emphasis sic.) He cites no authority for this proposition and has therefore "failed to rebut the presumed constitutionality of the statute." State ex rel. Evans v. McGrath , 151 Ohio St.3d 345, 2017-Ohio-8290, 88 N.E.3d 957, ¶ 6 (rejecting constitutional challenge to R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) filing requirements); see also Boles v. Knab , 129 Ohio St.3d 222, 2011-Ohio-2859, 951 N.E.2d 389, ¶ 3 (same).

{¶ 9} Finally, in his second proposition of law, Neil attempts to craft a constitutional argument based on what he argues is inconsistent treatment of pro se suits by the various courts of appeals. According to Neil,

some [Ohio courts] hold that pro se litigants should be held to the same standards as lawyers, while others hold that they should not be held to the same standards as lawyers and give greater latitude towards errors in pro se litigant's pleadings.

(Italics sic.) He asks this court to adopt a blanket rule of substantial compliance to excuse errors and omissions in pro se pleadings.

{¶ 10} We have repeatedly declared that "pro se litigants * * * must follow the same procedures as litigants represented by counsel." State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore , 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 N.E.2d 376, ¶ 5. " 'It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.' " (Italics sic.) State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel , 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, 800 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv. , 145 Ohio St.3d 651, 654, 763 N.E.2d 1238.

{¶ 11} Neil is correct that the state's appellate courts sometimes express a willingness to deviate from this principle. See, e.g. , Mitchell v. Holzer Med. Ctr. , 4th Dist. Gallia No. 16CA20, 2017-Ohio-8244, ¶ 7, 2017 WL 4765351 ("Because we ordinarily prefer to review a case on its merits rather than dismiss the action due to procedural technicalities, we generally afford considerable lenience to pro se litigants"); Johnson v. Geico Homesite, Inc. , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-17-003, 2017-Ohio-7273, ¶ 9, 2017 WL 3575608 (a "court may afford a pro se litigant some leeway by generously construing his filings"). But that leeway manifests in limited ways: attempting to address a pro se litigant's arguments on the merits when they are indecipherable, Angus v. Angus , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-742, 2015-Ohio-2538, ¶ 10, 2015 WL 3917651, or liberally construing the allegations in a pro se prisoner complaint as stating the elements of a claim, Baker v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. , 144 Ohio App.3d 740, 744, 761 N.E.2d 667. And appellate courts do recognize that any leniency afforded to pro se litigants does not extend to compliance with R.C. 2969.25(C). See, e.g., Ohio Atty. Gen. v. Brock , 4th Dist. Hocking No. 14CA19, 2015-Ohio-4173, ¶ 19, 2015 WL 5833976 ; Morris v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-596, 2005-Ohio-6306, ¶ 3-6, 2005 WL 3160845. Appellate courts have strictly applied R.C. 2969.25(C). Thus, Neil cannot present evidence of a conflict among the judicial districts or of a constitutional violation.

{¶ 12} The court of appeals properly dismissed Neil's complaint for failure to attach the statement of inmate account required by R.C. 2969.25(C).

Judgment affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    The STATE EX REL. RUSSELL, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, Appellee.
    No. 2017-1323
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 23, 2018 Decided July 11, 2018
    Mark Russell, pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Byron D. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Mark Russell, appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying his motion to waive court costs. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and deny Russell's motion to appoint counsel.

Background

{¶ 2} Russell is a prisoner confined at the Warren Correctional Institution in Lebanon, Ohio. On February 17, 2017, he filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals to compel appellee, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("DRC"), to have its Use of Force Committee review a corrections officer's alleged deployment of a chemical spray in Russell's face that caused severe burns. Russell also sought a waiver of the prepayment of filing fees.

{¶ 3} The Tenth District Court of Appeals referred the matter to a magistrate. On February 27, 2017, the magistrate recommended that the court dismiss the complaint sua sponte because Russell had failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C) governing inmate requests for waivers of filing fees. On March 14, 2017, the DRC filed a motion to dismiss, based on the same R.C. 2969.25(C) argument.

{¶ 4} Russell did not file an objection to the magistrate's recommendation or a memorandum in opposition to the DRC's motion to dismiss. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the case sua sponte, and it denied as moot the DRC's motion to dismiss. The court formalized its decision in a judgment entry filed June 22, 2017, in which it assessed costs against Russell.

{¶ 5} On August 25, 2017, Russell filed a motion asking the court of appeals to waive all court costs and filing fees on the ground that he has previously been declared indigent. The court denied the motion to waive costs on August 29.

{¶ 6} On September 21, 2017, Russell filed a notice of appeal to this court. His notice of appeal makes clear that the only subject of his appeal is the court of appeals' August 2017 entry denying his motion to waive costs. On November 3, 2017, he filed his merit brief, along with a motion for the appointment of counsel.

The motion for appointment of counsel

{¶ 7} Russell's motion for appointment of counsel states that "this case deserves the attention of a licensed Attor ney because it raises a Constitutional Question that needs to be litigated to its full potential." (Emphasis sic.) However, "[t]here is no generalized right of counsel in civil litigation." State ex rel. Jenkins v. Stern , 33 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 515 N.E.2d 928 (1987). Russell's belief that he has a constitutional interest to vindicate does not create a right to appointed counsel, and he has cited no legal authority in support of his request.

{¶ 8} We deny the motion to appoint counsel.

The merits of the appeal

{¶ 9} In his sole proposition of law, Russell contends that garnishments from inmate accounts should be governed by the same procedural rules and protections applicable to judgment debtors in civil court. And, he asserts, by garnishing his account without following statutory collection procedures, the DRC and the court of appeals are violating his state and federal due process rights.

{¶ 10} Russell's appeal suffers from the same procedural defect identified in State v. Dalton , 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-10-011, 2011-Ohio-362, 2011 WL 256537. Dalton was convicted of a felony, and at his sentencing, the trial court imposed court costs. Id. at ¶ 6. He later filed a pro se motion for a waiver of costs, which was denied. Id. at ¶ 2. He appealed, arguing that (1) the court erred in denying him his waiver and (2) the garnishing of his inmate account was being conducted in an unconstitutional manner. Id. at ¶ 4-5, 14. After disposing of his challenge to the assessment of costs on res judicata grounds, id . at ¶ 12, the court of appeals addressed his constitutional claim:

[A]ppellant argues that the procedures used to garnish his inmate account to pay court costs violated his right to due process of law under both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Ohio. However, the assignment of error raises issues beyond the scope of this appeal. This appeal concerns claimed trial court error in its denial of appellant's "motion to vacate court costs due to indigency forthwith." Appellant made no argument in the trial court that improper attachment or garnishment procedures were employed against him. He also sought no relief based upon any claim such procedures were used against him.

Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶ 11} Russell does not argue that the court of appeals abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a waiver of costs. See Rayess v. Staton , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26683, 2015-Ohio-5169, 2015 WL 8553160, ¶ 2 (Ohio App. 2015) ("A court has discretion over the issue of whether a person is indigent, and thus whether to waive filing fees and costs"). His merit brief is devoted entirely to the proposition that the DRC is violating the law in the manner by which it conducts garnishments. In fact, the relief he seeks is not a reversal of the Tenth District's decision, but an order compelling the DRC to restore all funds taken from his account.

{¶ 12} In a mandamus action, a relator "waive[s] new claims that he raises on appeal by failing to raise them in his original or amended petition." State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler , 102 Ohio St.3d 160, 2004-Ohio-2054, 807 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 6. Russell's mandamus petition did not challenge the DRC's manner of conducting garnishments, and he cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    The STATE EX REL. WHITE, Appellant, v. RICHARD, Warden, et al., Appellees.
    No. 2018-1326
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 Decided July 11, 2018
    Gregory White, pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Maura O'Neill Jaite, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is a direct appeal from a judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals that dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant, Gregory White. The court of appeals dismissed the action because White had failed to include certain commitment papers with his petition. White later filed an application for reconsideration, which the court of appeals denied. White purports to appeal both decisions to this court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

{¶ 2} White is a state prisoner serving sentences for multiple felony convictions. In 2004, he pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and robbery, which resulted in a 10-year aggregate sentence. When he committed those offenses, he was on parole from an indefinite sentence of 19½ to 29½ years imposed in 1989 following convictions for, among other offenses, aggravated robbery. When he committed the 1989 offenses, he was on parole from an indefinite sentence of 7 to 25 years for a 1979 conviction for aggravated robbery. And at the time of his 1979 conviction, he was on parole from an indefinite sentence of 10 to 25 years for a 1969 conviction for armed robbery.

{¶ 3} In May 2017, White filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals. He alleged that all his sentences were to be served concurrently and that his maximum sentence expired in June 2014. Although he attached copies of the judgments showing his 1969, 1979, 1989, and 2004 convictions, he failed to attach any commitment papers relating to any parole grant, revocation, or termination.

{¶ 4} Appellee Warden Rhonda Richard moved to dismiss White's petition, arguing that it is procedurally defective and that his claim lacks merit. On July 27, 2017, the court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss because White had failed to attach all relevant commitment papers to his petition. On September 8, 2017, the court denied White's application for reconsideration. White purported to appeal both decisions to this court on September 20, 2017.

{¶ 5} Under this court's rules, White needed to file his notice of appeal from the July 27, 2017 judgment by September 11, 2017. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.01(A)(1) and 3.03(A)(1). His notice of appeal, filed on September 20, 2017, was untimely. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.01(A)(3).

{¶ 6} That White filed an application for reconsideration and purports to appeal the court of appeals' judgment denying that application does not change the result. His habeas petition was an original civil action in the court of appeals. See Fuqua v. Williams , 100 Ohio St.3d 211, 2003-Ohio-5533, 797 N.E.2d 982, ¶ 7. The Rules of Civil Procedure therefore applied in the proceedings below, see State ex rel. Pendell v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections , 40 Ohio St.3d 58, 60, 531 N.E.2d 713 (1988), and those rules do not allow applications for reconsideration of final judgments, Pitts v. Dept. of Transp. , 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 7} This means that White's application for reconsideration is a nullity, as is the court of appeals' judgment denying that application. Pendell at 60, 531 N.E.2d 713. It follows that the court of appeals' September 8, 2017 judgment is not an appealable order. And although S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.01(A)(5) tolls the time for filing a jurisdictional appeal when an application for reconsideration has been filed in the court of appeals under App.R. 26(A)(1), neither rule applies to White's postjudgment filing. See Pendell at 60, 531 N.E.2d 713. Therefore, White's application for reconsideration cannot cure the untimeliness of his appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

O'Donnell, J., concurs in judgment only.

      On January 8, 2018, White filed a motion for appointment of counsel in this court. And on June 14, 2018, he filed a motion "for final adjudication of" the January 8 motion. We deny both motions.


text:
    DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. WILCOXSON.
    No. 2017-0663
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 24, 2018 Decided July 12, 2018
    Ruffolo, Stone & Stone and John M. Ruffolo ; and Auman, Mahan & Furry and David M. Rickert, Dayton, for relator.
    Leppla Associates, Ltd., Gary J. Leppla, and Philip J. Leppla, Dayton, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Clinton Ralph Wilcoxson II, of Vandalia, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0061974, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1993.

{¶ 2} In a formal complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on March 2, 2017, relator, Dayton Bar Association, charged Wilcoxson with multiple ethical violations arising from his neglect of a single matter, failure to reasonably communicate with the affected client, failure to deliver the client's file to successor counsel, and failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. Based on Wilcoxson's failure to answer that complaint, we imposed an interim default suspension on June 12, 2017. Dayton Bar Assn. v. Wilcoxson , 150 Ohio St.3d 1274, 2017-Ohio-4206, 81 N.E.3d 1259. Three days later, Wilcoxson filed a motion for leave to answer and a motion to vacate the interim default suspension. We granted his motion for leave to answer and remanded the case to the board, and we also granted his motion to terminate the interim suspension contingent on Wilcoxson answering relator's complaint. 150 Ohio St.3d 1401, 2017-Ohio-5822, 78 N.E.3d 903. On August 10, 2017, we reinstated his license to practice law without terminating the pending disciplinary proceeding. 150 Ohio St.3d 1282, 2017-Ohio-7157, 81 N.E.3d 1265.

{¶ 3} On remand, a panel of the board considered the cause on the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement. See Gov.Bar R. V(16).

{¶ 4} The parties stipulated that in 2014, Wilcoxson entered into an attorney-client relationship and agreed to file a federal employment-discrimination lawsuit on his client's behalf. The client agreed to pay an initial retainer of $1,000 plus a $400 filing fee but failed to timely make that payment. Wilcoxson then agreed to begin work once the client paid half of the retainer and the full filing fee. But instead of making the agreed payment of $900, the client paid only $500, on November 28, 2014.

{¶ 5} Despite the client's failure to abide by the modified fee agreement, Wilcoxson filed suit on December 5, 2014-four days after the deadline for filing the suit. On January 13, 2015, the client's former employer moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was untimely filed. Wilcoxson did not oppose the motion, and the court ruled that the client's federal claims were time-barred. Although Wilcoxson maintains that he had informed the client that he expected the federal claims to be dismissed as untimely, he did not inform the client regarding the status of the case until after it had been dismissed.

{¶ 6} The client retained new counsel and filed suit in state court. After Wilcoxson failed to comply with the new counsel's request that Wilcoxson provide the client's file, the client filed a grievance with relator in August 2015. Wilcoxson did not respond to the investigator's repeated requests for a meeting and the production of the client's file. But on January 7, 2016, Wilcoxson voluntarily appeared before the Dayton Bar Association Certified Grievance Committee. At that time, he answered all of the committee members' questions and freely admitted that he had failed to properly handle his client's legal matter. Several months later, Wilcoxson spoke with the client during a chance social encounter and agreed to refund $300 of the client's $500 payment ($400 of which represented the filing fee), and the client picked up the refund check in October 2016.

{¶ 7} The parties stipulated and the board found that Wilcoxson's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer withdrawing from representation to take steps reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest), 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation), and 8.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct). The panel unanimously dismissed an additional alleged violation that was not addressed in the consent-to-discipline agreement.

{¶ 8} The parties stipulated and the board found that one aggravating factor is present-that Wilcoxson failed to notify his client that he did not maintain professional-liability insurance. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). Mitigating factors, in contrast, include the absence of prior discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, the payment of restitution, and evidence of Wilcoxson's good character and reputation. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (3), and (5).

{¶ 9} The board recommends that we adopt the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement and suspend Wilcoxson from the practice of law for six months, all stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. In support of that recommendation, the board cited three cases in which we imposed conditionally stayed six-month suspensions for comparable misconduct.

{¶ 10} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Shuler , 129 Ohio St.3d 509, 2011-Ohio-4198, 954 N.E.2d 593, the attorney neglected two client matters and failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigations. We imposed a six-month suspension, fully stayed on conditions that included the attorney's successful completion of his three-year contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program. No aggravating factors were present, and mitigating factors included the absence of prior discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, evidence of good character and reputation, and a qualifying mental-health diagnosis.

{¶ 11} We also imposed a conditionally stayed six-month suspension in Dayton Bar Assn. v. Hooks , 139 Ohio St.3d 462, 2014-Ohio-2596, 12 N.E.3d 1212, for misconduct that included neglect of a single matter, failure to reasonably communicate with the client, and failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation. The only aggravating factor was Hooks's commission of multiple offenses, and mitigating factors included the absence of prior discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, and his acceptance of responsibility for the misconduct.

{¶ 12} And in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kluesener , 150 Ohio St.3d 322, 2017-Ohio-4417, 81 N.E.3d 457, we imposed a six-month suspension, fully stayed on the condition that the attorney engage in no further misconduct, based on the attorney's neglect of a single matter, failure to provide competent representation, failure to keep the client reasonably informed, failure to protect the client's interests on withdrawal from the representation, and intentional failure to comply with legal discovery requests. No aggravating factors were present, but relevant mitigating factors included the absence of prior discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, full and free disclosure to the board and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, evidence of good character and reputation, and the attorney's full acknowledgment of his misconduct.

{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, we agree that Wilcoxson's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and that a conditionally stayed six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct. We therefore adopt the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement.

{¶ 14} Accordingly, Clinton Ralph Wilcoxson II is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for six months, all stayed on the condition he engage in no further misconduct. If Wilcoxson fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full six-month suspension. Costs are taxed to Wilcoxson.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.

      Relator's complaint did not allege a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform a client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance). Stipulated evidence suggests that Wilcoxson attempted to comply with that rule, albeit unsuccessfully.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SKOLNICK.
    No. 2017-1735
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 24, 2018 Decided August 1, 2018
    Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Catherine M. Russo, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
    Coughlan Law Firm, L.L.C., and Jonathan E. Coughlan, Columbus, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Howard Evan Skolnick, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0061905, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1993.

{¶ 2} In a formal complaint filed with the Board of Professional Conduct on May 22, 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Skolnick with a single violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) for verbally harassing his paralegal for more than two years. Based on the parties' stipulations and Skolnick's hearing testimony, the board found that Skolnick had engaged in the charged misconduct and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. No objections have been filed.

{¶ 3} Having reviewed the record, we adopt the board's findings of fact and misconduct. Given the longstanding and pervasive nature of Skolnick's degrading verbal attacks against his paralegal, however, we find that a one-year suspension, with six months stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct, is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} Almost immediately after L.D. began working as a paralegal at Skolnick's law firm in August 2011, Skolnick began criticizing and verbally harassing her. He hurled insults and called her stupid, dumb, fat, "whorey," and bitch. Skolnick also called L.D.'s husband a "douche bag" and made fun of her mother, though he had never met her. Uncomfortable with Skolnick's behavior, L.D. soon began looking for a new job. As she could not afford to leave the firm until she had secured new employment, she responded to over 100 employment advertisements, but her job search was unsuccessful.

{¶ 5} Skolnick's verbal insults and harassment continued throughout L.D.'s nearly two-and-a-half-year tenure with the firm. At some point, L.D. began recording those interactions. These recordings reveal that on one occasion, Skolnick told L.D. that he would put her next to his office so that he could "watch every move that [her] despicable ass makes." During that conversation, he also told her that he had been losing weight because seeing her made him feel nauseated. Another time, L.D. left a meeting upset and humiliated because Skolnick had used foul language in front of attorneys to criticize her level of education. And in the spring of 2012, Skolnick sexually harassed L.D. While Skolnick drove L.D. and another female employee to lunch, he remarked that the two women should give him "road head" so that he could rate their performances on a scale from one to ten. Skolnick also falsely told an African American client that L.D. did not like black people, a remark that upset L.D. and forced her to defend herself in front of the client.

{¶ 6} As a result of Skolnick's harassment, L.D. suffered from anxiety, sleep disturbances, depression, and poor body image. Those symptoms persisted even after she left the firm to take a new job in January 2014. A clinical psychologist who evaluated L.D. the following October reported that her symptoms met some of the criteria for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder.

{¶ 7} Skolnick stipulated and the board found that his conduct adversely reflected upon his fitness to practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). We accept these findings of fact and agree that Skolnick's pervasive pattern of verbally harassing and abusing his paralegal falls within this catchall provision. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker , 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21.

Sanction

{¶ 8} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the board found two aggravating factors: Skolnick engaged in a pattern of misconduct and caused harm to a vulnerable employee. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3), (8). As mitigating factors, the board found that Skolnick did not have a prior disciplinary record, presented evidence of his good character, cooperated in the disciplinary process, acknowledged his misconduct, and expressed remorse for his behavior. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), (5). Although Skolnick presented some evidence that he had been diagnosed with and was being treated for cyclothymic disorder and exhibited traits of obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, the board declined to afford mitigating effect to those conditions because Skolnick did not present any evidence that they were causally related to his misconduct as required by Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).

{¶ 10} Skolnick testified that after receiving a letter from L.D.'s counsel accusing him of sexual harassment, discrimination, and creating a hostile work environment, he agreed to mediate those claims. He never denied L.D.'s allegations and quickly settled her claims for $300,000-the limits of his insurance coverage-to avoid causing her any additional trauma. Skolnick also testified that he hired a human-resource specialist to revise the firm's employee handbook and to provide sexual-harassment training to himself and his staff. He delegated some of his management duties to other attorneys in the firm, reduced his office hours, and started performing some of his work remotely. It is not clear, however, that the board attributed any mitigating effect to these facts.

{¶ 11} Based on Skolnick's verbal and sexual harassment and the harm it caused to L.D., the board recommends that we suspend him from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct. In support of that sanction, the board considered two cases in which we imposed fully or partially stayed suspensions on attorneys who had engaged in inappropriate communications with staff. In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Baker , 72 Ohio St.3d 21, 647 N.E.2d 152 (1995), we suspended an attorney for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions, for using inappropriate, vulgar, sexually explicit, and sexually suggestive language in the presence of a 17-year-old student who worked in his office. And in Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Mismas , 139 Ohio St.3d 346, 2014-Ohio-2483, 11 N.E.3d 1180, we imposed a one-year license suspension, with six months conditionally stayed, on an attorney who had sent inappropriate text messages to a student law clerk in which he suggested that she perform sexual favors for him, indicated that her employment was conditioned on her compliance with his demands, and repeatedly insisted that he was not joking. The board also noted that in Akron Bar Assn. v. Miller , 130 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-4412, 955 N.E.2d 359, we imposed a fully stayed six-month suspension on an attorney who had made inappropriate and unprofessional statements of a sexual nature to a client in a single telephone call.

{¶ 12} Unlike in Baker , Mismas , and Miller , the target of the attorney's inappropriate communications was not a young student or a client. But he directed frequent profanity-laced verbal tirades toward and sexually harassed a vulnerable employee who needed her job to support her family. During L.D.'s two-and-a-half-year tenure, Skolnick berated her for her physical appearance, dress, education, and parenting skills. He called her a bitch, a "hoe," a dirtbag, and a piece of shit, and he told her that he hoped she would die. And because L.D. recorded her interactions with Skolnick on more than 30 occasions, we have had the opportunity to hear Skolnick's outbursts for ourselves.

{¶ 13} The only explanation that Skolnick offered for his extreme, obnoxious, and humiliating attacks on L.D. was that he had learned the lingo from rappers and hip-hop artists while practicing entertainment law and that he believed he was using the phrases in more of a humorous than a harmful way.

{¶ 14} In light of the longstanding and pervasive nature of Skolnick's degrading verbal attacks against his paralegal, we believe that a sanction greater than the stayed six-month suspension recommended by the board is necessary not only to protect the public and the dignity of the legal system but also to deter future misconduct of this nature by Skolnick and other attorneys licensed to practice law in this state.

{¶ 15} Accordingly, Howard Evan Skolnick is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, with the final six months of the suspension stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. If Skolnick fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve the full one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Skolnick.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

French, J., dissents.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.

      Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) provides that a mental-health disorder qualifies as a mitigating factor when all the following factors exist: a diagnosis of a disorder by a qualified healthcare professional, a determination that the disorder contributed to the respondent's misconduct, a sustained period of successful treatment, and a prognosis from a qualified healthcare professional that the attorney will be able to return to the competent, ethical practice of law under specified conditions.


text:
    The STATE EX REL. EVANS, Appellant, v. MCGRATH, Judge, Appellee.
    No. 2017-1259
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted February 27, 2018 Decided August 2, 2018.
    William H. Evans Jr., pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Bridget C. Coontz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, William H. Evans Jr., appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against appellee, Judge Patrick M.

McGrath of the Court of Claims. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Background

{¶ 2} In 2014, Evans, then an inmate at the Ross Correctional Institution, filed a negligence action against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in the Ohio Court of Claims. Judge McGrath dismissed the suit, but Evans appealed, and the Tenth District reversed and remanded "for further appropriate proceedings." Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-463, 2015-Ohio-3492, 2015 WL 5086335, ¶ 17.

{¶ 3} While Evans's negligence action was pending on remand, he filed with the Tenth District a complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge McGrath. He sought an order prohibiting Judge McGrath from conducting proceedings on the defendant's liability and requiring him to hold a damages-only hearing on Evans's negligence claim. The court of appeals dismissed Evans's complaint for the writs on the grounds that he had misunderstood its order to the Court of Claims, because the court of appeals previously had held only that Evans had met the liberal pleading standards required of complaints for negligence and not that Evans had prevailed on the merits. State ex rel. Evans v. McGrath , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-40, 2017-Ohio-7418, 2017 WL 3775340, ¶ 4-5.

Legal Analysis

{¶ 4} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Evans must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a corresponding legal duty on the part of Judge McGrath to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals , 149 Ohio St.3d 656, 2017-Ohio-829, 77 N.E.3d 909, ¶ 24. Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue: the exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese , 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. He must prove entitlement to the writs by clear and convincing evidence. Marsh at ¶ 24. "Our plenary authority in extraordinary actions permits us to consider the instant appeal as if it had been originally filed in this court." State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen , 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138, 656 N.E.2d 940 (1995).

{¶ 5} Evans contends that a writ mandamus and/or prohibition is appropriate to restrict Judge McGrath on remand to holding a damages-only hearing. In support, he cites res judicata, the law of the case, and the "cross-error rule." However, the court of appeals had held only that Evans's complaint sufficiently alleged the elements of a negligence claim and could withstand a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) ("failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). It did not, as Evans contends, determine that Evans had proved negligence such that Judge McGrath was required to hold a damages-only hearing.

{¶ 6} A writ of mandamus "is an appropriate remedy to require a lower court to comply with an appellate court's mandate directed to that court." State ex rel. Heck v. Kessler , 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 647 N.E.2d 792 (1995). However, the court of appeals did not order the court of claims to determine the negligence action in Evans's favor, and nothing in the record suggests that Judge McGrath is refusing to comply with the mandate of the court of appeals. Nor does Judge McGrath lack the authority to preside over a claim for relief in negligence. Therefore, the court of appeals correctly dismissed Evans's complaint in mandamus and prohibition.

Judgment affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. JACOB.
    No. 2016-1488
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted June 22, 2018 Decided June 26, 2018
    {¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing of an application for reinstatement by respondent, Harry Joseph Jacob III, Attorney Registration No. 0008620, last known address in Solon, Ohio.
    {¶ 2} The court coming now to consider its order of May 10, 2017, wherein the court, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(3), suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of two years, with the second year stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct, finds that respondent has substantially complied with that order and with the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(24).
    {¶ 3} Therefore, it is ordered by this court that respondent is reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Ohio.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).
    {¶ 5} For earlier case, see Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Jacob , 150 Ohio St.3d 162, 2017-Ohio-2733, 80 N.E.3d 440.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SCHUMAN.
    No. 2016-1834
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted June 22, 2018 Decided June 26, 2018
    {¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing of an application for reinstatement by respondent, Andrew Robert Schuman, Attorney Registration No. 0072950, last known business address in Bowling Green, Ohio.
    {¶ 2} The court coming now to consider its order of December 6, 2017, wherein the court, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(3), suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year, with the final six months of the suspension stayed on conditions, finds that respondent has substantially complied with that order and with the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(24).
    {¶ 3} Therefore, it is ordered by this court that respondent is reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Ohio. It is further ordered that in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) and consist with the opinion rendered herein on December 6, 2017, respondent shall serve one year of monitored probation.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, relator, disciplinary counsel, shall file with the clerk of this court the name of the attorney who will serve as respondent's monitor, in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21)(A)(3). It is further ordered that at the end of respondent's probationary period, relator shall file with the clerk of this court a report indicating whether respondent, during the probationary period, complied with the terms of the probation.
    {¶ 5} It is further ordered that at the end of the probationary period, respondent may apply for termination of probation as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(21). It is further ordered that respondent's probation shall not be terminated until (1) respondent files an application for termination of probation in compliance with Gov.Bar R. V(21)(D), (2) respondent complies with this and all other orders issued by this court, (3) respondent complies with the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (4) relator files with the clerk of this court a report indicating that respondent has complied with the terms of the probation, and (5) this court orders that the probation be terminated.
    {¶ 6} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).
    {¶ 7} For respondents earlier case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman , 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.3d 850.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SMITH.
    No. 2017-0487
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted June 22, 2018 Decided June 26, 2018
    {¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing of an application for reinstatement by respondent, Samuel Ray Smith II, Attorney Registration No. 0076242, last known business address in Cleveland, Ohio.
    {¶ 2} The court coming now to consider its order of December 6, 2017, wherein the court, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(3), suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of 18 months, with the final 12 months stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct, finds that respondent has substantially complied with that order and with the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(24).
    {¶ 3} Therefore, it is ordered by this court that respondent is reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Ohio.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).
    {¶ 5} For earlier case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith , 152 Ohio St.3d 131, 2017-Ohio-8821, 93 N.E.3d 955.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LAND.
    No. 2013-0940
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted October 27, 2017 Decided July 2, 2018
    {¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing on October 27, 2017, of a petition for reinstatement by respondent, Suzanne Prieur Land, Attorney Registration No. 0046878. In accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(25)(E), respondent's petition for reinstatement was referred to the Board of Professional Conduct. The board filed its final report in this court on May 7, 2018, recommending that respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio. No objections to said final report were filed, and this cause was considered by the court.
    {¶ 2} Upon consideration thereof, it is ordered by this court that the petition for reinstatement of respondent is granted and that respondent, Suzanne Prieur Land, last known address in Hebron, Kentucky, is reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio.
    {¶ 3} It is further ordered by the court that respondent be taxed the costs of these proceedings in the amount of $1,164.28, less the deposit of $500.00, for a total balance due of $664.28 payable, by cashier's check or money order, by respondent on or before 90 days from the date of this order. If costs are not paid on or before 90 days from the date of this order, interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum will accrue until costs are paid in full. It is further ordered that if costs are not paid in full on or before 90 days from the date of this order, the matter may be referred to the attorney general for collection and respondent may be found in contempt and suspended until all costs and accrued interest are paid in full. It is further ordered that respondent is liable for all collections costs pursuant to R.C. 131.02 if the debt is certified to the attorney general for collection.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).
    {¶ 5} For earlier case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Land , 138 Ohio St.3d 357, 2014-Ohio-1162, 6 N.E.3d 1183.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    IN RE Resignation of CROSSER.
    No. 2018-0784
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted June 5, 2018 Decided July 2, 2018
    {¶ 1} Joan M. Crosser, Attorney Registration No. 0061345, last known business address in Rossford, Ohio, who was admitted to the bar of this state on May 17, 1993, submitted an application for retirement or resignation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11). The application was referred to disciplinary counsel pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B). On June 5, 2018, the Office of Attorney Services filed disciplinary counsel's report, under seal, with this court in accordance with Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B)(2).
    {¶ 2} On consideration thereof, it is ordered by the court that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C), the resignation as an attorney and counselor at law is accepted as a resignation with disciplinary action pending.
    {¶ 3} It is further ordered and adjudged that from and after this date all rights and privileges extended to respondent to practice law in the state of Ohio be withdrawn, that henceforth respondent shall cease to hold herself forth as an attorney authorized to appear in the courts of this state, that respondent shall not attempt, either directly or indirectly, to render services as an attorney or counselor at law to or for any individuals, corporation, or society, nor in any way perform or seek to perform services for anyone, no matter how constituted, that must by law be executed by a duly appointed and qualified attorney within the state of Ohio.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that respondent desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent or clerk or employee of another, and hereby is forbidden to appear in the state of Ohio as an attorney and counselor at law before any court, judge, board, commission, or other public authority, and hereby is forbidden to give another an opinion as to the law or its application or advise with relation thereto.
    {¶ 5} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent shall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(C). If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(23), respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(23)(A)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any client trust funds or property.
    {¶ 6} It is further ordered that respondent shall not enter into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with an attorney or law firm with which respondent was associated as a partner, shareholder, member, or employee at the time respondent engaged in the misconduct that resulted in this acceptance of respondent's resignation with discipline pending.
    {¶ 7} It is further ordered that respondent shall surrender respondent's certificate of admission to practice to the clerk of the court on or before 30 days from the date of this order and that respondent's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys maintained by this court.
    {¶ 8} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against respondent by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered by the court that if after the date of this order the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection awards any amount against respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection within 90 days of the notice of that award.
    {¶ 9} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall do the following:
    {¶ 10} 1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of respondent's resignation and consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal service elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in respondent's place;
    {¶ 11} 2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;
    {¶ 12} 3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or property in the possession or control of respondent;
    {¶ 13} 4. Notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties in pending litigation of respondent's disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;
    {¶ 14} 5. Send all notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;
    {¶ 15} 6. File with the clerk of this court and disciplinary counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of the notices required herein, and setting forth the address where respondent may receive communications; and
    {¶ 16} 7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.
    {¶ 17} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall surrender the attorney-registration card for the 2017/2019 biennium.
    {¶ 18} It is further ordered that until such time as respondent fully complies with this order, respondent shall keep the clerk and disciplinary counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.
    {¶ 19} It is further ordered that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings. All case documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47, which govern access to court records.
    {¶ 20} It is further ordered that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order and all other orders in this case to respondent's last known address.
    {¶ 21} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


author: O'Donnell, J., dissents.

text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LEKSAN.
    No. 2012-2055
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted June 26, 2018 Decided July 12, 2018
    {¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing on October 13, 2017, of a petition for reinstatement by respondent, Thomas John Leksan, Attorney Registration No. 0027125. In accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(25)(E), respondent's petition for reinstatement was referred to the Board of Professional Conduct. The board filed its final report in this court on April 16, 2018, recommending that respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio and engage with a law-practice monitor, appointed by relator, for a period of one year. No objections to said final report were filed, and this cause was considered by the court.
    {¶ 2} Upon consideration thereof, it is ordered by this court that the petition for reinstatement of respondent is granted and that respondent, Thomas John Leksan, last known address in Santa Cruz, California, is reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio. It is further ordered that in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), respondent shall serve one year of monitored probation.
    {¶ 3} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, relator shall file with the clerk of this court the name of the attorney who will serve as respondent's monitor, in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21)(A)(3). It is further ordered that at the end of respondent's probationary period, relator shall file with the clerk of this court a report indicating whether respondent, during the probationary period, complied with the terms of the probation.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that at the end of the probationary period, respondent may apply for termination of probation as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(21). It is further ordered that respondent's probation shall not be terminated until (1) respondent files an application for termination of probation in compliance with Gov.Bar R. V(21)(D), (2) respondent complies with this and all other orders issued by this court, (3) respondent complies with the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (4) relator files with the clerk of this court a report indicating that respondent has complied with the terms of the probation, and (5) this court orders that the probation be terminated.
    {¶ 5} It is further ordered by the court that respondent be taxed the costs of these proceedings in the amount of $862.47, less the deposit of $500.00, for a total balance due of $362.47 payable, by cashier's check or money order, by respondent on or before 90 days from the date of this order. If costs are not paid on or before 90 days from the date of this order, interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum will accrue until costs are paid in full. It is further ordered that if costs are not paid in full on or before 90 days from the date of this order, the matter may be referred to the attorney general for collection and respondent may be found in contempt and suspended until all costs and accrued interest are paid in full. It is further ordered that respondent is liable for all collections costs pursuant to R.C. 131.02 if the debt is certified to the attorney general for collection.
    {¶ 6} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).
    {¶ 7} For earlier case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Leksan , 136 Ohio St.3d 85, 2013-Ohio-2415, 990 N.E.2d 591 (2013).
    O'Connor, C.J., and Fischer, Sadler, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
    Kennedy and French, JJ., would not require respondent to serve monitored probation.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.

Lisa L. Sadler, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for DeWine, J.


text:
    STATE v. AMOS
    2017-1778
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 14, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for admission pro hac vice of Marsha L. Levick. Motion granted. Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. XII(4), counsel shall file a notice of permission with the Supreme Court's Office of Attorney Services within 30 days.


text:
    STATE EX REL. GIANT PETROLEUM, INC. v. E. CLEVELAND
    2018-0648
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 14, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Mandamus. On relators' motion for default judgment. Motion denied as moot.


text:
    ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 13, 2018
    1. Amendments to the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio ( Sup.R. 4 ) were adopted July 17, 2018, and are effective August 1, 2018. The final version of the amendments has been published in the August 13, 2018 Ohio Official Reports advance sheet.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concurred in adopting the amendments.
    2. Amendments to the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio (S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.10, 3.11, 10.01, 15.04, and 17.07 ) were adopted July 17, 2018, and are effective September 13, 2018. The final version of the amendments has been published in the August 13, 2018 Ohio Official Reports advance sheet.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concurred in adopting the amendments.
    3. Proposed amendments to the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio ( Sup.R. 10 through 10.05 and Forms) have been published in the August 13, 2018 Ohio Official Reports advance sheet for a public-comment period ending October 12, 2018.
    O'Connor, C.J., and French, Fischer, and DeGenaro, JJ., concurred in publishing the proposed amendments for comment.
    O'Donnell, Kennedy, and DeWine, JJ., dissented as to the publication of the amendments for comment.


text:
    STATE EX REL. SANCHEZ-PARODI v. POKORNY
    2018-1110
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 10, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Prohibition. On relators' motion to expedite. Motion denied.


text:
    COLUMBUS BAR ASSN. v. GILL
    2012-2069
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 9, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On application for reinstatement. Application denied.


text:
    DIXON v. DANKOF
    2018-0368
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Mandamus. On relator's motion for leave to respond. Motion denied.


text:
    DIXON v. DANKOF
    2018-0370
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Prohibition. On relator's motion for leave to respond. Motion denied.


text:
    U.S. BANK NATL. ASSN. v. CONRAD
    2018-0834
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion for immediate stay of lower court's decision. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. NAGY
    2018-0843
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.


author: Fischer, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE v. MARTIN
    2018-0874
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. SINGLETON
    2018-0877
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. TORRES
    2018-0878
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion granted. Appellant shall file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction within 30 days.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, J., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. LANE
    2018-0891
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion granted. Appellant shall file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction within 30 days.

O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE EX REL. PORTERFIELD v. MCKAY
    2017-1453
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    Sua sponte, cause dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2323.52(G).
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    RUSSELL v. BECK
    2018-0691
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On S.Ct. Prac.R. 12.04 determination, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
    O'Donnell, J., dissents and would grant an alternative writ.


text:
    BALDWIN v. CHRIST HOSP. OF CINCINNATI, Ohio
    2018-0750
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On relator's motion to amend complaint. Motion granted. On respondents' motions to dismiss. Motions granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    FEAGIN v. ROBINSON
    2018-0773
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Procedendo. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. AREGA v. BESSEY
    2018-0831
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On respondents' motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    BOCOOK v. MOHR
    2018-0890
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE v. ARMENGAU
    2017-1074
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion requesting the court to grant motion and supplemental notice. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. POWELL
    2017-1462
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion to re-open. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. LUNDEEN v. STATE MED. BD.
    2018-0263
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Mandamus and Prohibition. On relator's motion for alternative writ of prohibition. Motion denied.


text:
    RUIZ v. BRECKSVILLE
    2018-0192
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied. On motion for extension of stay and request for new hearing. Motions denied.


text:
    STATE EX. REL. TRI EAGLE FUELS, L.L.C. v. DAWSON
    2018-0556
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    ANDERSON v. WBNS-TV, INC.
    2018-0792
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Connor, C.J., and DeWine, J., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. SMITH
    2018-0357
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


author: Kennedy, J., dissents.

text:
    ELECTRONIC CLASSROOM OF TOMORROW v. STATE BD. OF EDN.
    2018-0526
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Kennedy, J., dissents.

French and DeWine, JJ., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. ROBINSON
    2018-0902
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Kennedy, J., dissents.

O'Donnell, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. JACKSON
    2018-0916
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion granted. Appellant shall file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction within 30 days.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell and DeWine, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. HARGROVE
    2018-0917
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. PICHARDO-REYES
    2018-0922
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. CANALES
    2018-0765
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. COULON
    2018-0856
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. FOX
    2018-0920
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. MAYES
    2018-0925
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    DOE v. GALLIA COMMON PLEAS COURT
    2017-1673
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   Kennedy, J., dissents.

DeWine and DeGenaro, JJ., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. LUTHER
    2018-0740
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    MENTCH v. CUYAHOGA CTY. PUB. LIBRARY BD.
    2018-0742
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. MCGUIRE
    2018-0744
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. NEWTON
    2018-0745
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. JOHNSON
    2018-0746
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. ALLEN
    2018-0747
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. SANCHEZ
    2018-0751
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    SANTOMIERI v. MANGEN
    2018-0755
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. DILLEY
    2018-0761
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    JAMISON v. JAMISON
    2018-0767
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. JACKSON
    2018-0721
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. BARNES
    2018-0769
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. HAMPTON
    2018-0774
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    WORLD BUS. SERVS., INC. v. YOEST
    2018-0775
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    MOORE v. MOORE
    2018-0776
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    BLISSWOOD VILLAGE HOME OWNERS ASSN. v. GENESIS REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS GROUP, L.L.C.
    2018-0778
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. KEMPTON
    2018-0788
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Fischer, J., dissents and would accept the cause on proposition of law No. I.


text:
    STATE v. LEGGETT
    2018-0798
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. BEYDUK
    2018-0829
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    IN RE D.F.
    2018-0854
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


author: O'Donnell, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE v. BRADEN
    2018-0858
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., not participating.


author: Fischer, J., dissents.

text:
    IN RE [D.B.]
    2018-0723
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Fischer, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. HEALD
    2018-0861
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. ROBINSON
    2018-0875
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. CRUZ
    2018-0895
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. ANTHONY
    2018-0918
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. LANDRUM
    2018-0679
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


author: DeGenaro, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE v. ALEXANDER
    2018-0698
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. [C.W.]
    2018-0716
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. LITTLEPAGE
    2018-0717
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Fischer and DeWine, JJ., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. MCKELTON
    2018-0720
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    2018-0725
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    WILLIAMS v. SCHNEIDER
    2018-0726
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., dissent.
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    KATZ v. OHIO REAL ESTATE COMM.
    2018-0729
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    HELMS v. THOMAS
    2018-0731
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. LAMB
    2018-0734
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. MINEFEE
    2018-0737
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. LAWLESS
    2018-0738
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 15, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Kennedy, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. MILLER
    2018-0948
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    August 22, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellee's revised motion to strike appellant's notice of appeal and memorandum in support of jurisdiction. Motion denied. Appellee may file a memorandum in response to jurisdiction within three days.