text:
    PEOPLE v. DRAPER (John)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 11, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DiFiore, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    PEOPLE v. FISH (Calvin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 11, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: Stein, J.

text:
    PEOPLE v. FLINN (Diana)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. CURTIS (Gary)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 4, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: Rivera, J.

text:
    PEOPLE v. GELLING (Joseph)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HARPER (David)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. HIBBERT (Everton)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration (Rivera, J.)


author: Feinman, J.

text:
    PEOPLE v. MOORE (Frankie)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HENDERSON (Robert)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: Fahey, J.

text:
    PEOPLE v. G ( )
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 25, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. GABBIDON (Craig)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 24, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HAMANT (Joucoo)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. HARRIS (Robert)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HENRIQUEZ (Herbert)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: Wilson, J.

text:
    PEOPLE v. GREEN (Nicole)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 18, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Granted


text:
    PEOPLE v. GIDDENS (Ronald)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. HILL (Quentin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. GREEN (Musin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. Quinton HILL
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    denied September 14, 2018
    DiFiore, Ch. J.
    APPLICATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. GIUCA (John)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration (Wilson, J.)


author: ( Rivera, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. GIFFORD (David)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   ( Rivera, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. GREEN EYES ( )
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. GARCIA (Frank)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed.


text:
    PEOPLE v. GARCIA (Joy)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. GILCREASE (Tony)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 10, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: ( DiFiore, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. HANSSON (Saundra)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 7, 2018
   ( DiFiore, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HURD (Devar)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HOLDBY (Christopher)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. LAWSON (Davan)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: ( Feinman, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. L. (KAJUAN)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   ( Feinman, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. JACKSON (Dominique)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 25, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. KNIGHT (Gammen)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 25, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. HONG MO LIN ( )
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HUGGINIS (Ralph)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. ISHTIAQ (Raja)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. KUNEY (Michael)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. LIPTON (Gilbert)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. JAMES (Jesse)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   ( Rivera, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. JEREMIAH (Isaiah)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. KAID (Saeed)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. KUZDZAL (Matthew)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. JENKINS (Emmanuel)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. LASHER (Thomas)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. HOYLE (Curtis)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. JASIEWICZ (Patrick)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. JONES (Pedro)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. JOSEPH (Joel)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. JOSEPH (Kerryl)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. JONES (Monica)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 11, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. JACKSON (Scott)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MITCHELL (Stephen)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. MADERA (Damian)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MORGIA (Francis)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MCCLOUD (Cornell)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. MOORE (John)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MANCHA (Rudy)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ (Moises)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied (Wilson, J.)


text:
    PEOPLE v. MASTERS (Steven)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. MORRIS (Willie)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. MCWHITE (Dana)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 18, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied (Wilson, J.)


author: Garcia, J.

text:
    PEOPLE v. MORISSEAU (Charlene)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Garcia, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. MORISSEAU (Charlene)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Garcia, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MOSCA (David)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Garcia, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MARTINEZDIAZ (Darguin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MACLEOD (Robert)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MALLOY (Levi)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MATTISON (Ernest)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MCCAIN (Malik)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. MILLS (Richard)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 10, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. LOZADA (Alexander)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. LOPEZ (Manuela)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 5, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MOSES (Matthew)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 4, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. NOVAK (Paul)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   ( DiFiore, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. PARIS (Rodney)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PAYNE (Jermaine)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. RILEY (D.)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. OLIVERAS-ARVELO (Luis)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PETERKIN (Joshua)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. OSHINTAYO (Stanley)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   ( Feinman, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. MUSHEYEV (Dmitriy)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 25, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. RINALDI (John)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 25, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. PARKER (Latwoine)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied (Fahey, J.)


text:
    PEOPLE v. PARKER (Marquis)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Garcia, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PHILLIPS (Gerald)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. PRUITT (Frank)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


author: ( Stein, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. MURPHY (Reginald)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   ( Stein, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. ORTIZCORA (Marcos)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PEREZ (Ramon)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PIERRE (Keion)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PEACE (Shawn)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   ( Rivera, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. PINO (Carlos)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. NIEVES (Wilfredo)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. RICHARDS (Michael)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   ( Feinman, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. ORNELAS (Marisela)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 4, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied (Stein, J.)


text:
    PEOPLE v. SCOTT (Ian)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 27, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: ( Wilson, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. SANDERS (Thomas)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   ( Wilson, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. ROMERO (Ubaldo)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


author: ( Fahey, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. ROSALES (Jamie)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   ( Fahey, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SCIVOLETTE (George)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. SAWYER (William)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SCIENTIFIC ( )
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SCIENCE
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    denied September 20, 2018
   ( Rivera, J.)

APPLICATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. ROONEY (Matthew)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: ( Garcia, J.)

text:
    PEOPLE v. SANTIAGO (Giovanni)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   ( Garcia, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SMITH (Anthony)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   Garcia, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. STANDSBLACK (Saul)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. STANDSBLACK (Saul)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. ROSENDO (Carmelo)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SHUFELT (Ryan)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SOTIROPOULOS (Antonios)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. ROYAL (Tariq)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. SMITH (Taurean)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. SANKARA (Ahmadou)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. SCHAEFER (Kevin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. SPITZER (Alexander)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 4, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. WELCH (Cleveland)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. TEBOUT (Ali)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. WAGONER (Tina)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. THOMPSON (John)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 25, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. WALKER (Frederick)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 21, 2018
   Fahey, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. THORSEN (Timothy)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. WELLS (Christopher)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. THATCHER (Dante)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 19, 2018
   ( Rivera, J.)

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. THIOUBU (Hasim)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 14, 2018
    Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied (Stein, J.)


text:
    PEOPLE v. WATERS (Isiah)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. TERBORG (Jeffrey)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed


text:
    PEOPLE v. TROCHE (Felix)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. UMANZOR (Jaime)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. VIRELLA (Luis)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Wilson, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. TERBORG (Jeffrey)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. TERBORG (Jeffrey)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Dismissed.


text:
    PEOPLE v. STREET (Kevin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 11, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. WALTON (Ernie)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 11, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. WATSON (Kevin)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. VARGAS (Robert)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 6, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. WILSON (Keith)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 28, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


text:
    PEOPLE v. WOODS (Joseph)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 26, 2018
   Feinman, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. WHITE (Lawrence)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 20, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. WILSON (Mandel)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 17, 2018
   DiFiore, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied Reconsideration


text:
    PEOPLE v. WEST (Richard)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 13, 2018
   Rivera, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (Thomas)
    Court of Appeals of New York.
    September 12, 2018
   Stein, J.

Applications in Criminal Cases for Leave to Appeal Denied


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MICKENS.
    No. 2017-1726
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 24, 2018 Decided July 10, 2018
    David C. Comstock Jr., Bar Counsel, Canfield, for relator.
    Charles Gary Mickens, Warren, pro se.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Charles Gary Mickens, of Youngstown, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0052024, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.

{¶ 2} On December 8, 2016, we publicly reprimanded Mickens for neglecting a probate matter, failing to communicate with the fiduciary for that probate estate, and failing to advise his clients that he did not maintain professional-liability insurance. Disciplinary Counsel v. Mickens , 151 Ohio St.3d 302, 2016-Ohio-8022, 88 N.E.3d 920.

{¶ 3} In a formal complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on June 29, 2017, relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, charged Mickens with several ethical violations relating to the representation of a single client who retained him in December 2003-approximately eight years before the conduct for which Mickens was previously disciplined.

{¶ 4} A panel of the board considered the cause on the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement. See Gov.Bar R. V(16). The parties stipulated that Troy Carlton retained Mickens to pursue an insurance claim arising from a structure fire. Carlton paid a $500 retainer plus $300 for the filing fee and gave Mickens all the paperwork he had received from the insurance company. After Mickens failed to return Carlton's phone calls, Carlton became frustrated and stopped calling, but he never sought or retained new counsel. During a chance meeting at a local courthouse in late 2016, Carlton asked Mickens about the status of his case. Mickens stated that he would look into it, but Carlton never heard from him again. Mickens has admitted that he did not resolve the matter with the insurance company or file suit on Carlton's behalf and that he owes Carlton a refund of $800. He also admitted that he did not carry malpractice insurance during the representation and that he has no recollection of having informed Carlton of that fact.

{¶ 5} The parties stipulated and the board found that the conduct set forth above violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with a client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from a client), and 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform a client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance and obtain a signed acknowledgment of that notice from the client). Relator agreed to dismiss one additional alleged violation.

{¶ 6} Stipulated aggravating factors include Mickens's prior disciplinary offenses and a selfish motive, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (2), and mitigating factors include Mickens's full and free disclosure to the board, his cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and evidence of his good character and reputation, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4) and (5).

{¶ 7} The board recommends that we adopt the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement and suspend Mickens from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he make restitution of $800 to Carlton within 60 days of our order, complete six hours of continuing legal education ("CLE") in law-office management, serve one year of monitored probation, and engage in no additional misconduct. In support of its recommendation, the board noted that in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kluesener , 150 Ohio St.3d 322, 2017-Ohio-4417, 81 N.E.3d 457, we adopted a consent-to-discipline agreement and imposed a conditionally stayed six-month suspension for similar rule violations arising from an attorney's neglect of a matter. We note that in Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon , 146 Ohio St.3d 44, 2016-Ohio-535, 51 N.E.3d 605, we also imposed a conditionally stayed six-month suspension on an attorney with prior discipline who failed to reasonably communicate with two clients, neglected the legal matter of one of those clients, and failed to inform the other client that he did not maintain professional-liability insurance.

{¶ 8} Based on the foregoing, we agree that Mickens's conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(2) through (a)(4), and 1.4(c) and that a six-month suspension, stayed on the recommended conditions, is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct. We therefore adopt the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement.

{¶ 9} Accordingly, Charles Gary Mickens is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he pay restitution of $800 to Troy Carlton within 60 days of this order, complete six hours of CLE in law-office management in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), and engage in no further misconduct. If Mickens fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full six-month suspension. Costs are taxed to Mickens.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.

      To the extent that Mickens's misconduct commenced before February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but continued after that effective date, the acts comprise single continuing ethical violations whether charged under the Rules of Professional Conduct, the former Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, or both. See, e.g. , Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman , 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1.


text:
    AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. TUCKER.
    No. 2017-1739
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 24, 2018 Decided July 10, 2018
    Nathan A. Ray ; Akron, and Wayne M. Rice, Bar Counsel, for relator.
    Jon David Tucker, pro se.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Jon David Tucker, of Tallmadge, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0068817, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1997.

{¶ 2} In February 2017, relator, Akron Bar Association, charged Tucker with violating the Rules of Professional Conduct for misusing his client trust account. The parties entered into stipulations of fact and misconduct and jointly recommended that Tucker serve a conditionally stayed six-month suspension. After a hearing, the Board of Professional Conduct issued a report finding that Tucker committed some of the charged misconduct and recommending that we adopt the parties' stipulated sanction. Neither party has objected to the board's recommendation.

{¶ 3} Based on our review of the record, we adopt the board's findings and recommended sanction.

Misconduct

Count I-Client-trust-account violations

{¶ 4} In 2015, relator investigated and ultimately dismissed a grievance filed against Tucker by a former client. During that investigation, however, relator discovered that Tucker had used funds from his client trust account to pay for his malpractice insurance. Relator opened a separate investigation into Tucker's use of his client trust account and later found that he had been using the account for personal and business purposes. Specifically, between January 2013 and September 2015, Tucker wrote almost 200 checks from his client trust account to pay for a variety of personal and business expenses, including his office rent, utilities for his home, personal-income and real-estate taxes, insurance, attorney-registration fees, judicial-campaign contributions, and loan payments. In addition, on at least 80 occasions, he electronically withdrew funds from the account to cover personal expenses.

{¶ 5} During the disciplinary process, Tucker admitted that he had used his client trust account as a "personal bank account and his law office operating account" and that rather than withdrawing money from his client trust account when he earned it, he allowed his personal funds to accumulate in the account and then paid personal and business expenses directly from it. Consequently, at the end of 2013, he had a balance of $19,446.78 in his client trust account but only $2,000 could be attributed to clients, with the remaining funds belonging to him. Similarly, his client trust account had a balance of $26,315.68 at the end of 2014, but only $14,250 constituted client funds. Tucker also admitted that he had failed to maintain records to document the identity of funds in the account.

{¶ 6} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that Tucker violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer's own property), 1.15(a)(2) through (5) (requiring a lawyer to maintain certain records regarding funds held in a client trust account and certain bank records as well as to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the account), and 1.15(b) (permitting a lawyer to deposit his or her own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying or obtaining a waiver of bank service charges).

{¶ 7} We agree with the board's findings of misconduct.

Count II-Funds belonging to William Congrove

{¶ 8} At his disciplinary hearing, Tucker testified that William Congrove, a friend and former client, gave Tucker a $17,000 check that Congrove had received as insurance proceeds for a fire at his home. Although the check did not relate to any legal work that Tucker had completed for Congrove, Tucker deposited the funds into his client trust account. He then withdrew $10,000 in cash from the account and gave the money to Congrove, along with $7,000 from his personal funds. Tucker testified that at the time, he was trying to help his friend cash the check because Congrove did not have a bank account. Tucker admitted, however, that he should not have deposited the check into his client trust account and that during that general time period, he had not maintained the required records for the money that he had deposited in the account.

{¶ 9} Based on this conduct, the board found that Tucker violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(a)(2), 1.15(a)(3), and 1.15(a)(5). We accept the board's findings of misconduct.

Sanction

{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 11} As aggravating factors, the board found that Tucker engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed multiple offenses. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3) and (4). In mitigation, the board found that Tucker has no prior discipline, he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and he demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), and (4). The board also noted that no clients were harmed as a result of Tucker's misconduct and that since initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, he had made changes to his law practice to ensure compliance with the rules relating to client trust accounts.

{¶ 12} To support its recommended sanction, the board reviewed similar cases involving attorneys who used their client trust accounts to pay for personal and business expenses, including Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnston , 121 Ohio St.3d 403, 2009-Ohio-1432, 904 N.E.2d 892 (imposing a conditionally stayed one-year suspension on an attorney who commingled personal and client funds in his client trust account, used the account to pay personal and business expenses, overdrew the account on 22 separate occasions, and bounced a check to a client), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry , 133 Ohio St.3d 527, 2012-Ohio-5014, 979 N.E.2d 313 (imposing a conditionally stayed one-year suspension on an attorney who commingled personal and client funds in his client trust account, used the account to pay personal and business expenses, and borrowed client funds from the account to cover a deficiency in his personal checking account).

{¶ 13} Of the precedents cited by the board, we find Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher , 122 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009-Ohio-3480, 911 N.E.2d 897, most instructive. In that case, an attorney wrote at least 150 client-trust-account checks to cover personal and business expenses, wrote 101 client-trust-account checks to himself without first verifying the amount in the account that belonged to him, and failed to maintain required records to document the identity of funds in the account. In addition, he impermissibly loaned money to a client and cashed checks for the client's small business by depositing them into his client trust account. In mitigation, the attorney had no prior discipline, lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and fully cooperated in the disciplinary process. We noted that although the attorney commingled personal and client funds, no one had accused him of misappropriation and no clients were harmed as a result of his misconduct. We also noted that the attorney had acknowledged his deficiencies and had agreed to accept help in properly managing his client trust account. We suspended the attorney for six months but stayed the suspension on conditions, including monitored probation.

{¶ 14} Tucker's misconduct is comparable to the ethical infractions in Fletcher , and, in mitigation, Tucker also has no prior discipline, lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and cooperated in the disciplinary process. In addition, the board found that Tucker's actions did not harm any clients and that he has instituted corrective measures to ensure proper use of his client trust account. In accord with Fletcher , we conclude that a conditionally stayed six-month suspension is appropriate in this case.

Conclusion

{¶ 15} For the reasons explained above, Jon David Tucker is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he (1) complete a six-month period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), (2) complete six hours of continuing legal education relating to law-office management, including at least two hours relating to trust-account management, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X within six months of this court's disciplinary order, and (3) engage in no further misconduct. If Tucker fails to comply with a condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full six-month suspension. Costs are taxed to Tucker.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. RUTHERFORD.
    No. 2017-0010
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 24, 2018 Decided July 11, 2018
    Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek Beckman and Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Guy Darius Rutherford, whose last known address was in Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0066032, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996.

Summary of Prior Discipline

{¶ 2} We suspended Rutherford in four different matters starting in 1998 and ending in 2009. Rutherford was suspended in 1998 for nonpayment of child support, In re Rutherford , 81 Ohio St.3d 1254, 691 N.E.2d 1049 (1998), and was reinstated two months later. He was briefly suspended for failing to timely register as an attorney in 2005 and 2007. In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Rutherford , 107 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2005-Ohio-6408, 838 N.E.2d 671 ; In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Rutherford , 116 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-6463, 877 N.E.2d 305. In 2006, we imposed a stayed six-month suspension for Rutherford's neglect of three clients' matters, failure to deposit unearned fees into his client trust account, and failure to promptly deliver funds that his clients were entitled to receive, but we later revoked the stay based on his contempt of our prior order. Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rutherford , 112 Ohio St.3d 159, 2006-Ohio-6526, 858 N.E.2d 417 ; Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rutherford , 118 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2008-Ohio-3441, 889 N.E.2d 1028. He was reinstated in May 2009.

{¶ 3} On March 11, 2016, we suspended Rutherford's license on an interim basis after he failed to answer a December 11, 2015 disciplinary complaint filed by relator, disciplinary counsel, which alleged that he had abandoned multiple clients, failed to refund (or failed to timely refund) their retainers, failed to cooperate in multiple disciplinary investigations, and engaged in additional misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v. Rutherford , 145 Ohio St.3d 1247, 2016-Ohio-944, 49 N.E.3d 309. On October 31, 2016, we converted that interim suspension into an indefinite suspension pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(14)(E)(1), and that suspension remains in effect. Disciplinary Counsel v. Rutherford , 147 Ohio St.3d 1245, 2016-Ohio-7532, 65 N.E.3d 764.

Pending Disciplinary Complaint

{¶ 4} On November 4, 2016, relator filed a new complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct alleging that Rutherford had engaged in additional misconduct, including the neglect of four separate client matters, and had then failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. Based on Rutherford's failure to file an answer to that complaint, we imposed another interim default suspension on February 1, 2017. Disciplinary Counsel v. Rutherford , 149 Ohio St.3d 1261, 2017-Ohio-365, 75 N.E.3d 1271.

{¶ 5} On September 7, 2017, we granted relator's motion to remand this proceeding to the board to seek Rutherford's permanent disbarment. Thereafter, relator submitted a motion for default disbarment supported by sworn or certified exhibits, including the affidavits of four clients, assistant disciplinary counsel, and relator's investigator and administrative personnel. See Gov.Bar R. V(14)(F).

{¶ 6} The motion for default was referred to a master appointed by the board for disposition pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(14)(F)(2)(a). The master recommended that Rutherford be permanently disbarred based on findings that included that he neglected client matters, failed to refund unearned retainers, and failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. The board adopted the master's findings of fact and conclusions of law and agreed that Rutherford should be permanently disbarred. For the reasons that follow, we adopt the board's report and permanently disbar Rutherford from the practice of law in Ohio.

Misconduct

Counts I through III: The Sherrod, Hernandez, and Cedeno Matters

{¶ 7} Between October 2013 and November 2015, Penny Sherrod, Martha Hernandez, and Reinaldo Cedeno separately retained Rutherford to file complaints for divorce. Each of them paid him a retainer of $600 to $800 for attorney fees and costs. Rutherford did not perform any of the contracted work-although he falsely advised Sherrod that he had filed a complaint for divorce on her behalf. He also had little or no communication with these clients after collecting their fees. Sherrod, Hernandez, and Cedeno each requested a refund of their legal fees, but Rutherford complied only with Cedeno's request-nearly one year after it was made.

{¶ 8} The board found and we agree that by engaging in the described conduct, Rutherford committed three violations each of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), and 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer's withdrawal from employment) and a single violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count IV: The Vega Matter

{¶ 9} In June 2015, Rinaldo Vega hired Rutherford to represent Vega's son in pending criminal and immigration matters. Vega had advanced Rutherford $4,500 in attorney fees by October 15, 2015, and Rutherford informed him that he had filed an application to inspect sealed records in the criminal case. After numerous failed attempts to communicate with Rutherford, Vega retained another attorney to represent his son in the immigration case only. Rutherford met with the immigration attorney to discuss the case and promised to forward the files in his possession. Although Rutherford responded to the immigration attorney's e-mailed inquiry about the status of the files and did forward some documents, he never provided most of the files.

{¶ 10} After Vega's son was found guilty of several offenses in his criminal case, Rutherford filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. The court of appeals granted the motion and sent a copy of its order to Rutherford's address of record, directing him to file a notice of appeal and a completed docketing statement on or before February 16, 2016, but the mailing was returned by the postal service marked "attempted-not known" and "unable to forward." Rutherford took no further action on behalf of Vega's son, and the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Vega filed a grievance with relator and requested a refund, but Rutherford has not refunded any portion of Vega's $4,500 retainer.

{¶ 11} The board found that Rutherford's conduct in these cases violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 1.16(e), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct.

Count V: Failure to Cooperate

{¶ 12} Beginning in February 2016, relator sent multiple letters of inquiry and a notice of intent to file a complaint to the addresses that Rutherford had registered with the Office of Attorney Services. Many, but not all, of those letters were returned marked "attempted-not known," "unable to forward," "addressee unknown," or "not deliverable as addressed." Relator also sent those documents to the e-mail address Rutherford had registered with the Office of Attorney Services, and relator received responses from relator's e-mail server that the deliveries had been completed. But Rutherford failed to contact relator and never provided any written response to relator's letters or e-mails. He also failed to provide relator or the Office of Attorney Services with a valid residential or office address.

{¶ 13} In March 2016, relator's investigator attempted several times to personally serve Rutherford at his residential and office addresses. The investigator learned that Rutherford had been evicted from his residence and that the building-management company had no forwarding address. He also learned that although Rutherford had not been seen at his office in months, the building receptionist had continued to place mail in his office. The investigator left letters of inquiry regarding the Sherrod and Hernandez matters on Rutherford's desk, which had stacks of unopened mail on it.

{¶ 14} After attempted service of relator's complaint on Rutherford failed, that document and subsequent orders of this court were served on the clerk of this court in conformity with Gov.Bar R. V(27)(B).

{¶ 15} The board found that Rutherford had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation). Relator's complaint also charged that Rutherford's failure to provide his current residential and office addresses to the Office of Attorney Services violated Gov.Bar R. VI(4)(B) (requiring each attorney admitted to the practice of law in Ohio to provide the Office of Attorney Services with the attorney's current residential address, office address, office telephone number, and office or personal e-mail address), and the board found that Rutherford failed to comply with those requirements. We adopt the board's findings of fact and misconduct with respect to this count.

Sanction

{¶ 16} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 17} As aggravating factors, the board found that Rutherford acted with a selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, took advantage of vulnerable clients, and failed to make restitution. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), (8), and (9). We also note that he has a history of prior discipline, including sanctions for the same type of misconduct that we sanction him for today. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1). No mitigating factors are present. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C).

{¶ 18} In recommending that we permanently disbar Rutherford, the board cited multiple cases in which we held that the presumptive sanction for attorneys who accept retainers and fail to carry out contracts of employment is disbarment because the conduct is " 'tantamount to theft of the fee from the client.' " E.g. , Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry , 127 Ohio St.3d 398, 2010-Ohio-6206, 939 N.E.2d 1255, ¶ 33, quoting Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Weaver , 102 Ohio St.3d 264, 2004-Ohio-2683, 809 N.E.2d 1113, ¶ 16.

{¶ 19} Having independently reviewed the record, we agree that relator has submitted clear and convincing evidence that Rutherford collected retainers from several clients, failed to perform the contracted legal services for those clients, and, in most cases, failed to return any portion of their retainers. Furthermore, relator has established that Rutherford lied about the status of a client's case, prejudiced the administration of justice when another client's delayed criminal appeal was dismissed as a result of his inaction, and failed to cooperate in multiple disciplinary investigations. Given the nature of Rutherford's misconduct, the extensive aggravating factors present (including his prior discipline for similar acts), the complete absence of mitigating factors, and the sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct, we agree that permanent disbarment is warranted.

{¶ 20} Accordingly, Guy Darius Rutherford is permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to Rutherford.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    The STATE EX REL. PAYNE, Appellant, v. REINBOLD, Judge, et al., Appellees.
    No. 2017-1449
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 23, 2018 Decided July 12, 2018
    Brolin D. Payne, pro se.
    Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven DiMartino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Brolin D. Payne, appeals the dismissal of his complaint for a writ of procedendo against appellees, retired Judge Richard D. Reinbold Jr., a visiting judge sitting in the underlying case by assignment, and Summit County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mary Margaret Rowlands. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Background

{¶ 2} In his complaint, Payne alleged the following facts, which we accept as true for purposes of considering his appeal from the dismissal of his complaint. See State ex rel. Smith v. McGee , 144 Ohio St.3d 50, 2015-Ohio-2748, 40 N.E.3d 1105, ¶ 12.

{¶ 3} Judge Rowlands was the original judge assigned to hear a 2012 criminal case involving Payne, State v. Payne , Summit C.P. No. CR-2012-01-0028. At some point in time, Judge Rowlands requested that the chief justice of this court assign a visiting judge to the case.

{¶ 4} On July 16, 2012, Judge Reinbold held a hearing on Payne's motion to suppress evidence and his motion in limine. On July 18, Judge Reinbold entered judgment entries denying both motions.

{¶ 5} Judge Reinbold presided over Payne's trial from July 23 to July 25, 2012. The jury convicted Payne of rape and gross sexual imposition. Judge Rowlands entered a journal entry of conviction on July 27, 2012.

{¶ 6} On August 20, 2012, the chief justice appointed Judge Reinbold to hear Payne's criminal case, "effective July 20, 2012."

{¶ 7} Judge Reinbold held a sentencing hearing on September 5, 2012. Thereafter, Payne was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison in an entry journalized on September 10.

{¶ 8} The court of appeals affirmed Payne's convictions. State v. Payne , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26655, 2013-Ohio-5230, 2013 WL 6212236. He filed two petitions for postconviction relief, which were denied. See State v. Payne , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27947, 2016-Ohio-2819, 2016 WL 2343362, ¶ 2, 6-7.

{¶ 9} On May 23, 2017, he commenced the present action for a writ of procedendo in the Ninth District Court of Appeals. He alleged that he had never received a final, appealable sentencing order because "Judge Reinbold did not have the authority to conduct the suppression hearing and trial and * * * Judge Rowlands did not have the authority to issue the conviction and sentencing order on September 10, 2012 after being replaced by * * * Judge Reinbold on August 20, 2012." He asked the court to order Judge Reinbold and/or Judge Rowlands to issue a "proper" final sentencing entry.

{¶ 10} Judges Reinbold and Rowlands filed a motion to dismiss, to which Payne filed a brief in opposition. On September 13, 2017, the Ninth District dismissed the case sua sponte because Payne had an adequate remedy at law. Payne appealed.

Analysis

{¶ 11} "A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment." State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover , 84 Ohio St.3d 530, 532, 705 N.E.2d 1227 (1999). To be entitled to a writ of procedendo, a relator must establish (1) a clear legal right to require the respondent to proceed, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to proceed, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall , 141 Ohio St.3d 234, 2014-Ohio-4724, 23 N.E.3d 1077, ¶ 20. " ' "[T]he writ of procedendo is merely an order from a court of superior jurisdiction to one of inferior jurisdiction to proceed to judgment. It does not in any case attempt to control the inferior court as to what that judgment should be." ' " State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899 (1995), quoting State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed , 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 600, 589 N.E.2d 1324 (1992), quoting State ex rel. Davey v. Owen , 133 Ohio St. 96, 106, 12 N.E.2d 144 (1937).

{¶ 12} Payne challenges the finality of the sentencing entry, first by challenging Judge Reinbold's jurisdiction to preside over the trial: "[Because Judge] Reinbold held the trial before the certificate of assignment was issued and journalized by the Summit County Clerk * * * [he] did not have the authority to conduct the trial and the jury guilty verdict must be determined a nullity." But " '[a] claim of improper assignment of a judge can generally be adequately raised by way of appeal.' " State ex rel. Black v. Forchione , 144 Ohio St.3d 149, 2015-Ohio-4336, 41 N.E.3d 414, ¶ 4, quoting State ex rel. Key v. Spicer , 91 Ohio St.3d 469, 746 N.E.2d 1119 (2001). Payne is therefore not entitled to an extraordinary writ to challenge Judge Reinbold's jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Poulton v. Cottrill , 147 Ohio St.3d 402, 2016-Ohio-5789, 66 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 4 (a writ of procedendo is inappropriate when the relator had an adequate remedy by way of appeal).

{¶ 13} Second, Payne contends that after the assignment of Judge Reinbold, Judge Rowlands was divested of jurisdiction to sign the conviction entry. But a nonassigned judge is permitted to perform purely ministerial acts. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Harris v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 139 Ohio St.3d 149, 2014-Ohio-1612, 9 N.E.3d 1057, ¶ 9 (holding that "signing a judgment entry of conviction is a ministerial act when the assigned judge has already imposed sentence and the entry correctly reflects that sentence and the assigned judge's name"). Even assuming that Judge Rowlands was the wrong person to sign the conviction entry, this would not affect the finality of the later sentencing entry. State v. Sylvester , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103841, 2016-Ohio-5710, 2016 WL 4701543, ¶ 32 (no plain error in allowing a substitute judge to receive a jury's verdict and schedule the matter for sentencing despite the absence of evidence showing that the judge had been properly selected by the administrative judge). In any event, as explained above, Payne could have challenged Judge Rowlands's ability to sign the conviction entry on direct appeal.

{¶ 14} In his complaint, Payne also challenged Judge Rowlands's jurisdiction to sign the final sentencing order, under the same theory. Of course, if Payne were correct that Judge Rowlands no longer had any jurisdiction over this case as a result of the assignment order, then he would not be entitled to a writ of procedendo against her. But in his merit brief, Payne changes his theory: he now asserts that the signature on the sentencing entry does not belong to Judge Rowlands or to Judge Reinbold. However, Payne did not raise this argument in the court of appeals, and a reviewing court will not consider issues the appellant failed to raise below, e.g. , State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm. , 139 Ohio St.3d 295, 2014-Ohio-1909, 11 N.E.3d 1136, ¶ 17.

{¶ 15} We hold that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint.

Judgment affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

O'Donnell, J., concurs in judgment only.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    OHIO RENAL ASSOCIATION et al. v. KIDNEY DIALYSIS PATIENT PROTECTION AMENDMENT COMMITTEE et al.
    No. 2018-1047
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted August 9, 2018 Decided August 13, 2018
    Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, Maria J. Armstrong, Nelson M. Reid, and James P. Schuck, Columbus, for relators.
    McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, Derek S. Clinger, and Ben F.C. Wallace, Columbus, for respondents Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Committee, Anthony Caldwell, Mary Jo Ivan, and Samara Knight.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Tiffany L. Carwile and Ann Yackshaw, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In this original action under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, relators, Ohio Renal Association and Ian Weir (collectively, "ORA"), challenge an initiative petition to place a proposed constitutional amendment-the "Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment"-on the November 6, 2018 ballot. The respondents in this case are the Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Committee and its individual members, Anthony Caldwell, Mary Jo Ivan, and Samara Knight (collectively, "the committee"), and Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted. Because ORA has shown that Ohio law requires invalidation of the petition, we sustain the challenge.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

{¶ 2} To qualify its proposed amendment for the ballot, the committee must gather valid signatures from at least 10 percent of the number of electors who voted in the last gubernatorial election. Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1a ; R.C. 3519.14 and 3519.22. According to Secretary Husted, this requires the committee to submit a minimum of 305,591 valid signatures in support of placing the measure on the ballot. Those signatures must be obtained from electors in at least 44 of Ohio's 88 counties, and the signatures obtained from each of those counties must equal at least 5 percent of the total votes cast in that county in the last gubernatorial election. Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1g.

{¶ 3} To facilitate the review of the signatures obtained, R.C. 3519.10 provides that each filed part-petition "shall contain signatures of electors of only one county." Once a petition is filed, the secretary of state must separate the part-petitions by county and transmit them to the appropriate county boards of elections to determine the number of valid elector signatures on each part-petition. R.C. 3519.15 ; see also R.C. 3501.11(K)(1) (requiring boards to "[r]eview, examine, and certify the sufficiency and validity of petitions and nomination papers, and, after certification, return to the secretary of state all petitions and nomination papers that the secretary of state forwarded to the board").

{¶ 4} ORA first contends that we must invalidate the committee's petition because, it argues, several circulation managers failed to comply with R.C. 3501.381(A). That statute provides:

(1) Any person who will receive compensation for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures * * * for a statewide initiative petition * * * shall file a statement to that effect with the office of the secretary of state before any signatures are obtained for the petition or before the person is engaged to supervise, manage, or otherwise organize the effort to obtain signatures for the petition, whichever is later.
(2) Any person who will compensate a person for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures * * * for a statewide initiative * * * petition shall file a statement to that effect with the office of the secretary of state before any signatures are obtained for the petition or before the person engages a person to supervise, manage, or otherwise organize the effort to obtain signatures for the petition, whichever is later.

R.C. 3501.381(A). Pursuant to R.C. 3501.381(B), the secretary of state has prescribed a one-page form-"Form 15"-for the disclosure of the information required by division (A). Any person violating division (A) is guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor, and if division (A) is violated, "the petition for which a person was compensated for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing the effort to obtain signatures shall be deemed invalid." R.C. 3501.381(C).

{¶ 5} In the alternative, ORA argues that the summary of the part-petitions, which the committee filed pursuant to R.C. 3519.16(B)(2), did not comply with that statute's requirements.

II. FACTS AND EVIDENCE

{¶ 6} On July 4, 2018, the committee filed with Secretary Husted an initiative petition that proposes to add its amendment as Article XIX, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. After the county elections boards reviewed the part-petitions, Secretary Husted, on July 23, certified that the petition contained 296,080 valid signatures-9,511 short of the total number needed for the petition to be placed on the November 6 ballot. Secretary Husted certified that the petition met the 5 percent minimum threshold for 48 counties. As required by R.C. 3519.16(F), Secretary Husted gave the committee ten days to circulate and file a supplemental petition to cure the deficiency. On August 1, the committee filed a supplemental petition containing an additional 41,122 signatures. Secretary Husted sent the supplemental part-petitions to the affected county boards of elections for review. See R.C. 3519.16(F) (requiring county elections boards to "immediately examine[ ] and pass[ ] upon * * * the validity and sufficiency of the signatures on" the part-petitions of supplemental petitions and to report to the secretary of state within eight days).

{¶ 7} ORA does not allege that any person required to file a disclosure under R.C. 3501.381(A) ultimately failed to do so. But it claims that four individuals and two companies (collectively, "the managers") failed to file a Form 15 before circulators under their supervision obtained signatures for the petition. ORA alleges that circulators being supervised by the managers collected 145 part-petitions before an appropriate Form 15 had been filed.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standards for review

{¶ 8} In this petition challenge, ORA has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the committee's petition does not meet the requirements of Ohio law. S.Ct.Prac.R. 14.01(B). In deciding the challenge, we are guided by several rules of construction. We must "liberally construe" the people's initiative power "to effectuate the rights reserved" in the Ohio Constitution. State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner , 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 24. And we "must avoid unduly technical interpretations that impede the public policy favoring free, competitive elections." State ex rel. Ruehlmann v. Luken , 65 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 598 N.E.2d 1149 (1992). But when an election law is clear, "the settled rule is that [it is] mandatory and require[s] strict compliance." State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections , 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 539, 757 N.E.2d 319 (2001). Substantial compliance is acceptable only when an election provision expressly states that it is. Id.

B. ORA's challenge is ripe for review

{¶ 9} As an initial matter, the committee argues that we cannot reach the merits of ORA's challenge because it is not yet ripe. According to the committee, ORA's challenge depends on the certification of the petition for the ballot, and certification depends on the occurrence of a future contingency-i.e., the secretary of state's certification of sufficient valid signatures on the supplemental petition. The committee relies on State ex rel. Jones v. Husted , 149 Ohio St.3d 110, 2016-Ohio-5752, 73 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 21 (plurality opinion), and State ex rel. Quinn v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections , 152 Ohio St.3d 568, 2018-Ohio-966, 99 N.E.3d 362, ¶ 37, in which we recognized that a claim is not ripe "if it rests on contingent events that may never occur at all."

{¶ 10} The language of Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution does not support the committee's argument that a petition may be challenged in this court only after it has been certified for the ballot by the secretary of state. Section 1g contemplates a process during which both the secretary of state and this court may be called on to determine the sufficiency of a petition. Once a petition is filed, the secretary of state first must "determine the sufficiency of the signatures" at least 105 days before the election. Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1g (first paragraph). If a party seeks to bring a "challenge to a petition or signature on a petition," it must file an action in this court at least 95 days before the election. Id. (second paragraph). "If the petitions or signatures are determined to be insufficient"-by either the secretary of state or this court-"ten additional days shall be allowed for the filing of additional signatures to such petition." Id. (third paragraph). Then, if additional signatures are filed, the secretary of state must "determine the sufficiency of those additional signatures" at least 65 days before the election, and any challenge "to the additional signatures" shall be filed in this court at least 55 days before the election. Id.

{¶ 11} This year, the initial deadline for filing an action in this court was August 3 (95 days before the election). Although a later action could be filed on or before September 12 (55 days before the election), under Section 1g, any later action would be limited to challenging "the additional signatures" filed. Id. Thus, under the timeline imposed by Section 1g, to challenge the committee's original filing, ORA had no choice but to file its action before Secretary Husted certified the petition for the ballot.

{¶ 12} This case, like Jones and Quinn , involves the possibility of a contingent future event. But the nature of the contingency is different here. In Jones and Quinn , the claims would become necessary only if a future event occurred. Therefore, they were not ripe. See State v. Loving , 180 Ohio App.3d 424, 2009-Ohio-15, 905 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.) (a case is not yet ripe "if it rests on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or may never occur at all"), citing Texas v. United States , 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998). Here, in contrast, the challenge will become unnecessary if a future event occurs-that is, if the committee fails to cure the deficiency. Thus, the committee's concern is not actually one of ripeness but one of potential mootness. See State ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow , 125 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-1844, 928 N.E.2d 728, ¶ 10 (a case becomes moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant the requested relief; under such circumstances, there is no longer a "live" issue that demands resolution). Because ORA's challenge is ripe and currently not moot, we address it on the merits.

C. R.C. 3501.381 requires invalidation of the petition

1. R.C. 3501.381(A) applies to the managers

{¶ 13} R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) and (A)(2) apply to different classes of persons involved in an effort to obtain signatures for an election petition. While R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) requires a disclosure from a person who "will receive compensation for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures," R.C. 3501.381(A)(2) requires a person who "will compensate a person for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures" to file a disclosure. (Emphasis added.) Evidence shows that the managers filed Form 15s pursuant to R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) and (A)(2).

{¶ 14} But the committee suggests that ORA has not shown that the managers even were required to file the disclosures. According to the committee, if the managers did not need to file Form 15s, there can be no violation of R.C. 3501.381(A).

{¶ 15} In arguing that ORA has not presented sufficient evidence in support of its claim under R.C. 3501.381(A), the committee focuses on the phrase "for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures," which is used in both R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) and (A)(2). The committee argues that this language narrows the applicability of the disclosure requirement to a select class of persons that may not include the managers.

{¶ 16} We need not address whether the managers were required to file Form 15s under R.C. 3501.381(A)(2), because sufficient evidence shows that they were required to file the disclosures under R.C. 3501.381(A)(1). Indeed, the committee's own evidence shows that the managers oversaw circulators who collected signatures and that the managers would "receive compensation for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures." Thus, contrary to the committee's argument, sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that the managers were required to file disclosures under R.C. 3501.381(A).

2. R.C. 3501.381(A) prohibits signature collection before an applicable disclosure form has been filed

{¶ 17} R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) provides that any person required to file a disclosure must do so "before any signatures are obtained for the petition or before the person is engaged to supervise, manage, or otherwise organize the effort to obtain signatures for the petition, whichever is later." ORA argues that the managers violated this rule, because circulators under their supervision collected signatures before the managers' Form 15s had been filed with Secretary Husted. Indeed, ORA has presented as evidence the Form 15s filed by each of the managers and numerous part-petitions that were circulated under the supervision of the managers and signed by electors before the respective Form 15s were filed.

{¶ 18} The committee does not dispute that R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) prohibits the collection of signatures by a circulator before that circulator's compensated manager has filed a Form 15. And although Secretary Husted presents a contrary argument, it is unclear and not supported by the statutory language.

{¶ 19} Secretary Husted argues that ORA has not presented sufficient evidence to prove a violation, because no evidence shows that the managers were paid or engaged to supervise, manage, or organize an effort to collect signatures before they filed the Form 15s. Secretary Husted seems to suggest that there can be no violation of R.C. 3501.381(A) unless a manager is shown to have received compensation before a circulator under his management collected signatures. R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) does not support that interpretation, because it clearly applies not to a person who has been paid but to one who "will receive compensation."

{¶ 20} Secretary Husted also argues that there can be no violation of R.C. 3501.381(A) unless the manager is shown to have been engaged before a circulator under his management collected signatures. Here, he posits that circulators may have collected signatures under the supervision of the managers when the managers were acting as volunteers on behalf of the committee. This conjecture is undermined by the committee's evidence, which clearly shows that the signature-gathering effort was organized and managed by for-profit companies and individuals.

{¶ 21} We therefore reject Secretary Husted's arguments and conclude that it is a violation of R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) for a circulator to obtain signatures before that circulator's compensated manager has filed a Form 15 with the secretary of state. We further find that ORA has presented sufficient evidence showing that the managers violated R.C. 3501.381(A)(1) by managing circulators who collected signatures before filing their Form 15s.

3. Because R.C. 3501.381(A) was violated, we must invalidate the petition

{¶ 22} R.C. 3501.381(C) provides that if division (A) is violated, "the petition for which a person was compensated for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing the effort to obtain signatures shall be deemed invalid." ORA argues that this provision requires us to invalidate the committee's entire petition-not just the affected part-petitions.

{¶ 23} "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted." Sears v. Weimer , 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. The committee argues that R.C. 3501.381(C)'s reference to "the petition" is ambiguous and that we must apply rules of construction. ORA, in contrast, argues that division (C) is clear and that we must simply apply it by invalidating the committee's entire petition.

{¶ 24} We agree with ORA. R.C. 3501.381(C) plainly requires the invalidation of the singular "petition"-a clear reference to the entire petition rather than to separate part-petitions. As ORA points out, in other statutory provisions, the General Assembly has distinguished between a "petition" and the individual "part-petitions" or "petition papers" that constitute a petition. See R.C. 307.94, 709.45, 3513.09, 3513.262, 3517.011, 3519.15, and 3519.16. When, as here, statutory language is clear and has a definite meaning, we may not resort to rules of statutory interpretation; we must simply apply the unambiguous statute as written. Sears at paragraph five of the syllabus. That rule applies with particular force in this election case, in which "strict compliance" with the law is required unless the statutory provision at issue expressly states that substantial compliance is acceptable, State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted , 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 40.

{¶ 25} Therefore, because ORA has demonstrated violations of R.C. 3501.381(A)(1), we must sustain the challenge and invalidate the committee's petition.

D. The committee's constitutional arguments

{¶ 26} The committee claims that R.C. 3501.381, facially and as we apply it today, violates Article II, Sections 1a and 1g of the Ohio Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. As we evaluate the committee's claims, we must bear in mind that "laws are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality." Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div. , 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16. A party asserting a facial challenge to a statute must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid." Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc. , 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898, ¶ 21, citing United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). An as-applied challenge requires the challenger to "present clear and convincing evidence of the statute's constitutional defect." State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn. , 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 21. In this case, the committee has not met its burden as to any of its constitutional challenges.

E. We need not address ORA's claim under R.C. 3519.16(B)(2)

{¶ 27} Because we hold that the committee's petition is invalid under R.C. 3501.381(A), we need not consider ORA's alternative request for relief under R.C. 3519.16(B)(2).

Challenge sustained.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, French, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur in judgment only.

      On August 7, Secretary Husted moved for leave to file a surreply brief in response to the committee's argument that R.C. 3501.381 is unconstitutional. Secretary Husted attached his proposed surreply brief to his motion. Because the committee filed a response indicating that it does not oppose Secretary Husted's request, and considering Secretary Husted's interest in defending the constitutionality of Ohio's laws, we grant the motion.