text:
    IN RE WILMA T.,
    (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Wilma T., Respondent-Appellant).
    Appeal Nos. 3-17-0155 3-17-0156
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Rule 23 Filed March 13, 2018 Motion to Publish Granted April 24, 2018 Opinion filed April 24, 2018
    Veronique Baker and Kelly O. Phelps, of Illinois Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Springfield, for appellant.
    John L. McGehee, State's Attorney, of Rock Island (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Jasmine D. Morton, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Respondent, Wilma T., appeals from the circuit court's orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, arguing the court erred by granting (1) the order for involuntary commitment where she was a voluntarily admitted patient and did not file a written request for discharge, and (2) the order for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication where respondent was not presented written information about less restrictive alternatives to medication. We reverse.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Respondent is a 62-year-old homeless woman. On January 26, 2017, respondent was brought to the emergency room at Trinity Hospital by the police after she was found in a home that was not her own. She voluntarily admitted herself to the Robert Young Mental Health Center (Robert Young) at the hospital.

¶ 4 On February 17, 2017, a nurse at Robert Young filed a petition for respondent's involuntary admission. The petition stated respondent had been a voluntary admittee, but had "submitted written notice of [her] desire to be discharged." The petition further stated respondent "threatens staff members," "is non-compliant with medications," "is in denial of her mental illness," and "believes she is pregnant" and married to Barack Obama. Respondent's request for discharge was not signed by respondent, but stated, "[p]atient requesting discharge, but refusing to sign." It was signed by three nurses. Simultaneously, Dr. Rickey L. Wilson filed a petition for the administration of psychotropic medications requesting that respondent receive 25 to 100 milligrams of Risperdal Consta because respondent refused medication, presented as a potential harm to others, and could not provide for her own safety in a less restrictive environment.

¶ 5 A hearing was held on the petition on March 2, 2017. Wilson was accepted as an expert in the field of psychiatry and general medicine. Wilson stated he was employed at Robert Young as a psychiatric hospitalist. He provided inpatient care for respondent and had seen her Monday through Friday since January 30, 2017. He had the opportunity to examine respondent and diagnosed her with chronic schizophrenia paranoid subtype. Wilson did not believe respondent was able to understand her need for treatment. He stated she refused to take medication, and he believed respondent could cause herself or others to be put into harm's way. He noted that he had observed her in an agitated state where she was threatening one of the nurses with a metal fork. Wilson did not believe respondent could care for her needs based, in part, on her recent, prior admissions at Robert Young, stating:

"I feel that because of her lack of insight she needs to be stabilized and improved before discharge. And in her present untreated condition, I do not feel that she could keep herself safe and provide for basic needs, and I base that on the fact that those three very rapid admissions prior to my arrival here, but that's in her records, showing that she could not sustain herself on an outpatient basis."

Wilson created a treatment plan for respondent, which included medication. He noted she was also attending groups, but they were "not making a difference in her mental state." When asked if he had considered alternative treatments for respondent, Wilson stated, "She has had community support services prescribed in the past. She never complied with that[.]" With the medication, Wilson hoped respondent would stabilize within six weeks to two months. He recommended she remain at an inpatient facility. He believed respondent's condition would deteriorate.

¶ 6 On cross-examination, Wilson was asked if respondent was in the facility voluntarily. Wilson stated, "She would not sign a five day notice for discharge. * * * But she would say that she might want to leave but then she would change her mind, so it would be considered voluntary." He further stated, "She would not sign the form, but there were two witnesses to her request to leave." The court granted the petition.

¶ 7 The case then proceeded to a hearing on the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. Wilson again testified as an expert and stated respondent has shown poor judgment and disruptive behavior. Based on Wilson's review of respondent's medical records, her symptoms continue because she does not take medication. He stated, "I believe that medication is warranted. She does have a history of partially responding to medication in the past." Wilson recommended Risperdal Consta injections every two weeks. He stated respondent had been on the medication previously. The appropriate response time for each of the medications was three months. Wilson stated he discussed the medication with respondent and the nurses gave her a pharmacy printout of side-effects, benefits, and risks of the proposed medication. When asked if he considered less restrictive alternatives to the medications, Wilson stated, "She is attending group therapy. It is not effective. I have offered her oral medications, which she has refused." There was no indication respondent was given written information regarding alternatives to the treatment. The court granted the petition.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, respondent argues, inter alia , that the court erred by granting (1) the petition for involuntary commitment where respondent was a voluntary patient and did not present written notice of her desire to be discharged, and (2) the petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication where she was not given written information regarding alternatives to the proposed treatment. The State argues this appeal should be dismissed as moot. We agree the appeal is moot, but find that the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine applies. We further find the court erred by granting the petitions based on noncompliance with the statutes regarding (1) involuntary admission of theretofore voluntarily admitted patients, and (2) written information of alternatives to the proposed psychotropic medication.

¶ 10 I. Mootness

¶ 11 At the outset, the State argues this appeal should be dismissed as moot. The 90-day involuntary commitment order that is the subject of this appeal has already expired. Therefore, this appeal is moot. In re Robert S. , 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004). Generally, courts of review do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected by the court's decision. In re Alfred H.H. , 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74 (2009). However, there are certain exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 355-63, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. Whether one of these exceptions applies to the appeal must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the exception in light of the facts and claims raised. Id. at 355, 364, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74.

¶ 12 Respondent urges us to consider her appeal under the capable of repetition yet evading review exception. "This exception applies when the complaining party demonstrates that (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." In re Amanda H. , 2017 IL App (3d) 150164, ¶ 26, 413 Ill.Dec. 866, 79 N.E.3d 215. The State admits the first element is satisfied by the 90-day order. Thus, the only question is whether there is a reasonable expectation that respondent would be subject to the same action again. Id.

"To satisfy this criterion, there must be 'a substantial likelihood that [an] issue presented in the instant case, and any resolution thereof, would have some bearing on a similar issue presented in a subsequent case' involving the respondent. [Citation.] For example, if the respondent's appeal raises a constitutional issue or challenges the trial court's interpretation of a statute, the exception applies because the court's resolution of these issues could affect the respondent in subsequent commitment proceedings." Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Alfred H.H. , 233 Ill. 2d at 360, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74 ).

¶ 13 Here, both of respondent's issues satisfy the second element. Respondent has a long history of mental illness, including prior hospitalizations in the same hospital. Wilson noted respondent had three recent, prior admissions to Robert Young before he was employed there. Respondent challenges the circuit court's interpretation of section 3-403 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) ( 405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West 2016) ) regarding the petition for involuntary commitment filed while she was a voluntary patient. As respondent is a homeless woman whom the police have transported to the hospital on more than one occasion, it is substantially likely that such an issue will affect respondent in the future.

¶ 14 Moreover, we take judicial notice of our own recent case in which respondent challenged one of the same issues that she is raising here: the failure to provide her with written notification of the alternatives to the proposed treatment. In re Wilma T. , No. 3-16-0701 (2017) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c) ); see also People v. Davis , 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161, 2 Ill.Dec. 572, 357 N.E.2d 792 (1976) (quoting McCormick on Evidence, § 330, at 763 (2d ed. 1972) ) ("[t]aking judicial notice of matters of record in other cases in the same court is simply an application of the increasingly recognized principle that matters susceptible of judicial notice include facts 'capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.' "). The fact that the same problem has affected respondent twice, shows that this issue could affect her again in future proceedings. We now turn to the merits of the case.

¶ 15 II. Involuntary Commitment

¶ 16 Respondent first argues the order granting the 90-day involuntary commitment was improper as she was a voluntary patient and did not provide, in writing, her intent to be discharged. Specifically, respondent argues the order was "void" for noncompliance with section 3-403 of the Code. 405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West 2016).

¶ 17 The State concedes that respondent did not file a written notice of her desire to be discharged and, therefore, section 3-403 of the Code was not satisfied and submits forfeiture could apply. Nonetheless, the State believes that we should consider the issue under plain error. "The plain-error doctrine set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a) [citation] applies to appeals in criminal cases, not civil cases." In re Charles K. , 405 Ill. App. 3d 1152, 1163, 347 Ill.Dec. 711, 943 N.E.2d 1 (2010). However, " ' "[E]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error." ' " In re George O. , 314 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049, 248 Ill.Dec. 305, 734 N.E.2d 13 (2000) (quoting In re Rovelstad , 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 966, 217 Ill.Dec. 631, 667 N.E.2d 720 (1996), quoting In re Martens , 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327, 206 Ill.Dec. 895, 646 N.E.2d 27 (1995) ). Therefore, we will consider the issue.

¶ 18 Section 3-403 states:

"A voluntary recipient shall be allowed to be discharged from the facility at the earliest appropriate time, not to exceed 5 days * * * after he gives any treatment staff person written notice of his desire to be discharged unless he either withdraws the notice in writing or unless within the 5 day period a petition and 2 certificates [for the voluntary recipient's involuntary commitment] are filed with the court." 405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West 2016).

The general rule is that "a written request for discharge must precede the instituting of emergency involuntary commitment proceedings against voluntarily admitted patients." In re James E. , 207 Ill. 2d 105, 114, 278 Ill.Dec. 27, 797 N.E.2d 622 (2003). An oral request is not sufficient "to activate the statutory requirements for initiating an involuntary admission proceeding." In re Splett , 143 Ill. 2d 225, 234, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991). Where the record fails to show that the respondent submitted a written request for discharge prior to the initiation of involuntary admission proceedings, the involuntary admission order is invalid. Id. at 235, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883.

¶ 19 In this case, respondent was a voluntary patient and did not file a written notice for discharge. Consequently, involuntary admission proceedings should not have been commenced. We accept the State's concession and find the involuntary commitment order was invalid.

¶ 20 In coming to this conclusion, we note, as an aside, that the State takes issue with respondent's statement that the involuntary commitment order was "void." "A judgment entered contrary to statute by a trial court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter is voidable, not void." In re Bates , 315 Ill. App. 3d 736, 739, 248 Ill.Dec. 531, 734 N.E.2d 459 (2000). As the court had jurisdiction, the State is correct that the order was not void. However, this distinction does not change the above analysis.

¶ 21 III. Involuntary Admission of Psychotropic Medication

¶ 22 Respondent further argues she was not given written information regarding alternatives to the proposed treatment. Section 2-102(a-5) of the Code requires the recipient of psychotropic medication to be notified in writing of the alternatives to the proposed treatment. 405 ILCS 5/2102(a-5) (West 2016). This requirement is not satisfied by verbal advice. In re Vanessa K. , 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 20, 352 Ill.Dec. 802, 954 N.E.2d 885.

¶ 23 Here, respondent did not receive written information regarding alternatives to the proposed treatment. The State points out that "respondent lacked the ability to understand any written information that may have been communicated regarding alternative treatment options" and "there is no evidence to show that she understood the information provided." Due to this lack of comprehension by respondent, the State urges this court to conclude that the distribution of information respondent could not process, was an unnecessary formality.

"[S]ection 2-102(a-5) of the Code must be strictly complied with, so as to secure the liberty interest that a respondent has in refusing invasive medication. [Citation.] Because of this, verbal notice does not constitute compliance with section 2-102(a-5) of the Code, and a respondent cannot waive his [or her] right to written notice. [Citation.]
* * * If such notice is not given, then the State cannot establish that a respondent lacks the capacity to make a 'reasoned decision' about treatment, because the written notice forms the basis upon which such a decision can be made." In re Katarzyna G. , 2013 IL App (2d) 120807, ¶¶ 16-17, 374 Ill.Dec. 446, 995 N.E.2d 585.

Strict compliance is required. Thus, the State cannot establish that a respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision without the respondent receiving prior written notice.

¶ 24 We would be remiss if we did not note that this is the second time our court has determined that respondent's involuntary admission of psychotropic medication order was improper for the same reason. Wilma T. , No. 3-16-0701. Hopefully, the parties will take the necessary steps to ensure strict compliance occurs from this point forward.

¶ 25 CONCLUSION

¶ 26 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is reversed.

¶ 27 Reversed.

Presiding Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Schmidt dissenting, with opinion.

¶ 28 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:

¶ 29 I would dismiss this case as moot. The fact that respondent may face involuntary admission and involuntary medication, again, in the future is not a sufficient basis to make the second element of the mootness exception. Alfred H.H. , 233 Ill. 2d at 358-61, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74.

¶ 30 There is nothing in the majority's order that constitutes anything other than a recitation of existing case law. Therefore, the majority's resolution of the issues in this case should have no effect on respondent in subsequent commitment proceedings. Id. at 360, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74.

¶ 31 The majority laments the fact that no one below took note of a summary order issued in a prior case. It seems unrealistic to believe that circuit court judges, even assuming it is the same judge, will somehow remember a prior summary order. And, again, the fact that it was a summary order would lead one to believe it could have broken no new law and, therefore, was nothing more than a recitation of applying existing law to the facts, which, it seems by definition, takes the matter out of the realm of an exception to the mootness doctrine.

¶ 32 I therefore respectfully dissent.

      We note respondent raises a series of other arguments. As we reverse both the involuntary commitment and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication based on the grounds above, we offer no opinion on the mootness considerations or merits of the other issues.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    PRINOVA SOLUTIONS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROCESS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION LTD., Defendant
    (John Witterschein, d/b/a Process Technology, LLC, Respondent in DiscoveryAppellant).
    No. 2-17-0666
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 23, 2018
    Sanjay Shivpuri, of Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
    Jamie L. Burns, of Levenfeld Pearlstein, LLC, of Chicago, for appellee.
   JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal presents us with the following certified question:

"Can the respondent in discovery statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-402, operate in reverse, such that after a defendant has already been dismissed from the lawsuit, without prejudice, he may be converted into a respondent in discovery, and thereafter be converted to a defendant again?"

This issue was addressed by the First District of the appellate court in Westwood Construction Group, Inc. v. IRUS Property, LLC , 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, 407 Ill.Dec. 972, 64 N.E.3d 771, which held that such a scenario was permissible. We agree with the reasoning in that case and therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiff, Prinova Solutions, LLC (Prinova), filed a complaint on November 5, 2014, naming John Witterschein, d/b/a Process Technology, LLC, as the defendant. It alleged that it had purchased food blending and processing equipment from Witterschein that was defective. It alleged counts of breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.

¶ 4 On March 9, 2015, Witterschein filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014) ). He alleged that the contract was between plaintiff and Process Technology Corporation Ltd. of Hong Kong and that neither he nor his company (Process Technology, LLC) was named in it. Witterschein also filed a motion for Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. July 1, 2013) sanctions and a motion to stay discovery. On May 21, 2015, the trial court granted Witterschein's motion to dismiss, without prejudice. It further granted Witterschein's motion to stay discovery and denied his motion for sanctions.

¶ 5 Prinova filed an amended complaint on July 27, 2015, against Process Technology Corporation Ltd., which was the Hong Kong company. It further named Witterschein as a respondent in discovery pursuant to section 2-402 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2014) ) and issued interrogatories and document requests to him. On June 20, 2016, Witterschein filed an amended motion to dismiss and/or for a protective order. He argued that he could not be named as a respondent in discovery, because he had previously been dismissed from the lawsuit.

¶ 6 Before the trial court had ruled on Witterschein's motion, the First District of the appellate court issued its decision in Westwood Construction Group , 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, 407 Ill.Dec. 972, 64 N.E.3d 771, which held that defendants in an original complaint who had been dismissed without prejudice could be designated as respondents in discovery in an amended complaint. One justice dissented.

¶ 7 Based on Westwood Construction Group , the trial court denied Witterschein's amended motion to dismiss on March 28, 2017. It stated, "[F]rankly, what [the court] felt was the law is not the law" and "the plaintiff can, in fact, name former defendants as respondents in discovery." It stated, "[the court] disagree[s], but * * * there's no Second District case to the contrary."

¶ 8 The following month, Witterschein requested that the trial court certify the aforementioned question to allow him to file an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017). The trial court granted Witterschein's motion on August 1, 2017, and we granted his application for leave to appeal.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Rule 308 allows for the permissive interlocutory appeal of an order involving "a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" where "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). A certified question under Rule 308 presents a question of law, which we review de novo . Bowman v. Ottney , 2015 IL 119000, ¶ 8, 400 Ill.Dec. 640, 48 N.E.3d 1080.

¶ 11 This appeal also requires us to construe section 2-402 ; the construction of a statute is a question of law that we likewise review de novo . Bueker v. Madison County , 2016 IL 120024, ¶ 13, 410 Ill.Dec. 883, 72 N.E.3d 269. In construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, which is best indicated by the statute's language, when given its plain and ordinary meaning. Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc. , 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 410 Ill.Dec. 937, 72 N.E.3d 323. We will not "depart from the plain statutory language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent." In re Marriage of Goesel , 2017 IL 122046, ¶ 13, 421 Ill.Dec. 949, 102 N.E.3d 230.

¶ 12 Section 2-402 provides:

"The plaintiff in any civil action may designate as respondents in discovery in his or her pleading those individuals or other entities, other than the named defendants, believed by the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination of who should properly be named as additional defendants in the action.
Persons or entities so named as respondents in discovery shall be required to respond to discovery by the plaintiff in the same manner as are defendants and may, on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if the evidence discloses the existence of probable cause for such action.
A person or entity named a respondent in discovery may upon his or her own motion be made a defendant in the action, in which case the provisions of this Section are no longer applicable to that person.
A copy of the complaint shall be served on each person or entity named as a respondent in discovery.
Each respondent in discovery shall be paid expenses and fees as provided for witnesses.
A person or entity named as a respondent in discovery in any civil action may be made a defendant in the same action at any time within 6 months after being named as a respondent in discovery, even though the time during which an action may otherwise be initiated against him or her may have expired during such 6 month period." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2014).

The statute further requires that the plaintiff serve the respondent with a copy of the complaint and a summons. Id.

¶ 13 As stated, the First District of the appellate court addressed the issue presented here in Westwood Construction Group . In that case, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against five defendants, and the trial court dismissed the complaint against all of them, without prejudice. Westwood Construction Group , 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, ¶ 1, 407 Ill.Dec. 972, 64 N.E.3d 771. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint that named three of the previously-dismissed defendants as respondents in discovery under section 2-402. Id. These three parties filed motions to dismiss them as respondents in discovery, and they sought sanctions. Id. They argued that section 2-402 allowed a person to designate a party as a respondent in discovery and later convert the party into a defendant, but did not allow a previously-named defendant to be designated as a respondent in discovery in an amended complaint. Id. ¶ 6. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice but denied sanctions. Id. ¶ 7. The plaintiffs appealed the grant of the motions to dismiss, and the respondents appealed the denial of sanctions. Id.

¶ 14 The appellate court explained that section 2-402, though applicable to all civil actions, was enacted to give medical-malpractice plaintiffs a means to avoid naming numerous defendants. Id. ¶ 13. It allows a plaintiff to name as respondents in discovery parties whose culpability cannot be determined at the time the complaint is filed, and it gives the plaintiff the means to collect discovery from those parties to determine if they should be added as defendants. Id. ¶¶ 13 -14. It also can help the respondents avoid the burden of being unnecessarily named as defendants. Id. ¶ 13. A plaintiff has six months from the naming of a respondent in discovery to convert him to a defendant, but the plaintiff can receive a one-time, 90-day extension for good cause. Id. ¶ 15. To convert the respondent to a defendant, the plaintiff must seek leave of the court and cite evidence that shows probable cause for such action. Id.

¶ 15 The court held that nothing in section 2-402's plain language prevented the designation of a former defendant as a respondent in discovery in an amended pleading. Id. ¶ 17. It reasoned that the statute "contains no limitation as to when or in what sequence a plaintiff may designate a person or entity as a respondent in discovery" and that the "only limitation is that the designated persons or entities be 'believed by the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination of who should properly be named as additional defendants in the [action].' " Id. (quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2012) ). It reasoned that if the legislature had intended to restrict the designation of a respondent in discovery, such as to the initial filing, it would have done so. Id. The court stated that in "the absence of a prior dismissal with prejudice" the "unconventional pleading sequence" was not precluded. Id. ¶ 18. The court found premature the respondents' argument that the plaintiffs' actions showed bad faith, stating that the plaintiffs would be required to comply with section 2-402 and that, at the conclusion of the period set forth in the statute, the respondents could request "appropriate relief" in the trial court if they continued to believe that the plaintiffs had not complied with statutory or ethical pleading requirements. Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 16 Justice Hyman dissented from the majority's interpretation of section 2-402, stating that it "does violence to its language, thwarts legislative intent, and enables the plaintiffs here-and future plaintiffs-to use the 'respondent-in-discovery' process in a way that would be highly injurious to civil litigation." Id. ¶ 30 (Hyman, P.J., dissenting). Justice Hyman first stated that the phrase "other than the named defendants" ( 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2012) ) showed that the legislature envisioned respondents in discovery as a wholly separate group from the named defendants in the action, and since the respondents were named defendants in the original action, this clause should apply to them. Id. ¶¶ 32 -35. Second, Justice Hyman stated that the purpose of section 2-402 was to allow a plaintiff to determine who should be sued, whereas the plaintiffs in the case at issue had already determined that the respondents should be sued. Id. ¶ 36. Third, Justice Hyman stated that the respondents were not properly served under section 2-402. Id. ¶ 38. He further stated that section 2-402 contemplated a linear process, where a respondent in discovery might be named as a defendant. Id. ¶ 41. Justice Hyman stated that the plaintiffs had used section 2-402"backward" from the way the legislature intended and that allowing a plaintiff to keep a defendant " 'on the hook' " could lead to "unintended mischief." Id. ¶¶ 41 -42. Witterschein argues that Justice Hyman's points are valid and that we should adopt his reasoning.

¶ 17 Citing Allen v. Peoria Park District , 2012 IL App (3d) 110197, 360 Ill.Dec. 446, 968 N.E.2d 1199, Witterschein further argues that, under Illinois common law, a plaintiff is not permitted to conduct discovery to determine if he can discover a cause of action. In Allen , the reviewing court held that, where the plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed and they had not filed an amended complaint, the trial court erred in allowing them to conduct discovery to determine if they could find a cause of action. Id. ¶ 14. It stated that the plaintiffs sought "discovery to determine whether a wrong occurred, not who committed a known wrong" ( id. ¶ 12 ) and that they could not file a faulty complaint and use discovery as a basis to see if the defendant did something tortious ( id. ¶ 14 ). The court noted that filing a complaint without a factual basis was both improper and sanctionable as a matter of law. Id.

¶ 18 Witterschein argues that the trial court has the discretion to stay discovery pending a ruling on a motion to dismiss (see Adkins Energy, LLC v. Delta-T Corp. , 347 Ill. App. 3d 373, 381, 282 Ill.Dec. 685, 806 N.E.2d 1273 (2004) ) and that discovery is stayed when a complaint is dismissed without prejudice. He argues that, because the common law holds that discovery is not allowed against a defendant after he has been dismissed, section 2-402 is in derogation of the common law, and thus the statute cannot be construed as changing the common law beyond what the statutory language expresses or necessarily implies. See Williams v. Manchester , 228 Ill. 2d 404, 419, 320 Ill.Dec. 784, 888 N.E.2d 1 (2008) (citing latter principle). Witterschein argues that section 2-402's language allows a plaintiff to convert a respondent in discovery into a defendant if there is sufficient evidence for a cause of action against the respondent, and it allows a respondent in discovery to convert himself into a defendant. Witterschein argues that nowhere does the statute allow a plaintiff to convert a defendant into a respondent in discovery, particularly after the action against the defendant has been dismissed. He maintains that the procedural aspects of the statute support this position, as they require that a complaint and summons be served on a respondent in discovery, which would have already occurred if that party had initially been named as a defendant. Witterschein argues that we should not presume that the legislature intended the absurd action of serving the same person in the same case with two summonses. According to Witterschein, the statute contemplates a linear process where a respondent might become a defendant, whereas Prinova has used the statute in reverse.

¶ 19 Witterschein further argues that, if a defendant is dismissed pursuant to section 2-615, it means that the plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. He maintains that, if a plaintiff is then permitted to seek those same facts through discovery under section 2-402, it undermines Rule 137 and case law requiring that a plaintiff investigate a potential case and file suit only if the facts and the law reveal an objectively reasonable basis for doing so. See Kellett v. Roberts , 276 Ill. App. 3d 164, 172, 213 Ill.Dec. 26, 658 N.E.2d 496 (1995) (" Rule 137 requires litigants and their attorneys to conduct an inquiry into the facts and the law before filing a pleading and to certify that the pleading is well-grounded in fact and in law, or that a good-faith argument exists for the extension, modification, or reversal of the existing law."). Witterschein argues that this precise scenario occurred here and that, if Prinova could not obtain facts to sue him without resorting to discovery first, it never should have sued him in the initial complaint. Witterschein contends that section 2-402 was meant only for determining whether a party was the correct defendant in a medical-malpractice case, not for engaging in a fishing expedition in a commercial case to determine if there was something a nonparty could be sued for.

¶ 20 Witterschein adds that, if a plaintiff is permitted to convert a dismissed defendant into a respondent in discovery, it opens the door to a cycle in which a defendant is dismissed, converted into a respondent in discovery, converted back into a defendant, and again dismissed. Witterschein argues that the cycle can continue until a defendant is forced to settle to avoid the harassment and litigation expense. He contends that the "unintended mischief" that Justice Hyman warned about has occurred here, as Prinova has made no attempt to serve the named defendant, despite the passage of years, showing that the entire litigation is just an exercise in pursuing him when no case against him exists. Witterschein argues that section 2-402's purpose is to determine "who should properly be named" in the action. He further contends that, because this is a breach-of-contract action, the correct defendant is the other party to the contract (see Wilde v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Wilmette , 134 Ill. App. 3d 722, 731, 89 Ill.Dec. 493, 480 N.E.2d 1236 (1985) ), namely, Process Technology Corporation Ltd.

¶ 21 Last, Witterschein argues that "reversing" the respondent-in-discovery statute violates the Illinois Constitution. He argues that it violates the equal protection clause because it creates two classes of defendants: a sole defendant would have his case terminated after a section 2-615 dismissal, whereas a dismissed defendant in a case with multiple defendants could be converted into a respondent in discovery. Witterschein asserts that "reversing" the statute would also violate his rights to substantive and procedural due process, as he has the right to be dismissed from the litigation if Prinova does not have sufficient facts and a legal basis on which to sue him.

¶ 22 Prinova, for its part, argues that Westwood Construction Group was correctly decided. Prinova points out that, just as in that case, its case against Witterschein was dismissed without prejudice, and it was granted an opportunity to file an amended pleading. It argues that, contrary to Witterschein's assertion that a former defendant cannot be named as a respondent in discovery, no such limitation is present in the statute. Prinova maintains that the only limitation is that the designated respondent be "believed by the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination of who should properly be named as additional defendants in the action" ( 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2014) ), and here Prinova believes that Witterschein possesses such information. Prinova argues that its allegations show that Witterschein was its only contact for the transaction and that it is proper to gather information from him to determine whether there is any basis to name any additional defendants in its action. Prinova argues that this is particularly relevant given that Witterschein was dismissed without prejudice.

¶ 23 Prinova maintains that, although Witterschein argues that the statute's purpose is to allow medical-malpractice plaintiffs to conduct discovery, section 2-402's plain language states that a plaintiff may designate respondents in discovery "in any civil action." Id. Prinova argues that Witterschein's discussion of when discovery is stayed with respect to a defendant is comparing apples to oranges, as "a lawsuit naming an individual as a respondent in discovery is not an action against that individual and the individual is not a party to that action." Delestowicz v. Labinsky , 288 Ill. App. 3d 637, 639, 224 Ill.Dec. 387, 681 N.E.2d 1008 (1997). Prinova argues that it is attempting to issue discovery to Witterschein not as a party to the lawsuit but rather as a respondent in discovery to determine who should be named as an additional defendant, which is precisely the statute's purpose. Prinova contends that, contrary to Witterschein's assertion that the trial court already determined who should be sued, the trial court dismissed its initial complaint without prejudice, declining to hold that Prinova could never state a cause against Witterschein (or anyone else).

¶ 24 Prinova further argues that Witterschein's constitutional arguments are without merit, as section 2-402 can never be used by a plaintiff seeking to sue only one party, so it makes no difference whether Witterschein was previously dismissed from the case. Prinova argues that, if it had filed an entirely new case naming Process Technology Corporation Ltd. as the defendant and Witterschein as the respondent in discovery-which it would have been entitled to do since its complaint was dismissed without prejudice-Witterschein could not make his argument without calling the constitutionality of the statute as a whole into question.

¶ 25 Witterschein replies that there are two red flags in Prinova's response. Witterschein argues that the first red flag is that Prinova does not dispute that it is not pursuing the named defendant in the case, showing that the defendant is being used as a placeholder so that Prinova can pursue Witterschein. Witterschein maintains that Prinova's actions are an abuse of the judicial process that violates the spirit and text of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 2007) (reasonable service) and Rule 137. Witterschein asserts that the second red flag is that Prinova does not argue that it does not know whom to sue for the breach of contract. Witterschein argues that, although Prinova points out that the trial court dismissed him without prejudice, that is not the same as Prinova asserting that it needs discovery to determine whom to sue. Witterschein argues that Prinova is instead using section 2-402 to seek facts on which to sue him again.

¶ 26 We agree with the majority's analysis in Westwood Construction Group that nothing in section 2-402's plain language precludes a party who was previously named as a defendant and dismissed without prejudice from being named as a respondent in discovery in an amended complaint. Although section 2-402 was enacted to fill a role in medical-malpractice cases, it applies to "any civil action." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2014). A plaintiff may name as a respondent in discovery anyone "other than the named defendants, believed by the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination of who should properly be named as additional defendants in the action," and when Prinova filed its amended complaint, Witterschein was not a named defendant. Id.

¶ 27 Witterschein's emphasis on a "linear process" behind section 2-402 is misplaced. It is true that in a typical scenario a respondent in discovery would be converted into a defendant, rather than a previously dismissed defendant being named as a respondent in discovery. See Westwood Construction Group , 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, ¶ 18, 407 Ill.Dec. 972, 64 N.E.3d 771 (referring to latter scenario as an "unconventional pleading sequence"). However, as the Westwood Construction Group court pointed out, the statute "contains no limitation as to when or in what sequence a plaintiff may designate a person or entity as a respondent in discovery." Id. ¶ 17. If the legislature had intended to limit respondents in discovery to parties who had never been named defendants, it could have done so. See id. Further, we find unavailing the concerns about a perpetual cycle where a party is named as a defendant and a respondent in discovery, because a respondent in discovery can always self-convert to a defendant (see 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2014) ) and then seek a dismissal with prejudice. See Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital , 149 Ill. App. 3d 371, 375, 103 Ill.Dec. 854, 502 N.E.2d 1 (1986) (if a respondent in discovery chooses to exercise the right to be made a defendant upon his own motion, a plaintiff loses all advantages afforded by section 2-402 ). The respondent also can seek sanctions under Rule 137 or other "appropriate relief" (see Westwood Construction Group , 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, ¶ 19, 407 Ill.Dec. 972, 64 N.E.3d 771 ) if warranted.

¶ 28 We find this case distinguishable from Allen because that case did not involve a respondent in discovery. Further, in Allen , the plaintiffs were using "discovery to determine whether a wrong occurred, not who committed a known wrong" ( Allen , 2012 IL App (3d) 110197, ¶ 12, 360 Ill.Dec. 446, 968 N.E.2d 1199 ), which is clearly a fishing expedition, whereas here Prinova has clearly alleged a wrong in the form of defective processing equipment. It may use section 2-402 to assist in determining who should properly be named as additional defendants. Witterschein asserts that the only proper defendant is Process Technology Corporation Ltd., because it was the other party to the contract. However, as Prinova points out, Witterschein was dismissed without prejudice. Prinova could also add causes of action beyond those rooted in breach of contract.

¶ 29 Last, we conclude that Witterschein's constitutional arguments are without merit. His position that "reversing" section 2-402 would violate the equal protection clause, because it would create two classes of defendants, is unavailing. "The equal protection clause guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated in a similar manner, unless the government can demonstrate an appropriate reason to treat those individuals differently."

In re M.A. , 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 24, 397 Ill.Dec. 759, 43 N.E.3d 86. Witterschein argues that there are two classes at issue here: sole defendants who have their cases terminated after section 2-615 dismissals, and multiple defendants who could be converted into respondents in discovery. However, a sole defendant may not have his case terminated if the dismissal was without prejudice. Indeed, Witterschein himself was a sole defendant in Prinova's initial complaint, and that did not immunize him from being named as a respondent in discovery in the amended complaint. Thus, Witterschein has not sufficiently explained how similarly situated individuals are being treated differently under section 2-402.

¶ 30 Witterschein's due process arguments also fail. Witterschein argues that he has procedural and substantive due process rights to be dismissed from the litigation and not be subject to further discovery if Prinova does not have the facts or law on which to sue him. Procedural due process claims involve the constitutionality of the procedures employed to deny a person's life, liberty, or property. In re J.R. , 341 Ill. App. 3d 784, 795, 275 Ill.Dec. 916, 793 N.E.2d 687 (2003). Conversely, in a substantive due process challenge to a statute, the threshold question is whether the statute restricts or regulates a fundamental right, which will determine whether we apply a strict-scrutiny or rational-basis test. Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 28, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570. Even if, arguendo , the right to be dismissed from litigation were a fundamental right, section 2-402 would not impede this right here, as Witterschein was dismissed without prejudice, meaning that he could again be named in the litigation, and Witterschein could always self-convert to a defendant and again be dismissed. Although Witterschein raises the specter of a harassing cycle of continuously being named as a respondent in discovery, appropriate relief could be sought to avoid such a scenario. See supra ¶ 27.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question of the Du Page County circuit court in the affirmative, and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 33 Certified question answered.

¶ 34 Cause remanded.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.


text:
    The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WOODLAND COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 50 and The Board of Education of Fremont School District 79, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and The Board of Directors of Prairie Crossing Charter School, Defendants-Appellants.
    Nos. 1-16-2900 & 1-16-2927 (Consolidated)
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SIXTH DIVISION.
    Opinion Filed: March 23, 2018
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Brett E. Legner, Deputy Solicitor General, of counsel), for appellant Illinois State Board of Education.
    Respicio F. Vazquez, of Franczek Radelet P.C., of Chicago, for other appellant.
    James A. Petrungaro and Adam Dauksas, of Scariano, Himes & Petrarca, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellees.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendants, the Illinois State Board of Education (State Board) and the Board of Directors of Prairie Crossing Charter School, appeal from an order of the circuit court granting the joint motion for summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action filed by the plaintiffs, the Board of Education of Woodland Community Consolidated School District 50 (Woodland) and the Board of Education of Fremont School District 79 (Fremont) (collectively referred to as the School Districts). The defendants also appeal from the circuit court's denial of the State Board's cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 2 The following factual recitation is undisputed. Woodland and Fremont are bodies politic organized and existing under article 10 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/art. 10 (West 2012) ). Prairie Crossing Charter School (Prairie Crossing) is a charter school organized and existing pursuant to the Charter Schools Law (id. § 27A-1 et seq. ).

¶ 3 Over the objection of the School Districts, the State Board authorized the creation of Prairie Crossing in 1998, entitling it to enroll students residing within the boundaries of the School Districts. Pursuant to statute, a charter school which is authorized over the objection of a local school district is funded by withholding funds otherwise due to the local school district(s) within which the pupils attending the charter school reside and paying those funds directly to the charter school. Id. § 27A-9(f).

¶ 4 From the inception of Prairie Crossing in 1999 until the 2015-16 school year, the State Board included pupils attending Prairie Crossing within the pupil enrollment of either Woodland or Fremont, depending upon the pupils' residences, in calculating the sums to be deducted from the funds otherwise due the School Districts and paid to Prairie Crossing. However, in December 2014, Woodland and Fremont were notified by the State Board that, beginning with funding for the 2015-16 school year, pupils attending Prairie Crossing would no longer be included within the pupil enrollment of either Woodland or Fremont for purposes of calculating the funds to be diverted and paid to Prairie Crossing. The effect of the change would result in more funds being withheld from both Woodland and Fremont than would have been withheld and paid to Prairie Crossing under the funding formula employed in prior years. In addition, the State Board notified the School Districts that it had recalculated the amount that should have been withheld from their general state aid and paid to Prairie Crossing for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 using the revised funding formula. According to the State Board's recalculation , an additional $278,269 should have been withheld from Woodland and paid to Prairie Crossing and an additional $46,905 should have been withheld from Fremont and paid to Prairie Crossing. Although the retroactive application of the State Board's revised funding formula resulted in a determination that Prairie Crossing was underfunded by $325,174, the State Board and Prairie Crossing settled the underfunding for $200,000, of which $170,000 was attributed to Woodland and $30,000 was attributed to Fremont. The State Board advised Woodland and Fremont that it would be withholding the amount of the settlement attributable to each from their general state aid in equal installments over the next four years.

¶ 5 In May 2015, the School Districts filed the instant action against both the State Board and the Board of Directors of Prairie Crossing Charter School. In their amended complaint, the School Districts sought a judicial declaration that students residing within their respective boundaries and attending Prairie Crossing shall be counted as attending the school district in which they reside for purposes of calculating the sums to be deducted from the funds otherwise due to them from the State Board and paid to Prairie Crossing. They also sought a judicial declaration that the State Board lacked the statutory authority to recalculate the general state aid to which they were entitled for previous fiscal years and recoup any overpayment from the future general State aid to which they are otherwise entitled.

¶ 6 Following discovery, the School Districts and the State Board filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On October 7, 2016, the circuit court denied the State Board's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the School Districts, declaring that pupils attending Prairie Crossing shall be counted as attending the school district in which they reside for purposes of calculating the sums to be deducted from the funds otherwise due the School Districts and paid to Prairie Crossing. In addition, the circuit court found that the State Board lacked the statutory authority to recoup from the School Districts any funds which it paid to Prairie Crossing as a result of its recalculation of the funds to which Prairie Crossing was entitled for prior fiscal years. Both the State Board and Prairie Crossing filed timely notices of appeal which this court consolidated for disposition.

¶ 7 "Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York , 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556, 310 Ill.Dec. 338, 866 N.E.2d 149 (2007). When, as in this case, parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the resolution of the case is purely a question of law. Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz , 237 Ill. 2d 424, 432, 341 Ill.Dec. 485, 930 N.E.2d 999 (2010). We review the entry of summary judgment de novo . A.B.A.T.E. of Illinois, Inc. v. Quinn , 2011 IL 110611, ¶ 22, 354 Ill.Dec. 282, 957 N.E.2d 876.

¶ 8 This appeal concerns statutory interpretation. As such, we are presented with questions of law which we resolve de novo. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 231 Ill. 2d 370, 380, 326 Ill.Dec. 10, 899 N.E.2d 227 (2008). Our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent, which is best indicated by the plain and ordinary language of the statutes themselves. Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A. , 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23, 357 Ill.Dec. 55, 962 N.E.2d 956. We give words their plain and obvious meaning unless the legislative act changes that meaning. Svithiod Singing Club v. McKibbin , 381 Ill. 194, 197, 44 N.E.2d 904 (1942). In determining legislative intent, we also consider the object to be attained by the act. Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer , 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 25, 376 Ill.Dec. 294, 998 N.E.2d 1227.

¶ 9 In giving meaning to the words and clauses of a statute, no part should be rendered superfluous. Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay , 2013 IL 114617, ¶ 26, 371 Ill.Dec. 1, 989 N.E.2d 591. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language without resort to other tools of statutory construction ( Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove , 209 Ill. 2d 248, 255, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439 (2004) ), as it is not our function to rewrite a statute or depart from its plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed therein ( People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery , 235 Ill. 2d 73, 81, 335 Ill.Dec. 592, 919 N.E.2d 311 (2009) ). "If further construction of a statute is necessary, a court may consider similar and related enactments." Hartney Fuel Oil Co. , 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 25, 376 Ill.Dec. 294, 998 N.E.2d 1227. Statutory provisions should be read in concert and harmonized. People v. Rinehart , 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 26, 356 Ill.Dec. 759, 962 N.E.2d 444.

¶ 10 The two statutes at issue in this appeal are the School Code and the Charter Schools Law. The specific question to be answered is whether pupils residing within the boundaries of a local school district but attending a charter school should be counted as pupils attending the local school district for purposes of calculating the sums to be deducted from the funds otherwise due the local school district and paid to the charter school.

¶ 11 Where, as in this case, a charter school is authorized by the State over the objection of the local school district(s), an amount equal to the funds to which a charter school is entitled is diverted by the State Board from funds otherwise due the local school district(s) and delivered to the charter school. 105 ILCS 5/27A-9(f) (West 2012). Funding of a charter school, such as Prairie Crossing, which is organized other than by referendum is determined by agreement between the local school board and the charter school. However, in no event shall the funding be less than 75% or more than 125% of the local school district's per capita student tuition, multiplied by the number of students attending the charter school who reside in the local school district. Id. § 27A-11(b).

¶ 12 The Charter Schools Law does not define how a local school district's per capita student tuition is to be calculated. The arguments of the parties as contained in their respective briefs reflect their agreement that the phrase "per capita student tuition" as used in section 27A-11(b) of the Charter Schools Law is synonymous with per capita tuition cost (PCTC) as used in the School Code. Id. The State Board asserts in its brief, and the School Districts echo in their brief, that the formula set forth in section 18-3 of the School Code (id. § 18-3) is used to establish a local school district's PCTC. In relevant part, section 18-3 of the School Code provides that:

"[T]otal annual per capita [tuition] cost [ (PCTC) ] shall be determined by totaling all expenses of the school district in the educational, operations and maintenance, bond and interest, transportation, Illinois municipal retirement, and rent funds for the school year preceding the filing of such tuition claims less expenditures not applicable to the regular K-12 program, less offsetting revenues from State sources except those from the common school fund, less offsetting revenues from federal sources except those from federal impaction aid, less student and community service revenues, plus a depreciation allowance; and dividing such total by the average daily attendance for the year." (Emphasis added.) Id.

The specific issue on which the parties are in disagreement is the calculation of a local school district's annual average daily attendance for purposes of establishing its PCTC.

¶ 13 In urging reversal, the State Board argues that, in calculating a local school district's average daily attendance, pupils residing within the district but attending a charter school should not be counted as attending the public schools maintained by the local school district. The State Board reasons that, because local school districts do not bear the cost of educating pupils attending a charter school, those pupils should not be counted in determining the local school district's annual average daily attendance which is the denominator in the formula set forth in section 18-3 of the School Code used in calculating PCTC.

¶ 14 In support of its rationale in this regard, the State Board contends that section 18-3 of the School Code makes clear that the PCTC of a local school district "shall be determined by the State Superintendent of Education by multiplying the number of such children in average daily attendance in such schools" by the "annual per capita [tuition] cost [ (PCTC) ] of administering the schools of the district." Id. The flaw in the State Board's reliance upon the above quoted language of section 18-3 is that it relates to the average daily attendance of certain specified categories of pupils attending public schools maintained by a school district, not the average daily attendance of the local school district itself. The "such children" referred to are those pupils who fall within the specified categories. For funding purposes, the number of "such children" in average daily attendance in public schools maintained by a school district is to be multiplied by 1.2 times the annual per capita cost of administering the schools of the district. Id. Section 18-3 does not contain any provision setting forth the manner in which average daily attendance for the local school district is to be determined. That formula is contained in section 18-8.05(C) of the School Code which provides, in relevant part, that for purposes of calculating general State aid, average daily attendance is the "monthly average of the actual number of pupils in attendance of each school district , as further averaged for the best 3 months of pupil attendance." (Emphasis added.) Id. § 18-8.05(C)(1). Standing alone, the phrase actual number of pupils in attendance of each school district as contained in section 18-8.05(C)(1) could reasonably be interpreted to mean the actual number of pupils attending public schools maintained by a school district. However, section 27A-11(a) of the Charter Schools Law makes clear that, "[f]or purposes of the School Code, pupils enrolled in a charter school shall be included in the pupil enrollment of the school district within which the pupil resides." Id. § 27A-11(a). Based upon the clear and unambiguous language of section 27A-11(a) of the Charter Schools Law, we do not believe that pupils attending a charter school located within the local school district in which they reside can be excluded from a determination of the actual number of pupils in attendance in that district for purposes of calculating the district's average daily attendance. To conclude otherwise would render section 27A-11(a) superfluous.

¶ 15 Nevertheless, the State Board argues that pupils attending Prairie Crossing are not considered to be enrolled in the district within which they reside for purposes of determining the local school district's average daily attendance. It asserts that, although it originally authorized Prairie Crossing as a charter school, Prairie Crossing is now authorized by the Illinois State Charter School Commission (Commission), and as such, it is not part of a local school district but rather constitutes its own local education agency. See id. § 27A-5(k). The State Board concludes, therefore, that pupils attending Prairie Crossing are not considered to be enrolled in the district within which they reside. However, as the School Districts point out, the fact that section 27A-5(k) now provides that a Commission-authorized charter school is its own local education agency does not explain how that fact impacts the manner in which a charter school is funded. In particular, the fact that a charter school is considered a local education agency is not taken into consideration in section 18-3 of the School Code which contains the formula for determining a local school district's PCTC that is the basis for computing the funding to which a charter school is entitled. Further, although a Commission-authorized charter school may be considered a local education agency, there is no statutory authority for the proposition that its pupils do not reside within a local school district. Finally, as the School Districts argue, there is no statutory support, either express or implied, for the notion that a local school district's PCTC is to be determined differently for purposes of calculating funding for a charter school which is authorized by the State Board or the Commission as opposed to calculating funding for a charter school authorized by a local school district.

¶ 16 As a general rule, we accord deference to the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration. Shields v. Judges' Retirement System of Illinois , 204 Ill. 2d 488, 492, 274 Ill.Dec. 424, 791 N.E.2d 516 (2003). However, an agency's interpretation is not binding and will be rejected when it is erroneous. Id. Based upon the foregoing analysis, we believe that the State Board's interpretation of the School Code and the Charter Schools Law, as those statutes relate to the issue of whether pupils attending a charter school should be counted as attending the local school district in which they reside for purposes of calculating the local school district's average daily attendance, fails to comport with the clear and unambiguous language of section 27A-11(a) of the Charter Schools Law. We conclude, as did the circuit court, that pupils attending Prairie Crossing shall be counted as attending the school district in which they reside for purposes of calculating that local school district's average daily attendance, which is the denominator of the formula used to determine the district's PCTC set forth in section 18-3 of the School Code which, in turn, establishes the minimum and maximum to be deducted from the funds otherwise due the School Districts and paid to Prairie Crossing.

¶ 17 Having determined that the pupils attending Prairie Crossing shall be counted as attending the local school district in which they reside for purposes of calculating that district's average daily attendance, as the State Board did in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, we need not address the issue of whether the State Board was authorized by statute to recalculate the general state aid to which the School Districts were entitled in those years as there was no overpayment based upon the original calculation of the funds to which Prairie Crossing was entitled.

¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the School Districts and denying the State Board's cross-motion for summary judgment.

¶ 19 Affirmed.

Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion.