text:
    IN RE L.J.S., a Minor
    (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Richard S., Respondent-Appellant).
    Appeal No. 3-18-0218
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Opinion filed September 13, 2018
    Nate Nieman, of Rock Island, for appellant.
    John L. McGehee, State's Attorney, of Rock Island (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Thomas D. Arado, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 L.J.S. was adjudicated abused and neglected based on allegations that respondent, Richard S., sexually abused her. Afterward, the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights, claiming that Richard was an unfit parent because (1) he was depraved, (2) he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.J.S.'s removal, and (3) he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of L.J.S. It also claimed that it was in L.J.S.'s best interest to terminate Richard's parental rights. The trial court found Richard unfit and, subsequently, terminated Richard's parental rights. Richard appealed the unfitness ruling. We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, claiming that L.J.S., born August 7, 2006, was neglected, abused, and dependent. The petition alleged that L.J.S.'s environment was injurious to her welfare because she was sexually abused by her father, Richard. Richard had been incarcerated in Rock Island County jail because he was charged with six counts of predatory sexual assault. L.J.S.'s mother, Dawn B., was not involved in L.J.S.'s life. The State also filed a petition for temporary custody.

¶ 4 In May 2016, Dawn stipulated to the allegations in the petition. In its adjudicatory order, the court granted the State's petition, finding that, based on the stipulation, there were sufficient facts to find L.J.S. had been abused. In June 2016, a dispositional hearing was held. Richard was not present; however, his attorney made his first appearance at the hearing. After the hearing, the court entered a dispositional order, adjudicating L.J.S. abused and neglected. It also granted the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placement and custody of L.J.S. and ordered that visitation was at the discretion of DCFS and the Center for Youth and Family Solutions (CYFS). It stated that a service plan was appropriate and that DCFS must "develop and implement a new service plan in conformity of this Order."

¶ 5 In July 2016, the court entered a nunc pro tunc finding to support an adjudicatory order and a supplemental dispositional order, stating that, inter alia , Richard must (1) cooperate with services and service providers, (2) follow the "497 Client Service Plan" and sign necessary releases of information, (3) obtain and maintain appropriate housing and income, (4) participate in sex offender treatment, (5) complete integrated assessment, and (6) not have visitation with L.J.S. while he is incarcerated.

¶ 6 In December 2016, the first permanency review was held. The court found that Richard was not making reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.J.S.'s removal and not making reasonable progress toward the return of L.J.S. The permanency order stated that the appropriate permanency goal was to return L.J.S. home within 12 months. A second permanency review was held in March 2017. Dawn submitted a final and irrevocable consent to adoption, and the trial court certified that her consent was knowing and voluntary. The court ruled that Richard was not making reasonable progress or reasonable efforts. In its written order, the court stated that the appropriate permanency goal was substitute care pending determination of termination of parental rights. During this time, Richard pled guilty to five counts of aggravated criminal sex abuse, four of which related to L.J.S., and was sentenced to five 48-month terms of probation, all to be served concurrently. As part of his probation conditions, Richard was prohibited from having contact with L.J.S. He was released from jail on December 2, 2017.

¶ 7 The State filed a supplemental petition to terminate parental rights. The State alleged that Richard was an unfit parent because (1) he was depraved under section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act ( 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2016) ); (2) he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.J.S.'s removal during the relevant nine-month period of June 23, 2016, through March 23, 2017, under section 1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(i) ); and (3) he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of L.J.S. during the relevant nine-month period of June 23, 2016, through March 23, 2017, under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii) ). The State asserted as factual support for its allegations that Richard (1) pled guilty to five counts of aggravated criminal sex abuse, (2) failed to maintain appropriate employment or income while he was incarcerated, (3) failed to complete an integrated assessment, and (4) failed to communicate with DCFS about his participation in sex offender treatment or other services. The State also pled that it was in the best interest of L.J.S. that Richard's parental rights were terminated.

¶ 8 In August 2017, a parental fitness hearing was held. On direct examination, Kathie McAdams, caseworker for CYFS, testified that she had been L.J.S.'s caseworker for three months. She was not L.J.S.'s original caseworker but had been familiar with the earlier history of the case. When L.J.S. was adjudicated abused and neglected, Richard was incarcerated in Rock Island County jail awaiting charges for sexually abusing L.J.S. However, he was not in jail when McAdams was assigned to the case. While Richard was in jail, he was ordered to complete an integrated assessment. To her knowledge, Richard never attempted to coordinate and complete the integrated assessment or any other services. McAdams had no knowledge about the former caseworker's communication, if any, with Richard about completing the assessment. McAdams's first discussion with Richard about completing the assessment was on August 14, 2017. On that day, Richard told her that he had started receiving services at the Robert Young Center (Robert Young) after he had been released from jail. She was not able to verify his statement, however, because he would not sign a release. She had made two prior attempts to speak with him after receiving his contact information from his father, who came to McAdams's office and left her Richard's number. However, she had not made any effort to contact him before August 2017, and Richard never contacted her or, to her knowledge, the former caseworker. Richard was prohibited from visitation with L.J.S. because there had been a no-contact order. McAdams testified that, because of the no-contact order, he was not a return home option for L.J.S. Richard was living in Moline and receiving supplemental security income (SSI). In order for him to become a possible placement option for L.J.S., he would have to complete parenting classes, sex abuse classes, and the no-contact order would need to be dismissed.

¶ 9 On cross-examination, McAdams stated that she had not told Richard that she was the new caseworker although it was common to do so. In order for Richard to complete the assessment he would have to coordinate with McAdams. Richard's case file stated that he was mentally delayed, and he told McAdams that he was delayed and "had trouble understanding some things." When she spoke with Richard on August 14, she asked him if he understood everything she told him and he did not seem confused. She took over the case at the end of May or beginning of June 2017. McAdams did not know if the former caseworker had been in contact with Richard or if she had made any attempt to coordinate the assessment with him. McAdams believed that Richard knew that CYFS was L.J.S.'s servicing agency because he would have received court documents from the agency through the jail or his attorney.

¶ 10 The court took judicial notice of L.J.S.'s birth certificate; a 13-page document detailing Richard's five-count charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse to which he pled guilty; an amended order of protection; and a February 28, 2017, permanency hearing report. In the permanency report, Lela Donaldson, the former caseworker, stated that she had been unable to communicate with Richard while he was in jail "per his attorney." As a condition of his probation, Richard was ordered to complete sex offender treatment. He did not cooperate with CYFS to participate in services or inform the agency of the services he was participating in. Donaldson also stated that CYFS could not pursue reunification because the no-contact order prohibited Richard from having any contact with L.J.S. The agency planned to seek termination of parental rights. Richard submitted into evidence an updated criminal docket "as proof that [Richard] has put his past conduct behind him. There's no further evidence of any criminality from him."

¶ 11 On direct examination, Richard testified that he had been living in Moline, Illinois, for a month. He had previously lived by himself in Silvis, Illinois. He had been incarcerated for about 10 months in 2016 and was currently on probation for four years. He had not been in trouble since he was released from jail. While in jail, Richard was unable to attend parenting classes and sex offender treatment because the jail did not offer it. He got out of jail in December 2016 and started sex offender treatment in January 2017. He also had been seeing a doctor at the Robert Young for a "couple months now." He never had a job and his highest level of education was high school. He was currently on SSI because "I can't read and write that good." He understood that he had to complete sex offender treatment, but he did not know who to contact. The treatment was a two-year program. When he got out of jail, he did not know who his caseworker was. He was planning to appeal his criminal case.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Richard explained that he did not contact CYFS because "I didn't think it would be-I didn't think I would have to do that." He believed he would get his daughter back by doing things his attorney told him. Aside from the sex offender treatment and seeking psychiatric care at Robert Young, Richard did not attempt to participate in other services. He acknowledged that he did not sign a release to allow CYFS to review his treatment because "I didn't think it's necessary." He never missed a sex offender class. He believed that he would get L.J.S. back by completing sex offender treatment, seeing his doctor, and completing other classes. He was willing to complete other classes he might later be assigned if necessary.

¶ 13 The court requested that both parties submit written arguments with supporting precedent. Based on In re S.H. , 284 Ill. App. 3d 392, 219 Ill.Dec. 895, 672 N.E.2d 403 (1996), the court determined that the four counts of criminal sexual abuse related to L.J.S., of which Richard was convicted, constituted four separate acts sufficient to support a presumption of depravity. Next, the court stated that "The burden shifted then to the respondent father to prove to this court by clear and convincing evidence that he was not depraved." It held that Richard did not overcome the presumption of depravity and, thus, found him unfit. It further ruled that there was sufficient evidence to show that Richard did not make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.J.S.'s removal and did not make reasonable progress toward the return of L.J.S. The court explained:

"As to the allegation of lack of effort-reasonable effort-the court report filed by the former caseworker on February 28, 2017, clearly indicated that [Richard] had not communicated with the caseworker during his incarceration. He did not engage in any services, to that worker's knowledge, including sex offender treatment as ordered in the felony case for criminal sexual abuse charges, as indicated above. The caseworker also testified that she had not heard from [Richard] until shortly before the fitness hearing. She further testified that [Richard] had not engaged in any services that she was aware of, except for [Richard's] self report that he had begun sex offender treatment. When questioned about why he had not engaged in services or communications with the caseworker, [Richard] stated that he did not think he needed to communicate with the worker or provide verification for any of the services he was engaged in. When further questioned as to why he thought [Richard] could provide no answer other than to restate his belief. [Richard] clearly knew the expectations of the agency and frankly of this court and he constantly appeared in court while in custody and thereafter and had been repeatedly admonished by this court to cooperate with the Department of Children and Family Services, the designated agency with-and with the services contained in the service plan.
So, therefore, the court believes that the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the father failed to make reasonable efforts during the applicable time periods of June 23, 2016 to March 23, 2017.
As to the allegation of lack of reasonable progress towards the return of the child, the former caseworker's report and the testimony provided by the case worker clearly demonstrated that [Richard], in all reality, was and is unable to make that progress. Certainly [Richard] could have made no reasonable progress towards returning the child to his care while he was incarcerated. Post incarceration [Richard] is serving 48 months' probation which commenced December 2, 2016. Paragraph 12 of that probation order specifically prohibits [Richard] from having contact with the minor. Because of these impediments which this court believes are of the making of the father himself, the court is of the opinion that the State has proven, again for the same time period, that [Richard] failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child. Therefore, my ruling is today that the State has proven its case and that [Richard] is deemed unfit by this court as supported by clear and convincing evidence on the record."

¶ 14 In April 2018, a best interest hearing was held. The court found that it was in L.J.S.'s best interest to terminate Richard's parental rights. Richard filed a notice of appeal on April 18, and the court entered its written order on April 27. Richard only appealed the unfitness ruling.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 First, Richard argues that the trial court erred when it determined he was unfit based on depravity because (1) the State's evidence only showed that petitioner had one conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it determined that petitioner had to rebut the presumption of depravity by clear and convincing evidence; (3) even if the State met the presumption, it was rebutted because (a) he had no criminal history since his release from jail and (b) he was currently enrolled in sex offender classes and receiving psychiatric care at Robert Young.

¶ 17 Section 1(D) provides the grounds on which the trial court may find a parent unfit. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2016). One ground is that the parent is depraved. Id. § 1(D)(i). Section 1(D)(i) states, in relevant part:

"There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved if the parent has been criminally convicted of at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State or any other state, or under federal law, or the criminal laws of any United States territory; and at least one of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing of the petition or motion seeking termination of parental rights." Id.

¶ 18 In Illinois, the term "depravity" means " 'an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude.' " In re A.M. , 358 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253, 294 Ill.Dec. 698, 831 N.E.2d 648 (2005) (quoting Stalder v. Stone , 412 Ill. 488, 498, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952) ). The State shows depravity by establishing that respondent has a " 'deficiency' in moral sense and either an inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted morality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting In re J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678 (2000) ). "Where the presumption of depravity is rebuttable, the 'parent is still able to present evidence showing that, despite his convictions, he is not depraved.' " Id. (quoting J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678 ). If respondent presents evidence contradicting the presumption, the presumption is removed and the issue is determined based on the evidence presented. J.A. , 316 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 249 Ill.Dec. 484, 736 N.E.2d 678. The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is depraved remains with the State. A.M. , 358 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 294 Ill.Dec. 698, 831 N.E.2d 648. The trial court's determination that a parent is unfit will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Gwynne P. , 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354, 294 Ill.Dec. 96, 830 N.E.2d 508 (2005).

¶ 19 The parties dispute whether the State had proven Richard had at least three felony convictions in accordance with section 1(D)(i). Specifically, Richard claims that the four counts of aggravated sexual abuse were a part of one guilty plea that resulted in one conviction, and the State alleges that each count constituted a separate conviction. The trial court determined that, under S.H. , the counts against Richard constituted four separate convictions. In S.H. , the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights against respondent on the basis of depravity. S.H. , 284 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 219 Ill.Dec. 895, 672 N.E.2d 403. At the hearing on the petition, the State's only evidence was respondent's conviction of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and the trial court held that the State presented a prima facie case that respondent was depraved. Id. at 394-95, 219 Ill.Dec. 895, 672 N.E.2d 403. Affirming the trial court's decision, the Fourth District determined that "a parent who commits [sexual] acts like these upon his or her own child is subject to being found unfit due to depravity based solely upon that conduct." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 400, 219 Ill.Dec. 895, 672 N.E.2d 403.

¶ 20 We find S.H. distinguishable from this case. The court in S.H. relied on a prior version of section 1(D)(i) that only required a showing of depravity. The prior version stated:

"D. 'Unfit person' means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following:
* * *
(i) Depravity." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 1996).

The current version of section 1(D)(i) that this court must rely on mandates, in relevant part, that a rebuttable presumption is only established if the State proves the respondent was convicted of at least three felonies within five years of the filing of the termination petition. Therefore, we decline to follow the trial court's reasoning.

¶ 21 However, we can affirm the trial court's decision on any basis in the record ( People v. Campos , 349 Ill. App. 3d 172, 177, 285 Ill.Dec. 427, 812 N.E.2d 16 (2004) ), and we believe the record shows that Richard had at least five felony convictions within five years of the filing of the State's petition. A criminal history data sheet appearing in the record of exhibits shows there were five separate charges for aggravated criminal sex abuse (Class 2 felony), Richard pled guilty to each charge in December 2016, and he was placed on probation for each charge to be served concurrently. Therefore, we find that the State successfully raised the statutory rebuttable presumption that Richard was depraved.

¶ 22 Both parties acknowledge that the trial court erred at the next step when it required Richard to rebut the presumption by proving by clear and convincing evidence that he was not depraved. We agree that this was error. This court has determined that, under section 1(D)(i), a respondent need only provide some contrary evidence to rebut the presumption. See In re P.J. , 2018 IL App (3d) 170539, ¶ 14, 421 Ill.Dec. 757, 101 N.E.3d 194. Richard tendered some evidence of rehabilitation, rebutting the presumption and requiring the State to prove depravity by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court did not require the State to meet that burden. The application of the appropriate standard of proof is fundamental for persons facing involuntary termination of their parental rights. Id. ¶ 15. Thus, we find the State has failed to prove that depravity is a proper basis for unfitness in this case. The State has, however, raised three bases for finding Richard unfit. Proof of any one of those grounds is sufficient to support a finding of unfitness. In re C.W. , 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 262 Ill.Dec. 802, 766 N.E.2d 1105 (2002). We, therefore, consider the State's next contention-that Richard failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.J.S.'s removal under section 1(D)(m)(i).

¶ 23 Richard counters that the trial court erred when it found him unfit on that basis. Specifically, Richard alleges that he made reasonable efforts because (1) he began sex offender treatment in January 2017, (2) he began seeing a doctor at Robert Young, (3) he had not been in trouble since his release from jail in December 2016, and (4) he was attending all his sex offender treatment classes.

¶ 24 Section 1(D)(m)(i) states that a court may enter a finding of unfitness if a parent fails to "make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2016). "Reasonable efforts relate to the goal of correcting the conditions that caused the removal of the child from the parent [citation], and are judged by a subjective standard based upon the amount of effort that is reasonable for a particular person."

In re Daphnie E. , 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1066-67, 307 Ill.Dec. 123, 859 N.E.2d 123 (2006). The reviewing court must determine whether the parent has made "earnest and conscientious" strides toward correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the minor. In re B.S. , 317 Ill. App. 3d 650, 658, 251 Ill.Dec. 323, 740 N.E.2d 404 (2000), overruled on other grounds by In re R.C. , 195 Ill. 2d 291, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). "Parental deficiencies collateral to the conditions that were the basis for the child's removal, even if serious enough to prevent the return of the child, are outside the scope of this inquiry and are therefore not relevant." In re C.M. , 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164, 238 Ill.Dec. 422, 711 N.E.2d 809 (1999).

¶ 25 The evidence reveals that Richard failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.J.S.'s removal. The February 28, 2017, report shows that Richard did not communicate with CFYS while he was in jail. The report also stated that Richard had not cooperated with CFYS to participate in services. Although Richard testified that he had participated in sex offender treatment, the trial court relied on McAdams's testimony that, to her knowledge, defendant did not engage in any services because Richard refused to sign any releases to allow her to verify his participation. In re T.D. , 268 Ill. App. 3d 239, 245, 205 Ill.Dec. 708, 643 N.E.2d 1315 (1994) ("Reviewing courts accord the trial court's findings great deference in recognition of its unique ability to assess the credibility of witnesses."). The trial court reasonably inferred that Richard's statement that he did not think he needed to communicate with the caseworker and his refusal to sign releases indicated his defiance of his obligation to comply with the service plan. See id. Despite Richard's testimony that he lived by himself in Silvis and, later, in Moline after he was released from prison and that he was receiving SSI, there is also no evidence that the housing or income were "appropriate" or that any servicing agency was notified about this information. There is similarly no evidence that he completed his integrated assessment during the relevant nine-month period. Thus, we find that the trial court's ruling that Richard failed to make reasonable efforts during the applicable period was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because that finding is adequate basis for the court's determination that Richard was unfit, there is no need to address whether Richard made reasonable progress toward the return of L.J.S. See In re C.W. , 199 Ill. 2d at 210, 262 Ill.Dec. 802, 766 N.E.2d 1105.

¶ 26 CONCLUSION

¶ 27 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 28 Affirmed.

Justices Holdridge and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      While the record refers to an original petition to terminate parental rights, we have not found such a petition in the record.

      This court has jurisdiction to hear this case. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) ("A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment or order, is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the judgment or order.").


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald P. WALKER, Defendant-Appellee.
    NO. 4-17-0877
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
    Filed September 13, 2018
    Jason Chambers, State's Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Erin Wilson Laegeler, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
    James E. Chadd, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and James Henry Waller, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellee.
   JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 On July 20, 2017, defendant, Donald P. Walker, was stopped for an improper left turn and received a ticket for driving while his license was revoked ( 625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2016) ). On October 4, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence from the stop, asserting the police officer who stopped him lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion defendant had violated the law. As a result, defendant argued the evidence obtained by the State as a result of the stop was obtained in violation of defendant's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. After an October 31, 2017, hearing, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The State filed a certificate of impairment and this appeal. On appeal, the State argues the circuit court erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress because Officer Manuel Hernandez did have the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for committing a traffic violation. The State also argues, assuming we find the stop was improper, application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate under the circumstances here. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties are in agreement with regard to the facts in this case. At around 12:30 a.m. on July 20, 2017, defendant drove his car out of a gas station by making a right turn onto Hershey Road in Bloomington, Illinois. Defendant then proceeded north on Hershey Road, eventually moving into the left turn lane as he approached the intersection of Hershey Road and Empire Street. The traffic light was red, and defendant stopped at the intersection. When the light turned green, defendant made a left turn onto Empire Street, exiting the intersection into the farthest available westbound lane, which was the northernmost lane. After making his left turn, defendant was proceeding in a westerly direction on Empire Street, which had two lanes for westbound traffic. Immediately after defendant exited the intersection, Officer Hernandez stopped defendant for making an improper left turn because defendant did not exit the intersection into the nearest westbound lane of traffic on Empire Street.

¶ 4 After defendant testified as to what occurred, the State moved for a directed verdict. Pursuant to section 11-801 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) ( 625 ILCS 5/11-801 (West 2016) ), the State argued defendant was required to turn into the nearest westbound lane. Because defendant did not do so, the traffic stop was valid. The circuit court denied the State's motion for a directed verdict.

¶ 5 Officer Hernandez testified he was traveling behind defendant on Hershey Road. Like defendant, the officer moved into the left-hand turn lane to turn west on Empire Street. Another vehicle was between Officer Hernandez and defendant. When the traffic light turned green, defendant made a left turn into the farthest westbound lane. The officer testified he pulled defendant over for making an improper left turn. On cross-examination, defense counsel and the police officer had the following exchange:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Officer, when you pulled Mr. Walker over, it was for a wide turn; is that correct?
[OFFICER HERNANDEZ]: Yes, sir.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your understanding of that statute, what is the appropriate way to make a left turn?
[OFFICER HERNANDEZ]: When there's two lanes, it's to stay in the closest lane in case-like in that intersection, going south on Hershey, you have a turning lane to go east, another one to go directly south, and I believe a third lane that gives you an option to go directly south, and make a turn to go west on Empire.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, turning into the nearest lane on a left turn, is that required by the law or is it simply best practice?
[OFFICER HERNANDEZ]: That's what I've read. That's how I interpret it, yes."

The State presented no other evidence.

¶ 6 The State made the following argument to the court:

"The State would reiterate our argument in that the key to this section is that the last line says that whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made in the portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection thereby making it safe for other vehicles to enter the intersection if needed as proper for them. For example, if there was an oncoming car that needed to turn right, they would be able to do so according to that same section in number one. If the vehicle was not required to be in the left-hand lane, that would cause a potentially dangerous situation. In this situation, the law just says that a left turn need to go left at the intersection whenever practicable. There has been no evidence presented or anything that, that shows that this-that there was any circumstances that made that ability to turn into the left most lane not available to the Defendant. He had that opportunity. And then because he had that opportunity, he had that requirement in that the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection. For those reasons, we're asking that the motion to suppress be denied."

Defense counsel responded no one testified defendant was to the right of the center of the intersection. Further, the officer did not testify defendant placed anyone in danger or violated the Vehicle Code in any other manner. According to defense counsel, the police officer made the stop based on a misunderstanding of section 11-801 of the Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-801 (West 2016) ).

¶ 7 The trial court noted the facts were not in dispute and the question before it was an issue of law. According to the court, the plain language of section 801(a)(2) allowed defendant to exit the intersection into either of the westbound lanes of traffic. With regard to the last line of subsection (a)(2), which was the focus of the State's argument, the court noted:

"So, if you look at the language in the statute, the intersection is where the two different streets actually converge and make contact with one another. So it[']s between the four corners of the intersection. I, I agree with Mr. McIntyre's analysis of that section of the statute; that it means when you're turning left and there's oncoming traffic turning left, you're to turn before you get to the center of that intersection so that you don't run into each other as you're making your left-hand turn. In other words, northbound traffic on Hershey would turn to the south and west of a vehicle that was southbound on Hershey turning east. So, I, I think it's clear from this statute and the plain meaning of this statute is a defendant could turn into either of the westbound lanes of Empire. And I'm going to grant the motion to suppress because that was the only reason that the officer stopped him."

As a result, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress.

¶ 8 On November 29, 2017, the State filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court's grant of defendant's suppression motion and a certificate of impairment. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, the State challenges the circuit court's ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress, arguing the traffic stop was legal because Officer Hernandez had reasonable, articulable suspicion defendant violated the law. According to the State, section 11-801(a)(2) unambiguously required defendant to enter the leftmost lane legally available when he executed the left turn in this case. In the alternative, the State argues section 11-801(a)(2) is ambiguous and Officer Hernandez conducted a lawful traffic stop. Finally, the State contends the circuit court erred in excluding evidence recovered after the stop regardless of the legality of the stop itself.

¶ 11 In reviewing a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court applies a two-part standard of review. People v. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 11, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. First, we uphold the circuit court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 11, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. In this case, the parties are in agreement as to the facts. Second, this court reviews de novo the circuit court's ultimate legal conclusion regarding whether suppression is warranted. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 11, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092.

¶ 12 Both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. IV ) and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6 ) protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. "The touchstone of the fourth amendment is 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' " Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). Illinois courts construe the search-and-seizure provision of the Illinois Constitution in the same manner as the fourth amendment. See People v. Fitzpatrick , 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 24, 369 Ill.Dec. 527, 986 N.E.2d 1163 (noting it would construe article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 in the same manner as the fourth amendment).

¶ 13 A police officer's acts of "stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. Such seizures, commonly referred to as vehicle stops, are analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. "Pursuant to Terry , a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. "The officer must have a 'reasonable, articulable suspicion' that criminal activity is afoot." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ). While "reasonable, articulable suspicion" constitutes a less demanding standard than probable cause, the police "officer's suspicion must amount to more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch" ' of criminal activity." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). Moreover, "[t]he investigatory stop must be justified at its inception[,] and the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the governmental intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092.

¶ 14 In judging the police officer's conduct, this court applies an objective standard and considers, " 'would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate?' " Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). When evaluating a vehicle stop's validity, "we consider 'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ). "If reasonable suspicion is lacking, the traffic stop is unconstitutional and evidence obtained as a result of the stop is generally inadmissible." People v. Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 20, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641.

¶ 15 An officer may justifiably stop a vehicle based on his observation of a traffic violation. People v. Sorenson , 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2001). Here, the State asserted defendant violated section 11-801(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11801(a)(2) (West 2016) ) because he exited the intersection by entering the farthest, instead of the nearest, westbound lane of traffic. Section 11-801(a)(2) provides the following:

"Required position and method of turning. (a) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows:
* * *
(2) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left at any intersection shall approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle, and after entering the intersection, the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection." 625 ILCS 5/11-801(a)(2) (West 2016).

In this case, pursuant to the State's interpretation of the statute, defendant was required to use the nearest westbound lane of traffic. We disagree.

¶ 16 A court's primary objective in construing a statute "is to give effect to the legislature's intent, presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient or unjust results." Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641. "The best indication of that intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641. "If possible, the court must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence * * *." People v. Ellis , 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39, 262 Ill. Dec. 383, 765 N.E.2d 991, 997 (2002). A court "must not read a statute so as to render any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant; and it must not depart from the statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express." Ellis , 199 Ill. 2d at 39, 262 Ill.Dec. 383, 765 N.E.2d 991. The construction of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo . Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641.

¶ 17 The first sentence of section 11-801(a)(2) is a compound sentence and states (1) the law as to what lane-"the extreme left-hand lane"-a driver must be in when approaching an intersection to make a left turn and (2) the law as to what lane-"a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered"-the driver should use when exiting the intersection . The second sentence of subsection (a)(2), which is the focus of the State's argument, states the law as to what the driver should do within the intersection : "Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection."

¶ 18 Pursuant to a plain reading of section 11-801(a)(2), which we do not find to be ambiguous, defendant did not violate the law by exiting the intersection into the farthest westbound lane of traffic on Empire Street. For this court to agree with the State's interpretation of this subsection, we would have to depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express, and we would have to deem other parts of the statute superfluous. This court would have to determine the legislature intended (1) for the last sentence of subsection (a)(2) to be read to restrict what lane a driver could exit an intersection-without any language in the sentence to that effect-and (2) for language in the first sentence-"the left turn should be made so as to leave the intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction " (emphasis added)-to be ignored. We will not interpret this statute in the manner suggested by the State. Based on the evidence and a plain reading of the unambiguous language of section 11-801(a)(2), defendant did not violate any statute justifying the traffic stop by exiting the intersection in the farthest westbound lane of Empire Street.

¶ 19 The State's reliance on State v. Steen , 2004 MT 343, ¶ 8, 324 Mont. 272, 102 P.3d 1251, and State v. Graham , 2014-Ohio-3283, 17 N.E.3d 112, ¶ 19, as persuasive authority that section 11-801(a)(2) requires a driver to exit an intersection in the nearest lawful lane of traffic is misplaced. Those cases are easily distinguishable as the statutes at issue in both of those cases are not written as clearly as section 11-801(a)(2). Those statutes contained the same language:

"At any intersection where traffic is permitted to move in both directions on each roadway entering the intersection, an approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and by passing to the right of such center line where it enters the intersection and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered . Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection." (Emphasis added.) Steen , 2004 MT 343, ¶ 8, 324 Mont. 272, 102 P.3d 1251 ; Graham , 2014-Ohio-3283, 17 N.E.3d 112, ¶ 12.

Section 11-801(a)(2) is more specific as to what lane a driver making a left turn can exit an intersection, stating in relevant part, "the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered." This language gave defendant the right to leave the intersection in either westbound lane of Empire Street as both westbound lanes were available to traffic moving straight through the intersection on Empire Street.

¶ 20 As we have concluded section 11-801(a)(2) is not ambiguous, the State's alternative argument "the traffic stop was still lawful due to the ambiguity of the statutory language" also fails. The United States Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 539, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), did hold reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop "can rest on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition" as long as the mistaken understanding of the law was objectively reasonable. With regard to the objective standard, the Court stated, "We do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved." Heien , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 539. In addition, the Court declared, "[A]n officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce." Heien , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 539.

¶ 21 Justice Kagan, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred with the majority's reasoning but wrote separately to elaborate on the majority's holding regarding the objectively reasonable standard. According to Justice Kagan:

"A court tasked with deciding whether an officer's mistake of law can support a seizure thus faces a straightforward question of statutory construction. If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not. As the Solicitor General made the point at oral argument, the statute must pose a 'really difficult' or 'very hard question of statutory interpretation.' [Citation.] And indeed, both North Carolina and the Solicitor General agreed that such cases will be 'exceedingly rare.' " Heien , 574 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.).

In this case, the plain language of section 11-801(a)(2) does not present a difficult or hard question of statutory interpretation. The statute clearly allows a driver making a left turn to exit the intersection into any available lane of traffic moving in the proper direction. The officer's misunderstanding of section 11-801(a)(2) was not objectively reasonable. As a result, the officer's stop of defendant's vehicle was not justified.

¶ 22 As we have found the stop of defendant's vehicle was not constitutionally justified, we next turn to the State's argument the exclusionary rule should not be applied under the circumstances in this case. The State bases its argument on our supreme court's opinion in People v. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043. In LeFlore , the court noted "[t]here is no constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial." LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043. "[A]pplication of the exclusionary rule has been restricted to those 'unusual cases' where it can achieve its sole objective: to deter future fourth amendment violations." LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043.

¶ 23 According to our supreme court, the deterrent benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs for the exclusionary rule to be appropriate. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043. A court must look at the particular circumstances in a case to determine whether (1) a police officer acted with an objectively reasonable good faith belief his action was within the law or (2) the officer's conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence. If the officer's action meets either of these criteria, no illicit conduct needs to be deterred by suppressing evidence discovered as a result of the police action and the evidence should not be suppressed. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043. When determining whether this good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in a case, "a court must ask the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 25, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043.

¶ 24 In this case, the objectively ascertainable question would be whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the traffic stop was not valid because the defendant did not violate section 11-801(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-801(a)(2) (West 2016) ). We note the State has not identified any binding judicial authority interpreting section 11801(a)(2) upon which a law enforcement officer could have in good-faith relied upon to require a driver to exit an intersection into the nearest lawfully available lane of traffic when making a left turn.

¶ 25 This is also not a case involving a broad question of constitutional law, where an objectively reasonable police officer might have based his decision on the broad legal landscape around the country. This is a simple question whether a specific provision of the Vehicle Code was violated.

¶ 26 Finally, we note the last paragraph of the majority's analysis in LeFlore resolves this issue in defendant's favor. Our supreme court noted a police officer who is acting in defiance of the plain language of an existing statute or judicial order-instead substituting his own erroneous interpretation of the statute or decision-cannot be considered as acting in an objectively reasonable manner. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 69, 392 Ill.Dec. 467, 32 N.E.3d 1043. As a result, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence arising out of defendant's traffic stop.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment and opinion.