text:
    Constance OSWALD, Appellant, v. Brian HAMER, Director of Revenue, et al., Appellees.
    Docket No. 122203
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018.
    Edward T. Joyce and Kenneth Flaxman, of Law Offices of Edward T. Joyce & Associates, P.C., and Joan M. Mannix, both of Chicago, for appellant.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
    Mark D. Deaton, of Illinois Health and Hospital Association, of Naperville, and Steven F. Pflaum, Tonya G. Newman, and Collette A. Brown, of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, of Chicago, for intervenor-appellee.
    Frederic M. Grosser, of Champaign, for amici curiae Cunningham Township et al.
    Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Joel D. Fletcher, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for amici curiae Champaign County Treasurer et al.
    John M. Izzo and Eugene C. Edwards, of Hauser Izzo, LLC, of Flossmoor, for amici curiae Illinois Association of School Boards et al.
   JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code ( 35 ILCS 200/15-86 (West 2012) ) provides for a charitable property tax exemption specifically to eligible not-for-profit hospitals and their hospital affiliates (hereinafter hospitals). Plaintiff, Constance Oswald, filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a judgment declaring that section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code, on its face, violates section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art IX, § 6 ). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Brian Hamer, Director of Revenue, the Department of Revenue, and the Illinois Hospital Association. The appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (1st) 152691, 411 Ill.Dec. 452, 73 N.E.3d 536.

¶ 2 This court allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016) ). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Section 15-86(c) of the Property Tax Code provides that a hospital applicant "shall be issued" a charitable property tax exemption if the value of certain qualifying services or activities provided by the hospital in a given year equals or exceeds the hospital's estimated property tax liability for the same year. 35 ILCS 200/15-86(c) (West 2012). In her single-count complaint, plaintiff alleged that section 15-86(c) commands that the hospital applicant receive the charitable property tax exemption if the statutory criteria are satisfied. Plaintiff contended that section 15-86 was facially unconstitutional because the statute mandates the issuance of the charitable property tax exemption without consideration of the constitutional requirement that the subject property be "used exclusively for * * * charitable purposes" ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6 ). Plaintiff sought, inter alia , a judgment declaring that section 15-86 was "unconstitutional on its face" and an order enjoining defendants from granting any section 15-86 exemptions and requiring defendants to collect property tax from those hospitals that already had been granted such exemptions.

¶ 5 The complaint named as defendants the Department of Revenue and its director. The circuit court granted the Illinois Hospital Association's petition for leave to intervene as a defendant. Plaintiff and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment contesting solely the facial constitutionality of section 15-86. The circuit court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court found that section 15-86 does not dispense with the Illinois Constitution's requirements for charitable property tax exemption but, rather, the Department of Revenue must still evaluate a hospital applicant's claim for a section 15-86 exemption under constitutional requirements and precedent. Also, the court found that plaintiff failed to show that section 15-86 was inherently flawed in all circumstances. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the statute was not facially unconstitutional.

¶ 6 The appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (1st) 152691, 411 Ill.Dec. 452, 73 N.E.3d 536. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the legislature intended the word "shall" in section 15-86(c) to be mandatory. Id. ¶ 22. Rather, the court held that the word "shall" is merely directory. Id. ¶ 26. The court observed that its construction of section 15-86(c) followed case law that construed charitable property tax exemption statutes alongside the exclusive use requirements of section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 27-36. Alternatively, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's conclusion that section 15-86 was facially constitutional because plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of demonstrating that there was no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Id. ¶ 47.

¶ 7 Plaintiff appeals to this court. The Champaign County Treasurer et al. , Cunningham Township et al. , and the Illinois Association of School Boards et al. were each granted leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The ultimate question presented for our review is whether section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code, on its face, violates section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution. This matter comes before us in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they mutually agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the case may be resolved as a matter of law. Jones v. Municipal Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund , 2016 IL 119618, ¶ 26, 401 Ill.Dec. 454, 50 N.E.3d 596 ; Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue , 238 Ill. 2d 332, 339-40, 345 Ill.Dec. 20, 938 N.E.2d 459 (2010) ; Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz , 237 Ill. 2d 424, 432, 341 Ill.Dec. 485, 930 N.E.2d 999 (2010). The issues in this case involve statutory construction. Statutory construction presents questions of law that are appropriate for summary judgment. Hooker v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund , 2013 IL 114811, ¶ 15, 378 Ill.Dec. 416, 4 N.E.3d 15. Issues involving statutory construction and summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo . Id. Also, the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo . Irwin Industrial Tool , 238 Ill. 2d at 340, 345 Ill.Dec. 20, 938 N.E.2d 459 ; In re Parentage of John M. , 212 Ill. 2d 253, 265, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500 (2004).

¶ 10 In construing section 15-86, we are guided by familiar principles. When presented with an issue of statutory construction, a court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc. , 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 410 Ill.Dec. 937, 72 N.E.3d 323. All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The statute is viewed as a whole, construing words and phrases in context to other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Murphy-Hylton , 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 410 Ill.Dec. 937, 72 N.E.3d 323 ; J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc. , 2016 IL 119870, ¶ 25, 409 Ill.Dec. 31, 67 N.E.3d 243. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Murphy-Hylton , 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 410 Ill.Dec. 937, 72 N.E.3d 323 ; Williams v. Staples , 208 Ill. 2d 480, 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489 (2004). Additionally, the court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Murphy-Hylton , 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 410 Ill.Dec. 937, 72 N.E.3d 323 ; J & J Ventures Gaming , 2016 IL 119870, ¶ 25, 409 Ill.Dec. 31, 67 N.E.3d 243. To understand the purpose and effect of section 15-86, we consider its constitutional and statutory foundations.

¶ 11 A. Article IX of the Illinois Constitution

¶ 12 The constitutional backdrop of charitable property tax exemption legislation in Illinois is well established. Generally, the Illinois Constitution does not grant power to the legislature but rather restricts the legislature's power to act. The State's inherent power to tax is vested in the General Assembly. The legislature's power to tax is plenary and is restricted only by the federal and state constitutions. Article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX) generally subjects all real property to taxation. Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue , 213 Ill. 2d 273, 285, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 (2004) (and cases cited therein). "Under Illinois law, taxation is the rule. Tax exemption is the exception." Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue , 236 Ill. 2d 368, 388, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (2010).

¶ 13 However, section 6 of article IX limits the power of the legislature in the area of property tax exemption in pertinent part as follows:

"The General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only the property of the State, units of local government and school districts and property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6.

Section 6 of article IX is not self-executing but authorizes the General Assembly to enact legislation providing for an exemption. It is permissible, not mandatory, for the legislature to exercise that authority. Provena , 236 Ill. 2d at 389, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 ; North Shore Post No. 21 of the American Legion v. Korzen , 38 Ill. 2d 231, 233, 230 N.E.2d 833 (1967).

¶ 14 Section 6 of article IX divides property that the legislature may exempt from taxation into two categories: (1) property owned by "the State, units of local government and school districts" and (2) property used exclusively for the purposes defined in the second clause of the section. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. By designating the categories of property that the legislature may exempt from taxation, section 6 of article IX limits the legislature's authority to exempt. Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 286, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 ; MacMurray College v. Wright , 38 Ill. 2d 272, 276, 230 N.E.2d 846 (1967). Where the legislature does choose to provide for an exemption, it must remain within constitutional limitations. "No other subjects of property tax exemption are permitted. The legislature cannot add to or broaden the exemptions specified in section 6." Provena , 236 Ill. 2d at 389, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 ; accord Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 286, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 ; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Department of Revenue , 163 Ill. 2d 290, 297, 206 Ill.Dec. 113, 644 N.E.2d 1166 (1994).

¶ 15 One category of property that the legislature may exempt from taxation is property used for charitable purposes. "Charitable use is a constitutional requirement. An applicant for a charitable-use property tax exemption must 'comply unequivocally with the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis in original.) Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 287, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240. In Methodist Old Peoples Home , this court defined "charity" as " 'a gift to be applied * * * for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, persuading them to an educational or religious conviction, for their general welfare-or in some way reducing the burdens of government.' " Provena , 236 Ill. 2d at 390-91, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (quoting Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen , 39 Ill. 2d 149, 156-57, 233 N.E.2d 537 (1968) ).

¶ 16 Additionally, the term "exclusively used" "means the primary purpose for which property is used and not any secondary or incidental purpose." Methodist Old Peoples Home , 39 Ill. 2d at 157, 233 N.E.2d 537.

¶ 17 This court has repeatedly acknowledged the difficulty of framing a universally applicable definition of an exclusive charitable use. People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged , 40 Ill. 2d 91, 100, 237 N.E.2d 533 (1968) ; Methodist Old Peoples Home , 39 Ill. 2d at 156, 233 N.E.2d 537. However, the above-stated "principles constitute the frame of reference to which we must apply plaintiff's use of its property to arrive at a determination of whether or not such use is in fact exclusively for charitable purposes." Methodist Old Peoples Home , 39 Ill. 2d at 157, 233 N.E.2d 537.

¶ 18 "While the General Assembly has no authority to grant exemptions beyond those authorized by section 6, it 'may place restrictions, limitations, and conditions on [property tax] exemptions as may be proper by general law.' " Provena , 236 Ill. 2d at 390, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (quoting North Shore Post No. 21 , 38 Ill. 2d at 233, 230 N.E.2d 833 ). The party claiming an exemption carries the burden of proving clearly that the use of the subject property is within both the constitutional authorization and the terms of the statute under which the claim of exemption is made. Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 288-89, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 (and cases cited therein); Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza , 8 Ill. 2d 286, 290, 134 N.E.2d 292 (1956).

¶ 19 B. Section 15-65 Charitable Use Exemption

¶ 20 In conformity with section 6 of article IX, the General Assembly chose to create a charitable-use property tax exemption but with the additional restriction that the property be owned by a statutorily designated organization. Section 15-65 of the Property Tax Code requires not only that the property be "actually and exclusively used for charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit," but also that the property be owned by "[i]nstitutions of public charity," "[b]eneficent and charitable organizations," "[o]ld people's homes," not-for-profit health maintenance organizations, free public libraries, or historical societies. 35 ILCS 200/15-65 (2012) ; see Provena , 236 Ill. 2d at 390, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131. Accordingly, section 15-65 requires two things to qualify for a charitable use property tax exemption: charitable use and ownership by a charitable organization. Chicago Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Department of Revenue , 171 Ill. 2d 263, 270, 215 Ill.Dec. 655, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996) ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 , 8 Ill. 2d at 291, 134 N.E.2d 292.

¶ 21 Prior to the enactment of section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code, private hospitals could apply for property tax exemption as charitable organizations. See, e.g. , People ex rel. County Collector v. Hopedale Medical Foundation , 46 Ill. 2d 450, 453-54, 264 N.E.2d 4 (1970) ; People ex rel. Cannon v. Southern Illinois Hospital Corp. , 404 Ill. 66, 69-70, 88 N.E.2d 20 (1949) (both collecting cases).

¶ 22 In Provena , this court, with two justices recusing, unanimously concluded that Provena failed to satisfy the requirements for the charitable use property tax exemption. The plurality opinion reached this conclusion by recounting that the underlying purpose of charitable property tax exemption is the benefit that private charity confers upon the public and, consequently, to some extent, a relief of the State's burden to care for and advance the interests of its residents. Provena , 236 Ill. 2d at 394-95, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (and cases cited therein). The plurality reasoned:

"Conditioning charitable status on whether an activity helps relieve the burdens on government is appropriate. After all, each tax dollar lost to a charitable exemption is one less dollar affected governmental bodies will have to meet their obligations directly. If a charitable institution wishes to avail itself of funds which would otherwise flow into a public treasury, it is only fitting that the institution provide some compensatory benefit in exchange. While Illinois law has never required that there be a direct, dollar-for-dollar correlation between the value of the tax exemption and the value of the goods or services provided by the charity, it is a sine qua non of charitable status that those seeking a charitable exemption be able to demonstrate that their activities will help alleviate some financial burden incurred by the affected taxing bodies in performing their governmental functions." Id. at 395, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131.

After reviewing the record, the plurality determined that "both the number of uninsured patients receiving free or discounted care and the dollar value of the care they received" were de minimis . Id. at 397, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131.

¶ 23 However, two members of this court concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 411, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (Burke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Freeman, J.). The partial dissent concluded that Provena did not qualify for the charitable exemption based on the actual ownership of the property. Id. at 411-12, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131. The partial dissent disagreed with the plurality's determination that Provena's charity care was de minimis : "I disagree with this rationale. By imposing a quantum of care requirement and monetary threshold, the plurality is injecting itself into matters best left to the legislature."

Id. at 412, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131. "I do not believe that this court can, under the plain language of section 15-65, impose a quantum of care or monetary requirement, nor should it invent legislative intent in this regard." Id. at 415, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131. Having discussed the constitutional and statutory backdrop, we now turn to section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code.

¶ 24 C. Section 15-86 Hospital Charitable Use Exemption

¶ 25 In response to this court's decision in Provena , the General Assembly enacted Public Act 97-688 (eff. June 14, 2012), which, inter alia , added section 15-86 to the Property Tax Code ( 35 ILCS 200/15-86 (West 2012) ). The legislature expressly discussed Provena and the legislative intent underlying the statute. The legislature observed that, subsequent to Provena , "there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the test for charitable property tax exemption, especially regarding the application of a quantitative or monetary threshold." Id. § 15-86(a)(1). The legislature further observed: "It is essential to ensure that tax exemption law relating to hospitals accounts for the complexities of the modern health care delivery system." Id. § 15-86(a)(3). The legislature expressly codified its intent as follows:

"(5) Working with the Illinois hospital community and other interested parties, the General Assembly has developed a comprehensive combination of related legislation that addresses hospital property tax exemption, significantly increases access to free health care for indigent persons, and strengthens the Medical Assistance program. It is the intent of the General Assembly to establish a new category of ownership for charitable property tax exemption to be applied to not-for-profit hospitals and hospital affiliates in lieu of the existing ownership category of 'institutions of public charity.' It is also the intent of the General Assembly to establish quantifiable standards for the issuance of charitable exemptions for such property. It is not the intent of the General Assembly to declare any property exempt ipso facto, but rather to establish criteria to be applied to the facts on a case-by-case basis." Id. § 15-86(a)(5).

¶ 26 Section 15-86(c) provides for the hospital charitable property tax exemption in pertinent part as follows:

"(c) A hospital applicant satisfies the conditions for an exemption under this Section with respect to the subject property, and shall be issued a charitable exemption for that property , if the value of services or activities listed in subsection (e) for the hospital year equals or exceeds the relevant hospital entity's estimated property tax liability, as determined under subsection (g), for the year for which exemption is sought." (Emphasis added.) Id. § 15-86(c).

Subsection (c) also provides guidelines in specific situations, including where "the relevant hospital entity is a hospital owner that owns more than one hospital" and where the hospital applicant is "a multi-state hospital system or hospital affiliate." Id.

¶ 27 Subsection (e) lists the "services and activities" that are considered in making the calculations required by subsection (c). These include "[c]harity care," defined as "[f]ree or discounted services * * * measured at cost"; health services to low-income and underinsured individuals; subsidy of state or local governments; support for State health care programs for low-income individuals; subsidy for treating dual-eligibility Medicare/Medicaid patients; relief of the burden of government-related health care of low-income individuals; and "[a]ny other activity by the relevant hospital entity that the Department determines relieves the burden of government or addresses the health of low-income or underserved individuals." Id. §§ 15-86(e)(1) -(7).

¶ 28 Before this court, plaintiff contends that section 15-86 is facially unconstitutional because it mandatorily awards a property tax exemption based on satisfaction of its statutory criteria, without regard to whether the subject property satisfies the constitutional "exclusive charitable use" requirement. We disagree.

¶ 29 Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. Walker v. McGuire , 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 12, 396 Ill.Dec. 156, 39 N.E.3d 982 ; Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller , 221 Ill. 2d 130, 148, 302 Ill.Dec. 557, 849 N.E.2d 349 (2006). The party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional infirmity. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale , 229 Ill. 2d 296, 306, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008) ; Parentage of John M. , 212 Ill. 2d at 266, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500. It is a court's duty to construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality if reasonably possible. Further, if a statute's construction is doubtful, a court will resolve the doubt in favor of the statute's validity. Napleton , 229 Ill. 2d at 306-07, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 ; Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 291-92, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 (collecting cases).

¶ 30 Plaintiff observes that section 15-86 does not provide, as a condition for the charitable property tax exemption, that the subject property must be used exclusively for charitable purposes. Further, according to plaintiff, section 15-86 lacks even "any general reference" to the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use.

¶ 31 Admittedly, neither subsection (a) nor (c) of section 15-86 contains an explicit reference to the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use, as is provided in section 15-65. While such plain language crystallized the intent of the legislature in enacting section 15-65 (see Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 291-92, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 (construing section 15-65) ), the legislative intent of section 15-86 is nevertheless readily ascertainable.

¶ 32 We presume that the legislature enacts statutes in light of the constitution and intends to enact constitutional legislation ( Gill v. Miller , 94 Ill. 2d 52, 56, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330 (1983) ) and does not intend to exceed its constitutional limitations ( Methodist Old Peoples Home , 39 Ill. 2d at 156, 233 N.E.2d 537 ; MacMurray College , 38 Ill. 2d at 277, 230 N.E.2d 846 ). Accordingly, where a statute does not expressly refer to an applicable constitutional limitation, "it will be presumed that the legislature intended to observe the constitution." North Wichert Drainage District v. Chamberlain , 340 Ill. 644, 648-49, 173 N.E. 90 (1930) ; accord State ex rel. Burton v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp. , 7 Ohio St.2d 34, 218 N.E.2d 446, 451 (1966) ("the constitutional limitation is by implication a part of the statute, and the mere failure to set it forth in the statute does not invalidate the provision" "on the basis that it exceeds or is contrary to the constitutional provision"); 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 169 (1998) (same).

¶ 33 In the case at bar, while section 15-86(c) does not expressly provide that the hospital charitable property tax exemption is limited to applicants that satisfy the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use, section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution does say so, and we presume that the legislature intended to comply with this constitutional limitation. See North Wichert Drainage District , 340 Ill. at 648-49, 173 N.E. 90.

¶ 34 Beyond this presumption, the legislature stated in section 15-86(a)(5) : "It is the intent of the General Assembly to establish a new category of ownership for charitable property tax exemption to be applied to not-for-profit hospitals and hospital affiliates in lieu of the existing ownership category of 'institutions of public charity'." 35 ILCS 200/15-86(a)(5) (West 2012). This is an explicit reference to section 15-65, which in turn contains the explicit reference to the constitutional limitation of exclusive charitable use. Id. § 15-65. Construing these provisions together as a whole ( Murphy-Hylton , 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 410 Ill.Dec. 937, 72 N.E.3d 323 ), we conclude that the legislature intended to comply with this constitutional limitation.

¶ 35 Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that section 15-86(c), which provides that if the hospital applicant satisfies the statutory requirements for a hospital charitable property tax exemption, the hospital "shall be issued a charitable exemption for that property" (emphasis added) ( 35 ILCS 200/15-86(c) (West 2012) ), mandates the issuance of the exemption without consideration of the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use. Indeed, according to plaintiff, there is "nothing in the language" of section 15-86 suggesting that, if the requirements of subsection (c) are met, a hospital may nevertheless be refused the hospital charitable property tax exemption. On the other hand, defendants contend that section 15-86(c) is not mandatory but, rather, permissive or directory.

¶ 36 Plaintiff and defendants invoke the rules of statutory construction pertaining to the separate questions of whether a statutory provision is mandatory or permissive and whether the provision is mandatory or directory. See People v. Delvillar , 235 Ill. 2d 507, 514-15, 337 Ill.Dec. 207, 922 N.E.2d 330 (2009) ; People v. Ousley , 235 Ill. 2d 299, 310-11, 335 Ill.Dec. 850, 919 N.E.2d 875 (2009) ; People v. Robinson , 217 Ill. 2d 43, 51-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 37, 838 N.E.2d 930 (2005). Employing these rules of construction, plaintiff contends that the issue here is whether section 15-86(c) is mandatory or permissive. She argues that the provision is mandatory and, consequently, section 15-86 is unconstitutional.

¶ 37 "Legislative intent, however, remains the primary inquiry and controls the court's construction of a statute. [Citations.] Traditional rules of statutory construction are merely aids in determining legislative intent, and those rules must yield to such intent." Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund , 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111, 183 Ill.Dec. 6, 610 N.E.2d 1250 (1993) ; see People ex rel. Cason v. Ring , 41 Ill. 2d 305, 309-10, 242 N.E.2d 267 (1968) (same). We are presented with a situation where the legislature omitted a specific reference to the constitution's exclusive charitable use requirement. In similar circumstances, "courts have allowed the substitution of language in order to carry out the demonstrable legislative intention, observing, however, when doing so, that this technique of construction is to be exercised with caution." Gill , 94 Ill. 2d at 58, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330 ; see People ex rel. Barrett v. Anderson , 398 Ill. 480, 485, 76 N.E.2d 773 (1947) (same). "[W]here applying language literally in a clause of an otherwise coherent statute would frustrate the spirit of the statute and the intent of the legislature, language may be disregarded, modified or supplied to give effect to the legislative design."

Gill , 94 Ill. 2d at 59, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330 ; see Klein v. Department of Registration & Education , 412 Ill. 75, 86, 105 N.E.2d 758 (1952) (same).

¶ 38 In the case at bar, the legislature was certainly aware of section 6 of article IX of the constitution and its requirement of exclusive charitable use, and it intended to enact a constitutional hospital charitable property tax exemption. To construe subsection (c) as plaintiff argues would cast doubt on the constitutionality of section 15-86, which, as we have concluded, is a result the legislature could not have intended. "Accordingly, an interpretation under which the statute would be considered constitutional is preferable to one that would leave its constitutionality in doubt." Braun v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund , 108 Ill. 2d 119, 127, 90 Ill.Dec. 861, 483 N.E.2d 8 (1985) (collecting cases). We therefore construe the word "shall" in section 15-86(c) to be permissive and not mandatory. This reading of section 15-86(c) would avoid the possible constitutional infirmity, and that is the construction we adopt.

¶ 39 Therefore, a hospital applicant seeking a section 15-86 charitable property tax exemption must document the services or activities meeting the statutory criteria. Additionally, the hospital must show that the subject property meets the constitutional test of exclusive charitable use.

¶ 40 Significantly, plaintiff's action is framed solely as a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code. As such, we have before us only the statute itself. Reno v. Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 300-01, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is the most difficult challenge to make successfully. A statute is facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. Napleton , 229 Ill. 2d at 305-06, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 ; Parentage of John M. , 212 Ill. 2d at 269, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500 ; see United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). The fact that the statute could be found unconstitutional under some set of circumstances does not establish its facial unconstitutionality. Napleton , 229 Ill. 2d at 306, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 ; Parentage of John M. , 212 Ill. 2d at 269, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500 ; In re M.T. , 221 Ill. 2d 517, 536-37, 304 Ill.Dec. 336, 852 N.E.2d 792 (2006). Thus, if any situation exists where a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail. People v. Rizzo , 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 24, 406 Ill.Dec. 488, 61 N.E.3d 92 ; M.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 537, 304 Ill.Dec. 336, 852 N.E.2d 792 (and cases cited therein).

¶ 41 Several of plaintiff's supporting amici invite this court to discard the "no set of circumstances" test in determining the facial constitutionality of legislation. However, plaintiff herself does not raise this issue. An amicus takes the case as it finds it, with the issues framed by the parties. Accordingly, this court has repeatedly rejected attempts by amici to assert issues not raised by the parties. Bruns v. City of Centralia , 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 15 n.1, 386 Ill.Dec. 765, 21 N.E.3d 684 (citing Karas v. Strevell , 227 Ill. 2d 440, 450-51, 318 Ill.Dec. 567, 884 N.E.2d 122 (2008) ). Consequently, we decline this invitation.

¶ 42 In the case at bar, plaintiff concedes before this court, as she did before the appellate court ( 2016 IL App (1st) 152691, ¶ 47, 411 Ill.Dec. 452, 73 N.E.3d 536 ), that it is hypothetically possible for a hospital applicant to satisfy the requirements of section 15-86(c), i.e. , that the hospital services and activities listed in subsection (e) equal or exceed the hospital's estimated property tax liability, and for the hospital to use its property exclusively for charitable purposes as required under section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution. We cannot say that a hospital applicant, per se , may never satisfy both the statutory requirements of section 15-86 and the constitutional requirement of exclusive use for charitable purposes. See, e.g. , Chicago Bar Ass'n , 163 Ill. 2d at 300, 206 Ill.Dec. 113, 644 N.E.2d 1166.

¶ 43 While it is possible that specific future applications of section 15-86 may produce actual constitutional problems, it will be time enough to consider any such problems when they arise. See Napleton , 229 Ill. 2d at 306, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 ; Parentage of John M. , 212 Ill. 2d at 269, 288 Ill.Dec. 142, 817 N.E.2d 500 (both citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 504, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ). Here, we deal only with the statute on its face. So considered, we hold that plaintiff has failed to establish the facial invalidity of section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code.

¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Brian Hamer is no longer the director of the Illinois Department of Revenue. Thus, the current director, Constance Beard, has been substituted as a party by operation of law. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(d) (West 2012).

      Because section 6 of article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution merely rephrases its predecessor provision in the 1870 Illinois Constitution, " 'cases interpreting the permissive legislative exemptions under the Constitution of 1870 are equally relevant to the limits of exemption now constitutionally permitted.' " Eden , 213 Ill. 2d at 286, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 (quoting Small v. Pangle , 60 Ill. 2d 510, 514, 328 N.E.2d 285 (1975) ).

      Also, section 15-86 expressly provides that an otherwise eligible hospital applicant is not precluded from obtaining or maintaining a property tax exemption pursuant to other provisions of the Property Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/15-86(i) (West 2012).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Nelson YOUNG, Appellant.
    Docket No. 122598
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed September 20, 2018.
    James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Jacqueline L. Bullard, Deputy Defender, and Jason B. Jordan, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Daniel B. Lewin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Nelson Young, was convicted of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004) ). The circuit court of Morgan County sentenced him to serve a term of 40 years in prison, with 215 days of presentence custody credit, and also imposed certain fines and fees. Defendant subsequently filed a successive postconviction petition, which was dismissed on the State's motion. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia , that the circuit court erred in failing to award him the correct amount of presentence custody credit as required by statute.

¶ 2 The appellate court declined to address defendant's claim for additional presentence custody credit. 2017 IL App (4th) 150575-U, 2017 WL 3017211. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In July 2005, defendant was charged with first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004) ) for the stabbing death of his girlfriend, Eva Marie Davis. After undergoing a fitness examination, defendant was found unfit to stand trial in December 2005. He was temporarily transferred to the Department of Human Services for treatment and, following a second fitness hearing, was found fit for trial in March 2006. Defendant was tried and convicted by a jury, and the circuit court sentenced him to serve 40 years in prison, with 215 days of presentence custody credit. The court also ordered him to pay court costs and a DNA analysis fee. Sometime thereafter, the clerk of the circuit court recorded additional fines against defendant that had not been imposed by the circuit court as part of his sentence.

¶ 5 On direct appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence. The appellate court rejected that claim and affirmed his conviction and sentence. People v. Young , 381 Ill.App. 3d 595, 320 Ill.Dec. 505, 887 N.E.2d 649 (2008).

¶ 6 In April 2009, defendant, pro se , filed a petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008) ), asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective based on his counsel's trial strategy, including decisions regarding the presentation of or objection to evidence and the failure to pursue defenses other than accident. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. See id. § 122-2.1(a)(2). That judgment was affirmed on appeal. People v. Young , No. 4-09-0486, 2011 WL 10468203 (2011) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 7 In October 2014, defendant pro se filed a petition seeking postjudgment relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014) ). In that petition, defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the circuit court of certain facts showing that he was unfit to stand trial. Defendant further asserted that his right to due process had been violated because he was unfit at the time of trial. As relief, defendant requested the court to order a psychological evaluation to determine whether he was fit at the time of trial.

¶ 8 The circuit court recharacterized the petition as a successive postconviction petition and advanced it to second-stage proceedings. The court ultimately granted the State's motion to dismiss. Defendant sought reconsideration, contending, inter alia , that the circuit court erred by recharacterizing his petition as a successive postconviction petition without notifying him. In addition, defendant requested that the court vacate the dismissal and appoint counsel to represent him at the second-stage proceedings. The circuit court denied defendant's request for reconsideration.

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant raised three issues. First, he argued that the circuit court erred by recharacterizing his petition for relief from judgment as a successive postconviction petition without first admonishing him in accordance with People v. Pearson , 216 Ill.2d 58, 295 Ill.Dec. 621, 833 N.E.2d 827 (2005). Second, he requested that the appellate court vacate certain fines recorded against him by the circuit clerk because they had not been imposed by the court as part of his sentence. Third, defendant asserted that the circuit court erred in calculating the amount of presentence custody credit to which he was entitled under section 5-4.5-100 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2014) ). With regard to this contention, defendant requested that the appellate court grant him 183 days of additional credit based on the amount of time he was held in custody prior to the imposition of his sentence.

¶ 10 The appellate court agreed with defendant on the first two issues. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of his successive postconviction petition and remanded the case for proper admonishments in compliance with Pearson . 2017 IL App (4th) 150575-U, ¶¶ 34-38, 2017 WL 3017211. The appellate court also vacated three fines that were recorded against defendant by the circuit clerk but were not included as part of the circuit court's judgment. Id. ¶ 46. With regard to defendant's request for additional presentence custody credit, the appellate court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue because it determined that such a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal from postconviction proceedings. As a result, the appellate court declined to address the merits of defendant's claim. Id. ¶¶ 42-44.

¶ 11 Defendant appeals to this court. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The central issue in this appeal is whether defendant's claim for presentence custody credit under section 5-4.5-100 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2014) ) is procedurally defaulted because it was asserted for the first time on appeal from postconviction proceedings. The determination of whether a claim is procedurally barred presents a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Thompson , 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 25, 398 Ill.Dec. 74, 43 N.E.3d 984. In addition, our resolution of this issue requires statutory construction, which also presents a question of law that we review de novo . See People v. Manning , 2018 IL 122081, ¶ 16, 2018 WL 1417299.

¶ 14 As an initial matter, we address the appellate court's assessment of its jurisdiction to address defendant's claim for presentence custody credit. See Thompson , 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 26, 398 Ill.Dec. 74, 43 N.E.3d 984 (noting that a court of review has an independent duty to consider jurisdiction). The appellate court refused to consider the custody-credit claim, stating that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction" to do so. 2017 IL App (4th) 150575-U, ¶ 43, 2017 WL 3017211. That determination was mistaken. The appellate court obtained jurisdiction in this matter when defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of his successive postconviction petition. See Thompson , 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 26, 398 Ill.Dec. 74, 43 N.E.3d 984. Although the appellate court's statement regarding its jurisdiction was inaccurate, the court ultimately determined that defendant's request for presentence custody credit was not properly presented because such a claim could not be raised for the first time on appeal from postconviction proceedings. 2017 IL App (4th) 150575-U, ¶ 44, 2017 WL 3017211. We, therefore, address the parties' arguments as to the propriety of that conclusion.

¶ 15 Defendant argues that the appellate court erred in refusing to grant him an additional 183 days of presentence custody credit based on his failure to assert that claim in prior proceedings. The State responds that the appellate court properly declined to address the sentence-credit claim because it had been forfeited.

¶ 16 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014) ) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights occurred in the prosecutions that resulted in their convictions. A postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack, not an appeal seeking review of the judgment. The purpose of a postconviction action is to permit inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original trial that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously upon direct review. Issues that were raised and decided on direct review are barred by the doctrine of res judicata , and issues that could have been presented on direct review, but were not, are procedurally defaulted. People v. Taylor , 237 Ill.2d 356, 371-72, 341 Ill.Dec. 445, 930 N.E.2d 959 (2010). Also, any claim that is not included in the original or an amended petition is forfeited. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014) ; People v. Pendleton , 223 Ill.2d 458, 475, 308 Ill.Dec. 434, 861 N.E.2d 999 (2006) ; People v. Jones , 211 Ill.2d 140, 144-45, 284 Ill.Dec. 287, 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004). However, a forfeited claim may be raised in a successive postconviction petition if the defendant can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2014); Pendleton , 223 Ill.2d at 476, 308 Ill.Dec. 434, 861 N.E.2d 999 ; Jones , 211 Ill.2d at 148-49, 284 Ill.Dec. 287, 809 N.E.2d 1233.

¶ 17 In this case, it is uncontroverted that defendant's claim for additional presentence custody credit under section 5-4.5-100 has been forfeited. Defendant did not object to the presentence-credit calculation at the time of sentencing, in his initial posttrial motion, in his amended posttrial motion, or in the motion seeking a reduction of his sentence. The issue was not raised on direct appeal as plain error or as the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, nor was it presented in a timely filed section 2-1401 petition. Defendant's initial postconviction petition did not assert the claim or allege that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present it on direct appeal. Finally, defendant did not include the claim in his successive petition, which is the subject of this appeal.

¶ 18 Defendant does not dispute that his custody-credit claim could have been raised in those proceedings. He argues, however, that his failure to assert the claim earlier is of no moment because a claim for presentence custody credit is immune to the rules of procedural default. In particular, defendant claims that the applicable statutory language and relevant Illinois jurisprudence permits the assertion of his claim on appeal from the dismissal of his successive postconviction petition.

¶ 19 In addressing defendant's argument, we must construe the language codified in the presentence custody credit statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2014). The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. In general, courts will not depart from the statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. People v. Casas , 2017 IL 120797, ¶ 18, 422 Ill.Dec. 858, 104 N.E.3d 425.

¶ 20 Section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"the offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for the number of days spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed. * * *
The trial court may give credit to the defendant for the number of days spent confined for psychiatric or substance abuse treatment prior to judgment, if the court finds that the detention or confinement was custodial." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2014).

¶ 21 Defendant argues that, because section 5-4.5-100 provides that the grant of credit is mandatory and does not include any limitation restricting when credit requests may be asserted, claims for sentence credit under that provision are not subject to forfeiture. According to defendant, claims for presentence custody credit must be treated in the same manner as claims for per diem monetary credit under section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 ( 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2014) ). In support of this argument, defendant relies on People v. Woodard , 175 Ill.2d 435, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997), and People v. Caballero , 228 Ill.2d 79, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044 (2008).

¶ 22 Both Woodard and Caballero addressed the viability of claims for per diem monetary credit that were raised for the first time on appeal. Woodard did so in the context of a direct appeal ( Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 438, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 ), and Caballero did so in the context of an appeal from postconviction proceedings ( Caballero , 228 Ill.2d at 81, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044 ). In resolving each case, the court examined the language of section 110-14. Id. at 83, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044 ; Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 440, 444, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. The per diem monetary credit statute provides, in pertinent part, that a person incarcerated on a bailable offense "shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant." 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2016).

¶ 23 In Woodard , the court noted that the right to monetary credit is mandatory and shall be granted "upon application" for it. Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 444, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. In addition, the court also noted that the statute imposes no limitation restricting the time frame during which the application must be made. Id. The Woodard court held that, under the plain language of section 110-14, "the statutory right to a per diem credit is conferred in mandatory terms while being subject to a defendant's application. As such, the 'normal rules' of waiver do not apply [citation], and the right is cognizable on appeal as a matter of course subject to a defendant's application for it." Id. at 457, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. Lastly, after concluding that the statutory language permitted the defendant to initially request per diem credit on appeal, the court observed that "the mandatory credit in section 5-8-7(b) * * * has been treated similarly" by the appellate court. Id.

¶ 24 In Caballero , the court initially found that a claim for the per diem monetary credit under section 110-14 is a statutory right that is not cognizable under the Act. Caballero , 228 Ill.2d at 87, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044. The court went on to explain that the defendant's credit request did not allege a violation of a constitutional right but was, instead, merely an application for a different type of statutory relief. Id. at 87-88, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044. The court also noted that section 110-14 lacked a specified time frame or procedural stage for a defendant to make such an application and that the grant of such credit was a " ' "simple ministerial act" ' " that would promote judicial economy by precluding further proceedings on that matter. Id. (quoting Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 456, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935, quoting People v. Scott , 277 Ill.App.3d 565, 566, 214 Ill.Dec. 367, 660 N.E.2d 1316 (1996) ). The court then held that "if, as in this case, the basis for granting the application of the defendant is clear and available from the record, the appellate court may, in the 'interests of an orderly administration of justice,' grant the relief requested." Id. at 88, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044. The Caballero court also acknowledged Woodard 's general observation that the appellate court had treated presentence custody credit and monetary per diem credit similarly. Id. at 84, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044 (citing Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 457, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 ).

¶ 25 In asserting that his custody-credit claim is not subject to procedural default, defendant points out that in cases decided after Caballero the appellate court has not been consistent in granting claims for presentence custody credit under section 5-4.5-100 that are raised for the first time on appeal. See People v. Truesdell , 2017 IL App (3d) 150383, ¶ 19, 416 Ill.Dec. 256, 83 N.E.3d 1093 (granting credit on appeal from postconviction proceedings); People v. Ross , 2015 IL App (3d) 130077, ¶¶ 22-23, 396 Ill.Dec. 808, 40 N.E.3d 461 (same); People v. Purcell , 2013 IL App (2d) 110810, ¶¶ 8-9, 18, 370 Ill.Dec. 47, 987 N.E.2d 813 (same); People v. Harper , 387 Ill.App.3d 240, 244, 326 Ill.Dec. 745, 900 N.E.2d 381 (2008) (same). But see 2017 IL App (4th) 150575-U, ¶ 44, 2017 WL 3017211 (refusing to grant credit); People v. Morrison , 2016 IL App (4th) 140712, ¶ 19-21, 407 Ill.Dec. 1022, 64 N.E.3d 821 (same); People v. Nelson , 2016 IL App (4th) 140168, ¶ 39, 401 Ill.Dec. 305, 49 N.E.3d 1007 (same). Defendant asserts that this divergence in our appellate court must be resolved in favor of allowing such claims to be presented in the appellate court even where they were not raised in prior proceedings. According to defendant, all of the factors that animated the decisions in Caballero and Woodard are present in this case and, therefore, the same result should obtain here. We do not agree.

¶ 26 In both Caballero and Woodard , the conclusion that a per diem credit claim could be asserted for the first time on appeal was specifically predicated on the fact that section 110-14 provided that the mandatory per diem credit is to be granted "upon application of the defendant" without any specified time limitation for that application. Caballero , 228 Ill.2d at 83, 87-88, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044 ; Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 444, 457, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. In contrast, section 5-4.5-100 does not provide that presentence custody credit is to be granted "upon application of the defendant," nor does it contain any other language indicating that the normal rules of procedural default do not apply to claims for such credit. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2014). Defendant argues against placing too much emphasis on the "upon application" phrase and stresses that it was just one of several reasons underlying the decisions in Caballero and Woodard . This argument is unpersuasive. A careful reading of those cases reveals that the "upon application" language was pivotal to this court's reasoning. In fact, it was the lynchpin of the analysis because it demonstrated the legislature's intent to permit a request for per diem credit in the appellate court, even where the issue has not been properly preserved for review. As this court has recognized, the inclusion of that statutory language was a specific and exceptional circumstance justifying a departure from our usual rules of procedural default. See People v. Lewis , 234 Ill.2d 32, 42, 332 Ill.Dec. 334, 912 N.E.2d 1220 (2009) (distinguishing the statutory basis for the decision in Woodard ). Moreover, the general observation in Caballero and Woodard that our appellate court has treated the two types of sentence credit similarly does not detract from this conclusion. See Caballero , 228 Ill.2d at 84, 319 Ill.Dec. 364, 885 N.E.2d 1044 ; Woodard , 175 Ill.2d at 457, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. Neither Caballero nor Woodard examined the provision governing presentence custody credit or specifically addressed whether that language could be construed to require that procedural default be excused. Because section 5-4.5-100 does not contain language demonstrating a legislative intent that claims for presentence custody credit are not subject to forfeiture, the reasoning employed in Caballero and Woodard does not apply.

¶ 27 Defendant urges that to treat claims for presentence custody credit differently from per diem credit claims is unduly harsh because the entitlement to credit that will reduce the amount of time a prisoner is confined involves significant liberty interests-concerns that are not at issue in claims for monetary credit against fines. We acknowledge the logic underlying defendant's contention. However, our decision is grounded in the plain language of section 5-4.5-100 and the fact that the legislature has not included the "upon application" language that was deliberately included in the provision governing per diem monetary credit. See People v. Williams , 239 Ill.2d 503, 510, 347 Ill.Dec. 677, 942 N.E.2d 1257 (2011) (rejecting the argument that section 5-4.5-100 must be construed in the same manner as section 110-14, which is part of an entirely separate code).

¶ 28 We next address defendant's argument that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) permitted the appellate court to grant his claim for presentence custody credit despite the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal from postconviction proceedings. See e.g. , People v. Andrews , 365 Ill.App.3d 696, 699, 303 Ill.Dec. 83, 850 N.E.2d 888 (2006). Rule 615(b)(1) provides that a court of review may "modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken," as limited by subsection (b)(4), which permits a reviewing court to "reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(1), (4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). However, the grant of authority to modify a judgment of the circuit court cannot be isolated from the limitation that immediately follows-that modification must affect the judgment from which the appeal is taken. The judgment at issue in this case is not the sentencing order entered by the circuit court in 2006. Rather, the challenged judgment is the dismissal of defendant's successive postconviction petition, which did not assert any claim based on the miscalculation of presentence custody credit. This court has previously explained that, because the appellate court does not possess supervisory authority (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16 ("General administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court * * *.") ), it cannot address postconviction claims that are not raised in the initial petition. People v. Jones , 213 Ill.2d 498, 507, 290 Ill.Dec. 519, 821 N.E.2d 1093 (2004). The same rule applies to a successive postconviction petition. The authority granted by Rule 615(b) presumes that the issue underlying the requested relief is properly before the reviewing court. That circumstance does not exist in cases where a statutory claim for presentence custody credit is presented for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of either an initial or a successive postconviction petition that did not assert the claim. Id.

¶ 29 Defendant also argues that the appellate court should have addressed his statutory claim for presentence custody credit as a motion to correct the mittimus. See e.g. , People v. Brown , 371 Ill.App.3d 972, 986, 309 Ill.Dec. 526, 864 N.E.2d 767 (2007) ; People v. Wren , 223 Ill.App.3d 722, 731, 166 Ill.Dec. 194, 585 N.E.2d 1216 (1992). This argument is misguided. As this court has recognized, although a circuit court may not modify its judgment after it has lost jurisdiction over a case, it may correct the mittimus so that it accurately reflects the judgment that was entered. People v. Latona , 184 Ill.2d 260, 278, 234 Ill.Dec. 801, 703 N.E.2d 901 (1998). Also, the correction of a mittimus can be accomplished at any time. Id. This authority extends to the appellate court by virtue of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), which permits a reviewing court to enter any order that ought to have been made. However, the appellate court is authorized to order correction of a mittimus only where it is inconsistent with the judgment entered by the circuit court.

¶ 30 That is not the circumstance presented here. Defendant does not, and cannot, assert that the mittimus is inaccurate in this case because the judgment entered by the circuit court granted him 215 days of presentence custody credit. The relief defendant seeks is not correction of the mittimus but, rather, amendment of the sentencing judgment to reflect the correct calculation of the amount of presentence custody credit to which he is entitled. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1801(a) (West 2014) (providing that a copy of the circuit court's judgment constitutes the mittimus). That is not something that can be accomplished by the appellate court on appeal from the dismissal of a successive postconviction petition that did not raise the claim.

¶ 31 As set forth above, we find no recognized exception that applies in this case to excuse the procedural default of the custody-credit claim. Consequently, the appellate court properly refused to grant the credit requested by defendant for the first time in his appeal from the dismissal of his postconviction petition. To the extent that the appellate court's decisions in Andrews , Brown , and Wren hold to the contrary, they are hereby overruled.

¶ 32 Defendant has argued, in the alternative, that this court should announce a new rule in this opinion to allow a defendant to seek correction of a miscalculation of presentence custody credit at any time and at any stage of proceedings. We decline defendant's request. The assertion of an error in sentencing credit is best resolved in the circuit court, where any factual disputes as to the proper amount of credit can be adjudicated. Moreover, in People ex rel. Berlin v. Bakalis , 2018 IL 122435, ¶ 27, 2018 WL 1416891, this court recently referred this matter to our rules committee. The proposal referred to the rules committee in Bakalis encompasses defendant's request to the extent that, if adopted, it will provide a mechanism that would enable defendants to obtain a corrected calculation of presentence custody credit in the circuit court.

¶ 33 As a second alternative argument, defendant requests that we exercise our supervisory authority to grant him the additional 183 days of presentence custody credit. The State does not oppose the request that we exercise our supervisory authority but asserts that granting the additional credit outright is inappropriate in this case. The State points out that an award of credit for time spent confined for psychiatric treatment prior to judgment is discretionary and may be granted if the circuit court finds that the detention or confinement was custodial. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2014). As a consequence, the State contends that this case should be remanded to the circuit court for a determination of the correct amount of credit to which defendant is entitled. We agree that this is a question best answered by the circuit court.

¶ 34 Accordingly, in the exercise of our supervisory authority ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16 ), we order the circuit court to address defendant's claim on remand and determine the amount of additional presentence custody credit to which he is entitled. In addition, we order the circuit court to appoint counsel to represent defendant at the proceedings on remand.

¶ 35 Finally, we address defendant's citation of our recent decision in People v. Vara , 2018 IL 121823, 2018 WL 2453148, as it relates to the appellate court's judgment in this case. In Vara , we held that the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider a challenge directed at fines recorded by the circuit clerk that were not included in the sentence. Id. ¶¶ 13-23, 30. As explained in Vara , although the recording of fines not imposed by the court is invalid, the clerk's action is not subject to direct review because the appellate court is vested with jurisdiction to review only final judgments entered by the circuit court. Id. ¶¶ 23, 30.

¶ 36 In appealing the dismissal of his successive postconviction petition, defendant requested the vacatur of three fines recorded against him by the circuit clerk: the $50 court-finance assessment, the $10 medical-costs assessment, and the $25 violent-crime-victims-assistance assessment. 2017 IL App (4th) 150575-U, ¶ 46, 2017 WL 3017211. The State conceded the invalidity of those assessments, and the appellate court ordered that they be vacated by the circuit court. Id. In accordance with our decision in Vara , we hold that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to address defendant's challenge of the invalid assessments. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the appellate court's judgment directing that the assessments be vacated by the circuit court.

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings as ordered by the appellate court and consistent with the views expressed herein.

¶ 39 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 40 Cause remanded with directions.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Although the petition was advanced to second-stage proceedings, the circuit court did not appoint counsel to represent defendant.

      Throughout its brief, the State refers to defendant's petition as seeking relief under section 2-1401, as it was labeled and initially presented in the circuit court. However, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had recharacterized that document as a successive postconviction petition and remanded for the necessary Pearson admonishments, which would not be required or appropriate for a section 2-1401 petition. The State has not argued that the appellate court erred in its recharacterization determination or that the remand was improper. Accordingly, we address the issues presented here under the law governing postconviction proceedings.

      At the time defendant was sentenced in 2006, presentence custody credit was governed by section 5-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2006) ). That section was repealed in 2009 and replaced by section 5-4.5-100. No relevant changes were made to the language or substance of the provisions.