author: THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Cathy N. BATES, a/k/a Lynn Cathy Bates, a/k/a Cathy Lynn Nichols; and Timothy J. Bates, Appellants, v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC., s/b/m to ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc.; and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Appellees, Victor W. Dahar, Trustee.
    No. 16-1228
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    December 14, 2016

      Terne Harman, Kristina Cerniauskaite, and Harman Law Offices, on brief for Appellants.
    Gregory N. Blase, David D. Christensen, and K&L Gates LLP, on brief for Appel-lees.
    Before LYNCH, THOMPSON, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.
   THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Cathy N. Bates and Timothy J. Bates (our Appellants, whom we also call the Bateses) went bankrupt and Appellees foreclosed on their home. At the end of the tax year, they each received an IRS Form 1099-A in the mail alerting them that the foreclosure might have tax consequences. The Bateses sued our Appellees, .claiming that the Forms were a coercive attempt to collect on the mortgage debt—a debt Appellees have no right to collect because it was discharged during the Bateses’ Chapter 7 proceedings. The bankruptcy court and the district court found the Forms were not objectively coercive attempts to collect a debt. We agree, and so we affirm.

The Facts

The Bateses took out a loan from Appel-lee CitiMortgage, Inc. s/b/m to ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. (“CitiMort-gage”) secured by a mortgage on their home in Newport, New Hampshire. The Bateses filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2008 and their mortgage debt was discharged in 2009. The Bateses entered into a Loan Modification Agreement with Citi-Mortgage after the discharge. Under that Agreement, the Bateses did not reaffirm personal liability for the mortgage, but they could avoid foreclosure and stay in their home as long as they continued to make payments to CitiMortgage. The Bateses eventually stopped making payments, CitiMortgage foreclosed, and the Bateses moved out in October 2011.

In January 2012, the Bateses each received an IRS Form 1099-A (“1099-A Form” or “Form”) in the mail. According to the instructions on the back of the Forms, “[c]ertain lenders who acquire an interest in property that was security for a loan ... must provide you with this statement. You may have reportable income or loss because of..such acquisition or abandonment.” Both Forms listed the lender as “Freddie Mac” (also known. as Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, our other Appellee) “c/o CitiMortgage.” And, as of the time of- acquisition, the Forms listed the “balance of principal outstanding” as $194,624 and the fair market value of the property as $168,000. Box Five on the Forms was checked, indicating that “the borrower was personally liable for the repayment of the debt.” The front of the Forms also says “This is important tax information and is being furnished to the Internal Revenue Service. If you are required to file a return, a negligence penalty or other sanction may be imposed on you if taxable income results from this transaction and the IRS determines that it has not been reported.”

We pause here to note that a discharged debt can count as taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12). But, as Appellees point out (and the Bateses do not dispute), debt discharged in bankruptcy proceedings (like the Bateses’) and on a qualified principal residence (like the Bateses’) .does not. 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(A), (E). The Bateses’ 1099-A Forms .directed them to “Pub. 4681 for information about foreclosures and abandonments.’’ That publication explains: “Debt canceled in a title 11 bankruptcy case is not included in your income.” I.R.S., Dep’t of the Treasury, Publication 4681: Canceled Debts, Foreclosures, Repossessions, and Abandonments (for Individuals) 4 (2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/ irs-prior/p4681—2011.pdf. The Bateses do not claim that they owed any taxes as a result of the foreclosure or the Forms.

But, the Bateses say the 1099-A Forms reported bad information. After their bankruptcy, the Bateses were no longer personally liable for the mortgage debt, so they say Freddie Mac should not have checked the box showing the opposite, Timothy Bates averred that he called Appellees about his Form and was told that the debt was not discharged because it was a secured debt. The Bateses’ attorney later sent a letter to Freddie Mae pointing out that the Bateses’ mortgage was discharged in bankruptcy and demanding the revocation of the 1099-A Forms. The Bateses say they were terrified they would owe additional income taxes unless they resolved the matter "With Freddie Mac or CitiMortgage. Freddie Mac did not revoke the Forms and claims they are accurate.

One other important detail: the Bateses received a pre-recorded phone call from CitiMortgage on June 11, 2013, requesting proof of insurance on their old home; insurance was required under the terms of their former mortgage agreement. The phone call upset Timothy Bates: “it seemed we would never be free from the debt to CitiMortgage.”

In May 2013, about one month before receiving the last-straw phone call from CitiMortgage, the Bateses filed a motion to reopen their bankruptcy proceedings, then sued CitiMortgage and Freddie Mac for attempting to collect on the discharged mortgage debt in violation of the discharge injunction provisions of 11 U.S.C, § 524(a). Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court granted the Bateses summary judgment on their claim that the 2013 phone call violated the discharge injunction, though it later found the Bateses did not prove any damages on this claim. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for our Appellees on all of the Bateses’ other claims, including their claim that the 1099-A Forms violated the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy court found the Forms gave the Bateses “no objective basis” to believe Appellees were trying to collect the discharged mortgage debt. The Bateses appealed the bankruptcy court’s rulings on damages and the 1099-A Forms. The district court affirmed both. The Bateses now appeal the bankruptcy court’s ruling on the 1099-A Forms to us.

Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, as under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a motion for summary judgment “should be granted ‘only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant has successfully demonstrated an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hannon v. ABCD Holdings, LLC (In re Hannon), 839 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varasso), 37 F.3d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1994)). We review the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment decision de novo and give no special deference to the district court’s findings. Id

The Bateses’ Claim

The Bateses allege that the 1099-A Forms violated the discharge injunction provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a), which prohibit acts to collect, recover, or offset debts discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. See Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 706 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2013). To prove a discharge injunction violation, a debtor must establish that the creditor “(1) has notice of the debtor’s discharge ...; (2) intends the actions which constituted the violation; and (3) acts in a way that improperly coerces or harasses the debtor.” Best v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 540 B.R. 1, 9 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Lumb v. Cimenian (In re Lumb), 401 B.R. 1, 6 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009)).

The Bateses and our Appellees only dispute the third element—whether the 1099-A Forms were an improperly coercive or harassing attempt to collect on the discharged debt. The Bateses claim the Forms were coercive, especially because the Forms contained false information. They also claim the bankruptcy court erred by failing to consider whether the Forms were coercive under all the circumstances, including Freddie Mac’s failure to correct the Forms and the phone call from CitiMortgage about the insurance policy on their old home. CitiMortgage and Freddie Mac, of course, disagree. So do we. We explain.

We assess whether conduct is improperly coercive or harassing under an objective standard—the debtor’s subjective feeling of coercion or harassment is not enough. In re Lumb, 401 B.R. at 6; see Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp, (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2006). We have no “specific test” to determine whether a creditor’s conduct meets this objective standard, but we consider the facts and circumstances of each case, including factors such as the “immediateness of any threatened action and the context in which a statement is made.” Diamond v. Premier Capital, Inc. (In re Diamond), 346 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 2003); see In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 20. “[A] creditor violates the discharge injunction only if it acts to collect or enforce a prepetition debt; bad acts that do not have a coercive effect on the debtor do not violate the discharge.” In re Lumb, 401 B.R. at 7.

For example, a debt collector in Best, 540 B.R. at 10-11, sent a series of letters stating information like the unpaid loan balance and that failure to pay could result in foreclosure; the letters included a disclaimer explaining that if the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy, then the letter was for informational purposes only. These letters did not violate the discharge injunction because “[s]tatements of an informational nature, even if they include a payoff amount, are not generally actionable if they do not demand payment,” and these letters did not. Id. at 11. Likewise, references, to potential foreclosure in letters to a debtor during bankruptcy proceedings were not coercive where the letters accurately reported that the debtor could face foreclosure after bankruptcy but threatened no “immediate action” against the debtors. Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 402 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Penn. State Emps. Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1988)).

The bankruptcy court found, and we agree, that the 1099-A Forms are not a collection attempt. The 1099-A Forms state that they provide “tax information” and that, because of the foreclosure, “[y]ou may have reportable income or loss.” As in Jamo and Best, the Forms provide “information,” but they do not demand payment or threaten any action. As in Jamo and Best, the 1099-A Forms state the outstanding principal balance as of the date of foreclosure, but they do not indicate that the Bateses owe any money to anyone— not taxes to the IRS, and not the discharged debt to Freddie Mac or CitiMortgage. And that Freddie Mac may have incorrectly checked the box showing that “the borrower was personally liable for repayment of the debt” does not change this analysis: nothing on the Forms indicates that the Bateses’ potential “reportable income or loss” might be any different because of the checked box, and checking the box does not change-the, informational nature of the Forms or create a demand for payment. Because the discharge injunction prohibits acts “to collect, recover or offset” discharged debt, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), the fact that the 1099-A Forms do not attempt to collect any money from the Bateses would seem to decide the issue.

Undeterred, the Bateses claim the bankruptcy court was wrong because the Forms put the Bátéses “between a rock and a hard place”: they had to pay the discharged debt or seek tax advice. This tight spot makes the Forms coercive, they say, just as a tight spot made a creditor’s conduct coercive in In re Lumb, 401 B.R. at 7. But the Bateses’ situation does not compare.

The In re Lumb creditor threatened to sue the debtor’s wife to collect if the debt- or did not pay up. Id. at 3.- When the debt was discharged in bankruptcy, the creditor followed through on the threat, and the couple incurred $50,000 in legal fees defending the meritless lawsuit. Id. at. 5, 8. So, the debtor was in a. jam: pay the discharged debt, or pay the legal fees and risk losing the lawsuit. Id. at.8-9. In re Lumb features all of the hallmarks of objectively coercive creditor collection actions, and then some: an illicit demand to pay a debt despite the automatic stay (and later, the discharge injunction); a threat of immediate action if the debtor did not comply; and follow-through on that threat

The Bateses have nothing in common with the debtor in In re Lumb. The Bateses were confronted with no demand for payment and the Forms threatened no action. Nor was any action taken by Freddie Mac illicit, as the. parties agree that Freddie Mac was required to file the 1099-A Forms as a result of the foreclosure. So unlike in In re Lumb, where the consequence of paying to defend a bogus lawsuit was brought on by the creditor’s misdeeds, here the consequence of potentially needing tax advice was triggered by the foreclosure itself. That some consequence may have followed from the Bateses’ receipt of the 1099-A Forms does not make that consequence coercion.

Finally, the Bateses claim the bankruptcy court erred because it did not consider all of the circumstances surrounding the 1099-A Forms. Freddie Mac did not correct the Forms after Timothy Bates called about his Form and after the Bateses’ attorney sent a letter demanding the Forms be revoked. They also claim the bankruptcy court should have included the May 2013 pre-recorded phone message in the coercion calculus. These arguments do not help the Bateses.

As to the failure to correct the 1099-A Forms, the- Bateses’ argue their situation is like that of a debtor faced with a false credit report, and a creditor’s refusal' to correct a false credit report can show the creditor was trying to coerce the debt- or into paying a debt, so that inference should apply here, too. It does not. Reporting false or outdated information to a credit agency in an attempt to coerce payment on a discharged debt can violate the discharge injunction. See In re Zine, 521 B.R. 31, 40 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014); Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (collecting cases). The reason: negative credit reports have consequences—like reducing creditworthiness, and with it the debtor’s ability to get loans in the future—and so a false report might coerce a debtor into paying a discharged debt to avoid those consequences. In re Torres, 367 B.R. at 486. Evidence that a creditor refused to change a false or outdated report can give rise to an inference that the creditor intended to coerce the debtor into paying the discharged debt. Id. at 489-90.

The Bateses’ situation is not analogous. As we explained above, even if Freddie Mac incorrectly checked the box showing the Bateses were personally liable for the debt, filing the 1099-A Forms did not create tax liability for the Bateses or any other consequences beyond those that come with foreclosure. Because there were no consequences and no attempt to collect a debt, Freddie Mac’s failure to retract the 1099-A Forms does not give rise to an inference of. coercion.

As to the pre-recorded message, the call was made by CitiMortgage around a year and a half after the Bateses received their 1099-A Forms. As the bankruptcy court noted, there is no other evidence in the record of communication between the Bateses and Freddie Mac or CitiMortgage about the discharged debt after the foreclosure. The Bateses do not say why this phone call makes the Forms objectively coercive, and we see no reason to believe that it does.

Conclusion

We do not doubt that the 1099-A Forms caused the Bateses stress and concern. Indeed, when Timothy Bates called about the Forms, CitiMortgage just made things worse: its representative gave him wrong information and told him that the debt had not been discharged, instead of giving him correct information about his debt or helping him understand the 1099-A Forms. But the Bateses’ subjective feeling of coercion is not enough to prove a violation of the discharge injunction, and the Bateses have hot presented evidence that the Forms were objectively coercive. In fact, the only evidence in the record shows they were not. And so, we affirm.

      . The Bateses also claim that the fair market value of their home was the price Freddie Mac paid at the foreclosure sale, $205,237, so Freddie Mac should not have reported the fair market value as $168,000 on the 1099-A Forms, Appellees dispute the fair market value of the home. Whatever the home’s value, the Bateses did not make- this argument or present any evidence of this fact to the bankruptcy court, so the argument is waived. Crefisa Inc. v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp.), 186 F.3d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1999).

      . The Bateses also make two arguments here related to the fair market value of their property. First, they say they would have had no tax questions at all if the Forms were filled out correctly and "no deficiency or liability [was] displayed.” They also argue that if they reported what they believed to be the true fair market value on their taxes, the discrepancy between their figure and the 1099-A Forms could trigger an audit. As stated above, the Bateses' argument about the fair market value of their home is waived because it was not presented to the bankruptcy court, and so these derivative arguments are waived, too. In any case, the Bateses cite a Tax Topic to bolster their claim that a discrepancy between a tax return and a 1099-A Form can trigger an audit, but that same Tax Topic refers back to Publication 4681, which says debt can-celled in bankruptcy is not included in income. Indeed, the Bateses do not argue or present evidence that they had any tax liability, reported this event on .their taxes, sought tax advice, or took any other action because of the Forms. See I.R.S., Tax Topic 432: Form 1099-A (Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property) and Form 1099-C (Cancellation of Debt), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc 432.html (last updated Oct. 10, 2016); Publication 4681, supra, at 4.

      . On the Bateses' motion for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court found CitiMort-gage liable for violating the discharge injunction by making the insurance call. In his affidavit in support of that motion, Timothy Bates claimed that a CitiMortgage representative ”insist[ed]” he was “still responsible under the mortgage to pay for property insurance” and "demand[ed] that [the Bateses] pay for insurance on the foreclosed.homestead.” At a later hearing to assess the damages caused by the call, it came out that Mr. Bates did not speak to a CitiMortgage representative. Instead, he heard a pre-recorded message explaining that insurance was required under the terms of the mortgage agreement, but CitiMortgage did not have the policy information on tile, and requesting that the Bateses "[p]lease provide your insurance carrier and policy information to us.’:’ On review of the damages order, the district court-noted: "notwithstanding the bankruptcy court’s conclusion to .the contrary, there is no evidence in this record even remotely suggesting that the call was intended to coerce plaintiffs into paying a discharged debt ... Indeed, had defendants challenged the bankruptcy court’s finding on appeal they may well have obtained a reversal.” The Bateses did not appeal the district court's finding, so we need not wade into this bog. Whether or not the call violated the discharge injunction, under these circumstances it adds nothing to their 1099-A claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Gregory GARMON, Sr., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a Amtrak, Defendant, Appellee.
    No. 15-1803
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    December 16, 2016

      Christopher J. Trombetta, with whom Law Office of Christopher J, Trombetta, Mansfield, MA, was on brief, for appellant.
    Lisa Stephanian Burton, with whom Peter J. Mee, Boston, MA, Thomas J. McAn-drew, Providence, RI, and Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP were on brief, for appellee.
    Before LYNCH, THOMPSON, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.
   THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

In this employment discrimination case, appellant Gregory Garmon, Sr., an African-American man currently employed by Amtrak, alleges that his opportunities for overtime were reduced because of his race and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed. After careful consideration, we affirm the district court’s ruling-

Background

Gregory Garmon, Sr., has been employed with Amtrak since 1997 when he first began working for the company as a signal helper. In 2001 he was promoted to his current position as a lineman in the Electric Traction Department where his responsibilities include, among other things, construction, installation, and repairs of the overhead catenary system. In addition to linemen, Amtrak also employs high rail operators (“HROs”) and foremen. HROs perform all the duties of linemen, but also operate high rail equipment on the railroad.

From 2003 through February 2015, Amtrak organized its Electric Traction Department into three shifts. The first shift ran from 6:00 am. to 2:00 pm, Monday through Friday, and initially consisted of Garmon, the sole lineman, and two white co-workers, Christopher Alves and William Butler, both HROs. In 2008, James Thack-aberry, another white co-worker, was added to the first shift as a foreman. Throughout his employment, Garmon admits he was never interested in seeking a promotion to work as either a foreman or HRO. Indeed, Garmon stated that he “had no[ ] desire[ ]” to work as an HRO and accordingly, he currently still works as a lineman in Amtrak’s Boston/Providence cost center.

Garmon’s employment with Amtrak is governed by a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) negotiated between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”) and Amtrak. Despite Garmon’s unsubstantiated assertions to the contrary Rule 13 of the CBA explicitly governs the distribution of overtime for Amtrak’s IBEW employees. Rule 13 provides, in pertinent part, that “[ojvertime [is] to be distributed in conjunction with the duly authorized local committee of the craft or their representative and local management.” The CBA also provides a procedure for IBEW employees to file grievances within 60 days from the date of the occurrence on which their claims are based. Garmon never filed a grievance with the IBEW regarding his overtime discrimination or hostile work environment claims. Garmon did complain to a division engineer, George Fitter, about the distribution of overtime in 2012, but Fitter concluded that the overtime policy was being administered correctly.

In accordance with' the CBA, Amtrak overtime needs are first determined by Amtrak management and then communicated to a local union representative, who eventually manages the distribution of overtime amongst IBEW employees. Since February 2011, Michael Poole, who .has served as the Assistant Division .Engineer at Amtrak, has been responsible for determining overtime needs and seeking budgetary approval from Amtrak’s senior management for proposed overtime. Alves, Garmon’s co-worker-on the first shift, is also a member of the IBEW and served as the union representative who oversaw the overtime sign-up process from 2009 to 2013.

Before Poole was hired as the Assistant Division Engineer, overtime needs were determined by Amtrak management and verbally communicated to Alves, who would then create a written sheet based on the verbal suggestions of an Amtrak supervisor. After Poole was hired, the process was no longer verbal and an Amtrak supervisor would create and submit written sign-up sheets to Alves which identified the specific positions and shifts needed for overtime by role. Alves was then responsible for overseeing the overtime sign-up process and would return the filled-out sheets to Amtrak management.

It is this process of determining Amtrak overtime needs by Poole and Amtrak management that Garmon seems to take issue with. Garmon alleges that his supervisor, Greg Brennan, instituted an overtime plan in the fall of 2012, whereby Amtrak discriminated in its determination of overtime needs in order to afford white employees more overtime opportunities than African-American employees. According to Gar-mon, under the previous overtime plan, and prior to Thackaberry’s new first shift assignment, he would essentially take turns opting for overtime hours with the two other first shift employees—Alves and Butler. Garmon argues that Amtrak’s overtime system prior to 2012 did not distribute overtime hours based on position or role and thus he had more opportunities for overtime. Garmon also alleges that once Thackaberry—a foreman—was added to his shift he was required to share overtime opportunities with Thackaberry, while Alves and Butler—HROs—were not required to do the same.

In addition to his complaints about overtime denials, Garmon says that he was also subjected to a hostile work environment. He presents a list of workplace gripes: (1) he was denied access to the equipment canister keys; (2) he was not sufficiently trained regarding Structural Erection Diagrams (“SEDs”); (3) he was not appropriately acknowledged by his supervisors or other co-workers; (4) he was intimidated while at work; and (5) he was put in difficult situations in the hopes that he would fail. Amtrak denies all. First, it says that there was never a change in its overtime policy. Second, Amtrak adamantly denies that Garmon was ever subjected to a hostile work environment.

Concluding that Garmon failed to proffer any evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action or that he was subjected to a hostile work environment, the district court granted Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment. Garmon subsequently filed this timely appeal.

Discussion

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, “Although we will draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, we will not ‘draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, rank conjecture, or vitriolic invective.’ ” Pina v. Children’s Place, 740 F.3d 785, 795 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007)). “[A] party cannot successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment by resting ‘upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading.’ ” Pina, 740 F.3d at 795 (quoting LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993)). Rather, “a plaintiffs ability to survive summary judgment depends on his ability to muster facts sufficient to support an inference of discrimination.” Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2007). Therefore, “a nonmovant cannot rely ‘merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.’ ” Pina, 740 F.3d at 795 (quoting Dennis v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 549 F.3d 851, 855-56 (1st Cir. 2008)).

“A plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race [may] assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called ‘disparate treatment.’” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767-68, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). Here, Garmon alleges that Amtrak subjected him to both disparate treatment and to a hostile work environment because of his race. With regard to both claims, the parties dispute whether Garmon has sufficiently made a prima facie showing. We discuss each argument seriatim.

1. Disparate Treatment

Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, Garmon must rely on the three-stage burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell, Garmon bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Id.; Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 2003). To establish a prima facie case Garmon must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) [he is] a member of a protected class; (2) [he is] qualified for [his] job; (3) [he] suffered] an adverse employment action at the hands of [his] employer; and (4) [there is] some evidence of a causal connection between [his] membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action.” Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2011). “While the burden of establishing a prima facie case is ‘not onerous,’ the plaintiff is still required to prove the prima facie elements by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Del Valle-Santana v. Servicios Legales de P.R., Inc., 804 F.3d 127, 131 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Admittedly, “[t]he burden of showing something by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ ... ‘simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.’ ” Concrete Pipe & Prod. of California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. California, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (citations omitted). However, throughout the McDonnell burden-shifting analysis Gar-mon maintains the ultimate burden of persuasion. Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1092 (1st Cir. 1995).

If able to make such a showing, Garmon creates a rebuttable presumption that Amtrak engaged in discrimination. Amtrak may rebut this, presumption' by pointing to evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged conduct. Id. If Amtrak is able to make such a showing, the presumption of discrimination disappears and the burden of production again shifts to Garmon, who must offer evidence that Amtrak’s explanation is pretextual and that discriminatory animus prompted the adverse action. The parties dispute whether Garmon has met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Specifically, the parties dispute whether Garmon can establish that he suffered an adverse employment action or that a causal connection exists between the alleged action and his race.

a) Adverse Action

The parties first dispute whether Garmon can establish that he suffered an adverse employment action. Garmon argues that under an alleged new overtime policy instituted by Amtrak in 2012, he “suffered adverse employment events through the denial of overtime opportunities” and “the associated loss of income.” Amtrak responds that it never instituted a new overtime policy. According to Amtrak, employees are given the opportunity to sign up for overtime based on their respective shifts, positions, and locations. The process, it says, affords first-shift employees preference over first-shift overtime slots if they are qualified for the position or role that needs to be filled. If all qualified employees on the first shift decline an overtime opportunity, other Electric Traction employees are then allowed to fill the overtime slot depending on their positions, qualifications, and location. Amtrak asserts that Garmon was never subjected to a reduction in his overtime opportunities under any overtime policy change and that any alleged reduction in overtime does not amount to an'adverse employment action because his overtime hours exceeded those of two white, first-shift co-workers.

“An adverse employment action ‘typically involves discrete changes in the terms of employment, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’” Cham v. Station Operators, Inc., 685 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2010)). While we have not explicitly addressed whether a loss in overtime opportunities constitutes an adverse employment action within the § 1981 context, it seems foreseeable that, at least in some contexts, decreased overtime opportunities could cause a “material” change in the conditions of a plaintiffs employment. See Gu v. Boston Police Dept., 312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2002). To determine whether an action is materially adverse, we must engage in an objective, “case-by-case inquiry,” recognizing that “[w]ork places are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment action.” Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir. 1996). “A materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment ‘must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.’” Morales-Vallellanes, 605 F.3d at 35 (quoting Marrero v. Goya of P.R., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002)).

As for Garmon’s claim that he was subjected to an adverse employment action via a discriminatory overtime plan instituted by Brennan in 2012, the record contains no evidence of such a discriminatory plan or an actual decrease in Garmon’s overtime opportunities outside of his bare allegations to the contrary. Accordingly, Garmon fails to meet his ultimate burden of persuasion here.

A review of the record reveals that Amtrak’s overtime was determined and distributed according to the CBA, which governs “the rates of pay, hours, rules, and working conditions” of.Amtrak’s electrical workers. Pursuant to Rule 13 of the CBA, “overtime [is] to be distributed in conjunction with the duly authorized local committee of the craft or their representative and the local management. Record will be kept of overtime worked, and men called with the purpose in view of distributing the overtime equally.” To that end, Poole, a supervisor at Amtrak, first determined Amtrak’s overtime needs by considering multiple factors including “weather conditions, overall operational budgeting, and any special projects or details that would require additional manpower from the Electric Traction Department.” After that, Poole (or someone else from Amtrak’s management) would inform Alves, IBEW’s representative for overtime distribution among members from 2009 to 2018, of Amtrak’s overtime needs. Alves would then take the needs identified by Amtrak management and distribute overtime amongst IBEW employees in accordance with this collaborative process. And despite Garmon’s contentions to the contrary, there is no evidence in the record that this general overtime policy ever changed.

The only evidence proffered by Garmon in support of his contentions is his own affidavit, which in large part contains unsupported, speculative assertions about the way overtime was determined and administered at Amtrak. Garmon’s unsupported assertions, however, are insufficient to present a material issue of fact meriting trial. We have repeatedly held that “[t]o the extent that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment merely reiterate allegations made in the complaint, without providing specific factual information made on the basis of personal knowledge, they are insufficient.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that “[njeither wishful thinking ... nor conclusory responses unsupported by evidence will serve to defeat a properly focused Rule 56 motion”) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990)); López-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that where an “assertion merely repeats the conclusory allegations in the complaint,” it is insufficient because “affidavits submitted in opposition for summary judgment must be based on the affi-ant’s personal knowledge”).

To be clear, a party’s affidavit may be self-serving and yet, still present genuine issues of fact if it contains relevant information of which the party has first-hand knowledge. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 53. Here, however, Garmon’s affidavit in large part fails to meet this basic requirement as he avers facts beyond the scope of his personal knowledge. For instance, Garmon seems to take issue specifically with the internal process by which Amtrak management determined 'its overtime needs, including its specific position staffing needs, before communicating those needs to the IBEW representative for distribution. However, he lacks any personal knowledge of Amtrak’s decision making process or the policies which governed its determination of overtime needs.

Perhaps the only fact which Garmon avers, of which he may have personal knowledge, is his bare allegation that his “overtime opportunities became reduced by at least one-third.” However, Garmon proffers no evidence of an actual reduction in his overtime opportunities outside of this 'assertion and his own say-so. This is insufficient to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case. See Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 139 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that where a defendant relied “on her say-so” and did “not support her rhetoric "with hard proof,” “her severe-work-reduction [retaliation] charge amounted] to no more than conclusory speculation, which cannot block summary judgment” or establish a prima facie case).

In support of his claim, Garmon provides no evidence of the exact amount of overtime opportunities available to him prior to the initiation of the alleged discriminatory policy, no evidence of the amount of overtime shifts available to him after the alleged policy was initiated, no evidence of. an increase in overtime for his first-shift, white co-workers (Alves and Butler), nor—as the district court noted— any evidence that he ever sought and was denied any overtime lineman opportunities that he requested. In fact, even the most generous reading of his brief leaves numerous questions about the nature of his alleged reduction in overtime opportunities unanswered. Outside of Garmon’s statement that his overtime opportunities were reduced, the only evidence concerning overtime opportunities demonstrates that despite Garmon’s' contentions that he was denied overall overtime opportunities, he admits that he chose not to work certain overtime hours, including overtime that fell on Sundays. Thus, it would seem that Garmon’s real complaint may not be that his overtime hours' were reduced, but that he was not afforded overtime hours on the days he preferred. And while Garmon alleges that his direct supervisor, Brennan, initiated the alleged discriminatory overtime plan in 2012 to give white co-workers as much overtime as possible, Garmon again proffers no evidence in support of his contentions outside of his self-serving affidavit and bald assertions. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 53; López-Carrasquillo, 230 F.3d at 414; Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 217, 226 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he summary judgment stage is the put up or shut up moment in litigation.”) (citations omitted). While not an onerous standard, a prima facie showing requires more than mere bald assertions, unsupported by anything beyond personal sáy-so.

b) Causal Connection

Even if we were to assume that Garmon did suffer a materially adverse action in the form of a discriminatory overtime policy, Garmon fails to demonstrate a causal connection between his membership in a protected class and the adverse action alleged. Outside of the bare allegations in his complaint and his unsupported affidavit, Garmon presents absolutely no evidence that Amtrak decided to designate overtime needs by role, not for legitimate business purposes, but rather, in order to discriminate against him or other workers because of their race. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that at least one third-shift African-American HRO employee was able to select and work first-shift overtime hours that - he qualified for. This fact weighs against Gar-mon’s contention that Amtrak sought to make more first-shift overtime available to white employees at the expense of African-American employees. See Johnson v. Walgreen, Nos. 92-1084, 92-1085, 1992 WL 357828, at *5, (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 1992) (unpublished) (“the fact that the [appel-lees] had hired other black pharmacists suggests that the failure to interview or hire [the appellant] was for objective reasons .... Without ‘some meaningful, fact-specific ... causal link’ upon which a permissible inference of race-based discrimination could be premised ... [the appellant] has failed to make out a cognizable § 1981 claim”) (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (overruled on other grounds by Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004)). And Garmon lacks personal knowledge to support his allegations that the actual work required of employees working particular overtime hours in the aftermath of the alleged discriminatory policy did not require certain qualifications indicated by designation (HRO, linemen, or foremen). Garmon fails to meet his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination.

2. Hostile Work Environment

Garmon also alleges that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and as such the district court erred in rejecting his discrimination claim. To establish a hostile work environment, Gar-mon is required to “show that his work environment was so pervaded by racial harassment as to alter the terms and conditions of his employment.” Burlington, 524 U.S. at 768, 118 S.Ct. 2257. To make a prima facie showing Garmon must demonstrate:

(1) that [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) that [he] was subjected to unwelcome [racial] harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon [race]; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that [racially] objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established.

Douglas v. J.C. Penney Co., 474 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001)); cf. Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 42 (1st Cir. 2008).

In support of his hostile work environment claim, Garmon alleges that Amtrak subjected him to a variety of hostile conditions including: (1) failing to provide him keys to the equipment canister; (2) denying him .adequate training-, on SEDs, and thus, relegating him to a subordinate role in relation to less experienced, white co-workers; (3) reducing his overtime opportunities; (4) subjecting him to intimidation; and (5) placing him in difficult positions in an attempt to have him make an error and receive discipline. Gar-mon also argues that in 2001 Amtrak assigned him to the night shift and only changed him back to the day shift after he complained that he had been moved to the night shift because of his race. Garmon also alleges that his supervisors and other co-workers failed to appropriately acknowledge him on multiple occasions. We need not address the minutiae of each claim because even if Garmon’s complaints rise to the level of a hostile work environment, Garmon has not demonstrated' that he was subjected to any of the complained of actions because of his race. Here, Garmon proffers no evidence that any of the above-mentioned actions were race related outside of his unsubstantiated assertions that the actions had to -be the product of discriminatory animus. This is insufficient to create a material issue of fact or merit trial. See Jakobiec, 711 F.3d at 226 (“A plaintiffs failure to produce any evidentiary proof concerning one of the essential elements of his claim is grounds for summary judgment.”),

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling granting Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment with each party to bear their own costs.

      . Amtrak divides its Electric Traction Departments by geographical regions, called "cost centers." Electric Traction Department employees who work out of either Boston, Massachusetts, or Providence, Rhode Island, are organized under the same cost center—fittingly designated the “Boston/Providence” cost center.

        . Garmon never filed a grievance, in spite of the fact that Amtrak maintains an Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policy, as well as an Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action Policy and provides its employees with a Dispute Resolution Office to resolve complaints and enforce its Anti-Discrimination policies.

      . Gannon's reliance on Jenkins v. United Airlines, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-10092-RWZ, 1995 WL 598962, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14902 (D. Mass. July 31, 1995) for his argument that the CBA has no relevance- to his claims because "racial discrimination claims are not subject to any grievance procedure” is misplaced. In Jenkins, the court found that an arbitration provision in the CBA did not strip the court of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs Title VII race discrimination claims. The court noted that statutory civil rights claims were not subject to arbitration under the grievance procedures of the CBA clause. None of the Jenkins facts or issues are applicable to Garmon’s case. Nevertheless, because our ruling here is not contingent on Garmon's failure to follow CBA grievance procedures, his argument is inapposite.

      . Garmon contends that Poole never took into account these factors in determining overtime needs and argues that his supervisor, Gregory Brennan, made suggestions to Poole as to overtime needs in ordpr to “preserved the overtime opportunities existing on the first shift for the white workers.” Garmon relies on conclusory statements contained in his affidavit in support of his contentions, which only mirror the allegations of his complaint without any further factual support.

      . .While Amtrak, argues (and the record reflects) that between 2009 and 2013 Garmon worked more overtime hours than two of his three, white peers on the first shift, this fact does not by itself tell us one way or another whether Garmon’s opportunities for overtime were somehow reduced. That being-said, Gar-mon presents no evidence in support of his claim that he suffered lost overtime opportunities because of his race outside of His unsupported statements.

      . We also note that even if Garmon were to make out a prima facie case and sufficiently show a causal connection, his claim would ultimately fail at the third step of the McDonnell analysis, which requires him to provide evidence that Amtrak’s explanation for his alleged reduction in overtime opportunities is pretextual and that discriminatory animus prompted the adverse action. At this stage of the litigation, discovery is complete, the record and evidence that would appear at trial set. However, most of Garmon's proffered evidence of disparate treatment consists of his own personal observations which led him to believe that he was the target of illegal discrimination. But his "subjective speculation and suspicion” that he was treated unfairly because of his race is insufficient to establish a disparate treatment claim or that HROs, linemen, and foremen were all similarly-situated for purposes of overtime duties and work. See Mariani-Colon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 222 (1st Cir. 2007). Therefore, even if Garmon were to make a sufficient prima facie showing of this fourth element, he would ultimately fail at the pre-textual analysis later required under McDonnell.

      . In February 2015, Amtrak decreased the total number of shifts for the Electric Traction Department from three to two. Throughout his responses to Amtrak's Rule 56 Statement and his brief, Garmon appears to argue that Amtrak has changed the 2012 discriminatory overtime policy since the filing of his suit and that the changes implemented in 2015 ended Amtrak's alleged discriminatory practices. Because Garmon fails to provide any evidence that a 2012 discriminatory policy was ever - implemented and does not claim that the purported 2015 change resulted in any discriminatory actions against him, the alleged 2015 change in Amtrak shift scheduling is inappo-site.

      . Nor need we rest our decision on the statute of limitations impediments which the district court pointed out in its decision. Section 1981 discrimination claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See Buntin v. City of Bos., 813 F.3d 401, 404-05 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004)). And hostile work environment claims may be pursued under Section 1981 (as well as Title VII), See Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, Garmon’s Section 1981 discrimination claims accrue "when the alleged unlawful act 'has a crystallized and tangible effect on [him] and [he] has notice of both the act and its invidious etiology.’ " Buntin, 813 F.3d at 405 (quoting Shervin v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2015)). Because Garmon filed suit on July 11, 2013, the district court observed that all of his hostile work environment claims would have had to have taken place on, or after, July 11, 2009 to remain viable. Because the record demonstrates that all of the complained of acts Occurred before 2008, the district court opined that Garmon’s hostile work environment claims were precluded by the applicable four-year statute of limitations.

      . However, we remind the reader that "federal employment discrimination laws do pot establish ‘a general civility code' for the workplace.” Quilles-Quilles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs,, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct, 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)).


author: BARRON, Circuit Judge.

text:
    LABOR RELATIONS DIVISION OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC.; Associated General Contractors Labor Relations Division; Building Trades Employers’ Association of Boston and Eastern Massachusetts; New England Mechanical Contractors’ Association; National Electrical Contractors’ Association; Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors’ Association of Greater Boston; Barletta Engineering Corporation; Century Drywall, Inc., Petitioners, Appellants, v. Maura T. HEALEY, in her capacity as Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Respondent, Appellee.
    No. 15-1906
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    December 16, 2016

      James F. Grosso and Miranda S. Jones, Framingham, MA, with whom O’Reilly, Grosso & Gross, P.C. was on brief, for appellant.
    Pierce 0. Cray, with whom Maura Hea-ley, Douglas S. Martland, and the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee.
    Lindsey Powell, Washington, DC, with whom. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, Alisa B. Klein, Attorney Appellate Staff, M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Beverly I. Dankowitz, Acting Associate Solicitor, Radine Legum, Counsel for Labor-Management Relations, and Adam R. Pulver, Attorney, Civil Rights and Labor-Management Division, were on brief for amicus curiae United States of America.
    MacKenzie Fillow, Senior Counsel, Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, Jill Maxwell, Of Counsel, Margaret O’Hora, Of Counsel, David Smart, Of Counsel, and Ksenya Hentisz, Of Counsel, on brief for amicus curiae City of New York; Dennis Herrera, City Attorney, and Francesca Gessner, Deputy City Attorney, on brief for amicus curiae City and County of San Francisco; George Jepsen, Attorney General, on brief for amicus curiae State of Connecticut; Ian Warner, Legal Counsel to the Mayor of Seattle, on brief for amicus curiae City of Seattle; Jeremy Farrell, Corporation Counsel, on brief for amicus curiae City of Jersey City; Khalifah L. Shabazz, Corporation Counsel, on brief for amicus curiae City of East Orange; Do-menick Stampone, Corporation Counsel, on brief for amicus curiae City of Paterson; and David L. Minchello, Corporation Counsel, on brief for amicus curiae City of Plainfield.
    Jasper Groner, Boston, MA, Donald J. Siegel, James A.W. Shaw, Boston, .MA, Louis A. Mandarini, and Segal Roitman, LLP, on brief for amicus curiae Massachusetts AFL-CIO.
    Mark A. Gottlieb, on brief for amici curiae A Better Balance, Coalition for Social Justice-Education Fund,- Inc., Massachusetts Public Health Association, and the Public Health Advocacy Institute, Northeastern University School of Law.
    Ingrid I. Nava, Katherine D. Shea, Boston, MA, David B. Rome, Boston, MA, and Pyle Rome and Ehrenberg, P.C., on brief for amici curiae SEIU Local 32BJ, 1199 SEIU United Healthcare East, SEIU Local 509, UFCW Local 791, UFCW Local 1445, UFCW Local 328, United Steelworkers Local 8751, and UNITE HERE Local 26.

      Before THOMPSON and BARRON, Circuit Judges, McCONNELL, District Judge.

       Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation."

   BARRON, Circuit Judge.

In this case, a group of construction-industry employers’ associations and employers (“employers”) seek relief from a broad category of enforcement actions that may be brought under the Massachusetts Earned Sick Time Law (“ESTL”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148C. Specifically, the employers contend that the ESTL “is preempted” by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), “with respect” to those employers in the state who are parties to collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with unions. On that basis, the employers seek a judgment “prohibiting” the Massachusetts Attorney General from “[gjranting príváte rights of action to employees who are members of collective bargaining units” and “[ejnforcing civil sanctions pursuant to [the ESTL] against employers who are signatory [sic] to collective bargaining agreements.”

The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim insofar as it constituted a facial, preemption-based challenge to the ESTL, and for want of jurisdiction on ripeness grounds insofar .as it represented an as-applied preemption-based challenge to particularized, future actions to enforce the measure. Due to the claim-specific inquiry that we must undertake in order to determine Section 301’s preemptive effect, however, we conclude that the employers’ unusual request for sweeping pre-enforcement relief is not ripe for adjudication no matter how it is best characterized along the facial/as-applied spectrum. For that reason, we dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction.

I.

We start by describing the contours of both the Massachusetts ESTL and federal preemption under Section 301. We then will be better able to describe the basis for this suit and the District Court’s reasons for dismissing it.

A.

In 2014, voters in Massachusetts overwhelmingly approved the ESTL through the initiative process. The ESTL broke new ground in Massachusetts by providing that employers of a certain size must compensate their employees for the sick time that they use for specified purposes. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148C(a)-(d).

To ensure compliance with the ESTL, the law provides that the Attorney General “shall enforce [the law] and may obtain injunctive or declaratory relief for this purpose.” Id. at § 148C(i). That same subsection of the ESTL further provides that “[violation of [the ESTL] shall be subject to” various provisions of Massachusetts law that, among , other things, permit the imposition of civil penalties. Id.; see also id. at §§ 27C & 150.

In addition to providing for enforcement by the Attorney General, the ESTL also authorizes an “aggrieved” employee to bring actions under the ESTL, provided that such an employee first files the complaint with the Attorney General to notify her of the impending suit. Id at §§ 148C(l) & 150. After filing the complaint with the Attorney General, the aggrieved employee must wait ninety days to bring the suit unless the Attorney General permits the employee to file the suit before the ninety-day period has run. Id.

Finally, the ESTL authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations “to carry out the purpose and provisions” of the law. Id. at § 148C(n). The Attorney General exercised that authority on July 3, 2015 by promulgating regulations that defined certain terms in the ESTL, some of which the employers point to in pressing their preemption-based challenge. 940 C.M.R. §§ 33.01-33.11. Specifically, the ESTL provides that covered employers must compensate their employees for such paid sick time “at the same hourly rate as the employee” would have been paid had the employee not- taken leave. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 1480(a). The regulations promulgated by the Attorney General define the “same hourly rate” to mean “the employee’s regular hourly rate” for employees paid a uniform hourly rate. 940 C.M.R. § 33.02. For “employees who receive different pay rates for hourly work from the same employer,” the regulations permit an employer to use a “blended rate, determined by taking the weighted average of all regular rates of pay over the previous pay period.” Id.

B.

Section 301 of the National Labor Relar tions Act long pre-dates the ESTL. It was enacted in 1947, and it provides: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.G. § 185(a).

Notwithstanding its phrasing, Section 301 is “more than jurisdictional—[ ] it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of [CBAs].” Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). Moreover, soon after Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962), explained that, in light of the congressional command in Section 301 to “fashion ... a body of federal law for the enforcement of [CBAs],” state courts were not “free to apply individualized local rules when called upon to enforce such agreements.” Rather, “in enacting § 301[,] Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent state rules.” Id. at 104, 82 S.Ct. 571.

The result is that Section 301 preempts state-law “suits alleging [CBA] violations.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). There is no shortage of complexities concerning precisely what consequences flow from Section 301 preemption, but we need not delve into all of them here. For present purposes, it suffices to say that, by virtue of Section 301’s preemptive effect, a state-law claim for breach of a CBA often must be dismissed so that the claim may be arbitrated in accord with an agreement to arbitrate such a breach that the governing CBA contains. See, e.g., id. at 220-21, 105 S.Ct. 1904; see also Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 105, 82 S.Ct. 571 (holding that the CBA in that case “expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of submitting the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration”). As the Court has explained, “[t]he need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central reasons that underlay the Court’s [preemption] holding in Lucas Flour.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219, 105 S.Ct. 1904.

The Court has also made clear, however, that “[t]he requirements of § 301 as understood in Lucas Flour cannot vary with the name appended to a particular cause of action?’ Id. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Thus, in Lueck, a claim styled as a “tort claim for breach of a good-faith obligation under a contract” was held preempted under Section 301—and thus dismissed—because the “right[ ]” the plaintiff asserted was fundamentally “rooted” in the CBA, which had provided that a dispute over the employer’s compliance with the predicate right under the CBA was subject to arbitration.' Id. at 219-20, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (noting that a “rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance procedures would ;.. eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor contract law”—the primacy of the arbitrator in. CBA interpretation). In this way, too, Section 301 preemption ensures that “interpretation of [CBAs] remains firmly in the arbitral realm.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988).

There are limits, though, to Section 301’s preemptive reach. The Court has explained that “it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under [Section 301] to preempt state rules that ... establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212, 105 S.Ct. 1904. That is because Section 301 “says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409, 108 S.Ct. 1877. Accordingly, “the bare fact that a [CBA] will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation” pursuant to a state-law cause of action that confers a right independently of the CBA is not sufficient, in consequence of Section 301 preemption, to require the dismissal of the state-law cause of action. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994); see also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (“[N]ot every dispute ... tangentially involving a provision of a [CBA] is preempted by § 301”). For example, when “liability is governed by independent state law, the mere need to ‘look to’ the [CBA] for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by § 301.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (internal citation omitted).

C.

It is against this legal background that the employers filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2015. The employers did so before any action to enforce the ESTL had been filed against any employer who is a party to a CBA by either the Attorney General or by any aggrieved employee. But the employers contend in the currently operative complaint, which is styled as “Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief II,” that Section 301 preemption nonetheless entitles them to sweeping relief from the ESTL’s eventual enforcement.

Specifically, in that complaint, the employers seek “a judgment declaring that [the ESTL] is preempted with respect to employers who are signatory [sic] to collective bargaining agreements.” Second, the employers seek “a judgment prohibiting the Attorney General from: [(1)] Granting private rights of action to employees who are members of collective bargaining units; and [(2)] Enforcing civil sanctions pursuant to [the ESTL] against employers who are signatory [sic] to collective bargaining agreements,”

In support of the contention that Section' 301 preemption entitles the employers to the relief they seek, the complaint alleges the following facts. First, the complaint asserts that the construction-industry employers and the members of the construction-industry employers’ associations that bring this action are parties to CBAs. Next, the complaint alleges that “[a]ny and all state law claims brought under the [ESTL] would require a determination of the ‘hourly rate’ of a worker covered by a [CBA,] which would necessitate an analysis and interpretation of the terms of the [CBAs] made between the parties in a labor contract.” And, finally, quoting subsection (j) of the ESTL, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148C(j), the complaint asserts that the ESTL “further necessitates an analysis and interpretation of the terms of the [CBAs] made between the parties in a labor contract to determine whether the [ESTL] ‘diminishes, or impairs the obligations of an employer to comply with any contract, [CBA], or any employment benefit program or plan ... that provides to employees greater earned sick time rights’ ” than the ESTL.

The Attorney General responded to the employers’ suit in the District Court by moving to dismiss under both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The District Court ruled as follows.

Construing the complaint as a “facial preemption challenge” against the ESTL, the District Court first concluded that the employers would not be able to show that “all claims to benefits under the” ESTL for all unionized workers in the state would depend on CBA interpretation. Labor Relations Div. v. Healey, Civil Action No. 15-10116-RWZ, 2015 WL 4508646, at *7 (D. Mass. July 9, 2015) (emphasis omitted). The District Court reasoned that many conceivable ESTL claims brought against employers who are parties to a CBA would not so depend on CBA interpretation—claims, for instance, involving workers earning a “uniform hourly wage,” or claims not involving a wage dispute at all, such as retaliation. Id. Thus, the District Court held, the employers’ challenge failed the familiar test laid out in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), which requires plaintiffs bringing a facial challenge to a statute to show that there are no. set of circumstances under which that statute would be valid. Id. As a result, the District Court dismissed what it characterized as the employers’ facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(6).

The District Court then considered the employers’ challenge to the ESTL “as an' as-applied challenge” to only those enforcement actions (whether brought by the Attorney General or by employees) that would involve CBA interpretation. Id. at *8-!|!9, The District Court held, however, that, so understood, the complaint was not ripe for adjudication because, at the time the complaint was filed, “the purported application of the [ESTL] to [the employers] ha[d] been—at best—hypothetical.” Id. at *9. The District Court emphasized that no employee had, to that point, brought a claim for paid sick time under the ESTL. Id. “Neither,” the District Court observed, “ha[d] the Attorney General,” Id. On this basis, the District Court concluded that the employers’ as-applied challenge “[did] not present” a justiciable case or controversy under the Article III, and therefore the District Court dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

The employers now appeal.

II.

Although the Attorney General does not dispute that the suit, if understood to be a facial challenge to the ESTL, is ripe for adjudication, we are obliged to determine ripeness for ourselves. See City of Fall River v. FERC, 507 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that “the question of ripeness may be considered on a court’s own motion” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). And, after doing so, we hold, as the United States, contends as amicus, that this case, even if characterized as a facial challenge, is not ripe and thus must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

A.

The “ ‘basic rationale’ of the ripeness inquiry is ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements’ ” in violation of Article Ill’s case or controversy requirement. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Abbott Labs, v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). As the Supreme Court has put it, “the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941)).

In line with these principles, a claim is ripe only if the party bringing suit can show both that the issues raised aré fit for judicial decision at the time the suit: is filed and that the party bringing suit will suffer hardship if “court, consider,ation” is withheld, McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507). In considering the fitness prong of the ripeness inquiry, we have emphasized that a “claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events, that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed, may not occur at all.” City of Fall River, 507 F.3d at 6 (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998)). In a similar vein, we have explained that “[t]he conditional, nature of the claims” strongly counsels against a finding of hardship. McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 73.

The burden to prove ripeness is on the party seeking jurisdiction. See Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). The pleading standard for satisfying the factual predicates for proving jurisdiction is the same as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)—that is, the plaintiffs must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Román-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 45 n.3, 49 (1st Cir. 2011); Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting eases from other circuits). In evaluating such claims, we must separate out factual assertions from legal conclusions. As the Court instructed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Our review for ripeness is de novo. Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1007 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[A] trial court’s determination on á paper record that the case before it lacks ripeness presents a question of law subject to plenary review.”).

B.

We start by considering whether the employers’ pre-enforcement request for relief against the Attorney General is fit for judicial resolution. In contending that it is, the employers acknowledge that they seek relief from ESTL actions that have not yet been brought. But, they contend, Section 301 preemption would block any such suit. Therefore, the employers contend that there is no reason to wait to provide them the relief they seek because, even at this early stage, the case is sufficiently developed to be adjudicated. We do not agree.

Unlike a typical claim of field preemption, a claim of preemption under Section 301 that is lodged against a suit to enforce a state-law cause of action, such as one granted by a measure like the ESTL, does not involve “purely legal questions, where the matter can be resolved solely on the basis of the state and federal statutes at issue.” Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2008). Rather, Section 301 preemption can “defeat[ ]” a claim brought under the ESTL—and thus support the employers’ request for relief in this case—only if the specific claim that is brought is determined to depend upon the provisions of the CBA. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068. But, as this case comes to us, it is not sufficiently developed to be fit for such a claim-specific preemption inquiry.

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of ripeness in the quite similar preemption-based challenge presented in Shannon is instructive. 539 F.3d at 759-61. There, the court considered an employer’s challenge to a state agency official’s possible enforcement of a state overtime law under the Railway Labor Act, which has a preemption provision that operates in the same claim-specific manner as does preemption under Section 301. See Shannon, 539 F.3d at 754-56; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 260, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). Even in the somewhat more developed state of that case, however, the Seventh Circuit held that the claim was not fit for adjudication because the state agency’s investigation had not “progressed to a point where it [could] be determined what dispute, if any, the parties [would] have over the CBAs’ terms,” Shannon, 539 F.3d at 760, as there are “many scenarios where CBAs may be implicated as part of a state or federal cause of action, but preemption/preclusion of the claim [would be] unnecessary,” including situations “where reference to the CBA is only necessary for computing damages,” id. at 758.

If anything, the ripeness problem is even more acute here. At this pre-enforcement stage, there is no particular claim that has been identified at all. We thus cannot perform the requisite claim-specific preemption analysis as to any claim that may be brought, as we have before us only hypothetical ESTL claims, the details of which are not known.

To the extent that the employers contend that no details about a particular ESTL claim need be known because all ESTL claims are necessarily CBA-dependent, that contention is not supported by facts alleged in the complaint. In so concluding, we may take as true the questionable statement in the employers’ complaint that “[a]ny and all state law claims brought under the [ESTL] would require a determination of the ‘hourly rate’ of a worker covered by a [CBA].” But, even if we accept that contention, we do not accept the further assertion in the employers’ complaint that all claims brought under the ESTL that require a determination of an employee’s hourly rate thereby trigger Section 301 preemption. That contention is one of law, not fact, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, and it is plainly not sustainable.

For example, as the District Court rightly explained, ESTL enforcement actions may turn on issues concerning “liability” under the ESTL that are entirely independent of any CBA terms that may govern the hourly rate of pay for an employee, Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068, such as whether an employer retaliated against an employee for bringing an ESTL claim or whether an employee took leave for a permissible purpose under the law. See Healey, 2015 WL 4508646, at *7. Because the “liability” portion of the claim in such actions would be “governed by independent state law,” there would be “no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by § 301” in such cases, even if the need arose to “ ‘look to’ the [CBA] ” to calculate an employee’s hourly-rate under the ESTL for the purpose of calculating his “damages.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068; see also Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12, 108 S.Ct. 1877 (even where “federal law would govern the interpretation of [a CBA] to determine the proper damages, the underlying state-law claim, not otherwise pre-empted, would stand”).

Similarly, we may accept as true the questionable allegation in the employers’ complaint that all claims to enforce the ESTL on behalf of unionized employees will require a court to “determine whether the [ESTL] ‘diminishes or impairs the obligations of an employer to comply with any ... [CBA] ... that provides to employees greater earned sick time rights’ ” than the ESTL. But, even if we do so, it does not follow that ESTL claims brought against the employers will depend upon the CBA. Often, the Attorney General or an aggrieved employee will be seeking relief under the ESTL that is plainly greater than the relief afforded by the CBA. In such a case, liability under the law is still determined by the ESTL and not the CBA, insofar as Section 301 “cannot be read broadly to preempt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123, 114 S.Ct. 2068. In other words, the “legal character of [such] a claim” is still “‘independent’ of rights under the [CBA] ” because the question confronting a court concerns whether the employer, notwithstanding the CBA, has violated the ESTL. Id. As a result, the employers seek to have us adjudicate a necessarily fact-dependent dispute about how an ESTL suit would relate to an underlying CBA in advance of us having any actual claims that present the facts that would be relevant to our assessment of that relationship.

To be sure, at some point, some action may be brought under the ESTL against an employer who is a party to a CBA. And such an action may even be brought by an aggrieved employee, who is also a party to that labor agreement. In the event such a suit is brought, we would know at that time the details of the actual ESTL claim presented. We therefore would be well positioned to assess whether that particular claim—though predicated on the ESTL— nevertheless depended on a provision of the governing CBA. And we would then also be able to determine whether, in com sequence, the actual claim brought should be dismissed in accord with provisions in that CBA requiring that a dispute over its terms be arbitrated or whether preemption requires instead that the claim be addressed in . some other manner. See Roman Catholic Bishop, 724 F.3d at 92 (withholding consideration on ripeness grounds of the plaintiffs challenge to future applications of a city preservation ordinance until the plaintiff “settled upon any plan for future use of the property that would necessarily entail changes to the [c]hurch’s exterior” and thus trigger the application of the ordinance). But no such suit has been brought, and thus no such claim-specific inquiry can be made. We are therefore asked to resolve a hypothetical and abstract dispute rather than a real and concrete one. See McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 72 (holding that the plaintiffs claim was unripe because it “depends on future events that may never come to pass, or that may not occur in the form forecasted” and thus was “largely hypothetical” (quoting Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 537 (1st Cir. 1995))). Accordingly, we conclude that this case does not satisfy the first prong of the ripeness inquiry, as it is too contingent on as-yet-unknown features of as-yet-unspecified claims to be fit for adjudication at this time. See id. at 73; see also Shannon, 539 F.3d at 760.

Our analysis under the first prong of the ripeness inquiry also dictates the outcome as to the second prong, which concerns the harm to the parties seeking. relief that would come- to those parties from our “withholding of a decision” at this time. McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 73. Here, too, the analysis “focuses on ‘direct and immediate’ harm. It is unconcerned with wholly contingent harm.” Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. United States EPA, 959 F.2d 360, 367 (1st Cir. 1992)). As we have just explained, this case fails to satisfy the first prong because it is contingent on the details of future ESTL claims that are not now known. For the same reason, the harm to the employers from any delay in having their case adjudicated is necessarily also contingent. See Shannon, 539 F.3d at 761 (noting that the case did not present a “circumstance where the [state agency’s] investigation and subsequent enforcement of the [sjtate’s overtime laws would invariably lead to a finding of preemption,” and thus that the hardship the plaintiff alleged—the “need to defend itself in an enforcement action ultimately [held to be] preempted due to the need for an arbitrator, rather than a court, to interpret [ ] CBAs”—would not necessarily come to pass because any enforcement action actually brought by the state agency might not necessarily be preempted).

III.

Our focus on the claim-specific nature of Section 301 preemption also points the way to our resolution of the final issue that the employers raise. They contend that the District Court erred in refusing to consider certain CBAs to which some of them are parties and that had been attached to the employers’ opposition to the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss. . It is true that, “[ujnder certain ‘narrow exceptions,’ ” district courts may consider “some extrinsic documents ... without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion .for summary judgment.” Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). But the only exception that is arguably applicable here—for documents “central to plaintiffs’ claim”—does not apply. Id. (quoting Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3).

The employers offer no persuasive explanation for how the terms of the CBAs that the employers contend the District Court wrongly failed to consider could, on their own, meaningfully advance the preemption-based, request for relief. The employers therefore offer no account of how those .CBAs are central to their claim. The terms of those CBAs do not on their own suffice to show that those CBAs can .determine the outcome of the Section 301 inquiry without regard to the actual ESTL claim brought, nor do the employers explain how the CBAs might do so. For that reason, the preemption analysis in any actual enforcement action will necessarily depend on the specifics of the actual ESTL claim that is brought, even in a case in which one of the CBAs in question is operative. It is thus only once the specifics of an actual claim are known that it will be possible to- determine both how that claim relates to the governing CBA and how that claim may implicate Section 301 preemption. We therefore see no basis for reversing the District Court’s ruling regarding the CBAs in question, even if we were to assume, favorably to the employers, that our review of the District Court’s ruling in this regard is de novo. See id. at 36 n.5.

IV.

For these reasons, the suit .is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

      . Even when Section 301 preempts a state-law claim, there may be different ways, of disposing of the claim. Cavallaro v. UMass Mem’l Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012). “In most cases, a claim that requires interpretation of the applicable CBA is covered by ‘a broadly-phrased grievance and arbitration provision in the CBÁ’ ” and thus must be sent to arbitration. Rueli v. Baystate Health, Inc., 835 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Cavallaro, 678 F.3d at 6). But, as the Court has emphasized, "[h]olding the plaintiff's cause of action substantively extinguished may not ... always be the only means of vindicating the arbitrator’s primacy as the bargained-for contract interpreter.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 n.18, 114 S.Ct. 2068. Thus, we have previously noted some "uncer-taintly]” as to “when a state law claim implicating Section 301 should proceed as a federal claim, or simply be dismissed.” Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 645 F.3d 81, 85 n.4 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Lingle, 486 U.S. at 403 n.2, 108 S.Ct. 1877 (emphasizing that “state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 claims” (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962))).

      . We also acknowledge the helpful amicus briefs filed by- the City of New York, et al., the Massachusetts AFL-CIO, the Public Health Advocacy Institute et al., and SEIU Local 32BJ, et al. ■ • '

      . The complaint seeks generally a declaration that the ESTL "is preempted by Section 301.” But, as we have suggested above, preemption in this context is a complex concept with varying consequences. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 n.18, 114 S.Ct. 2068. The complaint goes on, however, to seek preemption-based relief—namely, that the Attorney General is "precluded from enforcing” the ESTL or authorizing suit to enforce the ESTL by aggrieved employees. That request for relief assumes that the consequences of preemption here would be to prevent any such ESTL suit from going to court. All the employers’ briefing proceeds bn a similar understanding of what preemption would entail. Accordingly, we decide the case on that basis,

      . We recognize, as the Court has recently explained, that-“[t]he doctrines of standing and ripeness ‘originate’ from the same Article III limitation,” and therefore that the ripeness analysis we undertake has commonalities with the injury-in-fact analysis we undertake when considering issues of standing. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006)). But, in this case, the parties have reasonably cast the jurisdictional issue as one that implicates ripeness, and, we note, the Seventh Circuit has applied the ripeness inquiry to evaluate Article III jurisdiction in the very similar case of Wisconsin Central, Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2008). We follow that same course.

      . It would seem likely that the employers would be the ones who would assert that some CBA-created obligation to provide greater benefits than those provided under the ESTL trumps the requirements of the ESTL. But the Court has made clear that a defense based on preemption under Section 301 may not be used to bring the underlying state-law claim into federal court. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). For that reason, we question whether a federal court would even have jurisdiction to decide a case arising in this speculative posture.

      . Of course, the employers do also seek, in substantial part, advance relief from actions that would be brought by the Attorney General rather than by an aggrieved employee. But the Attorney General is not alleged in the employers’ complaint to be a party to any CBA and thus would not appear herself to be bound by any CBA terms, including those mandating arbitration of disputes over its meaning. Cf. Waffle House v. EEOC, 534 U.S. 279, 293, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (holding that a private arbitration agreement between an employee and an employer-could not bind a nonparty governmental agency, the EEOC, and thus that the agreement—which was enforceable against the employee under the Federal Arbitration Act-—did not limit the types of remedies the agency could seek in an enforcement action it initiated under Title VII); see also Pruell, 645 F.3d at 83 ("[R]emoval and dismissal based on complete preemption under [Section 301] must start with a plaintiff covered by a CBA-” (emphases in original)). And the employers provide us with no insight into how Section 301 preemption would apply when a state-law claim arguably dependent on CBA interpretation is brought by a CBA nonparty to enforce rights of CBA parties. But, given the other problems that we have identified with finding this case to be fit for resolution at this time and that are present no matter which party brings an ESTL action, we need not decide how or whether Section 301 preemption might apply to an ESTL action brought by the Attorney General herself. We do note, though, that it would surely be better to make any such decision in the context of a real and concrete dispute rather than as to a hypothetical one. See .id. at 85 (holding that it would be "unwise, even perhaps inappropriate” to consider whether state-law claims asserted on- behalf of a putative class were preempted by Section 301 before learning whether the named plaintiffs were covered by CBAs and thus "whether any CBA [would be] implicated in claims asserted by the named plaintiffs”).

      . The hardship showing is especially uncertain as to any future ESTL claim brought by the Attorney General, even if any such claim were determined to depend upon the interpretation of a provision of the CBA. After all, because the employers do not allege that the Attorney General is a party to any such CBA, the actual preemptive effect of Section 301 on any such ESTL action is far from clear. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293, 122 S.Ct. 754; see also Pruell, 645 F.3d at 83. Nor is the employers' hardship showing appreciably stronger as regards the request for relief against the Attorney General as to her role under the ESTL with respect to actions brought by aggrieved employees. The Attorney General does not appear to have any role in authorizing such actions beyond permitting them to be filed in court, somewhat sooner than otherwise would be allowed by operation of (he ESTL itself. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148C(Z) & 150.-Withholding adjudication of this challenge, therefore, at most would appear to permit some asryet-unfiled lawsuit by an employee—which may or may not be preempted'—to be brought a few months earlier than it otherwise could be.