author: KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Garfield GAYLE; Neville Sukhu; Sheldon Francois, Appellants v. WARDEN MONMOUTH COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; Scott A. Weber, in his official capacity as Newark Field Office Director for Detention and Removal; Sarah R. Saldana, in her official capacity as Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security; Attorney General of the United States of America; Juan Osuna, in his official capacity as Director of Executive Office of Immigration Review; John Tsoukaris, in his official capacity as Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations, Newark Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Christopher Shanahan, in his official capacity as Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations, New York Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Warden Bergen County Jail; Joseph Trabucco, in his official capacity as Director of the Delaney Hall Detention Facility; Warden Elizabeth County Detention Center; Warden Essex County Correctional Facility; Oscar Aviles, in his official capacity as Director of the Hudson County Correctional Facility
    No. 15-1785
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Argued: February 10, 2016
    (Filed: September 22, 2016)

      Lawrence S. Lustberg, Joseph A. Pace, Gibbons, One Gateway Center, Newark, NJ 07102, Judy Rabinovitz [ARGUED], Michael K.T. Tan, American Civil Liberties Union, Immigrants’ Rights Project, 125 Broad St., 18th Floor, New York,' NY 10004, Counsel for Appellants
    Craig W. Kuhn, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044, Elizabeth J. Stevens [ARGUED], United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, 450 5th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20001, Counsel for Appelleés
    Andrew S. Amer, .Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, 425 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10017, Counsel for, Amicus-Ap-pellants
    Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

      Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)

   OPINION

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Over the course, of the last four years, Appellants Garfield Gayle, Neville Sukhu, and Sheldon Francois have been litigating, and the Government, defending, a purported class action to challenge the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that requires the mandatory detention of aliens who have committed specified crimes. The parties’ significant investment of time and effort culminated in partial grants and partial denials of summary judgment and two thoughtful and thorough opinions of the District Court that are now the subject of able briefing by the parties and amici on appeal. It is especially unfortunate, then, that when it ruled on the merits, entered injunctive relief on Appellants’ individual claims, and then denied class certification on the ground that it was not “necessary” in view of that injunction, the District Court put the cart before the horse as to both federal jurisdiction and our class action jurisprudence. That is, once Appellants were released from detention, their individual claims became moot so the District Court retained jurisdiction only to rule on Appellants’ motion for class certification—not to decide the merits issues, much less to order individual relief. So too is oür appellate jurisdiction limited to the denial of class certification.

Because the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction by adjudicating the merits issues and also adopted a doctrine of “necessity” to deny class certification instead of analyzing the criteria enumerated iñ Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we will vacate the judgment and the relevant orders of the District Court and will remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

Appellants are foreign nationals and Lawful Permanent Residents of the United States. As a result of various- state-law criminal convictions, "the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) sought to remove each Appellant from the United States. Pending their removal proceedings, each was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C., § 1226(c), which provides that where ICE has “reason to believe” that an alien is “deportable” or “inadmissible” by virtue of having committed one of a number of specified crimes or being involved in activities threatening national security, that alien “shall” be taken into custody “when the alien is released [from detention for those crimes], without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 803-06 (B.I.A. 1999); see also Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2013). The mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) stands in contrast to the general rule that when the Government seeks to detain an alien pending his removal proceedings, he may seek a bond hearing to show that he should not be detained. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b). Each Appellant sought relief from his mandatory detention.

At issue on appeal are the District Court’s rulings on Appellants’ Third Amended Petition, filed on August 5, 2013, and their third motion to certify a class, filed on May 12, 2014. The Third Amended Petition raised individual claims on behalf of Sukhu and two claims on behalf of a putative class of aliens who are being or will be mandatorily detained pursuant to § 1226(c). The first such claim alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process. Mandatory detention of aliens violates substantive due process, Appellants contended, when the alien has a “substantial challenge” to his removal— that is, when he challenges whether the crime for which he was convicted renders him removable or when he claims he is entitled to discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal or adjustment of status.

Appellants’ procedural due process claim challenged the procedures surrounding so-called “Joseph hearings,” the mechanism by which an alien who is mandatorily detained pending his removal proceedings is provided “with the opportunity to offer evidence and legal authority on the question whether the Service has properly included him within a category that is subject to mandatory detention.” In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 805. Specifically, Appellants asserted that an alien who is manda-torily detained pursuant to § 1226(c) is allowed to “seek[ ] a determination by an immigration judge that [he] is not properly included within” § 1226(c). 8 C.F.R, § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii); see also In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 800 (holding that an alien is entitled to a bond hearing if he can show at a Joseph hearing that the Government is “substantially unlikely to establish, at the merits hearing, the charge or charges that subject the alien to mandatory detention”). Appellants alleged (1) that aliens do not receive adequate notice of their right to a hearing, (2) that Joseph hearing procedures impermissibly place the initial burden of proof on the alien, and (3) that a contemporaneous verbatim record should be made of each Joseph hearing.

In connection with their request for relief, Appellants also sought to certify a class “consisting of all individuals in New Jersey who are or will be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” First Mot. to Certify (D.Ct. Dkt. No. 13). Appellants reliéd on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which allows plaintiffs to bring a class action when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply'generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The District Court ruled on the merits of the claims brought on behalf of the class in two stages. In an order and opinion dated March 14, 2014 {Gayle I), the District Court partially granted the Government’s motion to dismiss and held that § 1226(c) did not violate substantive due process with respect to aliens who assert a substantial challenge to their removability. The District Court thus dismissed Appellants’ petition “to the extent that [Appellants] are requesting that a Joseph hearing be provided to any mandatorily detained alien who has a ‘substantial challenge’ to his or her removal on grounds other than whether the alien falls within the § 1226(c) categories requiring mandatory detention.” Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692, 721 (D.N.J. 2014).

In an Order dated January '28, 2015 (Gayle II), the District Court resolved the remaining claims—i.e., the adequacy of Joseph hearing procedures—on cross-motions for summary judgment, and also ruled on Appellants’ motion to certify a class. As to the merits, the court held (1) that the form giving aliens notice of their right to seek a Joseph hearing (“Form I-286”) does not provide constitutionally adequate notice and that the Government was required to revise the form; (2) that Joseph hearing procedures violate due process by not placing the initial burden on the Government, but that once the Government shows probable cause to believe that the alien is subject to mandatory detention, the burden shifts to the alien to show that the Government is “substantially unlikely to prevail” in proving the alleged charges; and (3) that due process does not require a contemporaneous recording of a Joseph hearing. See Gayle v. Johnson, 81 F.Supp.3d 371 (D.N.J. 2015).

The District Court judge then addressed the third- motion to certify a class, having denied the first motion in May 2013 “without prejudice pending an expanded record and/or discovery,” Gayle v. Warden, 3:12— cv-02806, ECF No. 50, at 2 (May 13, 2013), and having terminated the second motion in connection with her March 14, 2014 opinion by instructing Appellants to refile a motion “limited to those individuals who are entitled to a Joseph hearing consistent with this Opinion,” see Gayle I, 4 F.Supp.3d at 721-22. Appellants did so, redefining the class as “all individuals who are or will be detained within the State of New Jersey pursuant to . 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and who have a substantial challenge to ‘threshold deportability’ or ‘inadmissibility5 on one of the statutory grounds that trigger mandatory detention.” Third Mot. to Certify (D.Ct. Dkt. No. 96). The District Court then denied the third motion to certify on the grounds that certification was “unnecessary” because its rulings on the merits of the ciatos meant that “all aliens who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief and remedies that this Court has imposed.” Gayle II, 81 F.Supp.3d at 404'. Appellants now appeal the January 28, 2015 order as to both the District Court’s merits determination and its denial of class certification.

n.

The District Court had statutory jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§. 1331 and 2241. We have statutory jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review legal determinations de novo, factual findings for clear error, and matters committed to the District Court’s discretion for abuse thereof.” United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 2015).

III.

On appeal, Appellants, joined by numerous amici, challenge the merits of the District Court’s substantive and procedural due process rulings, as well as its denial of their motion to certify a class, and the Government has responded point by point. Yet, as the parties conceded at oral argument in response to inquiry by the Court, Oral Arg. at 17:56, 38:01 (argued Feb. 10, 2016), the District Court did not have authority to reach the merits. Nor do we. The District Court’s judgment therefore must be vacated and the case remanded for consideration of the only issue over which it had jurisdiction: the motion for class certification.

We reach this conclusion for three reasons. First, because the claims of the individual class representatives were long ago moot and no mootness exception applies, the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reaching the merits. Second, under the well-recognized exception to mootness in U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), because the motion to certify a class was filed at a point in time when at least one putative representative had a live claim, the District Court had jurisdiction to consider that motion even though the putative representatives’ claims became moot. Third, in denying the motion to certify a class, the District Court erred by disregarding the Rule 23 criteria and instead relying exclusively on the ground that a class action was “unnecessary” because it would serve no useful purpose given the District Court’s merits rulings— rulings it had no jurisdiction to make.

A.

We begin our case where we must begin every case: with the question of jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction only over “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const., art. Ill, § 2. As a federal court, we must assure ourselves that we have Article III jurisdiction in every case that comes before us. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). A court has jurisdiction only if the claims before it are not moot. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341-42, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). The mootness doctrine imposes two requirements: (1) that the underlying dispute presents “live” issues, and (2) that the parties have “a legally cognizable interest in the outcome”—that is, a personal stake in the dispute. Chafin v. Chafin, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 721, 726, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013)). The parties must have a personal stake in the litigation not only at its inception, but throughout its existence. Id. at 1023. Therefore, “if developments occurring during the course of adjudication eliminate a plaintiffs personal stake in the outcome of a suit, then a federal court must dismiss the case as moot.” Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216, 1224 (3d Cir. 1993).

Here, we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction—at least to reach the merits—as Appellants’ individual claims were moot long before it issued the relevant orders. Each Appellant sought a bond hearing in an effort to obtain release from custody. But Gayle was granted ha-beas relief and released on bond in March 2013. See Gayle v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-02806, 2013 WL 1090993 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2013). Sukhu was released on May 8, 2013, after the immigration judge granted his application for adjustment of status. And Francois was released on bond on August 30, 2013, after the District Court ordered that he be given a bond hearing pursuant to Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011). See Francois v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-02806, 2013 WL 4510004 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2013). His removal was terminated on September 26, 2013, and the deadline for the Government to appeal that determination expired on October 28, 2013, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.38(b) and from that point, there was no effective relief the District Court could provide. In short, Appellants’ individual claims for relief have been moot for nearly three years.

Although not urged by the parties, we have considered whether the exception to mootness for disputes “ ‘capable of repetition’ while ‘evading review' ” might apply to salvage Appellants’ individual claims. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911)). That exception applies “if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again,” id. at 439-40,131 S.Ct. 2507 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) (per curiam)). We have held that detention pursuant to § 1226(c) may “evade review” where it is temporary and “the underlying removal proceedings justifying detention may very well be nearing a resolution by the time a federal court of appeals is prepared to consider them,” Diop, 656 F.3d at 227 and it is capable of repetition when an alien has been mandatorily detained based on a prior conviction but also has another prior conviction that would justify mandatory detention, id. at 228; see also United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 709 F.2d 852, 855 n.9 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding an inmate’s challenge to parole procedures not moot even after he was paroled because the parole commission reserved the right to void his parole if the district court’s order granting relief was reversed or vacated).

None of those circumstances pertain here. Sukhu’s application for status adjustment was granted and his removal proceedings were terminated on April 30, 2013, while Francois’s removal was can-celled on September 26, 2013. Thus, unless they commit qualifying crimes in the future, these named representatives have no reasonable prospect of being subjected to removal proceedings, much less mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c). Gayle’s case presents a closer question as his removal proceedings were still ongoing at the time the District Court rendered its merits decisions, so there was at least a theoretical possibility that he could have been detained again if he had another pri- or conviction that triggered mandatory detention. See Diop, 656 F.3d at 228. As the parties concede, however, he did not.

In sum, Appellants ■ had received the very relief they sought and presented no live individual claim to the District Court well before that court issued its opinion and order of March 14, 2014, partially granting the Government’s motion to dismiss and ruling on the merits of Appellants’ substantive due process claim, or its opinion and summary judgment order of January 28, 2015, ruling on the merits of the remaining claims, granting partial relief, and denying class certification on the ground that the relief it granted rendered certification unnecessary. Accordingly, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders and they must be vacated.

B.

Had this case involved only Appellants’ individual claims, federal jurisdiction would be absent, as in the District Court, and this case would be at an end. But class claims can breathe life into an otherwise moot case for they “allow a plaintiff to continue seeking class certification in certain circumstances even though his individual claim for relief has become moot.” Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir.2016). As relevant here, so long as a plaintiff flies a motion to certify a class when, he still has a live claim, the mooting of that claim while the motion is pending precludes the court from reaching the merits but does not preclude it from deciding the certification motion. Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202. This is because a plaintiffs claim that he should represent the class is one that is “presented ... in a concrete factual setting and [with] self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions,” and such a claim “remains as a concrete, sharply presented issue” even if the plaintiffs individual claims expire. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403-04, 100 S.Ct. 1202. For the same reason, the named plaintiff may appeal the denial of a motion to certify the class, id. at 404, 100 S.Ct. 1202, as long as he “had a live claim when he filed for class certification” and “appellate review may reverse an erroneous denial of class certification that, ‘if correctly decided, would have prevented the action from becoming moot,’ ” Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 977 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11, 100 S.Ct. 1202), because “the corrected ruling ‘relates back’ to the date of the original denial,” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11, 100 S.Ct. 1202. Thus, the critical question is whether a plaintiff had a live claim at the time the operative motion to certify was filed.

In this case, the answer to that question is not as simple as it might seem because Appellants technically filed three different motions to certify. While at least one Appellant had standing at the time the first was filed in November 2012, each Appellant’s claims had become moot before the filing of the second motion to certify, much less the third motion, which is the one the District Court decided on January 28, 2015 and the subject of this appeal. Thus, this case requires us to decide how Geraghty’s class mootness rule should apply to sequentially filed motions for class certification.

We considered this issue once before in Lusardi. There, the district court had conditionally certified a class under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act but later decertified it on the ground that the members of the proposed class were not similarly situated; the plaintiffs7 individual claims then became moot, and after the case was reassigned to another judge, plaintiffs sought a de novo hearing on class certification to recertify the class or to certify four subclasses. 975 F.2d at 967-69. The district judge agreed with defendants that “the dismissal of plaintiffs’ individual claims deprived the district court of jurisdiction to address the merits of class re-certification,” id. at 969, and we affirmed, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that their de novo certification motion “ ‘relates back’ to and would correct [the original judge’s] assertedly erroneous class decertification, decided when they still had live claims,” id. at 978.

The Government argues that Lu-sardi compels the same result in this case—that is, that Appellants’ third motion to certify was a de novo motion filed after Appellants’ individual claims expired and was therefore unreviewable by the District Court. See Gov’t’s Ltr. Br. 5. Appellants, on the other hand, urge that Lusardi is inapposite because neither Appellants’ first nor second motions for class certification were resolved based on an analysis of the Rule 23 factors; the District Court simply deferred that analysis until the third motion, so that all three should be considered one “continuously pending”- motion. See Appellants’ Ltr. Br. 7.

Appellants have the better of the argument. We acknowledged in Lusardi that so long as the named representative has a live claim at the time the motion is filed, Geraghty’s relation-back doctrine applies and the representative’s “private dispute, although mooted, essentially carrie[s] forward for the limited purpose of arguing a reviewable motion through to completion.” Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 976 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in that case, however, had seen their original motion to completion when the class was decertified for failure to comply with the certification requirements; those plaintiffs were now seeking to have the reassigned judge “decide the question entirely anew” in “a de novo hearing [that] would require the creation of an entirely new record and adjudication of complicated class considerations ... at a time when the interests of putative class representatives may no longer be squarely adverse to defendant or wholly in line with absent ‘class’ members.” Id. at 981. That, we concluded, would stretch Geraghty’s relation-back doctrine beyond the breaking point “[bjecause a determination on the merits of the [class certification] motion ‘could not relate back into a void.’ ” Id. at 978 (quoting Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir. 1987)).

There was no such void here, however, in Appellants’ efforts to litigate their original motion to completion or, hence, in the District Court’s jurisdiction. The first motion to certify was not denied for failure to satisfy Rule 23 criteria. Instead, it was denied solely so that further discovery could be completed “without prejudice pending an expanded record and/or discovery.” Gayle, 3:12-cv-02806, EOF No. 50, at 2. Likewise, the District Court terminated the second motion, not as a final adjudication of certification, but with express instruction that Appellants refile a motion to certify a class “limited to those individuals who are entitled to a Joseph hearing consistent” the court’s elimination of certain claims in Gayle ■ I. Gayle I, 4 F.Supp.3d at 721-22. Thus, the successive motions were substantially similar and required no additional discovery, and until the District Court ruled on the third motion, there was no denial of class certification based on a Rule 23 analysis or other intervening event th^t could be deemed to break the jurisdictional chain.

Our holding today—that Geraghty’s relation-back doctrine encompasses successive, substantially similar motions to certify unless and until certification has been finally resolved on Rule 23 grounds—comports with the logic of Geraghty and the practicalities of litigation. A plaintiff who files a motion to certify a class prior to the expiration of his individual claims does not lose his “interest in accurate resolution of his legitimate efforts to serve as class representative,” Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 976, merely because the District Court, as a technical matter, denies or terminates the motion without actually deciding it. Rather, his stake “carrie[s] forward for the limited purpose of arguing a reviewable motion through to completion,” id. and the certification question remains concrete and fit for judicial resolution, see Geragkty, 445 U.S. at 402-04, 100 S.Ct. 1202.

Moreover, as the drafters of Rule 23 recognize, “there are ‘many valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial certification decision’ ” to a later period in the litigation.' Richardson, 829 F.3d at 282 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendment). Yet district judges must also manage busy dockets, and one who intends to defer ruling, for example, pending additional discovery relevant to Rule 23 criteria, might reasonably decide to deny such a motion without prejudice rather than hold it in abeyance for months on end. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 476 (requiring semiannual public disclosure of the number of motions that have been pending on each district judge’s docket for more than six months). To hold that a plaintiffs certification claim is extinguished by such a denial would enfeeble the “flexible character” of .the mootness doctrine, Geragkty, 445 U.S. at 400, 100 S.Ct. 1202, and unmoor it from the realities of litigation.

Indeed, consider the implications of applying Lusardi to the facts of this case. If the District Court had jurisdiction only over the first motion to certify, our appellate jurisdiction would extend only to its order on that motion—an order denying the motion without prejudice to additional discovery. Yet that order is unreviewable: It is not a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]n order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is normally not final within the meaning of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291.”), nor is it subject to interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f), see In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 584 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that an order “conditionally” certifying a class under Rule 23(e) “but reserving] the class certification determination for a later time,” and similar “order[s] issued under some other subdivision of Rule 23” are not subject to interlocutory review under Rule 23(f)). That would mean the district court’s denial without prejudice—now unchal-langeable in the district court and unre-viewable on appeal—would preclude the plaintiff from obtaining a review of his right to represent a class. Geragkty dictates otherwise. 445 U.S. at 401-04, 100 S.Ct. 1202 (explaining that a plaintiff retains the “right” to seek to represent a class even after his personal claim has become moot).

In short, the District .Court had jurisdiction to decide Appellants’ third motion to certify, and we now turn to the question of whether its denial of that motion was proper.

C.

The sole ground for the District Court’s denial of class certification in this case was that it “d[id] not find certification of a class necessary.” Gayle II, - 81 F.Supp.3d at 403. As explained below, that was error, for “necessity” is not an express requirement of Rule 23, and the criteria the District Court was required to consider are wholly absent from its discussion.

To maintain a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a plaintiff must first show that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” (numerosity); that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” (commonality); that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class” (typicality); and that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” (adequacy). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Second, the plaintiff must show that the class action falls within one of the three types enumerated in Rule 23(b)—in this case, Rule 23(b)(2), which provides that “[a} class action may be maintained” if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” “Class certification is proper only ‘if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ of Rule 23 are met.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Jan. 16, 2009) (quoting Gen. Tel Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)).

Here, the District Court denied class certification as not “necessary” because a Rule 23(b)(2) class' is limited to injunctive and declaratory relief and the court’s declaration as to'the unconstitutionality of the government’s procedures and its grant1 of injunctive relief on an individual basis “would be binding on all of the governmental agencies and would indeed inure to the benefit of all members of the proposed class.” See Gayle II, 81 F.Supp.3d at 403. In assuming a “necessity” requirement, the District Court relied on Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom., N. States Power Co. v. Ihrke, 409 U.S. 815, 93 S.Ct. 66, 34 L.Ed.2d 72 (1972), in which the Eighth Circuit held a court may deny certification of a 23(b)(2) class where “[t]he determination of the constitutional question can be made by the Court ... regardless of whether [the] action is treated as an individual action or a class action. No useful purpose would be served by permitting [such a] case to proceed as a class action.” Id. at 572.

The role of “necessity” in our own Circuit, however, has been an open question. Although the Government asserts that we adopted a freestanding necessity requirement in Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1973), our opinion in that case and subsequent cases make clear we did no such thing. True, in Carter, we affirmed the district court’s denial of certification as “within the range of discretion permitted by Rule 23” when one of the rationales offered by the district court was that “the precedential value of its .decision would render a judgment in favor of the class unnecessary,” but the district court also had found a traditional Rule '23 factor, commonality, to be lacking. Id. Moreover, just a few years after Carter, we explicitly stated that a plaintiff seeking Rule 23 certification “need not .., prove[ ] that certification [is] ‘necessary,’ but only that there was compliance with the ■ prerequisites of Rule 23.” Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 579 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202 (1980).

Before answering this question, we consider the views of our sister Circuits— views that turn out to be wide-ranging. The Seventh Circuit has, expressly rejected the contention that a district court can deny certification as unnecessary, see, e.g., Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 1979), while other Circuits have affirmed the' denial of class certification on that ground, at least in the Rule 23(b)(2) context, see, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1978); Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976); James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979), reversed on other grounds, Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981); Kan. Health Care Ass’n v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1548 (10th Cir. 1994).

The First Circuit has staked' out a middle ground, observing in light of Rule 23(b)(2)’s express requirement “that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief [be] appropriate respecting the class as a -whole,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (emphasis added), that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) may be denied where class-wide relief is unnecessary because such relief is then a “formality or otherwise inappropriate.” Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985). At the same time, the court recognized that “[t]here may ... be situations where a class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) will arguably be unnecessary, but where other considerations may render a denial of certification improper,” such as the risk of mootness, the possibility of a defendant’s non-acquiescence in the court’s decision; or where class certification would not burden the court. Id. at 1356. We find the First Circuit’s approach persuasive.

Accordingly, we hold today that necessity is not a freestanding requirement justifying the denial of class certification. However, it may be considered to the extent it is relevant to the enumerated Rule 23 criteria, including “that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief [be] appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). That is, there may be circumstances where class certification is not appropriate because in view of the declaratory or injunctive relief ordered on an individual basis, there would be no meaningful additional benefit to prospective class members in ordering class-wide relief. See, e.g., Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261-62 (affirming a district court’s denial of class certification because the defendant “has made clear that it understands the judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants; indeed even before entry of the judgment, it withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the court ultimately directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the policy”).

The circumstances in which classwide relief offers no further benefit, however, will be rare, and courts should exercise great caution before denying class certification on that basis. After all, the imposition of individual relief is no guarantee it will be carried over to other class members. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing in a different context that stare decisis alone will not always cause a defendant to abide by a holding with respect to similarly situated individuals and that, in such circumstances, a district court might need to grant more “effective remedial relief”). Indeed, as the Government cautioned in its briefing on appeal, “as a matter of practice, the Department of Justice may choose to acquiesce in a particular district court decision, but such acquiescence is not as a matter of law,” Gov’t’s Ltr. Br. at 1, and that is borne out in practice. For example, even when a Court of Appeals has struck down a law or regulation, the Government has sometimes ceased enforcement only in that circuit and otherwise continued to apply it nationwide. E.g., Cen v. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir.2016).

Where class certification is denied on the ground of necessity, yet would-be class members continue to be subjected to injury, their only option may be to undertake the expense, burden, and risk of instituting their own litigation—barriers that in many cases will be prohibitive. The consequences can be significant for those who would otherwise benefit from the relief afforded by Rule 23(b)(2), a rule “designed specifically for civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a numerous and often unascertainable or amorphous class of persons.” Baby Neal ex rel. Ranter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 1 Newberg & Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 4.11, at 4-39 (1992)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (explaining that “[illustrative” of Rule 23(b)(2) class- actions “are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration”). A failure to exercise careful scrutiny before denying certification as unnecessary risks “placing] the defendant in the driver’s seat,” and allowing the defendant to, in essence, unilaterally prevent classwide relief. Cf. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 663, 672, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016) (rejecting a defendant’s “gambit” to moot a Rule 23(b)(3) class action by offering a settlement that the named plaintiffs did not accept).

With' these concerns in mind, courts must engage in a “rigorous analysis” of the appropriateness of 23(b)(2) relief, as well as the other Rule 23 criteria, before denying class certification. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364; Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015). As our sister Circuits have recognized, a court must do .more than assume or hypothesize that a ruling on the claims of an individual plaintiff will accrue to the benefit of the class. See, e.g. Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261-62; Kan. Health Care Ass’n., 31 F.3d at 1548 (affirming the district court’s denial of certification in a challenge to a state’s Medicare reimbursement plan as unnecessary because the district court found that “we have no reason to doubt that defendants would apply any changes made to the reimbursement formula uniformly to nursing homes in Kansas”).

Rather,, courts should scrutinize with care the representation that classwide relief is not necessary and consider, among other things: (1) the nature of the claims and of the parties; (2) the relief available to an individual plaintiff and the extent to which that relief would benefit putative class members; (3) the strength of the evidence that a defendant will abide by a court’s ruling on an individual plaintiffs claim with respect to others who are similarly situated; (4) the ease with which putative class members would be able to vindicate their rights following a defendant’s noncompliance; and (5) whether there are other circumstances, such as impending mootness of the individual claims, that nonetheless render classwide relief “appropriate”, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). To facilitate appellate review, courts should make explicit findings before denying class certification on the ground that classwide relief is not appropriate.

Here, without the benefit of the guidance we have provided today, the District Court denied class certification on the ground that “no useful purpose would be served by certifying a class because all aliens who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief and remedies that this court has imposed.” Gayle II, 81 F.Supp.3d at 404. Because the District Court did not have jurisdiction to enter the relief on which it predicated its ruling and because it did not engage in the “rigorous analysis” of Rule 23 criteria that we have required, we will remand for the District Court to reconsider Appellants’ motion to certify and to conduct that analysis in the first instance.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and its orders of March 14, 2014 and January 28, 2015, and will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      . The sole exception to mandatory detention lies where the Government believes release is necessary to protect a witness, See 8 U.S.C, § 1226(c)(2).

      . The first petition for habeas corpus was filed by Gayle individually in May 2012 urging that he be given a bond hearing because ICE violated the dictates of § 1226(c) by not detaining him immediately after he was released from state, custody. In November 2012, a First Amended Petition was filed, including individual claims for relief for Suldiu, as well as claims brought on behalf of a putative class. The Second Amended Petition, tiled in May 2013, added claims for Francois.

      .As discussed in more detail below, the first motion to certify was filed in November 2012. The second motion to certify was filed in February 2014.

      . Because Francois did not challenge whether he fell within a § 1226(c) category, the court then dismissed Francois for lack of standing. Gayle I, 4 F.Supp.3d at 721.

      . The Government cross-appealed the summary judgment order and sought an appellate determination of whether Form 1-286 is constitutionally deficient but ultimately withdrew that appeal.

      . Available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/ oralargument/audio/15-178 5Gaylev. Warden Monmouth.mp3.

      . Ironically, as. early as May 2013, Appellants’ counsel alerted the District Court to the problem of mootness for named representatives Gayle and Sulchu and advised the District Court "[w]e may have others the next time we come back.” May 10, 2013 Hr’g Tr. at 45 (D.Ct. Dkt. No. 54). But no others were added to cure mootness, and it appears that, after the District Court dismissed Gayle’s and Suk-hu’s claims as moot on May 13, 2013, neither the parties nor the District Court concerned themselves again with the issue of the Court's jurisdiction.

      . In addition to Gayle's 2007 drug conviction, which served- as the basis for his mandatory .detention, he was arrested for marijuana possession in 2008 and 2011, which resulted in convictions for disorderly conduct under New York Penal Law § 240.20. But disorderly conduct in New York is not an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.15(4), 240.20 (stating that disorderly conduct is a “violation” punishable by no more than 15 days’ incarceration), or a drug offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I); In re Zamora, 2008 WL 655924, at *1 (B.I.A. Feb. 14, 2008) (unpublished); of. In re Gomez-Rivas, 2011 WL 4730892 (B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2011) (unpublished), Nor are these convictions for disorderly conduct generally considered crimes involving moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)®, (ii); Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, 2010 WL 4686668, at *2 (DHS Apr. 16, 2010); Pet. for Immigrant Abused Spouse, 2013 WL 5504790, at *5 & n,2 (DHS Feb. 14, 2013). Gayle’s 1995 controlled substances conviction also could not subject him to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) because the statute applies only to aliens released from physical custody after the statute’s effective date, see Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 10 & n.2, 15 n.5, 16-17 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2009); In re West, 22 I, & N. Dec. 1405, 1410 (B.I.A, 2000); see also Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 609-10 (2d Cir. 2015), and Gayle was paroled before the statute went into effect in 1998.
      At oral argument, Gayle’s counsel informed us that he is facing new criminal charges for petty larceny but that these charges "will in all likelihood be dismissed.” Oral Arg. at 3:08. In any event, a later conviction subjecting Gayle to mandatory detention does not "un-moot” the case and retroactively confer jurisdiction. Similarly, the possibility that Gayle might commit crimes in the future does not keep his. claim alive absent some indication that Gayle is unable to follow the law. See, e.g., Turner, 544 U.S. at 440, 125 S.Ct. 1788 (holding that a petitioner’s suit challenging his previous incarceration for failing to pay child support was not moot because there was "a more than ‘reasonable’ likelihood that Turner will again be 'subjected to the same action’ " in light of numerous failures to pay).

      . The relief ordered by the District Court appears to have exceeded its jurisdiction in yet another respect: Federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, are deprived of jurisdiction "to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§ 1226(c)] other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); see also Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that § 1252(f)(1) permits classwide declaratory relief). Thus, despite its conclusion to the contrary, see Gayle I, 4 F.Supp.3d at 721, it seems the scope of the injunction entered by the District Court also exceeded its authority.

      . We are bound by our longstanding precedent interpreting Geraghty to mean that a district court retains jurisdiction to decide a motion,to certify as long as the individual plaintiff had a live claim at the time it was filed, See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 977 n.19 (3d Cir, 1992); Wilkerson v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1987). As we have previously observed, some Courts of Appeals hold that a plaintiff's individual claims must remain live at the time the motion to certify a class is decided, not merely filed, relying on Geraghty’s dictum that "[i]f the named plaintiff has no personal stake in the outcome at the time class certification is denied, relation back of appellate reversal of that denial still would not prevent mootness of the action,” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11, 100 S.Ct. 1202. See, e.g., Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 977 n.19 (collecting cases). But unless and until the Supreme Court has clearly taken a contrary view or we revisit our own precedent en banc, we will continue to adhere to the rule of Wilkerson and Lusardi. See In re Carco Elecs., 536 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting "strong statements” in Supreme Court opinions suggesting that a prior Third Circuit decision was "flawed” but stating that overruling that decision "must be left to the wise counsel of the Court en banc").

      . As we recently observed, a plaintiff also may continue to seek certification if his claims became moot after he filed a class complaint but before he filed for class certification where tire defendant "picked off” the plaintiff by mooting his individual claim before he had a fair opportunity to seek certification. See Richardson, 2016 WL 3854216, at *10. That is not the situation here.

      . Crucially, the plaintiffs in Lusardi failed to properly appeal the decertification order that extinguished their class claims by omitting it from their notice of appeal. As a result, we could not review the initial certification decision. See Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 970-73. No such defect prevents our review of the class certification denial in the instant case.

      . We need not decide whether a different result would be warranted where plaintiff's successive motion was so substantially different that it “would require the creation of an entirely new record and adjudication of complicated class considerations ... at a time when the interests of the putative class representatives may no longer be squarely adverse to defendant or wholly in line with absent 'class' members.” Lusardi, at 981. Here, the first and second motions to certify were essentially the same, while the third simply narrowed the class consistent with Gayle I.

      . Indeed, requiring "necessity” over and above Rule 23’s enumerated criteria would create conflict with Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 130 SiCt 1431; 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010)—in which the Supreme Court emphasized the primacy of Rule 23’s enumerated criteria, explaining that the Rule admonishes that "if [Rule 23’s] prescribed preconditions are satisfied ‘[a] class action may be maintained' (emphasis added)—not ‘a class action may be permitted.' ... The discretion suggested by Rule 23 ⅛ 'may' is discretion residing in the plaintiff,” id. at 399-40, 130 S.Ct. 1431—and Geraghty itself—in which the Court stated that “[Rule 23] .give[s] the proposed class representative the right to have a class certified if the requirements of the Rule[] are met," 445 U.S. at 403, 100 S.Ct. 1202. In addition, to the extent necessity would require a showing that a class , action was "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy," as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), such a requirement would be in tension with the absence of a "superiority” requirement in Rule 23(b)(2), see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362-63, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (observing that a putative class representative need not show that a Rule 23(b)(2) “class action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute” because in 23(b)(2) cases, "superiority [is] self-evident”).

      . Moreover, absent the attorneys’ fees provided by class treatment, attorneys may well be less willing to seek individual relief on plaintiffs’ behalf. After all, the class action device is designed in part to spur attorneys "who otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum result might be more than consumed by the cost. The prospect of [class action] fee arrangements offers advantages for litigation by named plaintiffs ... as well as for their attorneys.” See Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338, 100 S.Ct 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) ("The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action .... A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney's) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).

      . Compare Boeder v, Heckler, 768 F.2d 547, 553 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the district court lacked the authority to enjoin a federal agency’s treatment of anyone other than the individual plaintiffs in that case), with Gur-mankin, 626 F.2d at 1136 (accepting a defendant’s concession that, even where a class has not been certified, "the district court has the ability to render relief which is operative beyond the named plaintiff”).

      . Of course, if a putative class action does not meet the requirements of Rule 23, then a class may not be certified, regardless of any implications for mootness. Cf. Geraghty, 579 F.2d at 252 ("[A] possibility of avoiding mootness on appeal would not, of itself, be a sufficient basis for conferring class action status on a suit otherwise barred by Rule 23.”). However, if the prerequisites of Rule 23 are otherwise met, the impending mootness of individual claims counsels in favor of certification regardless of whether individual relief would theoretically render classwide relief unnecessary. For in that situation, class certification may be the only way to provide relief. See Winston hy Winston v. Children and Youth Servs. of Del. Cray., 948 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991) (suggesting that a district court should certify a class where it would prevent a case from becoming moot); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003) (stating that "class-action treatment was particularly important in this case because” the individual claims might have become moot); Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1344 ("There may ... be situations where a class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) will arguably be unnecessary, but where other considerations may render a denial of a certification improper," such as the risk of mootness.); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1070 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (stating that "[cjertification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) is ‘especially appropriate where, as here, the claims of the members of the class may become moot as the case progresses'" and holding, therefore, that the district court “abused its discretion in refusing to certify an otherwise, appropriate class because of 'lack of need’ ” (quoting Adams v. Califano, 474 F.Supp. 974, 979 (D. Md. 1979))); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 64 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that Rule 23(b)(2) serves the important purpose of “ensur[ing] that the claims of unnamed plaintiffs will receive full appellate review” should the named plaintiffs' claims become moot).

      . On remand, the Appellants are not confined to arguing their third motion to certify, which was filed in response to merits rulings the District Court had no jurisdiction to make. Instead, the Appellants may opt to proceed with .their second motion to certify or to file an amended motion.

      . Our holding that the District Court must address class certification as a threshold issue in the context of this case does not mean, of course, that a district court must decide the certification question before deciding other issues where mootness does not require it. Indeed, the advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 make explicit that various "considerations may affect the timing of” and "may justify deferring” the certification decision, including a defendant’s motion for dismissal or summary judgment or the need to explore the designation of class counsel—although "active management may be necessary to ensure that the certification decision is not unjustifiably delayed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendment).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Maurice Marie DIDON, Appellant in No. 15-3579, v. Alicia Dominguez CASTILLO Appellant in No. 15-3350.
    Nos. 15-3350 & 15-3579
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Argued: June 22, 2016
    (Filed: September 26, 2016)

      Anthony J. Vetrano, Esq. [ARGUED], Vetrano Vetrano & Feinman, 630 Freedom Business Center Drive, Suite 215, King of Prussia, PA 19406, Counsel for Maurice Marie Didon.
    Michelle Pokrifka, Esq. [ARGUED], CGA Law Firm, 135 North George Street, York, PA 17401, Counsel for Alicia Dominguez Castillo.
    Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
   OPINION

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction allows a parent to petition for the return of a child when that child has been removed or retained from her “habitual residence” country in violation of the parent’s custody rights in that country. The petition at issue in this case concerns two children (A.D. and J.D.) retained by their mother in the United States who hail from the Caribbean island of Saint Martin. That 34-square-mile island is comprised of two legally distinct, yet highly integrated, countries—French Saint Martin (where the children went to school) and Dutch Sint Maarten (where the children had their home). To complicate matters further, the Hague Convention is recognized by French Saint Martin (through France), but is not recognized by Dutch Sint Maar-ten.

The extraordinary facts of this case require us to decicle an issue of first, impression: may a child have two “habitual residence” countries at the same time under the Hague Convention (“concurrent habitual residence”)? We conclude that the text of the Convention does not permit concurrent habitual residence. We therefore look to the. ordinary meaning of the term “residence” and hold that the children were habitual residents only of the country in which they “lived”—Dutch Sint Maarten. Because Dutch Sint Maarten does not recognize the Convention, the Convention does not apply to this case.

Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgments and dismiss the petition. Because the District Court granted the petition as to A.D., we will also instruct the District Court to order that A.D. be returned to the United States forthwith.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

The parties’ dispute in this case revolves around two children—A.D. and J.D. A.D. is the biological son of Petitioner Maurice Marie Didon (“Didon”) and Respondent Alicia Dominguez Castillo (“Dominguez”), and J.D. is the biological daughter of Dominguez from a prior relationship. Dominguez moved to Dutch Sint Maarten in 2007, leaving J.D. behind in the Dominican Republic. Dominguez' subsequently met Didon in 2008 and moved into his apartment in Dutch Sint Maarten in 2009. On November 3, 2010, A.D. was born, and shortly thereafter, in 2011, J.D. moved into the Dutch Sint Maarten apartment.

After J.D. moved in, Didon and Dominguez petitioned the French consulate to change J.D.’s birth certificate to list Didon as her father. That petition was granted and a new birth certificate was' issued for J.D. listing Didon as her father and Dominguez as her mother. Although Didon characterizes this process as an “adoption” of J.D., “the parties never appeared before a court or otherwise formally engaged in the adoption process.” App. vol. I at 6.

The family resided, at the Dutch Sint Maarten apartment for the next three years. Throughout this time period, although the family resided in Dutch Sint Maarten, it was “primarily oriented” to French Saint Martin. “where. -Didon worked, and where the children attended school,[] went to doctor’s appointments, etc,” App. vol. I at 5. “Further, the family’s administrative affairs, such as the children’s insurance, were managed [in French Saint Martin].” App. vol. I at 14.

In July 2014, Didon filed a , custody action in French civil court seeking full custody of A.D. and J.D. Dominguez was neither served with papers in the action nor otherwise notified of the custody proceeding. During the pendency of the action, Dominguez informed Didon that she would be taking A.D. and J.D. to New York City on August 27, 2014 to attend her sister’s wedding. Dominguez advised Didon that she and the children would return on September 7, 2014, and showed Didon three round-trip airline tickets from Dutch Sint Maarten to New York City to that effect.

On September 6, 2014, Didon contacted the children’s school to inform the school that J.D. would be absent due to a vacation to the United States. Didon was told by school administrators that the school was not expecting J.D. to return because Dominguez had disenrolled the children. Didon immediately contacted the police, who were able to get in contact with Dominguez by telephone on the same day. Didon claims that Dominguez promised on the call to return with the children the following day, as planned, but Dominguez claims not to have made such ⅝ promise. Dominguez did not return with the children on September 7. •

In the children’s absence, Didon continued to pursue his French custody action and, on March 23, 2015, the French court granted full custody of A.D. and J.D. to Didon in an ex parte order. At the same time, Didon had hired a private investigator to look for the children and, in the summer of 2015, the investigator located them in Hazleton, Pennsylvania;

B. Procedural History

On August 13, 2015, Didon filed the instant Hague Convention petition-in the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking the return of A.D. and J.D. to French Saint Martin. Didon also filed an ex parte motion seeking a temporary restraining order and an expedited hearing on the merits of his petition.

On August 14, 2015, the District Court held an ex parte telephone hearing with Didon’s counsel, after which it entered an order directing the U.S. Marshals Service to serve a copy of the order and petition on Dominguez, and to confíscate the passports and other travel documents of Dominguez, A:D., and J.D. The District Court also granted Didon’s request for a temporary restraining order and enjoined Dominguez from removing A.D. and J.D. from the Middle District of Pennsylvania pending a hearing on the merits of the petition. The District Court subsequently held hearings in the matter on September 2 and September 22, during which both parties presented testimony and other evidence.

On September 24, 2015, the District Court rendered judgment, granting Di-don’s petition as to A.D. and denying the petition as to J.D. The District Court began by fixing the date of retention as September 7, 2014—the day on which Dominguez had promised to return from the United States with the children. It then examined where the children were habitually resident prior to that date. It observed: “The parties’ testimony reveals that the border [between Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin] is so permeable as to be evanescent, and is regularly and readily traversed by residents and travelers alike.... [F]or most purposes of its residents’ daily life, the island is essentially undivided.” App. vol. I at 13. It highlighted testimony about the family’s extensive contacts with both countries and concluded that “the record facts, in addition to the nature of the island itself, support a finding that J.D. and A.D. were habitual residents of both [Dutch] Sint Maarten and [French] Saint Martin.” App. vol. I at 15.

In support of its conclusion, the District Court distinguished cases holding that a child may have only one habitual residence country at a time as “deciding whether the child had abandoned a prior habitual residence in favor of a new one.” App. vol. I at 15. It also invoked dicta from Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) referencing “the rare situation where someone consistently splits time’ more or less [evenly] between two locations, so as to retain alternating habitual residences in each.” App. vol. I at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076 n.17).

The District Court bifurcated the remainder of its analysis. With respect to A.D., the District Court noted that the parties were in agreement that Didon had custody rights under French law because A.D. is his biological son. The District Court also noted that Didon was exercising those custody rights until Dominguez took A.D. to the United States. Because Dominguez retained A.D. from his habitual residence in violation of Didon’s custody rights under French law, the District Court concluded that A.D. was “wrongfully” retained under the Hague Convention and granted the petition as to A.D.

With respect to J.D., the District Court began by observing that Didon did not have custody rights over J.D. through adoption because his purported “adoption” did not satisfy the requirements of French law to vest custody. The District Court also rejected Didon’s argument that the French court’s ex parte custody order vested him with custody rights over J.D. at the time of retention because “the judgment was not issued until more than six months after the alleged wrongful retention date of September 7, [2014].” App. vol. I at 19. Because Didon did not have custody rights over J.D. under French law at the time of retention, the District Court concluded that J.D.. was not “wrongfully” retained under the Convention and denied the petition as to J.D.

Dominguez filed a motion for an emergency stay of the District Court’s judgment with respect to A.D. pending appeal, which the District Court denied without comment on September 25, 2015. A.D. was subsequently transferred from Dominguez to Didon on that same day. Didon and Dominguez filed cross-appeals from the District Court’s judgments with respect to J.D. and A.D., respectively.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard' op Review

The District Court had jurisdiction over the Hague Convention petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a). We have jurisdiction over the parties’ cross-appeals of the District Court’s judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review the District Court’s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 262-63. Accordingly, we will uphold the District Court’s factual findings if its “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record, even if ... we would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. at 263 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F,3d 269, 270 (3d Cir. 2007)).

III. Analysis

The Hague Convention was designed to “deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases.” Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 270). To that end, it provides a return remedy that seeks to “restore the status quo” that existed prior to the “wrongful” removal or retention of a child from her habitual residence country. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 270). The Convention deems a removal or retention to be “wrongful” where:

a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

Hague Convention, supra, at art. 3.

In evaluating whether the petitioning parent has made that showing, a court must determine: (1) when the removal or retention took place; (2) where the child was habitually resident immediately prior to the removal or retention; (3) whether the removal or retention violated the petitioning parent’s custody rights under-the law of the child’s habitual residence; and (4) .whether the petitioning parent was- actually exercising those custody rights at the time of the removal or retention, or would have exercised those rights but for the removal or retention. Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263.

In this case, we need only examine the second question (habitual residence), which proves dispositive. The- District Court concluded that the Hague Convention permits the children to have concurrent habitual residence in Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin. We conclude that the Hague Convention does not permit concurrent habitual residence and hold that the children were habitually resident only in the country in. which they lived—Dutch Sint Maarten. Because Dutch Sint Maarten does not recognize the Hague Convention, the Convention does not apply to this case. See Hague Convention, supra, at arts. 4 & 35; Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2006); Legal Analysis, supra, at 10504' (“[T]he Convention may be invoked only where the child was habitually resident in a Contracting State and taken to or retained , in another Contracting State.”). Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

A. The Hague Convention Does Not Permit Concurrent Habitual Residence

In determining whether the Hague Convention permits concurrent habitual residence, we begin our analysis with the text of the treaty. See Abbott v, Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10, 180 S.Ct. 1983, 176 L.Ed.2d 789 (2010) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008))). As with a statute, where the text of a treaty is unambiguous, we apply the treaty as written and the analysis is complete. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134-35, 109 S.Ct. 1676, 104 L.Ed.2d 113 (1989); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).

We conclude that the text of the Hague Convention unambiguously contemplates that a child may have only one habitual residence country at a time. Rather than referencing “a State” of habitual residence or “the States” of habitual residence, the Convention repeatedly refers to “the State” of habitual residence. See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra, at Preamble (“The States signatory to the present Convention, ... Desiring to ... establish procedures tó ensure the[] prompt return [of children] to the State of their habitual residence. ...” (emphasis added)); id. at art. 3 (“The ... .retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where ... it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person ... under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the ... retention_” (emphasis added));, see also 22 U.S.C. § 9003(f)(1) (“[T]he term ‘authorities’, as used in article 15 of the Convention to refer to the authorities of the state of the habitual residence of a child....” (emphasis added)). Such language is not susceptible to any construction whereby a child may have more than one habitual residence country at a time. See In Marriage of Hanbury-Brown (1996) 130 FLR 252, 285 (Austl.) ; Rhona Schuz, Policy Considerations in Determining the Habitual Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context, 11 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 101, 126 (2001); cf. Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1049, 1067 n.78 (2005).

This textual conclusion finds support in the Convention’s Explanatory Report, which is “generally recognized as ‘the official history and commentary on the Convention.’ ” Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Legal Analysis, supra, at 10503); accord Feder, 63 F.3d at 221 n.7. The Explanatory Report similarly makes clear that a child may have only one habitual residence country at a time:

The practical application of [the wrongful retention] principle requires that the signatory States be convinced that they belong, despite their differences, to the same legal community within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them— those of the child’s habitual residence— are in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.

Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report ¶34, in 3 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session 434-35 (1982) (emphasis added).

Thus, it is unsurprising that the overwhelming majority of United States cases that have addressed the issue have concluded that a child may have only one habitual residence country at a time. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sorenson, 559 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] person may have only one habitual residence.” (quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc))); Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 989 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2001) (same). Foreign cases addressing the issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., In Marriage of Hanbury-Brown (1996) 130 FLR 252, 285-86 (Austl.) (“[T]he notion of [concurrent] habitual residence is simply inconsistent with the wording of the Convention, and with all known judicial pronouncements upon it.”); Kaniuch v. Pontes, 2004 CarswellAlta 1922, para. 14 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (WL); Re V (Abduction: Habitual Residence) (1995) 2 FLR 992, 1001-02 (Eng.); Cameron v. Cameron (1996) SC 17 (Scot.).

Courts have not strayed from this bedrock principle even where a child has meaningful connections to two countries. For example, in shuttle custody situations, a child spends a roughly equal amount of time in two countries because her parents, who live in different countries, agree to split custody. See supra note 6. In a recent shuttle custody case, rather than considering the possibility of concurrent habitual residence, the Ninth Circuit adopted the theory of alternating habitual residence whereby a child’s habitual residence alternates between those two countries. Fa- lenzuelo, v. Michel, 136 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2013).

In concluding that concurrent habitual residence is possible under the Convention, the District Court relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision—Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit observed in dicta that, although “the view held by many courts” is that “a person can only have one habitual residence at a timé under the Convention,” “[t]he exception would be the rare situation where someone consistently splits time more or less evenly between two locations, so as to retain alternating habitual residences in each.” Id. at 1075 n.17 (emphasis added). The Court went on to observe that, if “[a] child ... spent regularly alternating periods with each parent,” the child “might ... acquire[ ] dual habitual residences.” Id. at 1083 n.50 (emphasis added). In support of its observations, the Court cited to a commentator that advocates for the possibility of concurrent ⅞0-bitual residence—Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International. Child Abduction 110 (1999).

After carefully reviewing Mozes, it is not clear to us whether the Ninth Circuit was endorsing concurrent habitual residence or alternating habitual residence in that case. The Ninth Circuit’s later opinion in Valenzuela appears to interpret Mozes to have endorsed alternating habitual residence. See Valenzuela, 736 F.3d at 1177-79. However, to the extent.that Mozes can be read to support concurrent habitual residence, we reject that interpretation of the Hague Convention as inconsistent with the Convention’s unambiguous text.

We áre mindful that, in' cases where a child has meaningful connections to two countries, the determination of which is the child’s habitual residence may sometimes be difficult. However, that is the determination required by the text of the Hague Convention. Courts are permitted only to interpret existing treaty provisions—not re-draft those provisions. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1224, 1235, 188 L.Ed.2d 200 (2014). “[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty.” Chan, 490 U.S. at 135, 109 S.Ct. 1676 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 22). Therefore, remaining faithful to the text of-the treaty, we hold that a child may have only one habitual residence country at a time under the Hague Convention.

B. The Children’s Habitual Residence Country is Dutch Sint Maarten

Given our conclusion that the Convention does not permit concurrent habitual residence, we must now determine in which country the children were habitually resident—Dutch Sint Maarten or French Saint Martin.

The Hague Convention does not define the phrase “habitual residence.” See Feder, 63 F.3d at 222. However, we interpret the words of treaties in accordance with their ordinary meaning. See SantovincEnzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40, 52 S.Ct. 81, 76 L.Ed. 151 (1931); Abbott, 560 U.S. at 11, 130 S.Ct 1983; In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009). “Habitual residence” is defined as “[a] person’s customary place of residence.” Habitual Residence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). We therefore look to the ordinary meaning of the term “residence,” which is incorporated into the phrase “habitual residence” as a matter of language and definition. See Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2006); Guzzo v. Cristofano, 719 F.3d 100, 106 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2013); Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2007). ,“Residence” is defined as “[t]he place where one actually lives,” or, put another way, where one has a home. Residence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed, 2014); Residence, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residence (last visited Sept. 23, 2016); see Live, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, http://www. merriam-yebster.com/dictionary/live (last visited Sept. 23,2016).

In our view, it would disregard the ordinary meaning of the term “residence” to find that a child is habitually resident in a country in which she has not “lived.” Consider, for example, a child whose home is in New Jersey but who travels to New York each day to attend elementary school and engage in various-other daily activities. On those facts, regardless of how much time the child spent each day in New York, an ordinary person would not say that the child is a “resident” of New York—a state in which she does not live. See In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1011. Indeed, the parties -have not pointed us to any case in which a child was found to be habitually resident in a country in which she had not lived.

Although drawing such a distinction between two relevant countries may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is the result of a difficult choice of law question faced by the drafters of the Hague Convention: how to determine which country’s custody law to apply where two countries have a potential interest in the application of their own custody law. The drafters of the Convention decided to resolve this question by according priority to the country of “habitual residence,” believing authorities in that country to be “in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.” Pérez-Vera, supra, ¶34 at 434-35. Such distinctions are common in conflict of laws analyses, which often resolve difficult choice of law questions by reference to rules viewed as predictable and easy-to-apply. See generally Hermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Latos 3-32 (2010) (examining the territorial theory of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws under which the law of the location of a legal event generally governs). In following the ordinary meaning of the term “residence” and requiring that a child have lived in a country for a finding of habitual residence, we are honoring the choice of law rule provided by the drafters of the Convention.

The adoption of a “living” requirement for habitual residence also fits harmoniously within existing' habitual residence jurisprudence. Such a requirement is consistent with principles of habitual residence' to which we have looked in the past. See Whiting, 391 F.3d at 547 (“All that is necessary is that the purpose of living tvhere one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.” (emphasis added) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 223)); In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 392 (same); Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Where a child is born while his ... mother is temporarily present in a country other than that of her habitual residence ... the child will normally have no habitual residence until living in a country on a footing of some stability.” (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Dr. E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual Residence, The Jurid. Rev. part 3, 138, 146 (1997))). It is also consistent with cases. from other courts. See Guzzo, 719 F.3d at 106 (defining habitual residence as “the place where [a child] usually or customarily lives” (emphasis added)); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2010) (observing that an agreement between two parents purporting to set a child’s habitual residence in a country where the child has “never lived” would be ineffectual). Moreover, in a typical Hague Convention case where a child is moved from one country to another and' a court must determine which is her habitual residence, see Valenzuela, 736 F.3d at 1177-78, the child has lived in both countries and so the requirement would be satisfied no matter which country the court determines to be'the child’s habitual residence.

We therefore conclude that a child must have lived in a country before that country can be considered her habitual residence under the Hague Convention. We take this opportunity to outline the analytical structure that courts should use in determining a child’s habitual residence country.

In answering the question of where a child is habitually resident, we have traditionally followed several principles. “The inquiry into a child’s habitual residence is a fact-intensive determination that cannot be reduced to a predetermined formula and necessarily -varies with the circumstances of each case.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291. As a general matter, a child’s habitual residence is “the place where [the child] has been physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of settled purpose-from the child’s perspective.” Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir.. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 224). “This approach considers a child’s experience in and contacts with her surroundings, focusing:on whether she ‘developed] a certain routine and acquire[d] a sense of environmental normalcy’ by ‘forming] meaningful connections , with the people and places [she] .encountered’ in a country prior to the retention date.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at. -292 (alterations in original) (quoting Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550-51). We also “consider the ‘parents’ present, shared intentions regarding their child’s presence [in a particular location],’ ” Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d; at 272 (alteration in original) (quoting Baxter, 423 F.3d at 368), especially “[w]hen a child is too young to have an intent regarding her habitual residence,” In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 392.

Within this framework, the living requirement logically comes before any question of where a child is “acclimatized” or the “shared intentions” of her parents— it is a prerequisite to a finding of habitual residence. A court adjudicating a Hague Convention petition should first ask whether the child at issue has lived in the purported habitual residence countries. If that requirement is satisfied for those countries, the court should then engage in the fact-intensive inquiry laid out in the preceding paragraph. Viewed in this way, the living test is used to determine whether a child has multiple residence countries, and the fact-intensive inquiry is used to determine, among those residence countries, which is the child’s habitual residence.

In this case, although the. children attended school, in French Saint Martin, it is clear that the country in which they lived (i e., had a home) was Dutch Sint Maarten. Because there is only one country in which the children lived, our analysis is complete and we need not proceed to the fact-intensive inquiry. We hold that the children were habitual residents of Dutch Sint Maarten alone. Because Dutch Sint Maarten does not recognize the Hague Convention, the Convention does not apply to this case and the petition must be dismissed. See Hague Convention, supra, at arts. 4 & 35.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgments and dismiss the petition. We will also instruct the District Court to order that A.D. be returned to the United States forthwith. The Clerk of Court will issue the mandate immediately.

      . Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention has been ratified by the United States and is implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ('TCARA''), 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. (formerly at 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.). According to ICARA, courts must "decide [] case[s] in accordance with the Convention.” Id. § 9003(d).

      . The Convention may be invoked by any person or entity that has custody rights over a child, see Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10505 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis], but for the sake of simplicity we will refer to the “parent” of a child as invoking the Convention.

      . We will use the term "Saint Martin” to refer to the entire island, “French Saint Martin” to refer to the French country, and "Dutch Sint Maarten” to refer to the Dutch country.

      . See . 'France—Declarations/Reservations, Convention of= 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid= 619&disp=resdn (“[T]he Government de- ’ clares that the Convention shall extend to the whole of the territory of the French Republic.”).

      . See Netherlands—Declarations/Reservations, Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid= 634&disp=resdn; Netherlands—Extensions, Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ conventions/status-table/extensions/?cid=24& mid=634; Netherlands Ministry of Security and Justice, Guide for International Cases of Child Abduction to Foreign Countries (May 2016), https://www.government.nl/binaries/ government/documents/leaflets/2014/04/15/ guide-for-intemational-cases-of-child-•abduction*to-foreign-countries/2016-05-11herziene-guidefor-international-casesof-child-abduction-to-foreign-countries.pdf ("[T]he Convention does not apply to [Dutch Sint Maarten].”); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Netherlands, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gOv/j/ drl/rls/hrrpl/humanrightsreport/index.htm? year=2015&dlid=252883 ("[Netherlands] is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International. Child Abduction, but the convention does not apply to ... [Dutch] Sint Maarten_”).

      .The authorities on this issue are inconsistent in their usage of terminology. The phrases "concurrent habitual residence,” "alternating habitual residence,” and "dual habitual residence” are sometimes used interchangeably. However, "concurrent habitual residence” refers .to a situation where a child is habitually resident in two countries at the same time, whereas "alternating habitual residence” refers to a distinct situation where a child is moved in between two countries on a regular basis (known as "shuttle custody”) such that her habitual residence alternates between those countries. "Dual habitual residence" can be used to refer to either or both situations. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the phrases "concurrent habitual residence” and "alternating habitual residence” in the manner just described and will not use the term “dual habitual residence.”

      . The following facts are taken from the District Court’s factual findings and are unchallenged by the parties unless otherwise noted.

      . The District Court acknowledged that Didon owned a two-unit apartment building in French Saint Martin, which the family used both as a rental unit for tourists and for "personal use.” App. vol. I at 14-15. However, on the basis of testimony that the family "did not reside there permanently and only stayed there together five or six times per year,” the District Court concluded that the apartment was not "the parties’ primary residence” and was only used "periodic[ally],” App. vol. I at 15 n. 13.

      .Dominguez-argues that only J.D. attended school in French Saint Martin, but the record contains evidence suggesting that A.D. attended school in French Saint Martin as well. See App. vol, II at 141. The District Court’s finding that both children attended school in French Saint Martin was not clearly erroneous.

      . Dominguez .alleges that Didon procured this judgment, by fraud. She argues that we should deny his petition because he seeks equitable relief and comes before us with unclean hands. However, we have expressly rejected the application of the unclean hands doctrine to Hague Convention petitions. See Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).

      . Under ICARA, a petition must be filed with a court "authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b).

      . The result of our decision today is that A.D. must be transferred back to the United States from Saint Martin. After that transfer, A.D. will have been relocated between Saint Martin and the United States three times in two years. We are naturally concerned that these multiple relocations of the child have been or will be detrimental to his well-being. See Chafin v. Chafin, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1026, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013).
      Accordingly, we reiterate here that a district court issuing a return order in a Hague Convention matter should seriously consider the possibility of staying that order pending appeal. While we do not endorse ‘‘[rjoutine stays” in such matters, a district court should carefully consider the traditional stay factors when "considering whether to stay a return order”:
      (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

        Id. at 1027 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009)).

      . Didon argues that the District Court’s determination that the children were concurrent habitual residents of Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin is a factual finding that we must review for clear error. .However, Didon’s argument conflates the related, but distinct, questions presented by this case.

        The determination of where a child is habitually resident is a mixed question of law and fact. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n.9 (3d Cir, 1995). "On such questions we employ a mixed standard of review, accepting [a] district court’s historical or narrative facts unless they are clearly erroneous, but exercising plenary review of the court’s choice of and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the facts.” Id. Under this standard, the question of whether a child may have concurrent habitual residence countries under the Hague Convention "defines the concept of habitual residence,” id. and therefore is a classic, legal question over which we exercise plenary review,

      , Because Didom permitted Dominguez to travel 'to the United States with the- children, Didon has alleged only a wrongful retention of the children, See Feder, 63 F.3d at 220 n.4. Therefore, we will not discuss wrongful removal.

      . “Once the petitioner meets its initial bur-: den, the respondent may oppose the child’s return by proving one of five affirmative defenses.” Karpenko, 619 F,3d at 263. Before the District Court, Dominguez unsuccessfully sought to invoke the affirmative defense that there is "a grave risk that [A.D.’s] return would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place [him] in an intolerable situation.” Id. at 263 n,3. Dominguez does not present any argument on this point on appeal and so has waived our consideration of the affirmative defense. See Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 269 n.9. In any event, as the District Court concluded, the sketchy and sharply disputed evidence of Didon's alleged abuse of A.D. does not approach the level of "clear and convincing evidence” required to prove the affirmative defense. Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263 n.3.

      . See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

      . “In interpreting any treaty, ‘[t]he opinions of our sister signatories ... are entitled to considerable weight,’ ” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16, 130 S.Ct. 1983 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999)). "The- principle applies with special force here, for Congress. has directed that 'uniform international interpretation of the Convention’ is part of the Convention's framework.” Id. (quoting former 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B)), Accordingly, we consider the "views of other contracting states,” as expressed in “international case law,” in interpreting the Hague Convention. Id.

        .Accord Panteleris v. Panteleris, 30 F.Supp.3d 674, 682 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (same); Blanc v. Morgan, 721 F.Supp.2d 749, 760 (W.D. Term. 2010) (same); In re Morris, 55 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1161 (D. Colo. 1999) (same); Freier v. Freier, 969 F.Supp. 436, 440 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same); cf. Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 272 ("[A] child’s prior habitual residence must be effectively abandoned by the shared intent of the parents for her to acquire a new habitual residence."); Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550 (same).

      . Accord Maharaj v. Maharajh, 2011 ONSC 525, para. 13 (Can.); Wilson v. Huntley, 2005 CarswellOnt 1606, para. 57 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); S.-C. (S.) v. C. (G.), 2003 CarswellQue 2223, para. 53 (Can. Que. Ct. Sup.) (WL); Dickson v. Dickson (1990) SCLR 692 (Scot.).

      . As the Ninth Circuit noted, foreign cases have similarly adopted the theory of alternating habitual residence. See In re CL (a minor) and In re the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985; JS v. CL (unreported High Court N. Ir. Aug. 25, 1998) (“[T]he child was habitually resident in whichever jurisdiction he was living for a particular week.”); Maharaj v. Maharajh, 2011 ONSC 525, para. 13 (Can.); Wilson v. Huntley, 2005 CarswellOnt 1606, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); In re A. (1998) 1 FLR 497 (Eng.); Re V (Abduction: Habitual Residence) (1995) 2 FLR 992, 1001-02 (Eng.); cf. Watson v. Jamieson (1998) SLT 180 (Scot.).
      Although we need not examine the propriety of alternating habitual residence in this case, we note that alternating habitual residence comports with the text of the Hague Convention because, under that theory, a child has only one habitual residence country at any given time.

      . We are particularly confused by the Ninth Circuit’s statement that the “exception” to a child having “one habitual residence at a time” would be “alternating habitual residences." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075 n.17. In an alternating habitual residence scenario, the child’s habitual residence alternates between two countries súch that the child does, in fact, have only one habitual residence country at a time.

      . Permitting concurrent habitual residence would also introduce a fundamental problem into the structure of' the treaty—in cases where the custody laws of two concurrent habitual residence countries conflict, how would a, court determine which country’s laws to apply in determining whether a wrongful retention had taken place? Given that the Convention clearly contemplates a child having only one habitual residence country at a time, it provides no choice of law rule for such a situation. But see Beaumont & McEleavy, supra, at 110 (suggesting a theoretical solution to this problem).
      Despite finding that the children in this case were habitually resident in both Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin at the same time, the District Court avoided this choice of law problem by analyzing Didon's custody rights only under French law. It did ■not provide any justification for ignoring Dutch custody law, which would have equal application to the wrongful retention inquiry in a concurrent habitual residence scenario.

      ; This principle holds true even if one views the Convention’s failure to address concurrent habitual residence as a "gap” or "oversight” rather than a conscious choice that a child may have only one habitual residence country at a time. See Chan, 490 U.S. at 135, 1-09 S.Ct. 1676 (“Neither can this Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty; any more than in a law.” (quoting In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 22, 5 L.Ed. 191 (1821))).

      . We note that, in all our Hague Convention cases in which we examined a district court’s determination as to where a child was habitually resident, the child had lived in the purported habitual residence countries, See Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 266-67; Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 285-86; In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2006); Whiting, 391 F.3d at 542-43; Feder, 63 F.3d at 218-20.

      . The drafters of the Hague Convention could, have adopted, instead of a “habitual residence” rule, an interest analysis standard, under which a court would examine the interest of the relevant countries in the application of their own’ custody law. See generally Roosevelt, supra, at 41-79. While such an approach might appear more appealing in this particular case given the meaningful connections of the children to both Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin, the drafters did not choose this choice of law approach and we must respect their decision.

      .As we observe supra note 8, the District Court found that Didon owned a two-unit apartment building in French Saint Martin. However, the testimony credited by the District Court made clear that the family stayed there together only five or six times , a year and so the children did not live in French Saint Martin. Indeed, the District Court found that "[p]rior to Dominguez’,s departure with the children, the family unit had been living together [in Dutch Sint Maarten] since A.D.’s birth in 2010.” App. vol. I at 21.

      . See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

      . Our dismissal of the petition is not limited to Dominguez’s appeal of the District Court’s grant of the petition as to A.D. Because the Hague Convention does not apply to this case, our dismissal must also extend to Didon's appeal of the District Court’s denial of the petition as to J.D.