text:
    Jane DOE, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Doe Child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Idris BRIDGEFORTH and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 1-17-0182
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SIXTH DIVISION.
    March 9, 2018
    Romanucci & Blandin LLC, of Chicago (Bhavani Raveendran, of counsel), for appellant.
    Law Department of Board of Education of the City of Chicago, of Chicago (Ronald L. Marmer and Lee Ann Lowder, of counsel), for appellee.
   JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Doe Child, a student at Ashburn Community Elementary School (Ashburn) in Chicago, was sexually abused by defendant Idris Bridgeforth, an Ashburn faculty member. After Bridgeforth's conduct was discovered, two legal proceedings ensued, one criminal and one civil. The criminal proceeding culminated with Bridgeforth's conviction for criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. See People v. Bridgeforth , 2017 IL App (1st) 143637, 416 Ill.Dec. 773, 86 N.E.3d 1058. The civil proceeding, which is the subject of this appeal, commenced when J.E.'s mother, Jane Doe, sued Bridgeforth for damages under several tort theories, and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (CPS) for willful and wanton conduct. The case proceeded to trial on (1) the willful and wanton conduct claim against CPS and (2) damages against Bridgeforth. The jury returned verdicts in favor of CPS and Bridgeforth.

¶ 2 Jane Doe's principal contention on appeal is that she is entitled to judgment n.o.v. on the willful and wanton conduct claim because she produced overwhelming evidence establishing that CPS was deliberately indifferent to J.E.'s safety. She also maintains that she is entitled to a new trial because (1) CPS's attorney misstated the law during closing argument, (2) the jury instructions and verdict forms were inaccurate and confusing, and (3) the jury ignored "proven elements of damages." We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On June 18, 2012, Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and of her daughter J.E., filed this lawsuit against Bridgeforth and CPS. The complaint, as later amended, contained five counts. Counts I through III were for battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. These counts were brought against Bridgeforth, a CPS employee who coached J.E.'s basketball and track and field teams.

¶ 5 Count IV, against CPS, was for willful and wanton conduct. It alleged that between August 1, 2009, and June 7, 2012, Bridgeforth transported J.E. to and from basketball and track and field games and practices using his personal vehicle. Count IV further alleged that, between December 1, 2011, and June 7, 2012, Bridgeforth repeatedly sexually assaulted J.E. while she was alone with him in his vehicle and sent her numerous sexually charged text messages. Jane Doe alleged that CPS engaged in willful and wanton conduct by, among other things, "fail[ing] to stop * * * Bridgeforth from harming [J.E.] when they knew that Bridgeforth was repeatedly alone with [J.E.] in his vehicle which was a known violation of CPS policy."

¶ 6 Bridgeforth was served but never appeared in the circuit court and was defaulted before trial. When trial began, the judge told the jury, "[i]t has been judicially determined that [Bridgeforth] committed the acts the Plaintiff alleged." And, when the court instructed the jury after the close of evidence, it told the jury that it had "found" Bridgeforth "liable" and that CPS "is not to be prejudiced by the fact that the liability of * * * Bridgeforth is no longer at issue."

¶ 7 Because of the nature of the issues presented, we must recite the trial evidence in unusual detail. At trial, Jane Doe testified that on the morning of June 6, 2012, she saw several sexually charged text messages on an iPod device J.E. had been using. Jane Doe recognized that the sender's phone number was Bridgeforth's. In the texts, Bridgeforth stated that he loved J.E. and wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. After viewing the texts, Jane Doe went to Ashburn, where she met with Jewel Diaz, the school principal. Shortly afterwards, J.E. arrived at Ashburn and joined the meeting. When asked about the texts, J.E. at first said they "were from [Bridgeforth's] daughter's friend that was a guy." Jane Doe became upset and left the meeting because "[J.E.] was covering up for [Bridgeforth]."

¶ 8 Jane Doe testified that she was unaware that CPS had a transportation policy that required faculty to obtain written permission before using their private vehicles to transport students. She stated that she would have given Bridgeforth written permission to transport J.E. in his personal vehicle had he requested it. However, she testified that "there would be no reason for him to ride alone" with J.E. because "there's a whole team." She further testified that it would have been suspicious for Bridgeforth to ask permission to drive alone with J.E.

¶ 9 On cross-examination, Jane Doe testified that she had an arrangement with Bridgeforth to drive J.E. home after practices when she was not available. She admitted that she "knew that there were times that [he] was bringing" J.E. home. She explained, however, that she "was under the assumption that he was bringing the whole team." Jane Doe admitted that she "never had any suspicion" about Bridgeforth; if she did, she would not have allowed Bridgeforth to give J.E. rides home.

¶ 10 J.E. testified that she attended Ashburn from kindergarten through eighth grade. She was on the track team from fifth to eighth grade, and the basketball team from sixth to eighth grade. Bridgeforth coached both teams. When a team had an away game, the coaches, including Bridgeforth, would transport the players, including J.E., to and from the game. In addition, Bridgeforth also transported J.E. home from practices. She explained that she was often alone with Bridgeforth during these rides.

¶ 11 When J.E. was in eighth grade, Bridgeforth began engaging in a course of sexual misconduct during their car rides. In one incident, Bridgeforth touched J.E.'s inner thigh and chest. Later, while driving J.E. home from a weekend track meet, Bridgeforth felt J.E.'s inner thigh and inserted his finger into her vagina, which J.E. testified was physically painful. In addition, Bridgeforth (1) frequently kissed J.E., (2) tried to coerce her into performing fellatio on him by "pull[ing] my head down into his lap," (3) asked J.E. to have sexual intercourse with him, and (4) fondled himself in front of her.

¶ 12 On June 6, 2012, Jane Doe discovered the text messages that Bridgeforth had sent to J.E. That day, when J.E. arrived at school, she was called into a meeting with Principal Diaz and Jane Doe, where she was asked about Bridgeforth's abuse. J.E. asked to speak to Megan McKay, one of her teachers. J.E. told McKay that Bridgeforth touched her inappropriately.

¶ 13 On cross-examination, J.E. testified that Bridgeforth was well liked at Ashburn and did not have a reputation for "doing inappropriate things." She explained that often when Bridgeforth gave her rides, other children were already in the car. Although J.E. did not know if her mother had given Bridgeforth permission to drive her, she stated that her mother knew that Bridgeforth was taking her home.

¶ 14 Denise Sklenar, a school clerk at Ashburn, testified that CPS had a written transportation policy. The policy, which was read into the record during her testimony, prohibited CPS faculty from using their personal vehicles to transport students unless the faculty member had written permission from the school principal and the student's parent or guardian. Sklenar stated that the policy was enacted "for the safety of the children who go to Ashburn" and to prevent CPS employees from having the opportunity to abuse or assault students.

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Sklenar testified that she never heard Bridgeforth say anything lewd or inappropriate. Sklenar then testified that she did not have any reason to suspect that Bridgeforth would sexually assault J.E.

¶ 16 Tonya Rippy, a teacher at Ashburn, testified that one of the reasons for CPS's transportation policy was to ensure student safety. She agreed that if a teacher transported a student in his or her private vehicle without parental permission, the teacher would be violating the policy and putting the student at risk.

¶ 17 Thereafter, she testified that she was a friend of Jane Doe and that they had a private, verbal agreement for Rippy to drive J.E. to and from school when Jane Doe was unavailable. She did not think written permission was necessary because she was "not wearing [her] teacher hat." She testified that other Ashburn faculty members saw her driving J.E., but that no one ever asked her if she had written permission from Jane Doe. Likewise, Rippy saw Bridgeforth driving students, including J.E., but she never asked if he had permission because she "assumed that permission was granted."

¶ 18 On cross-examination, Rippy testified that Jane Doe was aware that Bridgeforth was driving J.E. She recalled a conversation in which Jane Doe said, "[d]on't worry about her, she has a game. She's going to be coming home with [Bridgeforth]." Rippy understood this to mean that Jane Doe had given Bridgeforth permission to drive J.E. Rippy testified that she never heard Bridgeforth say anything sexual or inappropriate, and that nothing about Bridgeforth stood out in her mind as a "red flag" that she "should have caught in hindsight."

¶ 19 Leroy Martin, a special education teacher at Ashburn, testified that he coached Ashburn's football team with Bridgeforth. He stated that if he saw a student getting into a faculty member's private vehicle, he would "probably" ask a superior if the faculty member had permission to transport the student. He explained that a faculty member who saw a student in another faculty member's vehicle and did not "ask any questions" would be "making a decision to not act with regard for the safety of the child." He stated that if he saw a child getting into a faculty member's vehicle, he would investigate because "that would raise a red flag." Martin then testified that at the time of trial, he had recently transported students to a game in his personal vehicle even though he did not have written permission. He explained that "it was a last-minute thing * * *. The game was that day, and we didn't have any buses that day."

¶ 20 On cross-examination, Martin testified that during the 2011-12 school year, he never saw J.E. get into Bridgeforth's vehicle. He stated that he never heard Bridgeforth say anything sexual, lewd, or improper, and he testified that Bridgeforth never did anything or said anything that, in hindsight, raised a "red flag about what happened to [J.E.]"

¶ 21 Deidra Richardson testified that she was a teacher at Ashburn. She testified that the transportation policy was put in place to ensure student safety and that policy violations always need to be reported "because we want to keep children safe." On cross-examination, Richardson testified that she never saw any student, including J.E., getting into Bridgeforth's vehicle. She stated that she never heard Bridgeforth say anything that was lewd or sexual in nature. She stated that, in hindsight, nothing about Bridgeforth stood out to her as "red flag." She testified, "[w]hen I was told the news, I was * * * stunned. I was literally stunned." Upon further direct examination, she explained that she was stunned because she "had no idea that [Bridgeforth] was the type of person that was working at the school to do something to [J.E.]"

¶ 22 Megan McKay testified that she was a teacher at Ashburn. When J.E. was in the sixth grade, McKay was her science and homeroom teacher. McKay stated that at some point before June 2012, J.E. told her that Bridgeforth was transporting her in his private vehicle. McKay acknowledged that she did not ask J.E. or Principal Diaz if Jane Doe had given Bridgeforth permission to transport J.E.

¶ 23 On June 6, 2012, McKay was called to the school office and asked to speak to J.E. about an incident involving Bridgeforth. McKay explained that J.E. specifically asked to speak to her because she trusts McKay and felt safe with her. McKay explained that J.E. initially could not speak because she was crying. Once J.E. regained her composure, she told McKay that she had been texting with Bridgeforth for "months." When McKay asked J.E. if Bridgeforth touched her "down there," J.E. "started crying uncontrollably."

¶ 24 On cross-examination, McKay explained that she did not follow up when J.E. told her about the rides because "[i]t didn't seem like it was out of the ordinary and it was a weekend" and she knew that Bridgeforth and Jane Doe were friends. She stated that she "assumed that there was an arrangement made as friends especially since it was the weekend." Thereafter, the following colloquy ensued:

"Q. You testified a bit ago that you said yes and no when you were asked * * * whether you felt that the school had failed to protect * * * [J.E.]
A. I think that everybody trusted him. When you trust someone with your child, you know, there is a-I want to say permission given to hey, yeah, can you pick her up, do this for me, and that trust was violated. * * *
Q. But there were no red flags that you were aware of?
A. No, there were no red flags.
Q. You were shocked when all of this came to light[,] right?
A. Yes, very.
Q. So is it fair to say then there was nothing that you could have done even with the benefit of hindsight?
A. No, there was nothing I could have done.
Q. * * * Was there anything that Bridgeforth said that was lewd or inappropriate-
A. No.
Q. -at any point in time?
A. No. Not at all.
Q. Was there anything that you felt like that you could have done to have prevented this incident?
A. Not then, no.
Q. Was there anything that you felt like anybody else at Ashburn, any other employees, your friends or colleagues could have done to have prevented this incident?
A. No.
Q. So what I am gathering from you is that Bridgeforth is the culprit and there is nothing that you or the school could have done, is that right?
A. That is right."

¶ 25 Jewel Diaz, Ashburn's principal, testified that before June 6, 2012, she was not aware that students were receiving rides to and from games from coaches and that she never witnessed a student getting into a coach's private vehicle. On cross-examination, Diaz testified that she never heard Bridgeforth say anything lewd, sexual, or inappropriate. She stated that she never disciplined Bridgeforth and that she was unaware that Bridgeforth and J.E. had exchanged phone numbers.

¶ 26 Ezra Townsend testified that he was a special education classroom assistant and coach at Ashburn. Townsend testified that he saw Bridgeforth transporting J.E. in his private vehicle on five occasions. He acknowledged that despite seeing J.E. in Bridgeforth's vehicle, he never asked Diaz or Jane Doe if Bridgeforth had permission to drive J.E. Townsend described a time when Bridgeforth was giving Townsend, J.E., and some other students a ride home. According to Townsend, he needed to be taken to the suburbs, and J.E. lived near Ashburn. However, rather than drop J.E. off first, Bridgeforth drove to the suburbs to drop Townsend off. Townsend asked Bridgeforth why he was not dropping J.E. off first. According to Townsend, Bridgeforth "said [J.E.] was going with me by her people house that live out by me [sic ]."

¶ 27 Bridget Connolly testified for Jane Doe as a controlled expert in the field of educational administration. Connolly reviewed the CPS transportation policy and stated that its purpose was to "ensure the safety and well being of students[ ]" and "make sure there is a uniform practice on transportation for the district." She opined that one of the policy's goals was to prevent student sexual abuse. Connolly testified that Ashburn's faculty violated the transportation policy "on a consistent basis," which in her opinion was "a cause of J.E.'s sexual abuse and sexual assault." She testified that CPS broke its own rules when Bridgeforth drove J.E. because he did not have written permission from Jane Doe or Diaz. She opined that CPS had notice that Bridgeforth was driving J.E. because Townsend, McKay, Diaz, and Richardson knew Bridgeforth was giving J.E. rides. She noted that despite this, no one ever reported Bridgeforth's conduct to a school administrator.

¶ 28 Thereafter, Jane Doe's attorney asked Connolly if she had "an opinion to a reasonable degree of educational administrative certainty as to whether CPS blatantly disregarded" J.E.'s safety. In response, Connolly testified, "I believe that they violated the travel policy and that put the child in direct harm. I believe that they were aware that the policy violations were occurring over time." Connolly was then asked whether she had "an opinion as to whether Mr. Townsend specifically and blatantly disregarded" J.E.'s safety. In response, she testified, "I believe that his silence of not reporting the transportation of J.E. in a private vehicle by herself put her at risk." Upon further direct examination, Connolly opined that CPS "blatantly ignored the safety of [J.E.]"

¶ 29 Dr. Emily Arnstein testified that in August 2012, she was a clinical extern at Chicago Children's Advocacy Center (CCAC), during which time she treated J.E. for "complex trauma from being sexually assaulted." Dr. Arnstein testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that (1) the abuse J.E. experienced was affecting her functioning and (2) J.E. experienced "psychological pain." In addition, she opined that it was "possible" that the abuse J.E. experienced "could have a long-lasting impact."

¶ 30 On cross-examination, Dr. Arnstein testified that she attempted to evaluate J.E. using a trauma symptom checklist. However, because J.E. was underreporting her symptoms, Dr. Arnstein "could not consider it a valid profile." She later testified that she was unable to opine to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that J.E. sustained trauma from the sexual abuse. She acknowledged that in notes she took during J.E.'s therapy sessions, she described J.E.'s mood as "euthymic," meaning, "a normal mood in which the range of emotions is neither depressed nor highly elevated." Upon further examination, Dr. Arnstein explained, "[d]ue to the high score in the underreporting scale, [J.E.] may have been in denial or may not have been reporting them."

¶ 31 Dr. Myra West, another of Jane Doe's controlled experts, testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that J.E. experienced pain, suffering, and emotional distress and that it was "definitely possible" and "more likely than not" that J.E. would have a "future psychological effect" due to Bridgeforth's abuse. In addition, Dr. West testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that J.E. "more likely than not" experienced trauma due to Bridgeforth's abuse and that J.E. "will continue to experience emotional pain as a result of what happened."

¶ 32 CPS then presented its case-in-chief, beginning with the video deposition of its controlled expert, Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy. Dr. Galatzer-Levy testified that he disagreed with Dr. West's conclusion that J.E. was "psychologically damaged" by Bridgeforth's abuse. He explained that Dr. West's report "nowhere states that any particular symptom was caused by [J.E.] being abused, nor does she anywhere state that it is more likely than not that [J.E.] will develop * * * any particular symptom." Dr. Galatzer-Levy stated that there was "no data that supports and no even opinion that supports her ultimate opinion. She keeps referring to things that may happen, that are possible, but something that may happen or is possible is not the same as something that is more likely than not to happen."

¶ 33 Dr. Galatzer-Levy then opined that J.E. did not suffer psychological damage. He based that conclusion on a number of factors. First, he noted that J.E. "nowhere states that she had any psychiatric symptoms whatever." Second, he stated that, although Jane Doe had noted that J.E. was becoming irritable, "those symptoms occurred * * * before the onset of the sexual abuse." Third, he stated that, while Jane Doe and J.E. were having trouble getting along, that was "not at all atypical of 13-year old girls in relationship to their mother." Fourth, he noted that Jane Doe and J.E. both reported that J.E. was "in other respects doing quite well psychologically." Finally, he noted that, "in terms of [Dr. Arnstein's] observations and [J.E.'s] statements to [Dr. Arnstein], there was no indication of any illness or pathology."

¶ 34 In addition, Dr. Galatzer-Levy testified that he did not believe J.E. was underreporting her symptoms. He explained that because J.E. was "able to recall most of the event," her "failure to recall or reluctance to talk about the material is not itself a significant symptom." He then testified to a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that J.E. "will never develop psychiatric symptoms as a result of having been abused." He explained that most children who are sexually abused "do not later develop symptoms." With specific reference to J.E., he explained that "the children who are most likely to develop symptoms later develop them early, and this child has an-essentially an absence of symptoms immediately following the abuse."

¶ 35 On cross-examination, Dr. Galatzer-Levy testified that he was not aware that Bridgeforth (1) stated he felt J.E.'s pubic hair through her pants, (2) exposed his penis to J.E. and masturbated in front of her, (3) grabbed J.E.'s head to try to force her to perform oral sex on him, and (4) inserted his fingers into J.E.'s vagina. However, he testified that knowing that information would not have changed any of his opinions. Dr. Galatzer-Levy acknowledged that J.E. cried for approximately 30 minutes when she spoke to McKay, which he stated was a symptom of emotional distress. When asked what caused J.E.'s distress, Dr. Galatzer-Levy stated, "she might have been very distressed at simply recounting these events rather than by the events themselves."

¶ 36 Dr. Brandon Suarez testified that he was a clinical supervisor at CCAC, where he supervised Dr. Arnstein when she was a clinical extern. Dr. Suarez stated that he reviewed and approved Dr. Arnstein's treatment notes and observed one of her sessions with J.E. During his examination, CPS's attorney asked Dr. Suarez if he could opine to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty whether J.E. sustained trauma from the sexual assault. After counsel clarified the question, Dr. Suarez stated, "it's hard for me to say anything definitively." He explained:

"I think that because there was a high level of defensiveness, it's hard for me to say anything definitively. Because without further assessment and further time * * * as well-because a lot of children, they don't always show the symptoms of trauma immediately within 20 sessions, which could be a few months."

¶ 37 During CPS's closing argument, the following colloquy occurred:

"Townsend-he's known this family since she was a baby. You have to ask yourself growing up with [J.E.], do you think that man would have intentionally with conscious disregard or utter-
MR. MARASSO: Objection as to intentional.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. LAMANTIA: With conscious disregard or utter indifference do anything to hurt her or put her in a position to be hurt?"

¶ 38 During the jury instruction conference, CPS propounded a modified version of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 36.01 (2011) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01), which the court tendered to the jury over an objection by Jane Doe. It read: "If you decide for the defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago on the question of liability, you will have no occasion to consider the question of damages, as to the Board of Education of the City of Chicago." The court also tendered to the jury a modified version of IPI Civil (2011) No. 41.03, which read:

"The rights of the defendants Board of Education of the City of Chicago and Idris Bridgeforth are separate and distinct. Each is entitled to a fair consideration of his own defense and you will decide each defendant's case separately as if it were a separate lawsuit. Each defendant's case must be governed by the instructions applicable to that case."

¶ 39 The court also tendered three verdict forms and a special interrogatory to the jury. Verdict Form A had three sections. The first section listed Bridgeforth and CPS on separate lines and allowed the jury to check "yes" or "no" to indicate whether or not the jury had found in favor of Jane Doe against each particular defendant. The second section asked the jury to assess damages for J.E.'s (1) pain and suffering, (2) loss of normal life, and (3) emotional distress. The third section asked the jury to apportion fault, in a way that equaled 100%, between Bridgeforth and CPS. Verdict forms B and C allowed the jury to "find for" CPS and Bridgeforth, respectively, and against Jane Doe. The special interrogatory asked: "Did the action or failure to act by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago show an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of [J.E.]?"

¶ 40 When the jury announced it had reached a verdict, it had not answered the special interrogatory, so the court directed the jury to continue deliberating. When the jury returned, it had filled out verdict form B finding in favor of CPS and answered "no" to the special interrogatory. The court instructed the jury to complete verdict form A and ordered the jurors back to the jury room. After a third round of deliberations, the jury returned with verdict form A filled out as follows: in section one, the jury found in favor of (1) Jane Doe against Bridgeforth and (2) CPS against Jane Doe; in section two, the lines where the jury could assign damages were left blank; and in section three, the jury found Bridgeforth 100% at fault. Jane Doe moved for a mistrial and asked that the jury be polled. During jury polling, one juror answered, "I need clarification on it." After the court explained the polling question, the juror answered "yes." At the close of proceedings, the court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. Jane Doe filed a posttrial motion for judgment n.o.v. and new trial, which the court denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 41 ANALYSIS

¶ 42 I. Willful and Wanton Conduct

¶ 43 We first consider Jane Doe's argument that she is entitled to judgment n.o.v. on her willful and wanton conduct claim against CPS. A motion for judgment n.o.v. presents "a question of law as to whether, when all of the evidence is considered, together with all reasonable inference from it in its aspect most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, there is a total failure or lack of evidence to prove any necessary element of the plaintiff's case or the defendants' defense." Heideman v. Kelsey , 414 Ill. 453, 457, 111 N.E.2d 538 (1953). This is an imposing standard. As the supreme court has explained, "[j]udgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be entered unless the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand." Holton v. Memorial Hospital , 176 Ill. 2d 95, 109, 223 Ill.Dec. 429, 679 N.E.2d 1202 (1997).

¶ 44 Section 3-108(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) provides:

"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity nor a public employee who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property is liable for an injury unless the local public entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its supervision proximately causing such injury." 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 2012).

The Act defines "willful and wanton conduct" as

"a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This definition shall apply in any case where a 'willful and wanton' exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act." Id . § 1-210.

¶ 45 Willful and wanton conduct is "an aggravated form of negligence," not an independent tort. Jane Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors , 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 19, 362 Ill.Dec. 484, 973 N.E.2d 880. "[T]o recover damages based on willful and wanton conduct, a plaintiff must plead and prove [ (1) ] the basic elements of a negligence claim" and (2) that the defendant's conduct demonstrated "a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the plaintiff's welfare." Id.

¶ 46 "[W]illful and wanton conduct differs from mere negligence in that it 'requires a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barr v. Cunningham , 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 20, 417 Ill.Dec. 667, 89 N.E.3d 315 (quoting Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc. , 148 Ill. 2d 429, 449, (170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522, 1992) ). "Illinois courts define willful and wanton conduct, in part, as the failure to take reasonable precautions after knowledge of impending danger." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ; see Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10 , 82 Ill. 2d 415, 429, 45 Ill.Dec. 96, 412 N.E.2d 447 (1980) (" 'A willful or wanton injury must have been intentional or the act must have been committed under circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others * * *.' " (quoting Klatt v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 33 Ill. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 720 (1965) ) ). "To establish willful and wanton conduct in the absence of evidence of prior injuries," the plaintiff must produce, "[a]t a minimum, some evidence that the activity is generally associated with a risk of serious injuries." Barr , 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 21, 417 Ill.Dec. 667, 89 N.E.3d 315.

¶ 47 Based on these rules, our analysis can be distilled into two discrete inquiries. The first is whether Jane Doe established that the act of permitting a teacher to transport a student to and from athletic team practices and games in his private vehicle is "generally associated with the risk of serious injuries," in this case, teacher-on-student sexual assault. The second is whether Jane Doe established that CPS "knew," merely by virtue of various staff members knowing that J.E. was receiving rides from Bridgeforth, that J.E. was under an impending danger of sexual assault.

¶ 48 With respect to the first inquiry, Jane Doe's evidence was plainly insufficient. To be sure, Jane Doe did elicit testimony from Sklenar and Connolly to the effect that CPS enacted the transportation policy to prevent sexual assault incidents. But this testimony had little value. The transportation policy does not say its purpose is to prevent sexual assault. It does not actually mention or refer to sexual assault at all. Moreover, although CPS did not object to this aspect of Sklenar and Connolly's testimony, its admissibility is questionable because Jane Doe did not establish a foundation for Sklenar's or Connolly's testimony that the prevention of teacher-onstudent sexual assault was one of the goals that motivated CPS to promulgate the transportation policy.

¶ 49 Foundation is the cornerstone of admissibility. See Ill. Rs. Evid. 701 (lay witnesses) ("If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness * * *."), 703 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (expert witnesses) ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing."). Sklenar was a school clerk at Ashburn. She was not an administrator at CPS, and she never said that she had a role drafting or promulgating the transportation policy or that she had otherwise acquired firsthand knowledge of what transpired during the CPS proceeding wherein the policy was adopted. The same is true for Connolly, Jane Doe's expert. Although an expert witness is entitled to testify to his or her opinion so long as the opinion is made to a reasonable degree of certainty in the expert's chosen field, experts, like their lay counterparts, are nevertheless prohibited from engaging in guesswork or conjecture. See Ill. R. Evid. 703 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) ; Kinsey v. Scott , 124 Ill. App. 3d 329, 340, 79 Ill.Dec. 584, 463 N.E.2d 1359 (1984) ("An expert witness may not base his opinion upon conjecture, speculation, or a guess."). Here, Connolly did not even work for CPS, and like Sklenar, never testified to any facts or circumstances that could have established that she had knowledge, first-hand or otherwise, of CPS's motivations in promulgating the policy. Thus both Sklenar's and Connolly's testimony on this point was little more than an exercise in speculation. While CPS did not object to this testimony, a rational juror could have easily sensed the fragility of this testimony and simply afforded it no weight.

¶ 50 And even if the jury did credit this testimony, it would still not have been enough to establish willful and wanton conduct by CPS. In application, the "generally associated" inquiry boils down to whether the action at issue was inherently or obviously dangerous. Our supreme court's recent opinion in Barr is instructive on this point. In Barr , the plaintiff sued his gym teacher and school board after he suffered an eye injury while playing floor hockey during gym class. 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 3, 417 Ill.Dec. 667, 89 N.E.3d 315. The plaintiff alleged that the teacher engaged in willful and wanton conduct by failing to require the students to wear protective eyewear. Id. In the midst of trial, the circuit court entered a directed verdict in favor of both defendants. This court reversed, reasoning that the teacher's failure to require protective eyewear could be considered by a jury as evidence of willful and wanton conduct. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 51 The supreme court disagreed with this result. The court began its analysis by discussing Murray v. Chicago Youth Center , 224 Ill. 2d 213, 309 Ill.Dec. 310, 864 N.E.2d 176 (2007), and Hadley v. Witt Unit School District 66 , 123 Ill. App. 3d 19, 78 Ill.Dec. 758, 462 N.E.2d 877 (1984), two cases where the plaintiff produced enough evidence to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the "generally associated" inquiry.

Barr , 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 21, 417 Ill.Dec. 667, 89 N.E.3d 315. In Murray , a student suffered a severe spinal injury while using a trampoline during an extracurricular activity. Murray , 224 Ill. 2d at 246, 309 Ill.Dec. 310, 864 N.E.2d 176. The court found that "the defendants' failure to take adequate safety precautions in light of their knowledge of the inherent dangers of the activity raised genuine issues of material fact on the question of willful and wanton conduct." (Emphasis added.) Barr , 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 21, 417 Ill.Dec. 667, 89 N.E.3d 315 (citing Murray , 224 Ill. 2d at 246, 309 Ill.Dec. 310, 864 N.E.2d 176 ). In Hadley , a student was injured in an industrial arts class. The evidence showed that the injured student and three friends "attempted to pound a piece of scrap metal through a hole in an anvil," that the student's teacher "observed the boys' activity but did not tell them to stop or instruct them to put on safety goggles," and that "[a]fter about 20 minutes, a metal chip flew into plaintiff's eye, causing trauma and visual impairment." Id. at 22, 78 Ill.Dec. 758, 462 N.E.2d 877 (citing Hadley , 123 Ill. App. 3d at 20, 78 Ill.Dec. 758, 462 N.E.2d 877 ). A panel of this court "held that the teacher's failure to act after observing the students engaging in a 'dangerous activity' could constitute willful and wanton conduct." Id.

¶ 52 The Barr court then drew a distinction between the evidence the plaintiff introduced at trial and the facts of Murray and Hadley . It explained:

"In contrast to Murray and Hadley , there was no evidence presented at trial that floor hockey played with plastic hockey sticks and squishy balls is an obviously dangerous activity. Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of any particular dangers associated with floor hockey that called for the use of protective eyewear by students. Thus, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that defendants knew or had reason to know that he could be seriously injured from playing floor hockey without safety goggles." Id . ¶ 23.

¶ 53 The evidence Jane Doe marshaled at trial in this case is similarly insufficient. Simply put, Jane Doe did not introduce any evidence whatsoever that could have established a causal link or relationship between (1) a school district allowing teachers to transport students in their personal vehicles and (2) teacher-on-student sexual assault, which thus put CPS on notice as to the danger J.E. was facing. Rather, her sole evidence on this point was Sklenar's and Connolly's testimony about why CPS promulgated the policy, which, as we explained, lacked foundation. Based on the evidence Jane Doe introduced at trial, a rational juror could have easily rejected the proposition that permitting a teacher to use his or her personal vehicle to transport a student to or from a school-approved event is necessarily or "generally associated" with teacher-on-student sexual assault.

¶ 54 Jane Doe fares no better on the second inquiry, i.e. , showing that CPS knew-merely because several of its employees were aware that J.E. was receiving rides from Bridgeforth-that J.E. was under an impending danger of sexual assault. Once again, Barr is instructive. In Barr , the court faulted the plaintiff for failing to introduce evidence showing that the defendants "were aware of facts which would have put a reasonable person on notice of the risk of serious harm from the activity." Id. ¶ 24. Here, Jane Doe proved at best that CPS knew Bridgeforth was violating the transportation policy by giving J.E. rides in his private vehicle without written permission from Diaz and Jane Doe. But the record contains no support for Jane Doe's conclusion that that evidence was sufficient to prove that CPS was on notice that J.E. faced an impending danger of sexual assault from Bridgeforth.

¶ 55 In fact, the evidence at trial proved the exact opposite, namely that no one at Ashburn had any reason whatsoever to suspect that J.E. was not safe with Bridgeforth. Virtually every CPS employee who testified at trial stated one way or another that Bridgeforth's behavior did not display any red flags that could have "disclose[d] * * * to any reasonable man" the danger which J.E. was facing. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id . ¶ 20 (quoting Burke , 148 Ill. 2d at 449, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522 ); see id. ¶ 24 (willful and wanton conduct requires proof that the "defendants were aware of facts which would have put a reasonable person on notice of the risk of serious harm from the activity"). Sklenar stated that she "did not" have any reason to suspect Bridgeforth and that, if she did, "it would have been addressed immediately." Rippy, who was a friend of Jane Doe, testified that there were was nothing about Bridgeforth that stood out as something she "should have caught in hindsight." Martin, who coached football with Bridgeforth, testified that Bridgeforth never did or said anything that raised a "red flag about what happened to [J.E.]" Similarly, Richardson testified that there were no "red flags" with Bridgeforth, and she stated that she was "literally stunned" when she found out what happened because she "had no idea that [Bridgeforth] was the type of person that was working at the school to do something to [J.E.]" Likewise, McKay-the teacher J.E. sought out during the June 6 meeting-testified that "there were no red flags," "there was nothing I could have done," and that Bridgeforth was the real culprit and that there was nothing she or anyone else at Ashburn could have done to prevent Bridgeforth from abusing J.E. Diaz, for her part, testified that (1) she never heard Bridgeforth say anything lewd, sexual, or inappropriate, (2) she never disciplined Bridgeforth, and (3) she was unaware that Bridgeforth and J.E. had exchanged phone numbers. Even Jane Doe testified that she "never had any suspicion" about Bridgeforth and that she would have given Bridgeforth permission to drive J.E. had he formally requested it.

¶ 56 The bottom line is this: willful and wanton conduct "requires a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id . ¶ 20. Jane Doe never introduced any evidence that could have proven that anyone at CPS (1) knew J.E. was in serious danger of being sexually assaulted because Bridgeforth was transporting her in his personal vehicle or (2) knew of facts that would have disclosed that danger. Simply put, at trial Jane Doe failed to establish why anyone at CPS should have been able to deduce that Bridgeforth would sexually assault J.E. simply by knowing he was giving her rides in his personal vehicle. Thus, a rational jury could have found against Jane Doe on her willful and wanton conduct claim. The circuit court correctly denied Jane Doe's motion for judgment n.o.v. on her willful and wanton conduct claim against CPS.

¶ 57 Although it was a prominent feature of Jane Doe's theory of the case, the fact that CPS violated the transportation policy when Bridgeforth gave J.E. rides does not compel us to reach a different conclusion. It is well established that "a public entity's violation of its own internal rules does not constitute proof of negligence, much less willful and wanton conduct." Floyd v. Rockford Park District , 355 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702, 291 Ill.Dec. 418, 823 N.E.2d 1004 (2005) ; see Young v. Forgas , 308 Ill. App. 3d 553, 566, 241 Ill.Dec. 905, 720 N.E.2d 360 (1999) ("Internal rules and procedures * * * do not impose a legal duty upon municipal entities and their employees."). And even if evidence the policy was violated could be used to support Jane Doe's claim, she would still not be entitled to judgment n.o.v. At trial, Jane Doe's evidence that the policy violation caused J.E.'s injury came in through Connolly, who testified that CPS "blatantly ignored the safety of [J.E.]" when its agents observed her in Bridgeforth's vehicle in violation of the policy and did nothing to investigate or intervene. But that testimony could not have advanced Jane Doe's claim. "Willful and wanton" denotes "a range of mental states , from actual or deliberate intent to cause harm, to conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property, to utter indifference for the safety or property of others." (Emphasis added.) Harris v. Thompson , 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 41, 364 Ill.Dec. 436, 976 N.E.2d 999. Connolly's testimony that CPS "blatantly" disregarded J.E.'s safety did not fall within any of the mental states embodied in the definition of willful and wanton conduct. Indeed, "blatantly" is not even a mental state.

¶ 58 II. New Trial: Verdict Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

¶ 59 We next consider Jane Doe's argument that she is entitled to a new trial because the jury's verdict in favor of CPS on her willful and wanton conduct claim was against the manifest weight of the evidence. " '[O]n a motion for a new trial a court will weigh the evidence and set aside the verdict and order a new trial if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.' " Maple v. Gustafson , 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508 (1992) (quoting Mizowek v. De Franco , 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310, 1 Ill.Dec. 32, 356 N.E.2d 32 (1976) ). "A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence." Wardwell v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 2017 IL 120438, ¶ 11, 417 Ill.Dec. 620, 88 N.E.3d 772. "[T]he determination of whether a new trial should be granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be reversed unless it reflects an abuse of that discretion." Redmond v. Socha , 216 Ill. 2d 622, 651, 297 Ill.Dec. 432, 837 N.E.2d 883 (2005).

¶ 60 Jane Doe maintains that CPS "admitted" that it engaged in willful and wanton conduct and that a verdict in her favor was "evident." We disagree. As we explained, Jane Doe never introduced any evidence to establish that (1) CPS's act of permitting Bridgeforth to drive J.E. in his personal vehicle was generally associated with a risk of sexual assault or (2) CPS was aware, by virtue of knowing that Bridgeforth was giving J.E. rides, that J.E. faced an impending danger of being sexually assaulted. To the contrary, essentially every CPS employee who testified at trial testified that Bridgeforth's behavior did not manifest any warning signs that could, or should, have led anyone at Ashburn to believe that he was a pedophile with whom J.E.'s safety should not have been entrusted.

¶ 61 Moreover, for all that was made of the fact that several CPS employees saw J.E. in Bridgeforth's vehicle in violation of the transportation policy, that evidence was effectively nullified by Jane Doe herself. At trial, Jane Doe testified that she had no reason to suspect Bridgeforth, and she even testified that, had she been asked, she actually would have given explicit permission to Bridgeforth to drive J.E. In light of that testimony, the jury could have concluded that the fact CPS

violated its transportation policy was irrelevant, since it was known that Jane Doe would have ultimately given Bridgeforth permission if it had been requested. In essence, this testimony severed whatever causal link existed between the policy violation and J.E.'s injury. If Jane Doe would have given Bridgeforth permission to drive J.E. if he had asked, then the policy violations could not have caused J.E.'s injury. Either way, permission or no permission, J.E. would have ended up in Bridgeforth's car. We thus disagree with Jane Doe's assertion that a verdict in her favor was "evident."

¶ 62 III. New Trial: Improper Closing Argument

¶ 63 We next consider Jane Doe's argument that she is entitled to a new trial because CPS's attorney misstated the law during closing argument. " 'A new trial is not warranted based on an improper opening statement or closing argument unless, when the trial is viewed in its entirety, the argument resulted in substantial prejudice to the losing party or rose to the level of preventing a fair trial. [Citations.] Errors in opening statements or closing argument must result in substantial prejudice such that the result would have been different absent the complained-of remark before reversal is required. [Citations.]' " (Emphases in original.) Parsons v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. , 2017 IL App (1st) 161384, ¶ 57, 417 Ill.Dec. 404, 88 N.E.3d 45 (quoting Davis v. City of Chicago , 2014 IL App (1st) 122427, ¶ 84, 380 Ill.Dec. 189, 8 N.E.3d 120 ).

¶ 64 Jane Doe contends that during CPS's closing argument, its attorney incorrectly argued to the jury that Jane Doe had to show that CPS acted intentionally. We need not consider the propriety of counsel's remark because, based on our review of the record, it cannot be credibly suggested that this statement impacted the outcome of the case. First, given the lack of evidence supporting the willful and wanton conduct claim, it is simply not possible that the jury would have returned a verdict in Jane Doe's favor had the challenged remark not been uttered. Moreover, even though Jane Doe's objection was overruled, CPS's attorney immediately corrected himself after Jane Doe objected and conveyed the correct definition of willful and wanton conduct to the jury. See Lagoni v. Holiday Inn Midway , 262 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1035, 200 Ill.Dec. 283, 635 N.E.2d 622 (1994) (rejecting argument that a defense attorney's misstatement of a witness's testimony prejudiced the plaintiff because the misstatement "was immediately objected to and corrected by defense counsel"); People v. Boyd , 87 Ill. App. 3d 978, 985, 42 Ill.Dec. 777, 409 N.E.2d 392 (1980) (rejecting new trial claim due to prosecution's misstatement of the law where "the prosecutor immediately corrected himself in the next sentence"). Moreover, Jane Doe's attorney conveyed the correct standard to the jury during her closing argument, and during her rebuttal argument, her attorney expressly stated, "[w]e don't have to prove it's intentional," thereby curing any error. Bruske v. Arnold , 44 Ill. 2d 132, 138, 254 N.E.2d 453 (1969) ; see Wilson v. Humana Hospital , 399 Ill. App. 3d 751, 759, 339 Ill.Dec. 346, 926 N.E.2d 821 (2010). Any error was further cured by the circuit court, which, following closing arguments, instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence and tendered an instruction containing the correct definition of willful and wanton conduct. See Lecroy v. Miller , 272 Ill. App. 3d 925, 933, 209 Ill.Dec. 439, 651 N.E.2d 617 (1995). Under these circumstances, no reversible error occurred.

¶ 65 IV. New Trial: Improper Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms

¶ 66 We next consider Jane Doe's argument that she is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court tendered instructions and verdict forms that were confusing and misstated the law. Specifically, she contends that the court erred by tendering IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 and verdict forms B and C. "Whenever an IPI instruction is applicable in a civil case, the trial court, giving due consideration to the facts and the prevailing law, is required to use that instruction." Hobart v. Shin , 185 Ill. 2d 283, 294, 235 Ill.Dec. 724, 705 N.E.2d 907 (1998) ; see Ill. S. Ct. R. 239(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). "Generally, a trial court's decision to grant or deny an instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Studt v. Sherman Health Systems , 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 13, 351 Ill.Dec. 467, 951 N.E.2d 1131. "The standard for determining an abuse of discretion is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions are sufficiently clear so as not to mislead and whether they fairly and correctly state the law." Dillon v. Evanston Hospital , 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505, 264 Ill.Dec. 653, 771 N.E.2d 357 (2002). However, when the issue is whether the instructions accurately stated the law, our review is de novo. Studt , 2011 IL 108182, ¶¶ 13, 351 Ill.Dec. 467, 951 N.E.2d 1131. In either case, "[a] reviewing court ordinarily will not reverse a trial court for giving faulty instructions unless they clearly misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the appellant." Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp. , 201 Ill. 2d 260, 274, 266 Ill.Dec. 892, 775 N.E.2d 964 (2002).

¶ 67 We begin with IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01. Jane Doe maintains that IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 was "unnecessary and confusing." However, her appellate brief fails to argue that IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 inaccurately stated the law or had the effect of rendering the instructions inaccurate as a whole. To compound matters, aside from some basic citations laying out our standard of review, Jane Doe did not cite a single case supporting her claim until her reply brief, at which point she directs our attention to Misch v. Meadows Mennonite Home , 114 Ill. App. 3d 792, 70 Ill.Dec. 754, 449 N.E.2d 1358 (1983), and Mileur v. Briggerman , 110 Ill. App. 3d 721, 66 Ill.Dec. 443, 442 N.E.2d 1356 (1982). By proceeding in this manner, Jane Doe denied CPS its rightful opportunity to respond to her argument, and she denied this court the benefit of two carefully thought-out arguments. Nonetheless, we have considered Misch and Mileur , and find that neither case supports Jane Doe's argument.

¶ 68 With respect to Misch , Jane Doe's reply brief highlights a passage in the court's opinion describing IPI Civil No. 36.01 as " 'reiterative and rather meaningless,' " and directing that it " 'be used sparingly.' " (quoting Misch , 114 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 70 Ill.Dec. 754, 449 N.E.2d 1358 ). Jane Doe fails to mention, however, that the court in Misch rejected the plaintiff's argument that the circuit court erred by tendering IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01. Worse still, Jane Doe's reply brief contains only a partial quotation of the court's ultimate disposition of the IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 issue; in full, the court said, "[t]he instruction is still proper , although it is reiterative and rather meaningless, and so should be used sparingly." (Emphasis added.) Misch , 114 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 70 Ill.Dec. 754, 449 N.E.2d 1358. And in any event, Misch's admonition against using IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 is meaningless in light of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a), which mandates the use in civil cases of all pattern instructions that are on-point and accurate statements of the law. Ill. S. Ct. R. 239(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013).

¶ 69 Jane Doe's reliance on Mileur is similarly misplaced. In Mileur , the plaintiff sued the defendant for personal injuries sustained during a hunting accident. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $2700.89 and determined that the plaintiff was 50% at fault for his injuries. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the circuit court erroneously tendered IPI Civil No. 36.01 because there was no evidence to justify it. This court agreed, stating, "based on the evidence the jury could not decide the issue of liability in defendant's favor, and the trial court, therefore, erred in giving this instruction." Mileur , 110 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 66 Ill.Dec. 443, 442 N.E.2d 1356.

¶ 70 Attempting to draw a parallel between Mileur and the present case, Jane Doe emphasizes that "the jury could not have found in Defendant Bridgeforth's favor or against him on liability. The issue was already determined." But that misses the point. CPS propounded IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 to protect its interests, not Bridgeforth's. Regardless of whether Bridgeforth's liability had been established, CPS's liability was still undetermined.

¶ 71 Elsewhere, Jane Doe in her appellate brief appears to suggest that IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 somehow led the jury astray when it came time to apportion damages against Bridgeforth. That seems implausible, given that IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 does not mention Bridgeforth. And if IPI Civil (2011) No. 36.01 did confuse the jury, that confusion could have lasted only so long as it took the jury to finish reading IPI Civil (2011) No. 41.03, which stated:

"The rights of the defendants Board of Education of the City of Chicago and Idris Bridgeforth are separate and distinct. Each is entitled to a fair consideration of his own defense and you will decide each defendant's case separately as if it were a separate lawsuit. Each defendant's case must be governed by the instructions applicable to that case."

¶ 72 We next turn our attention to Jane Doe's complaint regarding the court's decision to tender, over her objection, verdict forms B and C. Jane Doe maintains that "everything the jury could have lawfully decided, and even not lawfully decided as the jurors ended up doing, was accounted for on Verdict Form A. Because all of the Jury's findings could have been accounted for on a single verdict form, the use of multiple verdict forms was confusing, prejudicial, and ultimately led to a legally deficient verdict."

¶ 73 We disagree with this argument insofar as it pertains to verdict form B. Though it was perhaps duplicative of verdict form A in some respects, Jane Doe has nonetheless not explained why verdict form B was confusing. Nor has she attempted to explain how verdict form B rendered the instructions confusing and inaccurate in their totality. Jane Doe suggests that the jury's confusion was evidenced by the fact that one juror had difficulty answering the court's question when the jury was polled. Yet if anything, the record suggests that, rather than expressing reservations about the verdict, the juror was simply confused by the court's question. This seems apparent to us given that, once the court clarified what each component of the polling question meant, the juror answered, "yes." We find no error in the court's decision to tender verdict form B to the jury.

¶ 74 Verdict form C is a different matter. Jane Doe maintains that verdict form C was improper because "[t]he jury in reality could not find for Defendant Bridgeforth; it was a legal impossibility." This argument is well taken. Damages-in the sense of a manifested physical injury-are not an element of the tort of battery. See Cohen v. Smith , 269 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1091, 207 Ill.Dec. 873, 648 N.E.2d 329 (1995). Thus, once the court told the jury that Bridgeforth had been found "liable," there was no way the jury could have legally awarded zero damages against him. Because verdict form C permitted the jury to do something the law did not allow and the jury did that very thing, we find that the court's decision to tender verdict form C prejudiced Jane Doe in her claim against Bridgeforth. As a result, we find that Jane Doe is entitled to a new trial against Bridgeforth on all three categories of damages she requested.

¶ 75 V. New Trial: Damages

¶ 76 Jane Doe also argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the jury ignored proven elements of damages. Technically, our finding that Jane Doe is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court improperly tendered verdict form C to the jury renders this issue moot. Upon retrial, Jane Doe will have the opportunity to once again present evidence to substantiate her claimed damages. That fact notwithstanding, due to the possibility that the same problem will arise upon retrial, we believe that interests of justice and judicial economy warrant discussion of one aspect of this issue: Jane Doe's claim for damages for pain and suffering.

¶ 77 It is well established that "[t]he determination of damages is a question of fact that is within the discretion of the jury." Snover v. McGraw , 172 Ill. 2d 438, 447, 217 Ill.Dec. 734, 667 N.E.2d 1310 (1996). It is equally clear from the case law that this court will not disturb a jury's decision to award (or not award) damages "unless a proven element of damages was ignored, the verdict resulted from passion or prejudice, or the award bears no reasonable relationship to the loss suffered." Gill v. Foster , 157 Ill. 2d 304, 315, 193 Ill.Dec. 157, 626 N.E.2d 190 (1993).

¶ 78 With respect to damages for pain and suffering, the supreme court has explained:

"In cases in which a plaintiff's evidence of injury is primarily subjective in nature and not accompanied by objective symptoms, the jury may choose to disbelieve the plaintiff's testimony as to pain. In such a circumstance, the jury may reasonably find the plaintiff's evidence of pain and suffering to be unconvincing." Snover , 172 Ill. 2d at 449, 217 Ill.Dec. 734, 667 N.E.2d 1310.

¶ 79 At first blush, that seems to describe this case in a nutshell: J.E. testified to her subjective feeling that Bridgeforth caused her to experience pain (she said it hurt when he put his finger in her vagina), but she had no objective evidence, like a hospital bill or doctor's note memorializing a course of treatment, to substantiate that claim. So it would be appear that, under Snover , the jury was free to accept or, as it did in this case, reject J.E.'s testimony.

¶ 80 Yet we do not think the matter is so simple. First, the plaintiff in Snover did not bring a claim for sexual battery. Rather, Snover was a personal injury lawsuit following an automobile accident. More to the point, in Snover , the court pinned its analysis on the possibility that "the jury * * * simply concluded [the plaintiff] suffered only minor injury and awarded damages accordingly." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 448, 217 Ill.Dec. 734, 667 N.E.2d 1310.

¶ 81 In line with that holding, at oral argument, CPS's attorney urged this court to deem the injury J.E. suffered when Bridgeforth violated her legally "de minimis ." That invitation is easily rejected. In truth, the fact that the Snover plaintiff's injury was capable of being described as "only minor" sets this case and Snover worlds apart. At least insofar as pain and suffering is concerned, the harm visited upon a person by virtue of being sexually assaulted can never be characterized as de minimis . There is no doubt that the minor victim in this case was harmed by the sexual abuse visited upon her by Bridgeforth.

¶ 82 Snover itself does not require a different result. As we mentioned, Snover involved a more benign set of facts-a car accident-rather than a sexual assault. The harm that results from a sexual assault is categorically distinct from other more common forms of personal injury. A car accident may cause physical injury, but a sexual assault is an affront to the victim's personal dignity and autonomy; the injury is deep-felt and intrinsic.

¶ 83 The practical reality that would result from holding sexual assault victims to the Snover standard provides further counsel against applying Snover to cases like the one before us. Snover contemplates a world in which the plaintiff's injury is susceptible to objective verification. This normally occurs through testimony from a medical professional about the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries and course of treatment. That is fine and well for car crashes, slip-and-falls, and workplace mishaps, but sexual assault is different. Applying Snover to sexual assault cases would ignore the fact that not all sexual battery cases will present the sort of objectively verifiable physical injury contemplated by Snover . Some victims do not report until long after they were assaulted. Some victims will simply not bear the sort of physical indicia of injury Snover demands. Indeed, under Snover , only victims who suffered brutal attacks causing a manifestation of serious, latent, and objectively verifiable physical injuries would be able to recover damages for pain and suffering. That cannot be the correct result, and we seriously doubt that the supreme court intended that outcome in cases such as this when it decided Snover . We therefore decline to apply Snover here.

¶ 84 Instead, we hold that, in tort cases in which the plaintiff proves that he or she was sexually assaulted by the defendant, testimony by the plaintiff that the act constituting sexual assault caused the plaintiff to experience physical pain is, absent evidence to the contrary, sufficient evidence to necessitate an award of damages for pain and suffering.

¶ 85 With this guidance in hand, we remand this case to the circuit court for a new trial, solely against Bridgeforth, on the issue of damages.

¶ 86 CONCLUSION

¶ 87 The circuit court's order denying Jane Doe's motion for judgment n.o.v. on her willful and wanton conduct claim against CPS is affirmed. The circuit court's order denying Jane Doe's motion for new trial is reversed with respect to her damages claim against Bridgeforth and is affirmed in all other respects. The case is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial, solely against Bridgeforth, on the issue of damages.

¶ 88 Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.

Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      In the criminal case, this court referred to Doe Child as "J.E." For consistency, we will refer hereinafter to her in the same manner.

      At trial, Connolly testified that to prepare her opinions, she reviewed CPS's policies, unspecified depositions, and some unidentified "supplemental materials."


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl REDMOND, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 1-15-1188
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.
    March 12, 2018
    Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Michael H. Orenstein, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE SIMON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Carl Redmond, arrested and charged in a domestic battery case for the third time, argues that his conviction should be overturned because the trial court failed to adequately warn him about proceeding without an attorney. After rejecting the services of at least six attorneys over a 17-month period and after being encouraged by the trial judge a dozen times to accept the services of an attorney, defendant indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se . He was tried by a jury, found guilty, and sentenced to 364 days in jail.

¶ 2 Now, defendant argues for the first time that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court did not specifically tell him the sentencing range for misdemeanor domestic battery at the time he made his waiver as is called for by the Illinois Supreme Court rule governing waiver of counsel. Defendant also argues that the State made improper comments during trial and committed other misconduct such that he did not receive a fair trial. We affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant Carl Redmond was arrested and charged with misdemeanor battery based on a complaint from his then-girlfriend, Paris Clark, that she had been abused multiple times during their months-long relationship. Based on Clark's testimony at trial, on one occasion, beginning July 5, 2013, defendant drove up to her while she was near Pullman Park and forced her into his car. He threatened to kill her and forced her to perform oral sex. She bit him, and they began to fight. Defendant elbowed her so hard that she was knocked unconscious until the next morning.

¶ 5 Clark's testimony continued from the time she woke up the next morning. She testified that she and defendant were still in the car. Defendant then drove the two of them to a motel where defendant removed her clothes and had forced sex with her. Afterwards, for three hours, defendant choked her, beat her, and accused her of sleeping with other people. When Clark tried to fight back, defendant took her to the motel room's bathroom and forced her head under water for a minute. Defendant then took all of Clark's clothes and her ID, keys, and cell phone, and he left the motel room indicating that he was going to make her smoke crack cocaine when he returned with it.

¶ 6 Clark testified that when she saw defendant's car pull away, she left the room completely naked and crying. A stranger at the motel gave her a sheet to cover up and offered to let her use his room for a few hours. She accepted the offer, and the stranger left. The stranger returned a few hours later with some clothes for her and drove her to her mother's house. She never told the stranger what had happened nor did she find out the person's identity. Clark's mother took her to the hospital, and someone at the hospital called the police. Clark had a swollen face and bruises all over her arms, legs, and back. She later went to obtain an order of protection and to press charges against defendant. It was not the first time that something like that had happened.

¶ 7 The State presented other crimes evidence consisting of testimony from Clark about other times she was forced to perform sex acts and was physically abused. She testified about a day in March 2013 when defendant choked her and she scratched him in the midst of the attack. Defendant went and got an order of protection against her. She testified that three days later, defendant woke her up to try to have sex with her and accused her of cheating on him. He choked her, headbutted her, and then took her phone and left. Defendant was aggressive with her again just six days after that, slamming her against a wall and choking her.

¶ 8 Clark also testified about an incident in May 2013 where she and defendant got into a fight. He hit and choked her, and she fought back, scratching him. Defendant called the police, and she was arrested. She was acquitted at trial. Clark testified that in June 2013, defendant attacked her again, and she similarly fled the house naked. The neighbors and, eventually, the police intervened. Clark's daughter testified that she had witnessed the abuse and seen the resulting injuries on her mom during the time her mom was dating defendant.

¶ 9 Defendant was arrested and charged with domestic battery for the incident that happened on July 5, 2013. Defendant indicated at multiple times during the course of pretrial proceedings that he wanted to represent himself. He had a few private attorneys appear on his behalf, but they all withdrew from representation because defendant would not cooperate and did not pay them. Defendant also used multiple assistant public defenders.

¶ 10 The trial judge advised defendant several times during the course of pretrial proceedings about the disadvantages of proceeding pro se and that it might be a bad idea for him to represent himself. As far back as the bond hearing, defendant stated that "I understand the seriousness of this charge" and acknowledged that he was aware he was charged with domestic violence and that he had been charged with domestic violence twice before under accusations by previous girlfriends. As pretrial proceedings went on, the trial judge expressed apprehension about letting defendant proceed pro se based on some of defendant's filings with the court. The judge advised defendant that he had a right to an attorney and gave defendant several opportunities to consult and retain attorneys, but, after discussing the matter many times, defendant firmly indicated that he was sure that he wanted to represent himself. The trial court stated that "we have been through this before. You understand all the disadvantages of proceeding pro se?" Defendant confirmed that he wanted to represent himself.

¶ 11 The case went to trial, and defendant was convicted by a jury. He was sentenced to 364 days in jail. Defendant, now with counsel, appeals. He argues that the trial court failed to give him the proper admonishments when he waived his right to counsel, such that his waiver cannot be considered knowing and voluntary. He also argues that, even though he was representing himself and did not object to the now-asserted issues, he did not receive a fair trial because the State presented "an inflammatory opening statement and unsupported closing argument."

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Defendant, as he concedes, failed to preserve any of the now-claimed errors for review. He made no objection to the admonishments he received after he requested that his attorney be removed and that he be permitted to represent himself. He made no objection in a posttrial motion, even though he did file a posttrial motion. Accordingly defendant's claims on appeal are forfeited. People v. Piatkowski , 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403 (2007) (issues not raised at trial or in a posttrial motion are not preserved for review and are forfeited).

¶ 14 Defendant nonetheless claims he is entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. Under plain error review, we will grant relief to a defendant on otherwise forfeited issues in either of two circumstances: (1) if the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant or (2) if the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005).

¶ 15 The plain error doctrine is not a general savings clause preserving all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court. People v. Gray , 215 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1050, 159 Ill.Dec. 508, 576 N.E.2d 177 (1991). Rather, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule and its purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 177, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467. Accordingly, we will review defendant's unpreserved challenge under the plain error doctrine. See People v. West , 2017 IL App (1st) 143632, ¶ 11, 410 Ill.Dec. 644, 70 N.E.3d 771.

¶ 16 Defendant's predominate claim on appeal is that the trial court did not substantially comply with the Illinois Supreme Court rule governing a defendant's waiver of counsel. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984) provides the requirements that a trial court must follow before accepting a defendant's waiver of counsel.

"Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).

¶ 17 The purpose of the waiver of counsel rule is to ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and voluntarily made. People v. Haynes , 174 Ill. 2d 204, 241, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318 (1996). Each determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. People v. Baez , 241 Ill. 2d 44, 116, 349 Ill.Dec. 165, 946 N.E.2d 359 (2011). Strict, technical compliance with the waiver of counsel rule is not always required. Haynes , 174 Ill. 2d at 236, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318. Substantial compliance is sufficient for a valid waiver of counsel if the record indicates that (1) the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily and (2) the trial court's admonishment did not prejudice the defendant's rights. Id. Although the court may consider a defendant's decision to represent himself unwise, a defendant's knowing and intelligent election to represent himself must be honored. Id. at 235, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318.

¶ 18 Defendant cannot make out a claim for relief on review because the record shows that his waiver was given freely and voluntarily and because he was not prejudiced by any error the trial court made. Defendant's own statements and conduct throughout the pretrial proceedings, trial, and in posttrial proceedings stand in stark contrast to his newfangled and transparent claim that he did not freely and voluntarily waive his right to counsel or that he was prejudiced by not having the technically-proper admonitions.

¶ 19 As early as his bond hearing, defendant indicated that he wanted to represent himself. He then volunteered to the court, expressly against the advice of his appointed attorney, that "I understand the seriousness of this charge." He went on to volunteer that he understood the seriousness because he had been charged with the same domestic violence charge two other times by girlfriends. Defendant also indicated that he had filed a complaint against Paris Clark for domestic violence against him, acknowledging that he was familiar with what the charge entailed. Soon after the bond hearing, defendant wrote a letter to the then-state's attorney referencing this case and again acknowledging that he knew the nature of the charge, stating that "I was charged with a domestic battery against Paris Clark" and again addressing the pendency of his own claim of domestic battery against Clark.

¶ 20 As the case moved on, defendant appeared with multiple private attorneys, but they all quickly withdrew because defendant refused to cooperate with them. At one of the many status conferences where defendant stated that he wanted to represent himself, the trial judge asked him, "you know it's not a good idea to represent yourself. Right? * * * You're going up against prosecutors that do this every day and who went to law school and know the law and the rules of evidence. * * * You should try and hire a lawyer. You had a lawyer at some point here." Defendant insisted that he was not even going to try to hire a lawyer.

¶ 21 The trial court went on to warn defendant about the potential pitfalls of going to trial without a lawyer. Defendant always indicated that he was aware of what proceeding pro se would mean. Defendant cycled through private attorneys and assistant public defenders with the trial court continuing to warn him about the downside of self-representation and encouraging him to accept or hire an attorney, giving him extensions to do so. Even when the judge warned defendant that some of the things he was doing gave the court pause as to whether it was wise for defendant to represent himself and entered a continuance expressly for defendant to consider self-representation, defendant shrugged off the warnings and pressed on not cooperating with attorneys and proclaiming that he wanted to represent himself.

¶ 22 After being arrested again for violating an order of protection, defendant was still unmoved, stating of his appointed attorney, "He has not [gone] over discovery with me. I don't think a lawyer should represent me." The trial court even made overtures to defendant after he continued to appear at status conferences without an attorney that the court would reappoint one of the assistant public defenders he had rejected even though his bond technically disqualified him from the right to representation by a public defender. All of this went on for 17 months and at least 18 court appearances. Defendant was represented by or consulted with something like 9 different attorneys on his case. The trial court offered defendant very generous extensions and gave defendant a dozen opportunities to retain counsel when defendant expressed unhappiness with his own.

¶ 23 Finally, on January 5, 2015, defendant stated, "Your honor, I have decided, under the circumstances, to proceed myself. * * * I have decided to proceed pro se." The trial court responded, "Okay Mr. Redmond. We have been through this before. You understand all the disadvantages of proceeding pro se? Obviously you're not a lawyer." The trial court continued, "You're going against people that have been to law school and know legal procedure and legal rules. You understand all that correct?" Defendant responded, "Yes." The trial court countered, "Okay, but you still want to represent yourself?" Defendant said, "Yes. I have no choice." The trial court reiterated, "Well, you do have a choice, Mr. Redmond. You can hire an attorney or represent yourself, which is what I asked you to decide by today. Is it your choice to represent yourself?" To which defendant replied, "That's the decision." The trial court accepted the decision and set the case for trial.

¶ 24 Now going back to the requirements under Rule 401(a), compliance with the rule requires that defendant be advised of and understand (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the sentence range, including the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected due to other convictions; and (3) the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed due to indigency. Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). As stated above (supra ¶ 19), the record makes clear that defendant knew the nature of the charge against him. Defendant does not argue to the contrary. In addition, defendant was told multiple times, including at the time of making the waiver that he had a right to counsel. When defendant said he had "no choice" other than self representation, the trial court made clear that there was another choice-having an attorney. The trial court indulged every reasonable opportunity to get defendant representation, and defendant refused. He refused the services of six attorneys that were willing to represent him. So we are only left with paragraph 2 of Rule 401(a) -requiring the trial court to disclose the possible sentencing range.

¶ 25 Defendant argues that his waiver of counsel was ineffective because the trial court did not specifically advise him at the time he made his waiver about the possible penalty that could be imposed. However, we disagree that the absence of a specific admonition on the sentencing range warrants reversal here. Reversal for imperfect admonitions for waiver of counsel is not required when the omission "does not prejudice defendant because either: (1) the absence of a detail from the admonishments did not impede defendant from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver or (2) defendant possessed a degree of knowledge or sophistication that excused the lack of admonition." People v. Pike , 2016 IL App (1st) 122626, ¶ 112, 403 Ill.Dec. 93, 53 N.E.3d 147, appeal denied , No. 120864, 417 Ill.Dec. 842, 89 N.E.3d 761 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).

¶ 26 Here, it is clear that defendant knew what he was doing when he decided to represent himself. The trial court's omission does not render his waiver ineffective. Defendant had represented himself before so he knew all the potential pitfalls of doing so. Defendant not only had significant experience with the court system from his earlier first degree murder conviction, he had significant experience with this very charge because it was his third time charged with this very offense. See People v. Redd , 173 Ill. 2d 1, 22, 218 Ill.Dec. 861, 670 N.E.2d 583 (1996) (a defendant's extensive experience with the court system is one indication that he knows what proceeding without counsel means and that the waiver is knowing and voluntary).

¶ 27 Defendant's statements and conduct show that he possessed a high degree of knowledge about the charge against him so that the absence of the technical admonishment did not impede him from giving a knowing and voluntary waiver. Even at trial, in his opening statement, defendant told the jury he was charged with a misdemeanor. He knew what that entailed. He mentioned the misdemeanor nature of the charge at various other points. Defendant volunteered at his sentencing hearing that he knew and had done legal research on the sentencing range. In his motion for a new trial, still unrepresented, defendant advised the court that prosecutors offered him a plea deal before trial, but that he did not accept it because it was for the maximum sentence-one year in prison. So he admits he knew before trial that the maximum sentence was a year.

¶ 28 Defendant filed motions to compel discovery, established a comprehensible defense, did some effective cross-examination, and indicated that he had done legal research. He obviously thought he knew better than all of the lawyers he consulted with-he refused to agree with any of them on trial strategy and fired them for it. The trial judge even acknowledged defendant's acumen and praised his conduct in court.

"I find that you've shown me throughout the year and a half that you have been in my courtroom that you are a smart individual, through everything that you've said. And even through your attorneys and then at trial, I find that you represented yourself quite well Mr. Redmond. You did a very good job. You know, where it is that you learned it or how you learned it, I don't know. But you've conducted yourself appropriately. You filed motions, you've argued appropriately, you've represented yourself appropriately."

¶ 29 All of the foregoing shows that defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. The trial court's failure to specifically advise defendant of the possible sentencing range at the time he waived his right to counsel did not influence his decision to waive counsel. Defendant knew what he was doing and the ramifications. His argument, raised for the first time on appeal, seizing on the trial court's technical error is insufficient to entitle him to relief. A defendant's knowing and voluntary election to represent himself must be honored. Haynes , 174 Ill. 2d at 235, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318. On these facts, it is clear that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary and the error did not prejudice his rights.

¶ 30 Defendant also argues that the State improperly inflamed the jury through an argumentative opening and by using his trial strategy against him. These contentions are also forfeited because defendant did not object at trial nor did he include them in a posttrial motion. See Piatkowski , 225 Ill. 2d at 564, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403. We, accordingly, review for plain error. While the State has wide latitude in making opening statements and closing arguments and is entitled to comment on the evidence, comments intending only to arouse the prejudice and passion of the jury are improper. People v. Herndon , 2015 IL App (1st) 123375, ¶ 36, 394 Ill.Dec. 919, 37 N.E.3d 398.

¶ 31 Defendant posits that it was plain error for the State to say multiple times in its opening statement that defendant was "torturing" Paris Clark and that she was living a "nightmare." Defendant argues that the statements crossed the line into becoming argument and that they had the purpose of inflaming the jurors' passions. However, after reviewing the transcript of the opening statement, it is apparent that none of the comments were out of bounds. The State used some vivid imagery, but it was only to reference what it believed the evidence at trial would show. Clark, in fact, testified that she was "tortured." If believed, her experiences can be fairly characterized as a nightmare. There was nothing improper about the State's opening statement. It was merely the State's characterization of the evidence that it believed would follow-testimony from Clark about multiple acts of violence and sexual violence inflicted on her.

¶ 32 Defendant also argues that it was plain error for the State to conduct "a mini-trial of uncharged acts, painting Redmond as a repeat rapist." However, the uncharged acts defendant alludes to were introduced as other crimes evidence. The comments made by the State were supported by Clark's testimony. Defendant never objected, and he had the opportunity to counter everything said by the State. The State did not spend an inordinate amount of time commenting on the uncharged acts so as to bias defendant in a way that he did not receive a fair trial.

¶ 33 Defendant maintains that it was plain error for the State to argue matters that he claims were unsupported by evidence and by using defendant's trial strategy against him. The State referenced "hundreds of reports" that Clark had made against defendant, when in fact the police officer testified that Clark had made out "several police reports naming [defendant] as an offender." It is true that the testimony did not match the State's proffered description, but the exaggeration does not constitute plain error. See People v. Banks , 237 Ill. 2d 154, 183, 343 Ill.Dec. 111, 934 N.E.2d 435 (2010) ("The wide latitude extended to prosecutors during their closing remarks has been held to include some degree of both sarcasm and invective to express their points.").

¶ 34 Defendant also complains that the State acted improperly when it declared that

"the State called four witnesses yesterday, but I submit to you that there was really a fifth witness for the State, Carl Redmond. Through his arrogance, through his complete abuser personality and his cross-examination of Paris Clark who he continued to victimize while he cross-examined her. Carl Redmond was just another witness for the State really."

Defendant never objected and he had the opportunity to counter everything said by the State. In light of the entire record, this statement is not sufficiently prejudicial to be considered so serious that it affected the fairness of the trial or challenged the integrity of the judicial process. The record demonstrates that defendant had a fair trial, but that the jury credited some part of Clark's testimony despite defendant's efforts to convince them not to. Finding no plain error, the jury's verdict must stand.

¶ 35 CONCLUSION

¶ 36 Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

Presiding Justice Pierce and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.