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    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy J. STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.
    NO. 4-16-0138
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
    FILED November 20, 2018
    James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Gavin J. Dow, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Andrew L. Killian, State's Attorney, of Paxton (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Erin Wilson Laegeler, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In February 2015, the State charged defendant, Billy J. Stevens, with two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. In July 2015, the trial court conducted the first jury trial, which resulted in a deadlocked jury and a new trial. The second jury trial took place in October 2015. The jury found defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in (1) admonishing the prospective jurors pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012); (2) giving Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.01 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th); and (3) not giving IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.66. Additionally, defendant argues the State committed error by (1) improperly bolstering the credibility of the victim, M.S., through the testimony of a witness; (2) questioning defendant about M.S.'s motivation to lie; (3) asking the jury about the message its verdict would send; and (4) bringing up details not in evidence at trial during closing arguments. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Around November or December 2014, defendant was separated from his wife and was living in his mother's home. During that time, his daughter, M.S., born in 2003, went to visit him at this residence. One night, while M.S. was watching a movie in her cousin's room, she said defendant came in and hugged her. After hugging her, defendant put his hand in her vagina and then did the same with his penis. M.S. testified defendant had done this repeatedly throughout M.S.'s life since she was three or four. After the most recent occurrence in November or December 2014, M.S. told her school's social worker, who notified the guidance counselor and the police.

¶ 5 As a result, in February 2015, the State charged defendant by information with two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, alleging defendant, who was 17 years of age or older, committed an act of sexual penetration with M.S., who was under 13 years of age, in that defendant placed his penis (count I) and his finger (count II) in the vagina of M.S on or about November 2014 through December 2014 ( 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2014) ).

¶ 6 The first trial was conducted in July 2015 and resulted in a hung jury. Defendant was retried on the same charges in October 2015. At the second jury trial, the State called four witnesses, M.S., Kristina Schuler, Mary Bunyard, and Sergeant Chad Johnson. Defendant was the sole witness in his case-in-chief.

¶ 7 A. M.S.

¶ 8 M.S. testified in detail about the night she was at her grandmother's house and what her father did to her, stating she was 11 years old at the time. She described the house she lived in with her mother and brother as a two-story home, with her room being upstairs. She stated, on some occasions when she would fight with her mother, defendant would come to her room to calm her down and then molest her, which began around the age of three or four. After the most recent occurrence at her grandmother's house, M.S. told her school's social worker, Schuler.

¶ 9 B. Kristina Schuler

¶ 10 Schuler is the social worker at M.S.'s school and has served in that capacity for the past nine years. Schuler knew M.S. from working with her on an individualized education plan, beginning in August 2014. They would meet weekly for about 20 minutes each session. She described M.S. as "very quiet, very shy" when she first met her, but as the year progressed, M.S. became more comfortable. She also testified that as time went on she had to do less prodding to get information from M.S. and never had a problem with M.S. lying. On February 5, 2015, M.S. came to her regular session with Schuler and said she wanted to tell her and the school guidance counselor, "Mrs. Johnson," something. The guidance counselor was unavailable, so Schuler asked if M.S. wanted to just speak to her. M.S. said her father "sexually abused" her and touched her, pointing to her private area. Schuler did not ask any follow-up questions in order to avoid interfering with any criminal investigation and contacted "the authorities." She told M.S. she was sorry to hear about these allegations and she would contact people to make sure M.S. was safe.

¶ 11 C. Mary Bunyard

¶ 12 Bunyard is a forensic interviewer with the Children's Advocacy Center, where she has worked for two years. Prior to that, she was in law enforcement for 20 years, 10 years as a patrol officer and 10 years as a detective. She interviewed M.S. while representatives from the Department of Children and Family Services and law enforcement watched from another room. She testified that she asked mostly open-ended questions in the interview. The interview with M.S. was audio recorded and played to the jury as an exhibit during Bunyard's testimony. After playing the audio recording, the State asked where M.S. said she was touched, and Bunyard said M.S. indicated she was touched in her 'private area.'

¶ 13 D. Sergeant Chad Johnson

¶ 14 Sergeant Johnson is a sergeant with the Paxton Police Department and was the lead investigator in this case. He interviewed defendant and stated defendant would have been 34 years old at the time of the alleged conduct. In the interview, defendant denied the allegations but never said M.S. was lying. When asked if defendant had an explanation for the allegations, defendant referenced a conversation with his daughter about whether the new bras she bought with her mother fit, but he claimed he did not touch her. Sergeant Johnson also observed the interview with M.S. The details of her timeline and defendant's timeline were "right on track," meaning the timelines "were exactly the same."

¶ 15 E. Defendant

¶ 16 Defendant testified on his own behalf and stated he had been living with his mother for the past three months or so since he was separated from his wife. He testified about his convictions for theft and driving with a revoked license. He described his relationship with his daughter as good and said M.S. would come to him if she had problems. He described the family home before the separation as a two-story home where he and his wife shared a bedroom on the first floor and the two children each had their own bedroom on the second floor. He denied each of the specific allegations in his testimony. He also admitted, when M.S. came over to visit while defendant was living in his mother's home, they would sleep in the same room, with M.S. on one bed and defendant on another. He also admitted on cross-examination that he would go to M.S.'s room at times to calm her down. On cross-examination, he was unable to give any reason why his daughter was making up these "horrible accusations."

¶ 17 The jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 A. Voir Dire Admonishments

¶ 21 Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to properly inquire of the jury pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), commonly referred to as the four Zehr principles (see People v. Zehr , 103 Ill. 2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984) ). Specifically, defendant contends the court failed to ask prospective jurors whether they understood the State's burden of proof or that defendant was not required to present evidence. The State concedes error on this contention, and we accept the State's concession.

¶ 22 Rule 431(b) requires the trial court to ask each potential juror

"whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does not testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant's decision not to testify when the defendant objects." Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012).

"The language of Rule 431(b) is clear and unambiguous," mandating "a specific question and response process." People v. Thompson , 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607, 345 Ill.Dec. 560, 939 N.E.2d 403, 409-10 (2010). A trial court "must ask each potential juror whether he or she understands and accepts each of the principles in the rule," and "the rule requires an opportunity for a response from each prospective juror on their understanding and acceptance of those principles." Thompson , 238 Ill. 2d at 607, 345 Ill.Dec. 560, 939 N.E.2d 403. We review de novo whether the trial court followed Rule 431(b). People v. Wrencher , 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, ¶ 37, 355 Ill.Dec. 279, 959 N.E.2d 693.

¶ 23 Here, the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether they were "unable and unwilling to accept and embrace" that "all persons charged with a crime are presumed to be innocent." Second, it asked the jurors whether they were "unable or unwilling to accept or embrace and apply the principle" that "it is the burden of the State who has brought the charge to prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Regarding the third principle that "defendant has no obligation to testify on his own behalf," the court asked if anyone had "a problem with that principle." The court inquired whether any jurors had "a problem or cannot accept" the fourth principle concerning defendant having no obligation to call any witnesses or present any evidence in his defense. Later in voir dire , the court asked the jurors as a group, "[d]o you understand this is a criminal case and the Defendant is presumed innocent as he is charged?" The court followed up by asking, "You understand the Defendant in this case has a constitutional right to not testify? If in fact he does not testify that in anyway [sic ] cannot make any difference in you arriving at any decision you might make." The court failed to ask whether the jurors understood the State's burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that defendant was not required to offer any evidence on his behalf.

¶ 24 In People v. Wilmington , 2013 IL 112938, 368 Ill.Dec. 211, 983 N.E.2d 1015, our supreme court determined whether a trial court erred in following Rule 431(b) by asking the prospective jurors if they disagreed with three of the principles enumerated in Rule 431(b). Our supreme court stated it was arguable whether the trial court's inquiry, asking for disagreement and getting none, was equivalent to asking for acceptance. Wilmington , 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 32, 368 Ill.Dec. 211, 983 N.E.2d 1015. However, the court held "the trial court's failure to ask jurors if they understood the four Rule 431(b) principles is error in and of itself." Wilmington , 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 32, 368 Ill.Dec. 211, 983 N.E.2d 1015.

¶ 25 In this case, it is arguable the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether they could accept the Rule 431(b) principles by asking if they had a problem with them. As we stated in People v. McGuire , 2017 IL App (4th) 150695, ¶ 35, 419 Ill.Dec. 83, 92 N.E.3d 494, "trial judges must strictly comply with Rule 431(b)." The rule ensures jurors understand and accept the bedrock principles of our criminal law, and failing to comply "could threaten the integrity of the jury's verdict" or "cast doubt on any guilty verdict a jury might return." McGuire , 2017 IL App (4th) 150695, ¶ 35, 419 Ill.Dec. 83, 92 N.E.3d 494. "Trial courts must exercise diligence when instructing the jury of the Zehr principles as codified in Rule 431(b)

and must not deviate in any way from the precise language chosen by the Illinois Supreme Court to be in that rule." McGuire , 2017 IL App (4th) 150695, ¶ 35, 419 Ill.Dec. 83, 92 N.E.3d 494. In order to protect the record, prosecutors must also be aware of the strict requirement of Rule 431(b) so "they can alert the trial court to any improper deviation from that rule." McGuire , 2017 IL App (4th) 150695, ¶ 35, 419 Ill.Dec. 83, 92 N.E.3d 494.

¶ 26 In this case, it is clear the court never asked whether the jurors understood the State's burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or the fact that defendant was not required to present evidence on his own behalf, and thus the court committed error. The language of Rule 431(b) is clear; the four principles are set forth succinctly, and the two questions to be asked, in whatever manner the court chooses, are simple: "do you understand" and "do you accept."

¶ 27 Defendant did not object to the admonishments during the voir dire . Ordinarily, "[t]o preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must object to the error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion." People v. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. If not, the error results in forfeiture. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. However, there is a well-established exception to that principle. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) provides "substantial or what have become known as plain errors may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. This voir dire error is subject to a plain-error analysis. Wilmington , 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 31, 368 Ill.Dec. 211, 983 N.E.2d 1015. For the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, we will address each of defendant's claimed unpreserved errors in one plain-error analysis later.

¶ 28 B. IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.01

¶ 29 Defendant argues the trial court erred in giving IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.01, which states the prosecution is not required to prove that the offense was committed on the particular date charged, to the jury. We disagree.

¶ 30 "Generally, the decision to give certain jury instructions rests with the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion." People v. Hale , 2012 IL App (4th) 100949, ¶ 19, 359 Ill.Dec. 746, 967 N.E.2d 476.

"Giving IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.01 [ (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.01 (3d ed. 1992) ) ] may result in reversible error, (1) where inconsistencies between the date charged in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial are so great that the defendant is misled in presenting his defense or (2) when he presents an alibi for the time alleged in the indictment and is thereby prejudiced because he failed to gather evidence and witnesses for the time actually proved by the State." People v. Suter , 292 Ill. App. 3d 358, 364, 226 Ill.Dec. 568, 685 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (1997).

¶ 31 Here, defendant asserts no alibi to the allegations and in fact acknowledged he was present on the night in question; thus, the second prong is not invoked here. Instead, the question becomes whether there is any variance in the dates alleged and whether the evidence misled defendant in the preparation of his defense.

¶ 32 Defendant's argument is analogous to that of the defendant in People v. Cregar , 172 Ill. App. 3d 807, 822-23, 122 Ill.Dec. 613, 526 N.E.2d 1376, 1386-87 (1988). In Cregar , 172 Ill. App. 3d at 823, 122 Ill.Dec. 613, 526 N.E.2d 1376, the defendant contended the lack of an instruction on other crimes was exacerbated by an Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.01 (2d ed. 1981) instruction stating the State need not prove the offense occurred on the exact date charged. This court stated, in Cregar , it was not error because the date alleged in the indictment was immaterial as long as the State proved the offense occurred at any time within the statute of limitations. Cregar , 172 Ill. App. 3d at 823, 122 Ill.Dec. 613, 526 N.E.2d 1376.

¶ 33 In this case, as in Cregar , defendant argued the error of submitting the instruction as to variance of dates was exacerbated by not instructing the jury about other-crimes evidence brought out by the testimony regarding molestation of M.S. from the age of three or four. We find that argument unconvincing, as we did in Cregar . See People v. Barlow , 188 Ill. App. 3d 393, 402-03, 136 Ill.Dec. 172, 544 N.E.2d 947, 953 (1989) ("[B]ecause the date of the offense is not an essential element in child sex offenses [citation], any change in the dates does not alter the nature of the crime charged."). The testimony clearly centered around the incident during November or December 2014. Both defendant and M.S. spoke about that particular time period. The other-crimes evidence was more vague, not specific, and clearly admissible. Even defendant acknowledged the admissibility of propensity evidence pursuant to section 11-7.3(a)(1), (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(a)(1), (b) (West 2014). Moreover, defendant's defense was also not time-specific and was a complete denial. Defendant was then directed to the specific time frame of November 2014 and again unequivocally denied "anything of a sexual nature." For good measure, his attention was then directed to M.S.'s testimony the day before, and he again denied "the things she said took place between the two of [them]."

¶ 34 Exactly when in November through December 2014 was not clear. M.S. said the last occurrence was at her grandmother's house "close to the end of winter," between Thanksgiving and Christmas. Otherwise the testimony about other incidents of sexual abuse was very general in nature. Defendant said he moved out of the home with M.S. and her mother in November 2014 and moved in with his mother, M.S.'s grandmother. He said she came to visit on only two occasions where she stayed overnight, again without being specific.

¶ 35 According to defendant, regardless of the date, he did not do it. Under the circumstances, in light of the broad range of dates charged between November 2014 and December 2014, the court giving IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.01 was appropriate and caused no prejudice to defendant.

¶ 36 C. IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.66

¶ 37 Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to give IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.66 to the jury. The State concedes error, and we accept its concession.

¶ 38 IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.66 instructs a jury to determine the weight to be given to hearsay statements at trial, considering the "age and maturity" of the victim, "the nature of the statement[s], [and] the circumstances under which * * * statement[s]" were made.

"In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13 * * *, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
* * *
(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.
(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and
(2) The child or moderately, severely, or profoundly intellectually disabled person either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; * * *
* * *
(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, or the intellectual capabilities of the moderately, severely, or profoundly intellectually disabled person, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor." 725 ILCS 5/115-10(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (c) (West 2014).

¶ 39 Here, the statements by Bunyard and Schuler were hearsay statements made by M.S., who was 11 years old at the time of the statements, and M.S. testified at trial. Under a clear reading of section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, trial court was required to give IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.66. 725 ILCS 5/115-10(c) (West 2014). Since the court did not, we find it committed error. See People v. Mitchell , 155 Ill. 2d 344, 354, 185 Ill.Dec. 528, 614 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (1993). This error was also not preserved by defendant through objection or posttrial motion and is subject to plain-error review.

¶ 40 D. Bolstering Credibility

¶ 41 Defendant argues the State repeatedly engaged in conduct that improperly bolstered M.S.'s credibility. We agree.

¶ 42 "Because questions of credibility are to be resolved by the trier of fact [citation] 'it is generally improper to ask one witness to comment directly on the credibility of another witness.' " People v. Boling , 2014 IL App (4th) 120634, ¶ 121, 380 Ill.Dec. 134, 8 N.E.3d 65 121 (quoting People v. Becker , 239 Ill. 2d 215, 236, 346 Ill.Dec. 527, 940 N.E.2d 1131, 1143 (2010) ). "[O]ne witness should not be allowed to express his [or her] opinion as to another witness's credibility." People v. Henderson , 394 Ill. App. 3d 747, 754, 333 Ill.Dec. 667, 915 N.E.2d 473, 478 (2009).

¶ 43 1. Schuler's Testimony

¶ 44 Defendant argues the State improperly bolstered M.S.'s credibility by eliciting statements from Schuler about M.S.'s veracity. We agree.

¶ 45 During the State's direct examination of Schuler, the following exchange occurred:

"Q. Now, as far as-I am asking veracity, telling the truth, did you ever have a problem with [M.S.] lying to you about things?
A. No, no, I did not."

The State argues the aforementioned exchange was not a way to bolster credibility but instead laid the foundation for M.S.'s character for truthfulness; both are impermissible.

¶ 46 In People v. Brothers , 2015 IL App (4th) 130644, 396 Ill.Dec. 275, 39 N.E.3d 1101, this court analyzed whether the State committed error when the officer stated the victim was very credible in a sexual assault case. When the State asked about the demeanor of the victim, the officer stated, "She was still in shock" "but very believable, very credible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brothers , 2015 IL App (4th) 130644, ¶ 18, 396 Ill.Dec. 275, 39 N.E.3d 1101. This court said that was improper even though the officer volunteered the information without prompting. Brothers , 2015 IL App (4th) 130644, ¶ 126, 396 Ill.Dec. 275, 39 N.E.3d 1101.

¶ 47 A witness is only permitted to express an opinion about another witness's character for truthfulness after their character for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation or opinion evidence. See Ill. R. Evid. 608 (eff. Jan. 6, 2015). Such was not the case here. The State elicited the aforementioned testimony in its direct examination of its second witness, Schuler. Before that, the only inquiry by defendant's attorney centered on a specific incident, not reputation or character. In response to a question about whether she told her mother about the ongoing abuse, the victim said, "[My mom] won't listen to me." Defense counsel merely entered the door the prosecutor opened by asking one question about whether her mother believed her. There was no reason for the testimony to come in other than to bolster M.S.'s credibility in an improper way. See Brothers , 2015 IL App (4th) 130644, ¶ 126, 396 Ill.Dec. 275, 39 N.E.3d 1101. As such, we find this was in error and subject to plain-error review.

¶ 48 2. Questioning of Defendant and Defendant's Statements

¶ 49 Defendant argues the State improperly elicited testimony from him and Sergeant Johnson about why M.S. would lie. The State concedes error on this issue, and we accept the State's concession.

¶ 50 "It is well established that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a defendant his opinion on the veracity of other witnesses, as such questions intrude on the jury's function to determine witness credibility and also demean and ridicule the defendant." People v. Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 49, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176.

¶ 51 In Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176, the appellate court analyzed the State's questions to the defendant on cross-examination in an aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion case. The defendant was asked by the prosecutor multiple times if the victim made up certain details, such as the defendant charging into her bedroom, threatening to kill her, and taking her wedding band. Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 50, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176. The court deemed this was improper, as the questions were "designed to demean and ridicule [the] defendant." Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 51, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176. The court in that case found plain error where the evidence was closely balanced and hinged on a credibility determination, stating "the prosecution's improper cross-examination denied [the] defendant a fair trial." Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 58, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176.

¶ 52 Here, the prosecutor cross-examined defendant about the credibility of M.S. as follows:

"Q. And you have no idea why she would make something like this up?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Did you have a good relationship with her?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. So out of the blue your 11[-], now 12-year-old daughter shows up and is making these horrible accusations about you and you have no idea why?
A. Yes."

¶ 53 The State clearly asked defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness, M.S., which is improper. See Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 49, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176. This error was exacerbated in closing arguments, when the prosecutor said, "But he can't come up with any particular reason why she would lie." While at times this error could be harmless, "reversal is warranted when the evidence is closely balanced and the credibility of the witnesses is a crucial factor underlying the jury's determination of guilt or innocence." Schaffer , 2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 49, 378 Ill.Dec. 577, 4 N.E.3d 176. As this error is unpreserved, we will review under a plain-error analysis to evaluate if the evidence is closely balanced.

¶ 54 E. Closing Argument

¶ 55 Defendant argues the State committed reversible error with certain comments made during closing argument. We agree.

¶ 56 Prosecutors have "wide latitude in making a closing argument and [are] permitted to comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields." People v. Glasper , 234 Ill. 2d 173, 204, 334 Ill.Dec. 575, 917 N.E.2d 401, 419 (2009). "It is, however, improper for the prosecutor to argue assumptions or facts not based upon the evidence in the record." People v. Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d 81, 151, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850, 885 (1998). "A closing argument must be viewed in its entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in their context. [Citation.] Statements will not be held improper if they were provoked or invited by the defense counsel's argument." Glasper , 234 Ill. 2d at 204, 334 Ill.Dec. 575, 917 N.E.2d 401. However, "[i]mproper remarks warrant reversal only where they result in substantial prejudice to the defendant, considering the content and context of the language, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 151-52, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850.

¶ 57 1. Comment on Facts Outside of the Evidence

¶ 58 Defendant argues the State committed error when it said the cunning nature of sexual predators is something "we" see on a daily basis. We agree.

¶ 59 In this case, the State on rebuttal stated as follows:

"[Defense counsel] argues that [defendant] must have been so cunning and so slick, he can do it over and over again and no one has a clue. Absolutely. We see that everyday in the news. We see that everyday, predators who pick out the perfect victim, the victim they know who is not going to tell on them, the victim they can do these things over and over again and no one is going to believe them or they are not going to tell anybody. That's not unheard of, ladies and gentlemen. We see it on a daily basis."

¶ 60 In People v. Lowry , 354 Ill. App. 3d 760, 771, 290 Ill.Dec. 337, 821 N.E.2d 649, 661 (2004), the appellate court stated it was improper in closing arguments to refer to "studies" to explain the discrepancies in witnesses' testimonies where there was no evidence of the "studies" referenced. In People v. Adams , 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 16, 356 Ill.Dec. 725, 962 N.E.2d 410, the State argued in closing that the officer who testified had to be believed because if the officer lied, he would be risking his job and his freedom. Our supreme court said this statement was "impermissible speculation, as no evidence was introduced at trial" to back those claims by the State. Adams , 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 20, 356 Ill.Dec. 725, 962 N.E.2d 410.

¶ 61 Here, the statement about how cunning or calculating sexual offenders that the State sees on a daily basis are was not presented as evidence in the trial. The State argues the statement is a permissible comment based on the jury's common knowledge. However, these comments went beyond talking about daily experiences of jurors and their knowledge of sexual abuse but went to matters outside of the trial. Had the State presented expert testimony to assist in exploring M.S.'s behavior under section 115-7.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the comments might have been admissible. See 725 ILCS 5/115-7.2 (West 2014). Here, however, the State was inferring knowledge of the habits of sexual predators as a matter of common knowledge. Therefore, the State injected error with its comments and, as there was no objection at trial or in a posttrial motion, we review this error under a plain-error analysis.

¶ 62 2. Comment About Message to Victims

¶ 63 Defendant argues the State committed error by asking the jury what kind of message it would send to victims if defendant was acquitted. We agree.

¶ 64 "[A] defendant's guilt may be proved only by 'legal and competent' facts, 'uninfluenced by bias or prejudice raised by irrelevant evidence.' " People v. Blue , 189 Ill. 2d 99, 129, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920, 936 (2000) (quoting People v. Bernette , 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443 (1964) ). "It is a basic principle of our criminal justice system that the prosecutor owes the defendant a duty of fairness." People v. Dunsworth , 233 Ill. App. 3d 258, 269, 174 Ill.Dec. 483, 599 N.E.2d 29, 36 (1992). "Because this duty extends throughout the trial and includes closing arguments, the prosecutor has an ethical obligation to refrain from presenting improper and prejudicial argument." People v. Liner , 356 Ill. App. 3d 284, 292, 292 Ill.Dec. 838, 826 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (2005). "The broader problems of crime in society should not be the focus of a jury considering the guilt or innocence of an individual defendant, lest the remediation of society's problems distract jurors from the awesome responsibility with which they are charged." People v. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d 53, 77-78, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405, 419 (2003).

¶ 65 Here, the prosecutor in closing arguments stated as follows:

"All we have are [M.S.'s] words. That has to be enough, ladies and gentlemen. Think of the message that you send to victims. Think of the message that we would be sending to victims by our Criminal Justice System, "Hey, don't you come forward. Don't say anything, don't even complain about these unless you got some corroborating evidence, unless you got DNA [ (deoxyribonucleic acid) ] or confession from the person, don't even come forward because you will not get over that burden.
That's not true, ladies and gentlemen. Her words are absolutely and can be absolutely enough."

¶ 66 In Liner , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 292 Ill.Dec. 838, 826 N.E.2d 1274, the appellate court reviewed whether the prosecutor's closing statement was improper. In closing arguments, the prosecutor said, "[Y]ou're not just protecting [the victim]. You're protecting every child and every citizen in every home in this county." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Liner , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 292 Ill.Dec. 838, 826 N.E.2d 1274. The court held the comments were improper since they were made to inflame the passions of the jury about a member of a class of "which we, as a society, are sympathetic." Liner , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 297, 292 Ill.Dec. 838, 826 N.E.2d 1274.

¶ 67 In People v. Fletcher , 156 Ill. App. 3d 405, 410, 108 Ill.Dec. 929, 509 N.E.2d 625, 629-30 (1987), the appellate court looked at the propriety of the State's closing argument. There, the State said, "If you want to find him not guilty because that was a, just a seven year old testifying, you can do so. But in doing so, you are saying that a seven year old's testimony can never convict a defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fletcher , 156 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 108 Ill.Dec. 929, 509 N.E.2d 625. The First District said the aforementioned comment was erroneous and "went to matters not in evidence." Fletcher , 156 Ill. App. 3d at 411, 108 Ill.Dec. 929, 509 N.E.2d 625.

¶ 68 In this case, the statements about the message it would send to child victims of sexual abuse was intended to inflame the emotions of the jury for a sympathetic class-children. As in Fletcher , the statement was not about the testimony at trial but instead went to a broader issue not in evidence. As such, it was improper for the State to ask the jurors to send a communal message by their verdict. This error was not preserved, and we will review this as a matter of plain error as well.

¶ 69 F. Plain Error

¶ 70 Defendant argues the aforementioned unpreserved errors should be reviewed under a plain-error analysis and this court should vacate the verdict and remand for a new trial. We agree.

¶ 71 "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).

"[T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. In the first instance, the defendant must prove 'prejudicial error.' That is, the defendant must show both that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. The State, of course, can respond by arguing that the evidence was not closely balanced, but rather strongly weighted against the defendant. In the second instance, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process." People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467, 479-80 (2005).

In the second instance, "[p]rejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, 'regardless of the strength of the evidence.' " (Emphasis in original.) Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (quoting Blue , 189 Ill. 2d at 138, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920 ). Under the first prong of plain-error analysis, "[w]hat makes an error prejudicial is the fact that it occurred in a close case where its impact on the result was potentially dispositive." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 68, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. Thus, whether the error is "trivial or de minimis " is "simply the wrong inquiry. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 69, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. "The only question in a first-prong case, once clear error has been established, is whether the evidence is closely balanced." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 69, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. "In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant." Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467. "In determining whether the evidence adduced at trial was close, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. "A reviewing court's inquiry involves an assessment of the evidence on the elements of the charged offense or offenses, along with any evidence regarding the witnesses' credibility." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. "The issue before us, however, does not involve the sufficiency of close evidence but rather the closeness of sufficient evidence." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 60, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675.

¶ 72 Here, defendant argues plain error under the closely balanced prong. In Sebby , our supreme court determined whether the evidence was closely balanced due to conflicting credible accounts of the alleged crime of resisting a peace officer. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 60, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. There the court mentioned the two different accounts were plausible, "and neither version [was] supported by corroborating evidence." Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 62, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. As such, the court believed the evidence was closely balanced as in People v. Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d 584, 606-607, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653, 667-68 (2008).

¶ 73 In Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d at 606-07, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653, our supreme court analyzed whether the case was closely balanced because of a "contest of credibility." In that case, the court stated the defendant's testimony was "credible in that it [was] consistent with much of the officers' testimony and the circumstances of his arrest." Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d at 607, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653. Given the opposing versions of the same event and no extrinsic evidence to corroborate either version, the case "necessarily involved the court's assessment of the credibility of the two officers against that of [the] defendant." Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d at 607, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653.

¶ 74 Here, this case boiled down to a clear question of credibility between M.S. and defendant. Although other witnesses testified, three of them restated what they were told by M.S or defendant. Sergeant Johnson mentioned the similarities in the description of events, which makes defendant's account more plausible as was argued in Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d at 607, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653. The State argues defendant made an inculpatory statement to police, referring to one exchange during the direct examination of Sergeant Johnson:

"Q: And as far as [M.S.'s] room, in particular, did he ever say he went into her room? Was there ever anything in the conversation with the Defendant about that?
A: Yes, she had talked about an incident once where she was jumping on the bed, and he had come up there and yelled at her, and had done somethings [sic ], and he claimed that he never would ever go into her room, wouldn't come up to her bedroom."

At best, this qualifies as a potentially inconsistent statement by defendant since he testified at trial that he had, on occasion, gone upstairs to her bedroom when they lived together to calm her down. If the State had presented evidence of a medical examination of M.S. revealing evidence of sexual activity, regardless of how recent, or expert testimony regarding the frequently observed effects on child sexual abuse victims in school or around other people, this may not have been solely a question of credibility. In cases where the evidence is a contest of credibility and there is no extrinsic evidence, the evidence is closely balanced. See Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 63, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675 ; see also Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d at 607, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653. It is the jury's job to make credibility determinations, and the various errors here interfered with its ability to do that.

¶ 75 The failure to properly admonish the jury as to the four basic Zehr principles in criminal prosecutions is plain error. Our supreme court has been clear that especially in close cases, a failure to follow Rule 431(b) can create reversible error by itself. The improper bolstering of M.S.'s testimony tipped the scale, especially in light of the failure to provide a complete instruction on how to even evaluate a child victim's testimony. Demeaning or ridiculing defendant also undermined his credibility, which was very important as the jury was asked to determine which witness it found more credible. The closing argument statements threatened the fairness of the trial and allowed a jury to convict not on the evidence but instead based on emotion or information not properly presented. The cumulative effect of these errors in conjunction with the closely balanced nature of the case requires a new trial. See Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 68-69, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675 (finding a defendant must only show error and a closely balanced case to be entitled to a new trial).

¶ 76 While we must reverse defendant's conviction, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was perfectly justified in believing the testimony of M.S., and the credible testimony of a victim without more can be sufficient to justify a conviction. See People v. Summers , 353 Ill. App. 3d 367, 372, 288 Ill.Dec. 972, 818 N.E.2d 907, 977 (2004) ; see also People v. Johnson , 2016 IL App (4th) 150004, ¶ 32, 403 Ill.Dec. 845, 55 N.E.3d 32 (finding the jury could give more weight to the victim's testimony over the defendant's and find the defendant guilty off the victim's testimony alone). Thus, we find there is no double jeopardy impediment to a new trial. See Hale , 2012 IL App (4th) 100949, ¶ 26, 359 Ill.Dec. 746, 967 N.E.2d 476. However, we reach no conclusion regarding defendant's guilt that would be binding on retrial. See Naylor , 229 Ill. 2d at 611, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653.

¶ 77 G. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 78 Defendant argues, alternatively, the unpreserved errors should be reviewed for ineffective assistance of counsel if we found there was not plain error. Based upon our finding of plain error, analysis of this issue is unnecessary.

¶ 79 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 80 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial.

¶ 81 Reversed and remanded.

Justices Steigmann and Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Frank KAINRATH, Raul Aguirre, and Jason Pyle, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Jay GRIDER, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Stickney Township Assessor, Louis S. Viverito, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Stickney Township Supervisor, and the Township of Stickney, Defendants,
    (Jay Grider, Individually and In His Official Capacity as Stickney Township Assessor and the Township of Stickney, Defendants-Appellants).
    No. 1-17-2270
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.
    November 26, 2018
    Del Gado Law Group, LLC, of Berwyn (K. Austin Zimmer and Joseph A. Giambrone, of counsel), for appellants.
    John S. Xydakis, of Chicago, for appellees.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, three municipal officeholders and current or former employees of the City of Burbank, Illinois, sued defendants Jay Grider and the Township of Stickney for defamation and false light. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Grider, in his capacity as the Stickney Township Assessor, sent a letter to newspapers, local officials, and others challenging plaintiffs' ethics and accusing them of illegally obtaining property exemptions, effectively causing homeowners in Burbank to pay more than their fair share in property taxes. Defendants now appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment, in which they claimed protection under the Citizen Participation Act (Act) ( 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2014) ), our state's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) act. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiffs in this case are Burbank Building Commissioner Frank Kainrath, Burbank Alderman Jason Pyle (also an employee of the Cook County Assessor's office) and Raul Aguirre, a former employee of both the Burbank Zoning Department and the Cook County Board of Review. Mr. Kainrath and Mr. Pyle supported Mr. Aguirre in an unsuccessful electoral race against defendant Jay Grider for Stickney Township Assessor in 2013. In their initial complaint, filed on June 25, 2015, plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Grider, in his capacity as Stickney Township Assessor, sent a defamatory letter accusing them of "wrongful and criminal acts." The letter was sent to a number of recipients, including the Cook County Assessor, the mayor of Burbank, the Better Government Association, and various news organizations. Plaintiffs sued Mr. Grider, individually and in his capacity as Stickney Township Assessor, for defamation and false light, seeking $12 million in compensatory damages and an additional $12 million in punitive damages "or an amount to be proven at trial."

¶ 4 Mr. Grider's June 2015 letter, which plaintiffs attached to their complaint, bore the heading "Why homeowners in Burbank can't catch a break on their property taxes" and stated that it was "By Jay Grider, Assessor[,] Stickney Township." In the letter Mr. Grider described how, "[i]n the course of processing the paperwork that comes through [his] office and reviewing public records online," he had "discovered how several current and former public servants used their inside status to scratch their own backs and lower their own property taxes-causing [the] homeowners of Burbank to pay more property taxes."

¶ 5 Mr. Grider asserted in the letter that "[a]t the top of th[at] ethically-challenged group" and "tax cheating posse" was Mr. Kainrath, who as building commissioner had "follow[ed] a pattern of withholding [the] assessable building permits of his preferred network of home builders and contractors *** to delay the improved properties from reaching the tax rolls in a timely manner." According to the letter, Mr. Kainrath was also a "Top Ten rental-property owner in Burbank," who used land trusts to hide his ownership interests in multiple single-family homes and who for years had received "multiple illegal homeowner exemptions," until "the Erroneous Exemption law went into effect."

¶ 6 The letter described Mr. Pyle, an employee of the Cook County Assessor's office for over 10 years, as "Kainrath's primary inside connection" for illegal exemptions. Mr. Grider asserted in his letter both that Mr. Kainrath developed and owned the property then used by Mr. Pyle as a primary residence and that Mr. Pyle assisted Mr. Kainrath with property tax appeals to reduce the assessed value for the property in 2010-12.

¶ 7 According to Mr. Grider's letter, "former Burbank Zoning Department employee Raul Aguirre," who "worked for the County Board of Review until his retirement in 2012," also helped Mr. Kainrath with property tax appeals and "bled taxpayers through illegal exemptions and inside-access to property tax appeals for real estate he owned in Burbank."

¶ 8 The letter concluded by explaining that Mr. Grider enjoyed his job as township assessor, "saw it as [his] duty to bring the above listed transgressions to light so the taxpayers in Burbank c[ould] get some relief," and believed that what he had detailed in his letter was "only the tip of the iceberg for th[e] situation."

¶ 9 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint pursuant to section 2619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014) ), arguing protection under the Act. A third defendant who was dismissed from the case and is not a party to this appeal also moved to dismiss, through a combined 2-619.1 motion (id. § 2-619.1). Ruling from the bench on September 14, 2016, the circuit court struck plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages, along with certain of their allegations that it felt did not "go to the issue of whether or not this statement by [Mr.] Grider was defamatory or not, which is really the issue we're talking about."

Without ruling on defendants' arguments for dismissal based on the Act-which are at the heart of this appeal-the circuit court granted plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint.

¶ 10 On June 23, 2017, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from suit pursuant to the Act. Defendants insisted that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether they were entitled to immunity under sections 15 and 20 of the Act ( 735 ILCS 110/15, 20 (West 2014) ). Defendants asserted that they had made the required threshold showings under that law that Mr. Grider's letter was an act of participation in government to obtain favorable government action and that plaintiff's suit was meritless and filed solely in response to Mr. Grider's protected actions, both because the statements in the letter were true and because the statements were reasonably related to Mr. Grider's duties as Stickney Township Assessor and were thus privileged and nonactionable. Defendants argued that the burden then shifted to plaintiffs to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the letter was not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, and that plaintiffs failed to carry this burden.

¶ 11 Defendants attached to their motion an affidavit by Mr. Grider, in which he explained that, as Stickney Township Assessor, he is a deputy assessor for the Cook County Assessor, is trained and certified to assess the value of residential property in Cook County, and handles inquiries from taxpayers regarding the amount of real estate taxes assessed on properties within the township. Mr. Kainrath, as Building Commissioner for the City of Burbank, is responsible for submitting building permits to Mr. Grider's office in a timely manner. Mr. Grider received one such permit for a pool to be built on a vacant piece of property but learned, by reviewing documents and public records available through the Assessor's internal operating system, that the property was not vacant but in fact contained a brand-new home, for which no building permit had ever been obtained. This caused Mr. Grider to investigate other permits from Mr. Kainrath's office. According to Mr. Grider, the focus of that investigation soon spread from Mr. Kainrath to Mr. Pyle and Mr. Aguirre and resulted in the findings stated in Mr. Grider's June 2015 letter. Mr. Grider attached a number of documents to his affidavit, including property tax search results and the transcript of his deposition.

¶ 12 In response to defendants' motion, plaintiffs argued that the Act did not provide immunity because defendants failed to show that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought "solely" in response to an act of government participation because defendants could not show that the statements in the letter were true. Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of their attorney, John Xydakis, who attached an e-mail from Tom Shaer, deputy assessor for communications at the office of the Cook County Assessor, to someone named "Katie," which detailed an investigation by the assessor's office into the specific claims in Mr. Grider's letter, concluding that those claims were "without merit," that there was no evidence of an "erroneous exemptions 'scheme' " (internal quotation marks omitted), and that "[a] detailed examination of [the relevant property identification numbers] and other information show[ed] very, very substantial compliance."

¶ 13 Although each side asked the circuit court to strike the opposing parties' affidavits as conclusory, lacking a proper foundation, or because they contradicted prior sworn deposition testimony, there is no indication in the record that the circuit court ruled on these requests.

¶ 14 Following argument, the circuit court denied defendants' motion, finding that although Mr. Grider's letter was sent in furtherance of his right to participate in and obtain favorable government action, "[t]here [wa]s at least a question of fact" regarding the truth or falsity of the statements in that letter. As such, defendants had failed to demonstrate that plaintiffs' claims were meritless, i.e. , that they were "solely based on, related to, or in response [to the letter]."

¶ 15 JURISDICTION

¶ 16 Plaintiffs contend that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. They argue that, by raising the affirmative defense of privilege as a reason why plaintiffs' claims lack merit under the Act, defendants are using this appeal to improperly obtain interlocutory review of the circuit court's order denying a later motion that defendants filed seeking summary judgment on the basis of privilege. This argument is not jurisdictional; it relates only to the proper scope of what may be considered when a court decides whether a defendant has met its initial burden under the Act, an issue we discuss in more detail below.

¶ 17 Our jurisdiction over this appeal is straightforward. Defendants filed their initial motion for summary judgment based on the Act on June 23, 2017. Although the Act requires that "a hearing and decision on [such a] motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent" ( 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2016) ), and the record indicates that the circuit court did not rule until August 18, 2017, our supreme court has held that failure to comply with the 90-day requirement does not cause the circuit court to lose jurisdiction ( Sandholm v. Kuecker , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 67, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418 ). On September 18, 2017, defendants timely filed a petition for leave to appeal from the court's August 18 order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(9), which provides for discretionary interlocutory appeals from "order[s] of the circuit court denying [ ] motion[s] to dispose under the Citizen Participation Act ( 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. )." Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(9) (eff. July 1, 2017). We granted defendants' petition on October 18, 2017, and accordingly have jurisdiction over this appeal.

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 Summary judgment is appropriate where, construed liberally in favor of the party opposing judgment ( Carney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25, 412 Ill.Dec. 833, 77 N.E.3d 1 ), "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2014) ). Although summary judgment is "encouraged as an aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit," it is "a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, therefore, should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt." Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. , 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43, 284 Ill.Dec. 302, 809 N.E.2d 1248 (2004). We review a circuit court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo ( Doria v. Village of Downers Grove , 397 Ill. App. 3d 752, 756, 336 Ill.Dec. 864, 921 N.E.2d 478 (2009) ) and may affirm the judgment of the circuit court "on any basis appearing in the record" ( Urban Sites of Chicago, LLC v. Crown Castle USA , 2012 IL App (1st) 111880, ¶ 21, 365 Ill.Dec. 876, 979 N.E.2d 480 ).

¶ 20 As an initial matter, we clarify the scope of this appeal and what portions of the record will be considered. Defendants petitioned this court for leave to appeal from the circuit court's denial of their initial motion for summary judgment, based solely on the Act. In connection with their petition, defendants filed a Rule 328 ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 328 (eff. July 1, 2017) ) supporting record consisting of the various complaints in this matter, the briefing on their initial motion for summary judgment, and the circuit court's order denying that motion. Defendants were later granted leave to supplement the record with a transcript of the hearing on their initial motion for summary judgment. These are the only documents relevant to our review in this case.

¶ 21 In their opposition to defendants' petition for leave to appeal plaintiffs attached their own Rule 328 supporting record, consisting of the briefing on a second motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, "Based Upon Privilege, Immunities, and Other Defenses." This second motion was not filed until August 11, 2017, less than a week before the court's denial of the first motion, and was not fully briefed or ruled on for another month, well after defendants' petition for leave to appeal the denial of their first motion was filed in this court. It is not any part of this interlocutory appeal. The documents in the defendants' supporting record are not relevant and will also not be considered because "the scope of appellate review of a summary judgment motion is limited to the record as it existed when the circuit court ruled." Campos v. Campos , 342 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1066, 277 Ill.Dec. 735, 796 N.E.2d 1101 (2003).

¶ 22 In assessing whether defendants' initial motion for summary judgment was properly denied, we look first to the burden-shifting requirements of the Citizen Participation Act and how those requirements have been construed by our supreme court. We then consider whether defendants made the necessary threshold showings under the Act, including a showing that plaintiffs' claims lacked merit.

¶ 23 A. The Citizen Participation Act and Sandholm

¶ 24 The Act ( 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2014) ) was enacted in 2007 to deter SLAPP litigation-"lawsuits aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sandholm , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 33, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418. It was meant to "strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury" on the one hand, "and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government" and furthermore "to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law." 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2014). The Act provides that "[a]cts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome." Id. § 15. The Act provides for summary dismissal, expedited appellate review, and recovery of attorney fees for the "SLAPPed" party. Sandholm , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 35, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418 ; 735 ILCS 110/20(a), 25 (West 2014). It is to be "construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and intent fully." 735 ILCS 110/30(b) (West 2014).

¶ 25 Under the Act, a defendant may move "to dispose of a claim in a judicial proceeding" on the grounds that (1) he engaged in an act "in furtherance of [his] rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government" and (2) the plaintiff's claim "is based on, relates to, or is in response to" that protected act of citizen participation. Id. § 15. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to produce "clear and convincing evidence" that the acts of the moving party were a sham, i.e. , that they were "not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action." Id. §§ 15, 20(c).

¶ 26 Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that Mr. Grider's act of sending his June 2015 letter to local government officials was an act of government participation. The parties' arguments instead center on whether defendants met their additional burden under section 15 of the Act of showing that plaintiffs' lawsuit was "based on, relat[ed] to, or [wa]s in response to" that protected act (id. § 15). If defendants did, the burden shifted to plaintiffs; if they did not, defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

¶ 27 In Sandholm , our supreme court construed the language of section 15 narrowly, holding that a defendant seeking the act's protections must demonstrate that the plaintiff's suit is "solely based on, relating to, or in response to" the defendant's act of protected citizen participation. (Emphasis in original.) Sandholm , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 45, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418. The court explained that "SLAPPs are, by definition, meritless," and a "SLAPP plaintiff's goals are achieved through the ancillary effects of the lawsuit itself ***, not through an adjudication on the merits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 34-35. Thus, "where a plaintiff files suit genuinely seeking relief for damages for the alleged defamation or intentionally tortious acts of defendants, the lawsuit is not solely based on defendant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government" and will "not be subject to dismissal under the Act." (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 45. The court noted that this construction would "allow[ ] a court to identify meritless SLAPP suits subject to the Act" and would "ameliorate the 'particular danger inherent in anti-SLAPP statutes *** that when constructed or construed too broadly in protecting the rights of defendants, they may impose a counteractive chilling effect on prospective plaintiffs' own rights to seek redress from the courts for injuries suffered.' " Id. ¶ 48 (quoting Mark J. Sobczak, Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act , 28 N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 559, 575 (2008) ).

¶ 28 The plaintiff in Sandholm was a high school athletics director and basketball coach who alleged that a group of individuals had launched an extensive media and letter-writing campaign to have him removed as coach due to their disagreement with him over his coaching style. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. The court concluded that the plaintiff's suit bore all the hallmarks of a genuine effort to seek damages for personal harm to his reputation from the defendants' alleged defamatory and tortious acts, and that the defendants had failed to show that it was a meritless suit filed solely to stifle defendants' right to engage in protected petitioning activities. Id. ¶ 57. Notably, the Sandholm court recognized that action taken by a defendant might be both tortious and in furtherance an act of protected citizen participation. Id. ¶ 53 ("It is entirely possible that defendants could spread malicious lies about an individual while in the course of genuinely petitioning the government for a favorable result."). It made clear that, in such cases, the Act does not apply. Id. ¶ 51.

¶ 29 This court has acknowledged the tension between the concept of "immun[ity] from liability" referenced in the Act ( 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2014) ) and the requirement, following Sandholm , that a defendant must demonstrate that a plaintiff's claims are meritless before the Act will be found to apply. Midwest REM Enterprises, Inc. v. Noonan , 2015 IL App (1st) 132488, ¶ 61, 397 Ill.Dec. 420, 42 N.E.3d 46. Under this construction, what the Act provides seems less like true immunity from suit and more like an expedited procedure for reaching the merits of a claim. But we are bound by the clear holding in Sandholm that the Act applies only to "meritless" claims. Sandholm , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 45, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418.

¶ 30 Defendants agree that it was their burden to show that plaintiffs' claims lacked merit and contend that the circuit court erred in finding they failed to do so. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' defamation claims are meritless because both absolute and qualified privileges applied to the statements in Mr. Grider's June 2015 letter and that plaintiffs' false light claims are meritless because plaintiffs failed to establish actual malice, a necessary element of that claim. We turn first to plaintiffs' defamation claims.

¶ 31 B. Whether Plaintiffs' Defamation Claims Lack Merit

¶ 32 "The essential elements of a defamation claim are: (1) that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) that the publication caused damages." Goral v. Kulys , 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶ 41, 386 Ill.Dec. 578, 21 N.E.3d 64. Certain types of statements constitute defamation per se , for which a plaintiff need not prove damages. Id. These include, among others, statements "that impute a person has committed a crime," statements "that impute a person is unable to perform or lacks integrity in performing her or his employment duties," and statements "that impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in her or his profession." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 33 On appeal, defendants do not include any argument, as they did in the circuit court, that the statements in Mr. Grider's letter were true. Defendants instead argue only that plaintiffs' defamation claims were "meritless" under the Act because both a qualified and an absolute privilege applied to the statements in Mr. Grider's letter.

¶ 34 Privilege, whether absolute or qualified, is an affirmative defense, not an element of a plaintiff's claim for defamation. As this court recently explained in Garrido , due to a "quirk of defamation law," many cases "misleading[ly]" state that an unprivileged publication of the defamatory statement is an element of the claim, when in fact a plaintiff need only prove lack of privilege "in the event that the defendant raises that particular affirmative defense." Garrido v. Arena , 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 25 n.2, 373 Ill.Dec. 182, 993 N.E.2d 488 (citing Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. , 276 Ill. App. 3d 861, 870, 213 Ill.Dec. 204, 658 N.E.2d 1225 (1995) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 613(2) (1977) ). See also Blair v. Walker , 64 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 349 N.E.2d 385 (1976) (noting that "[t]he defense of privilege" has long been recognized in tort cases).

¶ 35 The Garrido court went on to conclude that the existence of a valid affirmative defense is not something a court should consider when assessing whether a plaintiff's claim is "meritless" for purposes of the Act. Garrido , 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 26-27, 373 Ill.Dec. 182, 993 N.E.2d 488. It explained that, in its view, although "[t]he term 'meritless' is often used loosely to describe any unsuccessful legal claim or theory, *** in the context of a SLAPP it is a term of art and means something more." Id. ¶ 20. According to Garrido , a claim is "meritless" under the Act only "if a movant disproves some essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 36 The defendants in Garrido , like defendants here, argued that they were not liable for defamation because their statements were privileged. Id. ¶ 25. But the court held that this did not render the plaintiffs' claims "meritless" under the Act, because "[a] successful affirmative defense merely 'avoid[s] the legal effect of or defeat[s] the cause of action set forth in the complaint' " and in fact "rests upon the idea that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff's reputation." (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 26-27 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-613(d) (West 2010) ).

¶ 37 Other panels of this court have restated the holding in Garrido without providing any additional analysis of the issue. See Midwest REM Enterprises , 2015 IL App (1st) 132488, ¶ 60, 397 Ill.Dec. 420, 42 N.E.3d 46 (noting that "[t]o show the complaint lacks merit, the defendant must 'disprov[e] some essential element of plaintiff's prima facie case' " (quoting Garrido , 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 28, 373 Ill.Dec. 182, 993 N.E.2d 488 ) ); Goral , 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶ 40, 386 Ill.Dec. 578, 21 N.E.3d 64 (citing Garrido , 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 28, 373 Ill.Dec. 182, 993 N.E.2d 488, for the proposition that "the existence of an affirmative defense does not establish that a plaintiff's claim is 'meritless' under the second prong [of the Act]"). The circuit court in this case, though it did not cite the case by name, seems to have similarly relied on Garrido in ruling on defendants' motion, stating: "A defendant cannot fulfill the meritless prong of the second requirement [of the Act] by asserting an affirmative defense. Instead the Courts must look to examine the plaintiff's defamation claim and the allegations contained within the complaint."

¶ 38 In their reply brief, defendants argue that Garrido is distinguishable from this case on the basis that, in Garrido , protection under the Act was sought through a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014) ), and not, as here, through a motion for summary judgment. We reject this distinction as irrelevant. As this court noted in August v. Hanlon , 2012 IL App (2d) 111252, ¶ 23, 363 Ill.Dec. 925, 975 N.E.2d 1234, "[t]he Act applies to 'any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proceeding' " (emphasis in original) (quoting 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2010) ), and "for purposes of our analysis, any distinction between a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) is immaterial" ( id. ¶ 24 ).

¶ 39 We nevertheless question whether the distinction in Garrido -that a claim is meritless for purposes of the Act only if an essential element of the plaintiff's claim is disproved and not if a valid affirmative defense is asserted-flows inexorably from our supreme court's decision in Sandholm . Notably, the Garrido court cited no authority for its conclusion that the word "meritless" is a term of art having a special meaning in the context of a motion under the Act. See Garrido , 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 20, 373 Ill.Dec. 182, 993 N.E.2d 488. Certainly a claim is meritless if an essential element of the plaintiff's prima facie case is disproved, but is it not equally meritless if it is doomed to fail because it is subject to an obvious affirmative defense?

¶ 40 We need not resolve that question here, however. We conclude that, even if an affirmative defense-like privilege-can provide a basis for dismissal of a claim under the Act, in this case defendants failed to establish that a privilege applied to Mr. Grider's comments.

¶ 41 As our supreme court explained in Blair , 64 Ill. 2d at 5, 349 N.E.2d 385, "Privileged communications are generally divided into those which are absolutely privileged and those which are only qualifiedly privileged." An absolute privilege "cannot be overcome by a showing of improper motivation or knowledge of falsity," whereas a qualified privilege "is conditional upon the good faith and reasonable behavior of the defendant." Id. at 6, 349 N.E.2d 385. The defendants argue that both absolute and qualified privileges apply to Mr. Grider's comments.

¶ 42 Because it is such a "severe restriction" on a plaintiff's ability to seek recourse for acts of defamation, absolute privilege has historically been "narrowly applied to legislative, judicial and certain military officers and proceedings" and "high executive officials." Id. at 6, 349 N.E.2d 385 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591(b) (1977) (noting that, at the state level, application of the privilege is limited to the "governor or other superior executive officer of a state"); Restatement (Second) of Torts Appendix § 591, Reporter's Note, at 21 (1981) (explaining that "[t]he majority of the state courts have declined to extend the absolute privilege beyond the superior state officers and have recognized as to other officers only a conditional privilege"). This is in keeping with society's interest in "the unfettered discharge of public business" that such proceedings entail and such individuals are charged with. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blair , 64 Ill. 2d at 6, 349 N.E.2d 385. We agree with plaintiffs that Mr. Grider's level of executive authority cannot be compared to that of other public officials, for whom Illinois courts have recognized an absolute privilege. See, e.g. , id. at 7, 349 N.E.2d 385 (extending the privilege to statements made by the Governor); Geick v. Kay , 236 Ill. App. 3d 868, 876, 177 Ill.Dec. 340, 603 N.E.2d 121 (1992) (extending it to statements made by mayors of Illinois municipalities).

¶ 43 Mr Grider's duties are set out in the Property Tax Code, which provides that township assessors are "ex-officio deputy assessors" charged with making property assessments in the townships where they are elected, but that they "shall be under the direction and control of the county assessor in the same manner as other deputy assessors." 35 ILCS 200/2-55 (West 2014). At his deposition, Mr. Grider agreed that, as a township assessor, he has no authority to reassess property, issue exemptions, or issue certificates of error. Defendants have simply not shown that Mr. Grider exercises the high level of executive discretion necessary for a finding that statements made within the scope of his duties are absolutely privileged. See Catalano v. Pechous , 83 Ill. 2d 146, 156, 50 Ill.Dec. 242, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980) (concluding that, although a city clerk was an officer of the government of Berwyn, no privilege attached to his remarks because the ordinances governing his position demonstrated that his relevant duties were ministerial in nature).

¶ 44 The case defendants primarily rely on, Novoselsky v. Brown , 822 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2016), is not controlling and is also distinguishable. There, the Seventh Circuit recently concluded, despite the fact that her position "does not entail the same level of executive authority as a governor or mayor," that Illinois courts would hold that statements made by Dorothy Brown, as the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, enjoy the same executive privilege "insofar as she communicate[s them] with in the scope of [her] functions and duties." Id. at 350. Of course, as a federal case, this is not controlling. Even if it were, Mr. Grider's status, as a deputy assessor, is simply not equivalent to Brown's.

¶ 45 Defendants alternatively argue that a qualified privilege applied to the statements Mr. Grider made in his 2015 letter. "A qualified privilege exists where a communication that might be defamatory is not actionable because of the occasion on which or the circumstances under which it was made." (Emphasis added.) Cianci v. Pettibone Corp. , 298 Ill. App. 3d 419, 425, 232 Ill.Dec. 583, 698 N.E.2d 674 (1998), Three such occasions are recognized: "(1) situations that involve some interest of the person who publishes the defamatory matter; (2) situations that involve some interest of the person to whom the matter is published or of some third person; and (3) situations that involve a recognized interest of the public." Id. at 426, 232 Ill.Dec. 583, 698 N.E.2d 674. A qualified privilege is destroyed, however, where it has been abused. Id. "An abuse of the privilege may consist of 'any reckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party's rights, including the failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only the proper parties.' " Id. (quoting Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc. , 156 Ill. 2d 16, 30, 188 Ill.Dec. 765, 619 N.E.2d 129 (1993) ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 599, cmt. a (1977) (noting a qualified privilege "may be abused *** because the publication is made to some person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the particular privilege"). "[T]he issue of whether a qualified privilege exists [is] a question of law for the court, and the issue of whether the privilege was abused [is] a question of fact for the jury." Kuwik , 156 Ill. 2d at 25, 188 Ill.Dec. 765, 619 N.E.2d 129.

¶ 46 Defendants argue that the "undisputed evidence demonstrates that Grider's statements fall under two of the three recognized situations" in which a qualified privilege arises: "the interests of third parties and a recognized interest of the public." We agree with plaintiffs, however, that even if such a privilege arose, there is at least a question of material fact regarding whether Mr. Grider abused the privilege by sending his 2015 letter to parties not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish any proper purpose. At his deposition, Mr. Grider admitted that he additionally sent the letter to the Better Government Association, the mayor of Burbank, and to "some media outlets, because [he] was trying to get some action or reaction for the transgressions *** that took place." Defendants make no argument defending the reasonableness or necessity of sending the letter to these recipients in order to accomplish any reform. Defendants' casual dismissal of plaintiff's arguments as "Monday morning quarterbacking" does not persuade us that reversal is warranted.

¶ 47 In sum, we agree with the circuit court that defendants failed to demonstrate that plaintiffs' defamation claims were meritless. We need not consider the parties' arguments about whether plaintiffs' claims were also retaliatory. Under Sandholm , a lawsuit is not a SLAPP if it has potential merit, even if the plaintiff's motivation in bringing it was, in part, retaliatory. Sandholm , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 51, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418. Because defendants failed to demonstrate that plaintiffs defamation claims were meritless, the burden never shifted to plaintiffs to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the letter Mr. Grider published was not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.

¶ 48 We also need not consider defendants' argument on appeal that no proper foundation was laid for plaintiffs' introduction of the e-mail from Mr. Shaer at the office of the Cook County Assessor concluding, after an apparent investigation by that office, that the statements in Mr. Grider's letter were substantially false. As an initial matter, defendants failed to preserve this issue when they failed to secure a ruling on their motion to strike Mr. Xydakis's affidavit attaching the exhibit. See Intercontinental Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 260 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1090, 197 Ill.Dec. 799, 631 N.E.2d 1258 (1994) ("When a party moves to strike an affidavit which has been filed in support of a motion for summary judgment, it is that party's duty to bring his motion to the attention of the trial court and to get a ruling on the motion, and the failure to obtain such a ruling will operate as a waiver [forfeiture] of the objections to the affidavit."). It also does not matter since the affidavit went to rebut defendants' argument that the statements Mr. Grider made were true and, on appeal, the defendants are no longer pursuing that argument.

¶ 49 C. Whether Plaintiffs' False Light Claims Lack Merit

¶ 50 We separately consider whether defendants demonstrated that plaintiffs' claims for false light were meritless. See 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2014) (discussing when "a claim" may be disposed of under to the Act). The three elements of this cause of action are that "(1) plaintiff was placed in a false light before the public as a result of defendant's actions; (2) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice, with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statements." Wynne v. Loyola University of Chicago , 318 Ill. App. 3d 443, 454, 251 Ill.Dec. 782, 741 N.E.2d 669 (2000). Defendants argue that plaintiffs' false light claims are meritless because "[t]he undisputed facts presented offer no evidence that [Mr.] Grider acted with the requisite intent when he sent the letter."

¶ 51 A defendant who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of production, which can be met by either (1) affirmatively introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would disprove the plaintiff's case, or (2) establishing that a lack of sufficient evidence will prevent the plaintiff from proving an essential element of the cause of action. Hall v. Flowers , 343 Ill. App. 3d 462, 469-70, 278 Ill.Dec. 373, 798 N.E.2d 757 (2003). Where the defendant satisfies this initial burden of production, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a factual basis to support the elements of his claim. Id. at 470, 278 Ill.Dec. 373, 798 N.E.2d 757.

¶ 52 Defendants' argument appears to be that, based on Mr. Grider's own self-serving conclusion, made during his deposition testimony, that he acted without malice in sending the June 2015 letter, the burden of production shifted to plaintiffs to show a factual basis for their claim of malicious intent. We disagree. "When determining whether factual issues exist for purposes of a summary judgment motion, we must ignore personal conclusions, opinions and self-serving statements and consider only facts admissible in evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parker v. House O'Lite Corp. , 324 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1029-31, 258 Ill.Dec. 304, 756 N.E.2d 286 (2001) (finding-the defendant's own assertions to the contrary-that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether the defendant acted recklessly or with "actual malice"); see also Perfection Corp. v. Lochinvar Corp. , 349 Ill. App. 3d 738, 744, 285 Ill.Dec. 645, 812 N.E.2d 465 (2004) ("[u]nsupported assertions, opinions, and self-serving or conclusory statements made in deposition testimony are not admissible evidence upon review of a summary judgment motion").

¶ 53 Here, plaintiffs alleged that they and Mr. Grider were political rivals. At his deposition Mr. Grider acknowledged that, in all of his time as township assessor, this was the only investigation he personally undertook regarding illegal property tax exemptions or other misconduct, noting that normally, when he receives tips regarding such conduct from taxpayers, he forwards them on to the office of the Cook County Assessor through that office's whistle-blower website. We further note that a fact finder could conclude that the language used by Mr. Grider in his 2015 letter at times crosses the line between a dispassionate recitation of the facts into name-calling, referring to plaintiffs as an "ethically challenged group" who "used their insider status to scratch their own backs" and a "tax cheating posse" who "bled taxpayers through illegal exemptions and inside-access to property tax appeals." On this record, we cannot say that Mr. Grider's own testimony insisting he did not act with actual malice when he sent the letter is sufficient to demonstrate the lack of a question of material fact on this element.

¶ 54 CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the above reasons we affirm the circuit court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment under the Act. Defendants were not entitled to the protections afforded by the Act because they failed to show that plaintiff's claims lacked merit, such that they were filed solely in response to a protected act of citizen participation.

¶ 56 Affirmed.

Justices Harris and Griffin concurred in the judgment and opinion.