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    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Antoine HARDMAN, Appellant.
    Docket No. 121453
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed November 30, 2017
    Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Tonya Joy Reedy, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Antoine Hardman, was convicted of one count of possessing between 1 and 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), 407(b)(1) (West 2012). At a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a public defender fee of $500. See 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012). Hardman appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove that he committed the offense within 1000 feet of a school, that the public defender fee was imposed without a proper hearing, and that the mittimus should be amended to reflect the correct name of the offense. The appellate court affirmed Hardman's conviction and sentence, vacated the public defender fee, remanded for a new hearing on whether the public defender fee was appropriate, and amended the mittimus. 2016 IL App (1st) 140913-U, 2016 WL 4919945. We allowed Hardman's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 With respect to Hardman's conviction, Hardman only challenges whether the evidence established that the building at issue was a school. See 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012). For that reason, we confine the factual background to the evidence presented about the building purported to be a school, 646 North Lawndale Avenue.

¶ 4 The State charged Hardman with one count of possessing between 1 and 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of "any school * * * to wit: Ryerson Elementary School," a Class X offense. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), 407(b)(1) (West 2012). At Hardman's arraignment, the court appointed a public defender, and the State filed a motion for reimbursement for the cost of the public defender. See 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012).

¶ 5 Before trial, the State sought leave to amend the information. The information referred to "Ryerson Elementary School," but in pictures taken in the winter of 2014, a sign in front of the school listed the name as "Laura Ward." The State indicated that, on July 22, 2013, at the time of the offense, it believed that the building was called Ryerson Elementary School. However, when the court asked for the date of the school name change, the State responded that it believed that it was "this school year" that the name changed to Laura Ward. The State asserted that the school year "should have started in September." The court denied the State's motion to amend the information, finding that the State could explain the school name discrepancy at trial.

¶ 6 At trial, three witnesses testified about the location of the drug transactions. Officer Harmon of the Chicago police department testified that, on the date of the offense, he was on duty from 7 a.m. until 4 p.m. as an enforcement officer. Officer Harmon assisted in detaining Hardman. The State questioned Officer Harmon as to his familiarity with the area:

"Q. Now, how long had you worked in the 11th District on the date of this incident?
A. Well, I'd been in the 11th District nine years.
Q. In your nine years in the 11th District were you familiar with this area where the arrest occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar with the schools near this address?
A. I am.
Q. What school is there?
A. Laura Ward School.
Q. Is that what it is currently called?
A. Yes. It changed.
Q. What was the name of the school back on July 22, 2013?
A. Ryerson."

¶ 7 Officer Ruggiero, a Chicago police officer, testified that at about 10 a.m. on July 22, 2013, he was conducting surveillance of the alley at 634 North Ridgeway Avenue. Officer Ruggiero assisted in detaining Hardman. Officer Ruggiero testified that, in July 2013, he was part of the "Area North Saturation Team," assigned to the eleventh district. Officer Ruggiero testified that he had been an officer in the eleventh district for seven years by that time. The State questioned Officer Ruggiero as to his familiarity with the area:

"Q. And were you in the vicinity of 634 Ridgeway in Chicago?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that area within the 11th District?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you please describe the six hundred block of North Ridgeway for the jurors?
A. Yes. The area is residential, with buildings and also right next to a school called Ryerson Elementary School at that time.
Q. You say at that time. Does that school have a different name?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that?
A. Laura Ward.
Q. Now, what is the closest intersection to the area we're referring to?
A. Huron and Ridgeway.
Q. Are you familiar with that location?
A. Yes.
Q. And how are you familiar with that location?
A. I've worked in that area, I was assigned to the 11th District. I've done numerous arrests in that area.
Q. Have you made narcotics related arrests in that area?
A. Yes.
Q. Approximately how many?
A. During a year, around that time of year, at least twenty.
Q. You indicated that you have done surveillance in that area before?
A. Yes.
Q. Approximately how many times?
A. At least twenty times in that part of the year."

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Officer Ruggiero acknowledged that, as a patrol officer, it was his responsibility to try to keep the streets safe in the area of Ridgeway Avenue. When asked whether the area within the vicinity of 634 North Ridgeway Avenue was residential, Officer Ruggiero responded, "Correct. Right across the street from Ryerson Elementary School." Officer Ruggiero was asked whether "[p]eople were coming and going, taking their kids to school, parents" and answered, "[f]airly active neighborhood. It is an active neighborhood."

¶ 9 Christopher Lappe, an investigator with the Cook County State's Attorney's office, testified that he measured the distance from 634 North Ridgeway Avenue to "646 North Lawndale. The Laura Ward Elementary School," and determined that the distance was 88 feet. Investigator Lappe testified that the end point for his measurement was "[t]he parking lot for the Laura Ward." Investigator Lappe also testified that the school was "formerly called Ryerson Elementary School."

¶ 10 Hardman was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school, a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 570/401(c), 407(b)(1) (West 2012). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Hardman to eight years in the Department of Corrections. The trial court admonished Hardman of his right to appeal and then asked the State whether it had any other motions. The State reminded the trial court of its motion for reimbursement of public defender fees. The following exchange occurred between the trial court and the assistant public defender:

"THE COURT: Ms. Hull, how many times have you appeared on this case?
HULL: Eight times, Judge.
THE COURT: How many?
HULL: Eight.
THE COURT: Eight. All right. And you went to trial. All right. Attorney's fees would be appropriate of $500. Thank you."

¶ 11 On appeal, Hardman argued (1) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the building at issue was operating as a school on the date of the offense because the evidence showed that the building was in flux or in transition around the time of the offense and (2) that the trial court erred in assessing the $500 public defender reimbursement fee without considering Hardman's ability to pay and, since "no hearing" was held within the statutory time limit on his ability to pay, that the fee should be vacated outright without remand. Although not relevant here, Hardman also sought to have the mittimus amended to reflect the correct name of the offense of which he was convicted.

¶ 12 The appellate court affirmed Hardman's conviction, concluding that the officers' testimony was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that the building located near the offense was a school. 2016 IL App (1st) 140913-U, ¶ 18. The appellate court agreed that the trial court erroneously assessed the $500 fee; however, it determined that the proper remedy was to remand the case to the trial court to hold a proper hearing to consider Hardman's ability to pay. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 Hardman asserts that the State failed to prove that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school. Specifically, Hardman acknowledges that he was proven guilty of the underlying possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver charge. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (West 2012). He disputes, however, that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove him guilty of the enhancement provision, which elevates the penalty where an underlying offense occurs within 1000 feet of the real property comprising a school. See 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012).

¶ 15 Second, Hardman contends that, because the trial court imposed a public defender fee without first inquiring into his financial circumstances, in accordance with section 113-3.1(a)'s requirements, "no hearing" took place. Thus, according to Hardman, the proper remedy is to vacate the fee outright instead of remanding for a proper hearing. We begin by addressing Hardman's argument that the State must demonstrate, for purposes of section 407(b)(1), that a building is an active or operational school on the date of the offense.

¶ 16 "School" Locality Enhancement

¶ 17 Section 407(b)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides that the offense of delivery of a controlled substance is a Class X felony when committed within 1000 feet of the real property comprising any "school." 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012). Hardman acknowledges that the State proved he possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (West 2012). However, for purposes of proving the locality enhancement under section 407(b)(1), Hardman disputes that the evidence presented at trial established that the building at issue was a school.

¶ 18 To establish that an offense occurred within 1000 feet of a school, Hardman asserts that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the building at issue was an active or operational "school" at the time of the offense. To do so, according to Hardman, requires that the State present particularized evidence, based on a witness's personal knowledge of an enhancing location's actual use at the time of the offense. It is insufficient, for example, for the State to present testimony of a police officer who simply refers to a building as a "school." The State counters that Hardman is essentially asking this court to import an additional element into the statute-to require proof that the school be "active" or "operating" at the time of the offense.

¶ 19 Whether the statute requires the State to present particularized evidence of a building's use involves a question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review. See People v. Ward , 215 Ill. 2d 317, 324, 294 Ill.Dec. 144, 830 N.E.2d 556 (2005) ("Defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument devolves into an issue of statutory interpretation[.]"). "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent." People v. Johnson , 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 15, 413 Ill.Dec. 10, 77 N.E.3d 615. "The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Hall v. Henn , 208 Ill. 2d 325, 330, 280 Ill.Dec. 546, 802 N.E.2d 797 (2003).

¶ 20 No section of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act defines the term "school." 720 ILCS 570/101 et seq. (West 2012). However, the term has acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and legislative acquiescence. See People v. Young , 2011 IL 111886, 355 Ill.Dec. 677, 960 N.E.2d 559 (relying on the Criminal Code of 1961 ( 720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2008))). Courts look to the definition of "school" contained within the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code), which provides that a school "means a public, private, or parochial elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university and includes the grounds of a school." 720 ILCS 5/2-19.5 (West 2012).

¶ 21 Hardman contends that this court's decision in Young , 2011 IL 111886, 355 Ill.Dec. 677, 960 N.E.2d 559, requires particularized evidence of the location's use to prove the enhancing location element. In Young , this court considered whether the term "school" contained in section 407(b)(2) ( 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2) (West 2008)) encompassed preschools. Young , 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 1, 355 Ill.Dec. 677, 960 N.E.2d 559. There, the defendant challenged whether the State had provided sufficient evidence to prove that the offense occurred within 1000 feet of a school. Id. At trial, there was testimony that the offense occurred within 1000 feet of the " 'High Mountain Church and Preschool,' " but no other testimony was offered to describe the school or its attendees. Id. ¶ 5. In light of legislative acquiescence and the Criminal Code's definition of the term "school," this court concluded that the term did not encompass preschools. Id. ¶¶ 16-19. Hardman asserts that, "[g]iven this Court's conclusion that not every school or school building constitutes a 'school' under the enhancing statute, there must be additional evidence of what happens in the building, not just conclusory testimony that the building is a school."

¶ 22 Hardman maintains that, consistent with Young , several appellate court decisions have followed suit in requiring that particularized evidence be presented to establish that an offense occurred within a statutory enhancing location. We briefly highlight these cases, which involve other types of statutory locality enhancements.

¶ 23 At issue in People v. Morgan was whether the State had provided sufficient proof that Bedrosian Park was a "public park" for purposes of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act ( 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 1996)). 301 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1031, 235 Ill.Dec. 355, 704 N.E.2d 928 (1998). Although the Illinois Controlled Substances Act does not define "public park," the Morgan court noted that "public park" had been defined by the court in other contexts as "a piece of ground in a city or village set apart for ornament or to afford the benefit of air, exercise or amusement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Hardman contends that, in Morgan , sufficient proof had been presented because police officer testimony demonstrated that, at the relevant time, the park grounds and its adjacent parking lot were open to and used by the public and that the grounds encompassed several enclosed spaces with recreational facilities. Also, the defendant had testified that he played basketball at the park on the day of the offense. Id. at 1032, 235 Ill.Dec. 355, 704 N.E.2d 928. Hardman cites Morgan approvingly and asserts that Morgan demonstrates that the particularized testimony, based on personal knowledge and observations of the area on the day in question, established that Bedrosian Park was a public park in fact and not merely in name.

¶ 24 In People v. Fickes , the appellate court held that, to support a charge for aggravated participation in methamphetamine trafficking, "the State must present evidence, from a witness or witnesses who are sufficiently familiar with the area in question, that supports a reasonable inference that the building in question was functioning primarily as a place of worship on the date of the offense." 2017 IL App (5th) 140300, ¶ 27, 413 Ill.Dec. 985, 79 N.E.3d 334. There, the defendant's conviction was reduced from aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing to simple participation in methamphetamine manufacturing because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the offense occurred within 1000 feet of St. James Lutheran Church. Id. The appellate court concluded that no reasonable jury could have inferred that the building was functioning primarily as a church on the date of the offense because, "[a]s a matter of both logic and common sense, there is no inherent rational connection between a witness's mere use of the term 'church' at trial and the fact that the 'church' was or was not functioning primarily as a place of worship on a particular date prior to trial." Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 25 Hardman relies on other appellate cases involving churches. In People v. Sparks , the appellate court considered whether the State had demonstrated that the Salvation Army chapel was a church for purposes of section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act ( 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2) (West 2000)). 335 Ill. App. 3d 249, 251, 269 Ill.Dec. 309, 780 N.E.2d 781 (2002). The Sparks court noted that, in determining whether a building is a church, the "appropriate focus must be on the manner in which the place is used, i.e. , whether its primary use is for religious worship." Id. at 256, 269 Ill.Dec. 309, 780 N.E.2d 781. The Sparks court concluded that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the chapel was a church, given the testimony of the chapel's minister, who testified that the chapel was used exclusively for religious services. Id. It did not matter that services were only held once a week, that the chapel was part of a larger building used for nonreligious purposes, or that the chapel lacked certain traditional physical characteristics of a church. Id. at 256-57, 269 Ill.Dec. 309, 780 N.E.2d 781.

¶ 26 In People v. Ortiz , the appellate court held that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, on the date of the offense, there was a church within 1000 feet of the site of the offense. 2012 IL App (2d) 101261, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 637, 971 N.E.2d 1159. Although an officer testified that he measured the distance from the drug transaction to the building at issue, he did not testify to the date on which he conducted the measurement. Id. ¶ 11. Also, no testimony was presented to establish when photographs of the building were taken or whether the photographs accurately represented the building as of the date of the offense. Id. For these reasons, the Ortiz court concluded that it had no way of knowing whether Emmanuel Baptist Church existed on the date of the offense. Id.

¶ 27 In People v. Cadena , the appellate court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Evangelical Covenant Church was an active church on the date that the defendant was arrested for purposes of section 407(b)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act ( 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2008)). 2013 IL App (2d) 120285, ¶ 1, 373 Ill.Dec. 734, 994 N.E.2d 219. The Cadena court noted that the State had provided even less evidence than it had in Ortiz . Id. ¶ 13. Although the building at issue was, by name, a church, the Cadena court observed that Sparks requires proof of how the building was used. Id. ¶ 15. Specifically, the State did not present testimony from a witness with personal knowledge that the building was an active church on the date of the offenses. Id. ¶ 18. The Cadena court observed, however, that a police officer who testified to being familiar with the church due to regular patrol of the neighborhood would have had sufficient personal knowledge to testify as to the church's active status. Id.

¶ 28 Finally, Hardman relies on People v. Boykin , which considered whether the State had proved that "Our Lady of Peace" was a school for purposes of the enhancement under section 407(b)(2) ( 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2) (West 2008)). 2013 IL App (1st) 112696, ¶ 5, 377 Ill.Dec. 49, 1 N.E.3d 936. Relying on Ortiz and Cadena , the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The Boykin court found that the case was analogous to Cadena , where "there was no evidence of how the testifying officer would have known that the church was active on the dates of the offenses." Id. ¶¶ 14-15. In Boykin , the State had presented officer testimony that the offense took place within 1000 feet of a "school," but "there was no evidence presented to show how those officers had personal knowledge of the operation of that building." Id. ¶ 15. Citing Cadena , the Boykin court noted that "[t]he officers did not testify that they lived in the area or that they regularly patrolled the neighborhood, so as to allow an inference that they had personal knowledge as to whether the school was in operation on the date of the offense." Id. The Boykin court also commented that "there was even less evidence presented than in Cadena , as there were no questions asked at trial regarding whether Our Lady of Peace was an 'active' school." Id. For these reasons, the Boykin court reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school and affirmed the defendant's conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 29 Turning to Young , we disagree with Hardman's contention that Young requires the State to present evidence as to whether a school is active or operational on the date of the offense. The decisive factor in Young was that the term "school" did not encompass the type of school at issue therein. 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 19, 355 Ill.Dec. 677, 960 N.E.2d 559 (the term "school" was not defined "to include preschools"). This court did not base its holding upon whether the State had presented enough particularized evidence as to whether the preschool was active or operational on the day of the offense. Such evidence was not necessary to the conclusion that the term "school" did not extend to preschools for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act.

¶ 30 With the exception of Boykin , we find each of the appellate court cases distinguishable because each dealt with a statutory enhancing location other than a school. Morgan involved a "public park" that, based on its established definition, necessarily required evidence relevant to whether the property at issue was "a piece of ground in a city or village set apart for ornament or to afford the benefit of air, exercise or amusement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1031, 235 Ill.Dec. 355, 704 N.E.2d 928.

¶ 31 Fickes , Sparks , Ortiz , and Cadena do not support Hardman's position for two reasons. Fickes , 2017 IL App (5th) 140300, 413 Ill.Dec. 985, 79 N.E.3d 334 ; Sparks , 335 Ill. App. 3d at 251, 269 Ill.Dec. 309, 780 N.E.2d 781 ;

Ortiz , 2012 IL App (2d) 101261, 361 Ill.Dec. 637, 971 N.E.2d 1159; Cadena , 2013 IL App (2d) 120285, 373 Ill.Dec. 734, 994 N.E.2d 219. First, each of these cases involved the statutory enhancing location of a church. Subsections 407(b)(1)-(6) provide for aggravated penalties for drug violations occurring "within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any church, synagogue, or other building, structure, or place used primarily for religious worship ." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1)-(6) (West 2012). Conversely, subsections 407(b)(1)-(6) do not speak to any "use" requirement in the context of a school locality enhancement. Id. This court "will not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions" that are not found in a statute. People v. Roberts , 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 291 Ill.Dec. 674, 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005).

¶ 32 Second, section 407(c) makes clear that the State need not demonstrate that a building was active or operational on the day of the offense. See 720 ILCS 570/407(c) (West 2012). Section 407(c) provides: "[r]egarding penalties prescribed in subsection (b) for violations committed in a school or on or within 1,000 feet of school property, the time of day, time of year and whether classes were currently in session at the time of the offense is irrelevant." 720 ILCS 570/407(c) (West 2012); People v. Daniels , 307 Ill. App. 3d 917, 929, 241 Ill.Dec. 210, 718 N.E.2d 1064 (1999) ("The inclusion of section 407(c) is the legislature's way of ensuring that schools remain drug-free zones even when school is not in session."). Section 407(c) is directed only at schools. 720 ILCS 570/407(c) (West 2012). Section 407 does not except such circumstances from consideration for any other statutory enhancing location. Requiring particularized evidence as to a purported school building's active or operational status on the day of an offense would run counter to section 407(c)'s plain language.

¶ 33 Boykin also fails to support Hardman's position. Boykin 's reasoning and holding is based on Cadena , which involved the enhancing location of a church. As discussed, subsections 407(b)(1)-(6) require the State to demonstrate that the purported church was "used primarily for religious worship." See 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1)-(6) (West 2012). Conversely, subsections 407(b)(1)-(6) and section 407(c) make clear that the State need not present particularized evidence as to a purported school's use. Requiring such evidence would necessarily and impermissibly read a use requirement into the statute and conflict with section 407(c).

¶ 34 For these reasons, we reject Hardman's argument that, for purposes of demonstrating that an offense took place within 1000 feet of a school under section 407(b), the State must present particularized evidence that a building is an "active" or "operational" school on the day of the offense. We now address whether the testimony presented at Hardman's trial was sufficient to prove that Hardman's underlying offense occurred within 1000 feet of a school. 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012).

¶ 35 Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 36 Having determined that, for purposes of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, the State need not present particularized evidence that a building is an "active" or "operational" school on the day of the offense, we now consider the sufficiency of the evidence presented at Hardman's bench trial.

¶ 37 "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, our inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."

People v. Baskerville , 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31, 357 Ill.Dec. 500, 963 N.E.2d 898. All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the prosecution. People v. Martin , 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 15, 353 Ill.Dec. 247, 955 N.E.2d 1058. "This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses." People v. Jackson , 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81, 328 Ill.Dec. 1, 903 N.E.2d 388 (2009). "[I]n weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt." Id. at 281, 328 Ill.Dec. 1, 903 N.E.2d 388. This court "will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." People v. Campbell , 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992).

¶ 38 Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that the testimony gave rise to a reasonable inference that 646 North Lawndale Avenue was a school. Hardman asserts that, because no one with personal knowledge of the building's operation on the date of the offense testified, the State failed to prove that 646 North Lawndale Avenue was a school. As discussed, Hardman's particularized evidence argument fails. Officer Harmon's and Officer Ruggiero's testimony demonstrated familiarity with 646 North Lawndale Avenue and the surrounding area.

¶ 39 Officer Ruggiero stated that he had worked in the eleventh district for seven years, that he was a patrol officer there, and that he had made "numerous arrests in that area." Officer Ruggiero described the area where the offense occurred as residential and said that it took place "right next to a school called Ryerson Elementary School at that time." Officer Ruggiero had also previously conducted surveillance of the area at least 20 times during that part of the year.

¶ 40 Hardman suggests that Officer Ruggiero demonstrated a lack of personal knowledge because he merely responded on cross-examination that "[i]t is an active neighborhood" when asked whether people were coming and going, taking their kids to school. Again, Hardman's contention relies on the assumption that Officer Ruggiero was required to know exactly what happened in the building on the date of the offense. As mentioned, such exacting testimony is not necessary. Under section 407(c), whether people were coming and going, taking their kids to school, is irrelevant to the building's status as a school. 720 ILCS 570/407(c) (West 2012) ("[T]he time of day, time of year and whether classes were currently in session at the time of the offense [are] irrelevant.").

¶ 41 Officer Harmon testified that he had worked in the eleventh district for nine years, that he was familiar with the area where the offense occurred, including the schools near that location, and that the school was named Ryerson on the date of the offense. Officer Harmon also testified that the name of the school had changed to Laura Ward.

¶ 42 Hardman maintains that, "[a]t best, the State's evidence showed that the building was undergoing changes that summer, as indicated by the different names." We reject this argument. A rational trier of fact could have found that Ryerson Elementary became Laura Ward Elementary. A change in school name, alone, does not mean that 646 North Lawndale Avenue stopped being a school during the transition.

¶ 43 Hardman also cites People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255, 322 Ill.Dec. 574, 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008), contending that, to presume that a building that is labeled as a school is, in fact, a school unless rebutted by proof to the contrary creates an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption. This argument fails. Nowhere does section 407 state that the trier of fact must presume that, once a witness uses the word "school" to describe a building, the building is in fact a school. The trier of fact was at all times free to accept or reject a conclusion that the evidence demonstrated that 646 North Lawndale Avenue was a school. The very case upon which Hardman relies, Boykin , explained that "[t]he officers did not testify that they lived in the area or that they regularly patrolled the neighborhood, so as to allow an inference that they had personal knowledge as to whether the school was in operation on the date of the offense." 2013 IL App (1st) 112696, ¶ 15, 377 Ill.Dec. 49, 1 N.E.3d 936.

¶ 44 In the instant case, not only did the evidence show that 646 North Lawndale Avenue was named as a school, Officer Harmon's and Officer Ruggiero's testimony revealed their familiarity with the area where 646 North Lawndale Avenue was located. Both officers had worked in the area for years, and both knew enough about the area to know that the name of the school had changed. As mentioned, a "trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence." People v. Jackson , 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281, 328 Ill.Dec. 1, 903 N.E.2d 388 (2009). The logical inference, here, is that both officers knew the area well enough to know that 646 North Lawndale Avenue was still a school, despite the school's change in name.

¶ 45 We agree with the appellate court that the status of 646 North Lawndale Avenue as a school could be inferred from the testimony of two officers with demonstrated familiarity with the area due to their having worked in the area for years. Therefore, we affirm Hardman's conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school. 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012). We now address whether Hardman is entitled to outright vacatur of the public defender reimbursement fee or remand for a proper hearing.

¶ 46 Public Defender Reimbursement Fee

¶ 47 Section 113-3.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits circuit courts to order defendants who receive the services of appointed counsel to pay a public defender reimbursement fee. 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012). The prior version of this statute did not provide for a hearing or for consideration of a defendant's ability to pay the fee. People v. Love , 177 Ill. 2d 550, 557, 227 Ill.Dec. 109, 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997). Thus, in People v. Cook , this court held that "[a] summary decision which orders reimbursement without affording a hearing with opportunity to present evidence and be heard acts to violate an indigent defendant's right to procedural due process." 81 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 40 Ill.Dec. 825, 407 N.E.2d 56 (1980). Accordingly, the Illinois legislature enacted section 113-3.1 to remedy the due process violation identified in Cook by requiring that a trial court conduct a hearing that considers the defendant's financial ability to pay the fee before the fee may be ordered. Love , 177 Ill. 2d at 559, 227 Ill.Dec. 109, 687 N.E.2d 32. The hearing must occur within 90 days of the entry of the final order disposing of the case. 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012).

¶ 48 Hardman asserts that the circuit court violated his due process rights when it failed to notify him that it was considering imposing the fee and did not provide Hardman an opportunity to present evidence regarding his ability to pay the fee. See People v. Somers , 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 14, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471 ("[T]he court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances."). Thus, Hardman contends that the circuit court improperly assessed the $500 public defender reimbursement fee without holding a hearing, pursuant to section 113-3.1(a), to determine his ability to pay the fee. See 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012). Hardman also argues that, in light of judicial economy and public policy, no case should be remanded for the imposition of a public defender fee where the defendant did not receive a proper hearing the first time.

¶ 49 The appellate court concluded, and the State conceded, that the trial court did not conduct a sufficient hearing. 2016 IL App (1st) 140913-U, ¶ 19. We note that, although Hardman failed to object to the imposition of the public defender reimbursement fee at his sentencing hearing, the issue is not forfeited. See Love , 177 Ill. 2d at 564, 227 Ill.Dec. 109, 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997) ; People v. Carreon , 2011 IL App (2d) 100391, ¶ 11, 355 Ill.Dec. 783, 960 N.E.2d 665 ("where a trial court imposes this fee without following the appropriate procedural requirements, application of the forfeiture rule is inappropriate").

¶ 50 At issue is whether the proper remedy calls for outright vacatur of the fee or remand for a compliant hearing. Whether the appellate court should have vacated the public defender reimbursement fee outright instead of remanding for a hearing on his ability to pay raises a question of law, subject to de novo review. See People v. Gutierrez , 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 16, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437.

¶ 51 Section 113-3.1(a) provides:

"Whenever under either Section 113-3 of this Code or Rule 607 of the Illinois Supreme Court the court appoints counsel to represent a defendant, the court may order the defendant to pay to the Clerk of the Circuit Court a reasonable sum to reimburse either the county or the State for such representation. In a hearing to determine the amount of the payment, the court shall consider the affidavit prepared by the defendant under Section 113-3 of this Code and any other information pertaining to the defendant's financial circumstances which may be submitted by the parties. Such hearing shall be conducted on the court's own motion or on motion of the State's Attorney at any time after the appointment of counsel but no later than 90 days after the entry of a final order disposing of the case at the trial level." 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012).

¶ 52 Hardman contends that, if "no hearing" on a defendant's ability to pay and his financial circumstances took place within 90 days, this court has held that the proper result is to vacate the fee outright. See Gutierrez , 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 28, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437. Therefore, because the trial court asked no questions about Hardman's financial circumstances and gave him no opportunity to present evidence, Hardman maintains that the proceedings did not meet the threshold requirement to be considered "some sort of a hearing" under Somers . See 2013 IL 114054, ¶¶ 14-15, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471. Because "no hearing" was held within 90 days of the final order disposing of the case at the trial level, as required under section 113-3.1(a), Hardman contends that the fee must be vacated without remand.

¶ 53 The State argues that section 113-3.1(a)'s timing requirement governs the trial court's assessment of a public defender fee in the first instance, not the remedies available on appeal from a timely, but improper, assessment. The State acknowledges that the hearing was deficient but asserts that a hearing still took place. The State rejects Hardman's contention that Gutierrez holds that, whenever a hearing has not been held within 90 days, that remand is an inappropriate remedy. Finally, the State asserts that section 113-3.1(a)'s 90-day timing requirement is directory. However, the State posits that this court need not resolve the issue of whether section 113-3.1(a) is mandatory or directory because the requirement governs the timing of the trial court's assessment of the fee in the first instance.

¶ 54 In Gutierrez , this court considered whether the appellate court had properly remanded for notice and a hearing on the defendant's ability to pay a public defender fee. 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 1, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437. There, neither the court nor the State had moved for imposition of the public defender reimbursement fee. Id. ¶ 24. Rather, the circuit clerk imposed the fee. Id. In explaining that the cause should not have been remanded, this court stated: "The circuit clerk had no authority to impose the public defender fee on its own, and, because neither the State nor the circuit court was seeking a public defender fee, the appellate court should have vacated the fee outright." Id.

¶ 55 Hardman's reliance upon Gutierrez is misplaced. In Gutierrez , neither the State nor the circuit court requested reimbursement. Id. As we explained, "[p]ursuant to statute, a public defender fee may be imposed only by the circuit court after notice and a hearing on the defendant's ability to pay." (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 26. The record did not indicate that the circuit court was considering ordering the imposition of a public defender reimbursement fee. Id. ¶ 24. Because the fee was imposed by the circuit clerk, who was without the statutory authority to do so, there was no circuit court order for reimbursement. And because there was no circuit court order for reimbursement of a public defender fee, the appellate court could not remand for a hearing on an order that did not exist. This court noted that "the statute clearly does not contemplate the State asking for a public defender fee for the first time when the case is on appeal." Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 56 Next, Hardman cites Somers , in which we concluded that the proper remedy was to remand for a proper hearing. 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 20, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471. Hardman maintains that Somers is distinguishable because, there, the circuit court had asked three questions about the defendant's employment status before imposing the fee. Id. ¶ 4. Essentially, Hardman argues that, despite the imposition of a fee at his sentencing hearing, no hearing occurred because the circuit court failed to inquire into his financial circumstances as the circuit court did in Somers . Id.

¶ 57 In Somers , this court considered whether the appellate court properly remanded for a proper public defender reimbursement fee hearing when more than 90 days had elapsed since the trial court's entry of a final order. Id. ¶ 1. Before imposing the public defender fee, the trial court asked the defendant the following questions: whether defendant thought he could get a job when he was released from jail, if defendant would use the money he earned from a job to pay his fines and costs, and if there was any physical reason why he could not work. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had not complied with section 113-3.1(a). Id. ¶ 6. The defendant asked the appellate court to remand the cause for a proper hearing. Id. The appellate court did so. Id. However, the defendant subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, citing Gutierrez and arguing that the cause should not have been remanded because more than 90 days had elapsed. Id. The appellate court denied the petition for rehearing, and we allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

¶ 58 Before this court, the defendant argued that, because more than 90 days had elapsed, the appellate court was without authority to remand for a hearing because section 113-3.1(a)'s 90-day time limit is mandatory. Id. ¶ 9. The State argued that the actual issue was that the hearing held by the trial court was insufficient to satisfy section 113-3.1(a)'s requirements. Id. ¶ 13. Because the trial court complied with the statute's time limit, the State argued that the court did not need to reach the issue of whether the 90-day time limit is mandatory or directory. Id.

¶ 59 We agreed that the few questions posed by the trial court to defendant regarding his employment status were insufficient to satisfy section 113-3.1(a). Id. ¶ 14. We made clear what is required for a proper hearing pursuant to section 113-3.1(a) and then concluded that a hearing, albeit an insufficient one, had occurred:

"To comply with the statute, the court may not simply impose the fee in a perfunctory manner. [Citation.] Rather, the court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances. [Citation.] The hearing must focus on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay. [Citation.] The trial court must consider, among other evidence, the defendant's financial affidavit. [Citations.]
Clearly, then, the trial court did not fully comply with the statute, and defendant is entitled to a new hearing. Just as clearly, though, the trial court did have some sort of a hearing within the statutory time period. The trial court inquired of defendant whether he thought he could get a job when he was released from jail, whether he planned on using his future income to pay his fines and costs, and whether there was any physical reason why he could not work. Only after hearing defendant's answers to these questions did the court impose the fee. Thus, we agree with the State's contention that the problem here is not that the trial court did not hold a hearing within 90 days, but that the hearing that the court did hold was insufficient to comply with the statute." (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶¶ 14-15.

¶ 60 Because the trial court had complied with the 90-day statutory time period, we determined that there was no bar to remanding the cause for a proper hearing. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 61 Since Somers , appellate courts have determined that "remand is proper if 'some sort of a hearing' was held within the statutory period." People v. Glass , 2017 IL App (1st) 143551, ¶ 12, 411 Ill.Dec. 136, 72 N.E.3d 824. However, an appellate conflict has developed due to situations wherein a trial court afforded a defendant a less sufficient hearing than in Somers . See, e.g. , Id. ¶ 9 (court asked defense counsel how many times he had appeared in court, court noted that the case proceeded to a jury trial, and court then stated that $500 would be appropriate); People v. Castillo , 2016 IL App (2d) 140529, ¶ 1, 402 Ill.Dec. 291, 51 N.E.3d 1043 (court imposed fee after assistant public defender told the court that the public defender's office had prepared a motion in defendant's case); People v. Moore , 2015 IL App (1st) 141451, ¶ 30, 399 Ill.Dec. 25, 45 N.E.3d 696 (State reminded court of its motion for reimbursement, court asked defense counsel how many times she had appeared, and court assessed the fee).

¶ 62 Appellate courts have attached one of two meanings to what is contemplated by "some sort of a hearing." Some panels have concluded that a hearing does not occur where a court in no way addresses a defendant's ability to pay the public defender fee. See Moore , 2015 IL App (1st) 141451, 399 Ill.Dec. 25, 45 N.E.3d 696 ; Castillo , 2016 IL App (2d) 140529, ¶¶ 14-15, 402 Ill.Dec. 291, 51 N.E.3d 1043 ; People v. Montgomery , 2016 IL App (1st) 140507-U, ¶ 19, 2016 WL 1065534 ; People v. Lozada , 2016 IL App (1st) 143143-U, ¶ 12, 2016 WL 5156452. Other panels have focused more generally upon the State's motion to impose a fee and the ordinary definition of a "hearing." See Glass , 2017 IL App (1st) 143551, ¶¶ 13, 15, 411 Ill.Dec. 136, 72 N.E.3d 824 ; People v. Williams , 2013 IL App (2d) 120094, ¶ 20, 377 Ill.Dec. 383, 1 N.E.3d 1270 ; People v. Rankin , 2015 IL App (1st) 133409, ¶ 21, 394 Ill.Dec. 853, 37 N.E.3d 332 ; People v. Adams , 2016 IL App (1st) 141135, ¶ 26, 401 Ill.Dec. 596, 50 N.E.3d 738 ; People v. Alejo , 2015 IL App (1st) 133508-U, ¶ 29, 2015 WL 4730387 ; People v. Garcia , 2015 IL App (1st) 133502-U, ¶ 10, 2015 WL 4730379 ; People v. Turner , 2015 IL App (1st) 140028-U, ¶ 18, 2015 WL 9315720.

¶ 63 Those panels concluding that "some sort of a hearing" requires some inquiry into the defendant's financial circumstances attribute much weight to the fact that, in Somers , this court observed that the trial court had asked the defendant three questions about his financial circumstances. 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 15, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471. Specifically, after concluding that the trial court did not satisfy section 113-3.1(a), but that "some sort of a hearing" had still occurred, this court observed that the trial court had asked defendant about his ability to obtain a job, whether defendant would use future income to pay for his fines and costs, and if there was a physical reason why defendant may not be able to work. Id. As one panel reasoned, if "some sort of a hearing" means only a hearing in the ordinary or abstract sense, it would have been pointless for this court to focus on the trial court's three questions about the defendant's finances. Castillo , 2016 IL App (2d) 140529, ¶ 13, 402 Ill.Dec. 291, 51 N.E.3d 1043. For example, "[h]ad the supreme court needed only to distinguish Gutierrez , i.e. , if all that had been required were the trial court's imposition of the fee in open court, those questions would have been irrelevant." Id.

¶ 64 To illuminate what was meant by "some sort of a hearing" in Somers , other panels look to People v. Johnson , wherein this court defined the term "hearing," albeit in a different context. 206 Ill. 2d 348, 358, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294 (2002) ; Glass , 2017 IL App (1st) 143551, ¶ 15, 411 Ill.Dec. 136, 72 N.E.3d 824 ; Williams , 2013 IL App (2d) 120094, ¶ 20, 377 Ill.Dec. 383, 1 N.E.3d 1270. There, this court defined the term "hearing" as it is denoted in Black's Law Dictionary. Johnson , 206 Ill. 2d at 358, 276 Ill.Dec. 399, 794 N.E.2d 294 (a hearing is a " 'judicial session usu[ally] open to the public, held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying.' Black's Law Dictionary 725 (7th ed. 1999)."). For example, the Williams court opined that this definition buttresses the Somers court's statement that a hearing "clearly" took place. Williams , 2013 IL App (2d) 120094, ¶ 24, 377 Ill.Dec. 383, 1 N.E.3d 1270. If a hearing "clearly" took place in Somers , this suggests that a lesser inquiry would suffice to constitute a hearing. Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 65 It is clear that the assessment of the public defender reimbursement fee in Hardman's case did not comply with section 113-3.1(a). After the State reminded the court of its motion, the trial court asked defense counsel how many times she had appeared, noted that the case went to trial, and then imposed a fee of $500. Among other deficiencies, the trial court did not consider Hardman's financial circumstances and did not obtain a financial affidavit. See 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2012). We need only determine whether "some sort of a hearing" occurred and, in turn, the proper remedy.

¶ 66 Despite the deficiencies attendant to the trial court's imposition of the fee, we remand the cause for a proper hearing because "some sort of a hearing" occurred. Under Somers , "some sort of a hearing" encompasses a proceeding that meets the ordinary definition of a hearing, as noted above. In the instant case, the State reminded the court of the motion for reimbursement at the sentencing hearing. A judicial session occurred, and the issue of whether Hardman should be assessed a public defender fee was considered. It was only after the trial court asked the public defender how many times she had appeared that the court assessed the fee. The parties were present, and the hearing occurred within the 90-day time limit. In Somers , we did not state that the questions asked by the trial court were determinative of whether a hearing had occurred. See 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 15, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471.

¶ 67 Although a trial court's compliance with section 113-3.1(a) would satisfy the definition of a "hearing," a trial court's failure to satisfy section 113-3.1(a) does not automatically mean that there was "no hearing." As the Williams court observed, were we to require an inquiry into a defendant's finances as a precondition for remand, this would "inevitably require us to artificially parse out what constitutes an insufficient hearing that is adequate to trigger a remand * * *. For example, would one financial question be enough of an inquiry to allow for a remand?" 2013 IL App (2d) 120094, ¶ 25, 377 Ill.Dec. 383, 1 N.E.3d 1270. Also, unlike in Gutierrez , the State had clearly sought imposition of the public defender reimbursement fee before the trial court. Gutierrez , 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 23, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437 ("the statute clearly does not contemplate the State asking for a public defender fee for the first time when the case is on appeal").

¶ 68 Hardman contends that, under this reading of Somers , the outcome in People v. Daniels would have been different. See People v. Daniels , 2015 IL App (2d) 130517, 390 Ill.Dec. 47, 28 N.E.3d 216. There, the trial court made no reference to a public defender fee during the sentencing hearing but assessed the fee in a written order later that day. Id. ¶ 29. The appellate court determined that the fee should be vacated because it was assessed without a hearing. Id. ¶ 30. We reject Hardman's argument. Unlike the instant case, Daniels involved imposition of a fee in the absence of the parties. Id. ¶ 29.

¶ 69 Finally, Hardman argues that, because this court "may provide by rule for procedures for the enforcement of orders entered under this Section" ( 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(d) (West 2012)), this court should conclude that no case should ever be remanded for the imposition of a public defender fee where the defendant did not receive a proper hearing the first time. We decline to address Hardman's policy argument. Although we have repeatedly expressed our disappointment that defendants are often deprived of a proper hearing on the issue of a public defender reimbursement fee, we remain confident that circuit courts will properly comply with the statute in the first instance. See Somers , 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 18, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471 ; Gutierrez , 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 26, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437.

¶ 70 Based on our conclusion that a hearing occurred within the statutory time limit, we need not address the issue of whether section 113-3.1(a)'s 90-day time limit is mandatory or directory. See Somers , 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 18, 368 Ill.Dec. 525, 984 N.E.2d 471. Because we conclude that "some sort of a hearing" occurred, we hold that the proper remedy in Hardman's case is to remand for a proper hearing.

¶ 71 CONCLUSION

¶ 72 To prove that an offense occurred within 1000 feet of a school, for purposes of section 407(b)(1), the State is not required to present particularized evidence that the building is an active or operational school on the date of the offense. 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (2012). We find that, based on the testimony presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could have found that the State had proved that the offense took place within 1000 feet of a school. We affirm Hardman's conviction and sentence.

¶ 73 The trial court failed to comply with the requirements of section 113-3.1(a), and therefore we affirm the appellate court's vacatur of the public defender fee. Because "some sort of a hearing" occurred, we hold that the proper remedy is to remand for a proper hearing before a public defender fee may be imposed. Thus, the appellate court properly remanded for a new hearing.

¶ 74 Appellate court judgment affirmed; cause remanded.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Kathy CORBETT, Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF LAKE, et al. (City of Highland Park, Appellant).
    Docket No. 121536
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed November 30, 2017
    Matthew B. Knight and Michael J. Atkus, of Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & Knight, Ltd., of Rosemont, for appellant.
    Peter F. Higgins, of Lipkin & Higgins, of Chicago, and Lynn D. Dowd, of Naperville, for appellee.
    Edward F. Dutton, of Lisle, for amicus curiae Park District Risk Management Agency.
   JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is the meaning of section 3-107(b) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) ( 745 ILCS 10/3-107(b) (West 2012)). The plaintiff filed a complaint at law in the circuit court of Lake County against the County of Lake (County) and the city of Highland Park (City) for personal injuries arising out of a bicycling accident on the Skokie Valley Bike Path. Defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment alleging various immunities under the Act. The circuit court allowed both motions and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed the judgment with respect to the City only.

¶ 2 The appellate court reversed the part of the circuit court's judgment pertaining to the City and remanded the cause to the circuit court. 2016 IL App (2d) 160035, 407 Ill.Dec. 712, 64 N.E.3d 90. The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in holding that the Skokie Valley Bike Path is a riding "trail" within the meaning of section 3-107(b) of the Act. Id. ¶ 33. Thus, the City could not assert absolute immunity under section 3-107(b). Id. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court but for different reasons.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On August 21, 2013, plaintiff, Kathy Corbett, was riding her bicycle with a group of other cyclists on the Skokie Valley Bike Path. The group was riding south on a portion of the path running parallel to Skokie Valley Road (U.S. Route 41), between Park Avenue West and Old Deerfield Road, within the city of Highland Park. Plaintiff alleged that, prior to that date, defendants had been informed of a dangerous condition on that section of the path, in which "weeds and other vegetation were growing up through the asphalt * * *, causing portions of the path to be broken, bumpy and elevated." Plaintiff alleged that she was thrown off her bicycle while riding over the defective portion of the path, causing her to sustain severe injuries. She alleged that her injuries were proximately caused by the willful and wanton acts or omissions of defendants.

¶ 5 According to documents in the record, at the time of plaintiff's accident the County was a party to a recreational lease agreement over the Skokie Valley Bike Path with Commonwealth Edison (ComEd). ComEd was the owner of the right-of-way encompassing the path, and the County was a tenant. Other documents in the record reveal that the County and the City were parties to a maintenance agreement, which provided that the City was responsible for routine maintenance on the portion of the path within the corporate limits of Highland Park. According to the agreement, "routine maintenance" included all activities necessary to keep the path in a reasonably safe and serviceable condition for bicycle and pedestrian traffic.

¶ 6 In its answer to plaintiff's complaint, the City raised various affirmative defenses , including immunity under section 3-107(b) of the Act. Defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. Relevant to this appeal, the City asserted in its motion that it was absolutely immune from liability, even for willful and wanton conduct, pursuant to section 3-107(b). That section provides, in part: "[n]either a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a condition of: * * * (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail." 745 ILCS 10/3-107(b) (West 2012). The City attached several exhibits in support of its motion. The exhibits included deposition transcripts of plaintiff and other witnesses.

¶ 7 Plaintiff testified in her deposition that, on the date of the accident, she was riding her bicycle with a group of people with whom she regularly rode. She had previously ridden on the particular stretch of path where the accident occurred. Plaintiff testified that section of the path was surrounded by shrubs and wild grasses. It was separated from residences and commercial businesses and set back from the highway. Plaintiff testified that the group was riding south on the path at a speed of 15 to 17 miles per hour as they approached a stop sign at Old Deerfield Road. The rider two places in front of her, Hasan Syed, hit a bump, lost control of his bicycle, and crashed. Plaintiff testified that the rider directly in front of her veered off, but she was not able to do so. Instead, she rode over Syed and flew off her bicycle, landing on the asphalt and sustaining multiple injuries.

¶ 8 Yves Roubaud testified in his deposition that he was riding with plaintiff and the others on August 21, 2013. He described the path as a bicycle path used by cyclists and walkers for recreational purposes. It had a yellow dividing line on it. Roubaud testified that the stretch of the path where the accident occurred was separated from residences and commercial businesses and set back from the highway. Roubaud stated that he was riding between Syed and plaintiff when Syed fell to the ground. Roubaud stated that he swerved to the left and rolled over Syed's leg but did not fall down. He then turned around and saw plaintiff lying on the ground, moaning in pain.

¶ 9 In his deposition, Syed testified that the path was used for recreational bicyclists riding at slow speeds and for walkers. He stated that the path was not intended to be used by professional riders but was "just for fun." Syed stated that the path had shrubs on both sides. Syed testified consistently with plaintiff and Roubaud regarding the events surrounding plaintiff's accident.

¶ 10 John Stevens testified in his deposition that he was riding with plaintiff and the others on August 21, 2013. He described the path as approximately six feet wide, paved with asphalt, and "lined by some type of growth most of the way, whether hedges or bushes." He stated that the path was not connected to any particular park. He also testified that the path was separated from commercial businesses and from traffic other than bicycles, walkers, and runners.

¶ 11 In her response to the City's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argued that the path is not a "riding trail" under section 3-107(b) of the Act because it is paved and runs through a busy, developed commercial and industrial area of the city rather than a forest or mountainous region. Plaintiff attached her affidavit, in which she averred that she was familiar with the exact location on the path where the incident occurred, having ridden her bicycle through the area many times. She also attached photographs in support of her statements describing the path.

¶ 12 Plaintiff alleged the following facts. The path is not located in a wooded, natural scenic area. The path passes by a city park called Buckthorn Park. At the specific location where the accident occurred, there are commercial and industrial businesses, parking lots, and buildings abutting both sides of the path. Many of the businesses have cyclone fences that are adjacent to the path. Behind these fences are stacks of industrial materials such as pipes and cement blocks. There are some large bushes and grass but no trees present in the area where the incident occurred. Near the site of the accident, the path intersects with Old Deerfield Road, which is a busy city street with motor vehicles regularly crossing the path. As bicyclists approach the road from the north and south, there are stop signs for the bicyclists but no stop signs for the cars. The path is sandwiched between U.S. Route 41, which is less than one block to the east, and railroad tracks, which are less than one block to the west. There are large ComEd utility poles that run alongside the entire path, with multiple power lines overhead.

¶ 13 In its reply, the City did not dispute the facts averred by plaintiff. It argued, however, that the decisions of neighboring landowners to develop their property and the fact that the path is adjacent to a road did not defeat the immunity conferred by section 3-107(b) of the Act. The City argued that the nature of the path itself is determinative of whether it is a "riding trail" under section 3-107(b). The City contended that the undisputed evidence, i.e. , that the path is surrounded by grass, shrubs, hedges, and bushes, shows that it is a "riding trail" as contemplated by section 3-107(b).

¶ 14 The circuit court allowed both defendants' motions and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, plaintiff did not challenge the judgment for the County. She argued that the grant of summary judgment for the City was error because the path was not a "riding trail," as that term has been construed by the appellate court.

¶ 15 The appellate court reversed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the City and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 2016 IL App (2d) 160035, ¶¶ 33-34, 407 Ill.Dec. 712, 64 N.E.3d 90 (affirming in part and reversing in part the circuit court's judgment). The appellate court reviewed the relevant case law and found that the judicially accepted definition of the word "trail" is " 'a "marked path through a forest or mountainous region." ' " Id. ¶¶ 23, 29 (quoting Brown v. Cook County Forest Preserve , 284 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1101, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d 383 (1996), quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981)). The court concluded that the presence of industrial and residential development completely surrounding the path defeated the City's argument that it runs through a forest or mountainous region. 2016 IL App (2d) 160035, ¶¶ 29-30, 407 Ill.Dec. 712, 64 N.E.3d 90. Therefore, the immunity provided by section 3-107(b) did not apply. Id.

¶ 16 This court allowed the City's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). We also allowed the Park District Risk Management Agency to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of the City.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 This appeal requires us to review the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the City. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and other matters on file establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). This court reviews the circuit court's summary judgment ruling de novo . Bremer v. City of Rockford , 2016 IL 119889, ¶ 20, 412 Ill.Dec. 813, 76 N.E.3d 1271. Issues involving statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are also reviewed de novo . Moon v. Rhode , 2016 IL 119572, ¶ 22, 409 Ill.Dec. 8, 67 N.E.3d 220.

¶ 19 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City on the basis that it is immune from liability for plaintiff's injuries under section 3-107(b) of the Act. Section 3-107 of the Act provides, in its entirety:

"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a condition of: (a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a township or other road district highway. (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail ." (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/3-107 (West 2012).

¶ 20 There is no question that, if section 3-107(b) applies, the City is completely immune from liability, even for willful and wanton conduct. See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island , 219 Ill. 2d 497, 514, 302 Ill.Dec. 466, 848 N.E.2d 1030 (2006) (when the plain language of an immunity provision in the Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, it means that the legislature intended to immunize both negligence and willful and wanton conduct). Furthermore, there is no dispute that plaintiff's injury was caused by a condition of the path. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the Skokie Valley Bike Path is a "trail" within the meaning of section 3-107(b). The statute itself does not provide a definition of the term.

¶ 21 Before addressing the meaning of the statutory language, we note that the Skokie Valley Bike Path is considered a "shared-use trail" by the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). IDOT is the state agency responsible for officially designating bikeways throughout the state pursuant to the Bikeway Act. 605 ILCS 30/2 (West 2012). Manuals published by IDOT provide that a shared-use trail is physically separated from the roadway and intended for use by bicycles and other non-motorized forms of transportation, including pedestrians, disabled persons in wheelchairs, and in-line skaters. See Illinois Department of Transportation, Bureau of Design and Environment Manual, 17-1.01 (2011); Illinois Department of Transportation, Bureau of Local Roads and Streets Manual, 42-1.01 (2013).

¶ 22 The Skokie Valley Bike Path, in particular, is a type of shared-use path called a "rail-with-trail" because it runs parallel to train tracks located about 40 feet to the west of the path. Skokie Valley Trail (Lake County) Illinois, TrailLink by Rails-toTrails Conservancy , https://www.traillink.com/trail/skokie-valley-trail-(lake-county)/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2017). Running parallel to the path on the east side is U.S. Route 41. The path is approximately 10 miles long and paved with asphalt. It runs from the village of Lake Bluff at the northern end to the city of Highland Park at the southern end. Id. There are several major road crossings, which are marked and include crosswalks. The path has a yellow, painted line dividing it into two lanes and has signs with mile markers for users of the path. Because the path shares a right-of-way with ComEd, high-voltage electrical wires run overhead along the entire path. Id. The path connects to other shared-use paths, including the North Shore Bike Trail, the Des Plaines River Trail, and the Robert McClory Bike Path. Id.

¶ 23 The appellate court below concluded that the Skokie Valley Bike Path was not a "trail" within the meaning of section 3-107(b). In so holding, the appellate court relied on the analytical framework adopted in a previous case, Brown v. Cook County Forest Preserve , 284 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d 383 (1996). In Brown , the court determined the meaning of the word "trail" in the statute by reference to a dictionary. The dictionary definition chosen by the court defined a "trail" as a " 'marked path through a forest or mountainous region.' " Id. at 1101, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d 383 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981)). The Brown court held that, since that the bicycle path at issue in that case ran through a forest or a "natural and scenic wooded area[ ]," it was a "riding trail" under section 3-107(b). Id. The fact that the path was paved did not alter the court's analysis since, according to the court, the only relevant characteristic of the path was that it traversed a forested area. Id.

¶ 24 The appellate court in this case used the same analytical framework as the Brown court, holding:

"the case law that we follow does require that, to be within section 3-107(b), a path not only be used by bicyclists (or hikers or both) but be located within a ' "forest or mountainous region" ' [Citations.] As a matter of law, this restriction defeats the City's assertion that the path is a riding or hiking trail. No contention has been made that the path is located in a mountainous region (mountains being scarce in Lake County). No serious contention can be made that the path is located in a forest; no reasonable person who views the photographs of the path and its surroundings, or even reads their descriptions by those who have seen them, would describe those surroundings as a forest. The path is bordered by narrow bands of greenway that sport some shrubs and a few trees; these narrow bands are surrounded by industrial development, residential neighborhoods, parking lots, railroad tracks, and major vehicular thoroughfares (to the east and south of the area of the accident). The case for considering the path a riding trail would not succeed even if utility poles could be considered trees with power lines for branches." ( Emphasis in original.) 2016 IL App (2d) 160035, ¶ 29, 407 Ill.Dec. 712, 64 N.E.3d 90.

Accordingly, under the appellate court's approach, the application of the statute and the existence of blanket immunity turn on whether the trail runs through a forest or "natural and scenic wooded area."

¶ 25 Without expressing any view on the correctness of the result in the Brown case, we believe the analytical framework adopted by that court was misguided. First, when using a dictionary to help determine statutory meaning, it is appropriate to use one in existence at the time of the statute's enactment. See Sayles v. Thompson , 99 Ill. 2d 122, 125, 75 Ill.Dec. 446, 457 N.E.2d 440 (1983) ("[t]he meaning of a statute or constitutional provision depends upon the intent of the drafters at the time of its adoption , and it is a long-standing principle of statutory construction that it is the court's duty to ascertain and effectuate that intent" (emphasis added)). The Brown court used a definition from a dictionary published in 1981, well after section 3-107(b) was enacted in 1965.

¶ 26 Second, Brown misquoted the definition of the word "trail" in the dictionary it cited. The entire definition is "a blazed or otherwise marked path through a forest or mountainous region." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981). From the same dictionary, the word "blaze" means "a mark made on a tree usu. by chipping off a piece of the bark." Id. at 232. To "blaze" a trail means to "to mark out (as a path) by making blazes on trees." Id. Thus, a "blazed or otherwise marked path" is one made by chipping pieces out of trees. In other words, the definition used by Brown has nothing to do with shared-use trails or designated bicycle paths.

¶ 27 Third, and most importantly, the appellate court in Brown erred in viewing the word "trail" outside the context of the statute in order to determine its meaning. It is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used. [Citations.]" Deal v. United States , 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). "The terms in a statute are not to be considered in a vacuum." M.I.G. Investments, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency , 122 Ill. 2d 392, 400, 119 Ill.Dec. 533, 523 N.E.2d 1 (1988). Rather, the words and phrases in a statute must be construed in light of the statute as a whole, " 'with each provision construed in connection with every other section.' " Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue , 213 Ill. 2d 273, 291, 290 Ill.Dec. 189, 821 N.E.2d 240 (2004) (quoting Paris v. Feder , 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 227 Ill.Dec. 800, 688 N.E.2d 137 (1997) ); 2A Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:5 (7th ed. 2007).

¶ 28 Instead of considering the meaning of the word "trail" in the context of the statute as a whole, the Brown court isolated the word from the statute and assigned to it a definition from a dictionary. But dissecting an individual word or phrase from a statutory provision and mechanically applying to it a dictionary definition is clearly not the best way of ascertaining legislative intent. See Whelan v. County Officers' Electoral Board , 256 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558, 196 Ill.Dec. 297, 629 N.E.2d 842 (1994). As Judge Learned Hand observed:

"Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham , 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).

¶ 29 The appellate court's decision to define the word "trail" using a general dictionary definition of the term distorts the meaning of the statute by divorcing the term from its context. Under the appellate court's rationale, a governmental entity is immune from liability for conditions on a trail only if there is sufficient foliage or a certain number of trees surrounding the trail to constitute a "forest" or "scenic wooded area." This analysis is both subjective and arbitrary and has nothing to do with whether a governmental entity should be held liable for creating a risk of injury to users of a trail. Nevertheless, although we disagree with the appellate court's analysis, we agree that section 3-107(b) is not intended to apply to a bicycle path like the one in the present case.

¶ 30 In construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Gutman , 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 355 Ill.Dec. 207, 959 N.E.2d 621. The best indicator of that intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. As we have stated, unless a word in a statutory sentence is defined in the statute, it must be read in context in order to determine its meaning. Accordingly, a word such as "trail" in section 3-107(b)"must be read in the context of the entire sentence in which it appears." Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray , 191 Ill. 2d 214, 229, 246 Ill.Dec. 324, 730 N.E.2d 4 (2000).

¶ 31 Section 3-107(b) does not state that immunity applies to an injury caused by a condition of "any riding trail." Rather, it provides that immunity applies to an injury caused by a condition of "[a]ny hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail." 745 ILCS 10/3-107(b). When construing a series of terms such as the ones in section 3-107(b), we are guided by the commonsense principle "that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning." Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd. , 432 U.S. 312, 322, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). This principle is related to the canon of statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis , i.e. , " 'a word is known by the company it keeps.' " People v. Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 30, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co. , 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961) ). In other words, "a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated." United States v. Williams , 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008).

¶ 32 The canon of noscitur a sociis is particularly useful when construing one term in a list, in order "to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving 'unintended breadth to [legislative acts].' " Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. , 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (quoting Jarecki , 367 U.S. at 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579 ). For example, in Gustafson , the United States Supreme Court "interpreted the word 'communication' in § 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 [ (48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) )) ] to refer to a public communication, rather than any communication, because the word appeared in a list with other words, notably 'notice, circular, [and] advertisement,' making it 'apparent that the list refer[red] to documents of wide dissemination.' " Yates v. United States , 574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (quoting Gustafson , 513 U.S. at 575-76, 115 S.Ct. 1061 ). "And [the Court] did so even though the list began with the word 'any.' " Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 1085.

¶ 33 Utilizing these principles of statutory interpretation, we reject the City's argument that the Skokie Valley Bike Path is obviously a "trail" as that word is ordinarily and popularly used. According to the City, the numerous references in the record describing the path as a "trail" are compelling evidence that the path is a "riding trail" as set forth in section 3-107(b). The City engages in the same flawed analysis as the appellate court, however, removing the word "trail" from the context of the statute and assigning to it a broad, general definition. Reading the text as a whole, we find that the words "hiking," "fishing," and "hunting" dictate a narrower construction of the term "trail." If section 3-107(b) stated that immunity applied to "any jogging, riding, in-line skating, or stroller trail," then it would be easy to find that a shared-use path such as the Skokie Valley Bike Path is a "riding trail." However, the inclusion of the words "hiking," "fishing," and "hunting" in the same sentence as "riding" indicates that the legislature intended to apply blanket immunity only to primitive, rustic, or unimproved trails. The word "hunting," in particular, leads us to this conclusion. A trail that leads to a deer blind or other hunting spot will likely be minimal, to avoid disturbing the game. There is no reasonable way that a hunting trail can be associated with or given a related meaning to the type of shared-use path at issue here.

¶ 34 Further support for our interpretation of the statutory language in section 3-107(b) is found when we compare it with the language in section 3-107(a). Under the doctrine of in pari materia , two sections of the same statute "will be considered with reference to each other, 'so that they may be given harmonious effect.' " Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees , 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185, 300 Ill.Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273 (2006) (quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422, 269 Ill.Dec. 452, 781 N.E.2d 249 (2002) ). Section 3-107(a) grants immunity from liability for an injury caused by a condition of: "(a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a township or other road district highway." 745 ILCS 10/3-107(a) (West 2012). The reference in section 3-107(a) to roads that provide access to "primitive" areas, rather than official streets, suggests that the legislature intended section 3-107 of the Act to apply to primitive, unfinished trails and roads. See Goodwin v. Carbondale Park District , 268 Ill. App. 3d 489, 493, 205 Ill.Dec. 956, 644 N.E.2d 512 (1994) ("Reading section 3-107 as a whole indicates that the property referred to therein is unimproved property which is not maintained by the local governmental body and which is in its natural condition with obvious hazards as a result of that natural condition.").

¶ 35 In addition, the City's interpretation of the statute leads to anomalous results when applied to a bicycle path located in a recreational area such as a public park. In construing statutory language, we may consider the consequences that would result in interpreting the statute one way or the other. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board , 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008). We also presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Brucker v. Mercola , 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514, 319 Ill.Dec. 543, 886 N.E.2d 306 (2007). Many shared-use paths run through public parks and other recreational areas. Under section 3-106 of the Act, injuries occurring due to a condition of recreational land are subject to immunity only for negligent conduct and not for willful and wanton conduct. See Moore v. Chicago Park District , 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 10, 365 Ill.Dec. 547, 978 N.E.2d 1050. Section 3-106 of the Act provides:

"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other enclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such injury." 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2012).

If a bicycle path winding through a public park were subject to blanket immunity under section 3-107(b), a pedestrian would be barred from suing for an injury caused by a condition of the path, while being able to sue for the exact same injury occurring on park grounds next to the path. This inconsistent treatment can be avoided, however, by construing the Act so that a shared-use trail in a public park or recreational area is subject to section 3-106 of the Act rather than section 3-107(b).

¶ 36 The City also contends that construing the statute broadly to grant blanket immunity for all bicycle paths would promote the public policy underlying the statute. According to the City, the public policy behind section 3-107(b) is to promote the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of creating greater access to riding trails, rather than to divert those funds to pay damage claims stemming from the condition of those trails. Cf. Moore , 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 22, 365 Ill.Dec. 547, 978 N.E.2d 1050 (discussing the public policy rationale for section 3-106 of the Act). But public policy also points the other way. After all, it seems strange to say that a local public entity can build and maintain a bike trail, encourage people to use it, and represent that it is safe but then escape all liability for injuries caused by even the most egregious misconduct in failing to maintain it.

¶ 37 At the same time, it makes sense to apply blanket immunity to undeveloped, unimproved trails that are left in their natural state as a feature of those trails. Requiring public entities to maintain such trails "would defeat the very purpose of these types of recreational areas, that is, the enjoyment of activities in a truly natural setting." Goodwin , 268 Ill. App. 3d at 493, 205 Ill.Dec. 956, 644 N.E.2d 512. A law review article published shortly after section 3-107 was enacted makes a similar point:

"There is at least one situation in which it may be undesirable to require a public entity to maintain its land in safe condition, and that is as to those lands set aside for hiking, camping, fishing, and hunting. The users of these lands desire to have the property maintained in its natural condition. To maintain this land in a reasonably safe condition would, to some degree, defeat the purpose for which such lands have been provided." Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in Illinois , 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 265, 287 n.102 (1966).

Because there are legitimate policy reasons for giving the statute a narrow application, the policy reasons offered by the City cannot overcome the language of the statute. Furthermore, the Act is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed against the governmental entity claiming immunity. Van Meter v. Darien Park District , 207 Ill. 2d 359, 368, 278 Ill.Dec. 555, 799 N.E.2d 273 (2003).

¶ 38 The City makes an additional argument that the definition of a "recreational trail" in section 10 of the Recreational Trails of Illinois Act ( 20 ILCS 862/10 (West 2012) ) should be read into section 3-107(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. (defining a "recreational trail," in part, as "a thoroughfare or track across land or snow"). We reject this argument. The two statutes have different purposes and different contexts, and it is inappropriate to import the definition of the term "trail" from one statute to another, since "the context in which a term is used obviously bears upon its intended meaning." People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc. , 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 29, 378 Ill.Dec. 402, 4 N.E.3d 1.

¶ 39 Accordingly, we hold that section 3-107(b) of the Act was intended to apply only to primitive or rustic trails.

These include any designated hiking, riding, fishing, or hunting trail that retains its original, natural surface and is not improved with asphalt, concrete, crushed aggregate, or similar finishes and is not intended for ordinary "on-road" type bicycles, bicyclists pulling children in trailers, pedestrians pushing strollers, or similar forms of transportation. The Skokie Valley Bike Path is a 10-mile-long, shared-use path, paved with asphalt and held out for the use of bicycles, pedestrians, and in-line skaters. It is not a "trail" within the meaning of the statute as this court has interpreted the term. Thus, section 3-107(b) does not apply in this case, and summary judgment for the City was improper.

¶ 40 As a final matter, in light of our holding that immunity under section 3-107(b) is inapplicable to the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, we need not address plaintiff's alternative argument that the City waived its tort immunity defense through its maintenance agreement with the County.

¶ 41 CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the circuit court's order entering summary judgment in favor of the City was in error. We thus affirm the appellate court's judgment. The matter is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 43 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 44 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 45 Cause remanded.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Portions of the record refer to the path as the "Old Skokie Bike Path" or the "Skokie Valley Bikeway."

      Lake County's motion was uncontested, was not appealed, and is not at issue in these proceedings. The County is not a party to the appeal before this court.