author: THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James EDWARDS, a/k/a Black, Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 15-1874
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    May 19, 2017

      Elizabeth Prevett, Federal Public Defender Office, for appellant.
    Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
    Before TORRUELLA, THOMPSON, and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
   THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Preface

A person with three convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses who commits a federal firearms crime is an armed career criminal and must be sentenced to at least 15 years in prison—so says the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA,” for short). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Under the governing rule, the government must prove the existence of the prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Mulkern, 854 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 467 (1st Cir. 2011). The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard “is a more-likely-than-not rule.” Mulkern, 854 F.3d at 90 n.2 (quoting United States v. Vixamar, 679 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2012)).

Now meet James Edwards, the defendant in today’s case. Edwards pled guilty—without a plea agreement—to a bunch of federal firearms offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). These pleas added to his already long criminal record, which included Massachusetts convictions for (1) unarmed robbery, (2) assault with a dangerous weapon, (3) distribution of a controlled substance, and (4) armed assault with intent to murder. The district judge concluded that convictions (1) and (2)— unarmed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon, respectively—are violent felonies. And Edwards conceded (then, as now) that conviction (3)—distribution of a controlled substance—is a serious drug offense. As for conviction 4—-armed assault with intent to murder—the judge thought it is not a violent felony because no binding caselaw directly holds that it is. So relying on convictions (1), (2), and (3), the judge deemed Edwards an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 15 years behind bars.

Unhappy with this outcome, Edwards appeals. But examining the matter afresh, see United States v. Dawn, 842 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2016), we affirm—though our analysis differs in some respects from the judge’s.

Narrowing of the Issues

Edwards attacks his sentence on a variety of grounds, not all of which require extended discussion.

For example, Edwards insists that the judge blundered by “imposing sentence on the basis of prior convictions that were not included in the indictment, not admitted by [him], and not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Recognizing that his argument runs smack into Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), a precedent we must apply until the Justices themselves say otherwise, he raises the issue only to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. So we need say no more about that argument. And though he says that United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105, 114 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 23, 195 L.Ed.2d 896 (2016), and cert. denied, — U.S.-, 13.7 S.Ct. 179, 196 L.Ed.2d 147 (2016), holds that assault with a dangerous weapon in Massachusetts is a violent felony, he notes his objection to that holding simply to preserve it for possible further review. Enough said about that issue too. With two predicates properly counted— assault with a dangerous weapon (thanks to Whindleton) and distribution of a controlled substance (thanks to his concession)—Edwards is left to argue that neither the unarmed-robbery conviction nor the armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction is a violent felony. And so, his argument continues, neither conviction can provide the necessary third predicate for his ACCA sentence. But because—for reasons shortly stated—we conclude that his armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction does qualify as an ACCA predicate, we need not decide whether his unarmed-robbery conviction does as well.

On, then, to the armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder issue.

Armed-Assault-with-Intent-to-Murder Conviction as the Third ACCA Predicate

ACCA Basics

Pertinently for Edwards’s case, ACCA defines a “violent felony” as a crime punishable by a prison term “exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)®—this is known as the elements clause. And “ ‘physical force,’ ” we know, means not simply what “force” means in physics, but “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States (“Johnson I”), 559 U.S. 133, 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010).

In deciding whether the elements clause covers armed assault with intent to murder, we look only to the crime’s statutory definition, not to Edwards’s specific conduct—courts call that the “categorical approach.” See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 569 U.S. 184, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2248, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). And after figuring out the crime’s definition, we must see whether “the minimum conduct criminalized” by the statute’s elements matches ACCA’s violent-felony definition, see Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-85, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013)—if there is no match, then the state conviction is not an ACCA predicate, see Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2248. But—and it is an important “but” (as we shall see)—our minimum-conduct focus “is not an invitation to apply ‘legal imagination’ to the state offense; there must be ‘a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that [Massachusetts] would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside’ ” ACCA’s violent-felony definition. See Moncrieffe, 133 S.Ct. at 1684-85 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alva-rez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007)).

Statute of Conviction

The relevant statute of conviction pertinently says that “[w]hoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another with intent to ... murder shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 18(b). According to Massachusetts’s highest court—the Supreme Judicial Court—armed assault with an intent to murder requires “proof of assault (while armed with a dangerous weapon) and a specific intent to kill that equates with malice,” with malice (in 'this context) meaning a lack of “ ‘justification, excuse, or mitigation.’ ” Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 910 N.E.2d 339, 350 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnston, 446 Mass. 555, 845 N.E.2d 350, 354 (2006)). And, unsurprisingly, “an intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct,” Commonwealth v. Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 476 N.E.2d 947, 952 (1985), seen in light of the surrounding circumstances, see Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 987 N.E.2d 1218, 1224 (2013).

Parties’ Positions

The gist of the parties’ arguments is easily stated.

Focusing on the word “assault” in the phrase “armed assault with intent to murder,” Edwards correctly says that in Massachusetts a person can commit an assault in one of two ways—through an attempted battery or through an immediately threatened battery. See Whindleton, 797 F.3d at 112 & n.8 (citing and quoting Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 939 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (2010)). A battery, he rightly adds, is a harmful or offensive touching. See id. (citing and quoting Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 457 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1983)). Relevantly for our purposes, we know that a harmful battery results from “[a]ny touching ‘with such violence that bodily harm is likely to result,’” while an offensive battery results from an intentional, unconsented-to touching that is an “affront to the victim’s personal integrity.” Burke, 457 N.E.2d at 624 (quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 78 N.E.2d 697, 705 (1948)); see also Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 965 N.E.2d 791, 798 (2012). Now, an offensive touching, he further and again correctly notes, does not necessarily involve sufficient force under Johnson I, see United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 137-38 (1st Cir. 2014)—remember, Johnson I says the type of “force” that comes within the elements clause is “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” see 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265. Putting this all together, he insists that because a person may be convicted of armed assault with intent to murder under the offensive-touching branch of assault, the conviction is not a predicate violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause.

For its part, the government rightly points out that (we quote from its brief) “[t]he crime of armed assault with intent to murder adds the additional elements that a defendant be armed and have a specific intent to kill that equates with malice.” And these “additional elements,” the government continues, “negate the possibility that a defendant might be convicted of armed assault with the intent to murder that involves a mere attempted or threatened offensive touching.” So according to the government, Edwards’s armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction is a predicate violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause.

Our Take

We believe the government has the better of this debate. Yes, as Edwards argues, someone can commit the Massachusetts crime of simple assault with offensive touching—the prototypical examples being spitting on the victim, see Commonwealth v. Cohen, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 358, 771 N.E.2d 176, 178 (2002), tickling her, see Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 72 Mass.App. Ct. 467, 892 N.E.2d 805, 814 (2008), or physically moving her to another room, see Parreira v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 667, 971 N.E.2d 242, 247 (2012). And yes, as he also notes, offensive touching fails the force requirement sketched in Johnson I. See Whindleton, 797 F.3d at 113-14 (discussing Martinez, 762 F.3d at 137-38). But we cannot accept the next part of his argument—that because the armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder statute has assault as an element and because someone can commit an assault without the sort of “violent force” required by Johnson I, a conviction under that statute cannot be an ACCA predicate. For doing so would require us to read the state statute with blinders on. And that we cannot do—in seeing if a crime involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of (in Johnson I’s words) “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” we must focus not just on one element—here, assault—but on all elements. See id.

Recall how the at-issue statute outlaws (emphases ours) “assault[ ] ... with intent to ... murder■” while armed “with a dangerous weapon,” see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 18(b)—i.e., the defendant must have acted with “a specific intent to kill that equates with malice,” see Vick, 910 N.E.2d at 350. Well, to our way of thinking, an assault committed with an intent to murder the victim becomes an attempted or threatened harmful battery—and thus an ACCA violent felony—because of the presence of that intent. A battery, in other words, could be merely offensive and not involve violent force if committed without murderous intent—but harmful if committed with murderous intent.

The bottom line is—as the government convincingly argues—that the intent-to-murder element makes it implausible that a defendant could be convicted under this statute based on an offensive-touching approach. Still hoping to convince us otherwise, Edwards speculates that an armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction “based on a threatened or attempted offensive touching theory” actually “is [ ]con-. eeivable.” His argument—as we understand it—rests on the idea that a person can cause physical injury without using physical force in the ACCA sense. He offers two supposed examples. One involves a person who “attempt[s] to insert a poison pill into the mouth of a sleeping hospital patient” without ever touching the patient. The other involves “an attempted lethal spray with poison.” Causing harm “indirectly” like that, he writes, “can show intent to murder but does not constitute violent force.” And looking to give his position a patina of plausibility, he drops a “cf.” citation to three assault-and-battery-by-means-of-a-dangerous-weapon cases that allegedly support his view that one could conceivably be convicted of armed assault with intent to murder on an offensive-touching theory: Commonwealth v. Barrett, 386 Mass. 649, 436 N.E.2d 1219 (1982), Commonwealth v. Vonberg, No. 06-P-1627, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 1111, 876 N.E.2d 897, 2007 WL 4097332 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 16, 2007) (unpublished table disposition), and Commonwealth v. Lord, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 265,770 N.E.2d 520 (2002). The Barrett defendant, you should know, sprayed his victim “in the face with a liquid from an aerosol can.” 436 N.E.2d at 1221. The Vonberg defendant sprayed his victim “in the face with WD-40.” 2007 WL 4097332, at *1. And the Lord defendant sprayed his victim “in the face with mace.” 770 N.E.2d at 522.

We are unmoved. To the extent Edwards thinks knowingly using poison to cause physical harm is not a use of physical force, Supreme Court caselaw suggests the opposite. Construing a provision banning persons previously convicted of “misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence” from possessing firearms, the high Court said physical force “encompasses even its indirect application,” like when a poisoner drops poison in a person’s drink. See United States v. Castleman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1414-15, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)). “The ‘use of force’ ” in the poison example, our judicial superiors explained, “is the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm.” Castleman, 134 S.Ct. at 1415. So it matters not one bit “[t]hat the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch)”—if it were otherwise, “one could say that pulling the trigger on a gun” involves no “ ‘use of force’ because it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually strikes the victim,” an argument that would be an absurdity. See id.

The parties argue over whether this aspect of Castleman’s physical-force analysis applies equally to ACCA’s physical-force requirement. We need not take sides. Our reasons are twofold.

For one thing, Edwards is dead wrong in characterizing the poisoning as an application of indirect force. The Barrett, Von-berg, and Lord defendants directly administered the noxious substance to the victim by spraying it in the victim’s face. And the application of poison in this way is a direct application of force. That poison causes harm in a different way than, say, a bullet does not mean the application is indirect. Edwards might possibly be understood to argue that the velocity of the harmful substance is somehow relevant to the violent-force analysis. To the extent he does, we see no case support for that idea. Johnson I did not require that a harmful substance be moving at a certain velocity to qualify as violent force, but that it be “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” See 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265. The force required to apply poison to a victim—while certainly lower in newtons than the force of a bullet—is still force with just that capability.

For another thing, nothing in Barrett, Vonberg, and Lord suggests the defendants there assaulted the victims with murderous intent. Again, each defendant committed an assault by means of a dangerous weapon, which, unlike armed assault with intent to murder, does not “require[] a showing of a specific intent to kill.” See Bright, 974 N.E.2d at 1113. Given how assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and armed assault with intent to murder involve different types of intent, the relevance of Barrett, Vonberg, and Lord to Edwards’s situation escapes us. What this means is that we see no realistic probability of Massachusetts convicting someone of armed assault with intent to murder who had not used, attempted, or threatened “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” see Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265—the possibility Edwards pushes falls under the heading of imaginative thinking, which the Supreme Court has told us not to rely on in applying the categorical approach, see Moncrieffe, 133 S.Ct. at 1684-85.

With that and at long last, we hold that Edwards’s armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction counts as his third ACCA predicate.

Final Words

For the reasons record above, we affirm the sentence imposed below.

      . Because Edwards’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea, we draw the background info from the uncontested portions of the probation office’s presentence report and the transcripts of the relevant court hearings. See United States v. Hudson, 823 F.3d 11, 13 n.1 (1st Cir. 2016).

      . ACCA’s violent-felony definition also includes enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives—as well as crimes “otherwise involving] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Armed assault with intent to murder is not an enumerated offense. And the Supreme Court invalidated the “otherwise” clause (also known as the residual clause) in Johnson v. United States, -U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2563, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015)—a case commonly referred to as “Johnson II.'' That leaves us with ACCA’s elements clause, as we noted above.

      . See generally McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 821, 131 S.Ct. 2218, 180 L.Ed.2d 35 (2011) (adding that "when determining whether a defendant was convicted of a 'violent felony,' we ... turn[] to the version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of violating”); Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265 (emphasizing that, in deciding whether a state conviction is a "violent felony,” federal courts are "bound by the [state] Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of” the statute of conviction).

      . If the statute of conviction defines more than one crime by laying out “elements in the alternative,” a court uses the so-called "modified categorical approach” to see which alternative formed the basis of the pri- or conviction. See Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2249. This approach lets courts look at "a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Id. No one has argued—and correctly so—that the modified-categorical approach applies here. So we need not. address it.

      .As far as the "armed with a dangerous weapon” part goes, the defendant need only have been "armed at the time of the assault; ‘the weapon need not have been used.’" Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 974 N.E.2d 1092, 1113 (2012) (quoting Salemme v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 421, 348 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1976)).

      . Edwards does not make—-and so has waived—any argument that armed assault with intent to murder is not a violent felony because there may be cases where it is factually impossible for the attempted or threatened battery to cause death. See Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that "we deem waived" arguments "not made”).

      . For anyone unfamiliar with legal-citation lingo, "cf.” means the writer believes the "[c]ited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition” but thinks it is "sufficiently analogous to lend support.” See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 59 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015).

      .On appeal, none of the defendants disputed that an assault and battery had occurred. See Barrett, 436 N.E.2d at 1223; Vonberg, 2007 WL 4097332, at *1; Lord, 770 N.E.2d at 523-26. Instead, they protested that their spraying devices were not "dangerous weapon[s],” see Barrett, 436 N.E.2d at 1223; see also Von-berg, 2007 WL 4097332, at *2-3; Lord, 770 N.E.2d at 524-25—with "dangerous weapon” defined either as (a) an inherently dangerous item, i.e., an item "designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily injury,” see Barrett, 436 N.E.2d at 1223 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (1980)), or as (b) a harmless item that is "capable of producing serious bodily harm” by the way it is used, see Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 741 N.E.2d 827, 833 (2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mercado, 509 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (rescript)).

      . A misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is
      an offense that ... has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force ... committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
      18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

      . Edwards, for example, cites to United States v. Rico-Mejia, 853 F.3d 731, 735-36 (5th Cir. 2017), which held that "Castleman’s analysis is applicable only to crimes categorized as domestic violence.” Responding to Edwards, the government writes that "Castle-man distinguished the requisite degree of force required for a 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ from that required for a ‘violent felony’ ”—an offensive touching satisfies § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s physical-force requirement but not § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s, Castleman holds. See 134 S.Ct. at 1410-13 (distinguishing Johnson I). But, the government adds, Castleman "made no similar distinction about the manner in which physical force may be employed”—so, as the government sees it, Castleman's conclusion that force can be applied both directly and indirectly still controls here. For support, the government cites to United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying Castleman's direct/indirect-causes analysis outside the misdemeanor-crime-of-domestic-violence context), and United States v. Haldemann, 664 Fed.Appx. 820, 821 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (same).

      .Relying on Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463 (1st Cir. 2015), Edwards intimates that we have already taken Castleman's poison/indirect-causes comment and limited its applicability to the misdemeanor-crime-of-domestic-violence context. Not so. Whyte noted Castle-man’s holding—which we mentioned in our tenth footnote—that the physical-force clause at issue there did not have same meaning as the physical-force clause at issue in Johnson I. See 807 F.3d at 470-71. Following our opinion in Whyte, the government petitioned for panel rehearing, arguing that the reach of Castleman's indirect-causes analysis extended beyond the facts of that case. But because the government débuted this argument in its rehearing petition, we said that "[f]or purposes of this case only, it is waived.” See Whyte v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 92, 92 (1st Cir. 2016) (order denying rehearing petition). So Edwards is wrong to suggest that Whyte forecloses the government’s argument.

      . We note for what it is worth that assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon—the crime involved in Barrett, Vonberg, and Lord—is an ACCA violent felony if done intentionally: because that crime must be committed with a weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, even "a mere touching with a dangerous weapon constitute[s] an attempted or threatened use of physical force,” we have held. See United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Whindleton, 797 F.3d at 115 (stressing that the use of such a weapon can " 'transform a lesser degree of force into the necessary “violent force” ’ " (quoting United States v. Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2012))).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alvin HOUSTON, Jr., a/k/a/ Chip, Defendant, Appellant, United States of America, Appellee, v. Shawna Calhoun, Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 16-1017, No. 16-1020
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    May 19, 2017

      Syrie D. Fried, Boston, MA, on brief for appellant Houston.
    Jeffrey W. Langholtz, Biddeford, ME, on brief for appellant Calhoun.
    Benée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, and Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    Before LYNCH, Circuit Judge, SOUTER, Associate Justice, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

      The Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.

       Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

   BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Defendants Alvin Houston, Jr., and Shawna Calhoun pleaded guilty to charges of transporting Minor A from Maine to Massachusetts and back to Maine over an eight-day period with the intent that Minor A engage in prostitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421. The district court sentenced each Defendant to 108 months’ imprisonment. In these consolidated appeals, Houston asserts the district court erroneously applied sentencing enhancements for undue influence and computer use, U.S.S.G. §§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) & (b)(3)(B), and the government breached the terms of a proffer agreement in its sentencing memorandum. Calhoun argues the district court failed to adequately weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when fashioning her sentence. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and concluding that all these claims lack merit, we affirm.

I.

When, as here, a sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea, we obtain the facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report, and the record of the disposition hearing. United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2010). “We rehearse only those facts that are needed to put the claims of error into context.” Id.

On December 13, 2014, Minor A contacted Calhoun via Facebook. In response to a question about her age, Minor A, who was 13 years old, wrote that she was 15. Calhoun replied, “[W]hat I do you need to be of age.” They later discussed meeting up to travel from Maine to either Massachusetts or New York.

Calhoun asked her acquaintance Houston to rent a car to drive Calhoun and Minor A from Maine to Boston, Massachusetts. In exchange, the group would pay his expenses and he could visit his child in Boston. On December 23, Houston drove Calhoun, Minor A, and another individual from Maine to Boston. While in Boston, Calhoun used her smartphone to prepare online advertisements on Backpage.com to market her own and Minor A’s sexual services. Calhoun coached Minor A on how to post to Backpage.com and also purchased condoms for Minor A to use. Houston, meanwhile, drove Minor A to various locations in the Boston area to engage in prostitution, and Minor A provided the money from these encounters to Calhoun. Both Houston and Calhoun learned Minor A’s true age either at the outset of the trip or while in Boston.

On December 30, Calhoun, Houston, and Minor A learned the FBI was looking for Minor A in Massachusetts. Houston then drove the group to Bangor, Maine. While en route, they stopped briefly in the Lewi-ston/Auburn area, near Minor A’s hometown. Minor A hid in the backseat of the car because the group knew the authorities and her mother were looking for her. Advertisements for Minor A’s sexual services in the Bangor area were posted to Back-page.com, and Minor A again performed sexual services for money.

Early in the morning on December 31, Calhoun and Houston drove Minor A to a hotel in the Bangor area so that she could meet with a client. The purported client was a law enforcement detective who identified himself after Minor A entered the hotel room. Police then arrested Calhoun and Houston, who were in the parking lot in the rental car.

That same day, Houston waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with the police. He said he knew that Minor A and Calhoun had both been engaging in prostitution at different hotels, that he had driven them to Boston and back to Maine, and that they paid for his expenses diming the trip.

In January 2015, Houston and Calhoun were charged in a one-count complaint with transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in prostitution, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421 and § 2.

The following month, Houston agreed to provide information relating to the human trafficking of Minor A via a proffer agreement. The government agreed not to offer Houston’s statements from the proffer session in evidence in its case-in-chief or in connection with a sentencing proceeding, except in a prosecution for false statements or perjury. But the terms of the agreement also provided that, in the event of a prosecution, the government would provide Houston’s statements to the district court. The parties acknowledged that the government could not bind the district court from using the statements to the extent permitted by law.

In March 2015, Calhoun and Houston were charged in a one-count indictment with the trafficking charges from the January complaint. Calhoun and Houston each pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. Their separate Revised Presentence Investigation Reports (PSRs) calculated the same offense level under the Guidelines. Starting with a base offense level of 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3, the PSRs computed 2-level enhancements for unduly influencing Minor A under subsection (b)(2)(B); 2-level enhancements for use of a computer under subsection (b)(3); 2-level enhancements as the offense involved the commission of a sex act under subsection (b)(4)(A); and 3-level reductions for accepting responsibility, resulting in total offense levels of 27. As Calhoun and Houston’s prior convictions placed them both in criminal history category III, their Guidelines ranges were 87-108 months’ imprisonment.

In December 2015, the district court held separate sentencing hearings for Calhoun and Houston. Overruling Houston’s objections to the undue-influence and computer-use enhancements, the district court accepted all of the suggested enhancements and reductions and sentenced each Defendant to 108 months’ imprisonment. Calhoun and Houston now appeal their sentences for the reasons described below.

II.

A.

Houston argues the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), which provides for a two-level enhancement when “a participant ... unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.” To the extent Houston objected to the undue-influence enhancement below, we review under a multifaceted abuse of discretion standard, in which we review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, its findings of fact for clear error, and its judgment calls for abuse of discretion. United States v. Leahy, 668 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2012). But we review the specific claims of error Houston failed to preserve for plain error. Under that standard, Houston must establish that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 2015).

Houston does not dispute that Calhoun warranted the enhancement for her conduct, but he faults the district court for accepting the government’s “simplistic” argument that Calhoun’s conduct as a “participant” could be attributed to him as relevant conduct. To qualify as a defendant’s relevant conduct, acts and omissions of others that occurred during, in preparation for, or while attempting to avoid detection of an offense must be “(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(B). Houston argues the district court held him vicariously liable for Calhoun’s manipulation and undue influence over Minor A without making an individualized finding that Calhoun’s conduct was “within the scope” of the criminal activity to which he agreed to jointly undertake. Because Houston did not make this specific argument before the district court, but instead argued that he himself did not unduly influence Minor A, we review this argument for plain error.

Contrary to Houston’s assertion, the district court did not uncritically hold Houston vicariously liable for all of Calhoun’s conduct, nor did it find that the scope of Houston’s involvement was identical to Calhoun’s. The district court did not, for example, hold Houston responsible for conduct that predated his involvement, such as Calhoun’s Facebook communications with Minor A. Instead, the district court focused on events that took place after Houston joined the criminal activity. The court found that Houston “participated actively with Calhoun” and facilitated her manipulation of Minor A by driving Calhoun and Minor A, renting motel rooms, and sleeping in the same room or same car with Calhoun and Minor A. Although the district court could have more specifically delineated the scope of the criminal activity Houston agreed to undertake, the court nonetheless indicated that Calhoun’s conduct was within that scope because Houston actively participated in the offense and facilitated Calhoun’s conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(B) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2015) (directing a court to determine the scope of criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, and allowing the court to consider “any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others”).

The district court did not plainly err by inferring that Calhoun’s undue influence over Minor A that took place after Houston began participating in the offense was within the scope of the criminal activity he implicitly agreed to undertake. Houston pleaded guilty to transporting Minor A with the intent that she engage in prostitution. Houston relied on Calhoun’s and Minor A’s success in prostitution activities to pay for his lodging, food, and alcohol. He admitted to overhearing at least some of Calhoun’s manipulative conduct over Minor A, including negotiations with customers, yet he continued to drive them between Massachusetts and Maine to meet with customers and avoid authorities who were looking for Minor A.

Further, even when a defendant does not agree to the precise conduct of another participant, the participant’s conduct may still be within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. For example, the Guidelines commentary explains that a defendant who agrees to commit a robbery is accountable for the other defendant’s assault and injury of a victim during the robbery, “even if the ... defendant had not agreed to the assault and had cautioned the [other] defendant to be careful not to hurt anyone.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(D). In that case, “the assaultive conduct was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery), was in furtherance of that criminal activity (the robbery), and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature of the offense).” Id.

The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in determining that Houston’s own conduct qualified for the undue-influence enhancement. First, the district court applied a rebuttable presumption that Houston unduly influenced Minor A because of their age difference— he was 27 and she was 13. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.3(B) (providing for a rebut-table presumption of undue influence when a participant is at least ten years older than the minor). Houston asserts in a footnote that it would be impossible to rebut this presumption when the district court applied it on a theory of vicarious liability, but the district court did not focus solely on Calhoun’s conduct. Rather, the court found Houston’s unique role in the offense compromised the voluntariness of Minor A’s behavior, including driving Minor A across state borders away from her family and familiar surroundings. Additionally, Houston drove Minor A to various locations to meet with adult men for sexual encounters, thus giving her few options other than engaging in prohibited sexual conduct. Contrary to Houston’s arguments, the district court faithfully discharged its duty to “closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether a participant’s influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor’s behavior.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.3(B). The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Houston failed to rebut the presumption that he unduly influenced Minor A. Between Calhoun’s conduct and Houston’s own role in the offense, we affirm the district court’s application of the undue-influence enhancement to Houston.

B.

Houston also argues the district court erred in applying the computer-use enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3). Specifically, he contends the enhancement does not apply to him because the application note limits the enhancement’s scope. We review this legal argument de novo. See Leahy, 668 F.3d at 21.

Under § 2G1.3(b)(3), a defendant is subject to a two-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved the use of a computer ... to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or (B) entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor.” Application Note 4 to this section states:

Subsection (b)(3) is intended to apply only to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor. Accordingly, the enhancement in subsection (b)(3) would not apply to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to obtain airline tickets for the minor from an airline’s Internet site.

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.4. There is obvious tension between the plain text of the Guideline in subpart (b)(3)(B), which involves using a computer to “solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor,” and Application Note 4, which only mentions using a computer to communicate with a minor or a minor’s caretaker. “[Cjommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993).

Today, we join the Circuit courts that have concluded Application Note 4 is inconsistent with the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). See United States v. Gibson, 840 F.3d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hill, 783 F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597, 606 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. McMillian, 777 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Winbush, 524 Fed.Appx. 914, 916 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). As these courts have recognized, § 2G1.3(b)(3) “has two distinct subsections, one relating to inducement of a minor and the other relating to solicitation of a third party.” Cramer, 777 F.3d at 606. If the drafters of the Guidelines intended Application Note 4 to apply to subsection (b)(3)(B), “it would render Subsection 3(B) inoperable in all but [a] narrow subset of cases under only one of the criminal statutes the Guideline covers.” Pringler, 765 F.3d at 454 (noting that although the Guideline covers six statutory provisions, only a specific scenario under one of the statutes—18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)—could satisfy both the plain text of the Guideline and the Application Note). But “there is no indication that the drafters of the Guidelines intended to limit th[e] plain language [of subsection (b)(3)(B) ] through Application Note 4.” Cramer, 777 F.3d at 606. Instead, as the Fifth Circuit observed, the Guideline’s drafting history shows that the application note was originally meant to apply only to subsection (A), not to subsection (B). Pringler, 765 F.3d at 455. The amendment that changed the application note to encompass both subsections “was a mere drafting error.” Id. Applying Stinson, we conclude Application Note 4 is not authoritative as to subsection (b)(3)(B). This reading of Application Note 4 does not, as Houston argues, “nullify” the note “altogether,” as it still applies to explain and clarify subsection (b)(3)(A).

The district court did not err when it disregarded Application Note 4 and instead applied the plain text of the computer-use enhancement in § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). The district court applied the enhancement to Houston because he jointly undertook criminal activity that involved using smartphones to solicit men to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with Minor A. We affirm the enhancement.

C.

Houston’s final argument is that the government breached the proffer agreement by referencing statements he made during the proffer session in its sentencing memorandum. Because Houston did not object below, we review for plain error. See Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 226 (providing the four prongs of plain error review).

“Informal immunity agreements, such as proffer agreements, ‘are shaped ... by the language of the contract conferring immunity.’ ” United States v. Melvin, 730 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Hogan, 862 F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 1988)). Houston’s brief relies on and heavily quotes from the Proffer Agreement. As such, we directly quote portions of the Proffer Agreement’s terms:

(2) In any prosecution brought against [Houston] ..., the Government will not offer in evidence in its case-in-chief, or in connection with any sentencing proceeding for the purpose of determining an appropriate sentence, any statements made by [Houston] at the meeting, except in a prosecution for false statements, obstruction of justice or perjury with respect to any acts committed or statements made during or after the meeting or testimony given after the meeting. The parties understand, however, that in the event of a prosecution of [Houston], the Government will provide to the Court the information which [Houston] provides pursuant to this Agreement. The parties understand that, while the Government will not introduce [Houston’s]' statements in evidence except as permitted in this agreement, the Government cannot bind the Court as to its appropriate use of such information and that the Court will use such information to the extent permitted by law.
(3) Notwithstanding item (2) above: ... the Government may also use statements made by [Houston] at the meeting to rebut any evidence or arguments offered by or on behalf of [Houston] (including arguments made or issues raised sua sponte by the District Court) at any stage of the criminal prosecution (including bail, all phases of trial, and sentencing) in any prosecution brought against [Houston].

Houston contends the government breached these terms when it asked the district court to apply the computer-use enhancement to Houston. Specifically, in his brief, he faults the government’s sentencing memorandum for urging the district court to

infer from all of the evidence, including [Houston’s] post-arrest statements, that [Houston] would have been aware of the repeated use of phones to post advertisements for Minor A’s services given the extensive amount of time [Houston], Calhoun, and Minor A spent together over an approximately 8-day period.

Houston contends that “the only support” for the government’s argument that he was aware of Calhoun and Minor A’s repeated use of phones to post advertisements came from his statements during the proffer session when he admitted driving Calhoun and Minor A to a drugstore to purchase pre-paid Visa cards to post advertisements on Backpage.com. And he argues that, by definition, his proffer statements are post-arrest statements, and thus, the government improperly urged the district court to consider the protected statements.

But Houston has divorced the government’s argument from its context. In the sentencing memorandum, the government quotes the statements Houston made during the first interview after he was arrested—his “post-arrest statements”—not the statements he made during his proffer session. During that initial interview the morning Houston was arrested, two officers asked Houston how customers found Calhoun’s number to set up sexual encounters with Calhoun or Minor A. Houston responded, “I don’t know. That’s on then-phone. That’s on their phone. They do everything on their phone. I don’t do. I told you I drive.” Read in context, the government urged the district court to infer from these post-arrest statements that Houston was aware that Calhoun and Minor A regularly used a phone to post advertisements. The government did not mention or refer to Houston’s proffer session statements.

The district court latched onto Houston’s proffer session statements during sentencing but not at the government’s request. When Houston argued at sentencing that there was “not a single objective fact that the Government can point to in which [Houston is] involved in any degree with the use of a computer in this ease,” the district court asked about Houston’s role in driving Minor A and Calhoun to a drugstore to purchase Visa cards to post ads on Backpage.com. In line with the terms of the agreement, the government had submitted the proffer session record to the district court, and, also consistent with the terms, the district court could then rely on that evidence to the extent permitted by law. Houston has not argued that the district court erred in relying on the proffer session statements sua sponte. The fact that the district court seized on the statements does not show that the government impermissibly urged the court to do so; it shows only that the district court independently reviewed the statements and used them to rebut Houston’s argument that he was not involved in using a computer in this case. The government did not breach the terms of the proffer agreement. We see no error, plain or otherwise.

III.

We turn now to Calhoun’s argument on appeal that the district court abused its. discretion by failing to carefully consider all the evidence presented during sentencing and adequately weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. She contends the district court relied too heavily on the nature of the offense and the value of deterrence, while minimizing mitigating evidence of Calhoun’s own difficult childhood in which she was sexually abused, grew up in violent households, was introduced to the drug world by relatives, and entered a series of abusive relationships.

To the extent Calhoun has attempted to raise a procedural error—that the district court “fail[ed] to consider the § 3553(a) factors,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)—we review for plain error since Calhoun did not object below, see Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 226. A district court must consider all the relevant § 3553(a) factors, but it does not need to address each factor, “one by one, in some sort of rote incantation when explicating its sentencing decision.” United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). When the district court explicitly states that it has considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, “[s]uch a statement ‘is entitled to some weight.’ ” United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Dávila-González, 595 F.3d at 49).

After adopting the Revised PSR’s Guidelines calculations, the district court outlined the circumstances of the offense as well as Calhoun’s criminal and personal history, and then stated it “considered all the sentencing factors authorized by law.” The district court went on to address the seriousness of the offense, Minor A’s vulnerability, Calhoun’s history of criminal conduct, the need to protect the public and deter Calhoun from criminal conduct, the importance of treatment, and its task in determining a just punishment in light of Calhoun’s guilty plea and personal history as a victim. The district court considered all the § 3553(a) factors and simply focused its analysis on the factors it considered most relevant. Further, a within-Guidelines sentence requires less explanation than one that varies from the Guidelines range. Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592. We discern no procedural error, plain or otherwise.

To the extent Calhoun attempts to argue the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence, we note that the applicable standard of review “is somewhat blurred” because she did not object below. See Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 228 (declining to decide whether a defendant must “preserve a claim that the duration of a sentence is substantively unreasonable” to avoid plain error review). But whether we review for abuse of discretion or plain error, Calhoun’s substantive reasonableness argument fails.

Calhoun primarily alleges that the district court overemphasized the seriousness of the offense and value of deterrence, while minimizing the mitigating factors of Calhoun’s personal history and difficult childhood. But this complaint amounts to little more than a disagreement over how to weigh the various § 3553(a) factors. The district court addressed Calhoun’s “predatory conduct” in transporting a 13-year-old for prostitution, but it also considered Calhoun’s difficult upbringing, noting that she too had been victimized in the past. In the end, the district court concluded that as a mother, Calhoun understood what she was doing and how it would impact Minor A, and thus, the mitigating circumstances did not require a lesser sentence. The district court was well within its discretion in determining how much weight to give the various factors. See Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593 (“A sentencing court is under a mandate to consider a myriad of relevant factors, but the weighting of those factors is largely within the court’s informed discretion.”). In sentencing Calhoun to 108 months in prison, the district court provided a plausible rationale and reached a defensible result within the range of reasonable sentences. See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result.”). The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the sentences the district court imposed on Defendants Alvin Houston, Jr., and Shawna Calhoun.

      . A "participant” is "a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1; see U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.1 (referring to the application notes of § 3B1.1 to define "participant”).

      . We make a distinction between events that predated Houston’s involvement and those events that took place after he agreed to take part in the criminal activity. While Houston urged the district court not to hold him responsible for Calhoun’s manipulation over Minor A that predated his involvement, he did not argue that Calhoun’s undue influence over Minor A' that occurred after he became involved was outside the scope of the activity he agreed to jointly undertake. As to the latter conduct, Houston disregarded the enhancement’s discussion of a “participant” and instead argued to the district court that he did not do anything to unduly influence Minor A.

      . In an amendment effective November 1, 2015, the Sentencing Commission restructured § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and its commentary to "set out more clearly the three-step analysis” for determining a defendant’s relevant conduct in offenses involving multiple participants. U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 791. While the commentary had previously addressed the "scope” element of the analysis, the amendment specifically includes that element in the text of the Guideline itself, fth Houston's revised PSR states that it was prepared under the 2014 Guidelines Manual, but we assume the district court used the 2015 Guidelines Manual when sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § IB 1.11 (directing a sentencing court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced,” so long as doing so does not violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution). Although the district court did not expressly set out each step of the relevant conduct analysis, we cannot say it plainly erred in this regard when Houston did not object to the lack of a specific finding under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

      . Even if the district court did apply the enhancement solely based on Calhoun’s conduct, we disagree with the premise that Houston could not rebut the presumption of undue influence because of their age difference. The case he cites for support, United States v. Chriswell, 401 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005), is inapposite. In Chriswell, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the undue-influence enhancement in cases involving undercover agents portraying imaginary minor victims. Id at 469. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that applying the enhancement, along with its rebuttable presumption, would "render[] the presumption irrebuttable” because an undercover officer can always portray the victim "as an unwilling and inexperienced victim whose will is easily overcome,” making it "virtually impossible” for a defendant to show that "the victim’s will was not overcome.” IA at 470.
      We do not face the same problem of an “irrebuttable presumption” here, even when applying the enhancement based on a different participant’s conduct. A defendant may always point to evidence that the other participant did not unduly influence the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. Houston did not have that option available in this case because even he agrees that Calhoun’s conduct easily warrants the enhancement, but that does not render the presumption irrebuttable as a rule. And so long as that participant’s conduct is relevant to the defendant under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, the plain text of the Guideline allows a sentencing court to apply the undue-influence enhancement for the conduct of the "participant.”


author: SELYA, Circuit Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Christopher COOMBS, Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 16-1246
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    May 19, 2017

      James S. Hewes, South Portland, ME, for appellant.
    Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
    Before LYNCH, SELYA and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
   SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Christopher Coombs strives to persuade us that the district court erred both in denying his multiple motions to suppress incriminating evidence and in fashioning his sentence. We are not convinced and, therefore, affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We rehearse the facts as supportably found by the district court following an omnibus hearing on the appellant’s several motions to suppress. See United States v. Gamache, 792 F.3d 194, 196 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 711-12 (1st Cir. 2011).

In the wake of his 2009 conviction on drug-trafficking charges, the appellant was sentenced to a fifteen-month term of im-murement to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. He served his prison sentence but, during his final six months under supervision, he again found himself on the wrong side of the law.

In October of 2014, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents intercepted a package at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. An air waybill—a document completed by the sender that includes the package’s origin, destination, and a description of its contents—accompanied the package. The air waybill indicated that the package was from “Marry” in Shanghai and was to be delivered at the appellant’s residence in Westbrook, Maine. The contents were described as “[polycarbonate.”

Inspection of the contents revealed an amber-colored crystal (a rock-like substance). The agents conducted a chemical field test and received a reading that was positive for methylenedioxymethampheta-mine (MDMA), commonly known as ecstasy. A second analysis, conducted in Portland, Maine, at a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) facility, detected alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone (alpha-PVP), a type of synthetic cathinone. Synthetic cathinones are colloquially known as bath salts.

On October 31, DHS agents and local police, in conjunction with the U.S. Postal Service, executed a controlled delivery of the package (with the contents safely removed) to the appellant at his Westbrook address.

While the controlled delivery was underway, the officers sought an anticipatory search warrant for the appellant’s residence. In support of probable cause, they represented, inter alia, that the substance in the package had tested positive for MDMA and alpha-PVP. A state magistrate issued the search warrant, with the caveat that it should be executed only if the appellant took the parcel inside his home.

As matters turned out, the appellant accepted the parcel while standing outside the building, and the officers promptly took him to the ground. He was arrested on the spot and never brought the package into his home. The officers described the appellant’s manner at the time 'of the detention as “nerved up” but cooperative. By the time that news of the warrant arrived at the scene, the appellant already had consented to a search of his residence and had signed a form to that effect.

Following the appellant’s arrest, officers transported him to the police station and read him his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The appellant stated that he had ordered the package and some other shipments from China on behalf of a third party. When packages arrived, the appellant would deliver them to the requesting individual and would be paid for his trouble. The intercepted parcel, he said, represented the largest order that he had placed. When asked if alpha-PVP “sounded familiar,” he responded in the affirmative.

During a search of the appellant’s residence, officers seized a computer, a tablet, and five cell phones. Thereafter, the appellant—still in custody—exchanged telephone calls with his wife. A standard recording at the beginning of each call warned him that the conversations would be recorded and monitored. When his wife noted that the authorities had taken his electronic gear, he asked her to delete receipts from two e-mail accounts and supplied her with the passwords. In a subsequent conversation, the appellant sought to confirm that his wife had not only deleted the receipts but also had emptied the trash folders to “make sure they were deleted securely.”

In due course, the govermrient sought and received warrants authorizing the search of the five cell phones found at the appellant’s residence and the two e-mail accounts that he had mentioned to his wife. The search of the e-mails disclosed several exchanges between the appellant and overseas pharmaceutical companies, in which the appellant, in his own words, solicited “apvp (or similar products).” In addition, he made inquiries as to pricing and quantities and placed several orders.

Subsequent to the issuance of the last of the warrants, the seized amber-colored crystal was subjected to more sophisticated laboratory testing. This testing was conducted at a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) laboratory. It revealed, for the first time, that the substance was alpha-pyrrolidinohexanophenone (alpha-PHP) rather than alpha-PVP. Although these substances were (and are) both regulated as controlled substances—illegal bath salts—the two have different chemical compositions.

At the time of the appellant’s offensive conduct, alpha-PVP was regulated pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority to designate controlled substances temporarily, as needed, in order to “avoid imminent hazards to public safety.” 21 U.S.C. § 811(h); see Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of 10 Synthetic Cathinones Into Schedule I, 79 Fed. Reg. 12,938, 12,938 (Mar. 7, 2014). On the other hand, alpha-PHP was (and is) regulated as a controlled substance analogue, meaning that it is “substantially similar” to a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A), and thus may be regulated as such if intended for human consumption, see id. § 813; see also McFadden v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2298, 2302, 192 L.Ed.2d 260 (2015) (explicating relevant statutory scheme).

On January 15, 2015, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Maine handed up a two-count indictment against the appellant. Count one charged possession with intent to distribute alpha-PHP, a schedule I controlled substance analogue. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(32)(A), 813, 841(a)(1). Count two, which focused on the appellant’s instructions to his wife to delete certain e-mails, charged obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B).

The appellant maintained his innocence and filed five separate motions to suppress. Following an omnibus hearing, the district court—ruling in an electronic order—deemed the first suppression motion moot and denied the four remaining motions. The appellant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to counts one and two, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his quartet of motions to suppress.

Without objection, the district court calculated the appellant’s guideline sentencing range as fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The court then sentenced the appellant to a concurrent five-year incarcera-tive term on each count of conviction, to be followed by five years of supervision. At the same time, the court dealt with the appellant’s admitted violation of his earlier supervised release and imposed a 366-day incarcerative sentence for that violation. The court decreed that the revoeation-of-supervised-release sentence would run consecutively to the concurrent sentences imposed with respect to the offenses of conviction.

The appellant moved to modify the judgment. Pertinently, he sought to reduce his new term of supervision from five years to three years. The court granted this entreaty in part, reducing the supervised release term for count two to three years (the statutory maximum for that count, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2)). This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

In this venue, the appellant challenges the denial of four of his motions to suppress. We address the first two of these motions together and then examine the other two motions separately. Thereafter, we scrutinize the appellant’s claims of sentencing error.

A. Suppression.

We review a district court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress for clear error. See United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (1st Cir. 1994). This standard requires us to accept not only the court’s factual findings but also the reasonable inferences drawn from those discerned facts. See Paneto, 661 F.3d at 711. Questions of law engender de novo review. See Zapata, 18 F.3d at 975.

1. The Second and Third Motions to Suppress. The appellant’s second motion to suppress sought to exclude evidence obtained from the five cell phones found in his residence, and the third motion sought to exclude messages recovered from the appellant’s two e-mail accounts. The appellant argues that there was no showing of probable cause sufficient to justify the search of his cell phones and e-mails.

A finding of probable cause does not demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1st Cir. 1987). As relevant here, it demands proof sufficient to support a fair probability that a crime has been committed and that evidence of that crime is likely to be found within the objects to be searched. See United States v. Clark, 685 F.3d 72, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1993). The district court concluded that the government’s proffer passed through this screen. The appellant’s challenge to this conclusion rests on the assertion that the affidavits accompanying the warrant applications contained false information: that the amber-colored crystal in the mailed package was alpha-PVP when, in fact, it was alpha-PHP.

A criminal defendant may impugn the veracity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant if he can show that a false statement, necessary to a finding of probable cause, was included in the affidavit “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Evidence obtained as a result of a warrant will be suppressed if “the defendant proves intentional or reckless falsehood by preponderant evidence and the affidavit’s creditworthy averments are insufficient to establish probable cause.” United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2015).

In this instance, the challenged affidavits were signed by DHS Special Agent Gary Moulton. Moulton submitted two affidavits: one in support of the search of the five cell phones and the other in support of the search of the two e-mail accounts. Each of Moulton’s affidavits incorporated an earlier affidavit from a member of the Westbrook Police Department, Augustin Rodriguez, originally prepared in support of the application for the anticipatory search warrant. See supra note 3. The appellant does not allege that either Moul-ton or Rodriguez intentionally misled the magistrate in order to obtain search warrants. The question reduces, then, to whether the challenged statements in the affidavit were made “with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Ram ney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002).

Hindsight is always 20/20 and, when viewed in retrospect, the affidavits at some points mis-described the contents of the package. As matters turned out, the package did not contain alpha-PVP but alpha-PHP. It is apodictic, though, that “[ejven if a warrant issues upon an insufficient showing of probable cause, suppression may be inappropriate if the officers involved have exhibited objective good faith.” United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2014). This makes perfect sense: the purpose of suppression is to deter police misconduct, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-21, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and when law enforcement officers have obtained a search warrant in good faith and acted within its scope, there is “nothing to deter,” id. at 921,104 S.Ct. 3405.

Even so, recklessness can defeat a claim of good faith. We have explained that when an affiant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of his statements or when “circumstances evincing obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the allegations” were present, the affiant can be said to have crossed the line into recklessness. Ranney, 298 F.3d at 78 (quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984)); accord Tanguay, 787 F.3d at 52. In contrast, small inaccuracies in a warrant affidavit do not invalidate the warrant if those inaccuracies result from good-faith mistakes. See, e.g., United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 332-33 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasizing importance of leeway for affidavits drafted by nonlawyers “under significant time pressure”); United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that statement that “all” seized images were pornographic when at least two of thirty-three were not was misleading, but did not justify suppression). So, too, incorrect assertions made in good faith reliance on a third party’s errors, or even lies, do not demand suppression. See United States v. Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 138 (1st Cir. 2006). Nor does sincere reliance on incorrect technical data, even when law enforcement officers themselves are to blame for the bevue. See United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 556-57 (1st Cir. 1993).

Here, the government’s first line of defense is that there was no false statement at all: read together, the affidavits simply stated that the amber-colored crystal had tested positive for MDMA and alpha-PVP (which was in fact true). But this is only part of the story: the affidavits referred, several times, to the substance itself as alpha-PVP. Neither the government nor the defendant is entitled to cherry-pick an affidavit, focusing only on portions of the affidavit that are helpful to that party’s cause and ignoring the remainder. See Clark, 685 F.3d at 76 (stating that the probable cause analysis requires reading supporting affidavits “as a whole”). By the time of the suppression hearing, the government knew that the amber-colored crystal had been identified definitively as alpha-PHP. Yet, a fair reading of the affidavits as a whole shows, with conspicuous clarity, that they featured the assertion, later revealed to be mistaken, that the amber-colored crystal was alpha-PVP. We therefore reject the government’s claim that there was no false statement at all.

To be sure, the affidavits did misstate a fact. Even so, that the affidavits, in hindsight, misstated a fact does not resolve the matter. Rodriguez signed his affidavit on October 31, 2014. Moulton signed the first of his two affidavits on November 6, 2014. He signed the second affidavit on November 14, 2014. But the amber-colored crystal was not accepted for testing at the DEA laboratory until November 14, and the results of that testing were not made available to the DHS until December 9 (long after all of the search warrants had been issued).

There is not a shred of evidence that, when the affidavits were executed and submitted, either affiant knew (or for that matter had any reason to believe) that the amber-colored crystal was not alpha-PVP. The affiants’ mistaken assertion was made neither knowingly nor with reckless disregard for the truth. Quite the opposite: the affiants relied on the only laboratory test results then available to them—results that indicated, albeit preliminarily, the presence of MDMA and alpha-PVP. The appellant does not allege that these preliminary tests were conducted negligently or that the affiants acted recklessly in relying upon those results.

When all is said and done, the record in this case contains nothing that shows that either affiant had the slightest reason to entertain serious doubts about the accuracy of the available test results. For aught that appears, the affiants incorporated into their affidavits the best information known to them. Law enforcement officers who prepare warrant affidavits are expected to use care, but they are not expected to be clairvoyant. That a small portion of the information contained in these affidavits ultimately proved to be mistaken does not vitiate the affiants’ good faith. See Barnett, 989 F.2d at 556-57.

We could stop here but, for the sake of completeness, we proceed to consider whether the affidavits, even without the statements incorrectly referring to the amber-colored crystal as alpha-PVP, would still demonstrate probable cause. We think that they do.

To begin, the initial laboratory test results would not need to be edited out of the Rodriguez affidavit. Regardless of what the substance eventually proved to be, it is not false to say that the initial tests returned positive readings for MDMA and alpha-PVP. Thus, the Rodriguez affidavit, incorporated in the later Moulton affidavits, would still be read to assert, truthfully, that the contents of the package addressed to the appellant tested positive for controlled substances.

Moreover, Moulton’s affidavits would continue to state, truthfully, that the appellant accepted delivery of the package and that he asked his wife to delete receipts from his e-mail accounts after learning that the police had seized his computer. Given these and other statements, we are satisfied that the affidavits, stripped of the false assertion, would still contain enough true facts to establish a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found through a search of the appellant’s cell phones and e-mail accounts. See Tan-guay, 787 F.3d at 50.

That ends this aspect of the matter. In the circumstances of this case, the officers’ good faith is manifest. They gained no advantage by describing the amber-colored crystal as alpha-PVP rather than alpha-PHP. Both were regulated as controlled substances and, thus, we conclude that the officers reasonably believed that they were dealing with an illicit drug and identified that drug in a way that, though mistaken, did not materially mislead the magistrate. Put another way, had the affidavits referred exclusively to alpha-PHP, their force would not have been diminished. To cinch the matter, the affidavits, stripped of the false assertion, still make out a robust showing of probable cause. It follows that no error, clear or otherwise, tainted the district court’s order denying the appellant’s second and third motions to suppress.

2. The Fourth Motion to Suppress. Consent is a well-recognized exception to the requirement that police must have a warrant to search one’s home. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Laine, 270 F.3d 71, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, the appellant challenges the denial of his fourth motion to suppress, which sought to invalidate his consent to the search of his residence and exclude the evidence gathered as a result of that search.

The validity of a defendant’s consent must be gauged under the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2008). When evaluating the totality of the circumstances, an inquiring court must look for evidence of coercion, duress, confusion, and the like. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. A consenting party’s mental frailties may have a bearing upon this analysis. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). But such frailties are entitled to little weight in the abstract. See United States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a person is not precluded from consenting to a warrantless search simply because he or she suffers from a mental disease”); cf. United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In the context of the voluntariness of a confession, a defendant’s mental state by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion never disposes of the inquiry into constitutional voluntariness.”). For weight to attach, there must be evidence of some nexus between, say, the individual’s mental condition and the giving of consent, see United States v. Reynolds, 646 F.3d 63, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2011), or some evidence that officers obtained consent by exploiting a known vulnerability, cf. United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 438-39 (1st Cir. 2011) (making same point in context of allegedly coerced confession). When the evidence shows that the consenting party was “responsive, lucid, and cooperative with the police officers,” post hoc claims of incompetency inspire suspicion. Reynolds, 646 F.3d at 74.

In the ease at hand, the appellant acknowledges that he read and signed a consent form authorizing the search of his residence. That form, among other things, specifically advised him that he had a right not to consent to the search. He nonetheless maintains that his consent was not voluntarily given. He says that he had just been thrown to the ground and arrested, and suggests that he was intimidated and under intense stress. The record, however, undermines this suggestion: Moulton (whose testimony was credited by the district court) stated that more than twenty minutes elapsed between the appellant’s arrest and his consent to the search. The appellant appeared cooperative and lucid throughout, even if a bit “nerved up.” What is more, no officer’s weapon was drawn and no threats were uttered.

The appellant also argues that his history of mental illness—anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder—vitiated his consent. But the record contains nothing in the way of persuasive evidence that might show a nexus between the appellant’s psychiatric history and the giving of consent. Importantly, the officers who testified observed no evidence of mental incapacity during their interactions with the appellant. Overall, he seemed calm, albeit nervous, and was “able to carry on a conversation.”

In the last analysis, the voluntariness of the appellant’s consent presented an issue of fact for the district court. We have said before that “[w]here the evidence supports two plausible but conflicting inferences, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Laine, 270 F.3d at 76. So it is here: there was ample record support for the district court’s conclusion that the appellant, even given his afflictions, was not so stressed by the circumstances that his consent could be regarded as either coerced or otherwise involuntary. We therefore uphold the denial of the appellant’s fourth motion to suppress.

3. The Fifth Motion to Suppress. Finally, the appellant complains that the district court should have granted his fifth motion to suppress and excluded his statements at the police station following his arrest. In this regard, he notes that there is no documentation either of the Miranda warning or of his purported waiver of his Miranda rights. He does not deny, however, that the officers advised him of his Miranda rights before interrogating him.

The appellant’s argument gains no headway because neither a signed waiver of Miranda rights nor any other form of documentation is required. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384-85, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); see also United States v. Guzman, 603 F.3d 99, 106 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Oral waivers of Miranda rights are sufficient....”). Here, the government produced evidence that the officers not only read the appellant his rights but also received his verbal assurances that he understood those rights. To be sure, the appellant again points to his history of mental illness to suggest that his waiver of rights was not voluntary. The officers testified, though, that he was cooperative and responsive during the interview and that there was no reason to doubt the voluntariness of his waiver. On a cold appellate record, we cannot second-guess the district court’s decision to credit the officers’ testimony. We therefore uphold the denial of the appellant’s fifth motion to suppress. See United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 201 (1st Cir. 2006) (indicating thát findings of voluntariness hinge on credibility determinations).

B. Sentencing.

This brings us to the appellant’s claims of sentencing error. As a general matter, we review such claims for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008). We first resolve any claims of procedural irregularity and then address any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Demers, 842 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2016); Martin, 520 F.3d at 92.

Here, the appellant musters both procedural and substantive claims. First, he assigns error to the district court’s decision to run his 366-day sentence for the violation of his earlier supervised release term consecutively to his concurrent five-year sentences for the offenses of conviction. Second, he insists that those concurrent five-year sentences are substantively unreasonable. We address these claims separately.

1. Consecutive Sentence. The appellant assails the district court’s decision to run his 366-day sentence for violating his earlier supervised release term consecutively to the concurrent five-year sentences for the offenses of conviction. In support, the appellant relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), which draws a distinction between “terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time” and those “imposed at different times.” The sentences here fell into the former classification and, with respect to that classification, the statute provides that such sentences should run concurrently “unless the court orders” otherwise. Id.

A decision as to whether to run sentences concurrently or consecutively normally rests in the sentencing court’s informed discretion. See United States v. Román-Díaz, 853 F.3d 591, 597 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). Section 3584(a) does not create an exception to this standard. The plain language of the statute makes pellucid that a sentencing court has discretion to run sentences imposed at the same time for different crimes either concurrently or consecutively. In such a situation, the statute makes concurrent sentences the default rule but gives the sentencing court discretionary authority to deviate from that rule. See United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 792 F.3d 184, 194 (1st Cir. 2015).

The appellant’s challenge runs headlong into the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Given the district court’s concerns about the appellant’s cavalier attitude toward the law, see infra Part 11(B)(2), we think that its decision to run the sentences consecutively fits comfortably within the compass of its discretion.

Relatedly, the appellant argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case amounts to double-counting. In his view, he is being punished twice for the same act because the conduct underlying the counts of conviction forms the basis for the revocation of his supervised release term. This argument, too, lacks force.

Where, as here, conduct committed by a person while on supervised release transgresses the criminal law as well as the conditions of supervision, there is no legal impediment in sentencing the defendant both as a criminal and as a supervised release violator. See United States v. Chapman, 241 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2001). Were the rule otherwise, a defendant would effectively escape meaningful punishment for violating his supervised release conditions. See id.

By the same token, there is no legal impediment to imposing the sentences to run consecutively. See United States v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1994). Indeed, the sentencing guidelines envision precisely such a scenario:

[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation or supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or supervised release.

USSG § 7B1.3(f).

2. Substantive Reasonableness. The appellant’s last plaint is that his concurrent five-year sentences are substantively unreasonable. Specifically, he complains that these sentences offend the “parsimony principle” because they are “greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.” United States v. Dunston, 851 F.3d 91, 100 (1st Cir. 2017); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Even though this plaint was not voiced below, our standard of review is unsettled. See Demers, 842 F.3d at 14; United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 & n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 258, 193 L.Ed.2d 191 (2015). Here, however, the claim of error fails regardless of which standard of review obtains. Consequently, we assume—favorably to the appellant— that review is for abuse of discretion.

A claim that a sentence offends the parsimony principle is typically treated, for all practical purposes, as a claim that the challenged sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Dunston, 851 F.3d at 100. The appellant characterizes his claim as such, and we will treat it accordingly.

With respect to a claim that a sentence is substantively unreasonable, the key inquiry is whether the sentencing court has articulated a plausible rationale and reached a defensible result. See Martin, 520 F.3d at 96. “There is more than one reasonable sentence in virtually any case, and we will vacate a, procedurally correct sentence as substantively unreasonable only if it lies ‘outside the expansive boundaries’ that surround the ‘universe’ of reasonable sentences.” United States v. Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d 174, 180, 2017 WL 1755556 (1st Cir. 2017) [No. 16-1695, slip op. at 10] (quoting Martin, 520 F.3d at 92). This formulation presents an appellant with an uphill climb, and that climb is even steeper when, as in this case, the challenged sentence is within a properly calculated guideline sentencing range. See United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592-93 (1st Cir. 2011).

The appellant catalogues a litany of factors that, in his view, justify greater leniency. As a youth, he endured sexual and physical abuse, which led to homelessness when his mistreatment proved too much. He has experienced a number of health-related problems, including bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, chronic back pain, and hepatitis C. In addition, his family will suffer from his absence: he is a father figure to his three stepchildren (ages nine to twelve at the time of sentencing), and his wife suffers from fibromyalgia.

We do not gainsay that this litany of mitigating factors weighs in favor of leniency. The district court, though, took pains to note that it gave these factors due weight. It then mentioned several countervailing considerations and—having constructed a balance—set forth cogent reasons for nonetheless imposing a mid-range sentence. For example, the court—which had sentenced the appellant for his original drug-trafficking offenses—expressed concern that his relatively short prison term for his prior drug convictions already had taken the mitigating factors into consideration. The court was entitled to weigh in the balance the fact that it had given the appellant “a significant break” in his earlier case. Following that lenient treatment, the appellant had neither turned his life around nor learned to “obey the law.” Moreover, the court worried that the appellant continued to have a “mentality that he [could] get away with something.” The court expressed particular skepticism about the appellant’s claim that he did not know that álpha-PHP was illegal.

The short of it is that the district court weighed all of the relevant sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and wove those factors into a plausible sentencing rationale. That it did not weigh the factors as the appellant would have liked does not undermine the plausibility of this rationale. See Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593 (“A sentencing court is under a mandate to consider a myriad of relevant factors, but the weighting of those factors is largely within the court’s informed discretion.”).

The district court also achieved a defensible result. On this issue, the fact that the concurrent five-year sentences were within the guideline range is deserving of some weight. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007); United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 852 F.3d 168, 178 (1st Cir. 2017). To complete the picture, the sentences were “responsive to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the offender,' the importance of deterrence, and the need for condign punishment.” Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d at 180 [No. 16-1695, slip op. at 11]. So viewed, the sentences were within the universe of reasonable sentences for the offenses of conviction.

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, the judgment is

Affirmed.

      . Bath salts are a relatively new phenomenon in the drug enforcement arena. See Nat'l Drug Intelligence Ctr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Synthetic Cathinones (Bath Salts): An Emerging Domestic Threat 5 (2011). They have come into use as surrogates for better-known drugs such as ecstasy, methamphetamine, and cocaine. See id. Of late, bath salts have become a particular problem in Maine. See, e.g., McCue v. City of Bangor, 838 F.3d 55, 57-60 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Ketchen, No. 1:13-cr-00133, 2016 WL 3676150, at *7-9 (D. Me. July 6, 2016); Skoby v. United States, Nos. 1:11-cr-00208, 1:14-cv-00352, 2015 WL 4250443, at *3 (D. Me. July 13, 2015).

      . Although it makes no difference for present purposes, alpha-PVP has since been permanently designated as a schedule I controlled substance. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of 10 Synthetic Cathi-nones Into Schedule I, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,171, 12,172 (Mar. 1, 2017) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.1 l(d)(61)).

      . The first suppression motion sought to challenge the anticipatory search warrant, which had no effect unless and until the appellant brought the package inside his residence. See generally United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining use of anticipatory search warrants for controlled deliveries of contraband). As events played out, the officers detained the appellant before he brought the package inside. Consequently, the government agreed to withdraw the warrant and to disregard it as a basis for the search of the appellant’s home.

      . For example, Rodriguez’s affidavit specifically discussed "removpng] a quantity of the Alpha-PVP” from the package before the controlled delivery. Similarly, one of Moulton’s affidavits references the appellant’s "receipt of a large quantity of Alpha PVP” on the date of the controlled delivery.

      . We note, though, that the officers had recording equipment available at the time of the interview but opted not to use it. That decision was unfortunate: recording suspects’ interviews is a salutary way to eliminate future questions that may arise both about how a particular interview was conducted and about what was said. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1289 (1st Cir. 1996) (decrying policy of deliberately avoiding recording or taking notes during pretrial interviews and explaining that maintaining contemporaneous records safeguards against witnesses changing their stories over time).

      . In his appellate brief, the appellant advanced yet another claim of sentencing error, challenging the five-year term of supervised release imposed on count one. At oral argument in this court, the appellant abandoned that claim.