author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    Elijah SANFORD, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
    Docket No. 16-1840
    August Term, 2016
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Submitted: October 11, 2016
    Decided: November 9, 2016

      Barry D. LeiwaNT, Edward Scott Zas, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, New York, for Petitioner.
    Matthew S. Amatruda, Jo Ann M. Nav-ickas, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Respondent.
    Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, WESLEY, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Elijah Sanford pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In his plea agreement, Sanford agreed “not to file an appeal or otherwise challenge the conviction or sentence in the event that the Court impose[d] a term of imprisonment of 210 months or below.” The district court accepted Sanford’s plea, and sentenced him' to, inter alia, 151 months’ imprisonment. Sanford did not file a direct appeal.

Sanford later filed a pro se challenge to his conviction and sentence, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that the district court had lacked jurisdiction over his case and that his lawyers had provided ineffective assistance during the criminal proceedings. The district court denied the motion, finding that both arguments were meritless and that the latter claim was barred by Sanford’s waiver of his right to challenge collaterally his conviction or sentence. This Court thereafter denied Sanford a certificate appealability. The adjudication of Sanford’s first § 2255 motion became final in 2010.

Sanford now moves, through counsel, for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion, arguing that his sentence has been rendered unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Specifically, he states that his sentence was based, in part; on the so-called residual clause of United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.2(a)(2), and argues that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under the principles discussed in Johnson, This Court stayed decision on Sanford’s motion pending further briefing and supplementation of the record under Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1997).

In opposition to Sanford’s motion, the Government argues that the collateral attack waiver in Sanford’s plea agreement bars the present proceedings. We agree.

This Court must deny leave to file a successive § 2255 claim unless, in relevant part, it “contain[s]” “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). We may authorize the filing of a successive § 2255 motion only if the movant has made a prima facie showing that the proposed motion satisfies the successive criteria. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); see Bell v. United States, 296 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that the prima facie standard applies to § 2255(h) motions). We have previously granted many motions for leave to file § 2255 motions presenting Johnson-based challenges to the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). See, e.g., Blow v. United States, 829 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2016). Here, we do not reach the merits of Sanford’s motion because it is barred by the collateral attack waiver in his plea agreement.

A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and/or sentence is enforceable. See United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing waiver of appellate rights); Tellado v. United States, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014) (addressing collateral attack waiver). While “plea agreements are to be applied ‘narrowly’ and construed ‘strictly against the government,’ ” United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2000)), “exceptions to the presumption of the enforceability of a waiver ... occupy a very circumscribed area of our jurisprudence,” Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d at 319. For instance,

[i]n some cases, a defendant may have a valid claim that the waiver of appellate rights is unenforceable, such as [ (1) ] when the waiver was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently, [ (2) ] when the sentence was imposed based on constitutionally impermissible factors, such as ethnic, racial or other prohibited biases, [ (3) ] when the government breached the plea agreement, or [(4)] when the sentencing court failed to enunciate any rationale for the defendant’s sentence, thus amounting] to an abdication of judicial responsibility subject to mandamus.

Id.

Even assuming, however, that Sanford was sentenced under a Guidelines provision that is unconstitutional after Johnson, this Court has held that “a defendant’s ‘inability to foresee [a change in the law] does not supply a basis for failing to enforce an appeal waiver. On the contrary, the possibility of a favorable change in the law after a plea is simply one of the risks that accompanies pleas and plea agreements.’” United States v. Lee, 523 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2005)). This Court has “upheld waiver provisions even in circumstances where the sentence was conceivably imposed in an illegal fashion or in violation of the Guidelines, but yet was still within the range contemplated in the plea agreement.” Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d at 319 (citing United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1995) (enforcing appeal waiver despite allegation that the sentence was imposed in an illegal fashion)).

Although the Court has not addressed the issue in a published decision, this Court has recently denied, based on collateral attack waivers in the movants’ plea agreements, several motions for leave to file successive § 2255 motions raising Johnson claims. See, e.g., Riggins v. United States, 2d Cir. 16-1157, doc. 43; Parson v. United States, 2d Cir. 16-1401, doc. 42; Benjamin v. United States, 2d Cir. 16-1511, doc. 31. The Court also has enforced appeal waivers in recent direct appeals, despite the presence of similar Johnson claims. See United States v. Blackwell, 651 Fed.Appx. 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 2016) (Summary Order) (concluding that defendant’s argument that his Guidelines range was erroneously calculated because, under Johnson, his state robbery convictions were no longer “crimes of violence,” was foreclosed by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement); United States v. Cook (Wilson), 2d Cir. 14-4704 (L), doc. 142 (04/12/2016 Order) (granting Government’s motion to dismiss appeal based on appeal waiver despite appellant making a Johnson claim).

The record in this case shows that the waiver is enforceable. Sanford agreed in his plea agreement “not to file an appeal or otherwise challenge the conviction or sentence in the event that the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of 210 months or below.” The Court imposed 148 months’ imprisonment, thus triggering the waiver. Additionally, the waiver was knowing and voluntary: during the plea hearing, the district court confirmed that Sanford had signed the plea agreement and discussed it with his lawyer, that he was competent to plead guilty, and that he had no questions about his plea. The district court also reviewed the terms of Sanford’s appeal waiver, although it did not specifically mention that Sanford had waived the right to “otherwise challenge” the conviction or sentence (i.e., collaterally attack them). Given Sanford’s sworn statement that he had talked with his lawyer about the plea agreement and signed it, and there being no evidence indicating that Sanford was coerced or misunderstood any of the relevant facts, we conclude that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the collateral attack waiver.

Sanford’s collateral attack waiver therefore bars the present motion because the waiver encompasses any challenge to his sentence. Accordingly, the motion for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion is DISMISSED.

      . In lieu of a reply, Sanford has moved for a stay of the present proceeding pending the outcome of Beckles v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2510, 195 L.Ed.2d 838 (2016) (order granting writ of certiorari), in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide, inter alia, whether Johnson applies retroactively to § 4B1.2(a)(2) on collateral review. By separate order, we deny Sanford's request for a stay, and terminate the stay previously entered in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jesus H. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF GREAT MEADOW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent.
    Docket No. 16-2863
    August Term, 2016
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Submitted: October 17, 2016
    Decided: November 10, 2016

      Jesus H. Garcia, pro se, Malone, New York, for Petitioner,
    Lisa Ellen Fleischmann, Assistant Attorney General, New York State Office of the Attorney General, New York, New York, for Respondent.
    Before: KEARSE, JACOBS, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jesus H. Garcia, pro se, moves for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his 2009 New York conviction for burglary and sexual abuse. He has previously filed multiple § 2254 petitions challenging that conviction, each of which was dismissed as ■ incomprehensible. The preliminary question is whether such dismissals are “on the merits,” thus making his proposed § 2254 petition “successive.”

We hold that an order denying a § 2254 petition as incomprehensible is “on the merits” for the purposes of the successive-petition requirements if the petitioner was on notice that the district court considered the § 2254 petition to be incomprehensible, and had an opportunity to cure the defect. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we DENY Garcia’s motion for leave to file.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Garcia filed a § 2254 petition challenging his 2009 New York conviction for burglary and sexual abuse. Although legible, the petition was incomprehensible in the critical respect that it was impossible to discern . Garcia’s claims. The district court ordered Garcia to amend, explaining that the petition as originally filed was “indecipherable” and therefore failed to state a claim. After Garcia failed to amend, the district court dismissed the petition as incomprehensible, and this Court denied a certificate of appealability.

Before expiration of the time to seek Supreme Court review of this Court’s order, Garcia filed two additional § 2254 petitions in district court. Since adjudication of Garcia’s first § 2254 petition was not yet final, those petitions were not successive within the meaning of § 2244(b). See Hom Sui Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that a new § 2255 petition is not successive until adjudication of a prior § 2255 petition is “final”); Whab v. United States, 408 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2005) (adjudication is “final” when opportunity to seek Supreme Court review has expired). The district court dismissed both petitions as incomprehensible. Garcia appealed one of those two dismissals, and this Court dismissed that appeal for failure to move for a ■ certificate of appealability. Garcia-did not appeal the other dismissal. -

In 2016, Garcia filed the present motion for leave to file a successive § 2254 petition, Although it appears, Garcia is again attempting to challenge his 2009 burglary and sexual abuse conviction, his specific arguments cannot be discerned. -

DISCUSSION

Under § 2244, a district court may consider a successive § 2254 petition only if the petitioner first obtains an order from this Court authorizing the filing of that petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). However, before determining whether to grant leave to file a successive § 2254 petition, this Court must' consider whether the proposed petition would indeed be successive. See Vu v. United States, 648 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2011). Generally speaking, a § 2254 petition is successive if a prior petition challenged the same state-court-judgment and was “decided on the merits.” Id. (discussing successive criteria in. context of a proposed § 2255 motion).

We have never decided whether an order dismissing a § 2254 petition as incomprehensible is “on the merits” for purposes of the successive requirements. However, in the ordinary civil context, an incomprehensible complaint fails to state a claim, see Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972), and a dismissal for failure to state a claim operates as “a final judgment' on the merits and thus has res judi-cata effects,” Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009). It should follow that an order dismissing a § 2254 petition as incomprehensible, once the matter is fully adjudicated, should likewise operate as a “final judgment on the merits,” and should therefore trigger the rules governing successive § 2254 petitions.

At the same time, however, we have also held that a district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once,” unless amendment‘would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). “Our reluctance to dismiss these complaints at such an early stage of the proceedings stems in part from the limited legal knowledge and resources available to pro se plaintiffs, which may hamper their ability to articulate potentially valid claims in legally cognizable language.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004). These concerns are heightened in the § 2254 context, because prisoners ordinarily lack legal knowledge and resources. Moreover, the issue at stake—the legality of a prisoner’s confinement—is of fundamental importance.

Accordingly, we hold that an order denying a § 2254 petition as incomprehensible is “on the merits” for the purposes of the successive requirements if the petitioner was' on notice that the district court considered the § 2254 petition to be incomprehensible, and had a reasonable opportunity to cure that defect.

Those requirements were satisfied here. In Garcia’s first § 2254 proceeding, the district court granted leave to amend the “indecipherable” § 2254 petition. The court thereby alerted Garcia to the deficiency and afforded him the opportunity to cure it. In addition, Garcia filed his second and third § 2254 petitions, also indecipherable, after his first petition had already been rejected for that very defect. Under these circumstances, each of the three orders dismissing Garcia’s petitions as incomprehensible was “on the merits,” and triggered the requirements applicable to successive* § 2254 petitions for purposes of the new petition he now seeks to file.

Having concluded that the present petition is successive, we must consider whether it satisfies the requirements of § 2244(b), that is, whether it relies on a new and retroactive constitutional rule, or whether it relies on a sufficient showing of facts previously unavailable. Since Garcia’s motion for leave to file a successive § 2254 petition is as incomprehensible as the others, he has not made a “prima facie showing” that his application satisfies the § 2244(b)(2) requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Garcia’s motion for leave to file a successive § 2254 petition is DENIED.

      . This Court must deny leave to file a successive § 2254 petition containing a new claim, unless:
      (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
      (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfin-der would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
      28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).


author: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Karine GEVORKYAN, Arthur Bogoraz, Inna Moldaver, and Sam Moldaver, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ira JUDELSON, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-3249-cv
    September Term, 2016
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Submitted: September 14, 2016
    Decided: November 15, 2016

      ANDREW Lavoott Bluestone, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Karine Ge-vorkyan, Arthur Bogoraz, Inna Moldaver, Sam Moldaver.
    Jonathan Svetkey, Waters & Svetkey, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee Ira Judelson. -
    Before: JACOBS, PARKER, and LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

In 2011, Plaintiff-Appellant' Arthur Bo-goraz was arrested in Puerto Rico and ultimately indicted in Kings County, New York in connection with an alleged multimillion dollar insurance fraud. His bond was set at $2,000,000, Bogoraz, with the assistance of his wife and family friends, sought to obtain a bail bond to secure his pretrial release. After two agencies declined to issue a bond, Plaintiffs approached Defendant-Appellee Ira Judel-son, a licensed bail bond agent affiliated with the International Fidelity Insurance Company (“International Fidelity”). Plaintiff-Appellant Karine Gevorkyan submitted an application for the $2,000,000 bond. International Fidelity accepted the application and the parties executed-an Agreement of Indemnity (the “Agreement”). Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiffs paid Bogoraz, in trust for International Fidelity, a $120,560 premium to obtain the bond.

On March 28, 2012, Judelson posted the bail bond with the state court as was required by New York law. That court then elected to conduct a bail sufficiency hearing pursuant to NYCPL § 520.30 which provides:

Following the posting of a bail bond ... the court may conduct an inquiry for the purpose of determining the reliability of the obligors or the person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, and whether any feature of the undertaking contravenes public policy....
At the conclusion of the inquiry, the court must issue an order either approving or disapproving the bail.

Following the sufficiency hearing, the state court rejected the bond. Bogoraz appealed to the Appellate Division which concluded that Bogoraz “ha[d] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the cash or collateral posted to secure a bail bond originates from a legitimate source and is not the fruit of criminal or unlawful conduct,” and that Bogoraz “failed to meet [t]his burden at the bail bond source hearing.” People ex rel. Aidala v. Warden, Rikers Island Correctional Facility, 100 A.D.3d 667, 667, 952 N.Y.S.2d 904 (2d Dep’t 2012). Accordingly, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the bond, id. a decision the Court of Appeals declined to review, 20 N.Y.3d 858, 960 N.Y.S.2d 350, 984 N.E.2d 325 (Feb. 7, 2013). Bogoraz was therefore never released on bail.

Plaintiffs then sought the return of the premium from Judelson. Their theory, pressed throughout this litigation, was that because bail was denied, Judelson was not entitled to retain the premium because he was never exposed to the risk that Bogo-raz would not appear in court when required, which was the purpose of the premium. Judelson refused to return the funds, contending that he satisfied his contractual obligations, and thereby earned the premium, when the bond was “posted and signed” by the state court. App’x at 22.

Plaintiffs then sued for return of the premium, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Judelson. Having located no controlling New York precedent, the court relied on common law contract principles and concluded that the language of the Agreement was ambiguous as to whether Judelson was entitled to retain the premium. After considering testimony as to the parties’ intent, the court found that the parties did not intend for the premium to be returned if the bond was not accepted and that Judelson was entitled to retain the premium. The court stated: “Pursuant to the terms of the Bail Bond Application, as supplemented with extrinsic evidence, Defendant is entitled to retain the bond premium in the amount of $120,260.” App’x at 36. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

New York regulates the bail bond industry through Article 68 of the New York Insurance Law (“NYIL”). Under Article 68, a repeat issuer of bail bonds such as Judelson must be licensed. NYIL § 6801(b)(1). The NYIL also strictly regulates the premium that a bail bond agent may charge for bail bond services. New York regulates the bail bond process itself pursuant to Article 520 of the NYCPL. For example, § 520.20 regulates how a bond is properly “posted in satisfaction of bail,” and § 520.30 prescribes the procedures at bail-sufficiency hearings. These provisions of the NYIL and the NYCPL appear to be the only New York statutory provisions governing bail bonds.

The parties dispute their applicability. The Appellants contend that they require return of the premium, Judelson disputes this contention, and the district court found these sources to be “not dispositive,” App’x at 37, a conclusion with which we are in accord. Although Article 68 controls the amount of the premium a bail bondsman may charge, nothing in that Article sheds light on when that premium is actually earned, Nor is Article 68 of any assistance on the question of when, if ever, a premium paid to obtain a bond must be returned if the bond never serves the purpose for which the premium was paid.

The Appellants rely heavily on NYCPL § 520.30(3) which provides that:

A bail bond posted in the course of a criminal action is effective and binding upon the obligor or obligors until the imposition of sentence or other termination of the action, ..., unless prior to such termination such order of bail is vacated or revoked or the principal is surrendered, or unless the terms of such bond expressly limit its effectiveness to a lesser period.

They argue that this provision means that the bond they procured was never “effective and binding” because Bogoraz was never released from jail. However, it seems to us a stretch to construe a provision which relates to the period during which a bond is subject to forfeiture, to govern the return of premiums paid on a bond that was never accepted. Suffice it to say that the provision is unhelpful on the questions before us of whether (i) a bail bond agent’s retention of a premium is conditioned on the bond becoming “effective and binding,” or (ii) earning a bond premium is contingent on a judicial determination that the collateral posted to secure the bond originated from a legitimate source. In. short, New York’s statutory scheme does not resolve the issue we confront.

Nor have Appellants identified any authoritative New York case law that requires the return of a bail bond premium upon the denial of a bond at a sufficiency hearing. What law they do cite at best requires the return of “unearned premiums” in. other areas of insurance—i.e., automobile, life, and home insurance. On the basis of these cases, they argue that insurers may not retain premiums covering periods in which they were not exposed to risk. In essence, they ask us to establish and apply a new (and potentially broad) principle to all contracts governed by the NYIL which is that the premium must follow the risk.

We- are reluctant to go down this path. (These cases, which involve very different areas of insurance law, do not meaningfully address, let alone resolve, the issues that are dispositive of this appeal. They do, however, highlight the dearth of New York authority on the question we confront and, for that matter, the dearth of authority on nearly every aspect of New York bail bond law.

As noted, the district court, in entering judgment for Judelson, relied exclusively on common law contract principles. To do so, however, it necessarily (albeit impliedly) determined that New York law allows for a bail bond agent to retain a premium where a bond it posted was rejected by the court. We are reluctant to resolve this unsettled, significant, and potentially recurrent issue of New York law without the assistance of the New York Court of Appeals.

CERTIFICATION

Rule 27.2(a) of our Local Rules provides that: “If state law permits, the court may certify a question of state law to that state’s highest court.” New York law permits us to certify questions pursuant to § 500.27(a) of the New York Rules of Court: “Whenever it appears to ... any United States Court of Appeals ... that determinative questions of New York law are involved in a case pending before that court for which no controlling precedent of the Court of Appeals exists, the court may certify the dispositive questions of law to the Court of Appeals.”

“ ‘Before certifying such a question, we must answer three others: (1) whether the New York Court of Appeals has addressed the issue and, if not, whether decisions of other New York courts permit us to predict how the Court of Appeals would resolve it; (2) whether the question is of importance to the state and may require value judgments and public policy choices; and (3) whether the certified question is determinative of a claim before us.’ ” In re Santiago-Monteverde, 747 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 225 (2d Cir. 2013)). We answer each of these questions in favor of certification.

First, no New York court has addressed whether the denial of a bail package following a sufficiency hearing means that no premium was “earned” by the bail bond agency. There are no analogous decisions that would allow us to predict how the Court of Appeals would resolve this question and there are virtually no decisions of the Court of Appeals or the Appellate Divisions bearing even generally on the premiums earned by bail bond agencies.

Second, this issue is “of importance to the state” and “require[sj value judgments and public policy choices.” In re Santiago- Monteverde, 747 F.3d at 158. The state’s interest in regulating the premiums to be received by bail bond agents is clear. NYIL § 6804(a) was intended by the Legislature to secure compensation for bail bond agents and to protect defendants and their families at a critical juncture in criminal proceedings. The proper balance between these competing interests is best struck by the Court of Appeals.

Third, the resolution of this question will determine the outcome of this appeal. If New York law does not permit a bail bond agent to retain its premium following the rejection of a bail package at a sufficiency hearing, the district court would be reversed. If New York law has no such prohibition, the question becomes simply one of contract interpretation for this Court.

CONCLUSION

The following question is hereby certified to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York pursuant to 2d Cir. Local R. 27.2 and § 500.27(a) of the New York Rules of Court:

Whether an entity engaged in the “bail business,” as defined in NYIL § 6801(a)(1), may retain its “premium or compensation,” as described in NYIL , § 6804(a), where a bond posted pursuant to NYCPL § 520.20 is denied at a bail-sufficiency hearing conducted pursuant to NYCPL § 520.30, and the criminal defendant that is the subject of the bond is never admitted to bail.

In formulating this certified question, “we do not mean to limit the Court of Appeals to a narrow response. The certified question may be deemed expanded to cover any pertinent further issue that the Court of Appeals chooses to explain.” Rosner v. Metro. Prop. and Liability Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2000); see also In re Santiago-Monteverde, 747 F.3d at 159 (the Court of Appeals “may reformulate or expand the certified question as it deems appropriate”).

It is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of Court transmit to the Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals this opinion as our certificate together with a complete set of briefs, appendices, and the record filed by the parties in this Court. This panel will retain jurisdiction of the present appeal for resolution after disposition of the certified question by the New York Court of Appeals or once that court declines to accept certification.

      . Bogoraz was ultimately sentenced to 3.5 to 7 years of imprisonment after pleading guilty to money laundering and fraud charges.

      . Because the $120,560 paid for the premium was $300 above the amount permitted by statute, the district court ordered a return of that amount to Plaintiffs.

      . "[T]he premium shall not exceed ten per centum of the first three thousand dollars [of the bond] and eight per centum of the excess amount of three thousand dollars up to ten thousand dollars and six per centum of the excess amount over ten thousand dollars.” NYIL § 6804(a).

      . NYCPL § 520.20(1) states: ”[W]hen a bail bond is to be posted in satisfaction of bail, the obligor or obligors must submit to the court a bail bond in the amount fixed, executed in the form prescribed in subdivision two, accompanied by a justifying affidavit of each obligor, executed in the form prescribed in subdivision four.” NYCPL § 520.30 is quoted in relevant part, supra at 3.

      . Plaintiffs also point to NYIL §§ 1305 and 2131 to argue that "‘[ujnearned premiums’ are regulated by New York’s Insurance Law.” Br. of Appellant at 17. These provisions do not appear to be relevant. Section 1305, although addressing the concept of “unearned premiums,” only relates to the reserves to be maintained by insurers, and § 2131, which addresses the refund of certain unearned premiums, relates only to “rental vehicle companies, wireless communication equipment vendors and self-service storage companies.”

      , However, the fact that the premiums permitted under NYIL § 6804(a) are made directly proportional to the size of the bond indicates that the state has some interest in tying the amount of the premium to the amount of risk.

      .For example, it appears no New York appellate court has ever analyzed (or even cited) NYIL § 6804. Further, there is noticeably scant appellate authority discussing bail bond premiums at all and that which does is of no assistance here. See, e.g., Johnson-Roberts v. Ira Judelson Bail Bonds, 140 A.D.3d 509, 510, 34 N.Y.S.3d 421 (1st Dep’t 2016) (affirming default judgment against defendant bail-bondsman because "[a]lthough execution of the bond is a condition precedent for retaining a premium payment, defendants failed to present any documentary evidence that they had actually executed and posted any bond”).

      . We take no issue with the reasoned approach of the district court, which did not have, as we do, the option of certification. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the "district court did not have the ability to ask the New York Court of Appeals for guidance”).

      . Article VI § 3(b)(9) of New York’s Constitution confers the power to make this rule.


author: SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

text:
    UNITED STATES of America v. Anthony Douglas ELONIS, Appellant
    No. 12-3798
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States on June 1, 2015
    Argued after Remand on May 2, 2016
    (Filed: October 28, 2016)

      Ronald H. Levine, Esq., Abraham J. Rein, Esq. [ARGUED], Post & Schell, 1600 John F.'Kennedy Boulevard, Four Penn Center, 13th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for Appellant
    Michael L. Levy, Esq. [ARGUED], Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Sherri A. Stephan, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, 504 West Hamilton Street, Suite 3701, Allentown, PA 18101,. Counsel for Appellee
    Before: MCKEE , Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA,' Circuit Judges

       Judge McKee was Chief Judge at the time this appeal was argued. Judge McKee completed his term as Chief Judge on September 30, 2016. Judge D. Brooks Smith, assumed Chief Judge status on October 1, 2016.

   OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

Anthony Elonis was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which prohibits transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another. We affirmed his conviction on appeal, but the Supreme Court reversed our judgment. It held that the jury instruction regarding Elonis’s mental state was insufficient and therefore erroneous. On remand, we will once again affirm Elonis’s conviction because we hold the error was harmless.

I.

In May 2010, Elonis’s wife left him, moved out of their home, and took their two children with her. Shortly thereafter Elonis began having problems at work. He was an operations supervisor and communications technician at Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom amusement park. His supervisors observed him with his head down on his desk crying, and he was sent home on several occasions because he was too upset to work.

One of the employees Elonis supervised, Amber Morrissey, made five sexual harassment reports against him. According to Morrissey, on one occasion Elonis came into her office late at night and began to undress in front of her. She left after he removed his shirt. Morrissey also reported another incident in which Elonis made an employee who was a minor female uncomfortable when he placed himself close to her and told her to stick out her tongue.

Elonis’s problems came to a head on October 17, 2010, when he posted a photograph from a Halloween event at the park to his Facebook page, showing him holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. He added the caption “I wish” under the photo. When his supervisor saw the Facebook post, El-onis was fired.

Two days later, on October 19, Elonis posted another violent statement to his Facebook page. He wrote:

Someone once told me that I was a firecracker. Nah. I’m a nuclear bomb and Dorney Park just f***ed with the timer. If I was the general manager, I’d be on the phone with Sandusky discussing a damage control plan. But I’m not and /all haven’t heard the last of Anthony Elonis.

This post raised concern among Elonis’s coworkers, who followed him on Facebook. They voiced their concern in Facebook posts of their own. One post stated, “I hope that Dan Hall [chief of patrol at Dorney Park] is aware that security needs to be looking out for him ...and another expressed fear that Elonis would “hurt or kill” someone. Elonis was aware of these fears. He admitted at trial that he had saved screenshots of the posts on his computer.

The fear among Dorney Park employees was not limited to these Facebook posts. Hall, the chief of patrol, testified at trial that he took steps to enhance park security and informed local police and the FBI of Elonis’s statements. Morrissey testified that she had chosen a hiding place in case Elonis ever came back to Dorney Park.

Despite his knowledge that his violent post had scared coworkers, Elonis posted another violent message two days after viewing his coworkers’ exchanges. He wrote:

Moles. Didn’t I tell ya’ll I had several? Ya’ll saying I had access to keys for the f***ing gates, that I have sinister plans for all my friends and must have taken home a couple. Ya’ll think it’s too dark and foggy to secure your facility from a man as mad as me. You see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main attraction. Whoever thought the Halloween haunt could be so f***ing scary?

This post became the basis for Count One of Elonis’s indictment, threatening park patrons and employees. He was acquitted of the charges in this count. ■

Around the same time, Elonis .began posting crude, degrading, and violent material to his Facebook page about his (soon-to-be former) wife. One post states, “If I only knew then what I know now, I would have smothered your ass with a pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, dropped you off in Toad Creek, and made it look like a rape and murder.” Another post was in response to a status update posted to Facebook by Elonis’s sister-in-law. Her status update read, “Halloween costume shopping with my niece and nephew should be interesting.” Elonis commented on this status, writing, “Tell [their son] he should dress up as matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his costume would entail though. Maybe [his mother’s] head on a stick?” .Elonis also posted in October 2010:

There’s one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts. Hurry up and die, b****, so I can bust this nut all over your corpse from atop your shallow grave. I used to be a nice guy but then you became a slut. Guess it’s not your fault you.liked your daddy raped you. So hurry up and die,.b****, so I can forgive you.

At trial, Elonis’s wife testified .that her husband’s posts, “made [her] extremely afraid for [her] life.” The posts made her feel “like [she] was being stalked,” and made her feel “extremely afraid for [her] and [her] children’s and [her] families’ lives.” She sought a Protection From Abuse order—essentially, a restraining order—against Elonis in state court. Elonis attended the proceeding at which the court issued the restraining order on November 4, 2010.

The issuance of the restraining order did not stop Elonis’s violent rhetoric. On November 7, 2010, he posted an adaptation of a stand-up comedy routine to his Face-book. In the actual routine, a comedian explains that it is illegal for a person to say he wishes to kill the President, but not illegal to explain that it is illegal for him to say that. Elonis’s version substituted his wife for the President:

Hi, I’m Tone Elonis.
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? ...
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say.
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just telling you that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife....
Um, but what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really think someone out there should kill my wife.....
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher.
Because that’s its own sentence.....
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal to go on Facebook and say something like the best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would be from the cornfield behind it .because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a clear line of sight through the sun room_
Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated diagram.
[diagram of the house]....

The diagram of the home was accurate. At the end of the post, Elonis linked to a YouTube video of the original stand-up routine, writing, “Art is about pushing limits. I’m willing to go to jail for my Constitutional rights. Are you?”

This was not the last violent remark Elonis made about his wife on his Face-book page. On November 15, referencing the Protection From Abuse order, Elonis wrote:

Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order
That was improperly granted in the first place
Me thinks the judge needs an education on true threat jurisprudence
And prison time will add zeros to my settlement
Which you won’t see a lick
Because you suck dog d*** in front of the children ...
And if worse comes to worse
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the state police and Sheriffs Department.

These posts formed the basis of Count Two of Elonis’s indictment, threatening his wife. The reference to the police at the bottom of the November 15 post formed the basis of Count Three of his indictment, threatening law enforcement officers.

The next day, November 16, Elonis escalated his violent rhetoric to include elementary schools:

That’s it, I’ve had about enough
I’m checking out and making a name for myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class
The only question is ... which one?

This post formed the basis of Count Four of Elonis’s indictment.

By this point, the FBI was monitoring Elonis’s Facebook posts, because Dorney Park had contacted the FBI regarding Elonis’s violent rhetoric against Dorney Park and its employees. The threat to initiate a school shooting prompted the FBI to visit Elonis at his house on November 30. Elonis did not cooperate with the agents who attempted to interview him. Later that day, he posted:

You know your s***’s ridiculous when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door
Little Agent Lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b*** ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat
Leave her bleediri from her jugular in the arms of her partner
[laughter]
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at it
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb
Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes on?
I was jus’ waitin’ for ya’ll to handcuff me and pat me down
Touch the detonator on my pocket and we’re all goin’
[BOOM!]
Are all the pieces cornin’ together?
S***, I’m a crazy sociopath
that gets off playin’ you stupid f***s like a fiddle
And if y’all didn’t hear, I’m gonna be famous
Cause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes the attention who happens to be under investigation for terrorism
cause y’all think I’m ready to turn the Valley into Fallujah
But I ain’t gonna tell you which bridge is gonna fall into which river or road
And if you really believe this s***
I’ll have some bridge rubble to see you tomorrow
[BOOM!][BOOM!][BOOM!]

This post formed the basis of Count Five of Elonis’s indictment.

II.

Elonis was arrested on December. 8, 2010, and charged with- transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Following his indictment, he moved to dismiss all five counts, contending his speech was protected by the First Amendment. The District Court denied his motion and his case proceeded to trial.

Elonis testified in his own defense at trial. He claimed he did not intend to make any threats, and would never act violently. He testified, “These were—these were lyrics. These—these were for entertainment purposes only. They weren’t intended for anyone to feel like I was threatening them or feel scared. I didn’t want anyone to feel scared.” When asked how he thought people might interpret his posts, Elonis responded, “You know, I didn’t really care what other people thought.” He further testified, “I made an on-line persona and I figured the worse I made myself seem, you know, I didn’t care what people said about me.”

Applying circuit precedent, the District Court instructed 'the jury that

a statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker' comniunicates the statement aS a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.-

The government’s closing argument emphasized that it was irrelevant whether Elonis intended the postings to be threats, saying;

Even if you were to believe absolutely everything that he' said to you’ today, it has absolutely no[ ] impact on whether or not you should find him guilty or not.... Again, it doesn’t matter what he thinks.

The jury convicted Elonis on Counts Two through Five of his indictment, acquitting' him only of Count One, threatening park patrons and employees.' He was sentenced to forty-four months’ imprisonment.

On 'appeal, Elonis argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), requires a jury to find that a defendant subjectively intended his statements to be understood as threats for them to fall under the true-threat exception to the First Amendment. Applying circuit precedent,, we upheld his conviction.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Elonis v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015). The Court did not reach the First Amendment issues presented by the case. Instead, it based its ruling on its interpretation of the statute under which Elonis was convicted, Section 875(c). Reasoning that “[f]ederal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state,” the Court rejected the objective standard under which the jury was instructed. Id. at 2012. While the Court added that in this case, there was no dispute that a knowledge or purpose standard would satisfy Section 875(c)’s mental state requirement, it declined to address whether a recklessness standard would be sufficient. Id. Accordingly, it reversed our judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Justice Alito concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority’s opinion. He would have decided the recklessness issue and held that a recklessness standard satisfies Section 875(c)’s mental state requirement. Id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring). He also suggested that on remand we “consider whether [Elonis’s] conviction can be upheld on harmless-error grounds.” Id. at 2018 (Alito, J., concurring).

III.

A.

The jury at Elonis’s trial was instructed it could convict him under Section 875(c) if it found that “a reasonable person in [his] position” would have “foreseen that the communication he made would have been interpreted by the recipient as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.” The Supreme Court held this instruction was insufficient and therefore erroneous, because “negligence is not sufficient to support a conviction under Section 875(c).” Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2013. Instead, the Court explained, the jury should have been instructed it could convict Elonis if it found he “transmit[ted] a communication for the pui-pose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication w[ould] be viewed as a threat.” Id. at 2012. The Court left open the question of whether an instruction on a standard of recklessness would be sufficient under Section 875(c) or under the First Amendment.

We believe Section 875(c) contains both a subjective and objective component, and the Government must satisfy both in order to convict a defendant under the statute. The Supreme Court focused on the subjective component. It held that to satisfy the subjective component of Section 875(c), the Government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant transmitted a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication would be viewed as a threat.

The Government must also satisfy the objective component, which requires it to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant transmitted a communication that a reasonable person would view as a threat. The objective component of Section 875(c) shields individuals from culpability for communications that are not threatening to a reasonable person, distinguishing true threats from hyperbole, satire, or humor. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). It requires the jury to consider the context and circumstances in which a communication was made to determine whether a reasonable person would consider the communication to be a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury on an individual. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003).

While it is clear that a defendant can be convicted under Section 875(c) for transmitting an objectively threatening communication “with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat,” Elonis and the Government disagree on the application of that standard. Elonis contends the Government must show the defendant “acted with knowledge of a reasonable person’s interpretation of the speech as threatening,” reasoning that “knowledge that particular persons would consider the communications threatening is not necessarily equivalent to knowledge of how a reasonable person would understand them.” Were this not the standard, Elonis argues, a defendant could violate Section 875(c) merely by “posting] photos of his pit bull on Facebook ... knowing that some members of the Facebook community unreasonably found photos of such dogs threatening....”

Elonis’s concerns are unfounded. The objective component of Section 875(c) ensures that a defendant can only be convicted for transmitting communications that are objectively threatening. Moreover, his approach would render the objective component meaningless. Instead of asking the jury whether the defendant’s communication was objectively threatening, Elonis would ask only whether the defendant believed his communication was objectively threatening. But it is not for the defendant to determine whether a communication is objectively threatening—that is the jury’s role. If a defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the recipient will view it as a threat, and a jury determines that communication is objectively threatening, then the defendant has violated Section 875(c) whether or not he agrees the communication was objectively threatening.

With this understanding of Section 875(c) in mind, we will turn to Elonis’s trial to determine whether the error at his trial was harmless.

B.

For a trial error to be harmless, we must “conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Our inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). When the error involves a mens rea instruction, “[a] verdict may still stand, despite erroneous jury instructions, where the predicate facts ‘conclusively establish [mens rea], so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act’” without also finding the requisite mens rea. Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 260 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580-81, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)).

Elonis was convicted on four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another....” The jury was erroneously instructed under an objective standard. The parties dispute whether a recklessness standard or a knowledge standard is sufficient. But under either standard, we find the District Court’s error was harmless. The record contains overwhelming evidence demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that Elonis knew the threatening nature of his communications, and therefore would have been convicted absent the error.

1.

Count Two of the indictment charged Elonis with violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure his ex-wife. The jury convicted Elonis on this count under an objective standard, finding that the Facebook posts about his ex-wife would be regarded as threatening by a reasonable person. A review of the evidence surrounding these posts unequivocally demonstrates the jury would have convicted Elonis were it required to find that he either knew his ex-wife would feel threatened by the posts or that he purposely threatened her.

In October 2010, just five months after Elonis’s wife left him, Elonis posted three messages to Facebook that referenced, among other things, his desire to rape her, kill her, put her head on a stick, and “bust this nut all over [her] corpse.” Following these posts, Elonis’s wife sought a restraining order against him. Elonis attended the proceeding at which the order was issued, on November 4, ■ 2010. Despite knowing his wife felt threatened enough to seek a restraining order against him, Elon-is continued his violent rhetoric with his November 7 post expressing, once again, his desire to kill his ex-wife. Just eight days later, he again posted a violent message about his ex-wife that explicitly referenced the restraining order she had obtained and asked whether it was thick enough to stop a bullet.

Elonis contends the jury may have acquitted him had it hot been instructed on an incorrect objective standard. According to Elonis, these errors “rendered irrelevant” his testimony regarding his mental state at the time he posted the messages to Facebook. But as Elonis concedes, Section 875(c)’s mental state requirement can be met with proof of purpose or knowledge. His testimony at trial focused on his purpose of his Facebook posts, but never contested that he knew his posts would be viewed as threats. Thus, even if the jury believed Elonis’s testimony, it could still have found that he knew the threatening nature of his posts.

Moreover, even if Elonis had testified he did not know his ex-wife would feel threatened, “harmless-error cases do not turn on whether the defendant conceded the factual issue on which the error bore.” Rose, 478 U.S. at 583, 106 S.Ct. 3101. “[T]he fact that [Elonis] denied that he had [the requisite mens rea] does not dispose of the harmless-error question.” Id. at 583-84, 106 S.Ct. 3101. Instead, harmless error review “mandates consideration of the entire record” to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 583, 106 S.Ct. 3101.

Reviewing the whole record, we find that even if Elonis had contested the knowledge element in his testimony, no rational juror would' have believed him. Considering the graphic nature of the three messages Elonis posted in October, it is not at all credible that Elonis did not know his ex-wife' would interpret them as threats. But it is less credible' still that, having attended the court proceeding at which she sought'- a restraining order against him, Elonis remained unaware of his ex-wife’s fears as he posted more violent messages on November 7 and 15. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Elon-is posted those two messages with either the purpose of threatening his ex-wife, or with knowledge that she would interpret the posts as threats. No rational juror could conclude otherwise.

2.

Count Three of the indictment charged Elonis with violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and Berks County Sheriffs Department. Just as with Count Two, the jury convicted Elonis of this Count under an objective standard, finding that the Face-book post about the police would be regarded as threatening by a reasonable person.

Elonis’s post regarding the police came at the end of his November 15 post about his ex-wife. It stated, “And if worse comes to worse / I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the state police and Sheriffs Department.” Elonis advances several arguments for why the jury would not have convicted him had it been instructed under a knowledge standard.

■ First, he contends again that the objective. standard prevented the jury from considering his testimony that he did not know his posts would be regarded as threatening. This argument fails for the same reasons as above. Contrary to his suggestion, Elonis never testified that he was unaware of the threatening nature of his posts referencing the State Police and the Sheriffs Department. Elonis knew that both his coworkers and his ex-wife felt threatened by the violent rhetoric in his previous Facebook posts. Despite that, he posted yet another violent message stating his intention to detonate explosives near State Police officers and the Sheriffs Department if “worse comes to worse.” If anything, this post is a more explicit threat than those that he knew had frightened his coworkers and ex-wife. It is difficult to imagine how Elonis could have believed it would be interpreted as anything but a threat.

Second, Elonis contends the fact that his statements were in lyric form suggests he did not know they would be regarded as threats. The evidence suggests otherwise. This was not the first time Elonis used a lyric form to post threatening statements. He previously posted statements about Dorney Park on October 19 and 22 with a lyric form similar to his post about the police. But despite the use of a lyric form, several of Elonis’s coworkers at Dorney Park regarded the posts as threatening, and Elonis was aware of their fears. He knew that his use of a lyric form did not lessen the threatening nature of his posts. His continued use of the form only heightens the likelihood he knew a reasonable person would interpret his post as a threat

Third, Elonis contends the fact he communicated his statements on Facebook— which he claims is “a medium that magnifies the potential for disconnect between the speaker’s intent and the audience’s understanding”—suggests he did not know his statements would be regarded as threats. But whatever disconnect there may have been surely disappeared when Elonis read his coworkers’ posts about how they felt threatened, and when he discovered his ex-wife was seeking a restraining order against him. By the time he made his statement regarding the •police, he was clearly aware of how his audience would understand it. His Facebook post was written either with the purpose to threaten the police, or with knowledge that the post would be interpreted as a threat.

3.

Count Four of the indictment charged Elonis with violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure a kindergarten class of elementary school children. The Facebook post that formed the basis for this charge states:

That’s it, I’ve had about enough
I’m checking out and making a name for myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class
The only question is ... which one?

As with the other counts, Elonis contends the jury may not have convicted him of this count were it required to find he knew the post would be threatening to a reasonable person. We disagree.

Elonis’s post is graphic and specific in ways that make it impossible to believe he was unaware it would be interpreted as a threat. He specifically threatens elementary schools in a ten-mile radius, narrows his threat further to kindergarten classes within those elementary schools, and ends his post with a haunting question that suggests he will carry out his threat imminently. Given the understandable sensitivity regarding school shootings in this country, of which Elonis was no doubt aware, no rational juror could conclude that Elon-is did not have the purpose to threaten, or did not know that a reasonable person would feel threatened, when he said he would “initiate the most heinous, school shooting ever imagined.”

4.

Finally, Count Five of the indictment charged Elonis with violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure an FBI agent. As with the other counts, the jury convicted Elonis under an objective standard, finding that the Facebook post about the FBI agent would be regarded as threatening by a reasonable person.

The post forming the basis for Count Five stated, referring to the FBI agent that visited Elonis’s house earlier in the day, “Little Agent Lady stood so close / Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost / Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and-slit her throat '/ Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner.” The post further stated that if the FBI returned, he would detonate an explosive device he had strapped to his body.

Elonis once more contends the jury may not have convicted him of threatening the FBI agent had it not been erroneously instructed under an objective standard. Once again, we disagree. By the time the FBI visited Elonis on November 30, he knew his former coworkers felt threatened by his posts. The chief, of patrol at Dorney Park, a friend of Elonis’s on Facebook, felt so threatened that he enhanced park security, informed the local police, and notified the FBI. Elonis knew his ex-wife felt threatened enough by his posts to take out a restraining order against him. And when FBI agents showed up at his door, Elonis knew his followers on Facebook felt threatened enough to contact the FBI, and the FBI took those concerns seriously. Despite that knowledge, Elonis posted yet another violent message, this time about one of the FBI agents that visited him. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates Elonis knew how this post would be interpreted. No rational juror could have found Elonis did not have the purpose of threatening FBI agents or did not know his post about FBI agents would be regarded as a threat.

C.

Our disposition on the issue of harmless error decides this case. Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine whether a finding of recklessness would be sufficient to satisfy the mental state requirement of Section 875(c). We will leave that question for another day.

ÍY.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Elonis would have been convicted if the jury had been properly instructed. We therefore hold that the error was harmless, and uphold his conviction.

      . Sandusky. Ohio is the location of Dorney Park’s corporate headquarters.

      . Toad Creek runs behind Elonis’s father-in-law's house, where Elonis’s wife was living at the time of the post.

      . Except for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2005), our opinion conformed to the general agreement at the time among other sister circuits that an objectively threatening communication falls into the true-threat exception to the First Amendment, see, e.g., United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 510 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases), abrogated by Elonis v. United States, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015). None have had a chance to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in this case.

      . As noted, the Court did not address whether a finding of recklessness would be sufficient.

      . The District Court’s instruction in this case properly states the objective component.

      . We recognize that, in addition to this objective component, the Ninth Circuit requires proof of a specific intent to threaten to satisfy the First Amendment. See Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1118. But see United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 485 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J„ dubitante) (explaining that as a matter of statutory interpretation, Section 875(c) requires a subjective component, but “as a matter of constitutional avoidance ... threat prohibitions like [Section 875(c) ] cover only ‘real’ threats, threats in other words that a reasonable observer would take as true and real”), abrogated by Elonis, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015).

      . We recognize it may sometimes be difficult to pinpoint the recipient of the communication. This is especially so in the age of social media, when the recipient of the communication may be a defendant’s Facebook followers or even the general public. But Section 875(c) operates the same whether the communication has one recipient or many. For example, if a defendant transmits a communication on Facebook, he violates Section 875(c) if the communication is objectively threatening and the defendant transmitted it for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that it would be viewed as a threat by his Facebook followers.

      . In Whitney, the jury was improperly instructed regarding the element of intent in a first-degree murder case. We found that, due to the strong circumstantial evidence of intent within the record, no "reasonable jury could have had any doubt about whether Whitney ... form[ed] the intent to kill." 280 F.3d at 261.

      . For example, Elonis testified his posts "weren’t intended for anyone to feel like I was threatening them or feel scared.” He further testified, "I’m not trying to threaten anyone.” These statements offer his explanation for the purpose of his posts, but do not address whether he knew his ex-wife would feel threatened by them.