text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Walter RELERFORD, Appellee.
    Docket No. 121094
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed November 30, 2017
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
    Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Jonathan Yeasting, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
    Steven W. Becker, of Chicago, Eugene Volokh and Gary T. Schwartz, of Los Angeles, California, and Ilya Shapiro, of Washington, D.C., for amici curiae Cato Institute et al.
    Robert R. Stauffer, Clifford W. Berlow, and Blake P. Sercye, of Jenner & Block LLP, and Rebecca K. Glenberg, both of Chicago, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois.
   JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Walter Relerford, was convicted of stalking ( 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012)) and cyberstalking ( 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012)) and was sentenced to serve a prison term of six years. Defendant appealed. The appellate court declared that the provisions of the stalking and cyberstalking statutes under which defendant was convicted are facially unconstitutional as violative of substantive due process and vacated his convictions on that ground. 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, 404 Ill.Dec. 505, 56 N.E.3d 489. This court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal as a matter of right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2017). We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, albeit on a different basis than that relied upon by the appellate court.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged in a four-count indictment with two counts of stalking ( 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012)) and two counts of cyberstalking ( 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012)). Count I charged defendant with stalking based on allegations that he (1) called Sonya Blakey, (2) sent her e-mails, (3) stood outside of her place of employment, and (4) entered her place of employment and that he knew or should have known that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. Count II charged defendant with stalking based on the same conduct specified in count I but alleged that he knew or should have known that his conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety. Count III charged defendant with cyberstalking based on allegations that he used electronic communication to make Facebook postings in which he expressed his desire to have sexual relations with Sonya Blakey and threatened her coworkers, workplace, and employer and that he knew or should have known that his conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety. Count IV charged defendant with cyberstalking based on the same conduct specified in count III but alleged that he knew or should have known that his conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.

¶ 4 At trial, the State presented evidence of the following relevant facts. Sonya Blakey was employed by Clear Channel Media and Entertainment (Clear Channel), where she managed and appeared on-air for a gospel radio station called Inspiration 1390. From May to August 2011, defendant worked as an intern for Inspiration 1390. In September or October 2011, he applied for a position as board operator at the station. Blakey and Derrick Brown, one of her coworkers, interviewed defendant for the position. After the interview, defendant sent Blakey a follow-up e-mail inquiring as to whether the position had been filled.

¶ 5 Defendant subsequently was informed that he was not being offered the position. In response, defendant called and e-mailed Blakey, as well as several of her colleagues, asking whether he could intern at the station again. Blakey testified that she received about five such e-mails from defendant. None of these e-mails contained any threatening language.

¶ 6 In January 2012, Blakey became aware that defendant was also contacting other Clear Channel employees. At around the same time, Blakey's manager told her to report any e-mails or telephone calls that she received from defendant to the human resources department. According to Blakey, sometime between January and March 2012, Clear Channel took the position that defendant was not welcome at the station and that Clear Channel employees were not to respond to his telephone calls and e-mails.

¶ 7 On one occasion in March 2012, Blakey saw defendant through a window as she was leaving work. Defendant and several companions were standing on the sidewalk outside of the office building in which Clear Channel is located. Defendant saw Blakey and waved at her, but Blakey did not wave back and just continued on her way. Although defendant did not follow her or verbally communicate with her, this encounter made Blakey feel "a little scared" and "a little nervous."

¶ 8 Sometime around late March or early April 2012, Jeffrey Garceau, an executive assistant to Clear Channel's president, directed defendant to stop contacting Clear Channel employees.

¶ 9 On April 4, 2012, Blakey was finishing her broadcast when defendant walked into the studio unannounced. Blakey switched her show to automated programming and asked defendant why he was there. Thereafter, Blakey and one of her colleagues escorted defendant from the building. Although defendant did not threaten her or put up a struggle while being escorted from the premises, the incident caused Blakey to feel "very nervous, very startled, shocked," and "scared."

¶ 10 On April 9, 2012, Blakey received an e-mail from defendant apologizing for the studio visit. In the e-mail, defendant stated, "[m]y intentions were not to startle you or to catch you off guard." Blakey conceded that this e-mail did not contain any statements threatening her safety or the safety of anyone at Clear Channel.

¶ 11 Around the same time that defendant sent the apology e-mail, Blakey learned from a colleague who was a Facebook friend of defendant that he had made several postings on Facebook about her. Defendant did not send the Facebook posts directly to Blakey, and because she was not one of his Facebook friends, she could not view the posts through her own Facebook account. However, Blakey's colleague e-mailed the posts to her. The Facebook posts stated as follows:

"This is a motherfucking orderI: f my shit gets shut down by any and everyone who does, dies. You got till Friday at 5:00 p.m. to find some type of job for me with Clear Channel Chicago, maybe a board op or something. If you don't, Saturday is going to be the worst day of your life. That's a motherfucking order, bitch, ass, punk. Send it through 100 shundulah jobo ho 1 [sic ]."
"The order: If Sonya's vagina is not in my mouth by next Friday, bury the entire Michigan State football team from 1993. That's the order. Send it through. One hundred."
"Just like the folks at Clear Channel think I want to come back to get close to Sonya, I mean, don't get me wrong, who wouldn't want to be close to her? She's wonderful and addictive to be around. The truth of the matter is, since I was 10, I've always wanted to work for WGCI, and that was before it was called Clear Channel. That was back in the 332 South Michigan Avenue days, suite 600. But now, since they are a. [sic ]"
"How am I gay? I want to fuck Sonya. There's nothing gay about that."
"I still love you, Sonya. Who gives a shit about that other shit? I'm a man before anything. I'm not afraid of anyone. Life is bullshit anyway. I wonder what will happen when I'm dead and gone. I wonder will they just move on to the next person and treat them the same way they are treating me.
I know everything and I'm still not mad. I'm definitely worried about you, though; especially since these Chinese people talking about killing everyone on the 27th and 28th floor of Clear Channel. That's fucked up.
I'll ride for you, Sonya. But these Chinese people don't fuck around. I think I'm going to need to ask Randall for some army weapons to fuck with them. I got your back.
But if the shit gets rough, you better scratch, bite, kick or do something."

¶ 12 As a result of the Facebook posts, the management at Clear Channel advised Blakey to stay home from work until the police located defendant. Blakey took a couple of days off work because defendant's actions made her feel afraid for her own safety. Blakey returned to work after defendant was apprehended on April 12, 2012.

¶ 13 In defense, defendant acknowledged waving to Blakey through the window while he was standing on the sidewalk in March 2012, but he explained that he often patronized the businesses and restaurants on the ground floor of the building in which Clear Channel is located. He also admitted entering the studio on April 4 but stated that he did so only in an effort to inquire about working at Clear Channel. Defendant conceded that he was "maybe over persistent" in sending numerous e-mail inquiries about employment opportunities at Clear Channel, but he denied that he intended any harm in pursuing his long-held career goal of working there. Defendant denied making the Facebook posts and also denied ever being notified that he was not to e-mail, call, or visit employees of Clear Channel.

¶ 14 The trial court found defendant "guilty as charged" and subsequently sentenced him to serve a six-year term for the offense of stalking charged in count I ( 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2) (West 2012)). The court did not impose sentences on the remaining counts, and the record does not reflect the reason for the trial court's failure to do so.

¶ 15 The appellate court vacated all of defendant's convictions based on its determination that the terms of subsection (a) of the stalking and cyberstalking statutes violate due process. 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶¶ 27, 31-33, 404 Ill.Dec. 505, 56 N.E.3d 489. In the appellate court's view, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Elonis v. United States , 575 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), compelled invalidation of both statutes on due process grounds because the relevant provisions lack a mental state requirement. 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶¶ 21, 26-27, 31-33, 404 Ill.Dec. 505, 56 N.E.3d 489. In vacating defendant's unsentenced convictions on counts II, III, and IV, the appellate court concluded that it had jurisdiction to address the validity of those convictions under this court's decision in People v. Dixon , 91 Ill. 2d 346, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180 (1982). 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶¶ 29-30, 404 Ill.Dec. 505, 56 N.E.3d 489.

¶ 16 The State appeals from the judgment of the appellate court as a matter of right. Defendant requests that the appellate court's judgment be affirmed, arguing that subsection (a) of each statute is facially unconstitutional because it is overbroad and violates the first amendment as well as violating substantive due process guarantees. We granted the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, the Cato Institute, and the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project leave to submit briefs as amici curiae in support of defendant. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 A. Substantive Due Process Under Elonis

¶ 19 On appeal, the State challenges the appellate court's judgment that the stalking and cyberstalking statutes are unconstitutional because they violate substantive due process, which generally requires that criminal conduct be accompanied by a culpable mental state. See People v. Madrigal , 241 Ill. 2d 463, 467, 350 Ill.Dec. 311, 948 N.E.2d 591 (2011). In particular, the State argues that the appellate court erred in holding that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Elonis , 575 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001, compelled invalidation of subsection (a) of the stalking and cyberstalking statutes on due process grounds because negligence cannot serve as the basis for criminal liability. We agree that the appellate court erred in vacating defendant's convictions based on Elonis .

¶ 20 In Elonis , the Supreme Court addressed the question of which mental state would be inferred to apply in a federal criminal statute that does not specify a mens rea requirement. Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2008-09. The Court recognized that, because criminal offenses generally require proof of a "guilty mind," courts typically interpret a criminal statute to require a criminal mens rea , even if the statute fails to include an applicable scienter requirement. Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2009. The Supreme Court observed that, although the negligence standard is commonly applied in assessing civil tort liability, federal courts " 'have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.' " (Emphasis added.). Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2011 (quoting Rogers v. United States , 422 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (Marshall J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.) (citing Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) )). Because the federal statute at issue in Elonis prohibited the transmission of threats in interstate commerce but did not specify a required mental state, the Court inferred that the government must prove the defendant either intended to issue threats or knew that his communications would be viewed as threats. Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2012. However, the Court also acknowledged that, if Congress had intended to criminalize reckless or negligent conduct, it could have done so specifically. Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2010 (citing Liparota v. United States , 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) ).

¶ 21 We agree with the State that the appellate court's reasoning is flawed. Elonis was not a due process case, and the Supreme Court did not engage in any due process analysis. Rather, Elonis merely decided a question of statutory interpretation and determined that, where the subject criminal statute was silent as to mens rea , a mental state of intent or knowledge would suffice. Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2012. On several occasions, this court has similarly inferred a requisite mental state where the statute is silent as to mens rea . See People v. Anderson , 148 Ill. 2d 15, 23-24, 169 Ill.Dec. 288, 591 N.E.2d 461 (1992) ; People v. Tolliver , 147 Ill. 2d 397, 400-03, 168 Ill.Dec. 127, 589 N.E.2d 527 (1992) ; People v. Gean , 143 Ill. 2d 281, 287-89, 158 Ill.Dec. 5, 573 N.E.2d 818 (1991) ; People v. Sevilla , 132 Ill. 2d 113, 120, 123, 138 Ill.Dec. 148, 547 N.E.2d 117 (1989). But these cases, like Elonis , have no bearing on the case before us because, as set forth below, the statutory provisions at issue here are not silent as to mental state.

¶ 22 Further, the appellate court's conclusion that due process does not permit criminal liability based on negligent conduct is unfounded. Indeed, Elonis acknowledged that criminal negligence has been recognized as a valid basis for imposing criminal liability. See Elonis , 575 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2011 (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. Law Inst. 1985 ), and 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4, at 372-73 (2d ed. 2003) ). Also, the Criminal Code of 2012 includes both recklessness and negligence as permissible mental states, and absolute liability is permitted in certain limited circumstances. See 720 ILCS 5/4-6, 4-7, 4-9 (West 2012). Contrary to the views expressed by the appellate court, substantive due process does not categorically rule out negligence as a permissible mental state for imposition of criminal liability, and Elonis does not suggest such a categorical rule. Therefore, we reject the appellate court's reasoning and its determination that Elonis mandates invalidation of the statutory provisions at issue here.

¶ 23 B. First Amendment

¶ 24 Defendant does not seek affirmance under Elonis but argues that the appellate court's judgment should be sustained for other reasons. Defendant's primary argument to this court is that the stalking and cyberstalking provisions under which he was convicted are facially unconstitutional because they violate the right to free speech as guaranteed under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. I ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 4. He also argues that the relevant provisions violate substantive due process guarantees because they improperly criminalize innocent conduct. The State opposes both contentions.

¶ 25 We first consider defendant's argument that the relevant statutory provisions are facially unconstitutional because they violate the right to free speech under the first amendment. We begin by examining the history and terms of the stalking statute as they relate to defendant's conviction under count I.

¶ 26 Illinois's first stalking statute, enacted in 1992, defined the offense as requiring an intentional threat of a violent crime plus multiple acts of following or surveillance in furtherance of the threat. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a) (West 1992). The statute was subsequently modified to require that the defendant's actions be undertaken "knowingly and without lawful justification." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a) (West 1994). This court held that the threat-focused version of subsection (a) was not unconstitutionally overbroad because the speech prohibited by the statute was an integral part of unlawful conduct. See People v. Bailey , 167 Ill. 2d 210, 227, 212 Ill.Dec. 608, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995). This conclusion was premised on the fact that the statute encompassed only activities performed without lawful authority and required that the defendant actually threaten the victim and take action in furtherance of the threat. Id. at 227-28, 212 Ill.Dec. 608, 657 N.E.2d 953.

¶ 27 With the adoption of amendments that became effective in 2010, the legislature greatly expanded the definition of the offense of stalking. See Pub. Act 96-686, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). The previous threat-focused definition of stalking was retained and renumbered as subsection (a-3). 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3) (West 2012). However, the legislature also crafted new statutory language to include additional conduct in the definition of the offense. The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).

¶ 28 The current version of subsection (a) of the stalking statute provides as follows:

"A person commits stalking when he or she knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to:
(1) fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person; or
(2) suffer other emotional distress." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012).

The phrase "course of conduct" is defined in subsection (c) as:

"2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other non-consensual contact, or interferes with or damages a person's property or pet. A course of conduct may include contact via electronic communications." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(1) (West 2012).
In addition, subsection (c) defines "emotional distress" as "significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(3) (West 2012). The phrase "reasonable person" is defined as "a person in the victim's situation." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(8) (West 2012). Subsection (c) defines "non-consensual contact" as "any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim's consent." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(6) (West 2012). Under that provision, "non-consensual contact" includes "being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim." Id.

¶ 29 Under the terms of the amended statute, two or more nonconsensual communications to or about a person that the defendant knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress constitute a course of conduct sufficient to establish the offense of stalking. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a), (c) (West 2012); see also People v. Douglas , 2014 IL App (5th) 120155, ¶ 41, 379 Ill.Dec. 548, 6 N.E.3d 876 (holding that only "non-consensual" communications fall within the prohibition of subsection (a)). Defendant contends that the new provisions, criminalizing communications to or about a person that negligently would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, violate the first amendment. U.S. Const., amend. I.

¶ 30 In general, statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute carries the burden of proving that the statute is unconstitutional. People v. Hollins , 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 402, 971 N.E.2d 504. The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. People v. Gutman , 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 355 Ill.Dec. 207, 959 N.E.2d 621. This court has a duty to construe the statute in a manner that upholds the statute's validity and constitutionality if reasonably possible.

Hollins , 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 402, 971 N.E.2d 504. The determination of whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law to be reviewed de novo . Id.

¶ 31 The first amendment, which applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, precludes the enactment of laws "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV. Under this amendment, a government "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union , 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002). Therefore, "[t]he Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. 234, 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002).

¶ 32 Content-based laws, which target speech based on its communicative content, are presumed to be invalid. United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) ; see also People v. Alexander , 204 Ill. 2d 472, 476, 274 Ill.Dec. 414, 791 N.E.2d 506 (2003). In addition to restrictions that are facially content based, the United States Supreme Court has "recognized a separate and additional category of laws that, though facially content neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech" because they "cannot be ' "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." ' " Reed v. Town of Gilbert , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) ).

¶ 33 However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that certain "historic and traditional" categories of expression do not fall within the protections of the first amendment, and content-based restrictions with regard to those recognized categories of speech have been upheld. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Alvarez , 567 U.S. 709, 717, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) ; Alexander , 204 Ill. 2d at 476-77, 274 Ill.Dec. 414, 791 N.E.2d 506. Those accepted categories of unprotected speech include true threats (see Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (per curiam )) and speech integral to criminal conduct (see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. , 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949) ).

¶ 34 Of relevance here, the proscription against "communicat[ions] to or about" a person that negligently would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress criminalizes certain types of speech based on the impact that the communication has on the recipient. Under the relevant statutory language, communications that are pleasing to the recipient due to their nature or substance are not prohibited, but communications that the speaker "knows or should know" are distressing due to their nature or substance are prohibited. Therefore, it is clear that the challenged statutory provision must be considered a content-based restriction because it cannot be justified without reference to the content of the prohibited communications. See Reed , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2227 ; see also Matal v. Tam , 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1764-65, 198 L.Ed.2d 366 (2017) (plurality opinion) (holding that the "disparagement clause," which prohibits federal registration of a trademark based on its offensive content, violates the first amendment). The State essentially concedes this point by failing to present any argument to the contrary and by contending that the terms of subsection (a) survive the strict scrutiny standard applicable to content-based restrictions.

¶ 35 The State argues, however, that the communications prohibited in subsection (a) do not unconstitutionally encroach on the right to speech because they are categorically unprotected by the first amendment. In particular, the State claims that "communicat[ions] to or about" a person are exempt from first amendment protection because they fall within either the exception for true threats or the exception applicable to speech that is integral to criminal conduct. We disagree.

¶ 36 1. True Threats

¶ 37 With regard to the exception for true threats, the Supreme Court has held that a communication qualifies as a true threat if it contains a "serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence." Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) ; see also Watts , 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399 (holding that political hyperbole does not constitute a true threat and, therefore, is protected by the first amendment).

¶ 38 The State offers no cogent argument as to how a communication to or about a person that negligently would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress fits into the established jurisprudence on true threats. The State does not explain how such a communication, without more, constitutes a "serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence." Black , 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536. Moreover, it is unclear whether the true threat exemption from the first amendment would apply to a statement made with innocent intent but which negligently conveys a message that a reasonable person would perceive to be threatening. Compare United States v. Cassel , 408 F.3d 622, 632-33 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Black as indicating that speech is unprotected under the first amendment only if the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat), with State v. Johnston , 156 Wash.2d 355, 127 P.3d 707, 710 (2006) (adopting an objective standard for statements that may be understood to convey a threat, even if the speaker did not so intend). The State does not attempt to reconcile this conflicting precedent.

¶ 39 However, we need not resolve that question here to dispose of the State's argument. Subsection (a) of the stalking statute specifically includes the making of threats as an independent basis of a course of conduct. The prohibition against distressing communications to or about a person stands separate and apart from the proscription against threats. Therefore, even assuming that statements which negligently convey a threat are not protected, a course of conduct based on such statements could be prosecuted under the threat portion of subsection (a). If distressing communications to or about a person are construed to refer to "true threats," as the State's argument suggests, then the language proscribing threats would be superfluous. Such a construction must be rejected because this court presumes that each part of a statute has meaning, and we will not construe a statute to render any part of it superfluous or redundant. People v. Baskerville , 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 25, 357 Ill.Dec. 500, 963 N.E.2d 898. Consequently, even if the negligent communication of a threatening message is unprotected, the State's argument fails.

¶ 40 2. Speech Integrally Related to Criminal Conduct

¶ 41 The State next contends that first amendment protections are not implicated because subsection (a) of the stalking statute is targeted at regulating conduct and not speech. In the State's view, because subsection (a) criminalizes only a "course of conduct," the prohibited actions do not fall within the protection of the first amendment. In support, the State relies on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien , which held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." United States v. O'Brien , 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

¶ 42 The State's reliance on O'Brien is misplaced because nothing in subsection (a) requires that speech and nonspeech elements be combined. Although the plain language of subsection (a) prohibits a "course of conduct," each of the actions identified in that subsection stand alone as actions that can form the basis of the course of conduct. Among the particularly specified actions are "communicat[ions] to or about" a person that the defendant knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The communications need not be accompanied by any other action to form the predicate for a prohibited course of conduct. As subsection (a) is written, two or more such communications are sufficient to form a course of conduct and warrant prosecution under subsection (a).

¶ 43 The State maintains, however, that the phrase "communicates to or about" does not implicate first amendment rights because it relates to speech that is integral to criminal conduct. The State's contention is wrong. The rule cited by the State applies when the speech is "an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute." Giboney , 336 U.S. at 498, 69 S.Ct. 684.

¶ 44 Thus, speech is "fully outside" the protection of the first amendment when it is a mechanism or instrumentality in the commission of a separate unlawful act. Stevens , 559 U.S. at 471, 130 S.Ct. 1577. According to the Supreme Court, this rule applies only where there is a " 'proximate link' " between the speech at issue and the criminal conduct. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. at 249-50, 122 S.Ct. 1389 ). Consequently, the State's reliance on New York v. Ferber , 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), which upheld a ban on child pornography, is misplaced.

¶ 45 Here, subsection (a) does not require that the prohibited communications be in furtherance of an unlawful purpose. As such, there is no "proximate link" between the restricted communications and some other criminal act. In light of the fact that a course of conduct can be premised exclusively on two communications to or about a person, this aspect of subsection (a) is a direct limitation on speech that does not require any relationship-integral or otherwise-to unlawful conduct. Under subsection (a), the speech is the criminal act.

¶ 46 The State's argument is not bolstered by its reliance on United States v. Osinger , 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014), United States v. Sayer , 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014), and United States v. Petrovic , 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012). Each of those cases upheld the constitutionality of the federal stalking statute, which explicitly requires that the defendant have the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate the victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). Because the federal stalking statute requires intent to commit an unlawful act and does not impose criminal liability for negligent conduct, the decisions in Osinger , Sayer , and Petrovic provide no guidance in this case.

¶ 47 Also, we note that courts in other jurisdictions have rejected similar arguments as a justification for upholding statutes that are comparable to subsection (a). See State v. Bishop , 368 N.C. 869, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (N.C. 2016) ; People v. Marquan M. , 24 N.Y.3d 1, 994 N.Y.S.2d 554, 19 N.E.3d 480 (2014) ; State v. Machholz , 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998).

¶ 48 Because the speech restrictions imposed by subsection (a) do not fit within any of the "historic and traditional" categories of unprotected speech, we review defendant's argument under the overbreadth doctrine. See generally Stevens , 559 U.S. at 471-72, 130 S.Ct. 1577.

¶ 49 3. Overbreadth

¶ 50 A statute is overbroad on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity as well as activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights. Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Consequently, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge a statute as a facial violation of the first amendment, even if that party's conduct would not fall within the amendment's protection. Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) ; People v. Minnis , 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 14, 409 Ill.Dec. 60, 67 N.E.3d 272. The justification for allowing an overbreadth challenge is the important goal of avoiding the potential chilling effect that overbroad statutes have on the exercise of protected speech. Virginia v. Hicks , 539 U.S. 113, 119, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) ; Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. , 482 U.S. 569, 574, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987).

¶ 51 A statute "may be invalidated as overbroad if 'a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' " Stevens , 559 U.S. at 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ). Given its limited application, the Supreme Court has observed that the overbreadth doctrine should be applied "only as a last resort" and only if the degree of overbreadth is substantial and the statute is not subject to a limiting construction. Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908.

¶ 52 The initial step in overbreadth analysis is to examine the challenged legislation because "it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers." United States v. Williams , 553 U.S. 285, 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). As set forth above, subsection (a) of the stalking statute defines the offense of stalking to include a course of conduct evidenced by two or more nonconsensual communications to or about a person that the defendant knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2), (c) (West 2012); Douglas , 2014 IL App (5th) 120155, ¶ 41, 379 Ill.Dec. 548, 6 N.E.3d 876. That provision, therefore, imposes a content-based restriction on speech and criminalizes communications to or about a person that negligently would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. As amended in 2010, subsection (a) embraces a vast array of circumstances that limit speech far beyond the generally understood meaning of stalking. Indeed, the amended provision criminalizes any number of commonplace situations in which an individual engages in expressive activity that he or she should know will cause another person to suffer emotional distress. The broad sweep of subsection (a) reaches a host of social interactions that a person would find distressing but are clearly understood to fall within the protections of the first amendment.

¶ 53 For example, subsection (a) prohibits a person from attending town meetings at which he or she repeatedly complains about pollution caused by a local business owner and advocates for a boycott of the business. Such a person could be prosecuted under subsection (a) if he or she persists in complaining after being told to stop by the owner of the business and the person knows or should know that the complaints will cause the business owner to suffer emotional distress due to the economic impact of a possible boycott.

¶ 54 The communications described above would be criminal even though they constitute speech in a public forum about a matter of public concern-a quintessential example of the type of speech that is protected by the first amendment. See Snyder v. Phelps , 562 U.S. 443, 451-52, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (recognizing that speech on issues of public concern is "at the heart" of the first amendment's protection (internal quotation marks omitted)); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (noting that the first amendment reflects "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); Garrison v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (holding that "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government"). As the Supreme Court has observed, "speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).

¶ 55 Indeed, even core political speech could be prosecuted under subsection (a) if the speaker knows or should know that the substance of his or her comments would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. This result would contravene the very purpose of the first amendment, which " 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' " Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 269, 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) ); see also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n , 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (recognizing that our political system and cultural life are premised on the notion that "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence").

¶ 56 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[m]ost of what we say to one another lacks 'religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value' (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from Government regulation." (Emphasis in original.) Stevens , 559 U.S. at 479, 130 S.Ct. 1577. Given the wide-ranging scope of the first amendment, its protection presumptively extends to many forms of speech that would fall within the broad spectrum of speech restricted by subsection (a).

¶ 57 We reject the State's assertion, made at oral argument, that the phrase "directed at" sufficiently narrows the scope of subsection (a) to insulate it from a first amendment challenge. This assertion suggests that the "directed at" language brings the prohibition against communications to or about a person within the category of speech that is unprotected under Rowan v. United States Post Office Department , 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970) (holding that nonconsensual one-to-one communications that impinge on the privacy rights of the recipient are not protected under the first amendment). However, the plain meaning of the phrase "directed at" does not limit its application to one-to-one communications affecting the right to privacy or prevent prosecution for communication in a public forum where the victim is a known or intended recipient of the message.

¶ 58 The example of the person voicing complaints during a town meeting about pollution caused by a local business illustrates the point. If the business owner is present at the town meetings, the complaints would be "directed at" him or her and could be the basis of a prosecution under subsection (a) even though the complaints would not fall into Rowan 's one-to-one exception from the first amendment.

¶ 59 Moreover, it is unclear from the State's suggestion whether the phrase "directed at" includes communications about the victim that are intended to be seen or heard by other people but not the victim. If so, such a situation is greatly attenuated from the circumstances contemplated by Rowan and would extend the scope of subsection (a) far beyond the reasonable limits of the Supreme Court's holding in that case. Nothing in the State's argument before this court clarifies how inclusion of the phrase "directed at" prevents the application of subsection (a) to circumstances that are not covered under Rowan .

¶ 60 A limiting construction should be imposed on a statute only where the statute is " ' "readily susceptible" to such a construction.' " Stevens , 559 U.S. at 481, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union , 521 U.S. 844, 884, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) ). Based on the above, we do not believe the "directed at" language can be interpreted to sufficiently narrow the scope of subsection (a) to avoid the infringement of first amendment rights. Accordingly, we find that the statute is not "readily susceptible" to the State's suggested limiting construction. See id.

¶ 61 We also reject the State's argument that the exemption in subsection (d)(2) of the stalking statute avoids any constitutional defect in the terms of subsection (a). The exemption on which the State relies states that "[t]his [s]ection does not apply to an exercise of the right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful." 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(d)(2) (West 2012). Yet, as was true with the earlier threat-focused version of subsection (a), the exemption contains no language that would actually prevent the prosecution of charges based on protected speech. Rather, the exemption is correctly viewed to function as an affirmative defense that must be raised by a defendant at trial after a prosecution has been initiated. As such, the exemption cannot eliminate the chilling effect on protected speech and resulting self-censorship.

¶ 62 Contrary to the State's assertion, the exemption does not prevent unwarranted prosecutions under a case-by-case application of the "communicates to or about" language. Nothing in the language of subsection (a) explicitly differentiates between distressing communications that are subject to prosecution and those that are not-and the State has not offered any guidance as to how Illinois citizens should tease out that difference. A case-by-case discretionary decision by law enforcement officers and prosecutors does not solve the problem of the chilling effect on innocent speakers who fear prosecution based on negligently made distressing communications to or about a person. We conclude that subsection (d)(2) is insufficient to remediate the extreme overbreadth of subsection (a) and cannot by itself make the terms of that provision constitutional. See generally Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union , 542 U.S. 656, 670-71, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004) ; Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. at 255, 122 S.Ct. 1389 ; see also United States v. Stevens , 533 F.3d 218, 231 n.13 (3rd Cir. 2008) (en banc ) (observing that, where a statutory exemption functions as an affirmative defense, it "poses an even greater threat to chill constitutional speech").

¶ 63 Given the wide range of constitutionally protected activity covered by subsection (a), we conclude that a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional when judged in relation to its legitimate sweep. See Stevens , 559 U.S. at 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577. Accordingly, the degree of overbreadth is substantial, rendering subsection (a) overbroad on its face. We hold that the portion of subsection (a) of the stalking statute that makes it criminal to negligently "communicate[ ] to or about" a person, where the speaker knows or should know the communication would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, is facially unconstitutional. Additionally, because subsection (a) of the cyberstalking statute imposes criminal liability based on similar language, it is unconstitutionally overbroad as well. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a) (West 2012).

¶ 64 C. Severability and Validity of Defendant's Convictions on Other Grounds

¶ 65 Public Act 96-686, which added the language "communicates to or about" a person to the definitions of stalking and cyberstalking, specifically states that its provisions are severable under section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/1.31 (West 2012) ). See Pub. Act 96-686, § 97 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). Therefore, the phrase "communicates to or about" must be stricken from subsection (a) in each statute. Accordingly, we address whether defendant's convictions can be sustained based on other conduct prohibited by the stalking and cyberstalking statutes.

¶ 66 Under counts I and II, defendant was charged with calling and e-mailing Blakey. However, because there is no evidence that any of the calls or e-mails were threatening, they cannot be considered as part of a course of conduct under subsection (a). Consequently, we consider whether the convictions under counts I and II may be upheld based on any other conduct occurring after Garceau issued the "no-contact" directive in late March or early April 2012.

¶ 67 Regarding defendant's wave to Blakey through a window from outside the Clear Channel office building, the record does not establish that this action constitutes nonconsensual contact under subsection (c)(6). Although Blakey testified that the incident occurred sometime in March 2012, she did not identify the exact date. In addition, although Blakey indicated that the incident occurred at a time when defendant was not welcome at the radio station, her testimony did not affirmatively establish that it occurred after the "no-contact" directive by Garceau. Therefore, this incident cannot be considered as part of a course of conduct for purposes of counts I and II.

¶ 68 What remains is the uninvited studio visit on April 4, which did occur after Garceau directed defendant to cease all contact with Clear Channel employees. Although this incident would constitute nonconsensual contact under subsection (c)(6), it amounts to a single instance of such contact and is insufficient to establish a course of conduct requiring two or more acts. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(1), (c)(6) (West 2012).

¶ 69 Counts III and IV were predicated exclusively on communications about Blakey in the Facebook posts. None of those posts included any language that can be construed as a threat specifically directed at her, and counts III and IV alleged only that defendant had threatened Blakey's coworkers, workplace, and employer. As a whole, the Facebook posts are vulgar and intrusive, but they cannot be characterized as conveying a threat against Blakey. Moreover, even if the first Facebook post could be seen as threatening to all Clear Channel employees, including Blakey, it amounts to only one such communication. A single Facebook post does not establish a course of conduct under subsection (a) of the cyberstalking statute. Accordingly, all four of defendant's convictions must be vacated.

¶ 70 D. Invalidation of the Unsentenced Convictions

¶ 71 As a final matter, we address the appellate court's decision to address the validity of defendant's unsentenced convictions under counts II, III, and IV. The appellate court acknowledged that its jurisdiction extends only to final judgments and that there is no final judgment in a criminal case unless sentence has been imposed. 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶ 29, 404 Ill.Dec. 505, 56 N.E.3d 489 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6, and People v. Flores , 128 Ill. 2d 66, 95, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989) ). The court concluded, however, that it had jurisdiction to address the unsentenced convictions based on this court's decision in Dixon , 91 Ill. 2d 346, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180. We find the appellate court's conclusion to be unwarranted under the circumstances of this case.

¶ 72 In Dixon , the circuit court incorrectly determined that two of the defendant's convictions merged into two other, more serious convictions. Id. at 349, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180. As a consequence, the circuit court did not impose sentence on the lesser offenses. Id. The defendant appealed only the two sentenced convictions. Id. at 353, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180. In response, the State requested that the appellate court remand the cause for imposition of sentences on the lesser offenses. Id. at 349, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180. The appellate court reversed one of the sentenced convictions and affirmed the other but refused the State's request to remand the cause for sentencing on the convictions for the lesser offenses. Id.

¶ 73 The State appealed, arguing that the appellate court's refusal to remand was erroneous. Id. This court agreed, finding that the situation presented in that case was "an anomalous one." Id. at 353, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180. This court held that, although the unsentenced convictions were nonfinal orders, the appellate court had jurisdiction to order a remand for imposition of sentence because the defendant had appealed the final judgments entered on the sentenced convictions and because the convictions on the lesser offenses were "intimately related to and 'dependent upon' " the sentenced convictions appealed by the defendant. Id. at 353-54, 63 Ill.Dec. 442, 438 N.E.2d 180 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(2) ).

¶ 74 We find that the appellate court's reliance on Dixon in this case is misplaced for two reasons. First, Dixon is distinguishable on its facts. As this court stated, the situation underlying that decision was "anomalous" because the circuit court determined, albeit incorrectly, that sentences could not be imposed on the lesser offenses because they merged into the other offenses. In our view, the decision in Dixon must be understood to be limited to the type of factual situation presented in that case, which does not exist here. We have no such explanation for the circuit court's failure to impose sentences on counts II, III, and IV. The record is simply silent as to the reason for the court's action-or inaction-in this case.

¶ 75 Second, we believe that Dixon must be given a narrower interpretation than the one assumed by the appellate court. A close reading of Dixon makes clear that, to the extent the appellate court had any jurisdiction to address the nonfinal convictions, that jurisdiction was limited to ordering a remand for imposition of sentences on the lesser convictions. In this case, the appellate court's conclusion that it was authorized to consider the merits of defendant's unsentenced convictions under counts II, III, and IV reads Dixon too broadly and extends that decision beyond its reasonable limits. We hold, therefore, that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to decide the validity of defendant's unsentenced convictions.

¶ 76 This court, however, has general administrative and supervisory authority over all courts under section 16 of the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16. In the exercise of this court's supervisory authority, we opt to exercise jurisdiction over the unsentenced convictions in counts II, III, and IV here. See e.g. , McDunn v. Williams , 156 Ill. 2d 288, 299-304, 189 Ill.Dec. 417, 620 N.E.2d 385 (1993). Because all of defendant's convictions were based on provisions that are unconstitutionally overbroad and violative of the first amendment and because those convictions cannot be sustained on other grounds, we vacate defendant's convictions under all four counts of the indictment.

¶ 77 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 78 In sum, the terms of subsection (a) of the stalking and cyberstalking statutes violate the first amendment because they are overbroad in that they impermissibly infringe on the right to free speech. Accordingly, the phrase "communicates to or about" is stricken from those provisions. Because defendant's convictions under those provisions cannot be sustained based on other conduct, his convictions must be vacated, and we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. In light of our resolution of the first amendment issue, we need not address the remaining arguments of the parties.

¶ 79 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      These provisions of the stalking statute are substantially similar to corresponding provisions in the cyberstalking statute. However, the definition of cyberstalking in subsection (a) of that statute additionally requires that the defendant "us[e] electronic communication" in committing the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a), (c) (West 2012).

      We note that, although defendant did not raise his first amendment facial challenge in the circuit court, the argument was raised on appeal. See People v. Thompson , 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32, 398 Ill.Dec. 74, 43 N.E.3d 984 (recognizing that a facial challenge to a criminal statute, asserting that it is void ab initio , may be raised at any time). The State does not dispute that the argument is properly before this court.

      Although the "no-contact" directive was not issued by Blakey personally, defendant does not argue that Garceau lacked authority to issue the directive on her behalf as one of Clear Channel's employees.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Kevin HUNTER, Appellant
    The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Drashun Wilson, Appellant.
    Docket Nos. 121306 121345 cons.
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed November 30, 2017.
    Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Katie Anderson and Meredith N. Baron, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellants.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In these consolidated appeals we consider the temporal reach of two legislative enactments: (1) an amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) ( 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2016) ), which, inter alia , eliminated armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses, and (2) the new juvenile sentencing provisions codified in section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), which, inter alia , give the trial court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm sentencing enhancements. The appellate court rejected defendants' arguments for retroactive application of these statutes to their cases that were pending on direct review when the statutes became effective and affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences. People v. Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 62, 73, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246 ; People v. Wilson , 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16, 407 Ill.Dec. 84, 62 N.E.3d 329. We affirm the judgments of the appellate court, albeit for different reasons.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 No. 121306-People v. Hunter

¶ 4 In June 2011, the State charged defendant Kevin Hunter with aggravated vehicular hijacking ( 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2010)), aggravated kidnapping ( 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2010)), and armed robbery ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)), all while armed with a firearm. The charges arose out of an incident the previous month in which Hunter and two unidentified men robbed Steven Maxwell of personal property including his vehicle and kidnapped him, all at gunpoint. At the time of the offenses, Hunter was 16 years old.

¶ 5 The version of section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act then in effect provided as follows:

" § 5-130. Excluded jurisdiction.
(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated criminal sexual assault, (iii) aggravated battery with a firearm where the minor personally discharged a firearm * * *, (iv) armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or (v) aggravated vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a firearm.
These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State." 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2010).

Pursuant to this statute, Hunter was tried in adult court.

¶ 6 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Hunter was convicted on all three counts. The trial court sentenced Hunter to 21 years on each count-the 6-year minimum for a Class X felony, plus the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement-to be served concurrently. See 720 ILCS 5/18-4(b) (West 2010); 720 ILCS 5/10-2(b) (West 2010); 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2010); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2010). Hunter appealed.

¶ 7 While Hunter's case was pending in the appellate court, Public Acts 99-69 and 99-258 became effective. Both Public Acts adopted new, identical sentencing provisions applicable to defendants under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense. Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105); Pub. Act 99-258, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105). Subsection (b) of the new sentencing provisions directs that the court "may, in its discretion, decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing enhancement based upon firearm possession, possession with personal discharge, or possession with personal discharge that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2016).

¶ 8 Public Act 99-258 also amended section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act, raising the age for automatic transfer to adult court from 15 years to 16 years and eliminating armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses. Pub. Act 99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) ).

¶ 9 In supplemental briefing in the appellate court, Hunter argued that the amendment to the Code and the new sentencing provisions in the Act applied retroactively and that his case should be remanded for a discretionary transfer hearing, as well as a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court held that neither provision applied retroactively and rejected Hunter's other claims of error, thus affirming his convictions and sentence. Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 20, 22, 62, 73, 80, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246. We allowed Hunter's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).

¶ 10 No. 121345-People v. Wilson

¶ 11 In October 2012, defendant Drashun Wilson was indicted for attempted first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2012)) and aggravated battery with a firearm ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2012)) in connection with the September 23, 2012, shooting of Floyd Fulton. At the time of the offenses and indictment, Wilson was 17 years old and, under the Act, was tried in adult court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2012). Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Wilson was found guilty of both offenses. The jury also found that Wilson personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to another person. After merging the aggravated battery conviction into the attempted murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Wilson to 31 years' imprisonment-the 6-year minimum for a Class X felony, plus the minimum mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement applicable where the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012). Wilson appealed.

¶ 12 While Wilson's case was pending in the appellate court, Public Acts 99-69 and 99-258 became effective. In supplemental briefing, Wilson argued that he was entitled to be resentenced under section 5-4.5-105(b) of the Code, under which the trial court could decline to impose the firearm enhancement. The appellate court held that section 5-4.5-105(b) applied prospectively only. Wilson , 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16, 407 Ill.Dec. 84, 62 N.E.3d 329. The appellate court rejected Wilson's other claims of error and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 1, 28, 35, 43, 46-47.

¶ 13 We allowed Wilson's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016)) and consolidated Wilson's and Hunter's appeals for review.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Whether the statutory amendments at issue here apply retroactively to defendants' cases presents an issue of statutory construction. As such, our review proceeds de novo . People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc. , 2015 IL 117193, ¶ 27, 390 Ill.Dec. 105, 28 N.E.3d 758 ; People v. Amigon , 239 Ill. 2d 71, 84, 346 Ill.Dec. 63, 940 N.E.2d 63 (2010).

¶ 16 I

¶ 17 We consider first the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act, adopted in Public Act 99-258. As noted above, the amendment changed the requirements for automatic transfer of a juvenile to adult court, by raising the minimum age from 15 years to 16 years and by eliminating armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses. Hunter was charged with both of these offenses. Relying on People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346, Hunter argues that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) applies retroactively to his case, and because the offenses with which he was charged are no longer qualifying offenses for automatic transfer to adult court, he requests remand to the juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing but for purposes of sentencing only. Hunter does not challenge his conviction.

¶ 18 Howard was decided after we granted Hunter's petition for leave to appeal. There, we addressed the retroactivity of the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) adopted in Public Act 99-258. Although Howard involved the change in the minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court, rather than the change in the list of automatic transfer offenses that is at issue here, both changes appear in the same section of the Act. Thus, Howard informs our analysis in this case.

¶ 19 In Howard , the defendant, who was 15 years old, was indicted on multiple offenses, including first degree murder. The charges against defendant were brought in adult court, pursuant to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act ( 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2014)). Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 4, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. While the defendant's case was pending in the trial court, Public Act 99-258 became effective. The defendant argued that his case must proceed in juvenile court because he no longer met the minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court. The trial court agreed and transferred the cause to juvenile court. The State sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to rescind the transfer order. We denied the writ. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶¶ 35-36, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346.

¶ 20 In Howard , we reviewed the proper analysis courts must employ when determining the temporal reach of a statute. We noted that this court adopted the United States Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27, 36-39, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001) ). Under Landgraf , we first ask whether the legislature has clearly indicated the statute's temporal reach. If so, and assuming no constitutional prohibition, the legislature's intent will be given effect. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. If the legislature's intent is not clear, then, under Landgraf , the court must determine whether the statute has a retroactive impact, i.e. , whether the statute "would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Commonwealth Edison , 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964, quoting Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483 ). "If there is no retroactive impact, the statutory amendment may be applied retroactively; if there is a retroactive impact, the court presumes that the legislature intended the amendment to be prospective only." Id.

¶ 21 Howard made plain, however, that based on section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014) ), Illinois courts need never go beyond the first step of the Landgraf analysis. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, which has never been amended since its adoption in 1874 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 131, § 4 (Hurd 1874)) states:

"No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether the repeal is in the act making any new provision upon the same subject or in any other act." 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016).

¶ 22 As Howard explained, section 4 "is a general savings clause, which this court has interpreted as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only." Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 (citing People v. Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506-07, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002) ). Thus, if the temporal reach of the statute is not clearly indicated in its text, then the statute's temporal reach is provided by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Id.

¶ 23 Applying this analysis to Public Act 99-258, Howard noted that the portion of the public act amending section 5-130(1)(a) did not indicate its temporal reach, thus requiring resort to the default rule in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Id. ¶¶ 21, 28. We agreed with the parties that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a), impacting whether a defendant is tried in juvenile or criminal court, is purely a matter of procedure and concluded that, in the absence of a constitutional impediment to retroactive application, the amendment applies to "pending cases," including the defendant's case. Id.

¶ 24 Howard rejected the State's argument that applying the amended statute to the defendant's case, which had been pending in adult court for three years, would run afoul of section 4's requirement that procedural changes only apply "so far as practicable" ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014) ). Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 32, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. We observed that transferring the defendant's case to juvenile court for a transfer hearing "is something that is feasible." Id.

¶ 25 Hunter argues that, like Howard , his case was also "pending" on the effective date of the amendment, albeit on direct review in the appellate court. Hunter posits that because our retroactivity jurisprudence does not distinguish between cases pending in the trial court and cases pending on direct review when a statutory amendment becomes effective, Howard requires remand of his case to the juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing.

¶ 26 The State counters that this court's statement in Howard that the amendment applies retroactively to "pending cases" does not mean that it applies broadly to all nonfinal cases, i.e. , cases that are pending on direct review. The State argues that the amendment only applies retroactively to cases pending in criminal court that are capable of conforming to the new statute. The State maintains that applying the amendment to cases pending on direct review would result in an absurdity, requiring a remand in every such case where the legislature made an intervening change to a trial court procedure. The State further argues that even if the amendment applies retroactively to cases that were pending on direct review at the time the amendment became effective, remand to the juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing in this case is not practicable because Hunter, who is now 22 years old, has aged out of the juvenile court system.

¶ 27 We agree with Hunter that our retroactivity jurisprudence has not typically distinguished between cases that are pending in the trial court and cases pending in the appellate court on direct review at the time a statutory amendment becomes effective. The same retroactivity analysis that we employed in Howard , where the defendant's case was pending in the trial court when the amendment became effective, has also been employed by this court where the defendant's case was pending in the appellate court at the time the amendment became effective. See Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d at 508-09, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (holding that the general savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes prohibited retroactive application of a substantive statutory amendment that went into effect while the defendant's case was pending on appeal); accord People v. Atkins , 217 Ill. 2d 66, 71-73, 298 Ill.Dec. 50, 838 N.E.2d 943 (2005) (holding that under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, a substantive amendment that became effective after the defendant was convicted and sentenced would not apply retroactively).

¶ 28 Our agreement with Hunter on this point, however, does not lead us to conclude that, pursuant to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes and our decision in Howard , remand for further proceedings is mandated in this case. The process of statutory construction requires more than mechanical application of a rule of law or a decision of this court. We have an obligation to construe statutes in a manner that will avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results that the legislature could not have intended. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Gaughan , 2016 IL 120110, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 890, 72 N.E.3d 276 ; Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n , 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 39, 391 Ill.Dec. 18, 30 N.E.3d 288. As we recently observed, "the process of statutory construction should not be divorced from consideration of real-world results." People v. Fort , 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 35, 417 Ill.Dec. 566, 88 N.E.3d 718. Here, Hunter's construction of the amended statute would lead to real-world results that the legislature could not have intended.

¶ 29 We return to the Howard case, on which Hunter relies. Although we stated in Howard that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act applies to "pending cases" ( Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 ), we did not elaborate as to what that term means in the context of applying the default rule of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Certainly, we were not asked in Howard to consider the retroactivity of a procedural statute where, as here, the case was pending in the appellate court, rather than the trial court, when the statute became effective.

¶ 30 We also observe that our application of section 4 in the Howard case began with this statement of the law: "Under section 4, substantive amendments may not be applied retroactively, but 'procedural law changes will apply to ongoing proceedings .' " (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting People v. Ziobro , 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46, 350 Ill.Dec. 839, 949 N.E.2d 631 (2011) (citing section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006) ))). In Howard , the trial court proceedings had not yet been concluded. In a real-world sense those proceedings were "ongoing." Indeed, we framed the question in Howard as whether, given the statutory amendment, the defendant should "continue" to be prosecuted in adult court. Id. ¶ 31. Application of the Statute on Statute's default rule meant that the amended statute, changing the requirements for automatic transfer to adult court, would apply retroactively to a pending case, i.e. , a case in which the trial court proceedings had begun under the old statute but had not yet been concluded.

¶ 31 Howard is consistent with the language of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, which requires that "the proceedings thereafter "-after the adoption of the new procedural statute-"shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). Section 4 contemplates the existence of proceedings after the new or amended statute is effective to which the new procedure could apply. The phrase "ongoing proceedings," used by this court in Ziobro and Howard , conveys this idea. See also People v. Zito , 237 Ill. 434, 438, 86 N.E. 1041 (1908) (under section 4, "what remained to be done" must conform to the mode of procedure under the new act).

¶ 32 In Hunter's case, however, the proceedings in the trial court were completed well before the statute was amended. No "ongoing proceedings" exist to which the amended statute could apply. Thus, in contrast to Howard , this is not a case where we must decide whether the defendant should "continue" to be prosecuted in adult court. This is also not a case where remand for further proceedings is necessitated by reversible error at trial. See Ziobro , 242 Ill. 2d at 45-46, 350 Ill.Dec. 839, 949 N.E.2d 631 (where, after reversing the trial court's dismissal of the criminal charges, we instructed that a new procedural statute would apply retroactively to the proceedings on remand). Although Hunter challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on direct review, the appellate court rejected that argument ( Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 13-20, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246 ), and Hunter does not press that claim, or any other claim of reversible error, in this court. Simply stated, there are no "proceedings thereafter" capable of "conform[ing]" to the amended statute. 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). Nothing remains to be done.

¶ 33 Because Hunter's trial court proceedings have been concluded, and no further trial court proceedings are necessitated by reversible error, applying the amended statute retroactively to Hunter's case would result in this court effectively creating new proceedings for the sole purpose of applying a procedural statute that postdates his trial and sentence. We have grave concerns about such a result.

¶ 34 The Landgraf opinion, from which our retroactivity jurisprudence sprang, speaks to this issue. There, the Supreme Court observed that procedural rules may often be applied in cases that arose before the rule was enacted. Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The Court, however, went on to note:

"Of course, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case. A new rule concerning the filing of complaints would not govern an action in which the complaint had already been properly filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule of evidence would not require an appellate remand for a new trial." Id. n.29.

¶ 35 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, made a similar observation:

"A new rule of evidence governing expert testimony, for example, is aimed at regulating the conduct of trial, and the event relevant to retroactivity of the rule is introduction of the testimony. Even though it is a procedural rule, it would unquestionably not be applied to testimony already taken -reversing a case on appeal, for example, because the new rule had not been applied at a trial which antedated the statute." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 291-92, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.).

See also Michael S. Gilmore, Application of Statutory Changes to Cases in Progress: The Crossroads of the Legislative and Judicial Power-An Analysis of Federal and Idaho Law , 34 Idaho L. Rev. 517, 543 (1998) (reviewing Justice Scalia's concurrence in Landgraf and noting that if procedural rule changes were truly applied retroactively "there would be retrial of cases every time new statutes governing pleadings, appeals, and evidence" were adopted that "would lead to different results from the old statutes").

¶ 36 We recognize that our retroactivity jurisprudence, though flowing from Landgraf , was tempered by our construction of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, and we presume that the General Assembly adopted Public Act 99-258 with knowledge of section 4 and this court's interpretation thereof. See People v. Villa , 2011 IL 110777, ¶ 36, 355 Ill.Dec. 220, 959 N.E.2d 634 ; People v. Jones , 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239 (2005). But in none of the several cases from this court on which Hunter relies did we remand a case to the trial court because "the new [procedural] rule had not been applied at a trial which antedated the statute." Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 291-92, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.). Remand under such circumstances would create inconvenience and a waste of judicial resources-a real-world result that the General Assembly could not have intended. Accordingly, we will not apply the amended statute retroactively to Hunter's case.

¶ 37 We reject Hunter's argument for retroactive application for the further reason that new procedural rules only apply to ongoing proceedings "so far as practicable." 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). We agree with the State that under the facts of this case, application of the amended statute is not practicable.

¶ 38 Howard equated what is "practicable" to what is "feasible" and concluded in that case that transfer to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing was feasible, even if not convenient. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 32, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. At the time of our decision in Howard , the defendant was 19 years old and still subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See People v. Fiveash , 2015 IL 117669, ¶¶ 14-16, 396 Ill.Dec. 98, 39 N.E.3d 924 (scope of the Act is limited to persons under the age of 21, and therefore, the juvenile court had no authority over the 23-year-old defendant). Hunter is now 22 years old. A discretionary transfer hearing in the juvenile court is no longer feasible because the juvenile court may not exercise jurisdiction over Hunter. Id.

¶ 39 We disagree with Hunter that, pursuant to Fort , 2017 IL 118966, 417 Ill.Dec. 566, 88 N.E.3d 718, and People v. Brown , 225 Ill. 2d 188, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163 (2007), retroactive application of the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) is yet feasible, despite his age.

¶ 40 In Fort , the juvenile defendant was tried in adult court for first degree murder, an automatic transfer offense, but convicted of second degree murder, which is not an automatic transfer offense. We held that plain error occurred when the trial court sentenced the defendant as an adult under the Unified Code of Corrections without the State first filing a motion requesting adult sentencing, as required by the Act ( 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2008)). Fort , 2017 IL 118966, ¶¶ 30-31, 417 Ill.Dec. 566, 88 N.E.3d 718. We determined that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the defendant's sentence and remand the matter to the trial court where the State would have the opportunity to file an appropriate motion for adult sentencing. Id. ¶ 41. We noted: "Should the trial court find after the hearing that defendant is not subject to adult sentencing, the proper remedy is to discharge the proceedings against defendant since he is now over 21 years of age and is no longer eligible to be committed as a juvenile under the Act." Id.

¶ 41 In contrast to Fort , where the case was remanded to adult court to allow the State to file a motion in that court requesting adult sentencing, Hunter seeks remand for a discretionary transfer hearing, which, he acknowledges, proceeds in the juvenile court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 2016). But as already noted, Hunter, who is 22 years old, is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

¶ 42 In Brown , on which Hunter also relies, the juvenile defendant was tried and convicted in adult court for attempted murder. Several years later, he filed a successive postconviction petition challenging his conviction because the statute under which his case had been transferred to adult court was found unconstitutional. We held that, because the statute was unconstitutional and void ab initio , the defendant's transfer to adult court based on that statute was also void and the defendant was thus entitled to a new transfer hearing. Brown , 225 Ill. 2d at 199, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163. Although the defendant would have been 25 or 26 years old at the time we remanded the matter to the circuit court, the State apparently made no argument challenging the remand based on the defendant's age. Brown 's silence on an issue that was not raised does not lend support to Hunter's position here that a remand to the juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing is feasible, notwithstanding that the juvenile court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a 22-year-old defendant.

¶ 43 In sum, because the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act did not become effective until after Hunter's trial court proceedings were concluded and his case was pending in the appellate court; because no reversible error necessitates remand for further proceedings to which the amended statute could apply; and because Hunter, in any event, is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, making remand impracticable, we hold that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act does not apply retroactively to Hunter's case.

¶ 44 II

¶ 45 We next consider the new juvenile sentencing provisions in the Code, adopted in Public Acts 99-69 and 99-258. Both public acts adopted identical provisions titled "SENTENCING OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE." Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105); Pub. Act 99-258, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (also adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105). The new provisions state in relevant part:

"(a) On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly, when a person commits an offense and the person is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the court, at the sentencing hearing conducted under Section 5-4-1, shall consider the following additional factors [enumerated 1 through 9] in mitigation in determining the appropriate sentence:
* * *
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the court may sentence the defendant to any disposition authorized for the class of the offense of which he or she was found guilty as described in Article 4.5 of this Code, and may, in its discretion, decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing enhancement based upon firearm possession, possession with personal discharge, or possession with personal discharge that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016).

¶ 46 Section 5-4.5-105 of the Code became effective while defendants' cases were pending in the appellate court on direct review. In each case, the appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that subsection (b), which gives the court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm enhancements, applies retroactively to his case. Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶ 43, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246 ; Wilson , 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16, 407 Ill.Dec. 84, 62 N.E.3d 329. In Hunter's case, the appellate court held that the legislature clearly indicated in subsection (a) that the new provisions apply to sentencing hearings " '[o]n or after the effective date' " of the statute, January 1, 2016. Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶ 43, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246. In Wilson's case, the appellate court also relied on the language in subsection (a), holding that a sentencing court's consideration of the additional mitigating factors set forth in subsection (a) and the sentencing court's discretion not to impose a firearm enhancement as set forth in subsection (b) may be exercised only when an individual that is under 18 years of age commits an offense on or after the effective date of the statute-January 1, 2016. Wilson , 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16, 407 Ill.Dec. 84, 62 N.E.3d 329.

¶ 47 Defendants argue that the appellate court erred in applying the language in subsection (a), which limits its temporal reach, to subsection (b). According to defendants, the legislature's decision to omit such limiting language from subsection (b) means that the legislature intended subsection (b) to apply retroactively. The State counters that section 5-4.5-105 establishes a comprehensive sentencing scheme, and that the legislature's expression of temporal reach in subsection (a) applies to the entire scheme.

¶ 48 Under our well-settled rules of statutory construction, "where the legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, courts will presume that the legislature acted intentionally in the exclusion or inclusion" ( People v. Smith , 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 30, 412 Ill.Dec. 793, 76 N.E.3d 1251 ) and that the legislature intended different results ( In re K.C. , 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50, 239 Ill.Dec. 572, 714 N.E.2d 491 (1999) ). Here, the fact that the legislature included language in subsection (a) limiting its temporal reach but omitted such language in subsection (b) is indicative that the legislature intended different results and that the limiting language in subsection (a) applies only to that subsection. Thus, only the trial court's obligation set forth in subsection (a) to consider additional factors in mitigation at sentencing is controlled by the limiting language in that same subsection.

¶ 49 Had the legislature intended all of the new sentencing provisions to have the same temporal reach as the provisions in subsection (a), the legislature could have included the limiting language in a separate subsection so stating, as it did in connection with another amendment adopted as part of the same public act. See Pub. Act 99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-805, adding 705 ILCS 405/5-805(7) ("[t]he changes made to this Section * * * apply to a minor who has been taken into custody on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act")). The legislature, however, did not do so with respect to the new juvenile sentencing provisions.

¶ 50 The legislature also could have preceded all of the subsections of the new statute with a statement indicating that all of the new provisions have the same temporal reach, as it did when it added another new section to the Act. See Pub. Act 99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 705 ILCS 405/5-822 (providing, prior to the numbered paragraphs, for data collection to commence "[o]n the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly")). The legislature did not do so.

¶ 51 We presume that the legislature acted intentionally when it included the limiting language in subsection (a) but omitted that same language in subsection (b), and we therefore agree with defendants that the appellate court erred in applying the language in subsection (a) to subsection (b). That said, we disagree with defendants that the omission of that language in subsection (b) means that the legislature must have intended that subsection (b) apply retroactively to cases that were pending on direct review when the statute became effective. Just as we will not read the limiting language of subsection (a) into subsection (b), neither will we inject into the statute an unexpressed provision requiring retroactive application of subsection (b). See King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp. , 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26, 293 Ill.Dec. 657, 828 N.E.2d 1155 (2005) (courts may not, in the guise of statutory construction, annex new provisions not expressed by the legislature).

¶ 52 Because the statute is silent as to the temporal reach of subsection (b), we once again refer to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Although the parties dispute whether subsection (b) is properly labeled "procedural" or "substantive," we need not decide that issue. Rather, we agree with the State that, under section 4, subsection (b) of the new statute cannot apply to Hunter and Wilson, who were sentenced before the statute took effect.

¶ 53 The second sentence of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes expressly provides:

"If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect." 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016).

¶ 54 In People v. Hansen , 28 Ill. 2d 322, 340-41, 192 N.E.2d 359 (1963), we held that the defendant was not entitled to be resentenced under the new criminal code, which went into effect just 13 days after he was sentenced, because, under section 4, "a punishment mitigated by a new law is applicable only to judgments after the new law takes effect." Similarly, in People v. Bradford , 106 Ill. 2d 492, 504, 88 Ill.Dec. 615, 478 N.E.2d 1341 (1985), we held that, under section 4, the defendant was not eligible to be sentenced under a statutory amendment that became effective while his case was pending in this court because he had already been sentenced prior to the statute's effective date. Where, however, a defendant's sentence is vacated on appeal and the matter remanded for resentencing, under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the law in effect at the time of the new sentencing hearing. People v. Reyes , 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 12, 407 Ill.Dec. 452, 63 N.E.3d 884 (per curiam ) (vacating the defendant's sentence as unconstitutional and remanding to the trial court where, pursuant to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, the defendant was entitled to be resentenced under the new juvenile sentencing provisions).

¶ 55 Here, no dispute exists that defendants were sentenced well before the new juvenile sentencing provisions, including subsection (b), became effective on January 1, 2016. Further, defendants make no claim that error occurred in the trial court that would require vacatur of their sentences and remand for resentencing, thus giving them the option to be sentenced under subsection (b).

¶ 56 Defendants' sole argument against applying the second sentence of section 4 in the present case is that subsection (b) of the new statute does not mitigate punishment. We disagree. To "mitigate" means "to make less severe." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1447 (1993); see Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (10th ed. 2014). Subsection (b) provides that the trial court "may, in its discretion, decline to impose any other applicable [firearm] sentencing enhancement." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2016). Thus, in the case of Hunter, who was found guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery, all while armed with a firearm, application of subsection (b) would mean that the low end of the sentencing range would be reduced from 21 years (the 6-year minimum sentence for a Class X felony, plus the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement) to 6 years (the minimum unenhanced sentence for a Class X felony). In the case of Wilson, who was found guilty of attempted first degree murder where he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, application of subsection (b) would mean that the low end of the sentencing range would be reduced from 31 years (the 6-year minimum sentence for a Class X felony, plus the mandatory 25-year minimum firearm enhancement) to 6 years (the minimum unenhanced sentence for a Class X felony). We conclude that subsection (b) of the new juvenile sentencing provisions mitigates punishment because the potential sentence is "less severe" than under the prior sentencing scheme. Accordingly, defendants are not eligible to be sentenced under subsection (b). The appellate court came to the correct conclusions, but for the wrong reasons.

¶ 57 CONCLUSION

¶ 58 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgments of the appellate court.

¶ 59 Affirmed.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Neither public act contains an effective date, but pursuant to the Effective Date of Laws Act (5 ILCS 75/0.01 et seq. (West 2014)), because the underlying bills were both "passed" prior to June 1, 2015 (see 5 ILCS 75/3 (West 2014) ), the effective date for both public acts was January 1, 2016 (see 5 ILCS 75/1(a) (West 2014)). See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 10 ("The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to June 1 of a calendar year.").

      See Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak , 223 Ill. 2d 318, 333-34, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246 (2006) (holding that curative legislation, adopted while the case was on appeal to this court, and which validated the challenged tax levy, applied retroactively under the clear language of the statute); Atkins , 217 Ill. 2d at 71-73, 298 Ill.Dec. 50, 838 N.E.2d 943 (holding that a substantive amendment to the burglary statute, which became effective after the defendant was convicted and sentenced, would not apply retroactively); Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d at 509, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (holding that substantive statutory amendment repealing the offense of which the defendant was convicted, which went into effect while the defendant's case was pending on appeal, would not apply retroactively); People v. Digirolamo , 179 Ill. 2d 24, 49-51, 227 Ill.Dec. 779, 688 N.E.2d 116 (1997) (holding that an amendment to the venue statute, which became effective after the trial proceedings concluded, would not apply retroactively because the amendment effected a substantive change in the law); Johnson v. Edgar , 176 Ill. 2d 499, 521-22, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997) (holding that curative legislation, adopted while the case was pending on appeal, would apply retroactively pursuant to the statute's express language); People v. Kellick , 102 Ill. 2d 162, 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 54, 464 N.E.2d 1037 (1984) (holding that the legislative history of a statute changing the death penalty eligibility requirements, that became effective five days after the defendant was sentenced, indicated the legislature's intent that the statute operate retroactively to a date that was 15 days prior to the commission of the murder, requiring vacatur of the defendant's death sentence).

      The defendant was born on September 4, 1997 (Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 4, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346), and our opinion was filed December 1, 2016.

      The defendant was 16 in 1997 at the time of the offense (Brown , 225 Ill. 2d at 192, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163 ), and our opinion in Brown was filed in 2007.

      Hunter was sentenced on May 29, 2014. Wilson was sentenced on May 2, 2014.