source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Fischer, J. Kennedy, J., concurring.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MASON, Appellant.
    No. 2017-0200
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted January 23, 2018 Decided April 18, 2018
    Ray A. Grogan, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin P. Collins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., and Kort Gatterdam, Columbus; and Todd Anderson, for appellant.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.
    Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher D. Schroeder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office.
    Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.
    Jeffrey M. Gamso, Cleveland and Erika B. Cunliffe, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
   Fischer, J.

{¶ 1} At issue in this case is whether Ohio's death-penalty scheme violates the right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Marion County Court of Common Pleas found that it does, but the Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. Because the Ohio scheme satisfies the Sixth Amendment, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} A jury found that appellant, Maurice Mason, raped and murdered Robin Dennis in 1993. See State v. Mason , 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 148, 694 N.E.2d 932 (1998). The jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder with a felony-murder capital specification, rape, and having a gun while under disability. The jury recommended a death sentence, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The Third District Court of Appeals and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. State v. Mason , 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-94-45, 1996 WL 715480 (Dec. 9, 1996) ; Mason , 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932.

{¶ 3} In 2008, after finding that Mason's trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty-phase trial. Mason v. Mitchell , 543 F.3d 766, 768 (6th Cir.2008). On remand, Mason moved the trial court to dismiss the capital specification from his indictment, arguing that Ohio's death-penalty scheme violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. He relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 624, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), which invalidated Florida's former capital-sentencing scheme because it "required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance." The trial court granted Mason's motion, and the state appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case.

{¶ 4} On appeal here, Mason argues that Ohio's death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Hurst .

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 5} We must presume that the death-penalty scheme enacted by the General Assembly is constitutional. R.C. 1.47. To prevail on his facial challenge, Mason must establish "beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible." State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher , 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, "doubts regarding the validity of a legislative enactment are to be resolved in favor of the statute." State v. Gill , 63 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 584 N.E.2d 1200 (1992).

B. Ohio's Death-Penalty Scheme

{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 establish what is required for a death sentence to be imposed in Ohio when the defendant elects to be tried by a jury. The essential steps outlined below are required under current law and were required under the versions of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 in effect when Dennis was killed in 1993. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 9-17. Although the Ohio General Assembly has since amended R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04, because the changes to the wording at issue in this appeal were not substantive, the amendments do not affect the analysis in this case.

{¶ 7} First, to face the possibility of a death sentence, a defendant must be charged in an indictment with aggravated murder and at least one specification of an aggravating circumstance. R.C. 2929.03(A) and (B). The state charged Mason with aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B) and an aggravating circumstance (committing aggravated murder while committing rape) under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).

{¶ 8} Second, the jury verdict must state that the defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder and must state separately that he is guilty of at least one charged specification. R.C. 2929.03(B). The state must prove guilt of the principal charge and of any specification beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ; R.C. 2929.04(A). The jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder and the charged aggravating circumstance.

{¶ 9} Third, once the jury finds the defendant guilty of aggravated murder and at least one specification, he will be sentenced either to death or to life imprisonment. R.C. 2929.03(C)(2). When the defendant is tried by a jury, the penalty "shall be determined * * * [b]y the trial jury and the trial judge." R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(b).

{¶ 10} Fourth, in the sentencing phase, the court and trial jury shall consider (1) any presentence-investigation or mental-examination report (if the defendant requested an investigation or examination), (2) the trial evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing and relevant to mitigating factors, (3) additional testimony and evidence relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances and any mitigating factors, (4) any statement of the offender, and (5) the arguments of counsel. R.C. 2929.03(D)(1). In this proceeding, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death." Id.

{¶ 11} Fifth, the jury finds and then recommends the sentence: "If the trial jury unanimously finds , by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances * * * outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.03(D)(2). But "[a]bsent such a finding" by the jury, the jury shall recommend one of the life sentences set forth in R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), and the trial court "shall impose the [life] sentence recommended." Id . Also, if the jury fails to reach a verdict unanimously recommending a sentence, the trial court must impose a life sentence. State v. Springer , 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 N.E.2d 96 (1992), syllabus.

{¶ 12} Sixth, if the trial jury recommends a death sentence, and if "the court finds , by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, * * * that the aggravating circumstances * * * outweigh the mitigating factors, [the court] shall impose sentence of death on the offender." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.03(D)(3). Then, the court must state in a separate opinion "the reasons why the aggravating circumstances * * * were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors." R.C. 2929.03(F).

C. Sixth Amendment Caselaw

1. Apprendi , Ring , and Hurst

{¶ 13} Mason's Sixth Amendment claim principally relies on Hurst , which, in turn, relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Apprendi involved New Jersey's "hate crime" law, which allowed a trial court to enhance an offender's penalty if the trial judge found that the offender had been motivated by racial or other bias in committing an offense. Apprendi at 468, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The question in Apprendi was whether such an aggravating fact must be found by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.

{¶ 14} Two years later, in Ring , the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to invalidate Arizona's former death-penalty scheme, which permitted imposition of a death sentence based solely on a trial judge's finding of the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. See Ring at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Ring court concluded that an aggravating circumstance in a capital case was " 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' " that must be submitted to a jury. Id. , quoting Apprendi at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348, fn. 19. Arizona's death-penalty law violated the Sixth Amendment because that law required the trial judge alone to find the aggravating facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. See id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428.

{¶ 15} The Supreme Court applied Apprendi and Ring in Hurst . A jury found Timothy Hurst guilty of first-degree murder. Although that offense was a capital felony under Florida law, the jury's verdict alone did not qualify Hurst for the death penalty: at the time of his conviction, Florida law provided that " '[a] person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death' only if an additional sentencing proceeding 'results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.' " Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 620, 193 L.Ed.2d 504, quoting former Fla.Stat. 775.082(1), C.S.H.B. No. 3033, Ch. 98-3, Laws of Fla. In Hurst's sentencing proceeding, the jury, as required by former Fla.Stat. 921.141(2), C.S.H.B. 207, Ch. 96-302, Laws of Fla., rendered an "advisory sentence" recommending death, but Florida law did not require the jury to specify the aggravating circumstances that influenced its decision. Id. , citing former Fla. Stat. 921.141. The sentencing judge then imposed a death sentence after independently determining and weighing aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors. Id. , citing former Fla.Stat. 921.141(3). Hurst's sentencing judge, who explained her findings in writing, found that two aggravating circumstances existed. Id.

{¶ 16} The United States Supreme Court began its review of Hurst's Sixth Amendment claim by reciting Apprendi 's basic tenet: "any fact that 'expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict' is an 'element' that must be submitted to a jury." Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 621, quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. It then explained that the Apprendi rule had required invalidation of Arizona's death-penalty scheme in Ring because Arizona had allowed the imposition of the death penalty based solely on judicial fact-finding of the aggravating facts. Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 621, citing Ring , 536 U.S. at 591-593, 597, 604, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556. The Hurst court concluded that under the same analysis, Florida's scheme had to be invalidated, because Florida did "not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty." Id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622. The court observed that the Florida jury's advisory sentence was immaterial for Sixth Amendment purposes, because it did not include " 'specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation [was] not binding on the trial judge.' " Id. , quoting Walton v. Arizona , 497 U.S. 639, 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). The court held that Florida's scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because Florida law "required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance." Id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 624. 2. Past Sixth Amendment Challenges to Ohio's Death-Penalty Scheme

{¶ 17} After the Ring decision was issued in 2002, we held that Ohio's death-penalty scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See State v. Hoffner , 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 68-70. We explained that in contrast to Arizona's scheme, Ohio's capital-sentencing scheme places the responsibility for making all factual determinations regarding whether a defendant should be sentenced to death with the jury. Id. at ¶ 69. We noted that " R.C. 2929.03 charges the jury with determining, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances and whether those aggravating circumstances are sufficient to outweigh the defendant's mitigating evidence." Id. , citing R.C. 2929.03(B) and (D). See also State v. Skatzes , 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 221.

{¶ 18} After the Hurst decision, we revisited the issue in State v. Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 59, stating that "Ohio's capital-sentencing scheme is unlike the laws at issue in Ring and Hurst ." In reaching that conclusion, we reasoned that Ohio law requires a jury in a capital case to make the findings required by the Sixth Amendment, because "the determination of guilt of an aggravating circumstance renders [an Ohio] defendant eligible for a capital sentence," Belton at ¶ 59, and the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors "is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment" (emphasis sic), id. at ¶ 60. Mason argues that Belton is not controlling here, because the Hurst question was not squarely presented in that case.

D. Ohio's Death-Penalty Scheme and the Sixth Amendment

{¶ 19} The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." This entitles criminal defendants "to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring , 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556. See also Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 ("The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death"). Ohio's death-sentence scheme satisfies this right.

{¶ 20} When an Ohio capital defendant elects to be tried by a jury, the jury decides whether the offender is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated murder and-unlike the juries in Ring and Hurst -the aggravating-circumstance specifications for which the offender was indicted. R.C. 2929.03(B). Then the jury-again unlike in Ring and Hurst -must "unanimously find[ ], by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors." R.C. 2929.03(D)(2). An Ohio jury recommends a death sentence only after it makes this finding. Id.

And without that recommendation by the jury, the trial court may not impose the death sentence.

{¶ 21} Ohio law requires the critical jury findings that were not required by the laws at issue in Ring and Hurst . See R.C. 2929.03(C)(2). Ohio's death-penalty scheme, therefore, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Mason's various arguments to the contrary misapprehend both what the Sixth Amendment requires and what it prohibits.

1. Death Eligibility

{¶ 22} Mason's arguments focus on the sentencing phase within Ohio's death-penalty scheme-namely, the "weighing" process that follows after a defendant has been found guilty of aggravated murder and at least one capital specification. He contends that the jury does too little during this phase (merely recommending a death sentence), while the trial court does too much (imposing the sentence based on its own specific, written findings). Before addressing these points, it is necessary to consider a threshold question: does the weighing that occurs in the sentencing phase-after the jury already has found the existence of an aggravating circumstance-constitute fact-finding under the Sixth Amendment?

{¶ 23} Hurst does not answer, or even address, this question. The question in Hurst was more basic: did the Florida scheme require that a Florida jury make a finding of fact as to an aggravating circumstance before a sentence of death was imposed? See Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 193 L.Ed.2d 504. Florida's former capital-sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because, instead of requiring the jury to make the critical finding before making its recommendation, it "required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance." Id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 624. The Hurst court did refer to Florida's weighing process by mentioning the role mitigating facts play in capital sentencing. Id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, quoting Walton , 497 U.S. at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (a Florida jury " 'does not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances' "); id. , quoting former Fla.Stat. 921.141(3) ("The trial court alone must find 'the facts * * * [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist' and '[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances' " [emphasis, ellipsis, and brackets sic] ). But those references merely described Florida's scheme; the court's holding did not address the weighing process. In the end, the court held only that Florida's sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it "required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance." Id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 624. With that in mind, it is necessary to consider additional caselaw on the subject.

a. The nature of the weighing process

{¶ 24} The United States Supreme Court has recognized "two different aspects of the capital decision-making process: the eligibility decision and the selection decision." Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967, 971, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, a defendant is eligible for the death penalty if the trier of fact finds him guilty of murder and at least one aggravating circumstance. Id. at 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630. This determination is necessarily factual. Id. at 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630. See also Kansas v. Carr , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 633, 642, 193 L.Ed.2d 535 (2016) (stating that "the aggravating-factor determination (the so-called 'eligibility phase') * * * is a purely factual determination"). "The selection decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure [sic] an assessment of the defendant's culpability." Tuilaepa at 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630. This, the Supreme Court has said, "is mostly a question of mercy," involving an exercise of judgment. Carr at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 642. See also Tuilaepa at 978, 114 S.Ct. 2630 ("at the selection stage, the States are not confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions"). Thus, the selection decision does not obviously involve a determination of fact.

{¶ 25} The eligibility/selection distinction is relevant under the Sixth Amendment in capital cases because the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that make a defendant death-eligible. See Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 619 (referring to "each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death"); Ring , 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ("Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants * * * are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment"). See also Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (referring to "the jury's traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty"); Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (referring to "the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense").

{¶ 26} Nearly every court that has considered the issue has held that the Sixth Amendment is applicable to only the fact-bound eligibility decision concerning an offender's guilt of the principal offense and any aggravating circumstances. See United States v. Gabrion , 719 F.3d 511, 532-533 (6th Cir.2013) (rehearing en banc); United States v. Runyon , 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir.2013) ; United States v. Mitchell , 502 F.3d 931, 993-994 (9th Cir.2007) ; United States v. Sampson , 486 F.3d 13, 31-32 (1st Cir.2007) ; United States v. Fields , 483 F.3d 313, 345-346 (5th Cir.2007) ; United States v. Purkey , 428 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir.2005) ; Ritchie v. State , 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind.2004) ;

Oken v. State , 378 Md. 179, 251, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003) ; Commonwealth v. Roney , 581 Pa. 587, 601, 866 A.2d 351 (2005) ; State v. Gales , 265 Neb. 598, 628, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003) ; Nunnery v. State , 127 Nev. 749, 770-775, 263 P.3d 235 (2011) ; State v. Fry , 2006-NMSC-001, ¶ 37-38, 138 N.M. 700, 126 P.3d 516.

{¶ 27} But some post- Hurst decisions have held otherwise. See Smith v. Pineda , S.D.Ohio No. 1:12-cv-196, 2017 WL 631410, *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22082, *6 (Feb. 16, 2017) (finding that Ohio's scheme satisfies the Sixth Amendment but also finding that "the relative weight of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors is a question of fact akin to an element under the Apprendi line of cases"); Chinn v. Jenkins , S.D.Ohio No. 3:02-cv-512, 2017 WL 631412, *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22088, *5 (Feb. 13, 2017) (same); Davis v. Bobby , S.D.Ohio No. 2:10-cv-107, 2017 WL 4277202, *2-3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157948, *6-7 (Sept. 25, 2017) ; Rauf v. State , 145 A.3d 430, 434 (Del.2016).

{¶ 28} In Gabrion , the Sixth Circuit (analyzing the federal death-penalty statute) explained that the weighing process requires "not a finding of fact in support of a particular sentence * * * [but] a determination of the sentence itself , within a range for which the defendant is already eligible." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 533. This analysis is persuasive and applies to the Ohio scheme, which expressly makes the weighing process a determination of the sentence itself. See R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(b) ("if the offender is found guilty of both the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender * * * shall be determined * * * [b]y the trial jury and the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury"). In other words, after completing its role as the fact-finder concerning a defendant's guilt, an Ohio jury assumes a different role as a "sentencer" (albeit in conjunction with the trial court). See Brown v. Sanders , 546 U.S. 212, 216, 126 S.Ct. 884, 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006) ("Once the narrowing requirement has been satisfied, the sentencer is called upon to determine whether a defendant thus found eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive it"). But see State v. Rogers , 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 429, 504 N.E.2d 52 (1986) (recognizing the trial court as the ultimate ''sentencing authority''), rev'd on reconsideration on other grounds, 32 Ohio St.3d 70, 512 N.E.2d 581 (1987).

b. Ohio's statutory scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment

{¶ 29} Based on the above analysis, we were correct to state in Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, at ¶ 60, that "[w]eighing is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment." (Emphasis sic.) The Sixth Amendment was satisfied once the jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder and a felony-murder capital specification. See State v. Adams , 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 269 ("Adams became death-eligible when the jury unanimously found him guilty of aggravated murder in the course of some predicate felony");

State v. Davis , 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 189 ("the jury's verdict, and not the judge's findings, made Davis eligible for the death penalty"); State v. Gumm , 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 417, 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995) ("At the point in time at which the factfinder * * * finds the defendant guilty of both aggravated murder and an R.C. 2929.04(A) specification, the defendant has become 'death-eligible,' and a second phase of the proceedings (the 'mitigation' or 'penalty' or 'sentencing' or 'selection' phase begins"). See also Jenkins v. Hutton , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (stating that Hutton was death-eligible under Ohio law when the jury found him guilty of aggravated murder and two aggravating circumstances). Accordingly, we approve our analysis in Belton and reject Mason's claim that Ohio's death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Hurst .

2. The Jury's Role in Sentencing

{¶ 30} While we uphold our conclusion in Belton that weighing is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment, we further conclude that even if the weighing process were to involve fact-finding under the Sixth Amendment, Ohio adequately affords the right to trial by jury during the penalty phase. Mason contends that it does not, because the process permits a jury only to recommend a death sentence. See R.C. 2929.03(D)(2). Here, he emphasizes the statement in Hurst that "[a] jury's mere recommendation is not enough," --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504. But he fails to appreciate the material difference between the process by which an Ohio jury reaches its death recommendation and the Florida process at issue in Hurst .

{¶ 31} The Florida statute required the jury to render an "advisory sentence" after hearing the evidence presented in a sentencing-phase proceeding:

Advisory sentence by the jury.-After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.

Former Fla.Stat. 921.141(2). In Hurst , the court held that the Florida scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it did not require the jury to find that Hurst was guilty of committing a specific aggravating circumstance. Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 624.

{¶ 32} Ohio law, in contrast, requires a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of at least one aggravating circumstance, R.C. 2929.03(B), before the matter proceeds to the penalty phase, when the jury can recommend a death sentence. Ohio's scheme differs from Florida's because Ohio requires the jury to make this specific and critical finding.

{¶ 33} Mason disputes this conclusion, relying on this court's statement in Rogers , 28 Ohio St.3d at 430, 504 N.E.2d 52, that Florida's system "is remarkably similar to Ohio's." But Rogers involved a different question. See id. at 429-430, 504 N.E.2d 52. Rogers noted that the systems are similar in that they both allow for jury recommendations; it did not consider the findings that the jury was required to make before recommending a sentence.

{¶ 34} Mason also argues that Ohio's scheme is inadequate under the Sixth Amendment because it requires the jury to render "only a general verdict." Here, Mason relies on Hurst 's reference to the " 'specific factual findings' " by a jury that were lacking under Florida's scheme. See Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 193 L.Ed.2d 504, quoting Walton , 497 U.S. at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511. He contends that this requires a jury to explain why it concluded that the aggravating circumstances are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. He contrasts the jury's general verdict to the trial court's sentencing opinion, which indeed must explain "the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors," R.C. 2929.03(F).

{¶ 35} While it is true that a trial court must fully explain its reasoning for imposing a sentence of death, Mason does not provide any support for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to explain why it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. In citing Hurst for this proposition, Mason fails to appreciate that Florida's statutory scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because the jury did not specify its finding of which aggravating circumstance supported its recommendation, not because the jury did not explain why it found that the aggravating circumstances were not outweighed by sufficient mitigating circumstances.

{¶ 36} On a related point, Mason contends that the jury's sentencing-phase finding and recommendation are insufficient because they provide no guidance to the trial court for its own findings and sentence determination. His argument relies on the statement in Hurst that " '[a] Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury's findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona,' " Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, quoting Walton at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047.

{¶ 37} Mason misses a key distinction between Ohio's statutory scheme and the Florida and Arizona statutory schemes at issue in Hurst and Walton : in Ohio, a jury is required to find the defendant guilty of a specific aggravating circumstance, thus establishing the aggravating circumstance that a trial court will weigh against the mitigating factors in its independent determination of punishment. See R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) ; State v. Wogenstahl , 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311 (1996), paragraph one of the syllabus. Mason does not explain why further guidance for the trial court is constitutionally required.

{¶ 38} Mason also complains that Ohio's statutory scheme does not require the jury to make findings regarding mitigating factors or to specify the factors that it considered in mitigation. There is only limited support for the argument that a jury must do so: Hurst , again quoting Walton , notes that Florida's former scheme did not require the jury to " 'make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.' " Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 193 L.Ed.2d 504, quoting Walton , 497 U.S. at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511. Notably, however, neither Ring nor Hurst held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find mitigating facts. See State v. Were , 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 186. Rather, they recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a jury will determine the facts that serve to increase the maximum punishment. Ring , 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ; Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 619. See also Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490-491, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, fn. 16 (stating that "[c]ore concerns animating the jury and burden-of-proof requirements are thus absent" when a trial judge alone finds a mitigating fact that reduces an offender's sentence). Because a finding that mitigating facts exist is not "necessary to impose a sentence of death," Hurst at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 619, this aspect of Mason's claim has no merit.

3. The Trial Judge's Role and the Sixth Amendment

{¶ 39} One of Mason's main concerns is the last step in Ohio's capital-sentencing process: the trial judge's independent findings that culminate in a written sentencing opinion. See R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) and (F). He contends that the trial judge must "make additional 'specific findings' beyond those made by the trial jury" and that an offender is not eligible for the death penalty until this judicial task is complete. Relying on Hurst , he says that a death sentence can be imposed in Ohio only after the trial judge makes these "independent factual determinations." But Mason misapprehends the issue, framing it as a question whether a death sentence "can be imposed," instead of whether it "will be imposed." Ohio does not permit the trial judge to find additional aggravating facts but requires the judge to determine, independent of the jury, whether a sentence of death should be imposed. See State v. Roberts , 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 160.

{¶ 40} Two significant flaws are apparent in Mason's claim. First, unlike the Arizona scheme found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Ring , under the Ohio scheme, the trial court cannot increase an offender's sentence based on its own findings. Rather, the trial court safeguards offenders from wayward juries, similar to how a court might grant a motion for acquittal following a jury verdict under Crim.R. 29(C).

{¶ 41} Second, Mason wrongly supposes that the Sixth Amendment prohibits judicial fact-finding. To be sure, Hurst and Ring both decry judicial fact-finding to some extent. But they do so in the context of reviewing statutory schemes that fail to provide for any jury fact-finding on critical questions. See Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (noting "the central and singular role the judge play[ed] under Florida law" [emphasis added] ); Ring , 536 U.S. at 592, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (noting that the court alone made the factual determination of an aggravating factor under Arizona law). The Supreme Court made clear in Blakely , 542 U.S. at 308, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, that "the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on judicial power, but a reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the extent that the claimed judicial power infringes on the province of the jury." See also Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 116, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) ("Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment"); United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 233, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ("We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range").

{¶ 42} Mason suggests that under Hurst , the Sixth Amendment requires the jury alone to decide whether a sentence of death will be imposed. But Hurst did not create this requirement. Ohio trial judges may weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors and impose a death sentence only after the jury itself has made the critical findings and recommended that sentence. Thus, "the judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict." Blakely at 306, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Under Ohio's death-penalty scheme, therefore, trial judges function squarely within the framework of the Sixth Amendment.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 43} We conclude that Ohio's death-penalty scheme does not violate a defendant's right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. For this reason, the trial court erred in granting Mason's motion to dismiss the death-penalty specification from his indictment. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and Jensen, French, Hall, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

Kennedy, J., concurs, with an opinion.

James D. Jensen, J., of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting for O'Donnell, J.

Michael T. Hall, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for O'Neill, J.

Kennedy, J., concurring.

{¶ 44} Because the majority's judgment is in line with our holding in State v. Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, I concur in that judgment. Although the majority never explicitly addresses Mason's argument that the analysis of Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), in Belton is dictum, its failure to cite Belton as binding precedent that resolves this case implies that the majority agrees that our holding in Belton is dictum.

{¶ 45} With regard to dicta, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the following almost 200 years ago in Cohens v. Virginia : "It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). For this reason, a court is not bound to follow its own dicta from a prior case in which the point at issue "was not fully debated."

Cent. Virginia Community College v. Katz , 546 U.S. 356, 363, 126 S.Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed.2d 945 (2006) ; see also Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc. , 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 638 N.E.2d 991 (1994) (explaining that dicta in a prior case had no binding effect on a court's decision in a later case).

{¶ 46} This is so because " '[t]he problem with dicta, and a good reason that it should not have the force of precedent for later cases, is that when a holding is unnecessary to the outcome of a case, it may be made with less care and thoroughness than if it were crucial to the outcome.' " State v. Bodyke , 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 89 (O'Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Bauer v. Garden City , 163 Mich.App. 562, 571, 414 N.W.2d 891 (1987).

{¶ 47} Our determination in Belton that Ohio's death-penalty statutes do not contravene the holding in Hurst , however, is not dictum. The issue presented in the third proposition of law in Belton was whether Ohio's death-penalty statute violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The court quoted Belton as asserting that

"even if a capital defendant enters a guilty plea to Aggravated Murder and the accompanying death specifications, he has a right to a jury trial to determine the existence of any mitigating factors and to determine whether the aggravating circumstance or circumstances to which he would plead guilty outweigh those factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."

Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, at ¶ 55. In effect, Belton argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a capital defendant the right to have a jury make additional factual determinations before sentencing-that notwithstanding his having waived the right to have a jury determine guilt, only a jury can make the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. The court answered the question squarely presented by the parties by applying Hurst - then the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue-and explaining that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is not implicated by a sentencing scheme that requires the trial judge to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors before selecting death as the appropriate sentence.

{¶ 48} The fact that the court could have analyzed the question presented in a different way-for instance, by considering whether Belton's waiver of a jury trial relinquished any right to a jury's participation in sentencing-does not mean that the way we did answer it is dictum. In Richards v. Mkt. Exchange Bank Co. , 81 Ohio St. 348, 367, 90 N.E. 1000 (1910), we rejected the view that "the determination of a question fairly presented by the record becomes mere dicta if there happens to be another proposition on which the decision might have been based."

{¶ 49} That a case could be distinguished on some factual basis from another case does not affect the authority of the rule of law it announced or reduce its holding to mere dictum. See United States v. Schuster , 684 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir.1982), adopted on reh'g , 717 F.2d 537 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc) ("Virtually all cases are factually distinguishable, but that does not vitiate the underlying rule of law to be derived from [a prior decision]"); State v. Rice , 169 N.H. 783, 795, 159 A.3d 1250 (2017) (acknowledging that the case was distinguishable from a prior case on the facts, but concluding that the "factual distinction" did not "justif[y] a difference in outcome"). Our decision in Belton is binding precedent controlling the outcome of this appeal, because its holding did not go beyond the facts and issues then before the court and its analysis was necessary for our ruling. Therefore, our holding in Belton is not dictum.

{¶ 50} Applying Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, I agree that Ohio's death-penalty statutes do not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as construed by Hurst , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504. As we explained in Belton , the weighing of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors required to ensure that only a defendant deserving of the ultimate penalty is sentenced to death "is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment" (emphasis sic), id. at ¶ 60, but rather "amounts to 'a complex moral judgment' about what penalty to impose upon a defendant who is already death-penalty eligible," id. , quoting United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 515-516 (4th Cir.2013).

{¶ 51} Once the jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder and at least one aggravating circumstance, under former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 10, the court could impose only one of the following penalties: "death, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment." Therefore, the maximum penalty authorized by the statute following the jury's verdict at the trial phase was death, and no judicial fact-finding could expose Mason to any greater punishment.

{¶ 52} Because Mason was eligible for capital punishment based on the jury's verdict at the end of the trial phase, his argument that Ohio's death-penalty scheme violates the Sixth Amendment because it does not require the jury to make specific findings of fact regarding the mitigating circumstances or why the mitigating circumstances were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances is not well taken. Accordingly, the majority correctly affirms the judgment of the court of appeals, and I concur.


author: O'Connor, C.J.

text:
    BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Appellant, v. VERLINGER et al., Appellees.
    No. 2017-0102
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted February 14, 2018 Decided April 19, 2018
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and Michael J. Hendershot and Peter T. Reed, Deputy Solicitors; and Edward T. Saadi, L.L.C., and Edward T. Saadi, Youngstown, for appellant.
    Nicholas A. Papa, Cleveland, for appellee Loretta M. Verlinger.
    Smith Marshall, L.L.P., Kallen L. Boyer, and R. Eric Smearman, Middleburg Heights, for appellee Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
    Law Offices of Craig S. Cobb and Craig S. Cobb, for appellee Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
    Donahey, Defossez & Beausay and Curtis M. Fifner, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association for Justice.
   O'Connor, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider the definition of "claimant" for purposes of R.C. 4123.931(G). This statute describes the responsibility of a claimant seeking workers' compensation benefits to notify a statutory subrogee and, if applicable, the attorney general of all third parties against whom the claimant may have a right of recovery and to provide the subrogee an opportunity to assert its subrogation rights against each third party. We hold that a claimant is any party who is eligible to receive compensation, medical benefits, or death benefits from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC"). We further hold that a claimant becomes eligible at the time of the injury or death that occurred during the course of employment and remains eligible unless and until a determination that the claimant is not entitled to benefits has been made and has become final (i.e., is no longer subject to appeal) or, if no claim is filed, until the time allowed for filing a claim has elapsed.

{¶ 2} Moreover, we hold that appellee Loretta M. Verlinger was a claimant at the time she settled with appellee Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") and appellee Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Foremost"). Appellant, the BWC, was a statutory subrogee, and Verlinger never gave it the opportunity to assert its subrogation rights prior to settling with the two insurers. Accordingly, appellees are jointly and severally liable to the BWC for the full amount of its subrogation interest. We vacate the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals that affirmed the summary-judgment entry of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, and we remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} The parties do not dispute the relevant facts in this case. Verlinger sustained serious injuries in an accident on August 1, 2011. She applied for workers' compensation benefits from the BWC on August 17, but the BWC disallowed the claim on September 6. She appealed the denial to the Industrial Commission on September 22. During the pendency of that appeal, Verlinger settled claims with Metropolitan, the insurer of the driver who caused the crash, and Foremost, her own insurer, resulting in payments to Verlinger and her husband. The parties finalized the settlements on December 15, 2011. On December 23, 2011, the Industrial Commission allowed Verlinger's claim, finding that she "sustained an injury in the course of and arising out of her employment," and she began receiving workers' compensation benefits.

{¶ 4} In July 2013, the BWC filed a complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against appellees, seeking compensation, pursuant to R.C. 4123.931, the subrogation statute, for the amounts it had paid and would pay on Verlinger's workers' compensation claim. The BWC and Verlinger filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Verlinger's motion, finding that because the BWC had rejected Verlinger's application at the time she settled with the two insurers, she was not a claimant pursuant to R.C. 4123.931.

{¶ 5} The BWC appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that Verlinger was not a claimant under the subrogation statute. In a split decision, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Analysis

{¶ 6} Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, so we review the appellate court's decision de novo. State v. Pariag , 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9. When reviewing a statute, "[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage." R.C. 1.42.

{¶ 7} R.C. 4123.931(G) states:

A claimant shall notify a statutory subrogee and the attorney general of the identity of all third parties against whom the claimant has or may have a right of recovery, except that when the statutory subrogee is a self-insuring employer, the claimant need not notify the attorney general. No settlement, compromise, judgment, award, or other recovery in any action or claim by a claimant shall be final unless the claimant provides the statutory subrogee and, when required, the attorney general, with prior notice and a reasonable opportunity to assert its subrogation rights. If a statutory subrogee and, when required, the attorney general are not given that notice, or if a settlement or compromise excludes any amount paid by the statutory subrogee, the third party and the claimant shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the statutory subrogee the full amount of the subrogation interest.

{¶ 8} We find this case to be straightforward. Verlinger was a claimant, and the BWC was a statutory subrogee, R.C. 4123.93(B). Therefore, Verlinger had a responsibility to notify the BWC of the settlement and because she did not, appellees are jointly and severally liable to the BWC for the full amount of the subrogation interest.

{¶ 9} R.C. 4123.93(A) defines "claimant" for purposes of R.C. 4123.931 as "a person who is eligible to receive compensation, medical benefits, or death benefits under this chapter." "Eligible" means "qualified to be chosen." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 736 (2002). Appellees argue that Verlinger was not eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits and therefore was not a claimant within the meaning of R.C. 4123.931(G), because the BWC had denied her claim for benefits at the time she reached her settlement with the insurers.

{¶ 10} However, it is clear that Verlinger was qualified to be chosen for benefits at the time she settled with the insurers, because just eight days later, the Industrial Commission allowed her claim and ordered the BWC to start paying her benefits. Nothing about Verlinger's qualifications changed during those eight days. Indeed, Verlinger's qualifications did not change at any time between the time of her injury and the commission's decision. Because she was injured in the course of her employment, Verlinger remained eligible for benefits at all times thereafter. The BWC initially disallowed her claim based on a lack of proof that the accident occurred in the course of her employment. But the BWC's decision was based on a lack of evidence as to eligibility, and because Verlinger timely appealed that decision, it did not become a final determination that Verlinger was ineligible.

{¶ 11} By appealing the BWC's decision, Verlinger at all times acted as though she was eligible for benefits. A claimant maintains eligibility for benefits until a final determination is made that the claimant is not entitled to benefits, either because neither party has timely appealed or because all appeals have been exhausted, or, if no claim is filed, until the statutory period for filing a claim has elapsed.

{¶ 12} Verlinger also argues that even if she was a claimant, the subrogation statute does not apply because the BWC had not yet made any payment on her claim at the time she settled. This argument is unavailing.

{¶ 13} For purposes of the subrogation statute, "statutory subrogee" is defined as "the administrator of workers' compensation, a self-insuring employer, or an employer that contracts for the direct payment of medical services." R.C. 4123.93(B). Here, the BWC meets this definition. Nothing in the definition requires a statutory subrogee to have identified the claimant as being entitled to benefits or to have made any payments to the claimant.

{¶ 14} Verlinger attempts to support her argument by conflating "subrogation rights" with "right of recovery," but these are distinct. The statute is clear that it is the "payment of compensation or benefits" that "creates a right of recovery," R.C. 4123.931(A). In contrast, the statute does not require a statutory subrogee to make payments in order to possess a subrogation right; the "right of subrogation * * * is automatic," R.C. 4123.931(H).

{¶ 15} Because Verlinger was eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits at the time she settled her claims with the insurers, she was a claimant for purposes of R.C. 4123.931(G). Indeed, at the time of settlement, her benefits claim was on appeal from the BWC's decision. Furthermore, pursuant to the same provision, because she failed to provide the BWC, the statutory subrogee, and the attorney general a reasonable opportunity to assert their subrogation rights, appellees "shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the statutory subrogee the full amount of the subrogation interest." R.C. 4123.931(G).

{¶ 16} We understand Foremost's argument that it is unfair to hold a third party jointly and severally liable without regard to its knowledge of any subrogation rights. However, this is a policy argument best made to the General Assembly. As Foremost notes, the General Assembly chose in R.C. 5160.37(F), governing recovery rights of the Department of Medicaid, to limit third-party liability for a subrogee's recovery when the third party is unaware of any subrogation rights. But the General Assembly did not limit third-party liability in R.C. 4123.931(G), and it is our job to apply the law as written, not as we might choose to write it.

{¶ 17} We hold that for purposes of R.C. 4123.931(G), Verlinger was a claimant and the BWC was a statutory subrogee at the time she reached her settlement with the two insurers. Verlinger failed to notify the BWC and the attorney general of her settlement. Accordingly, she and the insurers are jointly and severally liable to the BWC for the full amount of the BWC's subrogation interest.

Judgment vacated and cause remanded.

O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    IN RE MARSHALL.
    No. 2017-1163
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted August 18, 2017 Decided August 22, 2017
    {¶ 1} On August 18, 2017, and pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(18), the director of the Board of Professional Conduct filed with the Supreme Court a certified copy of a judgment entry of a felony conviction against Michael J. Marshall, an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio.
    {¶ 2} Upon consideration thereof and pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(18)(A)(4), it is ordered and decreed that Michael J. Marshall, Attorney Registration No. 0065767, last known business address in Steubenville, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law for an interim period, effective as of the date of this entry.
    {¶ 3} It is further ordered that this matter is referred to disciplinary counsel for investigation and the commencement of disciplinary proceedings.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that respondent immediately cease and desist from the practice of law in any form and that respondent is forbidden to appear on behalf of another before any court, judge, commission, board, administrative agency, or other public authority.
    {¶ 5} It is further ordered that effective immediately, respondent is forbidden to counsel, advise, or prepare legal instruments for others or in any manner perform legal services for others.
    {¶ 6} It is further ordered that respondent is divested of each, any, and all of the rights, privileges, and prerogatives customarily accorded to a member in good standing of the legal profession of Ohio.
    {¶ 7} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent shall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(C). If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(23), respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(23)(A)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any client trust funds or property.
    {¶ 8} It is further ordered that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. X(13), respondent shall complete one credit hour of continuing legal education for each month, or portion of a month, of the suspension. As part of the total credit hours of continuing legal education required by Gov.Bar R. X(13), respondent shall complete one credit hour of instruction related to professional conduct required by Gov.Bar R. X(3)(B) for each six months, or portion of six months, of the suspension.
    {¶ 9} It is further ordered that respondent shall not be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio until (1) respondent complies with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (2) respondent complies with this and all other orders issued by this court, (3) respondent complies with the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, and (4) this court orders respondent reinstated.
    {¶ 10} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered by the court that if after the date of this order, the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection awards any amount against respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection within 90 days of the notice of that award.
    {¶ 11} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall do the following:
    {¶ 12} 1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of respondent's suspension and consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal service elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in respondent's place;
    {¶ 13} 2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;
    {¶ 14} 3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or property in respondent's possession or control;
    {¶ 15} 4. Notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties in pending litigation of respondent's disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;
   {¶ 16} 5. Send all notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;

{¶ 17} 6. File with the clerk of this court and disciplinary counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of the notices required herein, and setting forth the address where the affiant may receive communications; and {¶ 18} 7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.

{¶ 19} It is further ordered that respondent shall keep the clerk and disciplinary counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.

{¶ 20} It is further ordered that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings. All case documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47, which govern access to court records.

{¶ 21} It is further ordered that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order, and all other orders in this case, to respondent's last known address.

{¶ 22} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, O'Neill, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.


text:
    HOWARD v. HCR MANORCARE, INC.
    2018-0626
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 25, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    On appellants' application for dismissal. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.


text:
    STATE v. MURRAY
    2017-0664
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 25, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS
    Sua sponte, it is ordered that the clerk shall issue an order for transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Highland County.


text:
    STATE EX REL. WASHINGTON v. NEIL
    2018-1010
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 25, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    Appellant has not filed a merit brief, due September 17, 2018, and therefore has failed to prosecute this cause with the requisite diligence. Cause dismissed.


text:
    STATE v. KIRKLAND
    2018-1265
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 20, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion for stay of execution. Motion granted. No execution date shall be set while this appeal is pending.


text:
    STATE v. MYERS
    2014-1862
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 20, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion for appointment of Elizabeth Arrick as counsel. Motion granted. Elizabeth Arrick is appointed to represent appellant for the purpose of filing an application for reopening pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 11.06.


text:
    STATE v. CLINTON
    2014-0273
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 20, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion for stay of execution of death sentence pending disposition of available state remedies. Motion granted. Stay shall remain in effect until exhaustion of all state post-conviction proceedings, including any appeals.


text:
    CINCINNATI BAR ASSN. v. JACKSON
    2018-0258
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 20, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On February 12, 2018, the Board of Professional Conduct filed a final report in the office of the clerk of this court pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(16), in which the board accepted the agreement entered into by relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, and respondent, Kory Akin Jackson. The agreement set forth the misconduct and the agreed, recommended sanction of a public reprimand. The board recommended that the agreement be accepted. The court issued an order waiving the issuance of a show-cause order, and this matter was submitted to the court on the report and record filed by the board.
    It is hereby ordered by the court that the recommended sanction is rejected. It is further ordered that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D), this cause is remanded to the Board of Professional Conduct for further proceedings, including consideration of payment of full restitution and a more appropriate sanction based on this court's precedent. Proceedings before this court in this case are stayed until further order of this court. Costs to abide final determination of the case.
    Kennedy, French, and DeWine, JJ., dissent.


author: Fischer, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE EX REL. HARGROVE v. FIRST DIST. COURT OF APPEALS
    2018-0844
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondents' motions to dismiss. Motions granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE EX REL. MADRIGAL v. ENGLISH
    2018-0828
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondents' motions to dismiss. Motions granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    BALDWIN v. UNIV. OF CINCINNATI HOSP. MED. CTR.
    2018-0839
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    Miscellaneous case. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relator's motion to amend complaint denied as moot.
    O'Connor, C.J., and Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
   O'Donnell, Kennedy, and French, JJ., concur in granting respondent's motion to dismiss but would also grant relator's motion to amend complaint.


text:
    STATE EX REL. KING v. WELLS
    2018-0865
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. GODALE v. ELEVENTH DIST. COURT OF APPEALS
    2018-0892
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relator's motion for leave to amend complaint granted.
    O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.
   O'Connor, C.J., and DeGenaro, J., concur in granting respondent's motion to dismiss but would deny relator's motion to amend complaint.


text:
    STATE EX REL. WILSON v. MOHR
    2018-0804
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relator's motion for order or relief denied.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. SAGE v. ROBINSON
    2018-0826
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. DABNEY v. HAMILTON CTY. COMMON PLEAS COURT
    2018-0862
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On respondents' motions to dismiss. Motions granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
   Fischer, J., not participating.


author: O'Connor, C.J., not participating.

text:
    STATE EX REL. SPEARS v. BREAUX
    2018-0884
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
   O'Connor, C.J., not participating.


text:
    STATE EX REL. GERALD v. O'BRIEN
    2018-0896
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. FRETT v. SUTULA
    2018-0825
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus and Prohibition. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. COLLINS v. ROBINSON
    2018-0885
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    BERECZ v. KERENYI
    2018-0897
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Procedendo. On respondent's motion to dismiss.
    Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    DANIELS v. ROTHGERY
    2018-0906
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relator's motion to supplement record denied.
    O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents and would deny respondent's motion to dismiss, grant relator's motion to supplement record, and grant a peremptory writ.


text:
    STATE EX REL. ALLEN v. INDUS. COMM.
    2018-0910
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relator's amended motion to strike motion to dismiss and relator's motion for relief denied as moot.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    WILLIAMS v. D'APOLITO
    2018-0988
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On respondents' motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relator's emergency motion for stay denied as moot.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    MCALPIN v. CUYAHOGA CTY. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    2018-0940
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE v. ADAMS
    2018-0974
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. On relator's motion to amend. Motion denied.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Fischer, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
   Kennedy, French, and DeWine, JJ., concur in granting respondent's motion to dismiss but would also grant relator's motion to amend.


text:
    STATE EX REL. GOTT v. QUILTER
    2018-0898
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondents' motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX. REL. ROTH v. WERREN
    2018-0914
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    BAKER v. SHANAHAN
    2018-0984
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
    O'Donnell, J., dissents and would deny respondent's motion to dismiss and grant an alternative writ.
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    ARMOUR v. TURNER
    2018-0994
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. On petitioner's motion for leave to amend. Motion granted. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    SMITLEY v. EPPINGER
    2018-0999
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. HARRIS v. KUBICKI
    2018-0964
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus and Prohibition. On S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04 determination, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    HARMON v. KATE
    2018-0982
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus and Prohibition. On respondents' motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed. Relators' motion to strike denied. Relators' motion for stay denied as moot.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    JOHNSON v. GOULDING
    2018-0992
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion denied. Sua sponte, alternative writ granted. The following briefing schedule is set for presentation of evidence and filing of briefs pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05.
    The parties shall file any evidence they intend to present within 20 days; relator shall file a brief within 10 days after the filing of the evidence; respondent shall file a brief within 20 days after the filing of relator's brief; and relator may file a reply brief within 7 days after the filing of respondent's brief.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, French, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
    Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE EX REL. LACKEY v. ROBINSON
    2018-1050
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE v. FRANKLIN
    1998-2061
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's application for reopening under S.Ct.Prac.R. 11.06. Application denied.


text:
    WILLIAMS v. D'APOLITO
    2018-1009
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondents' motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    DIXON v. BOWMEN
    2018-1072
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE v. NIXON
    2018-1082
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. ANDERSON v. MARQUIS
    2018-1148
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE v. WARE
    2005-1313
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's judicial notice and request to be heard. Request denied.


text:
    STATE v. BUTTERY
    2018-0183
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   Sua sponte, this cause is no longer held for a decision in 2017-0087, State v. Carnes. Stay of briefing schedule lifted. The clerk shall issue an order for the transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, and the parties shall brief this case in accordance with the Rules of Practice.

French and DeWine, JJ., dissent.

Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    NIXON v. DOHERTY
    2018-1001
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Prohibition. On respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. DILLINGHAM v. GMOSER
    2018-1015
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On respondent's amended motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. WILSON v. MACKO
    2018-1018
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. On petitioner's request for leave to replace pages.
    Request granted. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE EX REL. HIGGINS v. BOWERMAN
    2018-1033
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    GALLUZZO v. SAINT PARIS
    2018-1085
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    BROWNE v. ARTEX OIL CO.
    2018-1112
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    On motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and French, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.
    O'Donnell, Kennedy, and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    IN RE APPLICATION OF OHIO EDISON CO.
    2017-1664
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for stay. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. CLARK
    2018-1023
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    DIXON v. LUCAS CTY. COMMON PLEAS CLERK
    2018-1024
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS
    In Mandamus. On S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04 determination, cause dismissed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    IN RE APPLICATION OF OHIO EDISON CO.
    2017-1444
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for stay. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. BUSH
    2018-0993
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.


author: O'Donnell, J., dissents.

text:
    CLEVELAND v. BUR. OF WORKERS' COMP.
    2018-0572
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion to lift stay and proceed to briefing. Motion granted. The clerk shall issue an order for the transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, and the parties shall brief this case in accordance with the Rules of Practice.

O'Donnell, J., dissents.


author: DeGenaro, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE v. MILLER
    2018-0948
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellee's motion for an order of release from custody or motion for appeal bond. Motion denied.

French and Fischer, JJ., dissent.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. WEST
    2018-0976
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Kennedy, Fischer, and DeGenaro, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. TAYLOR
    2018-0985
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

DeWine and DeGenaro, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. BAKER
    2018-0998
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. HOPKINS
    2018-1079
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. DAVIS
    2018-1108
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Fischer and DeWine, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. RAMIREZ
    2018-0900
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Appeal accepted on proposition of law No. I.
    O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell and Kennedy, JJ., dissent.


text:
    CLIFTON STEEL CO. v. TRINITY EQUIP. CO.
    2018-1006
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion for stay and to continue bond at $10,000. Motion denied.

Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    MCADAMS v. GOLDBERG
    2018-1113
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Prohibition. On relator's motion for emergency relief. Motion denied.

O'Donnell, J., dissents and would grant an alternative writ.


text:
    BROWNE v. ARTEX OIL CO.
    2018-0942
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Appeal accepted on proposition of law No. I.
    Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., would accept the appeal on all propositions of law.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. SHUTES
    2018-1052
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion granted. Appellant shall file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction within 30 days. Motion for preparation of complete transcript of state expense denied.

O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy and French, JJ., dissent and would deny leave to file delayed appeal.


text:
    STATE v. HAYES
    2018-1111
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

O'Connor, C.J., and French and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. THOMAS
    2018-0796
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Appeal accepted on proposition of law Nos. II and III. Sua sponte, cause held for the decision in 2017-1135, State v. Wintermeyer, and briefing schedule stayed.
    O'Connor, C.J., and French, J., would also accept the appeal on proposition of law No. I.
   Fischer, J., would accept the appeal on all propositions of law.

O'Donnell and Kennedy, JJ., dissent.


text:
    ROBINSON v. MERCY ST. VINCENT MED. CTR.
    2018-0937
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. BYRD
    2018-0934
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. WALKER
    2018-0801
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. HERSI
    2018-0830
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. LEWIS
    2018-0913
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    French and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. WILSON
    2018-1048
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. JONES
    2018-0502
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On appellant's motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. BLANTON
    2018-0637
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On appellant's motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. BEARD
    2018-0802
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On appellant's motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    ROCKIES EXPRESS PIPELINE, L.L.C. v. TESTA
    2018-0882
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    PETITIONS TO TRANSFER
    On petition to transfer jurisdiction. Petition granted. The clerk shall issue an order for the transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County and the Board of Tax Appeals, and the parties shall brief this case in accordance with the Rules of Practice.


text:
    STATE v. WHITE
    2018-0921
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. VELEY
    2018-0971
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    BLAIN'S FOLDING SERV., INC. v. CINCINNATI INS. CO.
    2018-0598
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On appellant's motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. VANCE
    2018-0607
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On appellant's motion for reconsideration. Motion denied. Appellant's motion for memorandum in response to the motion for reconsideration denied as moot.


text:
    WILLACY v. CLEVELAND BD. OF INCOME TAX REV.
    2018-0794
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    PETITIONS TO TRANSFER
    On petition to transfer jurisdiction of Hazel M. Willacy. Petition granted. The clerk shall issue an order for the transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County and the Board of Tax Appeals, and the parties shall brief this case in accordance with the Rules of Practice.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE EX REL. BATES v. FRANKLIN CTY. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    2018-0997
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion to supplement the record and request for extension of time to file merit brief. Motion and request denied as moot.


text:
    STATE v. STEWART
    2018-0958
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    REIGERT v. RUSCIN
    2018-0960
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    PIETRANGELO v. AVON LAKE
    2018-0969
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. FARMER
    2018-0978
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. WEST
    2018-0990
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. DOTSON
    2018-1077
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. VARGAS
    2018-1081
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. SMITH
    2018-1097
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. TAYLOR
    2018-1105
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Connor, C.J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. LOOBY
    2018-0944
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell and Fischer, JJ., dissent.
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    LYTAL v. CRAWL FOR CANCER, INC.
    2018-0951
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    French and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    JOHNSON v. AM. ITALIAN GOLF ASSN. OF COLUMBUS
    2018-0962
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    DRAPER v. N. AM. SCIENCE ASSOCS., INC.
    2018-0966
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell and Kennedy, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. WARE
    2018-1058
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    MICHELSON v. VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
    2018-0955
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Appellee's motion to strike portions of appellant's appendix granted.
   Kennedy, J., would deny appellee's motion to strike as moot.

Fischer, J., would deny appellee's motion to strike.


text:
    STATE v. MAYES
    2018-1100
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. CLEMMONS
    2018-1102
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    BD. OF CTY. COMMRS v. PRINDLE
    2018-0939
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


author: French, J., dissents.

text:
    STATE v. CLARK
    2018-0954
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   French, J., dissents.

Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    IN RE ESTATE OF BRINGMAN
    2018-0956
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. DUNN
    2018-0961
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    LANG v. PIERSOL OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CO.
    2018-0979
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, L.L.C. v. MALISH
    2018-0980
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    IN RE J.R.
    2018-1046
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. TAYLOR
    2018-1096
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. ZIMPFER
    2018-1101
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    HINTON v. SHOOP
    2018-1120
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. CASTORELA-SOTELA
    2018-1141
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE EX REL. EBERHARDT v. JANIK
    2018-1367
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Habeas Corpus. Sua sponte, petitioner ordered to be released from custody immediately. Further proceedings by respondent are stayed pursuant to this temporary interim order pending a ruling by this court on the emergency motion for bond and request for alternative writs. Respondent ordered to file a response, if any, to both the petition for writ of habeas corpus and emergency motion for bond and request for alternative writs no later than Tuesday, October 2, 2018.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CLUTTS
    2018-1227
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On certified order of the Supreme Court of Illinois, No. 2017PR00048.
    Raymond Edward Clutts, Attorney Registration No. 0058842, last known address in Schaumburg, Illinois, suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for three years.


text:
    STATE EX REL. CAPITAL ROYALTY PARTNERS II, L.P. v. SERROTT
    2018-1214
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Prohibition. On motion for leave to intervene of Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. Motion granted. Intervening respondent, Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., ordered to file its responsive pleading within five days.


text:
    STATE EX REL. ARMATAS v. DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
    2018-1167
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Mandamus. On respondents' motion for leave to file substitute motion to dismiss. Motion granted. Respondents' original motion to dismiss shall remain under seal.


text:
    STATE v. RIEVES
    2018-0770
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On appellant's motion for reconsideration. Motion denied as moot.


text:
    PENLAND v. DINKELACKER
    2018-1197
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    In Mandamus. On relator's application for dismissal. Application granted. Cause dismissed.


text:
    MCADAMS v. GOLDBERG
    2018-1113
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 27, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MEDIATION MATTERS
    In Prohibition.
    The following case has been referred to mediation under S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.01.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HULL
    2018-0158
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 1, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On order to show cause. Jonathan Hull, Attorney Registration No. 0003925, last known address in Cleveland, Ohio, indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MARSHALL
    2013-0924
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 1, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On application for reinstatement by respondent, Joy Lenore Marshall, Attorney Registration No. 0073585, last known business address in Columbus, Ohio. Application denied.


text:
    CLEVELAND METRO. BAR ASSN. v. AUSTIN
    2018-0159
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 1, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On respondent's motion for leave to answer the certification of default. Motion granted. Matter remanded to the board for further proceedings under Gov.Bar R. V(12). The interim default suspension imposed against respondent on February 23, 2018, shall remain in place while this matter is pending before the board. Proceedings before this court in this case are stayed until further order of this court.


text:
    IN RE POLIZZI
    2018-0777
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 1, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On respondents motion to purge contempt. Motion granted.


text:
    STATE EX REL. EBERHARDT v. JANIK
    2018-1367
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 1, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Habeas Corpus. On motion for leave to intervene of Melva and Scott Sherwood. Motion denied.

O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. RUTHERFORD
    2017-0010
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 28, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    Sua sponte, Guy Darius Rutherford, Attorney Registration No. 0066032, last known business address in Cleveland, Ohio, found in contempt for failure to surrender his certificate of admission and failure to file an affidavit of compliance on or before August 10, 2018.


text:
    STATE EX REL. NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S HOSP. v. INDUS. COMM.
    2018-0888
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    September 28, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    On appellant's application for dismissal. Application granted. Cause dismissed.


text:
    STATE EX REL. JOHNSON v. GOULDING
    2018-0992
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 3, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Mandamus. On relator's motion to strike respondent's motion to dismiss. Motion denied as moot.


text:
    STATE EX REL. JONES v. SUMMIT CTY. COURT REPORTER
    2018-1173
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 3, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    In Mandamus. On relator's application for dismissal. Application granted. Cause dismissed.


text:
    RIEGER v. GIANT EAGLE, INC.
    2018-0883
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    October 3, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for admission pro hac vice of Scott D. Livingston. Motion granted. Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. XII(4), counsel is ordered to file a notice of permission with the Supreme Court's Office of Attorney Services within 30 days.