author: MAY, Judge.

text:
    In the Matter of the Civil COMMITMENT OF C.P., C.P., Appellant-Respondent, v. Community Hospital North/Gallahue Mental Health, Appellee-Petitioner.
    No. 49A02-1309-MH-770.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    May 23, 2014.

      Patricia Caress McMath, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

      Jenny R. Buchheit, Stephen E. Reynolds, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

MAY, Judge.

C.P. appeals her 90-day involuntary commitment to Community North Hospital (“the Hospital”). She acknowledges she is mentally ill but asserts the hospital did not prove she was gravely disabled or dangerous to herself. Because a psychiatrist’s testimony provided clear and convincing evidence that C.P. was gravely disabled, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

C.P. brought herself to the emergency room at the Hospital on August 18, 2013, claiming that she had been bitten by spiders in her home and that the “venom” left her “feeling heavily sedated, or drugged.” (Tr. at 17.) The doctors who examined her could not find any spider bites and referred her to psychiatry for an evaluation. The psychiatrist admitted her to the Behavioral Health Pavilion on an emergency detention.

This was the fourth time in thirty-one days that C.P. had arrived at the emergency room claiming she had been bitten by poisonous spiders in her home. On one of those occasions, police visited her home and could not find any spiders. On all four occasions, doctors were unable to find any spider bites on C.P. Nevertheless, C.P. did not believe she has a mental illness, and she believes the evaluations by the emergency room doctors are incorrect.

At a hearing on August 23, a psychiatrist who had seen C.P. each morning for five days testified about her condition. C.P. does not believe she has delusions. She believes there are spiders at her house that bite her when she is there. Because of her fear of the spiders, she has been living outside of her apartment. The psychiatrist further explained:

Q Now, is she able to provide herself with food, clothing, and shelter, and other essential human needs?
A No.
Q And, what needs is she unable to meet?
A She’s unable to live in a house. She’s unable to cook and eat in the house. She lost her job. She couldn’t go to her [examinations], uh, for the Ivy Tech related to the anxiety that comes from these thoughts. Uh, and she’s currently not working .... and uh, essentially she feels that she don’t [sic] have a place to live.
Q Okay. And, do you — in your opinion is she unable to meet these needs because of her mental illness?
A Yes.
Q Now, does she suffer also from a substantial impairment, or deterioration of her judgment, reasoning, or behavior?
A Yes.
Q And, does it — impairment effect [sic] her ability to function independently?
A Yes.
Q And, does her illness also effect [sic] her ability to take medication?
A Yes.
Q How so?
A Because, um, the person does not believe that they [sic] have the illness?
Q Now, was she prescribed medication in her previous admissions?
A Yes.
Q And—
A Uh, she had taken one — one dose of Risperdal. I verified with the pharmacy on August 1st. She was discharged on Risperdal, with an appointment with outpatient provider, and she went there, and reported that she does not need any services.
Q So, based on your examinations then, is [C.P.] gravely disabled?
A Yes.
Q And, this is — again, based on her mental illness?
A Yes.
Q Now, also based on your examinations do you have an opinion whether she presents a substantial risk of harming herself?
A She has not indicated to me that she has any thoughts to hurt herself, but based on her delusional thinking, she may engage in dangerous behavior, which can potentially put her at risk like the thoughts of burning the house, or may have burned the house, living outside in the car. Um, thoughts about ending it all, like to a point that she cannot take the anxiety that comes with these thinking [sic], and doing some dangerous behavior.
Q And, is this behavior also a part of her mental illness?
A Yes.

(Id. at 8-10.) Based thereon, the psychiatrist asked for a 90-day commitment to stabilize C.P. on anti-psychotic medications; however, he believed C.P. could be released from inpatient treatment after ten to fourteen days, at which point she could be treated on an outpatient basis.

At the end of the hearing, the court found:

On the evidence presented the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, Respondent is suffering from Psychosis Not Otherwise Specified, which is a mental illness as defined in Indiana Code 12-7-2-130. That the Respondent may be dangerous to herself or others as defined in Indiana Code 12-7-2-53. That Respondent is gravely disabled as defined in Indiana Code 12-7-2-96. That the respondent is in need of custody, care and treatment at Community Hospital North, or Gallahue Mental Health Services for a period of time not expected to exceed ninety (90) days.

(Id. at 34.)

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Involuntary commitment proceedings are subject to federal due process requirements because the “loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom resulting from the confinement.” Commitment of S.T. v. Community Hosp. North, 930 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh’g denied. “As everyone exhibits some abnormal conduct at one time or another, ‘loss of liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.’ ” Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).

When we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a civil commitment, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom favorable to the trial court’s decision. G.Q. v. Branam, 917 N.E.2d 703, 707 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. If the trial court’s decision was one a reasonable person could have made, we will affirm even if other reasonable decisions were possible. Id.

To have a person involuntarily committed, a petitioner must demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.” Ind.Code § 12-26-2-5(e). In this context, mental illness means “a psychiatric disorder that: (A) substantially disturbs an individual’s thinking feeling or behavior; and (B) impairs the individual’s ability to function.” Ind.Code § 12-7-2-130(1). The trial court found C.P. was diagnosed with “Psychosis Not Otherwise Specified, which is a mental illness as defined in Indiana Code 12-7-2-130.” (Tr. at 34.) C.P. does not challenge that finding on appeal.

Instead, she challenges the court’s finding that she “is gravely disabled as defined in Ind.Code 12-7-2-96.” (Tr. at 34.) A person is gravely disabled if

an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual: (1) is unable to provide for that individual’s food, clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or (2) has substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual’s inability to function independently.

Ind.Code § 12-7-2-96.

C.P. asserts that, although she did not accept her diagnosis or the recommended treatment, “there are no underlying facts that show C.P. has a substantial impairment in judgment that results in her being [un]able to function independently.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.) However, the psychiatrist testified C.P.’s mental illness prevented her from meeting her needs: “She’s unable to live in a house. She’s unable to cook and eat in the house. She lost her job. She couldn’t go to her [examinations].” (Tr. at 8.) C.P. had arrived at the hospital four times within one month seeking treatment for neurological effects of nonexistent spider bites. The psychiatrist testified that C.P.’s unwillingness to take medications to treat her mental illness, which she does not admit she has, substantially impairs her ability to function independently. Therefore, the psychiatrist believed a commitment was required to stabilize C.P. on antipsychotic medications, so she could understand her illness and perhaps comply with ongoing outpatient treatment. We may not reweigh the evidence and, thus, we cannot hold the court erred when it determined clear and convincing evidence demonstrated C.P.’s mental illness left her gravely disabled. See, e.g., In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (grave disability found based on noncompliance with medication regimen, lack of insight into illness, poor prognosis without medications, delusions, agitation and trouble sleeping).

Having rejected C.P.’s arguments, we affirm the court’s involuntary commitment order.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.

      . Although C.P.'s 90-day involuntary commitment has already ended, making her appeal moot, we address her appeal on its merits because "it involves questions of great public interest ... that are likely to recur.” See Commitment of S.T. v. Community Hosp. North, 930 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (addressing S.T.’s argument on its merits because involuntary commitment is a question of great public interest that is likely to recur), reh'g denied.

      . Pursuant to Ind.Code § 12-26-2-5(e), the Hospital needed to prove that C.P. was "either dangerous or gravely disabled.” A petitioner need not prove a person is both dangerous and gravely disabled. G.Q., 917 N.E.2d at 707. As the evidence supports the finding C.P. was gravely disabled, we need not address whether she was dangerous. See id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PYLE, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    John ALDEN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    No. 30A05-1309-MI-463.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    May 27, 2014.
    Jill M. Acklin, Westfield, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kyle Hunter, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

PYLE, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

John Alden (“Alden”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to prohibit the release of his criminal record.

We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Alden’s motion to prohibit the release of his criminal record.

FACTS

In November of 1992, the State charged Alden in Hancock County with Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Alden pled guilty to the charge on June 1, 1993, and completed his sentence on or around August 16, 1995. Subsequently, in 1998, an Illinois court convicted him of misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Alden claims that he has not received any convictions since.

On June 4, 2013, Alden filed a motion to prohibit the release of his criminal record. He argued that he met the requirements of Indiana Code § 35-38-8-5, which at the time allowed courts to restrict access to the conviction records of qualifying offenders eight years after they completed their sentences. Alden served his motion on the Hancock County Prosecutor but not any other State entities. Shortly after Alden filed the motion, the Indiana Legislature repealed Indiana Code § 35-38-8-5.

On August 14, 2013, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Alden’s motion. At the hearing, the trial court expressed concern that Alden had not served state agencies with notice of process even though he sought to enjoin those agencies from releasing his record. As a result, on August 20, 2013, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that: (1) Alden had failed to provide notice to certain state agencies; and (2) the Legislature had repealed Indiana Code § 35-38-8-5. Alden now appeals. We will provide additional facts as necessary.

DECISION

On appeal, Alden disputes both of the trial court’s conclusions. He argues that he was not required to serve notice to affected state agencies because he served notice to a deputy prosecutor, which constituted notice to the State. In response, the State reiterates the trial court’s conclusion that Alden was required to serve notice to the entities impacted by his motion — in particular the Attorney General and the Indiana State Police Central Repository (“ISPCR”). Second, Alden argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion as a result of the Legislature’s repeal of the statute. He contends that the repeal should have a prospective, rather than retroactive, effect. Except for a brief statement in a footnote, the State does not address the merits of this second argument and focuses solely on the issue of proper notice.

A. Notice

The State’s notice argument is a threshold procedural issue we must resolve before addressing the merits of whether the Legislature’s repeal of Indiana Code § 35-38-8-5 should have retroactive effect. Whether Alden was required to serve notice to state agencies is a question of law. We evaluate questions of law under a de novo standard and do not owe any deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions. McCown v. State, 890 N.E.2d 752, 756 (Ind.Ct.App.2008).

Indiana Code § 35-38-8-5 did not explicitly identify which parties were required to receive notice of a petition to restrict access to conviction records. However, the State contends that Indiana Code § 35-38-8-3 named the Indiana State Police as an adverse party. The statute stated that

[ejight (8) years after the date a person completes the person’s sentence and satisfies any other obligations imposed on the person as a part of the sentence, the person may petition a sentencing court to order the state police department to restrict access to the records concerning the person’s arrest and involvement in criminal or juvenile court proceedings.

I.C. § 35-38-8-3 (emphasis added). By extension, the State notes that Indiana Trial Rule 4.6(A)(3) requires service on the executive officer of a state governmental organization and the Indiana Attorney General when a state governmental organization is a party to an action. Accordingly, the State contends that Alden was required to serve the Attorney General on behalf of the state police department. The State also identifies the ISPCR as a necessary party requiring notice because the ISPCR is the proper repository for official state criminal history data under Indiana Code § 10-13-3-24.

While the Attorney General and ISPCR are entities that have an interest in Alden’s motion, we recently — and after the initiation of this appeal — held that Indiana Code § 35-38-8-3 did not require petitioners to serve notice on either the Attorney General or the ISPCR. Pittman v. State, 9 N.E.3d 179, No. 06A05-1305-CR-243, 2014 WL 1711011 (Ind.Ct.App. April 30, 2014). In Pittman, Pittman filed a petition under Indiana Code § 35-38-8-3 to restrict access to the record of his criminal conviction, and the trial court denied the petition because it found that he did not meet the statutory prerequisites for Indiana Code § 35-38-8-3. Id. at 180-81, 181-82, 2014 WL 1711011 at *1, *2. Pittman appealed, and, in a cross-appeal, the State argued that Pittman had failed to serve proper notice to the State because he had not served the Attorney General and the ISPCR. Id. at 181-82, 2014 WL 1711011 at *2. We disagreed with the State on the basis that “Pittman’s petition was simply an additional filing in his criminal case and did not initiate a new, free-standing cause of action.” Id. Consequently, Indiana Criminal Rule 18 rather than Indiana Trial Rule 4.6(A) governed Pittman’s service requirements. Id. Indiana Criminal Rule 18 states that unless the trial court provides otherwise, “a copy of every pleading and motion, and every brief submitted to the trial court, except trial briefs, shall be served personally or by mail on or before the day of the filing thereof upon each attorney or firm of attorneys appearing of record for each adverse party.” Id. (emphasis added). Based on this rule, we concluded that it was sufficient that Pittman, who had been convicted in Boone County, had served notice on the Boone County Prosecutor. Id.

The State’s argument here mirrors its argument in Pittman. Alden served the Hancock County Prosecutor but not the Attorney General or the ISPCR. Consequently, as in Pittman, the State argued that he did not properly serve notice to necessary parties. For the same reasons we articulated in Pittman, we do not find this argument persuasive. Alden’s motion was a new filing with respect to his criminal conviction rather than a new cause of action. As such, he fulfilled the notice requirements of Indiana Criminal Rule 18 by serving the Hancock County Prosecutor, the adverse party “of record.” See id.

B. Repeal

As we have found that Alden’s notice was sufficient, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion on the basis that the Legislature repealed Indiana Code § 35-38-8-3. Again, this is a question of law that we will review de novo. See Thomison v. IK Indy, 858 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).

In support of his contention that his right to move the trial court to restrict his criminal records survived the Legislature’s repeal of Indiana Code § 35-38-8-3, Alden cites Gosnell v. Ind. Soft Water Serv., Inc., 503 N.E.2d 879, 880 (Ind.1987), superseded by statute on other grounds, for the principle that legislative changes should be applied prospectively, rather than retroactively. However, the State correctly notes that Gosnell concerned the issue of retroactive application after the enactment of a new statute rather than the repeal of a statute. Instead, we find Indiana Code § 1-1-5-6 dispositive. Section 1-1-5-6 “applies to the repeal of a statute or part of a statute that has expired,” and provides that “[t]he repeal does not affect the validity of an action taken under the statute or part of the statute before its expiration.” I.C. § 1-1-5-6. While Indiana courts have never interpreted this provision of the Indiana Code, its plain language indicates that a party has a right to pursue an action allowed by statute even if that statute is later repealed, as long as the party undertakes the action prior to the repeal. Accordingly, because Alden filed his motion before the Legislature repealed Indiana Code § 35-38-8-8, we conclude that the repeal did not affect the validity of his action. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion on the basis that the Legislature had repealed the statute. We remand to the trial court for the trial court to consider the merits of Alden’s motion.

Reversed and remanded.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.


author: MATHIAS, Judge.

text:
    Craig ALVEY, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
    No. 20A04-1310-MI-538.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    May 28, 2014.

      Elizabeth A. Beilin, Elkhart, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Henry A. Flores, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

MATHIAS, Judge.

Craig Alvey (“Alvey”) appeals the Elk-hart Superior Court’s denial of his petition to expunge the records of his conviction. On appeal, Alvey claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Alvey could not have the records of his conviction expunged because Alvey had violated the terms of his probation.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On January 24, 2007, Alvey pleaded guilty to Class D felony possession of cocaine and was sentenced to eighteen months, all suspended to probation. On July 18, 2007, Alvey admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court sentenced him to “20 days to be served 5 COWP Weekends.” Appellant’s App. p. 17. On February 22, 2008, Alvey again admitted to violating the terms of his probation. This time, the trial court imposed the balance of Alve/s previously-suspended sentence and recommended that it be served in Community Corrections. Alvey was accepted into the Community Corrections program, where he served the remainder of his sentence. Al-vey completed his sentence on September 18, 2008. On September 12, 2012, Alvey successfully petitioned to have his Class D felony conviction reduced to a Class A misdemeanor.

On July 2, 2013, Alvey filed a petition to expunge the records of his Class A misdemeanor conviction. Alvey claimed that he had successfully completed his sentence and was therefore eligible for expungement. The State disagreed and noted that Alvey had twice admitted to violating the terms of his probation. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Alvey’s petition on October 1, 2013. Alvey now appeals.

Standard of Review

Here, the parties do not dispute the operative facts and argue only whether the relevant expungement statute is applicable to these facts. Thus, the question before us is one of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of statutes is a pure

question of law we review de novo, and we therefore need not defer to the trial court’s interpretation. Sanders v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Brown County, 892 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ind.Ct.App.2008); Johnson v. Morgan, 871 N.E.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Our goal in construing a statute is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of our General Assembly. Sanders, 892 N.E.2d at 1252 (citing Sales v. State, 728 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind.2000)). We presume that the General Assembly intended that the language used in the statute be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result. Id.

To determine the intent of the legislature, we examine the statute as a whole and also read sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. Id. (citing City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg’l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind.2005)). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. U.S. Steel Corp. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 951 N.E.2d 542, 552 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). Thus, we must give all words their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by statute. Id. When the language in a statute is ambiguous or uncertain, we may look not only to the language, but also to the nature and subject matter of the act and the object to be accomplished thereby in ascertaining the legislative intent. Johnson, 871 N.E.2d at 1053. If, however, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we will give such a statute its apparent and obvious meaning. U.S. Steel, 951 N.E.2d at 552.

Discussion and Decision

The expungement statute at issue in the present case provides:

(a) This section applies only to a person convicted of a misdemeanor, including a Class D felony reduced to a misdemean- or.
(b) Not earlier than five (5) years after the date of conviction (unless the prosecuting attorney consents in writing to an earlier period), the person convicted of the misdemeanor may petition a court to expunge all conviction records, including records contained in:
(1) a court’s files;
(2) the files of the department of correction;
(3) the files of the bureau of motor vehicles; and
(4) the files of any other person who provided treatment or services to the petitioning person under a court order;
that relate to the person’s misdemeanor conviction.
(c) A person who files a petition to expunge conviction records shall pay the filing fees required for filing a civil action, and the clerk shall distribute the fees as in the case of a civil action. A person who files a petition to expunge conviction records may not receive a waiver or reduction of fees upon a showing of indigency.
(d) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the period required by this section has elapsed;
(2) no charges are pending against the person;
(3) the person does not have an existing or pending driver’s license suspension;
(4) the person has successfully completed the person’s sentence, including any term of supervised release, and satisfied all other obli gations placed on the person as part of the sentence; and
(5) the person has not been convicted of a crime within the previous five (5) years;
the court shall order the conviction records described in subsection (b) expunged in accordance with section 6 of this chapter.

Ind.Code § 35-38-9-2 (emphasis added).

Here, Alvey claims that he met all of the requirements set forth in subsection (d) of the expungement statute and that the trial court was therefore required to expunge the records of his conviction. We disagree.

Subsection (2)(d)(4) clearly and unambiguously requires that Alvey had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he “successfully completed [his] sentence, including any term of supemsed release.” (emphasis added). Here, it is uncontra-dicted that Alvey twice violated the terms of his probation. He therefore did not successfully “complete[ ] his sentence, including any term of supervised release” as required by the expungement statute. See Pittman v. State, 9 N.E.3d 179, 185 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (concluding, under prior version of the expungement statute, that defendant had not successfully completed the terms of his sentence where he had violated the terms of his probation by committing another offense).

The fact that, here, Alvey later successfully completed his sentence in Community Corrections does not negate the fact that he had already violated the terms of his probation. As we explained in Pittman, we think that the intent of the General Assembly, as expressed by this statutory language, was to allow those persons who had successfully completed their sentences without incident to petition the court after the passage of a certain amount of time (here, five years) to expunge the records of their conviction. Id., at 185. Here, however, Alvey admittedly violated the terms of his probation twice, and he therefore cannot meet all of the requirements of the expungement statute.

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Alvey’s petition to expunge his conviction on the grounds that Alvey failed to successfully complete the terms of his sentence, including any terms of supervised release.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.

      . We refer here to the version of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-2 that was in effect at the time Alvey filed his petition and when the trial court ruled on his petition. This version of section 35-38-9-2 was effective July 1, 2013. We note that this statute was subsequently amended by Ind. Pub. Law 181-2014 § 8, effective March 26, 2014, well after the trial court ruled on Alvey’s petition. Both parties refer to the version of the statute quoted above, and neither party claims that the current version should govern this appeal.


author: VAIDIK, Chief Judge.

text:
    Lora HOAGLAND, Appellant/Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee/Defendant.
    No. 49A02-1301-PL-44.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    June 10, 2014.

      Ian W. Thompson, Greenwood, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    V. Samuel Laurin, III, Bryan H. Babb, Joel T. Nagle, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Ap-pellee.
   OPINION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

Indiana’s public schools lost hundreds of millions of dollars when new property-tax caps went into effect in 2010. Franklin Township Community School Corporation (“Franklin Township”) — one of a number of school corporations hit hardest by the new property-tax caps — responded by eliminating student transportation for the 2011-2012 school year. Franklin Township later contracted with an educational service center to provide student transportation for an annual fee. In November 2011 township parents filed a class-action lawsuit against the school corporation, challenging the constitutionality of its actions.

Though this case raises a number of legal questions, one is of primary importance: did Franklin Township act unconstitutionally with respect to student transportation? Applying our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481 (Ind.2006), we conclude that it did. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2010 the Franklin Township School Board voted to eliminate student transportation for the 2011-2012 school year. Franklin Township then transferred its transportation equipment, including its buses, to Central Indiana Educational Service Center (“CIESC”). CIESC, in turn, offered transportation services to Franklin Township parents. Parents who signed a transportation contract with CIESC received a year of transportation to and from school for one child for $475 and a $20 non-refundable deposit. A year of transportation for each additional child cost $405. Franklin Township did not receive any of the money paid to CIESC. Signing a contract with CIESC was optional; some parents chose to utilize CIESC for student transportation while other parents made alternate arrangements.

In July 2010, in response to an inquiry from the State Examiner, the Attorney General of Indiana issued an official opinion advising that Indiana’s public-school corporations were “not authorized to assess and collect a bus[-]rider fee from a student in order for that student to receive transportation to and from the student’s school to receive a public education. Such a fee is unconstitutional.” Appellants’ App. p. 23. The Attorney General cited our Supreme Court’s opinion in Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 481, explaining that Nagy “provides the following analytical framework [ ] for examining a fee or charge for services by a public[-]school corporation”:

Is the program, activity, project, service[,] or curricula mandated by the legislature or permitted by the legislature? If so, then “the legislature has made a policy decision regarding exactly what qualifies for funding at public expense.”
Although the legislature has the authority to place appropriate condition[s] or limitations on funding for such programs, “absent statutory authority, fees or charges for what are otherwise public education cost items cannot be levied directly or indirectly against students or their parents.”

Id. at 26-27 (citations omitted, formatting altered). Citing several sections of the Indiana Code, the Attorney General concluded that the Indiana General Assembly “has identified transportation of school children as a part of what would constitute a uniform system of public education in Indiana,” and pursuant to Nagy, a “school[-]bus rider fee is unconstitutional” under Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 30-31.

Despite this, Franklin Township proceeded with its plan to discontinue student transportation, and township parents were faced with a choice: pay the transportation fee or make alternate transportation arrangements for their children. Lora Hoagland, whose two sons qualified for the federal free-and-reduced-lunch program, opted to drive her children to and from school.

On November 10, 2011, the Attorney General issued a second official opinion addressing Franklin Township’s actions directly. Again citing Nagy, the Attorney General advised that:

An [Educational Service Center] is the agent of the school corporation and may not charge parents for transporting students to and from school. Such a fee is unconstitutional.
Franklin Township Community School Corporation’s transportation arrangement does not comply with state law as the school is attempting to do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly.
:¡: ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ * ⅜
Schools may utilize private parties for provision of student[-]transportation services, but neither the school nor the private party may charge fees to the parents for the provision of such services.
Schools may utilize [Educational Service Centers] for provision of student transportation services, but neither the school nor the [Educational Service Center] may charge fees to parents for the provision of such services.

Id. at 33 (emphasis added, formatting altered).

The next day Hoagland and Donna Chapman — a Franklin Township parent who had entered into a transportation contract with CIESC — filed a class-action lawsuit against Franklin Township and CIESC, alleging that Franklin Township had “unlawfully fail[ed] to provide transportation,” and seeking declaratory, in-junctive, and monetary relief. Id. at 10-11. After the lawsuit was filed, the Franklin Township School Board voted to resume busing its students to and from school at no charge.

The trial court granted Hoagland’s request for class certification and created two classes: “the paying class” — those individuals who entered into a contract with CIESC and paid the transportation fee— and “the non-paying class” — those individuals who made alternate transportation arrangements for their children. Hoagland is the named plaintiff for the non-paying class and Chapman is the named plaintiff for the paying class.

CIESC filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it. Appellee’s App. p. 10-25. The trial court granted CIESC’s motion. Appellants’ App. p. 92. Chapman appealed, and another panel of this Court affirmed. Chapman v. Cent. Ind. Educ. Ctr., 49A05-1209-PL-478, 2013 WL 1846610 (Ind.Ct.App. Apr. 30, 2013), trans. denied.

Only Hoagland’s and Chapman’s claims against Franklin Township remained. In August 2012, all three parties filed summary-judgment motions. After oral argument, the trial court granted summary judgment for Franklin Township. Appellants’ App. p. 49-61. In relevant part, the court concluded that: (1) the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) barred Hoagland’s and Chapman’s claims; (2) Hoagland and Chapman were not entitled to monetary damages; and (3) Franklin Township did not violate the Indiana Constitution by discontinuing student transportation to and from school. Id. at 50.

Hoagland — but not Chapman — appeals.

Discussion and Decision

On appeal, Hoagland contends that Franklin Township, through CIESC, violated the Indiana Constitution by charging a transportation fee. She argues that student transportation to and from school is an integral part of public education, so Franklin Township may not charge for it— or discontinue it. In response, Franklin Township argues that Hoagland’s claim is barred by the ITCA and the Indiana Constitution does not authorize the monetary relief that Hoagland seeks. Franklin Township also contends that it has no constitutional duty to bus its students to and from school under the Education Clause or any other Indiana law.

I. Standard of Review

Hoagland appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Franklin Township. “In reviewing an appeal of a motion for summary judgment ruling, we apply the same standard applicable to the trial court.” Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind.2013) (citations omitted). Our review is limited to the facts that were designated to the trial court, Ind. Trial Rule 56(H), and summary judgment shall be granted where the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” T.R. 56(C). “All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1218 (citation omitted). “When faced with competing motions for summary judgment, our analysis is unchanged and we consider each motion separately construing the facts most favorably to the non-moving party in each instance.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Where, as here, the facts are not disputed, our review is de novo. Justice v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 4 N.E.3d 1171, 1174-75 (Ind.2014).

II. Hoagland’s State Constitutional Claim is not Subject to the ITCA

Whether the ITCA applies to state constitutional claims appears to be an issue of first impression. This Court has previously held that claims against school corporations are subject to the ITCA. See Simpson v. OP Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 939 N.E.2d 1098, 1102 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied; Meury v. Eagle-Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 714 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Hoag-land acknowledges that she is suing a school corporation. However, she argues that she is asserting a state constitutional claim, not a tort claim, and asks us to declare that the ITCA does not apply to her state constitutional claim.

This issue has been raised in federal district court. In 2000, in an opinion on summary judgment, Judge John Tinder wrote:

The Defendants first argue that the Plaintiff has waived his [Indiana] constitutional claims for failure to file a timely tort claim notice. They have not cited to any case which holds that a state constitutional claim is governed by [the ITCA], and the court’s own research has located none. It is unclear whether the Indiana courts would require a tort claim notice to be filed with respect to state constitutional claims.

Baker v. Washington Bd. of Works, 2000 WL 33252101 at *7 (S.D.Ind. June 8, 2000), recons, granted in part on other grounds, 2000 WL 964934. “In the absence of any [] authority” holding that the ITCA applies to non-tort claims, Judge Tinder “decline[d] to impose such a requirement....” Id. Three years later, in Schreiber v. Lawrence, 2003 WL 1562563 *6 (S.D.Ind. Mar. 4, 2003), Judge David Hamilton noted that it was still unclear whether Indiana courts would apply the ITCA to state constitutional claims.

When interpreting a statute, we independently review a statute’s meaning and then apply it to the facts of the case being reviewed. Jones v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 926 N.E.2d 116, 121 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). First, we determine whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously in the statute. Id. If a statute is unambiguous — meaning it is not susceptible to more than one interpretation— we will apply its clear and plain meaning. Id.

By its express language, the ITCA “applies only to a claim or suit in tort.” Ind.Code § 34-13-3-1. A tort is defined as “a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of damages; a breach of duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1526 (8th ed. 2004). Hoagland’s claim sounds in Indiana’s Education Clause, not tort law, and for reasons explained below, she may not seek monetary damages. Moreover, this case does not involve the type of loss contemplated by the ITCA: in general, the ITCA requires a plaintiff to give notice of a claim soon after a loss occurs, and the ITCA defines “loss” as “injury to or death of a person or damages to property.” Ind.Code § 34-6-2-75. Therefore, in light of the ITCA’s express language, we conclude that the ITCA does not govern Hoagland’s state constitutional claim.

III. Hoagland May Not Seek Monetary Damages

Hoagland seeks monetary damages from Franklin Township. See Appellants’ App. p. 10-11. In granting summary judgment for the township, the trial court held that “the Education Clause does not afford the Plaintiff a private cause of action for monetary damages....” Id. at 57. We agree.

There is no express or implied right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. In Smith v. Indiana Department of Correction, 871 N.E.2d 975, 985-86 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, this Court held that:

[N]o Indiana court has explicitly recognized a private right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. With respect to Article 1 Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Supreme Court has “never held that the Open Courts Clause provides a substantive ‘right’ of access to the courts or to bring a particular cause of action to remedy an asserted wrong.” Blanch v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Ind.2005). With one exception, the federal district courts that have addressed the issue have found it unlikely that Indiana Courts would recognize an implied right of action for damages under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., Fidler v. City of Indpls., 428 F.Supp.2d 857, 865 (S.D.Ind.2006). In making this determination, the district courts reasoned that Indiana’s courts have been hesitant to recognize implied rights of action under Indiana statutory law, and it is unlikely that the framers of the Indiana Constitution intended such an action because they would have understood sovereign immunity to bar such an action. Baker, 2000 WL 33252101 at *8. Since there is no express or implied right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution, Smith cannot succeed on such a claim.

(Formatting altered, emphasis added). Because there is no right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution, Hoagland cannot succeed on her damages claim.

IV. Public-School Transportation in Indiana

Hoagland also seeks a declaratory judgment that Franklin Township acted unconstitutionally by discontinuing student transportation and contracting with CIESC to provide student transportation for a yearly fee. She argues that this student-transportation fee violates the Education Clause, Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. In essence, her argument is that student transportation is an integral part of public education, so Franklin Township may not charge for it — or discontinue it. In response, Franklin Township argues that it has no constitutional duty to transport its students to and from school. The trial court determined that Franklin Township acted constitutionally with respect to student transportation and denied Hoagland’s request for a declaratory judgment. For reasons explained below, we find that this was error.

A. The Education Clause and the Education Code

The Education Clause, Article 8, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution, states:

Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.

The Education Clause expresses two duties of the General Assembly: (1) the duty to encourage moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement and (2) the duty to provide for a general and uniform system of open common schools without tuition. Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1220-21.

Our legislature has enacted a detailed and comprehensive body of law aimed at providing a general and uniform system of public schools. See Titles 20 and 21 of the Indiana Code (“the Education Code”). The Education Code makes numerous provisions for public-school transportation in Indiana. One provision, Indiana Code section 20-27-5-2, is particularly relevant to our analysis.

Section 20-27-5-2 authorizes school corporations to transport their students to and from school. Critically, after suit was filed against Franklin Township, our legislature amended Section 20-27-5-2 to prohibit school corporations from charging a transportation fee:

(a) The governing body of a school corporation may provide transportation for students to and from school.[]
(b) If the governing body of a school corporation:
(1) provides transportation; or
(2) contracts with an educational service center (as defined by IC 20-20-1-2) to provide transportation;
no fee may he charged to a parent or student for transportation to and from school. However, a fee may be charged for transportation to and from an athletic, a social, or another school sponsored function.

(Emphasis added). The Education Code contains other provisions that pertain to school corporations’ transportation of students, see Ind.Code § 20-26-5-4(10), as well as parents’ rights to arrange transportation for their children, see Ind.Code ch. 20-27-6.

Notably, however, Indiana law also requires that some students be transported to and from school. School corporations must transport students with disabilities, 511 Ind. Admin. Code 7-36-8, homeless students, Ind.Code § 20-27-12-4, students in foster care, Ind.Code § 20-50-3-5, and in certain circumstances, private-school students, Ind.Code § 20-27-11-1.

B. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation

Nagy provides the analytical framework for examining a fee or charge for services by a school corporation.

In Nagy, the Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“EVSC”) imposed a $20 fee on all students from kindergarten through twelfth grade. 844 N.E.2d at 483. The “student-services fee” was used to fund, among other things, a student-services coordinator, nurses, media specialists, alternative education, elementary-school counselors, a police-liaison program, and activities such as athletics, drama, and music. Id. The fee was charged to every student, even those students who qualified for the federal free-and-reduced-lunch program. Id. If the student-services fee was not paid, EVSC would send a notice to the student’s parents threatening to refer the matter to a law firm for collection. Id.

Parents of children who qualified for the federal free-and-reduced-lunch program filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In relevant part, the complaint alleged that the student-services fee violated Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of EVSC.

This Court reversed, and our Supreme Court granted transfer. On transfer, our Supreme Court found EVSC’s student-services fee unconstitutional based on our legislature’s actions:

Where the legislature ... has identified programs, activities, projects, senices or curricula that it either mandates or permits school corporations to undertake, the legislature has made a policy decision regarding exactly what qualifies as a part of a uniform system of public education commanded by Article 8, Section 1 and thus what qualifies for funding at public expense. And of course the legislature has the authority to place appropriate conditions or limitations on any such funding. However, absent specific statutory authority, fees or charges for what are otherwise public education cost items cannot be levied directly or indirectly against students or their parents. Only programs, activities, projects, services or curricula that are outside of or expand upon those identified by the legislature — what we understand to be “extracurricular”— may be considered as not a part of a publicly-funded education. And thus a reasonable fee may be assessed, but only against those students who participate in or take advantage of them.

Id. at 492 (emphases added). Because the student-services fee was used to fund things such as a student-services coordinator, nurses, media specialists, alternative education, elementary-school counselors, a police-liaison program, and activities such as athletics, drama, and music, and the legislature had “already determined that all such items are part and parcel of a public school education and by extension qualify for public funding,” the Court ruled that the fee was unconstitutional. Id. at 493.

C. Franklin Township Acted Unconstitutionally

Applying Nagy to the facts of this case, we conclude that Franklin Township acted unconstitutionally. Our legislature has determined that school corporations “may” transport their students to and from school. See Ind.Code § 20-27-5-2. Thus, pursuant to Nagy, the legislature has determined that transportation to and from school qualifies as a part of a uniform system of public education. 844 N.E.2d at 492 (“Where the legislature ... has identified ... services ... that it either mandates or permits school corporations to undertake, the legislature has made a policy decision regarding exactly what qualifies as a part of a uniform system of public education.... ”). Franklin Township’s arrangement with CIESC — which is, by definition, Franklin Township’s agent — to transport its students to and from school for an annual fee violated the Education Clause. See id. (“[F]ees or charges for what are otherwise public education cost items cannot be levied directly or indirectly against students or their parents.”). This conclusion is consistent with the 2012 amendment to Section 20-27-5-2, which now prevents school corporations from charging a fee for transporting students to and from school.

If Indiana’s school corporations may not charge a fee for transporting students to and from school, may they stop transporting students to and from school? Franklin Township says yes; it argues that it may discontinue student transportation because the Education Code has only authorized— not mandated — student transportation. But that is not entirely accurate: Indiana’s school corporations must transport homeless students, foster-care students, special-needs students, and even private-school students who live on or near a school bus route. It is hard to image that the legislature meant to require our school corporations to transport these students but exclude all others. It is similarly difficult to comprehend, returning to Nagy, that if transportation to and from school is “part and parcel of a public[-]school education,” school corporations could simply discontinue it without running afoul of the Indiana Constitution.

Franklin Township’s statutory argument is not a persuasive one, and the township offers no justification for departing from the logic found in Nagy. For this reason, we conclude that Franklin Township also acted unconstitutionally when it discontinued student transportation to and from school.

In summary, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Hoagland is not entitled to legal relief, as there is no right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. However, we conclude that the ITCA does not apply to Hoagland’s state constitutional claim, and we reverse the trial court on that ground. We also conclude that Franklin Township acted unconstitutionally by discontinuing student transportation to and from school and by later contracting with CIESC to provide that transportation for a yearly fee, and Hoagland is entitled to declaratory judgment to that effect. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of declaratory judgment and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.

      . Franklin Township sold its equipment to CIESC for one dollar. Appellants’ App. p. 64.

      . In affirming the trial court, this Court wrote:
      [Cjhapman alleged in her complaint that "the CIESC contract is an unenforceable adhesion contract, that it is illegal, that it unlawfully purports to limit parents' remedy and is void as against public policy.” Chapman does not further allege why the CIESC contract is an adhesion contract, why it is illegal, why it unlawfully limited parents' remedy, or how it is void against public policy. Chapman entered into a contract with CIESC, under which CIESC, a private vendor, was to transport her child to school in exchange for a fee paid by Chapman. Chapman paid the fee and received bus services from CIESC for the 2011-2012 school year, and that contract between the parties is now completed.
      Chapman v. Cent. Ind. Educ. Ctr., 49A05-1209-PL-478, 2013 WL 1846610 (Ind.Ct.App. Apr. 30, 2013) (references omitted), trans. denied.

      . Franklin Township also argues that Hoag-land lacks standing to assert the paying class’s claims, and we agree. In December 2012 the trial court granted summary judgment for Franklin Township on Hoagland’s and Chapman's constitutional claims. While Chapman, on behalf of the paying class, had appealed the grant of summary judgment for CIESC, she did not appeal the grant of summary judgment for Franklin Township — only Hoagland did. Moreover, Hoagland is not in a position to raise the paying class’s legal challenges: she never entered into a transportation contract with CIESC, which forms the basis of the paying class's claims.

      . In Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 506 (Ind.2006), our Supreme Court recognized that the ITCA does not apply to federal constitutional claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

      . For this reason we need not consider whether Hoagland complied with the ITCA's provisions.

      . See also Cantrell, 849 N.E.2d at 499 (“There is no explicit language in the Indiana Constitution providing any specific remedy for violations of constitutional rights.”). Federal district courts have also held that there is no right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., Greater Indianapolis Chapter of N.A.A.CP. v. Ballard, 741 F.Supp.2d 925, 934 (S.D.Ind.2010) ("Going back to at least 2000, and after Cantrell, the judges of this District have refused to recognize implied rights of action under the Indiana Constitution.”).

      .Declaratory relief is appropriate in this case. "The test to determine the propriety of declaratory relief is whether the issuance of a declaratory judgment will effectively solve the problem involved, whether it will serve a useful purpose, and whether [] another remedy is more effective or efficient.” Hood's Gardens, Inc. v. Young, 976 N.E.2d 80, 84 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Boone Cnty. Area Plan Comm’n v. Kennedy, 560 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), turns, denied). "The determinative factor of this test is whether the declaratory action will result in a just and more expeditious and economical determination of the entire controversy.” Id. (citing Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condo. Phase I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)). As school corporations across the state are grappling with budget and transportation issues, declaratory judgment in this case will be a useful step toward resolving the controversy.

      . This first sentence was present in the original statute enacted in 2005. The remaining text was added by the 2012 amendment. See PL. 140-2012 (eff. July 1, 2012).

      . See also Ind.Code § 20 — 35—8—1(a)(1) (except as otherwise provided, if a student with legal settlement in a school corporation is transferred to another school corporation because of a disability, the transferor corporation must either provide transportation or pay transportation costs).

      . Section 20-27-11-1 provides:
      Sec. 1. (a) If a student who attends a nonpublic school in a school corporation resides on or along the highway constituting the regular route of a public school bus, the governing body of the school corporation shall provide transportation for the nonpublic school student on the school bus. (b) The transportation provided under this section must be from the home of the nonpublic school student or from a point on the regular route nearest or most easily accessible to the home of the nonpublic school student to and from the nonpublic school or to and from the point on the regular route that is nearest or most easily accessible to the nonpublic school from which the student can walk to and from the nonpublic school.

      . See Ind.Code § 20-21-l-2(a) (defining an "educational service center” as "an extended agency of school corporations....”).

      . Interestingly, neither party cites Chapter 20-27-13, which went into effect March 19, 2012, and discusses the termination of school transportation. The Chapter applies to any “school corporation that carried out a general program in at least one (1) school year beginning after June 30, 2010, to provide transportation to and from school for eligible students.” Ind.Code § 20-27-13-2. Of particular significance is Section 20-27-13-3, which authorizes school corporations to stop transporting "eligible students” to and from school:
      Except as provided in section 7 of this chapter, a school corporation described in section 2 of this chapter shall carry out a program to provide transportation to and from school for all eligible students in any part of a school year beginning after June 30, 2012, unless the governing body of the school corporation:
      (1) approves the termination of the transportation program; and

        (2) provides public notice of the date after which the transportation will no longer be provided under the transportation program;
      at least three (3) years before the date after which the transportation will no longer be provided under the transportation program.
      An "eligible student" is defined as an individual who is enrolled in a school corporation, has legal settlement in the school corporation, attended school in the school corporation’s taxing district, and is not required by federal or state law to receive transportation services to and from school. Ind.Code § 20-27-13-1. Because neither party cites Chapter 20-27-13, we do not raise it sua sponte.

      . Responding to concerns about budget shortfalls and student transportation, the legislature recently enacted Indiana Code section 6-1.1-20.6-9.9, which works in conjunction with Indiana Code section 5-1-5-2.5. Section 5-1-5-2.5 diverts money from school corporations’ transportation funds to pay their debts. Section 6-1.1-20.6-9.9 offers school corporations that lost at least ten percent of their property-tax funds a three-year reprieve from the fund-diversion requirement.

      . Neither party provides any independent constitutional analysis; Franklin Township relies wholly on the Education Code and Hoagland cites Nagy to support her claims.


author: FISHER, Senior Judge.

text:
    HOOSIER ROLL SHOP SERVICES, LLC, Petitioner, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVENUE, Respondent.
    No. 49T10-1104-TA-29.
    Tax Court of Indiana.
    May 14, 2014.
    Ronald M. Soskin, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Petitioner.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, John P. Lowrey, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Respondent.
   ORDER ON PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FISHER, Senior Judge.

Hoosier Roll Shop Services, LLC has challenged the Indiana Department of State Revenue’s (Department) final determination denying it an exemption from Indiana’s sales and use taxes for equipment it used and materials it consumed in grinding and calibrating its customers’ work rolls during the 2007 and 2008 tax years (the years at issue). The matter, currently before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, presents one issue: whether in grinding and calibrating its customers’ work rolls, Hoosier Roll produces other tangible personal property. The Court finds that it does.

FACTS

Background

Generally speaking, mills are in the business of converting slabs of raw steel, aluminum, and paper pulp into “sheets” of finished product for their customers: steel suitable for use as automobile framing or refrigerator doors; aluminum suitable for baking foil and dishes or beverage cans; and paper suitable for cigarettes, facsimile machines, or cardboard boxes. (See, e.g., Pet’r Am. Jt. Stipulation Facts (“Jt. Stip.”) ¶¶ 18-19; Pet’r Des’g Evid. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 5 (hereinafter “Burke Aff.”) ¶¶ 6, 12, 15, 23-24.) The mills accomplish this conversion through a high-tech rolling process: they run the raw slabs and pulp along a conveyer-belt type mechanism and through huge rolling machines at speeds often exceeding three thousand feet per minute. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 18, 20.) The rolling process “is so precise that variations of more than a ten-thousandth to ten-millionth of an inch may reduce the rolled product to scrap.” (Burke Aff. ¶ 14.)

A rolling machine contains two work rolls, each weighing up to 5,900 pounds. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 21.) The work rolls operate like giant rolling pins to create the proper thickness, flatness, surface texture, and luster of the sheet product as it passes between them. (See Jt. Stip. ¶ 22.) In order for the work rolls to create the proper thickness, flatness, surface texture, and luster of the sheet product, their surfaces must be ground and calibrated to certain specifications. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 23, 25, 28.) While some mills grind and calibrate their work rolls in-house, others outsource their work to roll shops like Hoosier Roll. (Burke Aff. ¶ 8.)

When mills purchase new work rolls, they are blank and must be ground and calibrated before they can even be used. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 24-25.) Once used for a specific job, the work rolls can be ground and calibrated to entirely new specifications and then used to produce an entirely different sheet product. (See Jt. Stip. ¶ 27.) A work roll can be ground and calibrated between 66 and 200 times (depending on whether it is a “hot mill” or a “cold mill” work roll); the mean number of times that a work roll is ground and calibrated is 40 times. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Opp’n Pet’r Mot. Summ. J. (hereinafter “Resp’t Des’g Evid.”), Ex. 6, Interrogs. 13, 14.)

Hoosier Roll’s Process

When Hoosier Roll is engaged by a customer to grind and calibrate work rolls, it first inspects and tests the work rolls to determine if they are salvageable. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid., Ex. 3 (hereinafter “Department’s LOF”) at 6-7.) Furthermore, it must remove any coating materials that are present on the work rolls. (Department’s LOF at 6.)

In order to grind and calibrate work rolls to meet its customer’s specifications, Hoosier Roll inputs certain data into its specialized CAD-CAM type computer system. (See Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 34, 38, 41; Burke Aff. ¶ 14.) The computer system feeds the data to an operator who then prepares the grinding equipment. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 42.) For instance, drivers are attached to the grinding equipment enabling the work rolls to spin, blank steel plates and welding equipment fashion the drivers to fit the work rolls, and appropriate grinding wheels are installed and dressed for the desired grind by using diamonds, solvents, and other products. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 44-46.)

Once the grinders have been prepared, Hoosier Roll mounts the work rolls on the grinders using cranes or propane-fueled forklifts. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 43, 47.) Throughout the grinding process, Hoosier Roll must not only continuously apply lubricants and coolants to reduce friction that could cause the work roll to expand (resulting in an uneven grind), but must also monitor the grind to ensure that it conforms to the required specifications. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 51, 53, 59-60.) Hoosier Roll uses various types of computerized equipment, including electronic saddle micrometers and ultrasound, to monitor the grinding process. (Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 50-51, 53-54, 58, 61.) Once the grinding process is complete, Hoosier Roll wraps the work roll to protect it from damage during subsequent shipping. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 63.)

Procedural History

On March 11, 2010, the Department completed an audit of Hoosier Roll. The Department explained in its audit report that while Hoosier Roll purchased certain items during the years at issue for use in its grinding and calibration operation, “[s]ales tax was not paid at the time of purchase ... and use tax was not accrued and paid.” (Resp’t Des’g Evid., Ex. 2 at 3.) Consequently, on April 5, 2010, the Department issued notices of Proposed Assessment to Hoosier Roll.

Hoosier Roll subsequently protested the proposed assessments, claiming that the purchases at issue were exempt from taxation. On August 31, 2010, the Department conducted an administrative hearing on the matter. In a letter of findings dated January 24, 2011 (LOF), the Department denied Hoosier Roll’s protest. Hoosier Roll subsequently requested a rehearing, which the Department denied.

On April 21, 2011, Hoosier Roll filed an original tax appeal. On March 14, 2012, both Hoosier Roll and the Department filed motions for summary judgment. The Court conducted a hearing on those motions on May 11, 2012. Additional facts will be provided when necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the designated evidence demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter this standard. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 865 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. Tax Ct.2007), review denied.

LAW

Indiana imposes both a sales tax and a use tax. The sales tax, also known as the state gross retail tax, applies to retail transactions that occur in Indiana. Ind.Code § 6-2.5-2-l(a) (2007). The use tax applies to storing, using, or consuming in Indiana tangible personal property acquired in a retail transaction regardless of where that transaction occurred or where the retail merchant was located. Ind.Code § 6-2.5-3-2(a) (2007).

In an effort to encourage industrial growth and to limit the effect of tax pyramiding, the Indiana legislature has enacted several statutes, collectively referred to as “the industrial exemptions,” that exempt from the sales and use taxes certain purchases of tangible personal property that is used or consumed in the production of other tangible personal property. See Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 1222, 1225, 1228 (Ind. Tax Ct.1992). Three of these exemptions are at issue in this case and provide:

[Tjransactions involving manufacturing machinery, tools, and equipment are exempt from the state gross retail tax if the person acquiring that property acquires it for direct use in the direct production, manufacture, fabrication, assembly, extraction, mining, processing, refining, or finishing of other tangible personal property.

Ind.Code § 6-2.5-5-3(b) (2007).

Transactions involving tangible personal property are exempt from the state gross retail tax if the person acquiring the property acquires it for his direct use in the direct production of the machinery, tools, or equipment described in [Indiana Code § 6-2.5-5-3].

Ind.Code § 6-2.5-5-4 (2007).

Transactions involving tangible personal property are exempt from the state gross retail tax if the person acquiring the property acquires it for direct consumption as a material to be consumed in the direct production of other tangible personal property in the person’s business of manufacturing, processing, refining, repairing, mining, agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, or arboriculture.

Ind.Code § 6-2.5-5-5.1(b) (2007). While each of these exemption provisions can apply to a host of different activities and factual situations, they are similar in that they each require the production of other tangible personal property.

ANALYSIS

The parties’ motions for summary judgment present just one issue for the Court to decide: whether Hoosier Roll produces a new good, thereby entitling it to the exemptions previously mentioned, when it grinds and calibrates work rolls. Hoosier Roll claims that it does: it takes a work roll, a tool ground and calibrated for a certain use and, through its grinding and calibration process, creates an entirely new tool for a different use (i.e., a remanufac-tured work roll). (See, e.g., Pet’r Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pet’r Br.”) at 16-18.) The Department argues, however, that Hoosier Roll does not produce a new good; rather, it provides a repair service that is designed merely to perpetuate the usable life of the work roll. (See, e.g., Resp’t Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Resp’t Br.”) at 7,11.)

In Rotation Products Corporation v. Department of State Revenue, 690 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998), this Court explained that merely characterizing a process as “remanufacturing” or “repair” is not helpful in determining whether the process actually produces a new product and is thus an exempt activity. See Rotation Prods. Corp. v. Dep’t of State Revenue, 690 N.E.2d 795, 800-02 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998) (explaining that some repair activities might constitute production while some remanufacturing activities might not). Consequently, in that case, the Court developed four questions, based on its analysis of case law from both Indiana and other jurisdictions, to assist it in determining whether a “remanufacturing” or “repairing” process produces a new product. See id. at 800-03. Here, both Hoosier Roll and the Department agree that the Court can determine whether Hoosier Roll produces a new good when it grinds and calibrates work rolls by using the facts they have presented to answer the questions set forth in Rotation Products. (See, e.g., Pet’r Br. at 16-19; Resp’t Br. at 7-9.)

QUESTION 1: What is the substan-tiality and complexity of the work done on the existing article and what are the physical changes to the existing article, including the addition of new parts ?

In answering this first question, the Court finds that Hoosier Roll makes substantial physical changes to the work rolls it receives from its customers through its complex process of grinding and calibration. Indeed, the surfaces of the work rolls — whether the rolls are new and blank or have been previously ground and calibrated to certain specifications — must be physically altered before the work rolls can be used to produce a specified sheet product. As a result of this physical alteration, the work roll Hoosier Roll returns to its customer is not the same work roll that the customer originally delivered to Hoosier Roll. As Hoosier Roll very convincingly explained, it takes a work roll, a tool ground and calibrated for a certain use and, through its grinding and calibration process, creates an entirely new tool for a different use. (See Pet’r Br. at 16-18.)

The Department acknowledges that while Hoosier Roll’s grinding and calibration process is complex, it “does not substantially change the underlying good” as the process “begins and ends with a giant rolling pin that is used to flatten things.” (Resp’t Br. at 7; Hr’g Tr. at 33 (emphasis added).) While it is true that when Hoosier Roll’s process is completed its customer still has a work roll, the Department’s argument fails to recognize that the intended use of that work roll — and thus the form of its physical surface — is very different from the use and form of the work roll when the customer first delivered it to Hoosier Roll. See, e.g., Rotation Prods. Corp., 690 N.E.2d at 804 (explaining that with respect to a remanufactured roller bearing, the new working surface has a very different “geometry” from the original and is therefore a new and different product from the original).

QUESTION 2: How does the article’s value before and after the work compare?

With respect to this second question, the Court finds that Hoosier Roll’s grinding and calibration process adds value to a work roll that was not there when the work roll was first delivered to it. This is evidenced by the fact that at the time a customer brings its work rolls to Hoosier Roll, it can no longer use them for their specified purpose. See, e.g., supra at note 6. Once ground and calibrated to new specifications, however, the customer can use the work roll again, as it has been transformed into a new tool.

Nonetheless, the Department asserts that because work rolls are initially manufactured and sold blank, they must have “an intrinsic value of themselves.” (See Hr’g Tr. at 33.) Accordingly, if any value results from Hoosier Roll’s grinding and calibration process, it is “only” use value to Hoosier Roll’s customer which “does not increase the value or marketability of the work roll itself.” (Resp’t Br. at 8.) This Court, however, has previously rejected the notion that the term “value” does not encompass use value. See Rotation Prods. Corp., 690 N.E.2d at 802 (recognizing that a manufacturing process converts material “ ‘having no commercial value for its intended use ... [to material that] has appreciable commercial value for its intended use ’ ” (emphases added) (citation omitted)).

QUESTION 3: How favorably does the performance of the “remanufactured” article compare with the performance of newly manufactured articles of its kind?

There is no dispute that each time a work roll is ground and calibrated to certain specifications, its performance as a work roll is no less favorable than its performance as a work roll with the previously ground and calibrated specifications. Consequently, the Department has conceded that the answer to this third inquiry weighs in Hoosier Roll’s favor. (See Resp’t Br. at 7; Hr’g Tr. at 28, 35.) (See also Department’s LOF at 7 (acknowledging that “the refurbished rolls perform as well as brand new work rolls”).)

QUESTION 4: Was the work performed contemplated as a normal part of the life cycle of the existing article?

In answering the fourth and final question advanced by Rotation Products, the Court finds that Hoosier Roll’s grinding and calibration process is not work that is contemplated as a normal part of a work roll’s life cycle. Indeed, grinding and calibrating work rolls is not “routine maintenance.” See Rotation Prods. Corp., 690 N.E.2d at 803 (explaining that the process of cleaning and polishing an item so that it functions more efficiently may be “routine maintenance” or a normal part of its life cycle). Rather, as previously explained, when Hoosier Roll grinds and calibrates work rolls, it physically transforms them into entirely new and different tools that are used by its customers to create entirely new and different sheet products. This finding is further buttressed by the fact that when Hoosier Roll’s customers send their work rolls to Hoosier Roll, they are aware that the work rolls may not even be salvageable in the first instance. (See, e.g., Department’s LOF at 7.)

CONCLUSION

In Rotation Products, this Court developed four questions that would assist it in determining whether a “remanufacturing” or “repairing” process produces a new product. The Court has determined that, in this case, the answer to each of those four questions favors Hoosier Roll; that is, Hoosier Roll produces other tangible personal property when it grinds and calibrates its customers’ work rolls. Consequently, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Hoosier Roll and AGAINST the Department.

SO ORDERED.

      . Steel slabs begin at a thickness of nine to twelve inches and, based on customer specifications, may be reduced to a thickness of as little as .0149 inches. (See Pet’r Am. Jt. Stipulation Facts ("Jt. Stip.”) ¶¶ 25, 29.) Aluminum is reduced to a thickness of .00067 inches for purposes of household aluminum (i.e., baking foil). (Jt. Stip. ¶ 30.)

      . While sheets of steel, aluminum, and paper may look flat to the human eye, the sheets actually have very fine crowns or valleys and must be ground with specific concave or convex curvatures, usually measured to the nearest .0001 inch. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 32; Pet’r Des'g Evid. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 5 (hereinafter “Burke Aff.”) ¶ 19.)

      . The surface texture of finished paper varies from the slick surfaces used for facsimile machine and copier paper to the rougher surfaces used in cardboard. (Jt. Stip. ¶31; Burke Aff. ¶ 18.)

      . Different lusters are required for steel or aluminum depending on whether it is to be painted or stamped. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 33; Burke Aff. ¶ 20.)

      . Hoosier Roll is located in Hammond, Indiana. (See Resp't Des'g Evid. Opp’n Pet’r Mot. Summ. J. (hereinafter "Resp’t Des’g Evid.”), Ex. 2 at 1, 3.)

      . Indeed, "[g]iven just-in-time inventory systems, shorter production runs are required with virtually all jobs completed before the work rolls wear out.” (Jt. Stip. ¶ 26.)

      . For instance, if a previously used work roll is too soft, bruised or cracked, it might not accept the new grinding specifications. (See Resp’t Des'g Evid., Ex. 3 (hereinafter ''Department’s LOF”) at 6-7.) In such cases, the work roll cannot be used and will be scrapped. (Department's LOF at 6-7.) This, however, is not an issue with respect to new work rolls. (Department’s LOF at 6.)

      .While the Department also assessed Hoosier Roll with a negligence penalty, it has since withdrawn that penalty assessment. (See Jt. Stip. ¶¶ 6, 9-10.)

      . The use tax is complementary to the sales tax because it is primarily designed to reach out-of-state sales of tangible personal property that is subsequently used in Indiana. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 865 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. Tax Ct.2007), review denied; Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 819 N.E.2d 913, 915 (Ind. Tax Ct.2004), abrogated on other grounds. "This complementary formulation exists to ensure that the Indiana sales tax may not be avoided by purchasing products in states where there is no sales tax or where there is a lower sales tax.” Morton, 819 N.E.2d at 915 (citations omitted). "Accordingly, the use tax bites where the sales tax does not.” Id. (citation omitted).

      . These sales tax exemptions also apply to the use tax. See Ind.Code § 6-2.5-3-4(a)(2) (2007).


author: WENTWORTH, J.

text:
    HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS, INC., Petitioner, v. Tom OWENS, Bartholomew County Assessor, Respondent.
    No. 49T10-1005-TA-23.
    Tax Court of Indiana.
    June 6, 2014.

      Sandra K. Bickel, Morse & Bickel P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Petitioner.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jessica E. Reagan, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Respondent.

      Paul M. Jones, Jr., Matthew J. Ehinger, Indiana Association for Community Economic Development, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.
   WENTWORTH, J.

This case asks the Court to determine whether the Indiana Board of Tax Review erred when it held that for the 2006 tax year, Housing Partnerships, Inc. failed to show that its rental properties qualified for the charitable purposes exemption provided in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16. The Court affirms the Indiana Board’s holding.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Housing Partnerships, an Indiana corporation, was formed in 1990. Its articles of incorporation state that it “is organized and operated not for profit but exclusively for charitable purposes.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 548.) More specifically, Housing Partnerships’ stated purpose is “to undertake, promote, develop, and encourage any activity or means to ameliorate the housing needs of disadvantaged persons without regard to race, religion, sex, or national origin; and to that end, to sponsor, support and promote, and to undertake housing projects” in Bartholomew County, Indiana. (Cert. Admin. R. at 548, 566.) In accordance with that stated purpose, Housing Partnerships’ objectives are

[ ] To build or cause to be built, and to rehabilitate or cause to be rehabilitated, housing units for persons of low-income or moderate-income ... and to rent or sell such housing units, without profit; to persons and families not otherwise able to obtain housing that is decent, safe and sanitary[; and]
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜: ⅜
[ ] To determine and investigate standards of housing; to foster any means for finding more efficient means of housing production which reduce the costs of housing for disadvantaged persons; to make available to the public general information relating to the conditions in which disadvantaged persons are compelled to live; and to promote "within the community such goals as may complement the activities of [Housing Partnerships].

(Cert. Admin. R. at 548.) Housing Partnerships funds its housing projects by using money from several different sources: the income it receives from both the sale and the rental of its housing units, donations from individuals and businesses, and monies received from various public and private grants. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 637, 1251-57, 1268.) In 2005 alone, Housing Partnerships received over $1 million in federal grant money. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 637,1250-59.)

In 2006, Housing Partnerships owned numerous single family homes, duplexes and small apartment buildings in Bartholomew County. Housing Partnerships rented these properties (or the units in them) to individuals whose annual incomes were at or below 60% of the area median income (adjusted for family size).

On February 3, 2006, Housing Partnerships filed an Application For Property Tax Exemption on each of its rental properties and its administrative office (the subject properties). The applications claimed that the subject properties were entitled to the charitable purposes exemption set forth in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16 because they were used to provide housing to low-income individuals and families. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 8-9.) On March 13, 2007, the Bartholomew County Property Tax Board of Appeals (PTABOA) denied the applications.

Housing Partnerships subsequently appealed to the Indiana Board. The Indiana Board conducted a hearing on the appeal on January 30, 2009. On April 6, 2010, the Indiana Board issued a final determination affirming the PTABOA’s exemption denial because Housing Partnerships’ evidence failed to establish a prima facie case that the subject properties were entitled to the charitable purposes exemption. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 475 ¶ 35.) The Indiana Board’s final determination also stated that to the extent Housing Partnerships had received a substantial amount of money through federal grants, but did not explain what, if any, terms and conditions were attached to that financial support, an exemption was not proper. (Cert. Admin. R. at 476-77 ¶¶ 37-39.)

On May 21, 2010, Housing Partnerships initiated this original tax appeal. The Court heard oral argument on November 15, 2011. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court gives great deference to final determinations of the Indiana Board when it acts within the scope of its authority. Tipton Cnty. Health Care Found. v. Tipton Cnty. Assessor, 961 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind. Tax Ct.2012). Consequently, the Court will overturn an Indiana Board final determination only if it is:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations;
(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or
(5) unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.

Ind.Code § 33-26-6-6(e)(l)-(5) (2014). Housing Partnerships, as the party seeking to overturn the Indiana Board’s final determination, bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. See Osolo Twp. Assessor v. Elkhart Maple Lane Assocs., 789 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Tax Ct.2003).

LAW

The charitable purposes exemption, set forth in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16, provides that “[a]ll or part of a building is exempt from property taxation if it is owned, occupied, and used ... for ... charitable purposes.” Ind.Code § 6-1.1-10-16(a) (2006). The exemption also extends to the land on which an exempt building is situated and the personal property that is contained therein. See I.C. § 6 — 1.1—10—16(c), (e). Accordingly, a taxpayer seeking a charitable purposes exemption under Indiana Code § 6 — 1.1—10— 16(a) must demonstrate that it owns, occupies, and predominantly uses its property for charitable purposes. See 6787 Steelworkers Hall, Inc. v. Scott, 933 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind. Tax Ct.2010); Ind.Code § 6-l.l-10-36.3(a) (2006).

Housing Partnerships is entitled to an exemption if it provided the Indiana Board with probative evidence that its ownership, occupation, and use of the subject properties as low-income housing constitute a charitable purpose. Because the provision of low-income housing is not per se a charitable purpose, see Jamestown Homes of Mishawaka, Inc. v. St. Joseph Cnty. Assessor, 909 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. Tax Ct.2009), review denied, Housing Partnerships needed to demonstrate two things at the Indiana Board hearing. First, it must have shown that its ownership, occupation, and use of the subject properties as low-income housing provided “evidence of relief of human want ... manifested by obviously charitable acts different from the everyday purposes and activities of man in general.” See Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 145 Ind.App. 522, 251 N.E.2d 673, 683 (1969). Second, Housing Partnerships must have shown that through the accomplishment of those charitable acts, benefit inures to the public sufficient to justify the loss of tax revenue. See Foursquare Tabernacle Church of God in Christ v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 550 N.E.2d 850, 854 (Ind. Tax Ct.1990). In other words, an exemption is proper “when a private organization takes on a task that would otherwise fall to the government, [as] this provides a benefit to the community as a whole because it allows the government to direct its funds and attention to other community needs.” College Corner, L.P. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 840 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ind. Tax Ct.2006).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Housing Partnerships argues that the Indiana Board’s final determination must be overturned for two reasons. First, it claims that the final determination is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because, in holding as it did, the Indiana Board ignored Housing Partnerships’ evidence. Second, it claims that the Indiana Board’s final determination is contrary to law.

I.

Housing Partnerships first claims that in reaching its determination, the Indiana Board abused its discretion by simply ignoring “the overwhelming amount of un-controverted testimony” by its employees, its tenants, and the executive director of the Columbus Housing Authority. (Pet’r Br. at 16.) Housing Partnerships -asserts that this testimony demonstrated that the subject properties were used to provide low-income individuals in the distressed areas of Bartholomew County with “clean, safe and secure housing ... at affordable and below-market rents” and with services and support designed “to assist them in becoming self-sufficient and productive members of the community.” (Pet’r Br. at 14.)

During the Indiana Board hearing, Housing Partnerships presented the testimony of Mark Lindenlaub, its president, and Connie Munn, its vice president. Their testimony established that Housing Partnerships had been recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as a 501(c)(3) organization, having met the federal statutory criteria to be exempted from federal income taxation as a charitable organization. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1211-12.) (See also Cert. Admin. R. at 551-56.) In addition, their testimony established that because Housing Partnerships received federal grant monies, it was able to charge below-market rental rates for the subject properties. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1252-53, 1262, 1268, 1287-97, 1303-04.) (See also Cert. Admin. R. at 583-84, 609-26.) Their testimony also established that Housing Partnerships not only pays for its tenants to attend at least one credit counseling session, but it also has offered classes to them on how to purchase a home and make home repairs. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1218-19, 1225-27, 1240-44.) Moreover, Housing Partnerships has written letters of recommendation for its tenants, it has taken them to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and it has provided them with referrals to various service organizations. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1272-80, 1300-01, 1317-20.) Finally, through their testimony they explained that Housing Partnerships’ building and rehabilitation efforts are directed to the oldest, poorest, and most dilapidated areas in Bartholomew County. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1219,1227-29.)

Housing Partnerships also presented the affidavits of three of its tenants (two former, one current). (See Cert. Admin. R. at 567-82.) All of these affiants described how Housing Partnerships and its employees have made a difference in their lives, whether it was by assisting them in repairing their credit, by giving them confidence to make home repairs, or simply by providing them with encouragement. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 567-82.) Finally, Housing Partnerships presented the testimony of Deborah Holt, the Executive Director of the Columbus Housing Authority (CHA) and a member of Housing Partnerships’ Board of Directors. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1323, 1327.) Holt testified that in her position with the CHA, she referred many of her Section 8 clients to Housing Partnerships because she believed it was the “best” landlord in Columbus. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1327-31.) She further testified that she believed that if Housing Partnerships did not exist, there would be a “huge” number of homeless people in the area because they would not be able to find good, clean, affordable housing. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1327-31,1335-41.)

In evaluating all of this testimonial evidence, the Indiana Board explained that it demonstrated that Housing Partnerships was “a good landlord and d[id] some nice things for its tenants,” but it did not demonstrate that the subject properties were owned, occupied, and predominately used for a charitable purpose as that term is used in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16. (Cert. Admin. R. at 478 ¶¶ 40-42, 479 ¶ 44.) The Indiana Board’s conclusion that a taxpayer must show more than just good deeds and a nonprofit status is supported by this Court’s case law. See generally Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Lake Cnty. Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals, 862 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. Tax Ct.2007), review denied; Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 818 N.E.2d 1009 (Ind. Tax Ct.2004), review denied; Nat’lAss’n of Miniature Enthusiasts v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 671 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. Tax Ct.1996); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 534 N.E.2d 277 (Ind. Tax Ct.1989) (all denying an exemption to a corporation despite its recognized federal or state nonprofit status). Moreover, evidence that a nonprofit corporation charges low-income individuals below-market rents for its apartments is not enough to show that the property is used for a charitable purpose, even when the nonprofit corporation provides free services to its tenants. See Jamestown Homes, 909 N.E.2d at 1144. Indeed, a taxpayer still must provide evidence that it has relieved the government of an expense that it would have otherwise borne. See id.

Throughout the administrative process and in its presentation to this Court, Housing Partnerships stated that it lessened the government’s financial burden because:

1) its building and rehabilitation efforts were directed to the distressed areas in Bartholomew County, relieving the government of its burden to revitalize those areas;
2) it helped people “from falling through the cracks,” relieving human want and therefore doing something the government otherwise would have had to do;
3) its rental rates were lower than other housing units, relieving the government (i e., HUD) of its obligation to subsidize a greater portion of the rents paid by Housing Partnerships’ Section 8 tenants;
4) it helped its tenants to become more financially self-sufficient, relieving the government of its burden to support them.

(See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 528-29, 1219, 1227-29, 1337-41; Pet’r Br. at 11; Pet’r Reply Br. at 7 n. 10; Oral Arg. Tr. at 22-23.) These statements, however, are nothing more than mere conclusions. They are not supported by any evidence in the administrative record that, for example, the government actually bore the burden of revitalizing Bartholomew County’s distressed areas, or that it bore the burden of “preventing people from falling through the cracks.” See College Corner, 840 N.E.2d at 910 (referring to a statutory provision that indicated the government bore the burden to provide for neighborhood sidewalks and alleys). Without laying such a foundation, Housing Partnerships’ conclusory statements do not constitute probative evidence. See, e.g., Whitley Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998) (explaining that allegations, unsupported by factual evidence, remain allegations), review denied.

The final determination shows that the Indiana Board did not ignore Housing Partnerships’ testimonial evidence. Instead, it shows that the Indiana Board weighed that evidence and concluded that it was not probative because it failed to demonstrate that the subject properties were owned, occupied, and used for a charitable purpose.

II.

Housing Partnerships also argues that the Indiana Board’s final determination is contrary to law. Specifically, Housing Partnerships claims that

[t]he Indiana Board misinterpreted [the Court’s holding in] Jamestown [Homes ] when it determine^] that an owner of property, whose actions provide numerous benefits to it[s] tenants and the community in addition to providing safe, secure, clean and affordable housing ... is not eligible for [a] property tax exemption under Indiana] Code § 6-1.1-10-16, merely because it receives government grants, even if the grant has nothing to do with the [subject properties.]

(Pet’r Br. at 18.)

In Jamestown Homes, a nonprofit corporation, through its participation in the federal government’s Section 221(d)(3) program, constructed an apartment complex. See Jamestown Homes, 909 N.E.2d at 1139. Under that program, the federal government covered the corporation’s mortgage insurance and subsidized a low-interest loan in an effort “to promote the construction of affordable housing for low to moderate-income families.” Id. In exchange for the governmental assistance, the corporation agreed both to rent its apartments to certain income-qualifying tenants and to charge budget-based rents. Id.

In its hearing before the Indiana Board, the nonprofit corporation argued that its property was entitled to an exemption because “the provision of ‘safe, decent and affordable housing for persons of lower income who could not otherwise afford such housing’ [was] a charitable purpose.” Id. at 1140. The Indiana Board denied the exemption, and on appeal, this Court affirmed the Indiana Board’s exemption denial. Id. at 1145. In affirming the Indiana Board, the Court explained that the nonprofit corporation failed to provide probative evidence to demonstrate, among other things, that it had lessened the burden of government in meeting the need for affordable housing “because that need [was] ultimately being met by the government through its mortgage insurance and interest subsidy.” Id. at 1144. Moreover, the Court noted in its analysis that numerous jurisdictions had rejected charitable exemptions on similar properties because, ultimately, any “charitable use” was achieved solely as a condition of the agreements with the federal government (ie., through their use, the properties were not relieving a government burden because the government was providing subsidies and financial assistance to them). See id. at 1143 n. 10.

Here, the Indiana Board explained in its final determination that Housing Partnerships needed to explain whether the federal government imposed any conditions on its receipt of the federal monies. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 477 ¶ 38.) The Indiana Board found Housing Partnerships’ lack of evidence or explanation on this point significant because “[an] exemption for low income rental properties ha[d] been denied [in Jamestown Homes ] based on [the] incentives the property owner[ ] received to construct and operate such housing.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 477 ¶ 38.) In other words, no probative evidence was offered for the Indiana Board to determine whether Housing Partnerships relieved the government of an expense it would otherwise have borne, or whether the government, through its federal grants, was still bearing the expense itself.

The Indiana Board concluded that Housing Partnerships did not provide facts showing that its provision of low-income housing met the legal requirements of a charitable purpose that would entitle it to an exemption from the general duty to pay property tax. This conclusion did not misinterpret Jamestown Homes, and it was reasonable. See, e.g., Amax Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 552 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. Tax Ct.1990) (explaining that this Court will not affirm a final determination if it finds that a reasonable person, upon reviewing the administrative record in its entirety, would not be able to find enough relevant evidence to support the decision).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Housing Partnerships has not demonstrated that the Indiana Board’s final determination is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the Indiana Board’s final determination in this matter.

      . The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) determines median income levels. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1236— 38.) For 2006, the median income levels for Bartholomew County were established at $25,500 for a single person, $29,160 for a family of two, $32,760 for a family of three, and $36,420 for a family of four. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 591, 1237-38.)

      . "Probative evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove a point in issue.” Inland

        Steel Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 739 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ind. Tax Ct.2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted), review denied.

      . Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 is administered by HUD. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2005). By participating in this program, landlords generally agree to set aside a number of units for rental to low-income individuals; HUD subsidizes the difference between the rental rates on those units and what the tenants can actually pay. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1263-64, 1325.) In 2006, 35% of Housing Partnerships’ tenants were Section 8. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 583— 84, 1342.) Housing Partnerships explains that Section 8 vouchers constitute a subsidy to the tenant and not the landlord. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1263-64, 1325.)