author: SULLIVAN, Justice.

text:
    Thomas R. CROWEL, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. MARSHALL COUNTY DRAINAGE BOARD, Appellee (Respondent below).
    No. 50S03-1202-MI-71.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    July 30, 2012.

      Mark A. Bates, Schererville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    James N. Clevenger, Plymouth, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
    Bryan H. Babb, Stephen C. Unger, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Association of Indiana Counties.
   SULLIVAN, Justice.

Thomas Crowel appeals a Marshall County Drainage Board order assessing him a portion of a drain-reconstruction project’s costs, contending that he receives no benefit from the project because his land was adequately drained before the reconstruction. We affirm the assessment because under Indiana law, all landowners whose surface water flows into a drain receive a benefit by virtue of that drainage.

Background

The Indiana Drainage Law, Ind.Code §§ 36-9-27-1 to -114 (2007), establishes an extensive and detailed regulatory scheme for addressing drainage issues. It creates a drainage board in each county, I.C. § 36-9-27-4, and gives the board jurisdiction over all regulated drains in the respective county, except as otherwise provided by the statute, I.C. § 36-9-27-15. The Drainage Law vests these boards with comprehensive regulatory authority to construct, reconstruct, and maintain public drains to alleviate problems associated with flooding, wetlands, and other accumulated surface water. I.C. §§ 36-9-27-38 to -69. It also empowers the boards to levy special assessments on properties benefited by drainage projects, provided that the assessments are apportioned to the benefits accruing to the particular parcel. I.C. §§ 36-9-27-39, -50, -62, -84(a), -112. The county surveyor assists the drainage board in the exercise of its statutory authority by providing specialized technical expertise. I.C. §§ 36-9-27-29, -34.

Myers Drain is a regulated drain in Walnut Township, Marshall County, Indiana. It was constructed between 1909 and 1913 and consists of an open ditch, called Myers Ditch, and eight clay-tile arms. The present case concerns the Marshall County Drainage Board’s plans for reconstruction of Arm #7 of the Myers Drain.

The watershed of Arm # 7 is approximately 358 acres and consists of commercial, residential, and agricultural properties. Pursuant to statute, Marshall County Surveyor Larry Fisher filed a report with the Board classifying Arm # 7 as a drain in need of reconstruction on the basis that the drain was inadequate to perform the function for which it had been constructed. See I.C. §§ 36-9-27-34(b)(1), -49. To reduce costs, Fisher recommended relocating and reconstructing the drain and using a drain with a wider diameter. Still, he estimated that the project would cost approximately $114,474, and he sent the Board a proposed schedule of assessments. The Board agreed with the surveyor’s report and figured that assessments would be approximately $300 per acre for agricultural land, approximately $600 per acre for residential land, and approximately $900 per acre for commercial land. It also discussed the possibility of classifying the project as an “urban drain.” In compliance with the statute, the Board subsequently published notice that a public hearing would be held to discuss the reconstruction of Arm # 7, and it also mailed notice to the affected landowners who were to be assessed under the proposal. See I.C. § 36-9-27-52.

Petitioner Thomas Crowel owns 26 acres of farmland within Arm # 7’s watershed. The proposed schedule of assessments called for his 26 acres to be assessed $7,055.41. After receiving notice to that effect, Crowel (and a few other landowners) filed written objections with the Board prior to the public hearing.

On March 15, 2010, the Board held a public hearing. Surveyor Fisher first discussed the reason for the proposed reconstruction, explaining that the existing tile was too small to drain the water that accumulated after a heavy rainfall. This was due largely to a substantial drop in elevation from the high points at the southern end of the watershed to the low points at the northern end of the watershed over a short distance—approximately 60 feet over the course of about a mile— which resulted in large amounts of rainfall racing toward a small outlet.

Crowel and his attorney were the first members of the public to speak at the hearing. Crowel maintained that he was not within the watershed of the Myers Drain because he paid a maintenance assessment on the Ballinger Drain. He also testified that he had never suffered the flooding problems afflicting the landowners at the lower end of the watershed and, as a result, that his property would not be benefited by the reconstruction. He admitted, however, that a small corner of his property occasionally had standing water, but he asserted that this was because a private tile drain that was supposed to drain into Arm # 7 had been blocked by a utility company’s gaS line. Crowel’s attorney then posed questions to the Board concerning the benefit Crowel would receive from the reconstruction project, the procedures followed to arrive at the proposal, Crowel’s private tile drain and the parties responsible for clearing it, and the criteria used to assess the lands within the watershed.

The Board, Surveyor Fisher, or both responded to each of these objections and concerns. Fisher explained that Crowel was paying a maintenance assessment on the Ballinger Drain because the Myers and Ballinger watersheds previously had been combined together for maintenance purposes. He also explained that the Board had no jurisdiction over Crowel’s private tile drain and that, because it was blocked by a gas line, Crowel would have to talk to the gas company and the highway department about getting his private tile unblocked; but Fisher and a Board member also explained that Crowel’s land would be benefited if the blockage were removed. Fisher and Board member Jack Roose also explained that, because Crow-el’s property is at the high end of the watershed, surface-water runoff from his land contributes to the flooding of lower-lying lands. Fisher explained that this project benefited Crowel because someone else was receiving his water. He also explained that, in determining the flow of water, he had looked at the topography of the land and had run a hydrology program to determine the volume of water entering the drain from each parcel. Fisher then testified that, in determining the assessment amounts, he and the Board had “look[ed] at the watershed and the use of the watershed,” “look[ed] at the potential for runoff,” and “determine[d] what the total watershed [was].” Ex. A, at 33-34. Finally, Fisher clarified that water drained from Crowel’s property in two ways-his private tile (once cleared) and surface-water runoff.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board found that the schedule of costs, damages, and expenses of the proposed reconstruction would be less than the benefits accruing to the owners of land benefited by the construction, as required by statute, I.C. § 36-9-27-52(h). Therefore, it adopted the surveyor’s reconstruction report and schedule of assessments and ordered that the reconstruction and relocation of Arm # 7 commence. And because the Board had designated Arm # 7 as an “urban drain,” it established a 20-year period for the payment of assessments.

On March 31, 2010, Crowel filed a petition for judicial review in Marshall Circuit Court, see I.C. § 36-9-27-106, contending that the Board’s decision and assessment was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, and not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court heard counsels’ arguments and considei-ed the matter solely on the record of the Board proceedings. On September 30, 2010, the court entered its findings and order affirming the Board’s decision. The trial court’s relevant findings were as follows:

7. The evidence shows that the Petitioner’s farm ground is at or near the higher end of the watershed area and the natural flow of storm water run-off carries the water from his real estate to that of the lower situated landowners.
8. The Court finds that flooding problems suffered by the affected (primarily residential) landowners at the lower portion of the watershed result in part from dealing with the water run-off from the Petitioner’s farm ground and the other agricultural ground located at the highest point of the watershed area.
9. The Drainage Board found it to be appropriate for all parcel owners within the watershed to bear some cost of the project and established a tiered rate structure for agricultural acreage, residential acreage (double the agricultural rate) and commercial acreage (triple the agricultural rate).
10. The Petitioner alleges that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful or not supported by substantial evidence in that the decision was not based upon any drainage study or any scientific method.
11. The evidence before the Board at the public hearing held on March 15, 2010, included detailed maps of the watershed area to include the Petitioner’s acreage as well as profile and elevation studies of the newly proposed drain.
12. The testimony of the surveyor at the public hearing held on March 15, 2010, established that the Petitioner’s property fell within the watershed of Arm # 7 of the Myers Drain and that surface runoff water from his property contributed to the flooding problems experienced by the homeowners at the lower end of the watershed.
13. The Petitioner did not present any credible evidence that his property was not within the watershed of Arm # 7 of the Myers Drain.
14. The Petitioner’s primary allegation was that his property would not be benefited because his property did not flood when the parcels lower in the watershed flooded.
15. The Board’s finding that his property contributed to the flooding problems of the lower owners and that it was therefore appropriate that as a parcel within the watershed, he should contribute to the cost of the project is not arbitrary, capricious, nor unlawful and is supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant’s App. 5-6. The court subsequently denied Crowel’s motion to correct errors.

The Court of Appeals reversed, in a 2-1 decision. Crowel v. Marshall Cnty. Drainage Bd., 951 N.E.2d 290 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). Writing for himself and Judge Kirsch, Judge Mathias held “that, as a matter of law, relieving the lower-lying parcels from flooding occasioned by the natural flow of surface water from Crow-el’s property does not benefit Crowel’s land and, therefore, cannot form the basis of the reconstruction assessment levied against him.” Id. at 298. Judge Vaidik dissented, arguing that Crowel’s property is benefited because it is located in the watershed and, as a result, drains surface water into the reconstructed drain. Id. at 300 (Vaidik, J., dissenting).

The Board sought, and we granted, transfer, Crowel v. Marshall Cnty. Drainage Bd., 963 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind.2012) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). Amicus Curiae, the Association of Indiana Counties, filed a brief in support of the Board’s Petition to Transfer.

Discussion

Crowel makes a host of often overlapping arguments, but his challenge to the Board’s order boils down to three general claims. First, he maintains that his property will not be benefited by the reconstruction project because he personally has no drainage problems and that the Board’s conclusion that he will be benefited simply because surface water from his land naturally flows into the drain is arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, and not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he argues that the method used by the Board in establishing the schedule of assessments was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, and not supported by substantial evidence. Lastly, he asserts that, at the very least, the benefits attributed to his land are excessive.

I

All agree that the Drainage Law requires that assessments levied for a drain-reconstruction project be apportioned to the benefits accruing to each parcel of land. I.C. § 36-9-27-50. The disputed issue concerns which factors a drainage board may consider in determining whether a parcel of land is benefited—specifically, whether a drainage board may ascribe a benefit to land solely on the basis that surface water naturally flows off the land, across lower-lying parcels, and into the regulated drain. The Board and the trial court both found that, because Crowel is at the high end of the watershed, surface-water runoff from his land contributes to the flooding of lands at the low end of the watershed, so he will receive a benefit from the additional drainage of his surface water that the reconstructed drain will provide.

Crowel argues that the record is devoid of evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that his land is within Arm # 7’s watershed or that surface-water runoff from his land contributes to the flooding of the lowlands. The trial court found that there was substantial evidence to support these conclusions, and the Court of Appeals agreed, Crowel, 951 N.E.2d at 296 nn. 1 & 2 (majority opinion). We summarily affirm on these issues. App. R. 58(A)(2). But Crowel maintains that, even if he is in the watershed, his property will receive absolutely no benefit from the reconstructed drain because his land does not flood. And he maintains further that the Board cannot, as a matter of law, attribute a benefit to his land solely by virtue of the fact that his surface runoff contributes to the flooding of the lowlands and drains into Arm # 7. Crowel relies on Hubenthal v. Crain, 239 Ind. 646, 159 N.E.2d 850 (1959), to support his position. For their part, the Board and amicus focus on the language of the applicable statutes and dispute Crowel’s reading of prior case law.

A

The current version of the Drainage Law was enacted in 1981. Pub. L. No. 309-1981, § 101, 1981 Ind. Laws 2409, 2893-2962 (codified as amended at I.C. §§ 36-9-27-1 to -114). The parties have pointed us to no decisions from this Court applying this statute and we can find none. But we do not necessarily write on a blank slate. Similar drainage laws have been on the books for well over a century, and these laws, like the current law, have required that the assessments be apportioned to the benefits accruing to each parcel. See, e.g., Hubenthal, 239 Ind. 646, 159 N.E.2d 850 (applying § 27-120(e), Burns 1948 Repl. (1957 Supp.)); Hinesley v. Crum, 175 Ind. 10, 93 N.E. 274 (1910) (applying § 6174, Burns 1908); Culbertson v. Knight, 152 Ind. 121, 52 N.E. 700 (1899) (applying R.S. 1881, §§ 4285, 4288); Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N.E. 871 (1885) (applying R.S. 1881, § 4275).

Our decisions have identified numerous criteria for determining whether land was benefited under prior statutes, but they also have articulated several limiting principles. E.g., Lipes, 104 Ind. at 506-07, 1 N.E. at 873. Among these is the general rule that only special benefits accruing to the land are to be considered and not general benefits that accrue to the landowner as a member of the public. Hubenthal, 239 Ind. at 650, 159 N.E.2d at 852-53; Lipes, 104 Ind. at 506-08, 1 N.E. at 873-74. Benefits have been deemed special when they have increased the value of the property, relieved it from burdens, or made it adaptable to a purpose that enhanced its value. Hubenthal, 239 Ind. at 650, 159 N.E.2d at 853; Lipes, 104 Ind. at 507-08, 1 N.E. at 874. Our prior cases also hold that the benefit need not be immediate and direct to justify an assessment and that, consequently, “[f]uture possibilities, if any, as well as collateral or indirect benefits, may be considered.” Hubenthal, 239 Ind. at 650, 159 N.E.2d at 853 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Hinesley, 175 Ind. at 14, 93 N.E. at 275; Culbertson, 152 Ind. at 125-26, 52 N.E. at 702; Lipes, 104 Ind. at 508, 1 N.E. at 874.

Relying on Hubenthal, Crowel argues that a drainage board “may not consider run-off in assessing costs.” Appellant’s Br. 15. This is so, he continues, because “surface water runoff which may eventually end up in a drain is not a specific benefit to the property and the landowner may not be assessed for the construction project costs based upon the natural drainage of his land.” Appellant’s Reply/Response to Amicus Curiae Br. 5. Crowel’s reliance on Hubenthal is misplaced for several reasons.

In Hubenthal, assessments were levied for the cleaning and repair of a ditch extending through several counties. 239 Ind. at 647-48, 159 N.E.2d at 851. All affected lands were divided into four watershed areas and “the assessment per acre was arrived at ... by first estimating the cost of an arbitrary segment of ditch which laid within a watershed area and then dividing the number of acres in the watershed area into said estimated cost.” Id. at 649, 159 N.E.2d at 852. This assessment method was based “on the theory that all land in the watershed area was equally liable for the repair of the ditch, irrespective of the fact that ... high grounds would receive little benefit from the project as compared with the low lands affected.” Id. No effort had been made to determine the extent to which particular lands in the area were benefited. Id. This Court held that this method of assessment was inconsistent with the statutory requirement that the assessments be apportioned to the benefits, id. at 651-52, 159 N.E.2d at 853, but we did not hold that the lands on the high end of the watershed received no benefit at all. Thus, although Hubenthal may support Crowel’s argument that the Board erred in the manner by which it established the schedule of assessments, which we address in Part II, infra, it does not support his argument that his property should be free from any assessment.

Moreover, other decisions from this Court cut against Crowel’s reasoning. For instance, in Culbertson we rejected the appellants’ contention that their lands were not benefited because they were sufficiently drained through artificial ditches already in place and because they could not reach the proposed drain without crossing the lands of others. 152 Ind. at 124, 52 N.E. at 701. Similarly, in Hinesley the appellants contended that their lands were not benefited by a drainage project because prior to the project the drain had been a natural watercourse and, consequently, that they had the right to drain their surface water onto the lands of others. 175 Ind. at 13, 93 N.E. at 275. This Court held that “it does not follow as a matter of law that their lands are not benefited by, and cannot be assessed for, the improvement.” Id. at 14, 93 N.E. at 275; see also Sharp v. Eaton, 175 Ind. 441, 446, 94 N.E. 753, 755 (1911) (“The fact that the lands of appellants were sufficiently drained under the existing conditions does not require the conclusion, as a matter of law, that they would not be so benefited as to justify assessments to aid in the construction of the drain.”); cf. Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 109, 22 N.E. 782, 786 (1889) (“The assessment is laid upon the land benefited, and not merely upon the land actually drained, for the benefit may extend beyond the specific parcel which is reclaimed.” (citation omitted)).

But most fatal to Crowel’s reliance on Hubenthal is that it was decided under a different statute. The principles set out in our decisions applying prior statutes may or may not be relevant under the current statute. For example, in Lipes we articulated the special-benefits rule and attempted to set out what types of benefits were special, rather than general, because the statute at issue was broadly worded and provided no guidance as to what the Legislature intended to be considered a benefit for purposes of apportioning assessments. 104 Ind. at 506-08, 1 N.E. at 873-74. But suppose the Legislature subsequently enacted a statute that provided guidance on how to determine benefits that was in some way inconsistent with the rules in Lipes—in such a case, it would be indefensible to claim that Lipes should apply rather than the statute. In light of this, we proceed to consider the applicable statutes.

B

In applying a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. E.g., George v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 945 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind.2011); City of Carmel v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 883 N.E.2d 781, 784-86 (Ind.2008). The best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, e.g., State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind.2008), and where the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as drafted without resort to the nuanced principles of statutory interpretation, e.g., City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg’l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ind.2005).

Section 50 of the Drainage Law requires that assessments for the reconstruction of a regulated drain be apportioned to the benefits accruing to each parcel of land, and it provides that “[t]he board may consider the factors listed in section 112 of this chapter in preparing the schedules.” I.C. § 36-9-27-50. Section 112, in turn, provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) In determining benefits to land under section[ ] ... 50 ... of this chapter, the board may consider:
(1) the watershed affected by the drain to be constructed, reconstructed, or maintained;
(2) the number of acres in each tract;
(3) the total volume of water draining into or through the drain to be constructed, reconstructed, or maintained, and the amount of water contributed by each land owner;
(4) the land use;
(5) the increased value accruing to each tract of land from the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance;
(6) whether the various tracts are adjacent, upland, upstream, or downstream in relation to the main trunk of the drain;
(7) elimination or reduction of damage from floods;
(8) the soil type; and
(9) any other factors affecting the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance.

I.C. § 36-9-27-112(a).

The statute contemplates that a parcel of land at the high end of a watershed that has adequate drainage due to natural surface-water runoff can be benefited by the reconstruction of a regulated drain at the lower end of the watershed. The first factor in subsection 112(a) that a drainage board may consider is “the watershed affected by the drain to be ... reconstructed.” I.C. § 36-9-27-112(a)(l). A drainage board may also consider “the total volume of water draining into or through the drain to be ... reconstructed ..., and the amount of water contributed by each land owner.” I.C. § 36-9-27-112(a)(3). It is true that subsection (a) provides a list of factors that a drainage board may consider and thus is not mandatory, but the fact that the Legislature included these criteria on the list expresses its understanding that all property in a watershed is benefited when a drain serving that area is reconstructed, as well as its intent to spread the assessment across all of those benefited properties. To be sure, the statutes clearly require the assessments to be apportioned to the benefit, I.C. §§ 36-9-27-50, -84(a), and it may be that certain areas of the watershed receive less benefit than others. But this means only that those lands would be assessed a lower amount, and here we are concerned only with whether they may be assessed at all.

This understanding of subsection 112(a) is fortified by other provisions of the Drainage Law. Recall that county drainage boards have jurisdiction over all regulated drains in their respective counties, unless otherwise provided. I.C. § 36-9-27-15. But they do not have jurisdiction over private drains and mutual drains, because the Drainage Law does not apply to such drains. I.C. § 36-9-27-16(a). Subsection 16(b), however, explicitly provides that “[ljand drained by a private or mutual drain is subject to assessment for the ... reconstruction ... of a regulated drain if the land is also drained by the regulated drain.” I.C. § 36-9-27-16(b) (emphasis added).

Additionally, the statutory provision applicable to “urban drains” requires that “in determining benéfits and assessments for an urban drain ... [t]he watershed, or entire land area drained or affected by the urban drain, shall be considered to be benefited and shall be assessed.” I.C. § 36-9—27—69(b)(1). The Board in this case purported to classify Arm # 7 as an urban drain, so Crowel’s land “shall be considered to be benefited” because it drains into Arm # 7. But aside from the purported urban-drain status of Arm # 7, we think this provision indicates that the general rule applicable throughout the Drainage Law is that all land that drains into a regulated drain is benefited by the drain’s reconstruction. It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature explicitly provided that all land draining into an urban drain is benefited in an effort to avoid confusion over the inevitable scenario in which an owner of rural land would claim that his land would not be benefited by an urban drain because it is not urban land. And we can think of no justifiable reason why the Legislature would assess all those who drain into an urban drain while not doing the same for nonurban drains.

We conclude that the applicable statutes permit a drainage board to conclude that all landowners whose surface water flows into a regulated drain are benefited by the reconstruction of that drain, though some parcels may receive greater benefits than others (and should therefore be assessed accordingly).

C

The majority in the Court of Appeals also relied on Hubenthal but offered a more refined argument than Crowel. The lynchpin of the court’s argument was the following passage:

In the apportionment of benefits, the viewers may not limit their consideration to the legal liability, which the law imposes generally upon the landowners of a watershed area by reason of indirect benefits which they receive from the drain, but they must also consider the fact that the owners of the higher land have a right to the natural drainage of their land and that the owners of the low lands must assume this burden different from their better situated neighbors. And further, that although the owners of the higher lands are chargeable for the additional burden caused by their artificial drainage, owners of the low lands must also be charged according to the benefits which they receive from the increased artificial drainage which the ditch provides.

Hubenthal, 239 Ind. at 651, 159 N.E.2d at 853 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The majority reasoned that this passage “is a corollary to Indiana’s common law ‘common enemy doctrine’ of surface water diversion.” Crowel, 951 N.E.2d at 297 (citation omitted). According to the majority, a landowner at the higher end of the watershed has a right to natural surface-water drainage that burdens lower lands, and the trial court erred in failing to consider “Crowel’s right to the natural drainage of his land in upholding the Drainage Board’s assessment.” Id. “Although it may be inconsistent with the concept of being a ‘good neighbor,’ or a more laudable and generalized concept of the common good,” the majority reasoned, “under the common enemy doctrine, Crow-el is entitled to the additional, natural drainage of surface water afforded his land due to its location on the high end of the watershed, and he is not liable to his neighbors for any damage to their property resulting from that drainage.” Id. at 298 (citation omitted). While this reasoning is fairly supported by the language in Hubenthal, a closer examination reveals that the common-enemy doctrine supports attributing a benefit to Crowel’s land.

The common-enemy doctrine is one of three general rules adopted by American courts to deal with the draining of surface waters, the other two being the “civil law rule” and the “reasonable use rule.” E.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4, 8-10 (1956) (Brennan, J.). In its purest form it provides that surface water is a common enemy and, as such, every landowner “has an unlimited and unrestricted legal privilege to deal with the surface water on his [or her] land as he [or she] pleases, regardless of the harm which he [or she] may thereby cause to others.” Stanley V. Kinyon & Robert C. McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891, 898 (1940); e.g., Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167, 173-74, 176 (1878); Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. 106, 10 Allen 106, 109-10 (1865); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 145-48 (1881). In contrast, the civil-law rule “is that a person who interferes with the natural flow of surface waters so as to cause an invasion of another’s interests in the use and enjoyment of his [or her] land is subject to liability to the other.” Kinyon & McClure, supra, at 893 (emphasis in original); e.g., Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala. 277, 282-83 (1882); Ambrosio v. Perl-Mack Constr. Co., 143 Colo. 49, 351 P.2d 803, 805 (1960) (en banc) (per curiam). Settled between these two extremes is the reasonable-use rule, under which a landowner does not have an unqualified privilege “to deal with surface water as he [or she] pleases, nor is he [or she] absolutely prohibited from interfering with the natural flow of surface waters to the detriment of others,” Kinyon & McClure, supra, at 904; rather, each landowner “is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his ■ [or her] land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others,” and he or she “incurs liability only when his [or her] harmful interference with the flow of surface water is unreasonable, id. See Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577-79 (1862) (adopting reasonable-use rule in context of percolating ground water); see also Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 443-46 (1870) (extending Bas-sett rule to surface water); accord Armstrong, 120 A.2d at 10.

The logic employed by the Court of Appeals and the language in Hubenthal reflect not the common-enemy rule but the civil-law rule. In essence, the majority held that Crowel’s land at the high end of the watershed is not benefited because, as the dominant estate holder, he has a natural easement or servitude for the natural drainage of his lands over lower, servient lands. Cf. Nininger, 72 Ala. at 282-83 (“The doctrine of the civil law is, that the owner of the upper or dominant estate has a natural easement or servitude in the lower or servient one, to discharge all waters falling or accumulating upon his land, which is higher, upon or over the land of the servient owner....”).

But Indiana follows a modified version of the common-enemy rule, not the civil-law rule. Our case law provides “that surface water which does not flow in defined channels is a common enemy and that each landowner may deal with it in such manner as best suits his [or her] own convenience. Such sanctioned dealings include walling it out, walling it in[,] and diverting or accelerating its flow by any means whatever.” Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ind.1982) (emphasis added); accord Pflum v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 892 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Ind.Ct.App.2008); Bulldog Battery Corp. v. Pica Invs., Inc., 736 N.E.2d 333, 339 (Ind.Ct.App.2000); Pickett v. Brown, 569 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. That said, our common-enemy rule does not allow a landowner to “collect or concentrate surface water and cast it, in a body, upon his [or her] neighbor.” Argyelan, 435 N.E.2d at 976 (citations omitted).

It is true that under Indiana law, the owner of higher lands is not liable for flooding of lower lands caused by natural surface-water drainage from his or her land. Thus, the reconstruction of Arm # 7 will not affect Crowel’s liability to his lower-lying neighbors because he has none— there is no evidence that he has collected or concentrated surface water and cast it upon his neighbors. But this does not mean, ipso facto, that he receives no benefit from the reconstruction project, for it is also true that, under the common-enemy rule, his lower-lying neighbors have the right to protect their lands from the flooding caused by his natural drainage—for example, by damming his water out or by changing the grades of their lands. Id. at 975; Crowel, 951 N.E.2d at 300 (Vaidik, J., dissenting). The reconstruction project aims to alleviate flooding caused in part by Crowel’s drainage and by doing so it decreases the. chance that the owners of the flooded lands will take matters into their own hands and engage Crowel in a water war. As Judge Vaidik wrote, “[t]he avoidance of a future water war with his neighbors is also a benefit, albeit an indirect one, to Crowel’s land.” 951 N.E.2d at 300; cf. Culbertson, 152 Ind. at 125, 52 N.E. at 702 (“Appellants’ position, that the viewers could only look at conditions as they existed at the time, is unsound. They could consider that the owners of intervening lands had the right to fight ‘the common enemy’....”).

It may be that one of the ancillary aims of the Drainage Law is to allow for a public solution that avoids the chaos potentially resulting from widespread water wars among neighbors. After all, it is a public law enacted under the State’s police power, e.g., Gifford Drainage Dist. v. Shroer, 145 Ind. 572, 573, 44 N.E. 636, 636 (1896), that “was designed to establish a joint enterprise to solve the common enemy of surface water problems,” Crowel, 951 N.E.2d at 300 (Vaidik, J., dissenting). See also Zigler, 121 Ind. at 102, 22 N.E. at 783 (“The Legislature has declared that the drainage of wet lands is a matter of public benefit....”).

D

We hold that Indiana law allows a drainage board to assess a benefit to a tract of land based solely on the fact that surface water from that land flows into the regulated drain for which the assessment is levied. As a result, the trial court’s order—which found that the Board’s decision to attribute a benefit to Crowel on this basis was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful, and was supported by substantial evidence—was not erroneous.

II

Crowel’s second general claim is that the manner in which the Board developed the schedule of assessments is arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, and not supported by substantial evidence. The Board classified the lands in the watershed as “agricultural,” “residential,” or “commercial,” and assessed agricultural lands at a base rate, residential lands at double the agricultural rate, and commercial lands at triple the agricultural rate. Crowel argues that this quasi-uniform per-acre assessment is similar to the assessment schedules invalidated in Hubenthal, 239 Ind. 646, 159 N.E.2d 850, and Whitley, Noble & Allen Joint Drainage Board v. Tschantz, 461 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), because although the Board employed a tiered rate structure there is a uniform per-acre assessment within the agricultural tier.

Hubenthal and Tschantz stand for the incontrovertible proposition that when a statute requires apportionment of assessments to benefits, assessments levied without considering benefits are invalid. For instance, in Hubenthal the Court explained:

In this case the assessment per acre was arrived at initially by the surveyor and viewers and finally by the court by first estimating the cost of an arbitrary segment of ditch which laid within a watershed area and then dividing the number of acres in the watershed area into said estimated cost. The extent to which the particular land would or would not be benefited as compared with other land in the area was not considered in establishing the particular assessment.

239 Ind. at 649, 159 N.E.2d at 852 (emphasis added); see also id. at 650, 159 N.E.2d at 852 (testimony of a viewer admitting that assessments were levied without eon-sidering benefits). This was in clear contravention of the statutory mandate “that the costs of ... repair of drains shall be apportioned according to the benefits derived therefrom.” Id. at 651, 159 N.E.2d at 853 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, in Whitley the drainage board approved a project to clear a large river and levied a uniform per-acre assessment upon all lands within the watershed. 461 N.E.2d at 1147. In doing so, it had not considered the benefits accruing to each parcel but instead had adopted the assessment schedule “on the theory that because every acre of land which drains into the river contributes to the drainage problem, all must equally pay for the maintenance of the river.” Id. at 1147-48. Applying Hubenthal, the court concluded that the assessment was improper because the board had failed to consider the benefits accruing to each parcel of land and thus had failed to comply with the mandate of the statute. Id. at 1149.

But uniform per-acre assessments are not per se invalid. Schrader v. Porter Cnty. Drainage Bd., 880 N.E.2d 304 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied; Clouse v. Noble Cnty. Drainage Bd., 809 N.E.2d 849 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. In Clouse, the Court of Appeals held that a uniform per-acre maintenance assessment was not arbitrary as a matter of law. Id. at 864. The assessments had been established after both the surveyor and the drainage board had examined the land and considered the factors listed in subsection 112(a), and because they had “considered the benefits to the tracts of land, Hubenthal and Whitley [were] inap-posite.” Id. Writing for the court, Judge Najam explained that, “[i]n a watershed system, drainage within the watershed does not respect property lines, and a pro-ration of benefits and assessments based on acreage is not unreasonable, provided that the benefits have been considered.” Id. In Schrader, a different panel applied Judge Najam’s reasoning and upheld another uniform per-acre maintenance assessment. 880 N.E.2d at 311. Prior to establishing the flat rate, the surveyor had “toured the area, used topographical maps, and studied aerial photographs in considering the individual benefits.” Id.; cf. I.C. § 36-9-27-112(b) (“In determining benefits ... to land ... the board may examine aerial photographs and topographical or other maps, and may adjourn the hearing to the site of the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance in order to personally view the affected land.”). And “[t]he record [was] devoid of any evidence that the Drainage Board’s imposition of the flat rate assessment was arbitrary or capricious.” Schrader, 880 N.E.2d at 311.

We think the present case is more analogous to Clouse and Schrader than it is to Hubenthal and Whitley. The record demonstrates that the Board considered several of the benefit factors listed in subsection 112(a) in arriving at its schedule of assessments. Again, subsection 112(a) provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) In determining benefits to land under section[ ] ... 50 ... of this chapter, the board may consider:
(1) the watershed affected by the drain to be constructed, reconstructed, or maintained;
(2) the number of acres in each tract;
(3) the total volume of water draining into or through the drain to be constructed, reconstructed, or maintained, and the amount of water con tributed by each land owner;
(4) the land use;
(5) the increased value accruing to each tract of land from the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance;
(6) whether the various tracts are adjacent, upland, upstream, or downstream in relation to the main trunk of the drain;
(7) elimination or reduction of damage from floods;
(8) the soil type; and
(9) any other factors affecting the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance.

I.C. § 36-9-27-112(a) (emphases added). The Board established a three-tiered assessment schedule based on the lands’ usage, with agricultural lands assessed at a base rate of approximately $300 per acre, residential lands assessed at double the agricultural rate, and commercial lands at triple the agricultural rate. The trial court found that the lowlands experiencing flooding were “primarily residential” and that the agricultural lands, including Crowel’s land, contributed to the flooding issues due to their location at the high end of the watershed. It also found that the evidence before the Board at the public hearing included “detailed maps of the watershed area” along with “profile and elevation studies.” Additionally, when asked by Crowel’s counsel about the manner in which the assessments had been established, Surveyor Fisher testified at the public hearing that he and the Board “look[ed] at the watershed and the use of the watershed,” “lookfed] at the potential for runoff,” and “determine[d] what the total watershed [was].” Ex. A, at 33-34. Thus, like in Clouse and Schrader, and unlike in Hubenthal and Whitley, the Board here arrived at its three-tiered uniform per-acre assessment after examining various scientific data and considering the benefits to each tract. It would be a perverse result to invalidate a schedule of assessments that resulted from consideration of the benefit factors listed in subsection 112(a).

Ill

Crowel’s third claim is that, at the very least, the benefits attributed to his land are excessive and that, consequently, his assessment is excessive. But this claim is not available for review.

Affected landowners who are dissatisfied with a drainage board’s order may file a petition for judicial review “in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the board is located.” I.C. § 36-9-27-106. The procedure governing judicial review of drainage board decisions depends on the nature of the challenge. Section 107 provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) Whenever a petition for judicial review is filed on the ground that:
(1) the board found that the petitioner’s land would be benefited by the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of a drain, and the benefits assessed were excessive; or
(2) the petitioner’s lands would be damaged by the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of a drain, and:
(A) the board failed to so find; or
(B) the amount of damages awarded was inadequate;
the court shall proceed to hear the issue of benefits or damages de novo. A change of venue may be taken from the judge and from the county, and a jury trial may be obtained, in accordance with the rules governing the trial of civil actions. An appeal may be taken in accordance with the rules governing appellate procedure.
(b) Whenever a petition for judicial review is filed on any ground other than those set forth in subsection (a), the review shall be heard by the court without the intervention of a jury. The court may not try or determine the cause de novo, but shall consider and determine the cause exclusively upon the record made before the board and filed with the court. A change of venue may be taken from the judge under the rules governing a change of venue in civil actions, but a change of venue may not be taken from the county. The proceedings shall be advanced upon the docket of the court. If the court finds from the record before it that:
(1) the person filing the petition for review has complied with all procedures required under this chapter to properly present the matters set forth in the petition for review, and has exhausted his administrative remedies; and
(2) the decision or determination of the board is arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence;
the court shall order the decision or determination of the board set aside and shall remand the matter to the board for further proceedings consistent with the findings and order of the court. If the court finds otherwise, the decision of the board shall be affirmed.
(c)....
(d)....

I.C. § 36-9-27-107.

It is clear that the statute provides two tracks for judicial review of drainage board decisions. If a petitioner claims that the benefits attributed to his or her land are excessive or that the Board erred in attributing damages, he or she must proceed under subsection (a). I.C. § 36-9-27-107(a). In a subsection (a) proceeding, the trial court or a jury considers evidence and determines whether, as a matter of fact, the benefits attributed to the petitioner’s property are excessive. Id. A finding that the benefits are excessive as to the petitioner does not alter the validity of the project overall, which is illustrated by the fact that the trial court cannot stay work on the project under a subsection (a) proceeding, though the drainage board may elect to do so. I.C. § 36-9-27-108(b). In essence, a subsection (a) challenge is an as-applied challenge.

On the other hand, subsection (b) proceedings do not concern the individual plight of the petitioner so much as they concern whether the drainage board complied with the requirements of the statute. I.C. § 36-9-27-107(b). They are decided solely on the record developed before the drainage board—the trial court does not hear any evidence but simply examines the record, much like an appellate court does. Id. A subsection (b) proceeding stays any work on the project until the challenged issues are resolved by the judiciary. I.C. § 36-9-27-108(a). If the courts determine that the drainage board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence, the cause must be remanded to the drainage board for further proceedings and no portion of the project stands. I.C. § 36-9-27-107(b). In essence, a subsection (b) challenge is a facial challenge.

The Board and Crowel agreed that this petition was brought under subsection (b), and the trial court entered an order to that effect. The trial court did not hear any evidence and decided the matter solely on the record before the Board and counsels’ oral arguments. The extent to which property is benefited is a question of fact to be decided by the Board in the first instance. E.g., Hinesley, 175 Ind. at 14-15, 93 N.E. at 276; cf. Culbertson, 152 Ind. at 126, 52 N.E. at 702 (“The burden of proof, that their lands were not benefited by the proposed drain, rests upon the appellants (remonstrators).” (citation omitted)). Because Crowel did not seek de novo review in the trial court under subsection 107(a), the Board’s decision is conclusive and not susceptible to attack on appeal.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Marshall County Drainage Board’s order and assessment schedule.

DICKSON, C.J., and RUCKER, DAVID, and MASSA, JJ., concur.

      . A "regulated drain” is "an open drain, a tiled drain, or a combination of the two.” I.C. § 36-9-27-2. An "open drain” is "a natural or artificial open channel that: (1) carries surplus water; and (2) was established under or made subject to any drainage statute.” Id. And a "tiled drain” is "a tiled channel that: (1) carries surplus water; and (2) was established under or made subject to any drainage statute.” Id.

      . A "watershed” is "an area of land from which all runoff water drains to a given point or that is affected by a.small lake.” I.C. § 36-9-27-2.

      . Amicus counsel Bryan H. Babb argued the cause in this Court on behalf of both amicus and the Board.

      . Section 50 provides in relevant part that upon receipt of the surveyor’s reconstruction report the board and the surveyor shall consult and then the board shall
      [p]repare a schedule of assessments containing a description of each tract of land determined to be benefited by the reconstruction .... The board shall enter in the assessment schedule the percentage of the total cost of the reconstruction to be assessed against each tract of land, with the percentage to be based upon the benefit accruing to the land from the reconstruction. The percentage allocated to all lands benefited must be at least one hundred percent (100%) and as near to one hundred percent (100%) as is practicable.
      I.C. § 36-9-27-50(1).

      . Of historical note, drainage statutes date back almost 600 years (if not longer) to the time of King Henry VI. See Commissions of Sewers, 1427, 6 Hen. 6, c. 5; see also Isle of Ely’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (C.P.); 10 Co. Rep. 141 a (Coke, C.J.) (holding that assessments for sewer improvement were to be apportioned to benefits).

      . Crowd attempts to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved artificial drainage rather than natural drainage. We address this argument in footnote 8, infra.

      . We say “purported” because the record does not reveal whether all of the urban-drain requirements were met. For instance, neither the prehearing notice nor the final order expressly labeled Arm # 7 as an urban drain. I.C. § 36-9-27-69(c)(Z), (d). Additionally, although the assessments differ depending on whether the land is "agricultural,” "residential,” or "commercial,” there is no evidence that the assessed properties were determined to be either "urban” or "rural,” I.C. §§ 36-9-27-68(6), -69(c)(3), as those terms are defined in the statute, I.C. § 36-9-27-2. Cf. I.C. § 36—9—27—69(b)(3) ("Except for urban land that has extra benefits, all urban land within the watershed shall be considered to be equally benefited, and the benefits shall be computed in proportion to the number of acres in each tract.”). Crowel does not challenge the Board’s order on any of these grounds. In point of fact, Arm # 7’s purported status as an urban drain and the urban-drain statutes were not mentioned by Crowel, the Board, amicus, the trial court, or the Court of Appeals.

      . The fact that Culbertson involved artificial drainage instead of natural drainage is immaterial because owners of lowlands have the right to combat all surface water. To be sure, the amount of benefit arguably differs between the two circumstances because, where artificial drainage is involved, the owner of the highland will receive a benefit from reducing his or her liability to the owners of the lowlands, in addition to the benefit of avoiding water wars.

      . The Board contends that Crowel waived this issue by raising it for the first time in his motion to correct errors, citing Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind.2000). Among the claims listed in Crowel’s petition for judicial review is a claim "that the Respondent’s Order/Determination is not based upon the benefits that would allegedly accrue to each tract of land.” Appellant’s App. 54. Almost all of his counsel’s argument during the hearing in the trial court was based on the contention that Crowel's land is not benefited at all. But there was one cursory reference to the method of assessment: "Clearly, Mr. Crowell [sic] will receive no benefit from this project. Furthermore, according to Indiana Case Law, merely being a land owner with surface drainage is not sufficient to support a uniform per acre assessment..:.” Tr. 6 (citing Hubenthal, 239 Ind. 646, 159 N.E.2d 850; Whitley, Noble & Allen Joint Drainage Bd. v. Tschantz, 461 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.Ct.App.1984)). Though we doubt that this conclusory argument would be sufficient to preserve an issue in an ordinary case, we decline to find waiver in this instance because the argument in the motion to correct errors to which the Board objects is almost identical to the one raised at oral argument before the trial court.

      . It is of no significance that Hubenthal and Whitley were repair or reconstruction cases, whereas Clouse and Schrader were maintenance cases. Similar to section 50, section 39 requires that maintenance assessments be apportioned to the benefits accruing to each tract of land from the maintenance project, and it cross-references section 112. I.C. § 36-9-27-39.

      . A petitioner may also institute proceedings under both subsections (a) and (b), and such hybrid proceedings are governed by subsection (d).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Dalmas Maurice Otieno ANYANGO and Jane Tinna Agola Otieno, as Natural Parents and Next of Kin of Isaiah Omondi Otieno, Deceased, Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORPORATION, Honeywell International Inc., and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., Appellees (Defendants below).
    No. 49S04-1207-CT-434.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    July 30, 2012.

      Gary C. Robb, Kansas City, MO, Roy T. Tabor, Susan W. Rempert, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
    Edward R. Moor, Thomas H. Neuck-ranz, Howard Huntington, James Beal, Chicago, IL, Debra A. Mastrian, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
    Nicholas C. Pappas, Darren A. Craig, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee, Rolls-Royce Corporation.
    Steven E. Springer, Crystal G. Rowe, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee, Honeywell International Inc.
   SULLIVAN, Justice.

Parents of a young man killed in a bizarre helicopter accident in British Columbia appeal an Indiana trial court’s dismissal of their complaint in favor of the Canadian forum, arguing that their claim should be tried here because they would only be entitled to nominal damages under British Columbia law. Because we conclude that British Columbia provides an available and adequate forum under applicable law, and that the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

This appeal arises out of an almost unbelievable accident occurring on May 13, 2008, in British Columbia, Canada. On that day, 20-year-old Isaiah Omondi Otieno, a Kenyan citizen and student at the College of the Rockies in Cranbrook, British Columbia, was mailing a letter from Canada to his parents in Kenya when a helicopter flying overhead lost power. The helicopter crashed to the ground and killed Otieno along with the helicopter’s pilot and two passengers.

On March 3, 2010, Isaiah’s parents, Dal-mas Maurice Otieno Anyango and Jane Tinna Agola Otieno (collectively, the “Otie-nos”), sued Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., Rolls-Royce Corp., and Honeywell International Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”), in Marion County, Indiana, for the wrongful death of their son. The Defendants are connected to the helicopter as follows:

• The helicopter was manufactured in Texas in 1974 by Bell Helicopter.
• The helicopter engine was manufactured in Indiana by the Allison Division of General Motors, which sold its assets to a company that was later purchased by Rolls-Royce.
• The helicopter’s engine components were designed at Honeywell’s facility in Indiana and then manufactured in North Carolina.

The Otienos sought to recover on theories of strict liability and negligence based on the design and manufacture of the helicopter engine and engine component parts and on the failure to certify and recommend safe and proper replacement parts. Subsequently, representatives of the three other people killed in the accident sued the Defendants and others in British Columbia on similar theories.

In June, 2010, the Defendants filed both a motion to dismiss the Otienos’ lawsuit pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(C) on the ground of forum non conveniens— that Indiana was an “inconvenient forum” compared to British Columbia—and a stipulation pursuant to Trial Rule 4.4(D) that they would (a) submit to the personal jurisdiction of and (b) waive any statute of limitations defenses in British Columbia. After considering the evidence and the written and oral arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in favor of British Columbia as the more convenient forum.

The Otienos appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. Specifically, the Otienos challenged the trial court’s finding that British Columbia provided an adequate forum in which to pursue their cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. Anyango v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 953 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

The Otienos seek, and we now grant, transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Discussion

Trial Rule 4.4(C) governs the dismissal of litigation based on forum non conveniens:

Jurisdiction under this rule is subject to the power of the court to order the litigation to be held elsewhere under such reasonable conditions as the court in its discretion may determine to be just.
In the exercise of that discretion the court may appropriately consider such factors as:
(1) Amenability to personal jurisdiction in this state and in any alternative forum of the parties to the action;
(2) Convenience to the parties and witnesses of the trial in this state in any alternative forum;
(3) Differences in conflict of law rules applicable in this state and in the alternative forum; or
(4) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.

Ind. Trial Rule 4.4(C). The language of the rule itself entrusts this determination to the trial court and so our review of a trial court’s dismissal under this rule is limited to abuse of discretion. Freemond v. Somma, 611 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (citing Killearn Props., Inc. v. Lambright, 176 Ind.App. 684, 687, 377 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1978)), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion when it “arrives at a conclusion that is clearly against logic and the natural inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

Both the Defendants and the Otienos submitted rather extensive briefs and evidence to the trial court in support of their respective positions. The trial court also held a hearing on the Defendants’ motion. The Defendants argued that this case should be litigated in British Columbia because the events giving rise to the suit occurred there and a parallel suit is pending there. They listed several considerations related to the inconvenience of an Indiana forum: the witnesses are located in Canada; Canadian officials investigated the case and disassembled the engine and engine components at issue; the physical evidence is in Canada; witnesses knowledgeable about damages are located in Canada (or Kenya); obtaining testimony of witnesses, documents, and physical evidence would be limited by the procedures of international discovery; and the case would be governed by Canadian law. In response, the Otienos argued that the bulk of the evidence related to their product-liability action is in the United States (and in Indiana in particular) and that, if tried in Indiana, the case would not be governed by Canadian law. Moreover, using the language of Trial Rule 4.4(C), they argued that it would not be “just” to require them to litigate this case in British Columbia because their action would not be economically viable there. Specifically, they contended that under applicable British Columbia law, “no monetary compensation would be permitted other than recovery of burial or funeral expenses.” Pet. to Transfer i (Questions Presented on Transfer).

Judge Keele’s order granting the Defendants’ dismissal motion addressed each of the enumerated factors in Trial Rule 4.4(C) as follows:

4. The Defendants have agreed to submit to personal jurisdiction in British Columbia, Canada. See [Ind. Trial] Rule 4.4(C)(1). The Defendants have agreed to waive or toll any applicable Canadian statute of limitations in British Columbia, Canada until Plaintiffs have had reasonable opportunity to file their claims in British Columbia, Canada, not to exceed 120 days from the date of this ruling.
5. Many witnesses reside in British Columbia, Canada and are outside the subpoena power of this Court. Most, if not all, anticipated witnesses which are United States citizens are employees of the Defendants residing in various states within the United States. The Defendants have agreed to make these individuals available for litigation in British Columbia, Canada. On the whole, it would be more convenient, if not necessary, for the parties and witnesses for the claims to be pursued in British Columbia, Canada, rather than in Indiana. See [T.R.] 4.4(C)(2).
6. It is anticipated that the claims will be subject to the substantive law of British Columbia, Canada and not of Indiana. See Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798 (Ind.2004) [; T.R.] 4.4(C)(3).
7. There are substantial additional factors which weigh in favor of this matter being considered by a Canadian court rather than this Court in Indiana. See [T.R.] 4.4(C)(4)[.] These include:
(a) It is undisputed that the court system in British Columbia, Canada, is adequate and available to Plaintiffs.
(b) There is already litigation pending in British Columbia, Canada, regarding the helicopter crash which seeks compensation for families of the victims.
(c) Rulings and discovery orders by this Court may be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce as to persons outside this Court’s jurisdiction.
(d) It is anticipated that there will be significant problems in dealing with resolving the application of Canadian law.
(e) The majority of public interest factors favor resolution of this dispute by a court in British Columbia, Canada. Indiana has little, if any, public interest in the outcome of this litigation.
(f) A foreign citizen that chooses Indiana as a forum rather than his own nation is entitled to a substantially diminished presumption that Indiana is a convenient forum. McCracken v. Eli Lilly & Co., 494 N.E.2d 1289 [ (Ind.Ct.App.1986).]

Appellants’ App. 6-7.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Otienos challenged only the trial court’s finding in paragraph 7(a) above. Specifically, they took issue with the trial court’s locution that the availability and adequacy of the British Columbia court system was “undisputed.” They maintained that this was in dispute because they have “no adequate remedy in British Columbia.” Appellants’ Br. 6.

In their brief, the Otienos describe how “an esteemed practitioner in British Columbia ... has unequivocally explained that British Columbia provides Plaintiffs no economically adequate remedy.” Id. at 8 (citation omitted). They also submitted an affidavit from an Indiana lawyer providing her opinion that the Otienos’ wrongful death action would have “a significant seven figure value” here. Appellants’ App. 565. And they provide case citations from jurisdictions other than Indiana that they say support their contention that dismissal on the ground of forum, non conveniens should be denied when the remedy in the alternative forum is inadequate.

All of this is to say that the sole reason the Otienos contend that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied is because their wrongful-death action would have “a significant seven figure value” if litigated in Indiana, whereas it would have only nominal value if litigated in Canada.

In sum, this is not so much a debate over the availability or adequacy of the British Columbia courts as it is a debate over the substantive law that would govern the Otienos’ recovery in the event they were able to establish liability. And this is precisely what was at issue in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), still the leading United States Supreme Court case in this area of forum non conveniens law.

Piper Aircraft’s facts and procedural posture resemble this case. In short, several Scottish citizens and residents had been killed in the crash of a chartered airplane in Scotland. Id. at 238-39, 102 S.Ct. 252. Their estates filed a wrongful-death action in the United States against the company that manufactured the plane and the company that manufactured the plane’s propellers. Id. The plaintiffs’ explicit purpose in filing their lawsuit in the United States rather than in Scotland was that United States laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages were more favorable to their position than those of Scotland. Id. at 240, 102 S.Ct. 252. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that Scotland was the more convenient forum. Id. at 241, 102 S.Ct. 252. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that dismissal is automatically barred where the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the forum chosen by the plaintiff. Id. at 246, 102 S.Ct. 252.

This is, of course, essentially the rule that the Otienos ask us to adopt here. But the Supreme Court rejected this approach, concluding that dismissal could not be denied “merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen forum.” Id. at 247, 102 S.Ct. 252. It then went on to say—importantly for our purposes—that “[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.” Id.

The Court provided several reasons for its conclusion:

• An earlier decision of the Court, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 [67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055] (1947), “recognized that dismissal may not be barred solely because of the possibility of an unfavorable change in law.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249, 102 S.Ct. 252 (footnote omitted).
• “Under Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiffs chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice. If substantial weight were given to the possibility of an unfavorable change in law, however, dismissal might be barred even where trial in the chosen forum was plainly inconvenient.” Id. (internal footnote omitted).
• The “Court’s earlier forum non conve-niens decisions .... repeatedly emphasized the need to retain flexibility.... If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non con-veniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.” Id. at 249-50, 102 S.Ct. 252.
• “[I]f conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum non conve-niens doctrine would become virtually useless. Jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied .... Ordinarily, ... plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non con-veniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.” Id. at 250, 102 S.Ct. 252.
• If, whenever a “foreign plaintiff named an American manufacturer as defendant, a court could not dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conve-niens where dismissal might lead to an unfavorable change in law[,] ... American courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs, would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation into the United States would increase and further congest already crowded courts.” Id. at 251-52, 102 S.Ct. 252 (internal footnotes omitted).

The Otienos quote a passage from Piper Aircraft in their papers: “Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the ... court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.” Appellants’ Br. 8 (alteration in original) (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254, 102 S.Ct. 252). But the full quote from Piper Aircraft is as follows:

We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice. In these cases, however, the remedies that would be provided by the Scottish courts do not fall within this category. Although the relatives of the decedents may not be able to rely on a strict liability theory, and although their potential damages award may be smaller, there is no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly.

Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254-55, 102 S.Ct. 252 (emphasis in original) (internal footnote omitted). Far from being an expansive admonition against dismissal as the Otienos assert, the quotation is only a passing aside that a highly anomalous situation will permit (not require) the trial court to weigh the inadequacy of the remedy in the alternative forum. This point is made clear by the last sentence: even though Scottish law did not recognize strict liability in tort, only permitted wrongful-death actions when brought by a decedent’s relatives, and only allowed relatives to sue only for “ ‘loss of support and society,’ ” id. at 240, 102 S.Ct. 252 (footnote omitted), the Court specifically said that there was “no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly,” id. at 255, 102 S.Ct. 252.

Although not binding on us, we find the reasoning of Piper Aircraft highly persuasive and adopt it. And in fact, there is already Indiana authority on point. In McCracken v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 4.4(C) on the ground that the United Kingdom was a more convenient forum:

[A]lthough a potential products liability award to a plaintiff might be smaller in the United Kingdom and even though litigation there might be more expensive and more difficult, there appears no danger that the plaintiffs would be treated unfairly or be deprived of their remedy. Conversely stated, the present plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that the alternative forum is so inadequate or unsatisfactory that there is no remedy at all.

494 N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (citing Ledingham v. Parke-Davis Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 628 F.Supp. 1447, 1450 (E.D.N.Y.1986)). The Ledingham case in turn relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Piper Aircraft. In Ledingham, the trial court was asked to dismiss the plaintiffs lawsuit in favor of a Canadian forum. 628 F.Supp. at 1449. The court had evidence that Canada did not recognize a claim of strict products liability, did not permit representation of clients on a contingency-fee basis, and imposed an upper limit on the recovery of nonpecuniary general damages. Id. In ruling that these facts did not establish an “inadequate” forum, the court said:

Faced with similar considerations, the Supreme Court held that the possibility that the law of the alternative forum will be less favorable to the plaintiff, while a factor, is not sufficient, alone, to bar dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 247 [102 S.Ct. 252], The Court went on to state that:
[I]f the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.
Id. at 254 [102 S.Ct. 252]. See Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608, 613 (6th Cir.1984).
Thus, although plaintiffs potential damage award may be smaller in Canada, and although litigation there might be more expensive and more difficult, the Court finds that there is no danger that plaintiff will be deprived of a remedy or treated unfairly there. See Dowling, 727 F.2d at 615.... [T]he courts of Canada provide an adequate alternative forum for this litigation....

Ledingham, 628 F.Supp. at 1449-50 (first and last alteration added). See also Donald J. Carney, Forum Non Conveniens in the United States and Canada, 3 Buff. J. Inf 1 L. 117, 133-135 (1996) (discussing Ledingham). Based on these authorities, we hold that a forum is “adequate” for purposes of Trial Rule 4.4(C) so long as the parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly.

As noted above, the Otienos have supplied us with nine case citations from jurisdictions other than Indiana that they say support their contention that dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens should be denied when the remedy in the alternative forum is inadequate. We have reviewed these cases and they do not change our view.

Of the nine cases cited, five of them do not address the point the Otienos make here—that dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens should be denied because the remedy in the alternative forum is inadequate. Rather, each of them stands for the proposition that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens where there was a material practical impediment (and not, to repeat, an inadequate remedy) to the nonmoving party litigating the claim in the alternate forum. We set forth these cases and their respective practical impediments in the margin.

Two of the nine cases cited by the Otie-nos combine a number of practical impediments with the adequacy of recovery as reasons for denying a dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens. In Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd,., the court listed the plaintiffs argument (disputed by the defendant) that recoveries in the Cayman Islands for wrongful death generally do not exceed $5,000. 713 F.2d 339, 346 (8th Cir.1983). But the court also listed several practical considerations—no contingent fees in the Cayman Islands; no resources on the part of the plaintiff to pay a retainer; absence of jury trial; requirement that the plaintiff post $1,000 bond, id. at 345-46—as limiting the plaintiffs “ability as a practical matter to bring suit in the alternative forum,” id. at 346 (citations omitted). To our issue, the court said “a plaintiffs showing of less favorable substantive law in the alternative forum is not to be given conclusive or even substantial weight in a forum non conveniens determination.” Id. (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 247, 102 S.Ct. 252).

In Macedo v. Boeing Co., the court considered that punitive damages were not recoverable and that strict liability was not recognized in the alternative forum. 693 F.2d 683, 687-88 (7th Cir.1982). But like the court in Lehman, the court gave most of its attention to practical concerns— plaintiffs in Portugal were required to pay substantial fees in advance; attorneys in Portugal were not permitted to accept a case on a contingent-fee arrangement; and the plaintiffs would be required to obtain translations for a very considerable amount of documentary proof. Id. at 690. The court found the alternative forum adequate: “The Supreme Court has told us that the absence of a strict liability principle and the probability of smaller damages do not make the remedy available in a foreign court inadequate.” Id. at 688 (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255, 102 S.Ct. 252).

One of the nine cases, Zions First National Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 520 (6th Cir.2010), is cited by the Otienos merely for the general proposition that dismissal under forum non conveniens is proper when there is an adequate alternative forum and the factors outlined in Gilbert point in favor of dismissal.

This brings us to the final case cited by the Otienos, Turgeon v. Naparstek, a Massachusetts trial court decision (this is not an appellate decision) in which Massachusetts residents injured in an automobile accident in Quebec opposed the defendants’ request that the court dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conve-niens. Nos. 96-6357, 96-6570, 1999 WL 1335524, 1999 Mass.Super. LEXIS 24 (Mass.Super.Ct. Jan. 19, 1999). The court concluded that

because Quebec law does not recognize common law automobile negligence actions and limits compensation to a statutory cap, plaintiffs could not bring an action for the remedy they seek in Quebec. Where the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the best interests of justice. Although plaintiffs received benefits under Quebec’s no-fault system, the scope of relief available under Massachusetts law is greater.

Id. at *4, 1999 Mass.Super. LEXIS 24 at *11-12 (internal citations omitted).

To the extent that Turgeon stands for the proposition that the adequacy of an alternative forum requires “the scope of relief available” to be at least as great as in Massachusetts, we decline to adopt such a rule here. We believe Piper Aircraft states the better rule.

Applying the standard we adopted, supra, we affirm the trial court’s finding that British Columbia is an “adequate” forum. British Columbia law allows the Otienos to pursue their wrongful-death cause of action and, as they admit, to recover some substantive damages, although we acknowledge that they may be nominal in value. There appears no danger that the Otienos would be treated unfairly or be deprived of their remedy. See McCracken, 494 N.E.2d at 1293.

The Otienos do not dispute any of the other findings of the trial court, so we dispense with the balancing of public and private interests at stake that is customary in a forum non conveniens determination. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 & n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 252 (identifying factors outlined in Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839).

In Gilbert, Justice Jackson wrote of forum non conveniens:

Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one’s own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.

330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839 (footnote omitted). Similarly, our Trial Rule 4.4(C) wisely entrusts the forum non conveniens decision to the trial court “under such reasonable conditions as the court in its discretion may determine to be just.” We find no basis for questioning the trial judge’s exercise of discretion here in granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Rather, it is overwhelmingly clear from his order that Judge Keele did exactly what Trial Rule 4.4(C) required of him.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

DICKSON, C.J., and RUCKER, DAVID, and MASSA, JJ., concur.

      . Forum non conveniens is defined as "[t]he doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the law—may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first place.” Black’s Law Dictionary 726 (9th ed. 2009).

      . We note language in most decisions of the Court of Appeals applying Trial Rule 4.4(C) to the effect that "[t]he purpose of [the rule] is to permit a case to be litigated in another [forum] upon a showing that litigation in Indiana is so inconvenient that substantial injustice is likely to result.” Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Recticel Foam Corp. 716 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Freemond, 611 N.E.2d at 691), trans. denied. This language appears to date to Killeam Properties, when it appeared with a citation to "1 Harvey, Indiana Practice. Author's Comments 4.4(C) p. 313." 176 Ind.App. at 687, 377 N.E.2d at 419. It would conflict with the explicit discretionary authority granted to the trial court in Trial Rule 4.4(C) if a motion to dismiss could not be granted unless it was clear that litigation in Indiana would be so inconvenient that "substantial injustice” would be likely to result.

      . Of course, the Otienos’ aversion to British Columbia law is only a relevant consideration here if the Otienos’ claims would be governed by different law in an Indiana court than in the Canadian forum. Said differently, given the Otienos’ analysis of Canadian law, it would do them no good to litigate in Indiana if Canadian law were to govern the proceedings here. For their part, the Defendants point to the fact that Judge Keele "anticipated that the claims will be subject to the substantive law of British Columbia, Canada and not of Indiana,” a conclusion that the Court of Appeals specifically affirmed, Anyango, 953 N.E.2d at 1151. There is a temptation— which we resist—to decide the choice-of-law question because it would be dispositive if we were to come to the same conclusion as our colleagues on the trial court and Court of Appeals.

      . In making this point, the Court also appropriately said that while “the possibility of a change in law unfavorable to the plaintiff should not be given substantial weight, we also necessarily hold that the possibility of a change in law favorable to defendant should not be considered.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 252.

      . Piper Aircraft did not purport to announce a rule of federal constitutional law, and the Supreme Court subsequently referred to forum non conveniens as a "common-law” doctrine. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (citing Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994)). In any event, the Supreme Court noted that, in its forum non conveniens decisions, the state law of forum non conve-niens dismissals had been "virtually identical to federal law.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 248 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 252.

        . See Manu Int'l S.A. v. Avon Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir.1981) (reversing trial court’s dismissal where witnesses were already in plaintiffs chosen forum or could as easily be brought there as to Taiwan; translation problems were much more serious in Taiwan; plaintiffs "as a practical matter" would not go "to Taiwan, hire counsel there, and then try, without compulsory process, to get witnesses to go there from England, New York, and Belgium”); Thomson v. Palmieri, 355 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir.1966) (upholding denial of dismissal where "[t]he central question [was] one of convenience, and_plain-tiff ... [said] that it could not afford to bring the matter elsewhere”); McKrell v. Penta Hotels (France), S.A., 703 F.Supp. 13, 14-15 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff lacked financial ability to litigate claim in France because she owed $10,000 in medical bills which she was unable to pay, her health insurance would expire soon, and she had assets of under $50); Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 528 F.Supp. 809, 818 (E.D.Va.1981) (denying motion to dismiss where attorneys in England were not permitted to accept a case on a contingent-fee arrangement; plaintiffs lacked sufficient funds to pursue actions in England and were unable to obtain legal aid), aff'd, 715 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.1983), disapproved on other grounds, Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988); Fiorenza v. U.S. Steel Int’l, Ltd., 311 F.Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (denying motion to dismiss where attorneys in Bahamas were not permitted to accept a case on a contingent-fee arrangement and plaintiff could not prepay a retainer; plaintiff had no source of income, was unable to work, and was living with his brother who supported him).

      . The plaintiff in Hodson, discussed in footnote 6, supra, argued against dismissal in part because the remedy available in England was inadequate and uncertain, although it did not specify in what way it was inadequate. 528 F.Supp. at 817. The court dealt with this argument in a footnote, giving "little weight to the plaintiffs' assertions that the remedy available in England is uncertain,” because the defendants had agreed to pay any judgment rendered against them in an English court and Virginia choice-of-law rules dictated that the substantive law of England would be applied to determine the remedy if heard in Virginia. Id. at 819 n. 8.


author: SULLIVAN, Justice,

text:
    James KINDRED, et al., Appellants, v. Betty TOWNSEND, et al., Appellees.
    No. 60A04-1101-PL-42.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    July 31, 2012.
   PUBLISHED ORDER DENYING TRANSFER

This matter has come before the Indiana Supreme Court on a petition to transfer jurisdiction, filed pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rules 56(B) and 57, following the issuance of a decision by the Court of Appeals. The Court has reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The submitted record on appeal, all briefs that were filed in the Court of Appeals, and all materials filed in connection with the request to transfer jurisdiction have been made available to the Court for review. Each participating member has had the opportunity to voice that Justice’s views on the case in conference with the other Justices, and each participating member of the Court has voted on the petition.

Being duly advised, the Court now DENIES the petition to transfer jurisdiction.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to counsel of record. The Clerk is also directed to post this order to the Court’s website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish this order in the bound volumes of this Court’s decisions.

DICKSON, C.J., and RUCKER, DAVID, and MASSA, JJ., concur. •

SULLIVAN, J., dissents with separate opinion.

SULLIVAN, Justice,

dissenting from the denial of transfer.

James, Thomas and Sam Kindréd (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint to quiet title against two separate defendants—represented by separate counsel—Betty Townsend and Harmon Crone. During the course of proceedings, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The trial court thereafter granted defendant Townsend’s request for an extension of time to respond. Defendant Crone did not make such a request and when the time for responding passed without an answer from Crone, summary judgment was entered against him. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

Less than thirty days later, Crone filed a motion to correct error (T.R. 59) and a motion for relief from the summary judgment order (T.R. 60(B)(1) (mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect)). After a hearing, the trial court reversed its earlier order.

Plaintiffs appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed. Kindred v. Townsend, 2011 WL 6916511, 2011 Ind.App. Unpub. LEXIS 1842 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). In doing so, the Court of Appeals analyzed applicable precedent under T.R. 60(B)(1) and concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting relief.

Plaintiffs seek transfer. Among their contentions is that the Court of Appeals did not address their argument that, Defendants not having timely responded to the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, their motions to correct error and for relief from judgment constituted impermissible end-runs around the time deadlines of T.R. 56(C). In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite explicit authority from this Court and the Court of Appeals holding that a trial court may not consider late summary judgment filings. HomEq Serv. Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Ind.2008); Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118, 124 n. 5 (Ind.2005); Desai v. Croy, 805 N.E.2d 844, 849 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied.

A party’s “absolute right to one appeal” in all cases includes the right to have each issue presented on appeal addressed and disposed of. Ind. Const. Art. 7, § 6. The plaintiffs were denied that here. I would grant transfer for purposes of addressing the raised but unanswered issue.


text:
    In the Matter of Cecelia M.K. HEMPHILL, Respondent.
    No. 55S00-1104-DI-243.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Aug. 1, 2012.
   PUBLISHED ORDER FINDING MISCONDUCT AND IMPOSING DISCIPLINE

Upon review of the report of the hearing officer, the Honorable Terry K. Snow, who was appointed by this Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission’s “Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action,” and the Commission’s Petition for Review, the Court finds that Respondent engaged in professional misconduct and imposes discipline on Respondent.

Facts: On the morning of December 5, 2008, Respondent encountered B.T. (“Father”) at the county courthouse, who told her that he had a custody hearing the following week in a divorce case. After some investigation, she learned that the family had been the subject of a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) case involving the couple’s son, J.T. (age 10) and daughter, D.T. (age 8), that the CHINS court had ordered Father to have only supervised visitation; and that the CHINS case was now closed. Father told her that his visitation was no longer supervised. Father mentioned that D.T. had told a Department of Child Services (“DCS”) worker that the boyfriend of his wife (“Mother”) had touched her inappropriately but that D.T. later said she made up the story because she wanted to live with Father. Based upon this statement alone, Respondent concluded that Mother’s boyfriend had molested D.T. and that the children were in grave danger.

Respondent wanted to talk to the children alone, particularly D.T., so Respondent could see her reaction when asked about Mother’s boyfriend. At Respondent’s request, Father wrote a note to the principal of the children’s school stating that she was Father’s new attorney and that he gave her permission to pick the children up from school. When Respondent arrived at the school at about 2:55 p.m., the school secretary was alone in the school office. Both Mother and Father were authorized to pick up the children from school. Respondent told the secretary that if Father had the right to pick them up, then the secretary had to release them to Respondent because she was his attorney and he asked her to pick up the children. The secretary refused at first but felt intimidated and eventually relented. The secretary then became very worried about the children and reported what happened to the school superintendent, who told the Morgan County Sheriff about the incident. When the Sheriff told Mother what had happened, she was terrified and became more upset as the evening wore on.

Meanwhile, Respondent called the children’s sitter, who provided after-school care, and told her that she was Father’s lawyer, that she had the children, and that she and the children were going to meet Father for dinner. Respondent refused to tell the sitter where they were. As Respondent continued driving with the children, she asked them general questions about their parents and Mother’s boyfriend. Neither child mentioned physical abuse. They eventually met Father and had dinner together, after which Father departed.

Respondent then drove with the children through the back roads around Martins-ville, looking for a birthday party D.T. had been invited to attend, relying on the children for directions. Respondent’s cell phone had died and she was low on gas. Respondent stopped at several houses looking for the party, without success. Respondent eventually took the children to Mother’s home at about 8:45 p.m.—nearly six hours after Respondent took them from school.

Violations: The Commission charged Respondent with violating the following Indiana Professional Conduct Rules:

4.1(a): Knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a third person in the course of
4.4(a): representing a client. 4.4(a): Using means in representing a client that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Rules 4..1(a) and 8.4(c). The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had not met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made a false statement of fact or engaged in dishonest conduct in violation of Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c). After a review of the record, we accept this conclusion.

Rule 4-4(o.)- The Commission alleges that by intimidating the school secretary into releasing the children to Respondent and by causing Mother great anxiety over their safety, Respondent used means that had no substantial purpose other than to burden third persons in violation Professional Conduct Rule 4.4(a). Respondent offered two reasons for taking the children from the school and keeping them for several hours without telling Mother where they were: (1) Respondent believed that she needed to speak to the children privately before the hearing the following week; and (2) she was concerned that without her intervention, the children would be abused for years to come. We agree with the hearing officer that both of Respondent’s stated purposes could have been accomplished by more appropriate and effective means. No legitimate purpose was served by Respondent insisting that the secretary release the children from school and driving them around for several hours without telling Mother where they were. We conclude that Respondent’s actions had no substantial purpose other than to burden the school secretary and Mother in violation of Rule 4.4(a).

Rule 8.i(d). The Commission alleges that by failing to abide by the orders and procedures of the divorce court and the CHINS court, and instead substituting her own judgment for that of the courts and Child Protective Services, Respondent engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d).

Whether and to what extent the CHINS custody order had been adopted by the divorce court is a matter of debate. Even if no order specifically barred Respondent from taking the children to see Father, we conclude that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d). As the hearing officer noted, Indiana has laws and procedures to deal with allegations of abuse, as well as agencies specifically designed to, charged with, and trained to deal with such allegations. Respondent, however, took matters into her own hands and acted precipitously in disregard for the laws and agencies designed to deal with allegations of child abuse. These actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d).

Discipline: An important factor in determining appropriate discipline is the risk to the public should we allow Respondent to continue in the practice of law. See Matter of McCarthy, 668 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind.1996). Respondent lacks any insight into why her conduct was wrong, maintaining that she did the right thing because she was serving a higher purpose of protecting the safety of the children. Convincing evidence was presented that this incident was not an isolated lapse. We therefore conclude that Respondent should be suspended without automatic reinstatement.

For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less than six months, without automatic reinstatement, beginning September 7, 2012. Respondent shall not undertake any new legal matters between service of this order and the effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of the minimum period of suspension, Respondent may petition this Court for reinstatement to the practice of law in this state, provided Respondent pays the costs of this proceeding, fulfills the duties of a suspended attorney, and satisfies the requirements for reinstatement of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4). Reinstatement is discretionary and requires clear and convincing evidence of the attorney’s remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice law. See Admis. Disc. R. 23(4)(b).

The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged.

The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to the hearing officer, to the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). The Clerk is further directed to post this order to the Court’s website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this order in the bound volumes of this Court’s decisions.

All Justices concur.