author: HENDRICKSON, P.J.

text:
    In the MATTER OF: P.R.P.
    NO. CA2017-02-026
    Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Butler County.
    January 22, 2018
    Repper, Pagan, & Cook, Ltd., Christopher J. Pagan, 1501 First Avenue, Middletown, Ohio 45044, for appellants.
    F. Harrison Green, Executive Park, Suite 230, 4015 Executive Park Drive, Cincinnati, Ohio 45241, for appellee.
   HENDRICKSON, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellants, the paternal grandparents of P.R.P. ("Grandparents"), appeal the decision of the Butler County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, denying their petition for companionship or visitation rights with P.R.P. For the reasons discussed below, this court affirms the juvenile court's decision.

{¶ 2} Mother, the appellee, and Father married in 2010. Their child, P.R.P., was born in April 2012. Father, Mother, and P.R.P. lived next door to Grandparents, in a home they rented from Grandparents. In October 2015, Father collapsed at work and stopped breathing. Father was placed on life support but died several days later. The record is unclear as to the cause of Father's death. There was some indication in the record that Father may have had issues with substance abuse. However, the family ordered an autopsy, which revealed the death was from "natural causes."

{¶ 3} While Father was alive, Mother's and Grandparents' relationship was strained. Following Father's death, the relationship deteriorated. In January 2016, Mother moved with P.R.P. out of the rented home and into her parents' home.

{¶ 4} In February 2016, Grandparents filed a complaint requesting visitation with P.R.P. pursuant to R.C. 3109.11, which allows the relatives of a deceased parent to petition for visitation with the deceased's minor child. The complaint alleged that P.R.P. had lived next door to Grandparents for P.R.P.'s entire life, that Mother ceased all communications with Grandparents, and that Mother was not willing to allow Grandparents to communicate with P.R.P.

{¶ 5} The court held a hearing over two days in August and November 2016. Mother, Grandparents, relatives, friends, and some of Grandparents' neighbors testified. Much of the testimony dealt with the longstanding interpersonal grievances between Mother and Grandparents and had little to do with P.R.P. In this regard, Mother testified that her relationship with Grandparents was "distant" and at times acrimonious.

{¶ 6} With respect to P.R.P., Mother testified that Grandparents only began interacting with P.R.P. to any significant extent in the summer after his third birthday. This testimony was corroborated by Mother's friend who said that she spent significant time with Mother at Mother's house and rarely saw Grandparents until P.R.P. was three years old. Mother testified that Grandparents occasionally watched P.R.P. but that P.R.P.'s maternal grandmother was the child's primary caregiver when Mother was at work.

{¶ 7} Mother stated that Grandfather confronted her and blocked her vehicle in the driveway when she was moving out of the rented home. Grandfather threatened to tell P.R.P. that Mother's behavior caused Father's death and that Mother was a "horrible" person. Grandfather also told Mother that P.R.P. would be "better off" being raised by Grandparents.

{¶ 8} Mother testified that she did not want Grandparents to have visitation with P.R.P. because she believed they intended to seek custody of P.R.P. and that they intended to demean her in P.R.P.'s presence.

{¶ 9} During his testimony, Grandfather denied that he accused Mother of causing Father's death and said that he knew that Father died of "natural causes." Later in his testimony, Grandfather conceded that he told Mother that "you could have saved" Father. Grandfather also admitted telling persons in the hospital that Mother finally "pushed [Father] over the edge" and that she could have been a better wife to Father. Grandfather explained that his comments referred to his belief that Mother had an affair and treated Father poorly during the marriage. Grandfather admitted that he received Father's cellular phone from Father's work and refused to return it to Mother despite her request.

{¶ 10} Grandfather conceded that he would anger Mother by giving candy to P.R.P. despite Mother's instructions otherwise. Grandfather testified that he would give P.R.P. another piece of candy after Mother became angry with him. Father's sister also testified that Mother did not like for Grandparents to watch P.R.P. because they would give him candy and would not put him down for naps. Additionally, Grandparents would not give P.R.P. snacks at the time Mother requested.

{¶ 11} Grandfather introduced numerous photographs taken in 2015 depicting Grandfather and the paternal side of the family playing with and interacting with P.R.P. Grandfather stated that he and Grandmother were seeking visitation with P.R.P. because P.R.P. loved spending time with them and that not seeing his grandparents would be "mental abuse."

{¶ 12} Mother called several witnesses to testify. One witness testified that she was at the hospital following Father's collapse and heard Father's family expressing hatred towards Mother. Another witness said she heard Grandfather state that Mother killed Father, which he stated in front of many people.

{¶ 13} Following the hearing, the court issued an order finding that Grandparents did not meet their burden to establish that it was in P.R.P.'s best interest to establish visitation with Grandparents. The court observed that Mother's desire to deny Grandparents visitation was neither "unreasonable" nor "irrational" because Grandparents did not respect Mother's rules regarding P.R.P.'s diet and nap times and because Grandfather threatened he would tell P.R.P. that Mother caused Father's death because of the stress Mother allegedly put Father through during their marriage.

{¶ 14} Grandparents appeal, raising three assignments of error.

{¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶ 16} THE COURT APPLIED THE WRONG TEST TO DETERMINE GRANDPARENT VISITATION.

{¶ 17} Grandparents argue that the court analyzed their visitation petition by erroneously requiring them to prove that Mother's desire to deny them visitation was "irrational" or "unreasonable" before analyzing whether visitation was in P.R.P.'s best interest according to the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D). Mother contends that the court applied the appropriate test for nonparental visitation, by reviewing each best-interest factor while giving special weight to Mother's wishes.

{¶ 18} This court employs the de novo standard of review on questions relating to the proper appropriate legal standard or test. See generally Roberts v. Mike's Trucking, Ltd. , 12th Dist. Madison Nos. CA2013-04-011 and CA201304014, 2014-Ohio-766, 9 N.E.3d 483, ¶24. A parent has a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of her own child. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Grandparents, however, have no constitutional right of association with their grandchildren. In re A.B. , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-104, 2016-Ohio-2891, 2016 WL 2621521, ¶ 39, citing In re Martin , 68 Ohio St.3d 250, 252, 626 N.E.2d 82 (1994). Instead, grandparent and other nonparent visitation rights are only as provided by statute. Id. Because parents have a fundamental right to raise their child and certain relatives only have a statutory right to visitation, the nonparent has the burden of proving that visitation is in the child's best interest. Id. , citing In re N.C.W., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-12-229, 2014-Ohio-3381, 17 N.E.3d 119, ¶ 25.

{¶ 19} Grandparents' right to visitation rests on the provisions of R.C. 3109.11, which provide in relevant part:

If either the father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the court of common pleas of the county in which the minor child resides may grant the parents and other relatives of the deceased father or mother reasonable companionship or visitation rights with respect to the minor child during the child's minority if the parent or other relative files a complaint requesting reasonable companionship or visitation rights and if the court determines that the granting of the companionship or visitation rights is in the best interest of the minor child. In determining whether to grant any person reasonable companionship or visitation rights with respect to any child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the factors set forth in division (D) of section 3109.051 of the Revised Code. * * *.

The best interest factors the court must consider if relevant are:

(1) The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with the child's parents, siblings, and other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, and with the person who requested companionship or visitation if that person is not a parent, sibling, or relative of the child;
(2) The geographical location of the residence of each parent and the distance between those residences, and if the person is not a parent, the geographical location of that person's residence and the distance between that person's residence and the child's residence;
(3) The child's and parents' available time, including, but not limited to, each parent's employment schedule, the child's school schedule, and the child's and the parents' holiday and vacation schedule;
(4) The age of the child;
(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(6) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers, pursuant to division (C) of this section, regarding the wishes and concerns of the child as to parenting time by the parent who is not the residential parent or companionship or visitation by the grandparent, relative, or other person who requested companionship or visitation, as to a specific parenting time or visitation schedule, or as to other parenting time or visitation matters, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(7) The health and safety of the child;
(8) The amount of time that will be available for the child to spend with siblings;
(9) The mental and physical health of all parties;
(10) Each parent's willingness to reschedule missed parenting time and to facilitate the other parent's parenting time rights, and with respect to a person who requested companionship or visitation, the willingness of that person to reschedule missed visitation;
(11) In relation to parenting time, whether either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of the adjudication; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child;
(12) In relation to requested companionship or visitation by a person other than a parent, whether the person previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether the person, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of the adjudication; whether either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent previously has been convicted of an offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that the person has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child;
(13) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent's right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(14) Whether either parent has established a residence or is planning to establish a residence outside this state;
(15) In relation to requested companionship or visitation by a person other than a parent, the wishes and concerns of the child's parents, as expressed by them to the court;
(16) Any other factor in the best interest of the child. * * *. R.C. 3109.051(D).

{¶ 20} The 15th factor is of "particular importance" because of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel . In re A.B. , 2016-Ohio-2891 at ¶ 41, 2016 WL 2621521. There, the Court held-with respect to a Washington state nonparent visitation statute-that a fit parent's decision with respect to nonparent visitation must be accorded "some special weight." Troxel , 530 U.S. 57 at 69, 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49. The Ohio Supreme Court has extended the rationale of Troxel to Ohio's nonparent visitation statutes. Harrold v. Collier , 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court held that "Ohio courts are obligated to afford some special weight to the wishes of parents of minor children when considering petitions for nonparental visitation." Id. at ¶ 12. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Ohio Supreme Court have defined the precise meaning of "some special weight," although the Ohio Supreme Court used the phrase "due deference" in describing the concept. Id. at ¶ 45.

{¶ 21} After thoroughly reviewing the record and the trial court's decision, this court finds that the juvenile court properly applied the pertinent law. The court complied with R.C. 3109.11 by considering each relevant best-interest factor under R.C. 3109.051(D). Because Grandparents did not argue or submit any evidence that Mother was an unfit parent, the court properly indicated that it would give special weight to Mother's wish not to allow visitation while also considering the remaining factors.

{¶ 22} Grandparents argue that the court ignored the other best-interest factors and simply deferred to Mother's wishes. However, nothing in the record or the court's written decision supports that contention. The decision, which consists of nine single-spaced pages, contains a discussion of each relevant best-interest factor. If the court had simply deferred to Mother's wishes without consideration of those mandatory factors there would have been no need to go through this thorough analysis.

{¶ 23} The court indicated that it found that Mother's desire not to grant visitation to Grandparents was neither "unreasonable" nor "irrational" given Mother's concerns with Grandfather's refusal to follow her rules and his threat to demean her to P.R.P. Grandparents argue that the law did not require them to prove that Mother's wishes were unreasonable or irrational and that the court used this requirement as a condition precedent before reviewing the best-interest factors.

{¶ 24} The relevant Revised Code provisions do not appear to specifically require the petitioner to produce any proof of lack of reasonableness or rationality with respect to a parent's position on visitation. Upon review, the lower court seems to have taken the "reasonable" and "rational" language from a portion of this court's opinion in In re A.B. where the opinion quoted from the lower court's written decision. In re A.B. , 2016-Ohio-2891, 2016 WL 2621521 at ¶ 31. That quotation, however, was simply a recitation of the lower court's decision in the opinion's factual section. The lower court did not support that language with any citation to law. Nor did this court adopt the trial court's decision as its own.

{¶ 25} It is not clear whether the lower court believed it was required to find that Mother's wishes were reasonable and rational. Regardless, any error with respect to this issue is harmless. The conclusion that Mother's position was reasonable and rational simply supports the court's decision to give special weight to Mother's wishes. If the court had instead found Mother's position on visitation unreasonable or irrational then necessarily the court would have given less weight to her position while weighing the best-interest factors.

{¶ 26} Grandparents also argue that the court erred when it stated it was required to give "extreme deference" to Mother's wishes. This court has previously used the phrases "extreme deference" and "great deference" in describing the special weight to be afforded a parent's position with respect to nonparent visitation claims. In re N.C.W. , 2014-Ohio-3381, 17 N.E.3d 119 at ¶ 38 ; In re A.B. at ¶ 41, citing In re E.T.B. , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-07-051, 2015-Ohio-2991, 2015 WL 4515514, ¶ 30 ; In re J.T.S. , 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2014-09-009, 2015-Ohio-364, 2015 WL 420162, ¶ 26. As discussed above, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Ohio Supreme Court has defined "special weight." For purposes of clarity, this court intends to discontinue the use of other descriptive phrases for the "special weight" to be afforded a parent's wishes. The law is clear that regardless of a parent's motivations, a court is required to give special weight to their wishes in accordance with Troxel and Harrold . Nonetheless, the court must balance the parent's wishes against the other best-interest factors and the parent's wishes are never paramount to the child's best interest. In re N.C.W. at ¶ 36 (observing that "nothing in Troxel suggests that a parent's wishes should be placed before a child's best interest"). This court concludes that the juvenile court's decision in this case was correct whether the court applied "special weight" or "extreme deference" to Mother's wishes because the record contained credible evidence supporting Mother's desire for no visitation with Grandparents. In sum, the record reflects that the court applied the appropriate legal analysis to Grandparents' petition for nonparent visitation. This court overrules Grandparents' first assignment of error.

{¶ 27} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶ 28} THE MAGISTRATE FAILED TO STATE WHETHER IT DIRECTED A JUDGMENT TO MOTHER OR ADJUDICATED THE VISITATION PETITION ON THE MERITS.

{¶ 29} In their second assignment of error, Grandparents argue that the court erred by dismissing their visitation petition without "clearly indicating whether [its] basis was a directed judgment or a merits adjudication." After Grandparents' case in chief, Mother's attorney orally moved the court to find "in accordance with the statute and the case law" that Grandparents did not have a right to visitation. Mother's attorney did not use the phrase "directed verdict." After Mother and Grandparents both argued their positions on Mother's oral motion, the court announced that it was not going to rule from the bench and might later ask the parties to file briefs on their respective positions. The trial resumed and Mother presented her case in chief.

{¶ 30} As to how this alleged error prejudiced Grandparents, Grandparents argue that the legal basis of the juvenile court's decision affects this court's standard of review. Grandparents argue that if the court directed a verdict in Mother's favor, the standard of review is for sufficiency of the evidence. If the court adjudicated the case on the merits, this court would review for an abuse of discretion.

{¶ 31} However, the standard of review is not a relevant concern in this appeal because Grandparents did not separately assign error to the trial court's decision that visitation was not in P.R.P.'s best interest. Instead, Grandparents argued in the first assignment of error that the court used an erroneous legal standard to determine the visitation petition. As discussed above, we reviewed that issue de novo and overruled the assignment of error. Grandparents' third assignment of error argues that the court erred in admitting certain evidence, but also does not substantively challenge the underlying decision that visitation was not in P.R.P.'s best interest.

{¶ 32} Nonetheless, the juvenile court's decision consisted of nine pages of detailed factual findings and conclusion of law. At the end of the decision the court wrote: "[t]he complaint for visitation (grandparents' companionship rights) filed February 26, 2016, by [Grandparents] is not well taken and the same shall be dismissed." The record is clear that the court determined Grandparents' petition on the merits. This court overrules Grandparents' second assignment of error.

{¶ 33} Assignment of Error No. 3:

{¶ 34} THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING A SETTLEMENT STATEMENT IN EVIDENCE.

{¶ 35} In their third assignment of error, Grandparents argue that the court erred in admitting into evidence Mother's statement about an alleged threat made by Grandfather while the parties were in a settlement conference. The juvenile court initially overruled Grandparents' objection to Mother's anticipated testimony, stating that it did not believe that a threat made during a settlement conference was inadmissible. Accordingly, the court allowed Mother to testify that Grandfather told her at the settlement conference that he would tell P.R.P. that she was a "horrible" person and "what I did" to P.R.P.'s father. After hearing Mother's testimony, the court sua sponte reconsidered its previous ruling about the admissibility of the statement and asked the parties to brief the issue after the trial.

{¶ 36} While the parties later briefed the statement's admissibility, the juvenile court's decision does not address the issue. Moreover, the lower court did seem to consider this testimony as it generally referred to Mother's concerns that Grandfather threatened to demean her if allowed to communicate with P.R.P.

{¶ 37} Grandparents argue that Mother's statement was inadmissible pursuant to Evid.R. 408. Mother argues that her testimony was not precluded under Evid.R. 408 because it was not offered to disprove Grandparents' claim to visitation, but rather to demonstrate that Grandfather made threats in order to pressure Mother into granting visitation. Alternatively, Mother argues that the admission of Grandfather's out-of-court statement was harmless error because Grandfather made similar statements outside of settlement proceedings, which were properly introduced into evidence.

{¶ 38} We review the lower court's decisions on the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. Cottrell v. Cottrell , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-10-105, 2013-Ohio-2397, 2013 WL 2635571, ¶ 80. Evid.R. 408 provides:

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

{¶ 39} The parties do not dispute that Grandfather's alleged statements occurred during a settlement conference. Evidence of a threat to demean Mother would be relevant to the court's consideration of whether Grandfather was a suitable person to allow visitation with P.R.P. and whether visitation would be in P.R.P.'s best interest. Thus, this evidence would be relevant to proving the invalidity of Grandparents' claim for visitation. Consequently, because no exception to Evid.R. 408 applies, Mother's testimony was inadmissible and the court erred to the extent it permitted the statement. However, we agree with Mother that any error was harmless.

{¶ 40} Civ.R. 61 provides that:

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

{¶ 41} Mother testified that Grandfather made similar, and in fact, more specific, threats to her months before the settlement conference. Mother claimed that during a confrontation in her garage Grandfather told her that she caused Father's death and that Grandfather "was going to make sure that [P.R.P.] knew that him and [Grandmother] would be better off raising my child and umm... basically I, I, basically I was just [a] horrible, horrible person, that I ran around on his son, I had multiple affairs and basically that he, [P.R.P] was going to know all of it and [P.R.P.] was going to grow up to pretty much hate me." Accordingly, Mother's inadmissible testimony concerning Grandfather's threat at the settlement conference was largely duplicative of other admissible testimony, and this error did not affect Grandparents' substantial rights. This court overrules Grandparents' third assignment of error.

{¶ 42} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.

      Grandparents characterize Mother's oral motion as one for a directed verdict or judgment. However, directed verdicts are not permitted in a bench trial. Heath v. Heath , 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2016-08-011, 2017-Ohio-5506, 2017 WL 2730298, ¶ 34. Instead, Mother's motion following the end of Grandparents' case in chief would properly be construed as a motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2).

      Again, because directed verdicts are not applicable in a bench trial, had we been reviewing the court's ruling on an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) our standard of review would have called for a manifest weight analysis. See ALH Properties v. Procare Automotive Serv. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 20991, 2002-Ohio-4246, 2002 WL 1906252, ¶ 8-12.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Harsha, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jack O. ROTHWELL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lawrence V. ROTHWELL, et al., Defendants-Appellants
    No. 17CA709
    Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Vinton County.
    RELEASED: January 29, 2018
    William S. Cole and Evan T. Cole, Cole, Kirby, & Associates, Jackson, Ohio, for appellant.
    Jonathan C. Clark and Daniel A. Yarmesch, Clark & Clark and Associates, LLC, Lancaster, Ohio, for appellees.
    Trecia Kimes-Brown, Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney, and William L. Archer, Jr., Vinton County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, McArthur, Ohio, for defendant Vinton County Treasurer.
    DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
   Harsha, J.

{¶ 1} The trial court granted summary judgment to the petitioners on their claim for the partition of property they owned jointly with Lawrence and Mark Rothwell. Appellant Mark Rothwell asserts that the trial court erred because his evidence established a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of an implied oral agreement between the parties not to partition the property. However, Mark Rothwell's evidence did not raise a genuine issue of fact, and even if it did, an oral contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. We reject his assertion.

{¶ 2} He also contends that the trial court erred in finding that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations. However, even if the statute of limitations did not apply, his claims were still meritless. First, there was no evidence of an implied-in-fact agreement not to partition the property. Second, there is no viable claim of fraud. And third, the statute of frauds barred his claims, which were premised on a purported oral agreement.

{¶ 3} We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court granting the partition.

I. FACTS

{¶ 4} Jack, Samuel, and Lawrence Rothwell are brothers; Mark Rothwell is Lawrence's son. In August 1995, they obtained ownership of two parcels of property in Vinton County. The deed conveyed a joint life estate to the Rothwells with remainder in fee simple going to the ultimate survivor.

{¶ 5} Nearly eleven years later in June 2016, Jack and Samuel Rothwell filed a complaint in the Vinton County Court of Common Pleas for the partition of the real property, naming Lawrence, Mark, and the Vinton County Treasurer as defendants. Mark filed an answer and counterclaim, which alleged that when the Rothwells purchased the property in 1995, Jack and Samuel approached him about investing in the real estate upon the promise that title would be vested jointly with the right of survivorship among the parties. And because Mark was significantly younger than the other parties, he would end up owning the entire interest in the property. Mark claimed that these representations were false and that he had relied upon them.

{¶ 6} Lawrence did not respond to his brothers' complaint for partition. Jack and Samuel filed a reply to Mark's counterclaim.

{¶ 7} Jack and Samuel filed a motion for summary judgment against Mark and for default judgment against Lawrence. They supported their motion with affidavits which stated: (1) Jack, Samuel, Lawrence, and Mark each have an undivided one-fourth interest as survivorship tenants in the real property; (2) neither Jack nor Samuel told Mark that he would eventually own the entire interest in the real property; and (3) neither Jack nor Samuel entered into any written agreement with Mark stating that he would eventually own the entire interest in the real property.

{¶ 8} Mark filed a memorandum in opposition, which primarily argued that Jack and Samuel fraudulently misrepresented that he would eventually own the real property. Mark submitted the affidavits of himself, his father, Lawrence, and his brother, Derek.

{¶ 9} Mark and Lawrence stated in their affidavits that: (1) they were approached by Jack and Samuel to purchase the real estate; (2) the purchase price of the real estate was $20,000 and they each paid $5,000; (3) it was explained that the property would be held in survivorship form, the last person surviving would own the property free from any other person, and the last person "would most likely be" Mark because "he was the youngest of the four owners"; and (4) had they known that one of the owners could force a sale of the property, they never would have invested in it.

{¶ 10} Derek stated in his affidavit that: (1) he had been asked to join as a partner in the potential purchase of the property after being told about the "last man standing," but he declined because he did not have the money; (2) over the years it was explained that the property was to be held in survivorship form, with the last person surviving owning the property free of any other person, and that the last person surviving would most likely be his brother, Mark, because he was the youngest of the four owners; and (3) he had provided material and labor to improve the real property.

{¶ 11} The trial court's decision found that because there was no written agreement supporting Mark's claim, it was barred by the statute of frauds. The court granted Jack and Samuel's motion for summary judgment and default judgment, also found that Mark's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, and determined that Jack and Samuel were entitled to partition the real property. It ordered Jack and Samuel's counsel to prepare and circulate a judgment entry.

{¶ 12} During the pendency of the case, Lawrence died, making Jack, Samuel, and Mark sole owners of the real property. The trial court entered judgment issuing a writ of partition for the property and this appeal ensued.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 13} Mark assigns the following errors for our review:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO PARTITION THE REAL PROPERTY.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARK ROTHWELL'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 14} Mark contests the trial court's granting of Jack and Samuel's motion for summary judgment on their partition claim. Appellate review of summary judgment decisions is de novo, governed by the standards of Civ.R. 56. Vacha v. N. Ridgeville , 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 19. Summary judgment is appropriate if the party moving for summary judgment establishes that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, which is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made and (3) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56 ; New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler , 129 Ohio St.3d 39, 2011-Ohio-2266, 950 N.E.2d 157, ¶ 24 ; Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Dunlap , 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3409, 2014-Ohio-3484, 2014 WL 3940314, ¶ 26.

{¶ 15} The moving party has the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion by pointing to summary judgment evidence and identifying parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the pertinent claims and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996) ; Chase Home Finance at ¶ 27. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party has the reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue remaining for trial, or that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264.

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Implied Agreement Not to Sell Real Property

{¶ 16} In his first and second assignments of error Mark asserts that the trial court erred because he established a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of an oral agreement between the parties not to partition the property. "Tenants in common, survivorship tenants, and coparceners, of any estate in lands, tenements, or hereditaments within the state, may be compelled to make or suffer partition thereof as provided in sections 5307.01 to 5307.25 of the Revised Code." R.C. 5307.01. "If the court of common pleas finds that the plaintiff in an action for partition has a legal right to any part of the estate, it shall order partition of the estate in favor of the plaintiff or all interested parties, appoint one suitable disinterested person to be the commissioner to make the partition, and issue a writ of partition." R.C. 5307.04. Although the right to partition is governed by statute, it remains an essentially equitable remedy committed to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Reel v. Reel , 2016-Ohio-8116, 74 N.E.3d 995, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.).

{¶ 17} "Courts recognize three types of contracts: express, implied in fact, and implied in law." Martin v. Jones , 2015-Ohio-3168, 41 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.), citing Legros v. Tarr , 44 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 540 N.E.2d 257 (1989). Mark does not claim that there was an express contract between the parties or one implied in law. He instead argues that the summary judgment evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact about the parties' oral implied-in-fact agreement not to partition the property. A contract implied in fact is " 'a contract that the parties presumably intended, either by tacit understanding or by the assumption that it existed.' " State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State , 98 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-6716, 780 N.E.2d 998, ¶ 31, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 322 (7th Ed. 1999).

{¶ 18} To establish an implied-in-fact contract the proponent must prove there is an agreement, based on a meeting of the minds of the parties and on mutual assent. See Chiquita Brands Internatl., Inc. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA , 2015-Ohio-5477, 57 N.E.3d 97, ¶ 7, quoting Lucas v. Costantini , 13 Ohio App.3d 367, 368, 469 N.E.2d 927 (12th Dist.1983). But unlike an express contract, an implied contract is not created or evidenced by an explicit agreement of the parties, i.e. by a formal offer and acceptance. Rather an implied contract arises from the conduct of the parties or circumstances surrounding the transaction that make it clear the parties intended to enter into a contractual relationship despite the lack of a formal agreement. See Union Savings Bank v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. , 191 Ohio App.3d 540, 2010-Ohio-6396, 946 N.E.2d 835 ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). "In a contract implied in fact, the meeting of the minds is shown by the surrounding circumstances that demonstrate that a contract exists as a matter of tacit understanding." Spectrum Benefit Options, Inc. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio , 174 Ohio App.3d 29, 2007-Ohio-5562, 880 N.E.2d 926, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.).

{¶ 19} In supporting their motion Jack and Sam Rothwell submitted affidavits expressly stating that they did not tell Mark that he would end up eventually owning the entire interest in the property, and they did not enter into a written agreement to that effect. In opposing the motion Mark submitted his affidavit as well as the affidavits of his father, Lawrence, and his brother, Derek, stating that it was explained to them that they would obtain the property with the right to survivorship: the last person surviving would own the property free of any other person and that the last person "would most likely" be Mark because he was the youngest of the four Rothwells purchasing the property.

{¶ 20} This evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine issue about the existence of an implied-in-fact oral agreement not to partition the property. Jack and Sam expressly stated by affidavit that they did not tell Mark that he would eventually own the property. And Mark submitted affidavits stating only that it was explained that he "would most likely" eventually obtain the property. There is no evidence that Jack and Sam either promised or guaranteed Mark that he would succeed to own the entire property. In fact, the affidavits that Mark submitted only said that "it was explained" that the property would be held in survivorship form and that the last person surviving would own the property free of any other person. And there is no evidence that Jack and Sam either promised or guaranteed not to seek partition of the property.

{¶ 21} The primary case Mark cites in support of his claim in his first and second assignments of error is Murdock v. Murchison , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-80-166, 1981 WL 5550 (Apr. 17, 1981). In Murdock, a church entered into a lease for property with an option to purchase and the congregation decided to purchase it. The church's attempt to get a loan for the purchase price failed, but two congregants were asked to sign on the loan with the pastor and his wife. The security for the loan was the church property and a parcel owned by the pastor; the monthly mortgage was paid by church members. A few years later, the two congregants, who had co-signed the loan and who owned one-half of the church property, left the church. They sought and received a partition of the property.

{¶ 22} The court of appeals in Murdock at *6, reversed the partition order. Because the property was used entirely for church purposes, it found that partition would breach an implied agreement not to partition the property and the fiduciary relationship between the congregants and the church:

In this particular case, all evidence points to a presumption that the property was to be used for church purposes. Only after the appellant had failed in his own attempts to purchase the property did he turn to appellee to aid in the financing. The property was used entirely for church purposes. Based upon the record and the evidence presented, an agreement to hold the property for the religious organization and to avoid partition seems evident.
* * *
Furthermore, * * * a fiduciary relationship may also be seen to exist when one undertakes a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another. * * * Appellee, by agreeing to assist, in effect undertook a duty to aid the church and its congregation in the purchase and maintenance of its property. There is also some evidence that appellee undertook the status and duties of a priest or deacon in the congregation, hence was under an obligation of trust and confidence toward his religious following. A fiduciary is under a duty of good faith and loyalty, such good faith being breached by the confiscation of church property through partition.

{¶ 23} Conversely, the parties here did not have any fiduciary relationship. Likewise, there is no evidence of a special purpose intended for use of the real property.

{¶ 24} Moreover, Murdock did not involve an assertion that the statute of frauds barred a purported implied-in-fact oral contract. R.C. 1335.05, Ohio's statute of frauds, provides that "[n]o action shall be brought whereby to charge the defendant * * * upon a contract or sale of lands * * * or interest in or concerning them * * * unless the agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith * * *." Here the trial court held that "[s]ince there is no writing [Mark's] claim is barred," thus crediting Sam and Jack Rothwell's claim that the statute of frauds barred Mark's defense of an implied-in-fact oral contract not to partition.

{¶ 25} On appeal Mark does not explicitly assert that the statute of frauds did not bar his claim. An agreement not to partition land is manifestly an agreement "concerning" the "contract or sale of lands" so it fits within the scope of the statute of frauds. See generally Statute of Frauds-Oral Agreement for Partition of Land-Invalidity of Defense of Oral Agreement Not to Partition in Action Brought for Partition , 22 St. John's L.Rev. 289-291 (1948); Equitable and Contractual Defenses to Partition , 18 Stan.L.Rev. 1428 (1966) ("If the agreement not to partition is oral, it may run into additional difficulty with the Statute of Frauds provisions that require a writing for a contract for the sale of an interest in land").

{¶ 26} Nor does Mark assert, or the evidence establish, the existence of an exception to the statute of frauds, e.g., part performance. See, e.g., Spectrum Benefit Options , 174 Ohio App.3d 29, 2007-Ohio-5562, 880 N.E.2d 926, at ¶ 43-44.

B. Affirmative Defense of Fraud

{¶ 27} At best Mark's fraud claim was premised upon a representation about potential future conduct, but it is well settled that a " 'claim of fraud cannot be predicated upon promises or representations relating to future actions or conduct.' " M.S. by Slyman v. Toth , 2017-Ohio-7791, 97 N.E.3d 1206, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), quoting Martin v. Ohio State Univ. Found. , 139 Ohio App.3d 89, 98, 742 N.E.2d 1198 (10th Dist.2000).

{¶ 28} Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by granting Jack and Sam Rothwell's motion for summary judgment and issuing the order of partition. We overrule Mark's first and second assignments of error.

C. Statute of Limitations

{¶ 29} In his third assignment of error Mark argues that the trial court erred in determining that his breach of contract and fraud claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

{¶ 30} Even if we assume that the trial court erred in holding that Mark's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, any error could only be harmless because Mark's claims were meritless for alternative reasons, i.e., no evidence of implied-in-fact agreement not to partition the property, no viable claim of fraud, and the applicability of the statute of frauds to bar the claims insofar as they were premised on a purported oral agreement. See State v. Marcum , 4th Dist. Hocking No. 14CA13, 2014-Ohio-5373, 2014 WL 6877673, ¶ 27, quoting Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio , 136 Ohio St.3d 231, 2013-Ohio-3019, 994 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 51 (" 'a reviewing court will not reverse a correct judgment merely because it is based on erroneous reasons' "). We overrule Mark's third assignment of error.

V. CONCLUSION

{¶ 31} The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Jack and Sam Rothwell and ordered a partition of the parties' real property. Having overruled Mark Rothwell's assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Hoover, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

      Jack and Sam Rothwell argue that Mark waived his claim that they had an implied-in-fact contract not to partition the property by failing to raise it in the trial court. But Mark did raise this claim in support of his fraud claim in his memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Thus, we reject the claim of waiver.


author: TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.

text:
    STATE of Ohio EX REL. Michael DEWINE, Ohio Attorney General, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSBORNE CO., LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
    NO. 2016-L-091
    Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Lake County.
    Decided August 6, 2018
    Mike DeWine, Ohio Attorney General; Gregg H. Bachmann, Nicole Candelora-Norman, and Amy Factor, Assistant Attorneys General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street, 25th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215, (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
    Richard N. Selby, II, Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., 60 South Park Place, Painesville, OH 44077, (For Defendants-Appellants).
    OPINION ON RECONSIDERATION
   TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.

ON RECONSIDERATION

{¶ 1} Appellants, Osborne Co., Ltd. and the Executors of the Estate of Jerome T. Osborne, appeal from an August 1, 2016 judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court ordered appellants to pay a civil penalty for violating Ohio Revised Code Chapter 6111 and ordered injunctive relief in favor of appellee, Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General. This judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons that follow.

{¶ 2} On May 29, 2012, appellee filed a complaint, in Case No. 12 CV 001459, against Defendants Jerome T. Osborne ("Mr. Osborne") and Osborne, Inc. Appellee subsequently filed an amended complaint, which substituted Osborne Co., Ltd. ("Osborne Co.") for Osborne, Inc. The trial court denied a motion for partial summary judgment filed by appellee on January 17, 2014. On January 22, 2014, Osborne Co. was voluntarily dismissed from Case No. 12 CV 001459, and appellee filed a complaint against Osborne Co. in Case No. 14 CV 00166. The trial court consolidated the two cases on January 30, 2014. On August 15, 2014, the trial court granted a motion to substitute the Executors of Jerome T. Osborne's Estate as defendants, following Mr. Osborne's death. The executors are identified as Richard M. Osborne, Sr.; Georgeanne Osborne Gorman; Michael E. Osborne; Jacqueline Osborne Fisher; William V. Krug; Jerome T. Osborne, III; William L. Mackey; and Jeremy Cash Osborne.

{¶ 3} The complaints against each appellant-Osborne Co. and Mr. Osborne's estate-set forth three causes of action, each alleging violations of Ohio's Water Pollution Control Laws as found in Revised Code Chapter 6111.

{¶ 4} Count One alleges appellants violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) by failing to obtain a certification from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("Ohio EPA") under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act or a Section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers before engaging in certain activities within and along the East Branch Chagrin River that resulted in "(1) the placement of dredged or fill material and/or wastes into waters of the State; and (2) degradation of certain portions of the East Branch Chagrin River and the threatened degradation of other portions [of] these waters of the state."

{¶ 5} Count Two alleges appellants violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) by failing to obtain a construction storm water discharge permit before engaging in construction activities that resulted in "disturbing one or more acres of land within and along two miles of stream channel of the East Branch Chagrin River."

{¶ 6} Count Three alleges appellants violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) because they polluted the East Branch Chagrin River, without a permit, by discharging storm water from land within and along two miles of stream channel of the East Branch Chagrin River, and thereby created a public nuisance.

{¶ 7} The parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts with regard to many issues in the case. With regard to remaining disputed facts, the matter ultimately proceeded to a bench trial in January 2016.

{¶ 8} This case arose after an employee of the Ohio EPA observed William Franz, an employee of Osborne Co., operating a track hoe in the middle of the East Branch Chagrin River. In his deposition, Mr. Franz testified that he was removing silt so the river would flow. The parties stipulated that Mr. Osborne instructed Mr. Franz to use the track hoe to remove sand and gravel from the stream bed and relocate this material along the edge of the stream, on the stream banks, and in the middle of the river. The parties also stipulated that, on certain occasions when the track hoe's bucket could not reach the river bank, Mr. Franz would place piles in the river, then relocate the track hoe and move those piles to the bank of the river. Another stipulation was that Mr. Osborne personally observed some of Mr. Franz's work and that he would usually call Mr. Franz the night before or first thing in the morning and tell him what project to work on each day and what to do for the project. After work was completed, Mr. Osborne would usually call Mr. Franz to ask how the work for the day went.

{¶ 9} The parties stipulated that appellants were performing the work on the river pursuant to agreements with the Village of Kirtland Hills, reached in 1983 and 1990, to maintain the river banks. In exchange for the work performed on the river, Mr. Osborne was allowed to farm certain property owned by the Village of Kirtland Hills. The work was done throughout the years from River Mile 4.30 to River Mile 6.15. Most of the work performed in or near the river was on property owned either by the Village of Kirtland Hills or Mr. Osborne.

{¶ 10} The parties stipulated that the East Branch Chagrin River is a "water of the state," as that term is defined in R.C. 6111.01 ; that it was designated as a State Scenic River by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources ("ODNR") on July 2, 1979; that it is designated as an Outstanding State Water for Ecological Value; and that its beneficial use designations are cold water habitat, seasonal salmonid habitat, primary contact recreation, and agricultural/industrial water supply.

{¶ 11} The parties stipulated that Mr. Franz, at the direction of Mr. Osborne, operated the track hoe in the river on 24 separate occasions from 2001 through 2007. Each of these occasions involved dredging the river and placing dredged material along the river bank or in the middle of the river. Evidence was introduced at trial that the dredged material formed nine piles, anywhere from eight- to twenty-feet high, for extended distances along the river bank. At least 25,656 cubic yards of river bottom were dredged. Most of the dredged material was piled on property owned by either the Village of Kirtland Hills or Mr. Osborne. One pile, referred to as "the Oliva pile," was located on private property near St. Hubert's church.

{¶ 12} According to trial testimony, the river had been excavated down to the bedrock in many areas between R.M. 4.30 and R.M. 6.15, which resulted in the river losing access to its floodplain and caused significant bank erosion. The state also introduced testimony that appellants' activities resulted in a loss or degradation of the habitat for fish and macro invertebrates.

{¶ 13} Paul Anderson, an environmental specialist in the surface water division of the Ohio EPA, became aware of the work being done in the river on July 13, 2007, at which time it ordered appellants to cease work in the river. Appellants complied. The Ohio EPA immediately performed a site survey and concluded the site was severely impacted by substrate removal and reworking and by placement of removed material in the floodplain and bankfull area: the habitat was severely simplified, siltation was high, and erosion was potentially high.

{¶ 14} The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers thoroughly inspected the river one week later. The parties stipulated that Mr. Osborne received a letter from the Corps in August 2007, stating the work in the river was an unauthorized activity and in violation of the Federal Clean Water Act. The letter stated, in part:

The inspection found that gravel and natural stone were excessively dredged from the stream at several locations, and disposed or stockpiled in the floodway and below the ordinary high water elevation, and also in the stream channel. No Department of the Army authorization was issued for this activity. Therefore, this work is an unauthorized activity and in violation of the Clean Water Act.

The letter directed Mr. Osborne not to perform any additional activities in the river and advised that any further work would be considered a knowing and willful violation of federal law, subjecting him to civil penalties.

{¶ 15} The parties stipulated that Mr. Osborne also received a notice of violation from the Ohio EPA in August 2007, alleging violations of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 6111. The notice also alleged violations of Ohio Administrative Code ("OAC") section 3745-1-04. This notice stated, in part:

The illegal activity began upstream of St. Hubert's Church on the East Branch of the Chagrin River and continued downstream approximately 8,700 feet. The inspection team observed that materials had been and were being side cast from the river bed onto various sections of the river bank. This activity constitutes a violation of [R.C.] 6111.04, which prohibits any person from causing pollution to any waters of the State without a valid unexpired permit issued by the Director of Ohio EPA. [R.C.] 6111.07 states that no person shall violate or fail to perform any duty imposed by rules adopted by Ohio EPA. The activities observed caused violations of [OAC] 3745-1-04, which contains criteria applicable to all waters of the State. Please be advised that failure to comply with the above laws may be cause for enforcement action pursuant to [R.C.] Section 6111 and subject you to civil penalties identified in [R.C.] 6111.09(A).
Please inform this office in writing, within ten days of receipt of this notification, of the description of the action(s) proposed to address these violations. Please provide all documentation associated with this activity including the intent of the activity, contracts with others to perform the activity, and a record of when this activity had been previously performed.

{¶ 16} Mr. Osborne responded by letter, through his attorney, on September 10, 2007. Mr. Osborne noted he began utilizing the land located in the Village of Kirtland Hills pursuant to an oral agreement in the late 1970s; this oral agreement was confirmed by written agreements in 1983 and 1990. Pursuant to these agreements, Mr. Osborne undertook erosion control and bank stabilization measures on the property on an intermittent basis. He indicated there were no records or documentation associated with said erosion control and bank stabilization measures. The letter ended by stating, "Mr. Osborne proposes no actions at this time to address the alleged violations" and that nothing in the letter shall be deemed an admission as to any unlawful activities; "in fact, for the record, Mr. Osborne denies any unlawful activities[.]"

{¶ 17} On November 1, 2007, Randall Keitz, a floodplain engineer with ODNR, surveyed the disturbed area of the river. He concluded, as a result of this survey, that the river was highly unstable with considerable ongoing erosion of the river banks due to the limited channel width and increased velocity of the water. Trees along the banks were being undermined, and access to the floodplain was very limited.

{¶ 18} On November 2, 2007, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent a letter to the director of the Ohio EPA, noting the work was done without authorization and in violation of the Clean Water Act. It authorized the Ohio EPA to immediately begin remedial and restoration measures without needing to obtain any further approval or permits from the Corps.

{¶ 19} Over the next two years, the Ohio EPA met with Mr. Osborne and the Village of Kirtland Hills to negotiate remediation of the river. On April 29, 2009, the Ohio EPA provided a proposed draft of a settlement, titled "Director's Final Findings and Orders," to appellants in an attempt to administratively settle the violations of R.C. Chapter 6111. The draft states, in Paragraph 3 of the Findings, that appellants altered approximately two miles of the stream channel in violation of R.C. Chapter 6111 and the Clean Water Act by dredging from and depositing fill material in the river. Paragraph 8 states that constriction of the floodplain remains a significant concern: lowering of the stream channel elevation and stockpiling of material along the stream banks significantly limits the amount of energy dissipation that can occur during flood events. Paragraphs 9 and 10 state that placement of dredged substrates directly upon the stream bank has increased the risk of flood damage, and lowering of the channel bed has caused bank erosion problems. Paragraph 11 states the river is not meeting certain biocriteria outlined in OAC 3745-1-07 due to habitat modification and disturbance.

{¶ 20} The draft then outlines several Orders directing appellants to implement a plan designed to fully remediate the river. It states that "[t]he Plan shall focus on facilitating the natural recovery of the river. Where appropriate, the plan may include replacement of the stockpiled substrates within the stream channel to provide enhanced habitat, to expedite the stream channel recovery process or to stabilize streambanks at specified locations."

{¶ 21} A section of the draft, titled "Reservation of Rights," provides, in part:

Ohio EPA reserves the right to take any action, including but not limited to any enforcement action for civil or administrative penalties against Respondent for violations specifically cited in these Orders, action to recover costs, or action to recover damages to natural resources, action to compel further remediation pursuant to any available legal authority as a result of past, present, or future violations of state or federal laws or regulations or the common law, and/or as a result of events or conditions arising from, or related to, the Site. Upon termination pursuant to the Termination Section of these Orders, Respondent shall have resolved their liability to Ohio EPA only for the Work performed pursuant to these Orders.

{¶ 22} Larry Reeder, enforcement supervisor of the surface water division at the Ohio EPA, testified that it did not intend to pursue a civil penalty against appellants at the time they were negotiating. Cynthia Paschke also testified regarding these negotiations. Ms. Paschke was qualified as an expert witness, limited to the collection and analysis of habitat data in the river, and she also represented appellants during their negotiations with the Ohio EPA. Ms. Paschke testified that appellants were prepared to move forward with the negotiated restoration project had the Ohio EPA waived its reservation of rights regarding future administrative and civil penalties, as it had done with the Village of Kirtland Hills. The Ohio EPA did not waive its reservation of rights, and Mr. Reeder testified he was notified in May 2009 that appellants would not sign the draft agreement and would not move forward with the restoration project. As a result, on June 25, 2009, the director of the Ohio EPA requested in writing that the Ohio Attorney General initiate civil proceedings against appellants.

{¶ 23} On July 27, 2009, the Village of Kirtland Hills signed a settlement agreement with the Ohio EPA (i.e., the final version of the Director's Final Findings and Orders). The village agreed, in part, to do the following: (1) remove the piles placed on the floodplain and redistribute the material into and along the river channel; (2) develop a plan to construct bank stabilization where appropriate to reduce bank erosion and stress; (3) develop a plan to re-vegetate exposed areas following excavation and construction activities; (4) develop a plan for storm water pollution prevention; (5) provide a schedule for implementing the plans and submitting reports to the Ohio EPA; (6) submit a plan to monitor river channel morphology, habitat quality, and biological water quality; and (7) submit a plan for the creation of a riparian buffer along the river that provides for permanent protection through a conservation easement or an environmental covenant. The "Reservation of Rights" section of this agreement, Section XI, simply provided that the "Ohio EPA and Respondent each reserve all rights, privileges and causes of action, except as specifically waived in Section XI of these Orders." Mr. Reeder testified that the Ohio EPA was not seeking a financial penalty against the Village of Kirtland Hills.

{¶ 24} The Village of Kirtland Hills hired Oxbow River and Stream Restoration, Inc. ("Oxbow") to perform the remedial work in the river. In January 2011, Oxbow developed a storm water pollution prevention plan, a stream restoration plan, and a stream restoration project summary of work. The remediation work outlined in the settlement agreement was largely completed by November 2013. Oxbow had redistributed approximately 25,000 cubic yards of previously dredged material into approximately 5,260 linear feet of active channel; stabilized approximately 1,240 feet of stream bank; and planted native grasses, sedges, shrubs, and trees on approximately 11.5 acres of land. Mr. Anderson testified that the river bed had been raised one to two feet in most locations, which improved access to the floodplain. The Oliva pile, however, was not removed and redistributed; apparently, the Village of Kirtland Hills refused to authorize work on property not under its control.

{¶ 25} William Zawiski, a water quality supervisor with the Ohio EPA, testified that he conducted a habitat evaluation on November 19, 2013. The restoration work had improved the habitat, but the river still needed more cover and pools; the river had not fully recovered from the unauthorized activities.

{¶ 26} Mr. Keitz testified that he conducted a stream channel classification survey in December 2013. The river remained moderately entrenched and could barely reach its floodplain; the river remained highly unstable with no bank protection. He recommended planting trees and other vegetation to stabilize the banks and further raising the bed, by adding rocks and other material, to slow river velocity and create habitats.

{¶ 27} The parties submitted post-trial briefs at the conclusion of the bench trial. Appellants restated the defenses they had raised at various stages throughout the case. First, appellants argued the statutory framework under which the complaint was brought ( R.C. 6111.04 & R.C. 6111.07 ) does not prohibit dredging; thus, the only alleged violations at issue relate to the unauthorized discharge of dredged materials into the river. Second, appellants argued the statutes at issue do not require one to obtain a permit; rather, obtaining a permit "provides a safe harbor, whereby individuals or companies who obtain a permit are exempted from these pollution laws." With regard to the imposition of a civil penalty, appellants argued the State had mischaracterized its failure to perform any remediation on the river as a result of recalcitrance, instead of recognizing it as a result of the Ohio EPA's refusal to waive civil penalties.

{¶ 28} On August 1, 2016, the trial court found in favor of the State of Ohio on all three counts.

{¶ 29} Regarding Count One-which alleged that defendants violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) by failing to obtain Section 401 and Section 404 permits prior to commencing work in the river-the trial court found appellants' activities along the East Branch Chagrin River resulted in the placement of dredged material in the river in excess of one cubic yard, thus triggering the requirement to obtain the permits.

{¶ 30} Regarding Count Two-which alleged appellants violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) by failing to obtain a construction storm water discharge permit before engaging in construction activities-the trial court found the State had shown that appellants disturbed one or more acres of land along the East Branch Chagrin River, thus triggering the requirement to obtain the permit. The trial court stated appellants' claim that the permitting process merely provides a safe harbor exemption from Ohio's water pollution laws has no basis in law.

{¶ 31} Regarding Count Three-which alleged that appellants violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) because they polluted the river by discharging storm water from land within and along two miles of stream channel of the river-the trial court stated it was closely related to Counts One and Two and, "[a]pplying the factors and analysis applied in count two," it found in favor of the State.

{¶ 32} The trial court found Mr. Osborne was subject to personal liability on all three counts and therefore held his Estate jointly and severally liable along with Osborne Co.

{¶ 33} The trial court found that significant harm to the river environment was caused by appellants' dredging; appellants were aware of the requirement to at least obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, but failed to do so; appellants avoided the costs of various permits and obtained an economic benefit from farming the land owned by the Village of Kirtland Hills; and the State incurred extraordinary enforcement costs. As a result, the trial court imposed a civil penalty of $404,240.00, plus post-judgment statutory interest.

This amount consists of $180,000 for 24 days of active dredging of the East Branch Chagrin River with each day being assessed a $7,500 penalty. This amount also includes $184,080 for creating a public nuisance by leaving spoil piles along the river from July 13, 2007 to November 1, 2013 (the date the Village of Kirtland Hills completed its portion of remediation) for a total of 2,301 days at $80 per day and an additional $40,160 for creating a public nuisance by allowing the remaining spoil pile to exist from November 2, 2013 to the present (July 29, 2016) for a total of 1,004 days at $40 per day.

{¶ 34} The trial court also ordered extensive injunctive relief, as follows:

(A) Defendants are permanently enjoined from discharging any pollution, other wastes, and dredge and fill material to waters of the State on or from the banks of the East Branch Chagrin River except in compliance with Chapter 6111 and any necessary permits and/or Section 401 certifications issued pursuant to Chapter 6111 and the rules adopted thereunder;
(B) Defendants shall submit a plan to the Ohio EPA to redistribute and/or remove the remaining pile in the East Branch Chagrin River within ninety days from the date of this judgment entry;
(C) Defendants shall implement and execute the approved redistribution and/or removal plan;
(D) Defendants shall submit a monitoring plan to characterize the current channel morphology, habitat quality, and biological water quality in the East Branch Chagrin River within ninety days from the date of this judgment entry;
(E) Defendants shall implement and execute the approved monitoring plan;
(F) Defendants shall submit a plan for the creation of a riparian buffer along the East Branch Chagrin River to bar construction activities and stream channel modifications except as authorized by the Ohio EPA within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of this judgment entry;
(G) Defendants shall implement and execute the approved riparian buffer plan; and
(H) Defendants shall submit a post-construction report to the Ohio EPA after completion of the remediation work and creation of the riparian buffer.

{¶ 35} Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment entry and assert four assignments of error for our review. Their first assignment of error states:

{¶ 36} "The trial court erred in interpreting the state of Ohio's statutory claims to encompass all work performed in the East Branch Chagrin River without a permit, as opposed to limiting the state of Ohio's claims to the discharge of dredged materials into the East Branch/Chagrin River."

{¶ 37} All three counts alleged in the complaint are premised on violations of the Water Pollution Control Act, found in Revised Code Chapter 6111. Appellants first assert that the deposit of dredged materials into the East Branch Chagrin River, rather than the excavation of material out of the river, is the only conduct the trial court should have considered in determining whether appellants violated the relevant statutes. They also argue the trial court improperly relied on federal permit requirements to find liability under state statutes.

{¶ 38} Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo. Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp. , 125 Ohio St.3d 358, 2010-Ohio-1926, 928 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 6 (citations omitted).

{¶ 39} The Water Pollution Control Act provides that "[n]o person shall violate or fail to perform any duty imposed by sections 6111.01 to 6111.08 of the Revised Code or violate any order, rule, or term or condition of a permit issued or adopted by the director of environmental protection pursuant to those sections . Each day of violation is a separate offense." R.C. 6111.07(A) (emphasis added). Also, at the time of the alleged offenses, R.C. 6111.99(A) provided: "Whoever violates section 6111.04, 6111.042, 6111.05, or division (A) of section 6111.07 of the Revised Code shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Thus, we emphasize that "sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused." R.C. 2901.04(A).

{¶ 40} Pursuant to R.C. 6111.03(G), the director of environmental protection may "[a]dopt, amend, and rescind rules in accordance with Chapter 119. of the Revised Code governing the procedure for hearings, the filing of reports, the issuance of permits, the issuance of industrial water pollution control certificates, and all other matters relating to procedure[.]" The director has adopted such rules, which are found in the Ohio Administrative Code at Chapter 3745.

{¶ 41} Appellants are charged with violating R.C. 6111.07(A) by violating R.C. 6111.04(A), which provides that "[n]o person shall cause pollution or place or cause to be placed any sewage, sludge, sludge materials, industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters of the state." Any such action is declared to be a public nuisance, except in cases where the director has issued a valid and unexpired permit or renewal thereof, as provided in R.C. 6111.01 to R.C. 6111.08.

{¶ 42} Appellants are also charged with violating R.C. 6111.07(A) by violating OAC Rule 3745-32-02(A)(2). At the time of the alleged offenses, the rule provided: "A section 401 water quality certification is required to obtain * * * [a] permit from the army corps of engineers pursuant to section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act[.]" Appellants obtained neither a 401 certification or a 404 permit. Appellee's amended complaint concluded that appellants had violated this rule by engaging in certain activities that resulted in pollution and degradation of the river without first obtaining a 401 certification or a 404 permit. This is not, however, conduct prohibited by the rule; this is conduct prohibited by R.C. 6111.04(A). Obtaining these permits would have provided appellants with an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of R.C. 6111.04(A). Appellee apparently anticipated appellants' inability to raise this defense and, in so doing, essentially alleged the same violation in two separate counts.

{¶ 43} It is worth noting that the language of OAC Rule 3745-32-02(A)(2) has since been amended. It now explicitly prohibits certain conduct, rather than merely proscribing a requirement for obtaining a 404 permit. It reads, in pertinent part:

(A) Any applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct any activity which may result in a discharge of dredged or fill material to a water of the state shall apply for and obtain a 401 certification from Ohio EPA.
(B) No person shall engage in an activity requiring a 401 certification prior to obtaining that certification from Ohio EPA.

This current language provides a basis for charging a separate violation; the language at all times relevant to this case, did not. We therefore continue to analyze the charge brought under R.C. 6111.04(A).

{¶ 44} "Pollution" is defined as "the placing of any sewage, sludge, sludge materials, industrial waste, or other wastes in any waters of the state." R.C. 6111.01(A). "Other wastes" is defined as "garbage, refuse, decayed wood, sawdust, shavings, bark, and other wood debris, lime, sand, ashes, offal, night soil, oil, tar, coal dust, dredged or fill material , or silt, other substances that are not sewage, sludge, sludge materials, or industrial waste, and any other 'pollutants' or 'toxic pollutants' as defined in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act that are not sewage, sludge, sludge materials, or industrial waste." R.C. 6111.01(D) (emphasis added). "Dredged material" means "material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the state." OAC 3745-32-01(H) (formerly (E) ). At the time appellants conducted their activity in the river, "discharge of dredged material" was recognized only when it was in excess of one cubic yard in a single or incidental operation. See former OAC 3745-32-01(C).

{¶ 45} Thus, it was not a violation of R.C. 6111.04(A) to excavate the East Branch Chagrin River. As pled, appellants are only potentially liable under R.C. 6111.04(A) for the discharge of dredged material into the river and for any other actions constituting pollution, as defined above, because they did not have permits to do so.

{¶ 46} Appellants are also charged with violating R.C. 6111.07(A) by violating OAC 3745-38-06 and by violating a term or condition of a permit issued by the director. On April 21, 2003, the director issued a General National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Construction Activities ("2003 General Permit"). The 2003 General Permit allows for the discharge of storm water from sites where construction activity is being conducted, as defined in the permit, conditioned upon the payment of applicable fees, submittal of a complete Notice of Intent application form, and written approval of coverage from the director in accordance with OAC 3745-38-06. OAC 3745-38-06(F) provided, at the time of the alleged offenses, that "[f]ailure to submit a notice of intent or request an individual permit will result in an unpermitted discharge subject to enforcement." Under the plain language of this rule, appellants are only potentially liable for the discharge of dredged material into the river due to the failure to submit a notice of intent or request an individual permit to do so.

{¶ 47} The trial court erred to the extent it found appellants liable for activity outside the scope of R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A). Appellants' argument that violations of these sections are the only properly alleged violations is well taken. Appellants are liable under R.C. 6111.04(A) for placing dredged material into the river and in any location where it could cause pollution of the river, because they did not have valid unexpired permits to do so. Appellants are also liable under R.C. 6111.07(A) for violating former OAC 3745-38-06 by failing to submit a notice of intent or request an individual permit prior to discharging dredged material into the river. As pled, they cannot be held liable for excavating the material out of the river.

{¶ 48} Appellants further assert that the only conduct the trial court should have considered as a violation of R.C. 6111.04(A) is the discharge of dredged materials into the water of the river, not the dredged materials deposited on the river banks. Appellants contend the trial court erred in making a determination that the "waters of the state," as defined in Chapter 6111, include all areas below the "ordinary high water mark." Appellants argue the concept of utilizing the "ordinary high water mark" to define the "waters of the state," thereby including dry land within the "waters of the state," is not supported by statutory or case law. This is, again, a statutory interpretation issue we review de novo. Riedel , supra , at ¶ 6.

{¶ 49} R.C. 6111.01(H) defines "waters of the state" as follows:

[A]ll streams, lakes, ponds, marshes, watercourses, waterways, wells, springs, irrigation systems, drainage systems, and other bodies or accumulations of water, surface and underground, natural or artificial, regardless of the depth of the strata in which underground water is located, that are situated wholly or partly within, or border upon, this state, or are within its jurisdiction, except those private waters that do not combine or effect a junction with natural surface or underground waters.

{¶ 50} The concept of the "ordinary high water mark" was introduced at trial by Edward Wilk, a Section 401 coordinator at the Ohio EPA. Mr. Wilk testified that in determining its jurisdiction, the Ohio EPA utilizes a December 7, 2005 Regulatory Guidance Letter from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Letter provides that, for purposes of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the lateral limits of jurisdiction over non-tidal water bodies, in the absence of adjacent wetlands, extend to the "ordinary high water mark." Corps regulations define the term at 33 CFR 328.3(c)(6) (formerly (e) ), which states:

The term ordinary high water mark means that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter and debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.

{¶ 51} We are not aware of any case law that holds the area over which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction is synonymous with the term "waters of the state" as used in R.C. 6111.04(A). Nor are we aware of any case law interjecting the concept of an ordinary high water mark into the definition of what constitutes "waters of the state." We agree with the State, however, that to accept appellants' argument would be to ignore the purpose of Ohio's Water Pollution Control Act and the problems it intends to remedy. See , e.g. , State v. Conley , 147 Ohio St. 351, 353, 71 N.E.2d 275 (1947) ("It is fundamental in the construction and application of statutes that not only the purpose to be served, but the object to be attained as well as the evil to be remedied, should be considered."). It defies all sense to conclude that the discharge of pollutants into a portion of a river that is fortuitously dry at the time of such discharge, but is at other times filled with water, falls outside the rubric of Ohio's Water Pollution Control Act.

{¶ 52} Further, in determining whether appellants violated R.C. 6111.04(A), it is not necessary to define "waters of the state" in such a way that it equates to or includes the "ordinary high water mark." Again, R.C. 6111.04(A) provides that "[n]o person shall cause pollution or place or cause to be placed any sewage, sludge, sludge materials, industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters of the state." (Emphasis added.) "Pollution" is defined, in relevant part, as "the placing of * * * other wastes [including dredged material] in any waters of the state." R.C. 6111.01(A) & (D).

{¶ 53} Thus, pollution, in violation of R.C. 6111.04(A), can occur either directly or indirectly. A direct violation occurs by placing dredged material in a water of the state. An indirect violation occurs by placing, or causing to be placed, dredged material in a location where it then causes pollution of a water of the state.

{¶ 54} Here, there is evidence that appellants directly caused pollution by placing dredged materials in the river, which is a water of the state. There is also evidence that appellants indirectly caused pollution by placing dredged materials in a location that resulted in some of that material ending up in the river, in excess of one cubic yard, either due to storm water runoff or due to the river rising up to the location. It is irrelevant, under the terms of the statute, whether that location of placement is above or below any ordinary high water mark.

{¶ 55} Appellants' argument that the trial court should not have considered the depositing of dredged materials on the river banks is not well taken.

{¶ 56} Appellants' first assignment of error has merit to the extent indicated. We have no question, as previously discussed, that there were violations of numerous statutory and administrative regulations. For whatever reason, however, the State did not charge appellants with violations of those provisions. Appellants proceeded to trial defending the allegations in the complaint. It would be unfair to require them to defend against violations alleged in letters and administrative orders that were not contained in the complaint filed with the trial court.

{¶ 57} Appellants' second and third assignments of error state:

[2.] The trial court erred in assessing a civil penalty against defendants in the amount of $404,200.00.
[3.] The trial court erred in awarding injunctive relief beyond the scope necessary to address the current effects of dredged materials into the East Branch/Chagrin River, as opposed to, any impact of the overall work performed in the river without a permit.

{¶ 58} Based on our disposition of the first assignment of error, we must remand this matter to the trial court to make a finding specifically related to the violations alleged in the complaint, to wit: discharge of materials into the East Branch Chagrin River without permits, as provided in R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A), and thereafter limit any civil penalty to the consequences of that conduct and to fashion an order of injunctive relief that addresses only the violations of R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A) as alleged in the complaint. Appellants' second and third assignments of error are therefore unripe at this time.

{¶ 59} Appellants' fourth assignment of error states:

{¶ 60} "The trial court erred in finding the Estate of Jerome T. Osborne personally liable."

{¶ 61} Appellants contend in order to find Mr. Osborne personally liable, the State must "pierce the corporate veil." They assert there was no evidence Mr. Osborne conducted any of the unauthorized activity in his personal, rather than corporate, capacity.

{¶ 62} The State responds that Ohio law is clear that individuals may be held liable when a court finds "personal participation" in the unlawful act and that it is not necessary to pierce the corporate veil. The State did not allege in its complaint that Mr. Osborne was responsible as an officer or owner of Osborne Co. It alleged that Mr. Osborne, individually, violated R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A). The State contends the plain language of the statute establishes the personal liability of Mr. Osborne. Appellants argue in response that the State's "personal participation" theory is an attempt to expand its enforcement powers beyond its statutory authority.

{¶ 63} R.C. 6111.04(A)(1) provides that "no person shall cause" a violation of the statute. R.C. 6111.07(A) provides that "no person shall violate or fail to perform any duty" under R.C. 6111.01 to R.C. 6111.08. In the definitions related to this chapter, at R.C. 6111.01(I), the term "person" includes all those set forth in the definition found at R.C. 1.59(C), which defines "person" as including "an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, and association."

{¶ 64} The parties stipulated that Osborne Co. is a corporation that has been incorporated under the laws of the state of Ohio since 1956 and is currently in good standing with the Ohio Secretary of State. Mr. Osborne was an owner and officer of Osborne Co.

{¶ 65} "A corporation is an artificial person, created by the General Assembly and deriving its power, authority and capacity from the statutes. * * * A corporate officer or shareholder normally will not be held liable for the debts or acts of the corporate entity." Mohme v. Deaton , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2005-12-133, 2006-Ohio-7042, 2006 WL 3833923, ¶ 7, citing Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 160, 707 N.E.2d 499 (1999) (citation omitted). "An exception to shareholder liability exists where, 'upon piercing the corporate veil,' it appears that a corporation is simply the 'alter ego' of the individual sought to be held liable." Id. at ¶ 8, quoting Inserra v. J.E.M. Bldg. Corp. , 9th Dist. Medina No. 2973-M, 2000 WL 1729480, *4 (Nov. 22, 2000).

{¶ 66} "In addition, a corporate officer can be held personally liable for tortious acts he or she has committed and, under such circumstances, a plaintiff need not pierce the corporate veil to hold individuals liable who have personally committed such acts." Id. at ¶ 9 (citations omitted). This has become known as the "personal participation" theory and has been applied to environmental law violations. See, e.g. , State ex rel. DeWine v. Sugar , 7th Dist. Jefferson, 2016-Ohio-884, 60 N.E.3d 735, ¶ 35 (citation omitted); State ex rel. DeWine v. Marietta Indus. Enters., Inc. , 4th Dist. Washington No. 15CA33, 2016-Ohio-7850, 2016 WL 6875425, ¶ 25.

{¶ 67} "A corporate officer, however, 'may not be held liable merely by virtue of his status as a corporate officer.' " Roberts v. RMB Ents., Inc. , 197 Ohio App.3d 435, 2011-Ohio-6223, 967 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.), quoting Mohme , supra , at ¶ 28. Rather, the evidence presented must indicate that the officer specifically directed the particular act to be done or that the officer participated or cooperated therein. Id. , citing Young v. Featherstone Motors, Inc. , 97 Ohio App. 158, 171, 124 N.E.2d 158 (1954) ; see also Marietta , supra , at ¶ 25 (citations omitted).

{¶ 68} The parties stipulated that Mr. Franz was employed by Mr. Osborne through Osborne Co. since 1991. It was also stipulated that Mr. Osborne directed Mr. Franz to remove material from the stream bed and place it along the edge of the river, on the river banks, and in the middle of the river and that Mr. Osborne personally observed some of this work. The parties further stipulated that Mr. Osborne usually called Mr. Franz the night before or first thing in the morning to instruct him what project to work on each day and what to do for each project, and that Mr. Osborne would usually call Mr. Franz at night to see how the work for the day went. Notably, the stipulations also include the following:

Defendants performed the work on the East Branch Chagrin River pursuant to April 1983 and June 1990 Agreements with the Village of Kirtland Hills to maintain the river banks. * * * In exchange for the work performed on the East Branch Chagrin River pursuant to the April 19, 1983 Agreement, Defendant Jerome T. Osborne was allowed to farm certain property owned by the Village of Kirtland Hills. [Emphasis added.]

{¶ 69} Thus, there is evidence that a personal benefit was conferred on Mr. Osborne and that he acted independent of the corporation, at least to some degree. The record does not contain any evidence that he was acting, at all times material, only in his corporate capacity. The State alleged Mr. Osborne personally violated the statute. The fact that he may have been acting in his corporate capacity is a defense to that claim-a defense that was not established in the record.

{¶ 70} In light of the stipulations and evidence presented, we agree that Mr. Osborne's personal participation in the violations has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court did not err in finding Mr. Osborne's Estate jointly and severally liable along with Osborne Co.

{¶ 71} Appellants' fourth assignment of error is without merit.

{¶ 72} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed with regard to holding appellants jointly and severally liable. The judgment is reversed with regard to the finding of liability for activity outside the scope of R.C. 6111.04(A) and R.C. 6111.07(A). This matter is remanded for the trial court to make a finding specifically related to the violations alleged in the complaint and thereafter limit any civil penalty and injunctive relief to the consequences of that conduct.

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion,

COLLEEN MARY O'TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion.

{¶ 73} I concur in the decision to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this matter for a proper determination of damages based on the alleged violations of R.C. 6111.04(A) and 6111.07(A) contained in the complaint, i.e., the "discharge of materials into the East Branch Chagrin River." Supra at ¶58. It is evident from the trial court's judgment that its determination of the appellants' liability relied heavily on the dredging of the stream channel rather than the discharge of materials. See , e.g. , "Anderson testified that the dredging activities significantly degraded fish and macro invertebrate habitat"; "[t]he dredging throughout the river resulted in a loss of riffles, pools and bank vegetation"; and "significant adverse changes in the morphology and habitat of the river were caused by the dredging." July 29, 2016 Opinion and Judgment Entry, at 12, 16, and 18.

{¶ 74} I would also point out the trial court, in its consideration of damages, noted that the appellants "chose not to settle at the administrative level" and, "unlike the Village of Kirtland Hills, * * * did not agree to measures to remediate the river," and also "obtained an economic benefit from being able to farm the extensive lands owned by the Village of Kirtland Hills." Opinion and Judgment Entry, at 19. The import of these findings is compromised by the fact that the appellants were willing to adopt measures to remediate the river if the State would have been willing to waive the right to seek civil penalties as it had done for the Village of Kirtland Hills. The State's failure to make this concession has not been satisfactorily explained, particularly given that all the appellants' dredging activity was done at the behest of the Village. With respect to the economic benefit derived by the appellants, this literally consisted of grass for consumption by appellants' horses. There is little in the record to support a finding of bad faith or self-interest on the part of the appellants.

{¶ 75} Accordingly, I concur in the judgment and opinion of this court.

COLLEEN MARY O'TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.

{¶ 76} I would uphold the trial court's order in its entirety. As such, I respectfully dissent.

      The original announcement of decision, State of Ohio ex rel. DeWine v. Osborne Co., Ltd. , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-091, 2017-Ohio-8284, 100 N.E.3d 1, released October 23, 2017, is hereby vacated. This opinion, issued upon reconsideration, is the court's journalized decision in this appeal. See App.R. 26(A)(1).

      Testimony at trial explained that a "river mile" is similar to a mile marker on a highway. Here, it is measured by the distance from Lake Erie (R.M. 0) to the source of the river. R.M. 6.15 is upstream of R.M. 4.30 and is just upstream of St. Hubert's Church, located at 8870 Baldwin Road, Village of Kirtland Hills, Ohio. R.M. 4.30 is near the western boundary of property owned by the Village of Kirtland Hills.

      Testimony at trial explained that cold water streams in Ohio are generally small, with small drainage systems. A cold water stream such as the East Branch Chagrin River is unique due to its size. It provides a large cold water habitat the State of Ohio seeks to preserve.

      Testimony at trial explained that the "bankfull area" is the portion of the stream channel that is large enough to contain the stream under most flow conditions. This area is either bare or has aquatic and annual vegetation; perennial vegetation cannot grow there because its roots are too wet or its seedlings get swept away. The floodplain lies above the bankfull area.