author: DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

text:
    Roselyne MARIKASI, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 16-3281
    United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
    Decided and Filed: October 20, 2016

      ON BRIEF: Larisa I. Schneider, Florence, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Alexander J. Lutz, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before: KEITH, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Roselyne Marikasi (“Marika-si”) appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her asylum petition. On August 20, 2014, an IJ denied Marikasi’s application for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 8 U.S.C. § 241(b)(3) and withholding of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ determined that Marikasi was not a credible witness due to inconsistencies in her testimony and her failure to sufficiently corroborate her claims. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Marikasi’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal on all counts and ordered Marikasi removed to her native country of Zimbabwe. Marikasi timely appealed the BIA’s decision on March 24, 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the BIA.

I. BACKGROUND

Marikasi, a native citizen of Zimbabwe, legally entered the United States on January 19, 2002 on a non-immigrant visitor’s visa with an expiration date of July 18, 2002. On November 25, 2002, Marikasi filed a form 1-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal. Since she had overstayed her visa, her application was referred to the Immigration Court, and on September 25, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings alleging that she was in violation of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). On July 11, 2005, Marikasi filed an amended Form 1-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal.

In her initial application from 2002, when asked whether she had suffered from harm or mistreatment in the past, Marika-si stated the following:

I got married to a very abusive husband it all started when I kept having miscarriages and that was when beatings and death threats started from a man I was living woth [sic] everyday [sic]. He use [sic] to sleep with a knife under the pillow and he was accusing me of cheating on him and I was causing all the miscarriages.

She did not check the box provided for “political opinion” as a reason for seeking asylum, but instead checked “nationality5’ and “membership in a particular group.” This initial application made no mention that her husband was a government agent in Zimbabwe or that she or her husband were members of any political party. In the portion of the application that asked whether Marikasi had been a member of any organization, such as á political party in Zimbabwe, she mentioned only the Mu-sasa Project for battered women.

In the 2005 amended application for asylum, Marikasi provided a different answer. In this application, when asked whether she had suffered from harm or mistreatment in the past, Marikasi stated:

I was tortured and mistreated by my husband who was a Government agent [in Zimbabwe] and by members of the ZANU PF [the leading party] because I belonged to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) [the opposition party]. My brother was brutalized and killed in 2002 by ZANU PF members because of my political activities in the MDC.

This time, Marikasi checked the box provided for “political opinion,” “membership in a particular group,” and “torture convention” as reasons for seeking asylum, but did not check the box for “nationality.” In response to the question concerning whether she had been involved in any organizations, such as a political party, Mari-kasi stated that she belonged to the MDC, Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe and actively organized meetings, campaigns, and rallies.

Following the submission of these asylum applications and several corroborating documents, a hearing was first held before an IJ in 2006. The IJ found that Marikasi was not a credible witness. The IJ said her story “developed wings,” transitioning from a battered wife’s story of domestic abuse at the hands of her husband to a political asylum story from an anti-government activist. As such, the IJ denied Mari-kasi’s claim for asylum due to its lack of credibility and deemed her removable.

On appeal in 2011, the BIA remanded the case for further factual development regarding . Marikasi’s claim of domestic abuse.

Following remand in 2014, an IJ once again denied Marikasi asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The 2014 IJ made the following findings concerning Marikasi’s testimony: (1) Marikasi was inconsistent regarding the number of times she went to the hospital, when she went to the hospital, and what caused her husband to beat her so badly she had to go to the hospital; (2) Marikasi was inconsistent with regard to whether she reported the abuse she suffered; (3) Marikasi was inconsistent regarding her involvement with the Musasa Project for battered women; (4) Marikasi’s testimony that she went into hiding from her husband in either April 2001 or October 2001 was inconsistent with evidence in both her initial asylum application and her amended asylum application; and (5) Marikasi was inconsistent in describing the reason or reasons why her husband would abuse her. Because, domestic abuse was the central reason for her asylum application, the 2014 IJ held that her inconsistencies, and her stated explanations for them, warranted an adverse credibility determination,

In addition, the 2014 IJ held that Mari-kasi did not sufficiently corroborate her claims to meet her burden of proof on the issue of past persecution. Relevant corroborating documents included a medical record showing that there was a “scuffle” with her husband, an affidavit from a former co-worker to whom Marikasi confided regarding the alleged domestic abuse, a letter from an American psychologist reporting anxiety related to domestic abuse and a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), and a letter from a doctor in Zimbabwe reporting “political violence” she allegedly suffered in 2001. The BIA affirmed the IJ after according limited weight to the individualized evidence of corroboration proffered by Marikasi.

The 2014 IJ, however, made the following determinations in Marikasi’s favor: (1) the Zimbabwean government is unable or unwilling to control domestic violence, and (2) women who suffer from domestic violence in Zimbabwe at the hands of a domestic partner and are unable to leave are sufficiently “particular” and therefore meet the requisite “social distinction” for asylum purposes. However, the 2014 IJ found that Marikasi was unable to demonstrate that her status in the domestic relationship with her husband was or is immutable because she could not show that she was unable to leave the abusive relationship and therefore failed to show that she was a member of this “particular social group.”

Next, the 2014 IJ held that Marikasi also did not meet the higher burden of proof for showing fear of future persecution. Similarly, the 2014 IJ found that she could not meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal under the INA or CAT.

Marikasi appealed the 2014 IJ decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ and dismissed the appeal. The BIA concluded that the 2014 IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. The BIA also agreed that Marikasi failed to present sufficient corroborative evidence to rehabilitate her discredited testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof. Further, it held that Marikasi waived the issue of whether she could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of Zimbabwe and that she was not a member of an immutable group based on marital status because she did not'show that she was unable to leave the marital relationship. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

This court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal from the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “The agency’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, and questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). “The BIA’s decisions are final agency determinations for purposes of judicial review, and we are also empowered to review the IJ’s opinion to the extent that the BIA adopts that opinion.” Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519, 526 (6th Cir. 2015).

“Credibility determinations are considered findings of fact, and are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.” Sylla v. I.N.S., 388 F.3d 924, 925 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2004)). “This is a deferential standard: A reviewing court should not reverse simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Rather, findings of fact, such as adverse credibility determinations, are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yu, 364 F.3d at 702). However, “[a]n adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” Id. at 637 (quoting Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926). Adverse credibility determinations “cannot be based on an irrelevant inconsistency.” Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 619 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2004). “If discrepancies cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance [her] claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Id. at 623 (quoting Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)). Even where several inconsistencies cited by the IJ are irrelevant or do not go to the heart of the applicant’s asylum claim, only one relevant inconsistency is required to uphold an adverse credibility determination. See Sy v. Holder, 337 Fed.Appx. 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).

B. Legal Standard

Under the INA, “the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum” if it is determined that “such an alien is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(A). The applicable definition for refugee includes a person away from her home country “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). When interpreting the INA, this court defers to the BIA’s judgment. Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003) (“we recognize the deference due the BIA’s interpretation of the INA insofar as it reflects a judgment that is peculiarly within the BIA’s expertise”) holding modified on other grounds by Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2006).

“The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee[.]” 8 Ü.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i). This burden can be carried ‘“either because [s]he has suffered actual past persecution or because [s]he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.’ ” Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)-(b) (1997)). “The applicant’s testimony, if credible, ‘may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (a) (1997)). If past persecution is shown, “[a]n applicant ... [establishing] such past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).

The INA does not define persecution, but this court has held that it “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Lumaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). We have interpreted “persecution” to require “physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.” Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. Further, persecuted individuals are those who are “specifically targeted by the government for abuse based on a statutorily protected ground and ... not merely a victim of indiscriminate mistreatment.” Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005).

Likewise, membership in a “particular social group” is statutorily undefined, “but several [BIA] decisions have refined and articulated the requirements to include: (1) a shared immutable or fundamental characteristic; (2) social visibility; (3) particularity; and (4) the group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subject to harm.” Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

1) Adverse credibility determination

Marikasi challenges each of the inconsistencies on which the 2014 IJ based the adverse credibility determination. Because only a single relevant inconsistency that goes to the heart of the applicants claim, and that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as inconsistent” need support an IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we will not review each of these in detail. Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Sy, 337 Fed.Appx. at 495. We conclude that Marikasi’s inconsistent statements provide substantial evidence on the record that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as inconsistent.”

Regarding whether any of these inconsistencies are relevant and go to the heart of Marikasi’s claim, “[i]f discrepancies cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance ... claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Daneshvar, 355 F.3d at 623. The hospitalizations recounted by Marikasi were allegedly caused by either her husband’s abuse or a group of pro-government youths who attacked Marikasi for organizing a political opposition rally. The BIA found that Marikasi was inconsistent regarding the number of times she was hospitalized, the dates of her hospitalization, and the reasons for the abuse that led to the hospitalization. Marikasi also did not mention being hospitalized in her initial asylum application. Her asylum claim is based on abuse from her husband, who she alleged was a Central Intelligence Officer for the leading party in Zimbabwean government, the ZANU-PF. Marikasi’s initial asylum application alleged persecution based on “membership in a particular social group,” and her amended asylum application alleged persecution on basis of “political opinion.” These hospitalizations can be viewed as attempts to “enhance [her] claims of persecution” because evidence of hospitalization can show the “physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty” required in the context of an asylum claim. Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. If credible, hospitalizations resulting from Marikasi’s domestic abuse or her political activities would bolster her asylum application and thus her inconsistencies concerning those hospitalizations go to the heart of her claim. Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence on the record supported an adverse credibility determination in this case and we will not disturb those findings on appeal.

Additionally, we agree with the BIA that other important factual inconsistencies between Marikasi’s asylum application and her testimony supported an adverse credibility determination. In Marikasi’s initial asylum application, she reported the following:

I got married to a very abusive husband it all started when I kept having miscarriages and that was when beatings and death threats started from a man I was living woth [sic] everyday [sic]. He use [sic] to sleep with a knife under the pillow and he was accusing me of cheating on him and I was causing all the miscarriages.

Yet, as the BIA noted, Marikasi claimed in her declaration and testimony upon remand that her husband physically abused her and she subsequently suffered two miscarriages. This differs significantly from the claim in her first asylum application that the miscarriages predated the abuse. This inconsistency in the timeline of domestic abuse is relevant and at the heart of Marikasi’s asylum claim because domestic abuse forms the very basis for her claim. It is of no moment that Marikasi expressed varying reasons as to why her husband abused her. Yet, alarm bells rightly toll on account of her variant stories as to when such tragic miscarriages transpired. Thus, Marikasi’s testimony surrounding her miscarriages “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” and support IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Pillea, 388 F.3d at 954.

2) Corroborating evidence

The BIA concluded that Marikasi did not present sufficient corroborative evidence to rehabilitate her discredited testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof. Marikasi raises several arguments in response to this determination.

First, Marikasi claims that the BIA ignored the medical records reflecting Petitioner’s hospitalization in 1999 resulting in her miscarriage due to her beating by her husband. However, this claim is without merit. In regard to the 1999 medical records, the IJ found that the records corroborated only the fact that Marikasi was abused by her husband in 1999, but failed to provide sufficient details to allow the court to determine that the abuse qualified as persecution under asylum standards. Considering that, oddly, Marikasi failed to discuss the account of the abuse in 1999 in her initial application or her 2006 hearing, we agree that this medical record, which reported a “scuffle at home with her husband,” does little to corroborate domestic abuse rising to the level of persecution, which requires evidence of physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty. Mikhailevicht, 146 F.3d at 390. Nor does the medical record clear up the credibility concerns stemming from Marikasi’s inconsistent statements.

In her remaining arguments concerning corroboration, Marikasi essentially argues that the corroborating evidence should have been afforded more weight. However, the role of this court is not to weigh the evidence. See Gray v. SLC Coal Co., 176 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[w]e should not reweigh evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the [factfinder]”). Our role here is to ensure that substantial evidence on the record supported the BIA’s fact-finding. In this regard, the letters, affidavits, and reports cited in Marikasi’s brief do not sufficiently corroborate her underlying asylum claim because they fail to fill significant, relevant gaps in her testimony.

Additionally, Marikasi cites to a Third Circuit case, Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2005), to argue the impact that PTSD can have on the accurate testimony of women who have been subjected to domestic or sexual violence. However, comparison to this case is inapposite. Fiadjoe involved a victim later recalling sexual abuse from when she was seven years old. Id. at. 137. The adverse credibility determination in that case turned in part on allegedly improper conduct by the IJ at her hearing. See id. at 155. In addition, some of the inconsistencies were based on testimony that was given to an INS officer in the airport very shortly after she suffered abuse. Id. at 159. Marikasi had a significant amount of time—almost a year—between her arrival in the United States and filling out her asylum application, and she claims no partiality or abuse on the part of the IJ. Further, her psychologist’s note provides no particularized explanation for how PTSD played a role in Marikasi’s varying accounts of the events in Zimbabwe. Thus, none of the pressures or circumstances that’ existed in Fiadjoe are present here, and the BIA did not err in finding that Marikasi failed to corroborate a litany of outstanding inconsistencies in her statements.

3) Past Persecution—“Particular social group”

Lastly, Marikasi contests the IJ and BIA determination that she did not meet the standard for an abused spouse seeking asylum. Under the INA, a refugee includes a person away from her home country “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail.himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In Matter of AR-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), the BIA reviewed the issue of whether spouses escaping an abusive domestic relationship can obtain asylum on refugee grounds and concluded in the affirmative.

This court has held that a “particular social group” is' a- group of individuals who share a common, immutable characteristic that is one that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013); Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011). The group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution, and the group must be both particular and socially visible. Umana-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 671. In this case, the BIA determined that, while victims of an abusive domestic relationship can qualify as a particular social group, Marikasi did not prove that she was part of a group with the requisite common, immutable characteristic. We agree. . .

“Marital status” is an immutable characteristic when the “the individual is unable to leave the relationship.” Matt ter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392. As further explained:

A determination of this issue will be dependent upon the particular facts and evidence'in a case. A range of factors could be relevant [in a domestic abuse situation], including whether dissolution of a marriage could be contrary to religious or other deeply held moral beliefs or if dissolution is possible, when viewed in light of religious, cultural, or legal constraints.

Id. at 393.

The BIA distinguished Marikasi’s case in the following important respects from Matter of A-R-C-G(1) when Mari-kasi went into hiding with the Musasa Project, she did not have any contact with her husband; (2) after she left the Musasa Project, she stayed with friends and never returned to her husband; (3) a substantial period of time had passed since Marikasi went into hiding and she remained out of contact .with her husband; and (4) she remained out of contact with her husband after leaving Zimbabwe. In addition, we note that because- of her ability to freely move through the country and avoid her husband, Marikasi failed to substantiate any religious, cultural, or legal constraints that prevented her from separating from the relationship in Zimbabwe or moving to a different part of that country. See Matter of A—R—C—G—, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393. Furthermore, Marikasi’s case illustrates that she had a substantial network of family, friends, and co-workers who showed willingness and ability to help her within Zimbabwe and she did not credibly show any particular actions or complicity by the government which would have rendered her unable to avail herself of that country’s protection.

Thus, Marikasi failed to carry hér burden because she failed to prove that she could not leave the relationship or that she could not relocate to another part of Zimbabwe.

4) Fear of Future Persecution

Having found that Marikasi did not show past persecution, consequently, there is no presumption that she faces a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(í)(ii); see also Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating.that where an applicant proves past persecution, “there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution”). Marikasi argues that the burden of proof was improperly placed on her by the BIA. However, because we agree with the BIA that she has not shown past persecution, the burden is properly on her to show future persecution. Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390.

Having made a determination that Marikasi has not suffered past persecution, we must determine whether the evidence would compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility of Marikasi suffering future persecution if she were to return to Zimbabwe. Id.) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). Our inquiry requires reasonably specific information showing a “real threat of individual persecution,” and a general, speculative assertion of fear is not enough to compel such a conclusion. Mapouya, 487 F.3d at 412 (emphasis added). Marikasi cites primarily to a State Department Report that discusses the difficulties the government of Zimbabwe has with controlling domestic violence in support of her claim. This report, however, does not support Marikasi’s individual claim of persecution. Further, despite her general expression of fear that her husband will resume the abuse upon her return, Marikasi failed to explain why she cannot move to another part of Zimbabwe, where she could avoid contact with her husband. See 8 C'.F.R. § 1208.1S(b)(2)(ii). Therefore, we are not compelled to conclude that the BIA erred in failing to find a reasonable probability of future persecution.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the BIA’s determination that Marika-si’s has not met her burden of proof to establish eligibility for asylum.

5) Withholding of Removal

Because Marikasi has not met her burden of proof on her eligibility for asylum, she accordingly cannot satisfy the more demanding standard that there is a clear probability of persecution required for withholding of removal under the Act. Liti, 411 F.3d at 641.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the BIA.

      . We note that there is a new standard of review for credibility determinations, which was created by the REAL ID Act of 2005. Under the REAL ID Act, considering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, a fact finder in an asylum claim may base an' adverse credibility determination on an inconsistency, regardless of whether the inconsistency goes to the "heart of the claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(l)(B)(iii). However, when an application for asylum is filed before May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act of 2005 does not apply. See Abdurakhmanov, 735 F.3d at 345 n.3. Here, Marikasi's application for asylum was filed in 2002. Thus, the inconsistencies on which the adverse credibility determination was made must go to the “heart of the applicant’s claim,” See Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926.

      , At least one sister circuit has utilized this analysis in a domestic abuse asylum claim. Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir.2016) (denying petition for review because petitioner, who was not married to the abusive man, could not prove immutability or social distinction).

      . We note that this analysis is based on Mari-kasi’s demonstrated ability to escape the abusive relationship and survive safely within her native country. The facts of Matter of A-R-CG- dictate that asylum applicants who allege that they cannot leave the relationship under this rule are not precluded from relief merely because they were able to escape the relationship and arrive in the United States. The petitioners in Matter of A-R-C-G- were "natives and citizens of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection.” Id. at 389. Thus, it would be inappropriate to use the fact that Marikasi was able to escape her country and arrive in the United States to defeat her asylum claim, as this undercuts the very purpose of asylum.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    William TENNIAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.; Jim Cochran; Michael Slabaugh, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-6356
    United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
    Argued: September 27, 2016
    Decided and Filed: October 24, 2016

      ARGUED: Luther Oneal Sutter, Sutter & Gillham, P.L.L.C., Little Rock, Arkansas, for Appellant. John E. B. Gerth, Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Luther Oneal Sutter, Sutter & Gillham, P.L.L.C., Little Rock, Arkansas, Andrew C. Clarke, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. John E. B. Gerth, Aron Z. Karabel, Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
    Before: GILMAN, GIBBONS, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

William Tennial is an African-American employee of United Parcel ■ Service, Inc. (UPS) who has served in various managerial roles over the course of more than 30 years with the company. After a number of service failures that occurred during his time as Hub Manager of the Memphis Hub’s “Twilight Sort,” Tennial was placed on a Management Performance Improvement Plan (MPIP) and eventually demoted to a supervisor of the Oakhaven Hub, a position that he currently holds. Although he acknowledges these service failures, Tennial points to a number of Caucasian managers who were allegedly responsible for similar failures, yet did not suffer comparable adverse employment actions. He therefore maintains, that his placement on the MPlP and his subsequent demotion were in fact motivated by race, age, and disability discrimination, as well as by retaliation for taking medical leave.

Tennial' brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against UPS and his supervisors, Jim Cochran and Michael Sla-baugh. UPS, Cochran, and Slabaugh subsequently moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on all claims; For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

In 2009, Tennial began working as the Business Manager of the Walnut Grove Packaging Center. His supervisors noted performance deficiencies and serious service failures at that facility over the next two years. Despite these service failures, Tennial contends that his performance was on par with other Caucasian managers.

In May 2011, Tennial became the Hub Manager of the Twilight Sort, where he worked under Hub Division Manager Richard Williams. Tennial’s performance and leadership deficiencies persisted, and the Twilight- Sort failed to meet performance goals under his supervision. He claims, however, that the Twilight Sort was in disarray before he took over and had failed to meet its performance goals for many years prior to his appointment.

In September 2011, the Twilight Sort suffered particularly severe service failures under Tennial’s leadership, including an incident in which over 200 packages were not sorted in a timely manner. Tennial and Williams were summoned to Nashville to' meet with UPS supervisors and Ken Harms, UPS District President, in order to discuss the 200 delayed packages and other service failures at the Twilight Sort. Although Williams had previously supervised managers who missed loads, he had never before been summoned to the District President’s office to explain this type of service failure,

Tennial alleges that Harms ■ told him during the -meeting that, unless he voluntarily stepped down as the Hub Manager, Harms would make it “extremely difficult for him to be successful.” He refused to step down. Tennial now contends that Harms followed through on his promise and created an extremely hostile work environment. As a result, Tennial requested leave for stress, depression, and anxiety under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shortly after this meeting. He was granted leave and thus missed UPS’s peak holiday season, which is the company’s busiest. Tennial returned to his position as the Hub Manager of the Twilight Sort in early 2012.

After Williams’s retirement later that same month, Cochran became the Hub Division Manager for Memphis and Tennial’s direct supervisor. Cochran monitored and assessed Tennial’s performance throughout March and April 2012. Numerous service failures were observed by Cochran, which Tennial claims were partly due to inexperienced supervisors, turnover, and a lack of capability at the Twilight Sort. In April 2012, Cochran and District Hub Operations Manager Sla-baugh nonetheless decided to put Tennial on a MPIP. At a meeting discussing his MPIP, Tennial took responsibility for his service failures and committed to. improving his performance. He also acknowledged that a failure to meet the goals stated in the MPIP could result in an adverse employment action, including a demotion.

Tennial thereafter failed to meet the goals of his MPIP. He was demoted in July 2012 from the Hub Manager at the Twilight Sort to Full Time Hub Supervisor at the Oakhaven Hub. Cochran testified that this demotion was performance-based, but Tennial maintains that the MPIP goals were impossible to attain because of the inexperienced supervisors at'the Twilight Sort, a lack of support, unpredictable volume, and the desire of upper management to see him fail. Tennial further asserts that previous and subsequent Caucasian Hub Managers of the Twilight Sort also failed to meet performance goals, yet were not demoted like he was.

B. Procedural background

In Tennial’s complaint, he first alleged that the defendants discriminated against him based on his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. He next brought claims under both the THRA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623, for age discrimination, as well as claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, for disability discrimination. Finally, Tennial alleged that the defendants interfered with his medical leave and retaliated against him, in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2616.

UPS, Cochran, and Slabaugh moved for summary judgment on all counts in November 2014. Tennial opposed their motion and, in June 2015, filed a motion under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asking the court to defer the consideration of summary judgment in order for him to supplement his response with additional discovery. According to the motion, Tennial wished to depose three managerial-level UPS employees regarding incidents that had happened after the filing of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The defendants filed a response opposing Tennial’s motion, claiming in part that the information that he sought to discover was irrelevant to his claims.

In November 2015, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Tennial’s Rule 56(d) Motion. Following this decision, the defendants filed a Bill of Costs with the Clerk of Court, seeking to recover permissible costs due the prevailing party under Rule 54 (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tennial objected, arguing that the court should use its discretion and refuse to tax costs against him because the costs sought were-unreasonable and unjustified. In February 2016, despite Tennial’s objections, the Clerk awarded costs to the defendants in the amount- of $8,921.30. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Watson v. Cartee, 817 F.3d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is proper when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this assessment, we must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party. McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016).

The denial of a Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery, on the other hand, is reviewed using the abuse-of-discretion standard. Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 720 (6th Cir. 2004). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” F.T.C. v. E.M.A Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that we will not reverse the district court’s ruling on Tennial’s motion unless we conclude that the ruling was arbitrary, unjustifiable, or clearly unreasonable. See id. The abuse-of-discretion standard is also applicable to our review of the district court’s decision concerning the taxation of costs. Soberay Mack & Equip. Co. v. MRF Ltd., Inc., 181 F.Sd 759, 770 (6th Cir. 1999).

B. Racial-discrimination claims

Although Tennial’s claims of racial discrimination arise under different statutes, they can all be considered by utilizing the same analytical framework. See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 573 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The elements of [a] prima facie case as well as the allocations of the burden of proof are the same for employment claims stemming from Title VII and § 1981.”); Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 526 F.3d 880, 885 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The analysis of claims brought pur suant to the THRA is identical to the analysis used for Title VII claims.”). Under this framework, a plaintiff can prove racial discrimination by proffering either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-65 (6th Cir. 2003). Tennial argues that he can establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination under both methods, so we will address each of them in turn.

2. Direct evidence

Direct evidence consists of facts that, “if believed, require[ ] the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Id at 865. In other words, when direct evidence is provided, no inferences are needed in order to conclude that racial discrimination is afoot. Id.

Tennial points to the following as direct evidence of racial discrimination: (1) Cochran’s use of the word “n*****” in referencing another, nonparty UPS employee, and (2) a statement made by District President Harms during a meeting with Tennial, in which Hams used the word “boys” in reference to Tennial’s black coworkers. Despite the derogatory nature of these words, the alleged comments do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination against Tennial.

The first comment is based on the bare-bones affidavit of a coworker, consisting of one sentence claiming that Cochran called the coworker a “n*****” while both were at work. Tennial was not present during this alleged incident. He next points out that the use of the word “boy” can be discriminatory, based on factors such as context, tone, and local custom. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (per curiam). But neither of these alleged comments was directed at or made in reference to Tennial, nor were they made in the context of his demotion. See id/, see also Worthy v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 472 Fed.Appx. 342, 347 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting as direct evidence of discrimination the use of the word “boy” when it was too remote in time to the adverse employment action).

A' finding of racial discrimination based on these comments, moreover, would require us to make inferences. First, we would have to infer that Cochran’s alleged use of the n-word with respect to an unrelated employee meant that his decision to demote Tennial was due to a similar racial animus. We would also be required to infer that Harm’s reference to Tennial’s coworkers as “boys” meant that his animus trickled down and influenced the individual decisions of Cochran and Slabaugh to initiate Tennial’s MPIP and demotion process.

In sum, neither of these stray comments constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination against Tennial. His “direct-evidence” theory of liability therefore fails.

2. Circumstantial evidence

Alternatively, Tennial' argues that there is enough circumstantial evidence to establish that UPS, Cochran, and Slabaugh discriminated against him based on race. We apply the burden-shifting approach from the McDonnell Douglas line of cases to analyze these claims under Title VII, Under this approach, Tennial must first establish the elements of a pri-ma facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). He has to show that he was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and (4) replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated nonminority employees. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992). If Tennial can establish these elements, then the burden shifts to UPS to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his demotion. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Assuming that UPS has done this, Tennial can still survive the company’s motion for summary judgment if he can “identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason is actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” See Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 812 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Macy v. Hopkins Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Tennial met the McDonnell Douglas requirements to establish a prima facie case. As an African American, he is a member of a protected class and his demotion constitutes an adverse employment action. Tennial was qualified for the job of Hub Manager because he had over 30 years of experience at UPS and was transferred to that position by the company. See Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 662-63, 666 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that consideration of the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at the prima facie stage of the case improperly conflates the distinct stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry). Finally, Tennial meets the last prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test because he was replaced as Hub Manager by a Caucasian.

The burden therefore shifted to UPS to come forth with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his demotion. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. UPS pointed to Tennial’s failure to correct on-going performance deficiencies and his failure to meet reasonable expectations as set forth in the MPIP. This performance-based reason is supported by numerous performance failures at the Twilight Hub both before and after Tennial’s MPIP process began, which he has acknowledged.

Because UPS put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for Tennial’s demotion, the burden shifted back to Tennial to “identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason is actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination” in order to survive the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Provenzano, 663 F.3d at 812. To show pretext, Tennial points to other Caucasian UPS managers who allegedly had comparable service failures, yet were not demoted. Although a plaintiff can prove pretext in several ways, evidence “[especially relevant to such, a showing” is proof that an employer treated similarly situated Caucasian employees differently when they engaged in acts of comparable seriousness. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Tennial must therefore show that similarly situated Caucasian “comparators” were responsible for. similar performance deficiencies, yet were not placed on a MPIP or demoted.

The nonprotected employee need not be identical in every way in order to be a proper comparator. Instead, the plaintiff must show that the comparator is similarly situated in all relevant respects and has engaged in acts of comparable seriousness. Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012). There is no specific list of factors that we must consider in making this determination. Instead, we must make an “independent determination as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiffs employment status and that of the nonprotected employee” based on the facts of the case. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998). Tennial put forth four potential comparators: James Fly, Jay Briggs, Bill Shadle, and Ann Hatley. He maintains that all of these Caucasian employees were responsible for performance failures, yet none were disciplined. For the reasons discussed below, however, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable jury could find any of these candidates to be adequate comparators.

Tennial first argues that Fly, who permanently replaced him as Hub Manager of the Twilight Sort in February 2013, is a proper comparator. Although Fly failed to meet performance goals during his first year as Hub Manager and has received reviews of “improvement needed,” he has not been placed on a MPIP or demoted for failing to meet these goals. Differences in experience and disciplinary history, however, establish that Tennial and Fly are not similarly situated. See Campbell v. Hamilton County, 23 Fed.Appx. 318, 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that differences in job title and responsibilities, experience, and disciplinary history may establish that two employees are not similarly situated). Fly had less than two years of management experience when he became Hub Manager and had worked in the Memphis Hub for only five years. Tennial, on the other hand, has over 10 years of managerial experience and over 20 years of experience at the Memphis Hub. Because of these differences, no,reasonable jury could find that Fly and Tennial are similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Tennial next contends that Briggs is a proper comparator. Briggs was Hub Manager of the Twilight Sort before Ten-nial' served in that position. Tennial argues that Briggs was a poor performer, but was not placed on a MPIP or demoted. He bases these assertions largely on an email from Slabaugh, written after Slabaugh observed the Twilight Sort under' Briggs’s management for only one day. In the email, Slabaugh comments that the Twilight Sort had “the worst package handling” he had ever seen.

Tennial further claims that Williams, his former supervisor, transferred him to the “troubled” Twilight Sort so that he could fix the problems that Briggs created there. The record, however, reveals that this is a mischaracterization. Williams testified that Briggs was a strong performer and was transferred from the Twilight Sort to the Oakhaven Hub because Oakhaven was the biggest and hardest sort. In contrast, Williams said that Tennial was performing below average as Hub Manager from the outset and that Williams himself had considered putting Tennial on a MPIP.

True enough, the record reveals that Briggs had previously been asked to prepare corrective-action plans to address his performance deficiencies. But these write-ups are similar to the ones that Tennial completed with respect to his own performance deficiencies, which cuts against the argument that Tennial and Briggs were treated differently. UPS records also indicate that Briggs improved and show that, during 2011 and 2012, Briggs was meeting his performance goals. Briggs, therefore, did not have the long-standing performance issues that Tennial did. So Briggs was not similarly situated to Tennial, nor did he h'ave a record of comparable acts of serious performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury, therefore, could find Briggs to be a proper comparator.

Shadle, who replaced Tennial as Hub Manager of the Twilight Sort during Tennial’s FMLA leave and briefly after his demotion, is offered as still another potential comparator. Tennial claims that, as his interim replacement, Shadle failed to meet the performance goals of a Hub Manager, but was not demoted. Despite Tennial’s assertions, there is no record evidence to support this argument. Shadle, moreover, was a training manager, acting only as a temporary replacement for Tennial and not as a permanent Hub Manager. No reasonable jury could find Shadle to be similarly situated to Tennial in all relevant respects or that he engaged in acts of comparable seriousness.

Finally, Tennial argues that Hat-ley is a proper comparator. Hatley is the Hub Manager at the Oakhaven Hub and served in that capacity during 2011 and 2012 when Tennial was put on a MPIP and demoted. Tennial asserts that Hatley failed to meet her performance goals, yet did not suffer consequences similar to Ten-nial. Hatley’s performance record, however, indicates that she did not engage in performance failures of comparable seriousness to Tennial’s. In 2010 and 2011, the record shows that Hatley actually exceeded her performance goals. Although Hat-ley fell 39% short of one of her performance goals in 2012, Cochran did not put her on a MPIP plan because she had exceeded her goals in the prior two years. Hatley’s performance errors, despite this singular .failure in 2012, were neither as long-standing nor as serious as Tennial’s. Because of these differences, no reasonable jury could find Hatley and Tennial to be similarly situated.

In sum, Tennial has failed to show that Fly, Briggs, Shadle, or Hatley are proper comparators. There is, moreover, no other evidence of pretext in the record. Because Tennial has failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to pretext, his racial-discrimination claims were properly found to not survive the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

C. ADEA claims

Tennial also asserts that, as an employee over the age of 50, he has been subjected to discrimination based on his age. He brings his claims under the ADEA, which prohibits age discrimination in employment decisions. 29 U.S.C. § 623. Much like the cases under Title VII, a plaintiff who alleges employment discrimination under the ADEA may bring a claim using either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2009). Because Tennial presented no evidence of discriminatory age-related statements made by any deci-sionmakers, his claim must be analyzed under the approach used for circumstantial evidence.

That approach embraces the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime discussed above. Id. at 622. Tennial was therefore required to show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was demoted, (3) he was qualified for the position held, and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. Id. Although Tennial was able to establish a prima facie case óf age discrimination for essentially the same reasons as stated in Part II.B. above, the sole fact that he was replaced by a younger person is insufficient as a matter of law to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether UPS’s nondiscriminatory reason for demoting him was pretextual. See Chappell v. GTE Prod. Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he isolated fact that a younger person eventually replaces an older employee is not enough to permit a rebuttal inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination”). The district court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment against Ten-nial on his ADEA claims.

D. ADA claim

We now turn to Tennial’s assertion that his rights were violated under the ADA. As the district court noted, the record is unclear as to the specific nature of Tennial’s disability. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we will assume that his work-related stress qualifies as a disability. Tennial alleges that he was subjected to discrimination because of this disability and because he was denied a reasonable accommodation,

He first asserts that his placement on a MPIP and the subsequent demotion were the result of disability discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, “a plaintiff must show that 1) he or she is disabled; 2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) suffered an adverse employment decision; 4) the employer knew or had reason to know of the plaintiffs disability; and 5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced.” Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the disability must be a “but for” cause of the adverse employment action. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

Even assuming that Tennial was able to meet elements one, two, three, and five of a prima facie case, he failed to present proof that any of- the defendants were aware of his disability. An employee cannot be subject to an . adverse employment action based on his disability unless the individual decisionmaker responsible for his demotion has knowledge of that disability. Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 Fed.Appx. 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2013). Although Tennial’s supervisors were aware that he took leave, there is no indication anywhere in the record that his supervisors knew that this leave was for work-related stress.

A prima facie case is not made out if the decisionmaker is unaware of the specifics of an employee’s disabilities or restrictions, even if the decisionmaker has a general knowledge that a disability exists. Arthur v. Am. Showa, Inc., 625 Fed. Appx. 704, 708 (6th Cir. 2015). Despite Tennial’s assertions, the record evidence shows that Tennial’s supervisors, including the primary decisionmaker Cochran, were unaware of Tennial’s stress-related disability. His claim for disability discrimination therefore fails.

Tennial’s related claim that he was denied a reasonable accommodation is similarly without merit. He relies on a recorded conversation from a meeting with Cochran held after he was put on the MPIP. The key part of this recording is as follows:

MR. TENNIAL: All right. I just wanted to talked [sic] to you. Eventually I want to sit down because it seems like I’m having a hard time comprehending exactly what your expectations are. So if you don’t mind just—of course, my ADA deal, I just wanted to ask you I had this—
MR. COCHRAN: Hold on. I don’t want to be recorded. I never had anybody record me before. I mean, I will be glad to put it in writing exactly what, you know, what is expected. Guarantee your process, showing leadership.
MR. TENNIAL: You want me to turn it off?
MR. COCHRAN: Please do.

Tennial claims that the above interaction constituted a request for and a denial of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. He contends that he needed a recording device because he was having trouble understanding what Cochran wanted. The recorder would have allowed Tennial to refer back to the conversation. Tennial admits that he did not further inform anyone at UPS of his request for an accommodation under the ADA, but insists that, during this interaction, he told Cochran that he was stressed out and needed a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

To make out a claim for the denial of a reasonable accommodation, an employee must first show that he proposed an accommodation and that the desired accommodation is objectively reasonable. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1108 (6th Cir. 2008). Employees must not only “request to be accommodated, but [must] also provide their employers with a sufficient basis to understand that the request is being made because of their disability.” Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 647 Fed.Appx. 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2016).

. Although there is no bright-line test for determining when an employee like Tennial has made such a request, “at a minimum he must ‘make it clear from the context that [the request] is being made in order to conform with existing medical restrictions.’ ” Id. (quoting Leeds v. Potter, 249 Fed.Appx. 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007)). The district court correctly held that a fleeting reference to “my ADA deal” was insufficient to put Cochran on notice of an accommodation request. Telmial did not explain that the recorder would help accommodate .his disability, .and the record evidence indicates that Cochran did not understand his request as such.

And even if Cochran had understood Tennial’s request as one for an ADA accommodation, Tennial’s claim fails for a second reason. If denied a requested accommodation, an employee cannot force his employer to provide that specific accommodation if the employer offers an alternative reasonable accommodation. Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 457 (6th Cir. 2004). In the present case, Cochran offered to memorialize the conversation for Tennial in -writing. Tennial fails to explain why this would not constitute a reasonable accommodation. Because Tennial has not met his evidentiary burden in showing that he made a request for an accommodation under the ADA, and because Cochran offered an 'alternative reasonable accommodation, Tennial’s claims under the ADA are without merit.

E. FMLA claims

Tennial next points to alleged errors in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on his claims under the FMLA. The FMLA entitles qualifying employees up to Í2 work weeks of leave under specified circumstances, including if they are suffering from a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). This court has recognized two theories of recovery under the FMLA: interference and retaliation. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell. Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 282 (6th Cir. 2012). Although a plaintiff can proceed under both theories, the proof needed for each claim differs. Id. A plaintiff proceeding under a retaliation theory must show discriminatory or retaliatory intent, whereas a plaintiff alleging interference need not prove any unlawful intent on the part of his employer. Id. Tennial asserts that his FMLA rights were violated under both theories. We will therefore address each of them in turn-.

Tennial first claims that his FMLA rights were interfered with when he was held responsible for the performance deficiencies of his interim replacement after he' returned from leave. To establish a claim for interference under the FMLA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he' is an eligiblé employee, (2) the defendant is an employer as defined under the FMLA, (3) the employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) the employee gave the employer notice of his intention to take leave, and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2005).

Analysis of the first four factors is unnecessary ■ because Tennial has not pointed to any evidence in the record showing that he was denied FMLA benefits. A benefit is denied if an “employer interferes with the FMLA-created right to medical leave or to reinstatement following the leave.” Arban v. W. Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 2003). Tennial was never denied leave. He was in fact granted it twice,, once in 2011 when he was the Twilight Sort’s Hub Manager and again in 2012 when he served as a supervisor of the Oakhaven Hub. Nor was he denied reinstatement to those positions when he returned from leave.

Tennial also brings a retaliation claim under the FMLA. He asserts that he was retaliated against for exercising his FMLA rights because he was placed on a MPIP after he returned from leave in 2011. Tennial alleges that his placement on a MPIP and his subsequent demotion were not motivated by his poor performance, but because he took leave during UPS’s peak holiday season. To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the Act, (2) this exercise of his protected rights was known to the defendant, (3) the 'defendant thereafter took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Id at 404.

In order to establish such a causal connection, a plaintiff must show some type of retaliatory intent. Tennial therefore had to establish that the true motivation for his placement on a MPIP and his subsequent demotion were not for the reasons given, but were instead based on the fact that he took a medical leave of absence. Id. at 404. To prove this causal connection, Tennial points to two sources of evidence: (1) the timing of his demotion, and (2) his supervisors’ hostility towards employees that take leave during the peak holiday season. But neither of these theories are supported by sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor.

Tennial requested and was granted leave under the FMLA shortly after his September 2011 meeting with Harms, and he returned to work in early 2012. Following his placement on a MPIP and his failure to meet those performance goals, Tennial was demoted to supervisor status in July 2012. Despite this nearly seven-month period of time between his return to work and his demotion, Tennial urges us to infer that his demotion was actually based on the exercise of his FMLA rights. The district court correctly noted, however, that the gap between Tennial’s return and his demotion is too long to support such an inference. Temporal proximity of more than six months, standing alone, has not been found to support an inference of retaliatory discrimination absent other compelling evidence. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “cases that have permitted a prima facie case to be made based on the proximity of time have all been short periods of time, usually less than six months”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Tennial contends, however, that there is additional evidence to support an inference of retaliatory discrimination. He points to the testimony of James Wherry, a former UPS division manager, who said that UPS has a policy of disfavoring employees that take leave during the peak holiday season. Wherry based this assertion on comments made to him by Wilson, Director of Human Resources at UPS, regarding an unrelated, nonparty employee. The weakness of this evidence is underscored by the uncontested fact that Cochran, not Wilson, made the decision to place Tennial on a MPIP and recommended that Tennial be demoted. We therefore agree with the district court that this evidence does not raise a genuine dispute as to whether a causal connection exists between Tennial’s leave and his demotion. He was therefore unable to establish a prima facie ease for retaliation.

In sum, the record does not support Tennial’s FMLA claims based on either interference or retaliation. The district court thus did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on these FMLA claims.

F. Tennial’s motion to stay the court’s consideration of summary judgment

Tennial also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to stay consideration of the defendants’ summary-judgment motion. Before summary judgment was entered, Tennial became aware of other instances of UPS’s allegedly preferential treatment of managers outside the protected class. Specifically, Tennial sought to depose three Caucasian managers who purportedly committed serious integrity violations but did not suffer similar adverse employment' actions. Information discovered in these depositions, he argues, would likely be relevant under Bobo v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012) (defining a comparator as an employee who is similarly situated in all relevant respects to the plaintiff and has engaged in acts of comparable seriousness). Although Tennial failed to elaborate, he seems to be arguing that these employees could potentially serve as comparators under Bobo. Because the conduct in question happened soon after the close of discovery and is potentially relevant to his claims, Tennial argues that the district court should have granted him leave to supplement his response before ruling on the defendants’ summary-judgment motion.

The district court denied Tennial’s motion, holding that the potential new information was irrelevant and thus would not alter the outcome of the decision. This ruling was not clearly erroneous because key differences between this case and Bobo support the district court’s conclusion. As Bobo makes clear, Tennial must show that the proposed comparators’ conduct was similar in kind and in severity to his own. See id. They must “have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” See Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir. 2002).

Such similar conduct does not exist in the present case. Tennial’s demotion was the result of his poor performance as a Hub Manager, whereas the three employees in question are alleged to have engaged in “serious integrity violations.” Even if this misconduct occurred and did not result in adverse employment actions for these employees, their alleged integrity violations are materially different in kind from Tennial’s performance-based conduct. These differentiating circumstances preclude them from being proper comparators. See Parks v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., 607 Fed.Appx. 508, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2015) (rejecting as comparators employees who had different disciplinary issues than the plaintiff) (internal quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, the district court’s decision to deny Tennial’s Rule 56(d) motion was not an abuse of discretion.

G. Order taxing costs

Tennial’s final argument is that the district court erred in taxing costs of $8,921.30 against him under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. He mentions this issue in an extremely cursory manner, however, devoting only two sentences in his entire brief to the contention. Tennial simply argues that the district court’s ruling should be reversed because “the case was close and difficult” and because of the “relative economic disparity between the parties.” There are no citations provided to the record or to any caselaw, and the issue is not mentioned or developed elsewhere in the brief.

This issue has therefore been waived under this circuit’s caselaw, which states that “[i]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” See Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, we need not consider this issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgement of the district court.