author: MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Jeff PEPPERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-10866
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Date Filed: 08/25/2016

      Matthew C. Billips, Orr Brown & Billips, LLP, Meredith J. Carter, Billips & Benjamin, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Mark A. Adelman, Deborah L. Dance, Cobb County Attorney’s Office, Marietta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

       Honorable John M. Rogers, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

   MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Jeff Peppers, a retired criminal investigator with the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, commenced this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Cobb County, Georgia under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex after he learned that a less-experienced female in the office was earning a substantially higher salary for the same job. Although the District Attorney and Cobb County are indisputably distinct legal entities, each created separately by state law, Peppers claims that they acted as “joint employers” because the County was responsible for approving the District Attorney’s budget and paying Peppers’s salary and benefits. Rejecting this argument, the district court granted final summary judgment to Cobb County.

After thorough review and having taken oral argument, we affirm the judgment of the district court. As we see it, the County is a legally separate and distinct entity that did not control the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship between the office of the District Attorney and its criminal investigators, nor did it act as a joint employer with the District Attorney. Because its role as paymaster is wholly insufficient to establish that Cobb County was Peppers’s employer, he could not sue the County under the federal anti-discrimination laws.

I.

Jeff Peppers, a male formerly employed as an investigator in the District Attorney’s Office, sued Cobb County, Georgia in 2013 .under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (“Title VIP’), and 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 215 (“Equal Pay Act”). In his complaint, Peppers alleged that the County employed him as a criminal investigator in the District Attorney’s Office for a number of years. On April 18, 2011, he claimed he was promoted from Criminal Investigator to Assistant Chief Criminal Investigator. Peppers said that his salary should have been increased when he was promoted, but it was not. Peppers brought his concerns regarding his salary to the Chief Criminal Investigator, who, he claimed, admitted that Peppers was not being paid what he should have been, and that a female employee, Christine Nerbonne, was paid a substantially higher salary, despite his superior qualifications, experience, and higher rank within the department. Indeed, while Peppers was paid $55,459.54, Nerbonne was paid $72,384.00.

Peppers charged that the County denied him compensation to which he was entitled, and paid him less than similarly situated female employees on account of his gender, and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also asserted that because of his gender, the County paid him substantially less than female employees who were employed in jobs requiring equal work, skill, effort, and responsibility, in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Peppers sought relief in the form of a recovery of the difference in compensation between what he received and what higher-paid female employees received, as well as an equal amount of liquidated damages.

A review of this summary judgment record revealed the following undisputed facts. Cobb County had no involvement in Peppers’s recruitment, his hiring, the establishment of his job responsibilities, the regulation of his work environment, or his supervision. All of these core functions were performed by the District Attorney. Nor did the County set compensation for the District Attorney’s employees — those were set by the District Attorney himself. But Peppers was actually paid by Cobb County, his compensation came from Cobb County funds, and his employment benefits were the same as those available to Cobb County employees. Cobb County also approved the annual operating budget of the District Attorney’s Office, which included individual employee salaries. All of this occurred in accordance with Georgia law, which provides:

Personnel employed by the district attorney pursuant to this Code section shall serve at the pleasure of the district attorney and shall be compensated by the county or counties comprising the judicial circuit, the manner and amount of compensation to be paid to be fixed either by local Act or by the district attorney with the approval of the county or counties comprising the judicial circuit.

Ga. Code Ann. § 15 — 18—20(b). Investigators are included among the personnel employed pursuant to that section of Georgia’s code. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-18-20(a) (“The district attorney in each judicial circuit may employ such additional ... investigators ... as may be provided for by local law or as may be authorized by the governing authority of the county or counties comprising the judicial circuit.”).

During discovery, Anthony Hagler, the human resources director for Cobb County, was deposed twice — once on his own behalf and once as a representative for Cobb County pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). When asked if employees, such as Peppers, working in the District Attorney’s Office were considered County employees, Hagler stated several times that they were on the County payroll, and considered County employees. In each such instance, however, Hagler made clear that he considered County employment to be synonymous with appearing on the County’s payroll. Hagler also said that the County reported to the Georgia Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that individuals working in the District Attorney’s Office were County employees. Moreover, the District Attorney’s employees were covered by the County’s worker compensation plan, and unemployment compensation policy. The employees’ salaries were paid out of Cobb County’s general funds.

Hagler’s testimony was clear throughout that, as far as he and the County were concerned, the County’s involvement with the District Attorney’s employees was limited to providing the budget and benefits. The County played no role in hiring, supervising, firing, establishing pay, or setting the duties and responsibilities of the prosecutor’s employees. As Hagler explained in a separately filed declaration after his deposition, the County’s limited involvement with the District Attorney’s criminal investigators included cutting their paychecks, ensuring that criminal investigators received proper benefits under the County’s employee benefits and retirement program, and distributing annual pay raises when requested and approved by the District Attorney and authorized by the County. Notably, Cobb County played no role in Peppers’s recruitment or hiring, creating his job title, establishing his job responsibilities and pay, regulating his work environment, or supervising him.

Indeed, the District Attorney’s Office was a legal entity separate from the County. See Ga. Const, art. VI, § 8, ¶ 1(a) (“There shall be a district attorney for each judicial circuit, who shall be elected circuit-wide for a term of four years.”); Ga. Const, art. IX, § 9, ¶ I (“Each county shall be a body corporate and politic with such governing authority and with such powers and limitations as are provided in this Constitution and as provided by law.”). The County was responsible only for approving the District Attorney’s annual budget.

Former District Attorney Patrick Head confirmed in a deposition the nature of the criminal investigators’ relationship to the District Attorney. According to Head, he had total control over employee hiring, firing, and compensation, within the overall budgetary boundaries set by the County, although he believed that he needed County approval to create new positions or give someone a raise. Moreover, as he explained the system, he had the authority to set salaries — -with approval of the County — but disagreed with any suggestion that the County had the authority to set salaries by itself. Rather, the County’s power extended no further than approving or disapproving the salaries that he set as the District Attorney. As for Investigator Christine Nerbonne in particular, he recalled contacting the County Manager’s office" to get approval for her to be hired because he wanted this hiring to be recognized as a lateral transfer. This would enable Nerbonne to receive the same compensation she had been receiving in another position as a Cobb County employee. The current District Attorney, Vic Reynolds, reiterated Head’s understanding of the plenary authority of the District Attorney over the hiring, supervising, and firing of the Office’s personnel.

On this record, both parties moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge, to whom the case was referred, issued a Report and Recommendation that the County’s motion for summary judgment should be granted, and Peppers’s partial motion denied because no reasonable jury could find that the County was Peppers’s “employer” for purposes of either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. Peppers unsuccessfully filed objections with the district court. Most importantly, the district court concluded that Hagler’s testimony that Peppers was an employee on the County payroll could not be taken as an admission by the County that it was Peppers’s employer for the purposes of Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation as its own, granted the County’s summary judgment, and denied Peppers’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

This timely appeal followed.

II.

A.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment, taking all of the facts in the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008); Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. in Greene & Tuscaloosa Counties in State of Ala., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

B.

It is unlawful under Title VII for employers to discriminate against any individual on account of the individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~2(a)(l). Under Title VII, an “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). A “person” includes “individuals, governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Title VII defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employed.]” 42 U.S.C. § 20003(f). As we have previously observed, “This definition does not get us very far.” Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court, however, has held that when a statute includes such a “nominal definition” to define the term “employee,” Congress intended to “describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.” Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444-45, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). A plaintiffs status as an employee under Title VII is a question of federal, as opposed to state, law. Calderon v. Martin Cty., 639 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, an employee’s status is determined by examining the language contained in Title VII, existing federal case law, and the circumstances of the case. Id. at 273.

Likewise, the Equal Pay Act generally prohibits employers from paying employees of the opposite sex different amounts for equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and that are performed under similar working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). We have held that when evaluating whether a defendant would qualify as an employer who is subject to the terms of the Equal Pay Act, a court should consider among others, these basic factors: whether the employment took place on the alleged employer’s premises; the degree of control the putative employer exerted over the employees; and whether the alleged employer had the power to fire, hire, or modify the terms and conditions of employment. Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1995).

III.

A.

The County argues at the outset that, regardless of the merits of Peppers’s claim, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter because Peppers filed an EEOC charge against the District Attorney’s Office and not against the County itself. We have long recognized that “in the federal tandem, jurisdiction takes precedence over the merits. Unless and until jurisdiction is found, both appellate and trial courts should eschew substantive adjudication.” Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations adopted) (quoting Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658, 667 (5th Cir. 1971)). Thus, we are obliged first to consider our power to entertain the claim.

Generally, only a party named in an EEOC charge can subsequently be charged in a lawsuit filed in court under Title VII. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 1994). “This naming requirement serves to notify the charged party of the allegations and allows the party an opportunity to participate in conciliation and voluntarily comply with, the requirements of Title VII.” Id. Our courts liberally construe this requirement and, where the Act’s purposes are fulfilled, a party not named in an EEOC charge may be subject to federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 1358-59. In examining whether the Act’s purposes have been met, we are required to examine several factors, including:

(1) the similarity of interest between the named party and the unnamed party; (2) whether the plaintiff could have ascertained the identity of the unnamed party at the time the EEOC charge was filed;
(3) whether the unnamed parties received adequate notice of the charges;
(4) whether the unnamed parties had an adequate opportunity to participate in the reconciliation process; and (5) whether the unnamed party actually was prejudiced by its exclusion from the EEOC proceedings.

Id. We have treated the administrative exhaustion requirement as a “jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII action.” Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).

For starters, there is no dispute in this case that the County received adequate notice of the charges. Anthony Hagler, the County’s human resources director, testified that the County had received a copy of Peppers’s EEOC complaint. Moreover, there is at least a similarity — although not an identity — of interests between the County and the District Attorney’s Office on personnel matters. Finally, the County was not stopped from participating in the EEOC’s reconciliation process as a result of its failure to be named because — based on the EEOC’s quick turnaround of the charge — even the' District Attorney’s Office (which had been named) was not afforded the opportunity to participate. The County cannot show any prejudice it suffered as a result of Peppers’s failure to name it in his EEOC claim. Both the district court and this Court have jurisdiction to entertain Peppers’s claim.

B.

Peppers argues, in turn, that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment on the County’s behalf after concluding that the County was not Peppers’s employer. Peppers claims that although he worked directly in the District Attorney’s Office, the County acted as his “joint employer,” thus exposing the County to liability and suit under the federal anti-discrimination laws. On this record, we are unpersuaded.

A Title VII workplace discrimination claim can only be brought by an employee against his employer. Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1242; Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359. Consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII, the federal courts have interpreted the term “employer” liberally. Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359. Thus, in order to decide whether an entity is a qualified employer, we have asked this basic question: “who (or which entity) is in control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that gave rise to the claim.” Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). An examination of this question requires consideration of the totality of the employment relationship. Welch, 57 F.3d at 1011 (citing Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1968)). Among the basic factors we consider are these: (1) how much control the alleged employer exerted on the employee, and (2) whether the alleged employer had the power to hire, fire, or modify the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment. Welch, 57 F.3d at 1011; Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243.

Here, there is no dispute that Cobb County and the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office are legally distinct governmental entities. Indeed, as we have noted, the position and general duties of district attorneys are created by the Georgia state constitution. Ga. Const. art. VI, § 8, ¶ 1(a). The County, likewise, is created by the Georgia state constitution. Ga. Const. art. IX, § 9, ¶ I. Thus, the District Attorney’s Office for the Cobb Judicial Circuit is a wholly distinct state office. Nor is there any dispute that, as a matter of Georgia law, the County lacked the authority to supervise, hire, or fire employees of the district attorney. Ga. Const, art. IX, § 2, ¶ 1(c); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-18-20(b). Thus, the County only possessed the power to approve the “manner and amount of compensation” for employees that was set by the District Attorney. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-18-20(b). Finally, there is no dispute that Peppers was hired and wholly supervised by the District Attorney. This, then, would seem to end the inquiry.

Peppers argues, however, that it is still possible to aggregate the County and the District Attorney so that they can both be characterized as his joint employers. Affording the term “employer” the liberal construction it is due, there are instances where we have looked beyond the nominal independence of an entity and asked “whether two or more ostensibly separate entities should be treated as a single, integrated enterprise when determining whether a plaintiffs ‘employer’ comes within the coverage of Title VII.” Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1341. We have broadly recognized three circumstances when this kind of aggregation may be possible:

First, where two ostensibly separate entities are highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations, we may count them together under Title VII. This is the “single employer” or “integrated enterprise” test. Second, where two entities contract with each other for the performance of some task, and one company retains sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of the other company’s employees, we may treat the entities as “joint employers” and aggregate them. This is the “joint employer” test. Third, where an employer delegates sufficient control of some traditional rights over employees to a third party, we may treat the third party as an agent of the employer and aggregate the two when counting employees.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In considering whether Cobb County and the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney are properly aggregated, we first look for guidance in our en banc opinion in Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999), and its examination of when governmental subdivisions may be aggregated under the single-employer test. For one thing, we have held that “where a state legislative body creates a public entity and declares it to be separate and distinct, that declaration should be entitled to a significant degree of deference, amounting to a presumption that the public entity is indeed separate and distinct for purposes of Title VII.” Id. at 1344. If a “fact finder reasonably could conclude the plaintiff has clearly overcome the presumption” that the entities are separate, then the entities will be considered a single employer for purposes of Title VII. Id. at 1345. The standard is an exacting one, however, and the presumption is only overcome with strong evidence. Id. Lyes offered two ways to rebut the presumption against aggregating separate government entities. Id. In the first place, a plaintiff may rebut it by presenting evidence that a governmental entity was created or maintained for the purpose of evading the federal employment discrimination laws. Id. at 1344. Second, absent an evasive purpose, a plaintiff can offer evidence allowing a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the presumption is clearly outweighed by “factors manifestly indicating that the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that they should be counted together under Title VII.” Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). Relevant factors in this calculus include: centralized control of operations; authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline, or discharge; authority to establish work schedules or direct assignments; and the obligation to pay the plaintiff. Id. We also observed that “the source of a governmental entity’s funding is a poor indication of whether it should be aggregated with another.” Id. at 1346 n.10.

The reason for the presumption against aggregation where governmental subdivisions are concerned is rooted in comity, federalism, and respect for a state’s abilities to create and define its own institutions. As we explained, “We should not brush aside a state’s own distinctions between its governmental subdivisions, because even ostensibly formal distinctions are part of a government’s ability to shape its own institutions within constitutional bounds, and we are obligated to respect a state’s right to do so.” Id. at 1344. Because there are “few things closer to the core of a state’s political being and its sovereignty than the authority and right to define itself and its institutions in relation to each other,” id. we must act with particular care and hesitation when we are asked to override those distinctions the state has adopted.

Here, it is self-evident from the basic laws of the State of Georgia that Cobb County is a distinct entity from the District Attorney’s Office, and there is no argument that the Lyes standard for aggregating the two has been met. We have also observed, albeit outside the context of employment discrimination, that “Georgia district attorneys are paid by state funds, although the county or counties within the district attorney’s judicial circuit may supplement their salaries.” Owens v. Fulton Cty., 877 F.2d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Ga. Code. Ann. § 15-18-10). Moreover, district attorneys serve a judicial district, not a specific county. Id. In fact, the great majority of judicial circuits in Georgia are comprised of more than one county. Id. That the Cobb Judicial Circuit’s boundaries are coincidentally coterminous with Cobb County does not in any way lessen the fact that the District Attorney’s Office is a state, not a county, office. We add that Georgia statutory code expressly empowers the District Attorney to hire and discharge personnel and to “define the duties and fix the title of any attorney or other employee of the district attorney’s office.” Ga. Code. Ann. § 15-18-20(a). Clearly, the presumption of separation applies. There is nothing in this record — nor does Peppers argue that there is — to support a conclusion that the separation between the County and the District Attorney was created for the purpose of evading federal employment discrimination law, or that other factors manifestly indicated that the two entities are so closely interrelated that they should be considered as being one entity. See Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1345.

Since Peppers cannot reasonably claim that the County and the District Attorney ought to be considered a “single employer,” he argues that they acted as “joint employers,” at least insofar as his compensation is concerned. “A ‘joint employer’ relationship is different from, though sometimes confused with, a ‘single employer’ situation.” Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359 n.6. We are not aware of any case explicitly applying the Lyes framework to a “joint employer” analysis, as opposed to the “single employer” context arising in that case. This is arguably a meaningful distinction because in the context of a “single employer” finding, we are essentially erasing a distinction that the state itself has recognized. But a “joint employer” finding recognizes that separation, only to conclude that the two separate entities collaborated to jointly employ an individual. Because it does not completely disregard the state’s decision to separate its governmental subdivisions, the concerns of comity and federalism are lessened in a “joint employer” finding. That said, the concerns regarding comity and federalism do not completely vanish. Indeed, even when considering whether two governmental subdivisions are joint employers, we must remain mindful of the state’s expressed determination that the agencies and subdivisions of government are divided and separated. Although the degree of deference set forth in Lyes need not be afforded, we are still well-advised to act with care and circumspection before aggregating separate state actors as joint employers.

The test for determining whether two entities acted as joint employers is relatively straightforward:

The basis of the finding is simply that one employer while contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer. Thus the joint employer concept recognizes that the business entities involved are in fact separate but that they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.

Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1360 (emphasis added) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982)). The Tenth Circuit has provided a useful description of what it means to be a joint employer and how that differs from being a single employer: “While the single employer test looks at the overall relationships of the two entities, joint employer status is determined by focusing on the entities’ relationships to a given employee or class of employees. The joint employment relationship, in other words, is employee-specific.” Sandoval v. City of Boulder, Colo., 388 F.3d 1312, 1324 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, entities comprising a “single employer” are the same for all purposes, while “joint employers” are the same only for certain employees or classes of employees. Notably, the Tenth Circuit has described the focus as resting on the employee or class of employees, as opposed to particular aspects of employment. This corresponds to our conception of the inquiry as likewise being focused on the “total employment situation.” See Welch, 57 F.3d at 1011.

Peppers has not adduced any evidence to establish that the County and the District Attorney acted as his joint employers with regard to his total employment situation. Again, the County had no involvement in recruiting or hiring Peppers as a criminal investigator, creating his job title, establishing his job responsibilities and pay, regulating his work environment, or supervising him in any way. The County’s involvement with investigators working in the District Attorney’s Office was essentially to act as a paymaster — its role consisted solely and entirely of issuing paychecks, ensuring investigators received proper benefits, distributing annual pay raises when requested and approved by the District Attorney, and approving the District Attorney’s budget. The long and short of it is that the District Attorney alone filled nearly all of the roles traditionally filled by an employer. Indeed, Cobb County had no more control over the nature, power, and functions of the investigators than it had the authority to determine which cases and prosecutions the District Attorney’s Office ought to pursue. Thus, looking at a “conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine,” the signs point obviously (and solely) toward the District Attorney being Peppers’s employer. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 538 U.S. at 445, 123 S.Ct. 1673 (quotation marks omitted).

Peppers argues, nevertheless, that the County was the entity “in control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that gave rise to the claim,” and thus should be exposed to liability under Title VII because this is a case centered on disparities in compensation. He says that he was paid from County funds, with paychecks issued by the County, and that the County had authority to approve the District Attorney’s budget, including individual salaries. Even so, the County could not change Peppers’s salary unless the District Attorney requested and recommended such a change. In fact, there was no evidence to suggest that the County had authority to do anything with regard to Peppers’s salary other than to approve or disapprove it. This is a far cry from co-determining the essential terms and conditions of Peppers’s employment. Thus, it hardly suggests that the County possessed joint authority over Peppers’s employment, even in this narrow area.

But, more fundamentally, Peppers’s joint employer argument founders because the focal point of the inquiry is not which entity controlled the specific aspect of the relationship giving rise to a discrimination claim, but rather which entity or entities controlled the fundamental and essential aspects of the employment relationship when taken as a whole. Whichever entity (or entities) predominantly controls the terms of the relationship may be found liable under Title VII. Thus, the County’s role in approving Peppers’s compensation is not dispositive. Moreover, recognizing two distinct governmental agencies or subdivisions as joint employers for purposes of compensation, but not for the purposes of hiring, firing, supervising, or anything else seems patently wrong. Even a liberal reading of the term “employer” cannot encompass such an analytically gerrymandered understanding. Peppers has failed to present a sufficient evidential foundation to support the conclusion that the County acted as his joint employer. Indeed, he has failed to present a material fact in dispute on this point.

Finally, Peppers makes much in his briefing of the County’s purported admission that he was an employee of Cobb County. To be sure, Hagler, the County’s human resources director, said that Peppers was a County employee. But even reading the statement in the light most favorable to Peppers, it does not sustain his claim when taken in context. Hagler’s “admissions” cannot reasonably be read as demonstrating that the County was Peppers’s employer for the purposes of federal anti-discrimination laws. Rather, he was speaking purely to whether Peppers appeared on the County payroll and the related administrative filings that are associated with that. He was not addressing whether, as a substantive matter, the County was engaged in the classical kinds of activities that would render it an “employer” under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. Indeed, at no point did Hagler so much as suggest that the County had any control over hiring, firing, setting the duties of, or supervising the work of Criminal Investigator Peppers.

Quite simply, an examination of the entire record of Peppers’s employment relationship establishes that Cobb County was not his employer even though it provided paymaster, administrative, and budgetary functions for the District Attorney’s Office. Nor can the County be aggregated with his actual employer to support a federal anti-discrimination case under the joint-employer theory. The district court properly granted final summary judgment to the County and denied Peppers’s cross motion; accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

      . Peppers also asserted a state law breach of contract claim, but the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim, and dismissed it without prejudice. Peppers does not challenge that decision on appeal.

      . Since summary judgment has been properly entered for the County because it was not Peppers’s employer, we need not, and do not, consider Peppers’s additional claim that, if the County were his employer, he would be entitled to summary judgment.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rodney Manyon LANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ted PHILBIN, Shundra Woods, Calvin Orr, Deputy Warden of Security, Sherman Maine, Captain of Security, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-11140
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Date Filed: 08/26/2016

      Amanda Kay Seals Bersinger, Bondu-rant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Michelle Jeanette Hirsch, Matthew F. Boyer, Samuel Scott Olens, Devon Orland, Attorney General’s Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and DALTON, District Judge.

       The Honorable Roy B. Dalion, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

   JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Rodney Manyon Lane, a Georgia state prisoner with a third-grade education, alleged in his pro se handwritten complaint that he was on his way to the dining hall at the Valdosta State Prison when he was savagely attacked by another inmate who had been threatening him. The other inmate stabbed Mr. Lane four times and hit him in the face with a lock. According to the complaint, the prisoner attacked Mr. Lane because he was not a gang member and not Muslim, yet was housed in a dormitory where gang members reigned, weapons were tolerated, and violence ran amuck. Mr. Lane said that he had asked certain prison officials to move him to a different dormitory before he was attacked, but they refused his request. Mr. Lane sued four of the prison officials at Valdosta State Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that their refusal to move him constituted deliberate indifference to the serious risk of serious harm he faced, and violated his Eight Amendment rights.

The district court dismissed Mr. Lane’s complaint for failing to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference. In the district court’s view, Mr. Lane failed to allege that the prison officials he sued had the requisite subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm that he faced. Mr. Lane now appeals. Following a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse. The allegations in the complaint sufficed to make out a plausible claim that the officials named as defendants were aware of the serious risk of harm faced by Mr. Lane.

I

The district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is subject to plenary review. See Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Tyson, 671 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, Mr. Lane’s complaint must have set out facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This means he must have alleged “factual content that allow[ed] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants] [were] ha-ble for the misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The allegations must be plausible, but plausibility is not probability. See id.

In this procedural posture, we assume the truth of the facts alleged by Mr. Lane. And because Mr. Lane filed his complaint pro se, we hold that pleading to a less stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. That means we read his complaint liberally. See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011).

II

The complaint alleged the following facts.

A

Mr. Lane was housed in E-Building at Valdosta State Prison, which consists of two separate 50-man dormitories called El-Building and E2-Building. A single officer supervises all 100 inmates in E-Building and no officers supervise the walkway from E-Building to the dining hall. The inmate population of E-Building is made up of 90% gang-affiliated inmates.

Numerous stabbings and beatings — including those of non-Muslim and non-gang inmates — take place in E-Building because of the dangerous offenders housed there and because of the numerous weapons concealed in its two dormitories. The inmates make the weapons in various ways. For example, inmates on the maintenance detail bring back lighting rods and other scrap metal from work, which they then use to create “shanks” (homemade weapons used as knives). Some inmates also pillage the cells in E-Building, tearing out light fixture panels and locker box shelves for use as materials for weapons. Though they would search E-Building, prison officials would not confiscate weapons. Administrators at Valdosta State Prison are aware of the situation in E-Building and threaten inmates housed in other dormitories with transfer to E-Building.

On the morning of June 17, 2013, while on his way to the dining hall, Mr. Lane was attacked from behind by a gang-affiliated inmate who had been threatening him. The inmate hit Mr. Lane in the eye with a lock and stabbed him four times in the back. Mr. Lane was rendered unconscious and lay on the walkway to the dining hall for several minutes before he was assisted by prison guards and provided with medical attention. He received 18 staples to close his stab wounds and his eye was glued shut. While Mr. Lane was receiving medical care, the inmate who attacked him stole all of his personal property, which was inside a locker box in his cell.

B

Mr. Lane filed an informal grievance with prison officials on June 20, 2013. The prison grievance form had four lines for Mr. Lane to describe the incident he was complaining about. On the form Mr.. Lane stated that officials at the prison had violated his constitutional rights by not housing him in a safe environment, and that this violation had resulted in his attack three days earlier. He requested an internal investigation and a transfer out of E-Building. Captain Sherhian Maine denied Mr. Lane’s informal grievance, responding only that the “dorms are regularly searched for safety issues.” D.E. 19-2 at 27.

On July 2, 2013, after denial of his informal grievance, Mr. Lane submitted a formal grievance, again on the form provided by prison officials. He once again stated that his constitutional rights had been violated by the prison officials who failed to protect him. He described his attack, and then indicated that he had requested a transfer to another dormitory from Counselor Shundra Woods and Deputy Warden Ted Philbin. He also claimed that Captain Maine had failed to investigate the gang membership of inmates.

Officials at Valdosta State Prison denied Mr. Lane’s formal grievance, summarily explaining that “[security is provided in all building (living) units at [the prison].” Id. at 30. Mr. Lane appealed the denial of his formal grievance, but that appeal was also denied because “[t]here [was] insufficient evidence to substantiate [Mr. Lane’s] allegation.” Id. at 32.

After the denial of his formal grievance appeal, Mr. Lane filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference by Counselor Woods and Deputy Warden Philbin to the serious risk of physical harm he faced. Mr. Lane later amended his complaint to add Captain Maine and Deputy Warden Calvin Orr as defendants.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims against Captain Maine and Deputy Orr should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that all claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference. In the magistrate judge’s view, Mr. Lane did not allege sufficient facts showing that any of the defendants had knowledge of the risk of serious harm he faced. The magistrate judge did not address the exhaustion defense asserted by the defendants. Nor did he analyze the other elements of Mr. Lane’s Eighth Amendment claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

Ill

Federal law provides a cause of action to a plaintiff who can prove that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the laws or Constitution of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Rehberg v. Paulk, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501-02, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012). There is no dispute that the prison officials sued by Mr. Lane acted under color of state law.

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment if he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference, Mr. Lane must allege facts sufficient to show “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). The narrow issue we address is whether Mr. Lane alleged sufficient facts, for purpose of his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, to make it plausible that the defendants had knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm he faced.

A

The first element of an Eighth Amendment claim — a substantial risk of serious harm — is assessed under an objective standard. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). Mr. Lane had to allege conditions that were sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment, i.e., conditions that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). As we have explained, “an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious harm; occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, [but] confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign is actionable.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Lane’s pro se complaint' sufficiently set out a substantial risk of serious harm. Mr. Lane alleged that E-Building’s inmate population consisted of 90% gang members, and that inmates who were not gang-affiliated (or who were non-Muslim) were robbed and stabbed. And he did not stop-there. Mr. Lane further alleged that there were “numerous stabbings and beatings,” that “only one officer supervised] two separate [50-]man dorms [of E-Building],” and that “[E-building] housed dangerous preditors [sic] (i.e. inmates).” D.E. 8 at 3^4. He also described how inmates in E-Building would bring back items from their work on the maintenance detail, and take materials from light fixtures and shelves, to make weapons. He claimed that, despite searches by prison officials, weapons were not confiscated. Finally, of course, he alleged that he was stabbed several times by a gang-affiliated inmate.

In Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 268 F.3d 1014, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), we held a plaintiff satisfied the substantial risk of serious harm element of an Eighth Amendment claim at the pleading stage by alleging that inmates dismantled the jail facility to make weapons, that inmates had ready access to weapons, and that the prison provided inadequate supervision of inmates. Similarly in Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977), we noted that easy access by inmates to certain materials and resources— which resulted in the widespread possession of weapons — contributed to a substantial risk of serious harm at a correctional facility. Mr. Lane’s allegations, taken together, permit a reasonable inference that E-Building was a place with inadequate supervision of dangerous inmates who possessed weapons, and where violence and terror were the norm. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Each factor separately ... may not rise to constitutional dimensions; however, the effect of the totality of these circumstances is the infliction of punishment on inmates viola-tive of the Eighth Amendment, as determined by the trial court.”).

B

The second element of an Eighth Amendment claim — the defendants’ deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm — “has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first component is subjective, so Mr. Lane needed to allege sufficiently that the prison officials he sued actually knew that he faced a substantial risk of injury. See Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099.

“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Inferences from circumstantial evidence, however, can be used to show that a prison official possessed the necessary knowledge. See Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099.

The district court dismissed the complaint in part because Mr. Lane had not alleged that he had been threatened or that he had informed any of the defendants of a threat of physical harm. Although notice of threats is certainly relevant, prison officials may not escape liability just because an injured inmate did not inform anyone that he was being threatened or that he faced an attack from another inmate. See Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583. As we explain, Mr. Lane sufficiently alleged that all of the officials named as defendants had subjective knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm he faced due to being housed in E-Building.

Counselor Woods. In his initial complaint, following his allegations concerning the violent conditions in E-Building, Mr. Lane stated: “[M]y counsel [sic] Ms. Woods no [sic] that.” D.E. 1 at 4. Although this was the first time that Counselor Woods’ name appeared in the handwritten complaint, Mr. Lane also alleged that he had “heard all the administrators at V.S.P threat [sic] to put you in E Build.” Id. (emphasis added). It can be reasonably inferred from these allegations that Counselor Woods was aware of the violent conditions at E-Building, and that she was one of the administrators whom Mr. Lane personally heard threatening inmates with transfer to E-Building as punishment.

But that is not all. On page two of his initial complaint, Mr. Lane asked himself a question: “What happened?” Id. at 5. He answered that question by alleging the following: “I asks [sic] my counsel [sic] Ms. Woods- on May 8, 2012 to move me and May 23, 2012 to move me she said she don’t [sic] move inmate [sic].” Id. Though unartfully phrased, a plausible inference from this allegation is that Mr. Lane informed Counselor Woods of the reason for his request — the substantial risk of serious harm of being housed in E-Building as a non-gang/non-Muslim inmate. The inference is a fair one, we think, because the request was made just one month before Mr. Lane was attacked. Cf. Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrections, 508 F.3d 611, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that where inmate told a corrections officer on at least two occasions that “he feared a gang member might kill him” and requested a transfer on that basis, there was a genuine issue of material fact on the officer’s subjective knowledge). All of these allegations, taken together, plausibly show that Counselor Woods was subjectively aware of the substantial risk of harm that Mr. Lane faced due to being housed in E-Building as a non-gang/non-Muslim inmate.

Deputy Warden Philbin. Mr. Lane alleged that on May 8, 2012, after he asked Counselor Woods to, move him out of E-Building, he also asked Deputy Warden Philbin to transfer him. Mr. Lane made this request on the sidewalk next to E-Building. Deputy Warden Philbin told Mr. Lane that he needed to talk to Sergeant Riley (first name unknown) about the request because he was the one who took care of transfers. Mr. Lane alleged that he replied that he had already asked Sergeant Riley and Ms. Woods about a transfer out of E-Building. Deputy Warden Philbin, however, got upset during the conversation. He told Mr. Lane to sue him, and said that he had been sued before. Deputy Warden Philbin then walked off to F-Building. See D.E. 1 at 5.

There is a plausible inference that Mr. Lane asked Deputy Warden Philbin, like Counselor Woods, for a transfer because of the dangerous conditions in E-Building. Indeed, Mr. Lane alleged that Deputy Warden Philbin was upset about the request, told Mr. Lane to sue him, and advised Mr. Lane that he had been sued before. And, to strengthen the inference even more, Mr. Lane alleged that he had heard “all” the prison administrators— which would include Deputy Warden Phil-bin — threaten to move inmates into E-Building as punishment.

Deputy Warden Orr and Captain Maine. Mr. Lane did not allege that he ever communicated a particularized threat to either Captain Maine or Deputy Warden Orr, such that they would be subjectively aware that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm due to being housed in E-Building, or that, such a risk was posed by another inmate in particular. But Mr. Lane did identify Deputy Warden Orr as the “Deputy Warden of Security,” and Captain Maine as the “Captain of Security” — suggesting, based on their job titles, that they were in a position to be subjectively aware of security-related issues in E-Building. Mr. Lane also alleged that he overheard Deputy Warden Orr threaten other inmates with a transfer to E-Building, see D.E. 8 at 4, evidencing his knowledge of the substantial risk associated with being housed there. As to Captain Maine, Mr. Lane alleged that he had failed to confiscate weapons and shanks' during searches. See D.E. 8 at 5. These allegations, together with the allegation that “all” prison administrators threatened inmates with transfer to E-Building, sufficiently pled awareness by Deputy Warden Orr and Captain Maine of the substantial risk associated with being housed in E-Building.

IV

The parties agreed at oral argument that, if we reversed on the subjective knowledge element of the Eighth Amendment claim, we should, remand the case to the district court to allow Mr. Lane to properly amend his complaint and to permit the defendants to respond to that amended complaint as they see fit. We think the parties’ approach makes sense, so we do not address or express any views as to the sufficiency of Mr. Lane’s current 'allegations with respect to the remaining elements of the Eighth Amendment claim.

Mr. Lane requests that he be appointed counsel to assist him in amending his complaint and pursuing his claims in the district court. Appointment of counsel for civil plaintiffs is a privilege, not a right, and is appropriate only in exceptional circumstances. See generally Smith v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013). This may be one of those cases that warrant appointment of counsel. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) (laying out five factors for determining whether the appointment of counsel is warranted in a civil case). But we leave the ultimate decision up to the district court.

The district court’s dismissal of Mr. Lane’s complaint is reversed. On remand, Mr. Lane should be allowed to formally and properly amend his complaint. And the defendants should be allowed to respond to the .-new complaint as they see fit.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

      . Mr. Lane filed an amended complaint which served to supplement the initial complaint. See D.E. 8. The magistrate judge and the district court construed this filing together with the initial complaint, and the parties do the same on appeal. Though this procedure is irregular, see Fritz v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982), for the purposes of this appeal so do we. The alleged facts set forth in this section therefore come from both complaints, construed together as one.


author: MELLOY, Circuit Judge:

text:
    IN RE: OCEAN WARRIOR, INC., Debtor. James E. Gowdy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher Mitchell, Joel Tabas, Trustee, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Ocean Warrior, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-11891
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Date Filed: 08/26/2016

      Thomas S. Berg, Mallett Saper Berg, LLP, Houston, TX, Joel M. Aresty, Joel M. Aresty, PA, Tierra Verde, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    William E. Weigand, Law Offices of William E. Weigand, PS, Seattle, WA, Dorothy Easley, Easley Appellate Practice, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee Christopher Mitchell.
    Samuel Jason Capuano, Joel L. Tabas, Tabas Freedman & Soloff, PA, Miami, FL, for Appellee Joel L. Tabas, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Ocean Warrior, Inc.
    Before MARCUS, DUBINA and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

       Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United State Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. -

   MELLOY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from an order by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, dated March 31, 2015. In that order, the district court affirmed eight rulings of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. The bankruptcy court found, in part, that Appellant James Gow-dy was liable for civil contempt. The bankruptcy court also imposed compensatory sanctions against Gowdy. Gowdy raises five issues on appeal. We affirm in most respects but reverse and remand for rede-termination of the amount of the Trustee fee award.

I.

In June 1989, Appellee Mitchell, a commercial fisherman, sued two Florida corporations, Ocean Warrior, Inc. (“Ocean Warrior”), and Warrior Fleet, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. He alleged the corporations failed to provide “basic maritime remedies of maintenance, cure and unearned wages” after he was injured while working aboard the corporations’ commercial shrimping vessel, the F/V Janice. Mitchell also filed an in rem maritime claim against the F/V Janice, naming as its owner Ocean Warrior. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington had the F/V Janice arrested in admiralty. On August 28, 1990, the district court in Washington ordered the in rem sale of the F/V Janice and the sale took place on the same day.

On the same day as the sale, Ocean Warrior filed a Chapter 11 Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. The sale of the F/V Janice was voided. The bankruptcy court determined there was substantial equity in the boat, over and above the amount claimed in Mitchell’s lawsuit. As a result, on May 9, 1991, the bankruptcy court ordered that Gowdy, the president of Ocean Warrior, be allowed to continue to operate the F/V Janice. The bankruptcy court ordered that Gowdy maintain insurance on the boat. The bankruptcy court also ordered the boat to remain in U.S. waters off the state of Washington pending the determination of Mitchell’s maritime claim. In April of 1992, the district court in Washington awarded Mitchell a judgment for his maritime claim.

Based on the Washington district court’s judgment, the bankruptcy court in Florida ordered Ocean Warrior to deposit $38,000.00 into-the court’s registry as security for Mitchell. No money was deposited, insurance was not maintained on the F/V Janice, and the F/V Janice disappeared in August 1992. When the boat disappeared, Gowdy also disappeared. The bankruptcy court in Florida and the district court in Washington each issued warrants for Gowdy’s arrest. The Washington warrant was for criminal contempt in connection with the suspected theft of the F/V Janice.

On February 10, 1993, with Ocean Warrior’s only valuable asset missing and a bankruptcy reorganization no longer possible, the bankruptcy court converted Ocean Warrior’s Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case and appointed a Trustee. The case was closed and reopened several times over the years. Then, on December 2, 1999, the bankruptcy court closed the case with the condition that “[t]he court shall retain jurisdiction to reopen this case in the event the Vessel F/V Janice and/or Mr. James Gowdy are located. All existing Orders shall remain in full force and effect.”

In June 2011, nearly twenty years after the F/V Janice and Gowdy disappeared, United States Marshals arrested Gowdy in Texas. At that time, he alleged that the F/V Janice had been stolen by a group of Colombians and that he had nothing to do with the theft. He also alleged that he came back into possession of the boat but subsequently lost it to creditors for liens. Gowdy was brought before the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on the arrest warrant issued by that court. In September 2011, the Washington district court released Gowdy on his own recognizance and deferred to the civil contempt proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. On October 17, 2011, the bankruptcy court reopened the bankruptcy proceedings and entered an Order to Show Cause as to why Gowdy should not be held in civil contempt.

The bankruptcy court held a hearing on December, 8, 2011, regarding its show cause order. Gowdy appeared pro se at the hearing. Gowdy initially indicated he thought he was being brought before the court on criminal contempt. However, the bankruptcy judge made it clear to Gowdy that the December 2011 hearing was for civil contempt only. According to the bank-’ ruptcy judge, Gowdy was not in danger of being incarcerated as a result of the hearing and the only issue was the location of the boat and damages owed to Mitchell if it could not be located. Gowdy refused to disclose the location of the F/V Janice or answer any questions about what had happened to the boat.

The court found Gowdy in civil contempt and ordered him to produce the F/V Janice or pay the amount due on Mitchell’s judgment. On May 4, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered a written order finding Gow-dy in civil contempt for violating “numerous” prior orders of the court, including provisions in orders dated February 9, 1991, and August 7, 1992. The May 4, 2012 order allowed Gowdy to purge the civil contempt by either returning the F/V Janice or depositing funds into the court’s registry to compensate Mitchell for damages caused by Gowdy’s contempt. The court gave Gowdy 90 days to purge his contempt before other sanctions would be considered, such as incarceration until the contempt was purged.

On June 19, 2012, Gowdy filed an affidavit alleging he had no assets, seeking to avoid paying filing fees to appeal the bankruptcy court’s civil contempt order. However, Gowdy’s representations about his finances excluded reference to his interest in a pending maritime personal injury lawsuit in Texas. Gowdy’s Texas lawsuit later settled for $449,637.22. Gowdy also excluded reference to his interest in a Texas home. Gowdy opined that the home was valued at $75,000.00 whereas Mitchell asserts on appeal that the home’s publicly assessed value is approximately $120,000.00. On September 7, 2012, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against Gowdy, seeking recovery for the conversion of the F/V Janice, turnover of the F/V Janice, and injunctive relief relating to the settlement funds due to Gowdy. Following interpleader proceedings, on May 29, 2013, the Trustee received $224,818.63 from the Texas court registry.

On July 17, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order awarding interim attorneys’ fees and costs to the Trustee. On December 11, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order temporarily staying the disbursement of funds to Mitchell pending the adversary proceeding’s conclusion or final conclusion of any appeal of the July 17, 2013 order. On March 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court ordered sanctions against Gowdy for failing to purge his civil contempt. In that order, the bankruptcy court also approved the disbursement of funds to Mitchell and authorized the entry of a final judgment against Gowdy and in favor of the Trustee. On April 8, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an amended final judgment in favor of the Trustee in the amount of $239,143.14. Gowdy filed his notice of appeal on April 16, 2014 and appealed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. This appeal followed.

II.

In a bankruptcy case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals “sits as a second court of review and thus examines independently the factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and employs the same standards of review as the district court.” In re Fisher Island Invs., Inc., 778 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Brown, 742 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014)). “Where the district court [sitting as an appellate court] affirms the bankruptcy court’s order,” the Eleventh Circuit “reviewfs] the bankruptcy court’s decision.” Id. In doing so, the court “review[s] the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo,” id. and its imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion, In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008). A lower court’s decision to impose sanctions will be affirmed unless the court “made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007)).

A.

Gowdy initially contends that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of fact regarding his civil contempt. Appellees counter that the bankruptcy court conducted an evidentiary show-cause "hearing on December 8, 2011. Having reviewed the record, it is clear that Gowdy received notice of the civil contempt allegations against him and that the bankruptcy court gave Gowdy the opportunity to testify, submit evidence, and rebut the allegations of civil contempt at his show-cause hearing. Gowdy failed to disclose any information as to why he could not purge the civil contempt. For these reasons, the bankruptcy court did not err in holding an evidentiary show-cause hearing, which satisfied due process requirements. See F.T.C. v. Leshin, 719 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2013) (“It is by now well-settled law that due process is satisfied when a civil contempt defendant receives notice and an opportunity to be heard.... ”).

B.

Gowdy next argues that his due process rights were violated when the bankruptcy court threatened incarceration for contempt and he lacked counsel at the show-cause hearing. Appellees reply that the show-cause hearing met the due process requirements and that Gowdy was not entitled to counsel at his civil contempt hearing. The United States Supreme Court has made 'dear Gowdy was not entitled to counsel at his civil contempt hearing because he faced no jeopardy of incarceration. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 443, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (interpreting prior Supreme Court cases-as “pointing out that the Court previously had found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases.... ”)• As the district court noted in its May 31, 2015 order, at Gowdy’s show-cause hearing the bankruptcy court stated: “[W]e’re not going to incarcerate you.... This is a civil contempt motion here notwithstanding that you were arrested on the criminal contempt motion.... ” Thus, the bankruptcy court did not violate Gowdy’s due process rights by conducting a show-cause hearing on his civil contempt without appointing Gowdy an attorney.

C.

Gowdy contends that the bankruptcy court had no authority to punish him for contempt and that the bankruptcy court’s sanction amounted to a criminal sanction. Appellees reply that the bankruptcy court had authority to impose civil contempt sanctions.

“Civil contempt power is inherent in bankruptcy courts since all courts have authority to enforce compliance with their lawful orders.” Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 967 n.18 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Distinct from the bankruptcy courts’ inherent contempt powers, 11 U.S.C. § 105 creates the bankruptcy courts’ statutory civil contempt power. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). “Civil penalties must either be compensatory or designed to coerce compliance.” In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)).

In this case, the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to hold Gowdy, the president and agent of Ocean Warrior, liable for civil contempt. Gowdy did not comply with the bankruptcy court’s orders in 1991 and 1992 because he failed to keep the F/V Janice in U.S. waters, failed to maintain insurance on it, and failed to deposit money into the registry of the court. At the show-cause hearing on December 8, 2011, the bankruptcy court determined Gowdy was in civil contempt and sought to coerce Gowdy to return the F/V Janice: “So the Court, based on what you have to say here, determines you are in civil contempt and directs that you have, let’s say, 14 days to either deliver the boat or the amount due [Mitchell’s] judgment.” After Gowdy failed to purge his civil contempt, on March 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court imposed sanctions to compensate the aggrieved parties — Mitchell and others— for the costs incurred because of Gowdy’s contempt.

Further, the sanctions were not punitive. See In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Punitive sanctions ... take the form of a fixed fine and have no practical purpose other than punishment; it is immaterial to a court imposing such sanctions that a contemnor might be fully in compliance with the order in question at the time the sanctions are imposed.”). Moreover, as the district court noted in affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders, “The bankruptcy court never contemplated incarceration or punitive sanctions and it acted within its jurisdiction to find Gowdy in civil contempt.” Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err by imposing coercive and compensatory civil contempt sanctions. See In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d at 1280; see also Leshin, 719 F.3d at 1234 (discussing the distinctions between coercive civil contempt sanctions and compensatory civil contempt sanctions).

D.

Gowdy claims that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because the civil contempt proceeding was not a “core proceeding.” Relying on Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), Gowdy argues that the bankruptcy court should have proposed a judgment instead of entering a final order. Appellees disagree, arguing that the civil contempt proceedings relating to the F/V Janice and Gowdy’s violation of the bankruptcy court’s orders are “core proceedings” over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enter a final order.

Bankruptcy courts may “enter final judgments in ‘all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.’ ” Stern, 564 U.S. at 474, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)). There are 16 different types of core proceedings sét forth by section 157(b)(2), including, in relevant part, “matters concerning the administration of the estate” and “orders to turn over property of the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E). If a proceeding is “not a core proceeding but ... is otherwise related to a case under title 11 ... the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.” Id. § 157(c)(1).

Here, Gowdy violated the bankruptcy court’s 1991 and 1992 orders involving the F/V Janice. As a result, following Gowdy’s show-cause hearing, the bankruptcy court found Gowdy in civil contempt and ordered bim to turn over the F/V Janice or pay damages. The court’s orders concerned “the administration of the estate” and “turn[ing] over property of the estate.” Therefore, the matters were “core proceedings” under the text of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E).

In addition, “[c]ivil contempt proceedings arising out of core matters are themselves core matters.” In re Skinner, 917 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1990); see In re White-Robinson, 777 F.3d 792, 795-96 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (noting post-Stern that a contempt order was a “core proceeding” because it was a “matter[] concerning the administration of the estate” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (alteration in original)). Thus, the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations of civil contempt against Gowdy and the authority to enter a final order, not merely a proposed judgment, finding Gowdy in civil contempt. See In re Skinner, 917 F.2d at 448.

E.

i.

Lastly, Gowdy argues that the bankruptcy court erred in disbursing his money to pay the Trustee fees pursuant to the July 17, 2013 order. On appeal, Gowdy raises the same argument that he raised at the district court: he contends that, if sanctions were appropriate, fees should have been “paid out of the judgment, not fees awarded from [his] property first, and then a judgment entered on top of the fees.” As the district court correctly noted, Gowdy fails to cite case law or statutes to support his argument. In making his argument, Gowdy also fails to fully explain the details of his critique of the bankruptcy court’s sanction and fee orders. Appellees counter that Gowdy’s appeal of the fee orders was untimely and that the bankruptcy court has wide discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are compelled to reverse as to the quantity of the fee award. First, we conclude Gowdy’s appeal is not untimely. And second, we conclude the fee award cannot include fees beyond those reasonably related to litigation and asset recovery efforts surrounding the contempt litigation. See Abbott Labs, v. Unlimited Beverages, Inc., 218 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[Attorneys’ fees in a civil contempt proceeding are limited to those reasonably and necessarily incurred in the attempt to enforce compliance.”); see also Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1557 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that one purpose of civil contempt sanctions is to “compensate the complainant for ... expenses it incurred because of the contemptuous act.”). Further, on remand, the district court must decide whether to permit the Trustee to pursue its adversary proceeding against Gowdy— a proceeding that never actually took place in light of the transfer of the substantial sums from Texas.

ii.

Under Bankruptcy Rule 8002, Gowdy had 14 days from the “entry of the judgment, order, or decree being appealed” to file a notice of appeal. The timely filing of a notice of appeal “is jurisdictional.” In re Williams, 216 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000). Gowdy timely moved to stay and reconsider the July 17 fee disbursal order, but did not file a notice of appeal until April 16, 2014, after the final sanctions judgment was entered and the court ordered the remainder of the fees disbursed to Mitchell. While the language of the rule suggests that Gowdy should have filed a notice of appeal within 14 days of the bankruptcy court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of the fee disbursal order, we conclude he was not required to do so in the circumstances of this case. In the July 17 order, the bankruptcy court characterized the disbursal being authorized as an “interim” award and declined to finally resolve the Trustee’s disbursal motion until it held a hearing and entered a final judgment regarding the contempt sanctions. Rule 8002(a)(1) does not require a party to a bankruptcy proceeding to file a separate notice of appeal for each interim fee disbursal at least where, as here, the interim order reserves decision on a substantial intertwined portion of the disbursal motion. The Trustee’s motion for the disbursal of the settlement funds was not substantially resolved until the court granted the portion of the order requesting disbursal of the fees to Mitchell and simultaneously entered final judgment in Mitchell’s favor. Gowdy timely appealed from that order.

in.

Regarding the actual sanction award and the absence of any resolution of the conversion claim, we believe it is necessary to recount in additional detail what occurred after the Trustee received $224,818.63 from the Texas court registry on May 29, 2013. Instead of continuing to pursue the adversary proceeding, the Trustee filed a motion to summarily disburse Gowd/s settlement funds in the following manner: $135,167.95 to Mitchell; $80,465.78 to Trustee’s Counsel; and $9,184.90 to Trustee’s Local Counsel in Texas. On July 17, 2013 — even though the bankruptcy court had not entered a sanctions award against Gowdy and the adversary proceeding had not been resolved— the court ordered allocation of the Trustee’s and attorneys’ fees and scheduled a hearing to consider disbursement to Mitchell. The bankruptcy court did not identify the fees as “reasonable and necessarily incurred in the attempt to enforce compliance.” Abbott Labs., 218 F.3d at 1242. Instead, the court explained the fees were reasonable in light of the work performed during the entire 20-year bankruptcy proceeding.

Finally, on March 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court imposed the sanction award in favor of Mitchell, which was a judgment “in favor of Mitchell in the amount of $372,209.02.” The court ordered the Trustee to transfer to Mitchell the $133,433.75 remaining from Gowdy’s settlement, and then entered a final judgment against Gowdy for the rest of the sanction award, $238,775.27.

Bankruptcy courts have broad discretion in awarding professional fees in bankruptcy proceedings. Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (“District courts have broad discretion in fashioning civil contempt sanctions.”). And, in awarding sanctions for civil contempt, a court “ha[s] numerous options, among them: a coercive daily fine, a compensatory fine, attorneys’ fees and expenses.” Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1991). A fee award in relation to a civil contempt sanction, however, is not without limit, and we conclude the bankruptcy court abused its broad discretion because it possessed no legal basis to require Gow-dy to pay the full Trustee’s fee. In re Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beach, 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir. 1990) (“An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”).

We reach this conclusion because Gowdy was never adjudged liable to the bankruptcy estate for converting the JANICE. Rather, he was found liable for contempt pursuant to Mitchell’s motion. Therefore, the fee award should have been limited to an amount necessary to “compensate the complainant” — Mitchell—“for losses and expenses ... incurred because of the contemptuous act [or to] coerce the contemnor into complying with the court order.” Jove Eng’g, 92 F.3d at 1557. The bankruptcy court could have required Gowdy to compensate the Trustee for the efforts in obtaining the personal injury settlement funds from Texas, which were costs reasonably incurred in enforcement of the court’s sanction order. But before being required to bear the full Trustee’s fees, Gowdy was entitled to a jury trial in an Article III tribunal on the Trustee’s conversion claim. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 503, 131 S.Ct. 2594.

III.

For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects other than the amount of the fee award. We remand for the bankruptcy court to award a fee based on the work the Trustee performed pursuant to Mitchell’s motion for contempt. The lower court also shall determine whether the Trustee may pursue its adversary claim at this late date.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.

      . It is undisputed that the F/V Janice was worth far in excess of $38,000.00. In fact, it was represented to the bankruptcy court that the boat was worth over $250,000.00, and an examiner later valued the boat at $225,000.00.

      . The bankruptcy court did not indicate an intention to incarcerate Gowdy at the show-cause hearing or in the order calling for the hearing. The bankruptcy court's May 4, 2012 order, however, indicated the court would “consider the imposition of sanctions," including incarceration until the contempt was purged, if Gowdy did not purge the contempt within 90 days, Even if .that order suggests Gowdy might in the future face the possibility of incarceration, the bankruptcy court met the due process requirements at Gowdy's show-cause hearing and eventually concluded Gowdy was not indigent on March 7, 2014. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (“|T]he Court's precedents speak with one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’ has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty." (emphasis added)). Nowhere else in the record does the bankruptcy court mention incarceration. We need not consider whether Gowdy would have been entitled to counsel at a future hearing if the possibility of incarceration had actually arisen.