author: BAILEY, Judge.

text:
    Charles KIETZMAN, Appellant, v. Amanda S. KIETZMAN, Appellee.
    No. 39A01-1301-DR-14.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Aug. 15, 2013.

      Jeffrey A. Flores, Flores Law Office, Madison, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    R. Patrick Magrath, Alcorn Goering & Sage, LLP, Madison, IN, Attorney for Ap-pellee.
   OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

C.K. (“Father”) appeals the dissolution court’s order, which granted A.L.’s (“Mother”) motion to relocate with their child, K.K., to China for three years and modified custody to make Mother sole custodian of K.K.

We affirm.

Issues

Father raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the dissolution court abused its discretion when it granted Mother’s petition to relocate to China with K.K. and denied Father’s motion to modify custody.

Facts and Procedural History

Father and Mother were married; the union resulted in the birth of one child, K.K. Father and Mother were divorced in 2010. Mother had a child, B.L., and later married B.L.’s father (“Stepfather”). Before and after the dissolution of the marriage to Mother, Father was employed and earned between $50,000 and $65,000 per year, and provided insurance and other benefits for K.K. After the dissolution of the marriage, Mother and Father shared physical and legal custody of K.K.

Stepfather is an engineer employed by a large chemical manufacturer. In October 2012, Stepfather’s employer offered him a position in a factory in China, where he would work for three years to train local personnel. The family would live in a special compound populated by employees of large international businesses with operations in China. If she moved to China with Mother, Stepfather, and B.L., K.K., who was nine years old during October 2018, would attend a special international school in China. The family would be able to return to the United States twice per year for three or four weeks at a time.

At around this time, K.K.’s grades in school began to suffer, and on December 27, 2012, she was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder, inattentive subtype (“ADD”). Mother and Father, who shared custody, did not agree on whether K.K. should be placed on medication for her ADD diagnosis.

On October 23, 2012, Mother filed her motion seeking the dissolution court’s permission to relocate to China with K.K. Shortly afterward, Father left his employment after selling some farmland; Father planned to live off the proceeds of the sale for several years while he worked part time and studied to become an Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”), and did not seek to reduce or otherwise modify his child support obligations for K.K.

A Guardian Ad Litem, Pamela Moon (“Moon”), was appointed to represent K.K.’s interests during the proceedings. Moon interviewed K.K. at both Mother’s and Father’s residences, and interviewed Mother, Father, and Stepfather. Moon ultimately concluded that it was in K.K.’s best interests to go to China with Mother and Stepfather, with ample parenting time afforded to Father.

On January 3, 2013, a hearing was conducted, during which Mother, Father, Stepfather, Moon, and Father’s sister testified concerning Mother’s planned relocation. Dr. Holly Robinson (“Dr. Robinson”), K.K.’s pediatrician, also testified, and portions of K.K.’s medical and school records were also entered into evidence. On January 7, 2013, the dissolution court entered its order and found that it was in K.K.’s best interests to relocate to China with Mother. The court ordered that Father have three periods of parenting time with K.K. per year; two of these would fall when K.K. was back in the United States with the rest of the family, and one would permit Father to visit K.K. in China. The court further ordered that both parents be afforded liberal access to K.K. via telephone, Skype, and other forms of communication. Finally, the trial court ordered that sole custody of K.K. would rest with Mother so that medical and other decisions could be made quickly while K.K. was in China.

On January 10, 2013, Father filed his notice of appeal. On January 17, 2013, Father filed a motion to stay the dissolution court’s order due to Mother and Stepfather learning of a cultural adaptation “quarantine” period imposed by Stepfather’s employer. The quarantine period was expected to affect Father’s planned summer parenting time under the order. The dissolution court conducted a hearing on Father’s motion on January 23, 2013, and denied the motion the same day.

On February 8, 2013, Father filed a motion to stay with this Court, seeking an emergency stay of the dissolution court’s order pending appeal. On February 22, 2013, this Court denied Father’s emergency stay. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Father appeals the dissolution court’s order granting Mother’s request to relocate with K.K., granting Mother sole custody of K.K., and denying his own request for modification of custody of K.K. The dissolution court entered findings and conclusions in reaching its decision. Our review of findings and conclusions in such cases is well settled:

Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we do not “set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Where, as here, the findings and conclusions are entered sua sponte, “the specific findings control only as to the issues they cover, while a general judgment standard applies to any issue upon which the trial court has not found, and we may affirm a general judgment on any theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial.” Sexton v. Sedlak, 946 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied.

Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 108-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2012).

Moreover, we review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of J.J., 911 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. The Indiana Supreme Court “has expressed a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters ... because of trial judges’ unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face.” T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court if evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom support the trial court’s judgment; this serves the interests of finality in custody matters. Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257-58 (Ind.2008).

A parent who wishes to relocate with a child who is the subject of an existing custody order must file a motion with the court that issued the order for custody or parenting time. Ind.Code § 31-17-2.2-1(a)(1). Upon motion, the court must set the matter for a hearing to review and, as appropriate, modify parenting time, custody, or other orders. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-l(b). A parent who wishes to oppose the relocation must file a motion seeking to prevent the relocation of the child within sixty days after receiving notice of the planned relocation. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(a). A parent who plans to relocate with the child must bear the burden of proof to show “that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(c). If the relocating party meets its burden, the burden of proof shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show that the relocation is not in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(d).

When reaching a decision on a proposed relocation, the trial court must take into account the following factors:

(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.
(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating individual to exercise parenting time or grandparent visitation.
(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting time and grandparent visitation arrangements, including consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties.
(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the relocating individual, including actions by the relocating individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating individual’s contact with the child.
(5) The reasons provided by the:
(A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and
(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the child.
(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

I.C. § 31-17-2.2-l(b).

“Other factors affecting the best interest of the child,” id, are the factors provided by our legislature in the Indiana Code, and include:

(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child’s parent or parents;
(B) the child’s sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

I.C. § 31-17-2-8.

Our supreme court has held that, even where there has not been a substantial change in one or more of the statutory-factors affecting the best interests of the child set forth in Section 31-17-2-8, a change in custody may be ordered due to relocation of a parent. In re Paternity of J.J., 911 N.E.2d at 729 (citing Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1256-57). A trial court must, however, consider all of the statutory factors enumerated in the relocation statute codified at Subsection 31-17-2.2-1(b). Id. at 731. Moreover, “[o]n appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind.2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the dissolution court found that Mother’s relocation was in good faith and for legitimate reasons, and that relocation of K.K. with Mother, Stepfather, and B.L. to China for three years was in KK.’s best interests. Father argues that this decision amounted to an abuse of discretion.

We do not agree. Our review of the dissolution court’s order reveals that the court considered the statutory factors and recognized the distance involved in a move to China, the duration of time K.K. would be gone, the need to preserve K.K.’s relationship with Father, the reasons for the move, and the good faith of both parents in their parenting and desires for K.K. The court recognized that Father’s opposition to the relocation was “understandable],” (App’x at 10) but found that the parental relationship between K.K. and Father could be preserved through the use of telecommunications and Father’s exclusive parenting time during return visits to the United States. The court further found that the relocation Mother proposed would be in K.K.’s best interests as an educational and cultural experience for her, and that despite K.K.’s recent diagnosis of ADD, the evidence presented to the court indicated that K.K. could readily adjust to the changes associated with a move to China and would likely thrive there. These findings have support in the record, including testimony from Dr. Robinson and Moon. Moreover, Mother was expected to be readily able to provide support to aid KK.’s transition to China because Mother planned to become an at-home parent for much of the duration of the stay in China.

Much of Father’s argument urges us to reweigh evidence or otherwise second-guess the dissolution court’s weighing of the statutory factors; we cannot do so. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307. Indeed, parts of Father’s argument would apply equally well to Mother if the dissolution court had denied Mother’s motion to relocate with K.K.: K.K. would be separated from one set of family members instead of another, Mother would miss parenting time, and Mother and K.K. would be the same distance and number of hours apart. Thus, we find no error in the court’s consideration of the matter and in reaching a clearly difficult decision. We therefore affirm the decision of the dissolution court granting Mother’s motion to relocate with K.K. to China, subject to the provisions for parenting time set forth in the order.

Similarly, we disagree with Father’s contention that the dissolution court failed to take into account the statutory factors associated with a custody modification under Indiana law. First, to the extent the statutory factors for modification of custody that form the best interest of the child test are incorporated into the requirements for considering a parent’s petition to relocate with a child, we have already determined that the dissolution court addressed these matters. Second, to the extent Father asks that we consider Father’s questions concerning Moon’s opinion, the general uncertainty of the future, the presence of family ties in Indiana, and Father’s suggestion that the ADD diagnosis is in fact merely anxiety about moving to China, these amount again to a request that we reweigh evidence.

We cannot do so, and we accordingly affirm the dissolution court’s order denying Father’s motion to modify custody.

Conclusion

We find no abuse of discretion in the dissolution court’s decision to grant Mother’s request to relocate with K.K. Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the dissolution court’s decision to deny Father’s request to modify custody. We accordingly affirm the decision of the dissolution court.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.

      . Father's motions for an emergency stay sought to prevent K.K.’s relocation as a result of a six-month "quarantine” period that would affect K.K.’s ability to travel to the United States during Father's scheduled parenting time in the summer of 2013. Father does not now argue that either the dissolution court or this Court erred in denying his motions. Thus we do not address any issues concerning the quarantine’s interference in his parenting time, and leave resolution of such disputes to the sound discretion of the dissolution court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: NAJAM, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Carl J. BRANDENBURG, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 40A04-1301-CR-23.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Aug. 20, 2013.

      Jennifer A. Joas, Madison, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Carl Brandenburg appeals his sentence following the revocation of his probation. He presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve the balance of his suspended sentence in the Department of Correction.
2. Whether the trial court miscalculated the amount of his child support arrearage.

We affirm, but we remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following Brandenburg’s guilty plea for non-support of a dependent child, as a Class C felony, in August 2011 the trial court sentenced him to five years with credit for time served and fifty-two months on probation. Brandenburg acknowledged that his arrearage at that time was “at least” $10,000. Appellant’s App. at 76. The trial court ordered him to pay $78 per week in child support beginning within sixty days of the order.

On November 4, 2011, the State filed a petition to revoke or modify probation alleging that Brandenburg had violated two conditions of his probation, namely, payment of child support and payment of fees associated with his probation. Following a continuance, Brandenburg failed to appear for a hearing on the alleged probation violations scheduled for July 18, 2012, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Brandenburg was arrested ten days later. The trial court finally held the hearing on November 9, 2012.

At the probation revocation hearing, Brandenburg admitted to both alleged violations of his probation. In particular, Brandenburg acknowledged that he had made only four child support payments since August 2011. Brandenburg testified that he had been employed part-time at a Wendy’s located thirty miles from his house for approximately three months in early 2012, but he was otherwise unemployed. He testified that he had recently been offered a job as a truck driver, but he had not talked to that potential employer about the job for “a couple of months.” Transcript at 16. Brandenburg testified that he would be “driving with [his] father,” who assured him that he had the job. Id. at 17.

The trial court revoked Brandenburg’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence of fifty-two months in the Indiana Department of Correction. In its order, the trial court stated that Brandenburg’s arrearage is $17,795.05. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One: Sentence

Brandenburg admitted to violating his probation and therefore does not contest the revocation of his probation. Instead, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the entire portion of his sentence that was suspended at the time of his initial sentencing.

Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, “the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind.2007). If this discretion were not given to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation. Id. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing decision for a probation violation is reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g).

Brandenburg contends that the State failed to prove that he recklessly or intentionally failed to pay his child support obligation, and in support of that contention he cites our supreme court’s opinion in Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613 (Ind.2010). In Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind.2012), our supreme court explained its holding in Runyon as follows:

if the [probation] condition violated involves a financial obligation, then the probationer must be shown to have recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay. [Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 616]. This Court determined “[a]s to the fact of violation, the statute expressly imposes the burden of proof upon the State. But with respect to the ability to pay, the burden of proof is not explicitly designated.” Id. Noting that revoking probation for violating a financial obligation requires proof of both the underlying violation and the defendant probationer’s state of mind, we held, “it is the State’s burden to prove both the violation and the requisite state of mind in order to obtain a probation revocation.” Id. With respect to the ability to pay, we held that it is the defendant probationer’s burden “to show facts related to an inability to pay and indicating sufficient bona fide efforts to pay so as to persuade the trial court that further imprisonment should not be ordered.” Id. at 617 (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind.2008)).

(Emphasis added).

Again, Brandenburg does not contest the revocation of his probation. Instead, he maintains that

he demonstrated an inability to pay his child support arrearage and fees and that he made a bona fide effort to find the resources to pay these. He believes that these efforts should have required the trial court to consider placement
alternatives and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider placement alternatives that would enable him to make payments toward his child support arrearage and pay his fees.

Brief of Appellant at 7-8. But the trial court was not persuaded by Brandenburg’s testimony, and the court determined that, on the whole, the evidence compelled Brandenburg’s incarceration. In particular, the trial court found:

8) Since May 24, 1993, and prior to the filing of criminal charges herein on August 7, 2009, the State of Indiana filed at least nine (9) Petitions for Contempt, five (5) Writs of Body Attachment were issued and there were fifteen (15) Income Withholding Orders! Having spent seventeen (17) years trying to get Mr. Brandenburg to pay child support through the civil process, the State filed criminal charges herein.
4) When convicted on August 4, 2011, the arrearage was $10,000.00.
6) Since August 4, 2011, Defendant has paid $543.26 in child support.
8) Defendant is forty-two (42) years of age and able-bodied. He is married. He has a valid operator’s license and a C.D.L. “permit.” He has at least two (2) prior felony convictions.
9) After walking out of this courtroom on August 4, 2011[,] with only the obligation to pay child support to remain free, Defendant, while able to pay, failed miserably.
10) This Court has stated many times before that nonsupport criminal cases will not be more of the same “in and out of court” process to persuade parents to support their children and this case is no exception.

Appellant’s App. at 97-98. In short, the trial court concluded that Brandenburg did not sustain his burden to prove his inability to pay or “sufficient bona fide efforts to pay so as to persuade the trial court that further imprisonment should not be ordered.” See Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1114; Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 617. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Brandenburg to serve the balance of his sentence in the Department of Correction.

Issue Two: Arrearage

Brandenburg contends that the trial court misstated the current amount of his arrearage in the December 4, 2012 order, and the State “acknowledge[s] that there does seem to be some uncertainty as to the amount of the arrearage.” Brief of Appellee at 9. In short, the amount of the arrearage was approximately $10,000 in August 2011, and Brandenburg’s daughter had turned twenty-one in August 2009. Brandenburg maintains that his child support obligation ceased “by operation of law” on his daughter’s twenty-first birthday under former Indiana Code Section 36-16-6-6. Therefore, he contends, the arrearage could not have increased to $17,795.05, as found by the trial court, after the date of his sentencing in 2011. We remand to the trial court for a hearing to recalculate the amount of Brandenburg’s child support arrearage.

Affirmed, but remanded with instructions.

MATHIAS, J., and BROWN, J., concur.


author: BARNES, Judge.

text:
    Gregory JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 49A02-1301-CR-28.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Aug. 20, 2013.

      Suzy St. John, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

Gregory Johnson appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. We affirm.

Issue

The sole issue is whether the trial court properly admitted evidence recovered as a result of a traffic stop of Johnson’s vehicle.

Facts

On May 29, 2012, Officer Keith Minch of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department pulled over a Dodge Caravan minivan driven by Johnson because of Officer Minch’s belief that the rear window of the vehicle was too darkly tinted, so that he “could not see through it clearly enough to identify the occupants inside and describe them to the point that the law allows.” Tr. p. 7. After receiving identification from Johnson, Officer Minch discovered that Johnson’s driver’s license was suspended. Officer Minch then placed Johnson under arrest. During a pat down search incident to arrest, Officer Minch found several bags of marijuana inside a pocket of Johnson’s pants.

The State charged Johnson with Class A misdemeanor dealing in marijuana and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Johnson filed a motion to suppress the marijuana, arguing that the initial stop of his vehicle was illegal because his windows were not illegally tinted. The trial court did not hold a separate motion to suppress hearing but considered it during Johnson’s bench trial, which was held on December 17, 2012. During that trial, Johnson presented uncontradicted evidence that the tint on the minivan was factory standard for Dodge Caravans for that year and of that type. The trial court refused to suppress the marijuana; it acquitted Johnson of dealing in marijuana and convicted him of possession of marijuana. Johnson now appeals.

Analysis

The trial court here essentially held a hearing on Johnson’s motion to suppress in conjunction with his trial and seemed to rule on the matter as a question of admissibility of evidence. We review a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. We cannot reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and must consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. It also is well-settled that when reviewing the constitutionality of a search or seizure, we must also examine “any uncontested evidence favorable to the appellant.” Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind.1993). “Although a trial court’s determination of historical facts is entitled to deferential review, we employ a de novo standard when reviewing the trial court’s ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.” Lindsey, 916 N.E.2d at 238. In other words, when a trial court has admitted evidence alleged to have been discovered as the result of an illegal search or seizure, we generally will assume the trial court accepted the evidence presented by the State and will not reweigh that evidence, but we owe no deference as to whether that evidence established the constitutionality of a search or seizure.

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a seizure in the form of a traffic stop is permissible if an officer has at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law, or other law, has been violated. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind.2013). Whether reasonable suspicion for a seizure existed requires examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). The reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe illegal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Id. Reasonable suspicion cannot be based only upon an officer’s general “hunches” or unpartic-ularized suspicions. Id.

Recently, in Sanders, our supreme court highlighted the deference to be given to police officers who have pulled over a vehicle for a perceived violation of Indiana Code Section 9-19-19-4, the Indiana Window Tint Statute. The statute provides in part:

A person may not drive a motor vehicle that has a:
(1) windshield;
(2) side wing;
(3) side window that is part of a front door; or
(4) rear back window;
that is covered by or treated with sun-screening material or is tinted to the extent or manufactured in a way that the occupants of the vehicle cannot be easily identified or recognized through that window from outside the vehicle. However, it is a defense if the sun-screening material applied to those windows has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than twenty-five percent (25%) as measured on the non-film side and light transmittance of at least thirty percent (30%) in the visible light range.

Ind.Code § 9-19-19-4(c). In Sanders, Officer Minch pulled over a vehicle with tinted windows when he was unable to clearly recognize or identify the occupants, but later testing revealed that the windows were not in fact in violation of the Window Tint Statute because they permitted a light transmittance of 38%. The court held that although this testing would absolve the driver of liability for violating the Window Tint Statute, it did not make the stop illegal, in light of the officer’s testimony that established reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Sanders, 989 N.E.2d at 335-36. It also stated, “Although the officer was ultimately mistaken in his belief that a violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon a good faith, reasonable belief that a statutory infraction had occurred and thus we are unable to say that the traffic stop was not lawful.” Id. at 336.

Even if we were to assume that the tinting on the windows of the minivan Johnson was driving was legal, that does not negate Officer Minch’s testified-to observation that, at the time of the stop, he could not clearly identify the vehicle’s occupants. Likewise, we are precluded from accepting Johnson’s invitation to consider photographic evidence presented during trial that he argues shows the tinting on his rear window was not excessive and, in fact, was no darker than other similar Dodge Caravans. To do so at the expense of Officer Minch’s testimony of what he observed at the time of the traffic stop would constitute reweighing the evidence, which we cannot do. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, even if Officer Minch was mistaken about whether the rear window of the minivan violated the Window Tint Statute, his testimony establishes that it was a good faith mistake and that there was reasonable suspicion to make the stop. See id.

The defendant in Sanders did not make an argument under the Indiana Constitution. Id. at B34 n. 2. Johnson does make such an argument. The legality of a search or seizure under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution turns on the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Lacey v. State, 946 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Ind.2011). Although there may be other relevant considerations depending on the circumstances, the reasonableness of a search or seizure tons on a balancing of: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.2005).

We will admit that the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that Johnson was committing a traffic violation was not overwhelming. Unlike running a red light or turning without signaling or speeding as measured by a radar gun, there is much subjectivity that goes into deciding whether a window of a moving car is too dark under the Window Tint Statute. And, again, the State does not dispute that the minivan’s windows were factory standard. Still, the degree of suspicion was not nonexistent. We also will acknowledge that the State’s interest in enforcing the Window Tint Statute is not an overwhelmingly pressing public safety concern. Again, the red light, failure to signal, and speeding examples are all more inherently dangerous than having overly-tinted windows. Nonetheless, there are legitimate law enforcement and safety interests in prohibiting the operation of vehicles with excessive window tinting, and police officers are entitled to enforce the statute.

Johnson concedes that the degree of intrusion caused by the traffic stop was “not excessively high.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. There is no argument or evidence that Officer Minch unnecessarily extended the length of the traffic stop by conducting a “fishing expedition.” Instead, Officer Minch only asked Johnson for his identification, which revealed that Johnson’s license was suspended and led to his arrest and the discovery of the marijuana. Officers who stop a vehicle for a suspected violation of the Window Tint Statute are permitted to briefly detain a motorist to, among other things, request a driver’s license and vehicle identification and conduct a license plate check. See Herbert v. State, 891 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006)), trans. denied. Even if the degree of suspicion and needs of law enforcement were not overwhelming in this case, the relative lack of intrusiveness of the traffic stop and Officer Minch’s behavior lead us to conclude that his conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and, therefore, did not violate the Indiana Constitution.

Johnson also makes a statutory argument, which is essentially that the General Assembly could not have intended to permit police officers unbridled discretion to pull over vehicles with legal window tinting on the basis of their own subjective assessment that the tinting is too dark, or that Officer Minch’s testimony that he could not adequately “identify ... and describe” the occupants of the minivan did not meet the requirements of the Window Tint Statute. Tr. p. 7. We observe, however, that Officer Minch gave very similar testimony in Sanders, which our supreme court deemed adequate to establish reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle. We also assume that, when drafting and subsequently recodifying the Window Tint Statute, the General Assembly was well aware of the constitutional principle that police officers are permitted to pull over vehicles upon reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated, and furthermore that “pretextual” stops of vehicles for minor traffic violations do not run afoul of either the United States or Indiana Constitutions. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 787 (Ind.2001). If the General Assembly believes it would be wise to rewrite the Window Tint Statute in such a way as to limit police officer authority to pull over vehicles for suspected violations of that law, it could do so. Additionally, the primary check upon potential abuse of the Window Tint Statute as a pretext to conduct traffic stops must lie with trial courts, which are in a position to judge the credibility of police officer testimony regarding the ability to see through a particular vehicle’s window tinting.

Conclusion

Officer Minch’s stop of Johnson’s vehicle did not violate the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, or the Window Tint Statute. We affirm the admission of the marijuana into evidence and his conviction for possession of marijuana.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., and PYLE, J., concur.

      . The trial court sustained the State’s objection to a document from the dealer who sold the minivan indicating that the window tint was factory standard, but Johnson testified to the same effect regarding the window tint without objection.

      . Recently, in Walker v. State, 986 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), another panel of this court stated that if a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a search or seizure via objection to the admissibility of evidence at trial and appeal from a resulting conviction, and not through a separate motion to suppress hearing and interlocutory appeal, then on appeal "we may not consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” We disagree with this statement. Fair and Lindsey, for example, both were appeals after final conviction, not interlocutory appeals from denial of a motion to suppress. See also Lance v. State, 425 N.E.2d 77, 78 (Ind.1981) (applying "uncontested adverse evidence" standard to search and seizure question in appeal after trial and final conviction).

      . Curiously, Officer Minch also pulled over the defendant in Sanders.

      . The State has never disputed Johnson’s assertion that the windows on the minivan were factory standard. We will assume for the sake of argument that Dodge did not mass-produce minivans with illegally dark window tinting.

      . Officer Minch testified in Sanders that "he could not 'clearly recognize or identify the occupant inside.'" Sanders, 989 N.E.2d at 335.


author: BROWN, Judge. RILEY, Judge,

text:
    In re the Matter of A.H. and S.H., Minor Children, V.H., Mother, Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
    No. 10A01-1302-JM-93.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Aug. 21, 2013.

      Bart M. Betteau, Betteau Law Office, New Albany, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    April F. Williams-Shaw, DCS Local Office in Clark County, Jeffersonville, IN, Robert J. Henke, DCS Central Administration, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

BROWN, Judge.

V.H. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order granting Petitions to Interview Children filed by the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Mother raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in issuing the order. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 9, 2013, DCS received a report that Mother was using methamphetamine and heroin on a daily basis when her children, four-year-old K., six-year-old A.H., and eight-year-old S.H., were present, that Mother was selling prescription drugs and heroin, and that there were syringes all around the house. Brandy Terry, a DCS family case manager, reviewed the allegations against Mother on January 10, 2013.

On January 11, 2013, Terry visited Mother at her home, explained to Mother the nature of the report, observed Mother’s home, and interviewed Mother. Mother stated that she was not using drugs, methamphetamine, or heroin and that she had prescription drugs that she was using for health conditions. Mother stated that she had no history of drug abuse. She submitted to a drug screen, and the results “were that she was negative for all drugs except those that she was prescribed.” Transcript at 19. Terry-asked Mother to confirm that S.K. was the father of S.H., and Mother did so and then told Terry that S.K. had made a false allegation to DCS about her in the past and that she believed that S.K. had made the current report as well. Terry walked through every room of Mother’s house and did not observe any indication of illicit drug use or sales in the home such as pills, a pipe, manufacturing equipment, or distinctive odors. Terry also did not observe any indication that Mother was impaired or under the influence of drugs. Four-year-old K. was present while Mother was interviewed by Terry, but Terry did not interview the child due to his age, and she observed that K. appeared happy and healthy. Terry asked Mother to sign a safety plan, and Mother did so, which provided that Mother agreed to remain sober and drug free while providing care for the children, not to use, sell, or manufacture illegal drugs, and to take any prescription drugs only as directed.

Terry informed Mother that, as part of the assessment, she needed to speak with A.H. and S.H., who were in school at the time. She asked for Mother’s permission to speak with the children; however, Mother did not give permission to speak •with them, stated that she wished to speak with her attorney, and indicated that the children had “been through a lot of things like this before and ... [she] did not wish to do any further damage to the children.” Id. at 48. At some point, Terry also spoke with the father of A.H., who informed Terry that Mother had a history of drug abuse, that he was not sure if Mother was currently abusing, and that he had not seen Mother for six to nine months. On January 14, 2013, Mother called Terry and indicated that she did not want the children to be interviewed.

On January 25, 2013, DCS filed separate petitions to interview A.H. and S.H. On February 1, 2013, the court held a hearing on the petitions, at which Mother verbally moved to dismiss DCS’s petition and the parties presented evidence and arguments. Mother, by counsel, agreed that Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 permitted an assessment which included an interview of the children. However, Mother argued that the statute is unconstitutional pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When asked if it was her training and experience to be able to observe if a person uses methamphetamine and heroin on a daily basis, Terry responded affirmatively, and when asked whether the evidence she observed during the home visit “not only [did] not [ ] substantiate [the allegations], but that it was a big lie,” Terry answered “[a]t that point.” Id. at 44. Mother testified that she had reason to believe that S.K. might file a false accusation against her, that S.K. does not pay his child support and does not have visitation, and that she is pursuing court action for back child support. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.

On February 6, 2013, the court entered an Order Granting Request to Interview Children which provided in part:

[Mother] asserts, compellingly, that her [Fourteenth Amendment right to direct the upbringing of her children should outweigh [DCS’s] intrusion into her life. Certainly, she does have the fundamental right to raise her child without undue state intervention, but that right is not absolute. Where significant compelling interests exist, such as protecting the welfare of children, the state has the power to intervene under its parens pat-riae power. This certainly is the mechanism codified in IC § 31-33-8-7(d). As such, [DCS], by clear statutory authority, must issue a report on the conditions of the children. In this case, [DCS] has a compelling interest, and has no other means to directly assess the conditions of these children without an interview. ...

Appellant’s Appendix at 17-18. The court required Mother to produce A.H. and S.H. for interviews within ten days of the order and permitted Mother to be present for the interviews. Mother filed a motion to stay interview pending appeal, which DCS opposed and the court denied. Mother now appeals.

ISSUE AND ARGUMENTS

The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting DCS’s Petitions to Interview Children. Mother contends that the order compelling her to surrender her children for interrogation was contrary to due process of law. She argues that she was deprived of her right to due process because the relevant statutory scheme, Ind. Code § 31-38-8-7, interferes with her right to raise and protect her children in the absence of fair procedures and that “[e]ven though the initial report was proved false, [DCS] invoked the statutory procedure to compel [her] six and eight year old children to be interrogated.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Mother maintains that “[t]his case clearly shows that to grant such a petition, although permissible under the relevant statutes, is contrary to a parent’s right to due process.” Id. at 9. Specifically, Mother argues that due process requires the presence of additional procedural protections prior to compelling child interrogation. She asserts that the private interest involved in this case of a parent preventing the damage which would be caused by an interrogation is extremely significant, and Mother acknowledges that the State has an interest in protecting children from parental neglect or abuse.

Mother further argues that, in considering the risk of error created by the challenged procedure, analysis of the relevant statutory scheme shows that it permits compelled interrogation in cases where there is no concern of danger to a child and in violation of the due process guarantee. It is her position that the lack of a verification requirement creates a risk of error, and that the lack of a requirement that a petition include a factual basis establishing child abuse or neglect also creates a risk of error. She maintains that her “right to raise / protect her child should not give way ... where the true facts conclusively demonstrate that no abuse or neglect is taking place,” and that “[t]he State has no interest in interfering with her rights as a parent in such a situation.” Id. at 13. Mother states that the deficiencies of the statutory scheme become apparent when compared to actions alleging a child is a child in need of services (“CHINS”) generally, that in a CHINS action the coercive intervention of the State is not permitted until a trial court is satisfied that a factual basis exists to warrant such intervention, and that a CHINS petition must be verified, approved by the court, and contain sufficient evidence demonstrating that a child is being abused or neglected.

Mother asserts that, for the statutory scheme to pass constitutional muster, DCS’s petition must contain evidence under oath demonstrating that a child is being abused or neglected, that if the factual basis rests upon hearsay the petition should establish the credibility of the source or corroborate the information in some manner, and that the adequacy of the factual allegations must be determined by a neutral, detached magistrate at a hearing. Mother maintains that this is the only way to ensure that parents are protected from malicious false reports or overzealous departments.

DCS maintains that the court did not deny Mother’s due process rights, that DCS made Mother aware of the allegations, that Mother was afforded notice of the court’s hearing on the petitions to interview, and that the court conducted a hearing where Mother was provided an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. DCS argues that Mother has a right to raise the children and DCS has a compelling interest in protecting children, that DCS only wanted to interview, not interrogate, the children, and that the provisions of Ind. Code §§ 31-33-8 provide that DCS shall initiate an appropriate and thorough child protection assessment and that the assessment may include an interview. DCS posits that, given that the purpose of the interviews is to assess the allegations, ensure the children’s safety, and make a determination as to what actions DCS should take based upon the outcome of the assessment, the additional steps requested by Mother are unwarranted.

DCS further contends that due process does not require a petition under Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7(d) to be verified, and that “[i]n recognizing that a request to interview children is not on the same level of intervention as a CHINS Petition, where DCS is requesting that the court intervene in a families’ [sic] life, our General Assembly chose not to include a requirement that a petition filed under Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7(d) be verified.” Appellee’s Brief at 11. DCS states that its petitions contained sufficient information regarding the need to interview the children, that the language of Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7(e) requires the court to conduct a hearing, that thus the statute affords a parent with due process through this requirement, and that Mother has failed to demonstrate any harm. DCS further maintains that it satisfied its burden under Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7(d) and that the court did not abuse its discretion or err in ordering Mother to produce the children for an interview.

In her reply brief, Mother argues that DCS’s brief fails to demonstrate that her due process rights were protected and “reveals the governmental agency’s arrogance, a belief that it should be allowed to interrogate children at its whim without any meaningful judicial oversight whatsoever.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1. Mother states that she is required to show only a deprivation of a protectable interest and that she need not show harm. Mother further contends that DCS’s protest of her use of the term “interrogation” as opposed to “interview” “reflects a complete callousness as to the right of parents to prevent compelled questioning of their children by governmental agents and to a mother’s point of view,” that the present statute “permits compelled interrogation whenever [DCS], in its subjective interpretation, feels that an interview is necessary to protect a child,” and that “[d]ue process simply cannot condone compelled interrogation to be totally dependent on the whim of a governmental agency.” Id. at 2. Mother also asserts that she was not provided with an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner and that the court’s hearing was not meaningful because the court was statutorily permitted to enter the order even though it was not necessary for protection of the children.

DISCUSSION

This case involves the ability of the DCS to interview a child as part of an initial assessment in response to a report of child abuse or neglect. Ind.Code §§ 31-33-8 govern the investigation of reports of known or suspected child abuse or neglect. Ind.Code § 31-33-8-1(a) provides that “[t]he department shall initiate an appropriately thorough child protection assessment of every report of known or suspected child abuse or neglect the department receives, whether in accordance with this article or otherwise.” At the time of the petitions, Ind.Code § 31-33-8-1 (c) provided that “[i]f the report alleges a child may be a victim of child abuse, the assessment shall be initiated immediately, but not later than twenty-four (24) hours after receipt of the report.” (Supp. 2009) (subsequently amended by Pub.L. 205-2013, § 339 (eff. Jul. 1, 2013), moving language to subsection (e)). Ind.Code § 31-33-8-6 provides: “The department shall promptly make a thorough assessment upon either the oral or written report. The primary purpose of the assessment is the protection of the child.”

With respect to the scope of the assessment and a petition to interview a child, Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 provides:

(a)The department’s assessment, to the extent that is reasonably possible, must include the following:
(1) The nature, extent, and cause of the known or suspected child abuse or neglect.
(2) The identity of the person allegedly responsible for the child abuse or neglect.
(3) The names and conditions of other children in the home.
(4) An evaluation of the parent, guardian, custodian or person responsible for the care of the child.
(5) The home environment and the relationship of the child to the parent, guardian, or custodian or other persons responsible for the child’s care.
(6) All other data considered pertinent.
(b) The assessment may include the following:
(1) A visit to the child’s home.
(2) An interview with the subject child.
(3) A physical, psychological, or psychiatric examination of any child in the home.
(c) If:
(1) admission to the home, the school, or any other place that the child maybe; or
(2) permission of the parent, guardian, custodian, or other persons responsible for the child for the physical, psychological, or psychiatric examination;
under subsection (b) cannot be obtained, the juvenile court, upon good cause shown, shall follow the procedures under IC 31-32-12.[]
(d) If a custodial parent, a guardian, or a custodian of a child refuses to allow the department to interview the child after the caseworker has attempted to obtain the consent of the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian to interview the child, the department may petition a court to order the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian to make the child available to be interviewed by the caseworker.
(e) If the court finds that:
(1) a custodial parent, a guardian, or a custodian has been informed of the hearing on a petition described under subsection (d); and
(2) the department has made reasonable and unsuccessful efforts to obtain the consent of the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian to interview the child;
the court shall specify in the order the efforts the department made to obtain the consent of the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian and may grant the motion to interview the child, either with or without the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian being present.

Ind.Code § 31-33-8-12 provides that “[u]pon completion of an assessment, the department shall classify reports as substantiated or unsubstantiated.”

With respect to Mother’s argument that Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 interferes with her right to raise and protect her children and that due process requires the presence of additional procedural protections prior to compelling the interview of a child, this court has noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a parent’s fundamental right to raise her child without undue interference by the state. In the Matter of J.W. v. DCS, 977 N.E.2d 381, 384-385 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing In re T.H., 856 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind.Ct.App.2006)), trans. denied. However, “[t]hat fundamental right is not unlimited ... because the state has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children. When parents neglect, abuse, or abandon their children, the state has the authority under its parens patriae power to intervene.” Id. at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted and citing G.B. v. Dearborn Cnty. Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied). Due process is essentially “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). When determining whether a litigant received proper process, we balance three factors: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” In re J.S.O., 938 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). As we review and balance these three interests, we recognize that, “although due process is not dependent on the underlying facts of the particular case, it is nevertheless ‘flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” Lawson v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 835 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (quoting In re B.T., 791 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied). The private interest affected by the proceeding of a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of her child is substantial, and the countervailing factor of the State’s parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also substantial. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917-918 (Ind.2011).

The statutory provisions set forth above provide requirements and guidance for DCS to undertake a child protection assessment in response to the receipt of a report of child abuse or neglect, and the provisions provide that the assessment must include the conditions of the children in the home. According to the statute, at the stage or point that a report is received by DCS, the report and any allegations made by way of the report have not yet been investigated and are not yet classified as substantiated or unsubstantiated. The determination to classify a report as substantiated or unsubstantiated is made following the completion of the assessment, which may include an interview of the child under Ind.Code § 81-33-8-7(b) and as set forth in Ind.Code § 81 — 38—8—7(d) and (e). The assessment as described by Ind.Code § 31-83-8-7 is a preliminary process undertaken by DCS following the receipt of a report in order to evaluate or determine whether a basis exists to substantiate the report and which may require action of some nature by the state to protect the child or children. See Ind.Code § 31 — 33— 8-6 (noting that the “primary purpose of the assessment is the protection of the child”). While we recognize the fundamental right of a parent to raise her child without undue interference by the state, we cannot say that due process requires DCS to conduct an assessment or a portion of an assessment in order to obtain information which would provide a basis supporting the accuracy or reliability of the report, prior to interviewing the child or children. Indeed, an interview of the child or children as part of this initial evaluation may provide the information needed for DCS to classify a report as substantiated or unsubstantiated. We cannot say that legislation allowing DCS the ability to interview a child as part of the initial assessment and after obtaining a court order if necessary violates due process. See G.W., 977 N.E.2d at 386 (noting that this court was aware of no constitutional prohibition against the proposed child interview arrangements). Further, as noted above, parents’ fundamental right to raise their children without undue interference by the state, and the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of children are both substantial, see In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917-918, and we cannot say that the risk of error created by the legislature’s chosen procedure in Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 or the actions of DCS or the trial court in this case is substantial or favor reversal in this case.

In addition, we do not find Mother’s argument that the fact that Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 does not require that a request for a child interview be verified, or include, similar to the initiation of CHINS actions, a basis that abuse or neglect occurred to be compelling. The statutory provisions related to the filing of a petition alleging that a child is a CHINS, found at Ind.Code §§ 31-34-9, provide that DCS must request the juvenile court to authorize the filing of a CHINS petition, see Ind.Code § 31-34-9-1, that the juvenile court shall consider the inquiry “and the evidence of probable cause that is contained in the report of the preliminary inquiry or an affidavit of probable cause” and authorize the filing of a petition if the court finds probable cause to believe that the child is a CHINS, Ind.Code § 31-34-9-2 (emphasis added). The CHINS petition must “be verified,” contain a citation to the provision of the juvenile law that defines a child in need of services, and contain “[a] concise statement of the facts upon which the allegations are based, including the date and location at which the alleged facts occurred.” Ind.Code § 31-34-9-3 (emphasis added). A child is a CHINS in part if the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered and the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted “without the coercive intervention of the court.” Ind.Code § 31-34-1-1. Under the CHINS statute, among other things, a child may be taken into custody, a parent may enter a program of informal adjustment, and the court may enter a decree ordering supervision of the child by DCS, that the child receive outpatient treatment, that the child be removed from the home, and that the child’s parent complete services recommended by DCS. See Ind.Code §§ 31-34-2, -4, -8, 20. In contrast, as mentioned above, Ind.Code §§ 31-33-8 address the investigation of reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and set forth the process to be undertaken by DCS following the receipt of such a report. The assessment described in Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 may include an interview of the child, and this assessment, including the interview, may provide the information needed for DCS to classify the report as substantiated or unsubstantiated. The extent and nature of DCS’s role in completing an assessment under Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7, including a child interview, to determine whether a report is substantiated is clearly distinct from the coercive intervention of DCS on behalf of the state under the CHINS proceedings in Ind.Code §§ 31-34. Further, we cannot say that Mother was not afforded notice of the hearing on the petitions to interview or an opportunity to be heard with respect to the petitions at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the record and under these circumstances, we conclude that Mother has failed to establish that the trial court erred in granting DCS’s Petitions to Interview Children or that she was denied due process. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the Petitions to Interview Children.

Affirmed.

BRADFORD, J., concurs.

RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion.

RILEY, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order granting the DCS’s petitions to interview the minor children as part of an assessment in response to a report of child abuse or neglect. Although the majority analyzes the merits of Mother’s claim, I would dismiss the appeal as moot.

An issue becomes moot when it is no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome or when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). An actual controversy must exist at all stages of the appellate review, and if a case becomes moot at any stage, then the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss. Id. On February 6, 2013, the trial court issued its order, compelling Mother to produce her minor children for interviews within ten days of the issuance of the order. Despite Mother’s request, the trial court refused to stay the interviews pending her appeal. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I must conclude that the children have been interviewed and no effective relief can be given to Mother.

Although a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine exists, it is not applicable to the instant case. The public interest exception posits that an otherwise moot case may be decided on the merits if the case involves a question of great public importance or interest that is likely to recur. Id. at 412. The instant issue is not capable of recurrence as contemplated by the public interest exception. The statutory protection of the welfare of the minor children based on the conditions in the home and on a completion of an assessment is a question of fact that varies from family to family and changes over time. See I.C. § 31-33-8-7(a). Although the question may recur in a very generalized setting, no conclusion within the authority of this court can bear on future disputes with respect to a DOS’s petition to interview the minor children because a determination of factual circumstances must be made each time a disputed interview is sought. I conclude that the case does not present an issue of great public interest and, therefore, I would dismiss the appeal as moot.

      . The dissent's position is that the issue is moot in light of the trial court's refusal to grant a stay pending appeal. However, given the brief amount of time, twelve days, between the court’s order denying the stay and the Notice of Appeal, the fact that DCS does not claim that the issue is moot, the lack of evidence in the record indicating that the interview has occurred, and this Court’s preference for deciding cases on their merits, we address the issue as briefed and presented to us on its merits.

      . Ind.Code §§ 31-32-12 relate to a juvenile court authorizing mental or physical examinations or treatment.

      . See Phillips v. Cnty. of Orange, 894 F.Supp.2d 345, 376 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (noting that "there is no authority to substantiate the Parent Plaintiffs’ claim that the in-school interview of [the child], conducted after CPS received a call alleging that [the child] was the victim of sexual abuse, violates their liberty interest in her care, custody, and management”); Hawley v. Nelson, 968 F.Supp. 1372, 1386 (E.D.Mo.1997) (stating in part that, upon receiving a report of suspected neglect or abuse, the division of family services was required under Missouri law to undertake a thorough investigation, that such a thorough investigation would reasonably include an interview with the child, that in the context of the investigation the failure to secure parents’ permission for interviews "protected the state’s very strong interests in protecting the child and learning in timely fashion what the child had to relate about the matter,” and that ”[t]his interest was paramount to the personal interests of the plaintiffs in preventing false accusations”), judgment aff'd, 141 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir.1998); J.B. v. Washington Cnty., 127 F.3d 919, 925-927 (10th Cir.1997) (recognizing the importance of both the private and governmental interests, turning to the last factor in the Mathews balancing and examining the procedures used, and stating that given the situation the procedures employed were reasonably calculated to balance the competing interests and to achieve an interview with the child untainted by the parents’ influence).