author: BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

text:
    Luz Marina Cantillano CRUZ; J.X.M.C., Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 15-2511
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: December 6, 2016
    Decided: March 13, 2017
    Amended: March 14, 2017

      ARGUED: James Edward Tysse, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Yanal Harbi Yousef, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Michelle A. Reed, Dallas, Texas, Steven H. Schulman, Matthew W. Kinskey, AKIN GRUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jamie M. Dowd, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
   Petition for review granted; remanded for further proceedings by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Thacker joined.

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Luz Marina Cantillano Cruz (Cantillano Cruz), a citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) conclusion that Cantillano Cruz was not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Cantil-lano Cruz argued before the BIA and IJ that she feared persecution on account of her nuclear family ties to her husband Johnny Martinez (Martinez), whom she suspected had been murdered by his employer. The BIA and IJ rejected this argument and determined that any persecution suffered by Cantillano Cruz occurred because she had threatened to report the employer to the police, an act that did not qualify as a basis for her requested relief.

Upon our review, we conclude that Can-tillano Cruz’s familial relationship with Martinez necessarily was one central reason for the persecution and fear of future persecution established by Cantillano Cruz, thereby meeting the statutory “nexus requirement” for asylum provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 8 U.S.C. § 1168(b)(1)(B)®. Accordingly, we grant Cruz’s petition and remand her case to the BIA for further proceedings.

I.

In July 2014, Cantillano Cruz and her minor son entered the United States without authorization and presented themselves to immigration officials to request asylum. Several days later, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Cantillano Cruz with a notice to appear charging her as an alien present in the United States without admission, under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Cantillano Cruz conceded removability but filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.

At a hearing before the IJ, Cantillano Cruz claimed past persecution and fear of future persecution based on her membership in a “particular social group,” namely, the “nuclear family of Johnny Martinez.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A). She testified and presented other evidence in support of her claim. The evidence showed that in 2003, Cantillano Cruz and Martinez began living together, and that, although they were never married, were considered a married couple by members of their community. The couple had two children together.

Between 2001 and 2007, Martinez worked for the Honduran government as a border patrol agent. However, in 2007, he obtained new employment working as the personal bodyguard to Danny Avila, who claimed to be a fisherman. For about five years, Martinez accompanied Avila on extended “fishing trips.”

Martinez eventually learned that Avila worked with organized crime groups in Honduras and Colombia that were engaged in the trafficking of drugs and firearms. In May 2012, Martinez told Cantilla-no Cruz that because of Avila’s criminal conduct, Martinez planned to quit his job and to return to his employment as a border patrol agent. One week later, in June 2012, Martinez accompanied Avila on another “fishing trip,” but Martinez did not return.

Cantillano Cruz and Martinez’s uncle, Calin Isaias Ramirez Meza (Isaias), later visited the local boat dock to search for Martinez. Cantillano Cruz found Martinez’s clothes and motorcycle abandoned there. When Cantillano Cruz and Isaias questioned Avila about Martinez’s whereabouts, Avila told them to stop asking questions. After Isaias stated that he and Cantillano Cruz would “put [in] a police report,” Avila threatened that they would suffer the same fate as Martinez. Cantilla-no Cruz and Isaias visited the dock a few more times to ask about Martinez, and encountered Avila there more than one year after their first encounter. Avila told them not to come back, and further warned “that there were dangerous people around.”

After Cantillano Cruz returned home from her final visit to the dock, Avila contacted her and instructed her to “go to a certain place” to retrieve money owed to Martinez. Based on Avila’s earlier threats, Cantillano Cruz declined his offer.

During a telephone call initiated by Avila, Cantillano Cruz assured Avila that she had no intention of contacting the police regarding Avila or her husband’s disappearance. Nevertheless, on different occasions in 2013 and 2014, Cantillano Cruz observed Avila and his associates loitering outside her home. During these incidents, they brandished and fired weapons, and threatened to kill Cantillano Cruz and her children. Also, Avila and his associates killed Cantillano Cruz’s dogs.

In July 2014, two days after the last threatening encounter, Cantillano Cruz fled Honduras with her younger child. Because she could not afford to bring both children with her, she left her older child with Martinez’s mother. After Cantillano Cruz left Honduras, Avila continued to inquire about her whereabouts. Cantillano Cruz testified that Avila focused his threats on her because he knew that Martinez probably had told her about Avila’s criminal conduct.

Upon considering Cantillano Cruz’s .testimony and the other evidence, the IJ concluded that she was credible. The IJ also credited the testimony of Dr. Thomas Boerman, an expert on the subject of organized crime in Honduras. Among other things, Dr. Boerman testified that Avila likely targeted Cantillano Cruz because he suspected that Martinez had told her about Avila’s criminal activities.

In addressing Cantillano Cruz’s claim for asylum, the IJ concluded that Cantilla-no Cruz was a member of a cognizable particular social group, namely, the “nuclear family members of Johnny Martinez.” Even though the two never married, the IJ concluded that they lived together as domestic partners and were considered a married couple. However, the IJ further found that Cantillano Cruz failed to show that she had experienced persecution and feared future persecution “on account of her membership in the nuclear family” of Martinez.

The IJ instead determined that the “main reason” Avila had threatened Can-tillano Cruz was to deter her from contacting the police. The IJ stated that “although family ties likely motivated” her search for Martinez and her decision to confront Avila, “that concern for [Martinez’s] well-being could exist outside their familial relationship.” The IJ further observed that the only other family member who had been threatened was Isaías, who also had confronted Avila at the dock, and that neither Martinez’s mother nor Cantil-lano Cruz’s older child had received such threats. Additionally, the IJ found that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that Avila threatened Cantillano Cruz because she had learned about his criminal activities from Martinez. The IJ accordingly denied Cantillano Cruz’s application for asylum, as well as her application for withholding of removal.

The IJ also rejected Cantillano Cruz’s request for protection under the CAT. Even though the IJ assumed that Avila had killed Martinez and would find Cantil-lano Cruz upon her return to Honduras, the IJ concluded that Avila had threatened Cantillano Cruz only about two times per year, and that the “situation never escalated to violence.” The IJ further determined that Avila had threatened to harm Cantil-lano Cruz only if she reported Avila to police, which she had not done.and did not intend to do if she returned to Honduras. Thus, the IJ concluded that Cantillano Cruz failed to show that she likely would be tortured if she returned to Honduras.

Cantillano Cruz appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. The BIA dismissed her appeal, adopting and supplementing the IJ’s conclusions. According to the BIA, Avila’s threats constituted “[h]arm meted out by a private actor for personal reasons or solely on general levels of crime and violence in Honduras,” which were insufficient bases to demonstrate eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s denial of Cantillano Cruz’s request for protection under the CAT.

Cantillano Cruz petitioned this Court for review. We granted her unopposed motion for stay of removal proceedings pending our review.

II.

Cantillano Cruz contends that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding that she was not persecuted because of her membership in the particular social group of the nuclear family of Johnny Martinez. Citing our decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015), Can-tillano Cruz submits that her familial relationship with Martinez was “intertwined” with her actions resulting in Avila’s threats toward her. Cantillano Cruz also submits that the BIA and IJ erred in their factual findings, contending that the record conclusively demonstrates that her nuclear family ties to Martinez were “at least one central reason” she was targeted and threatened by Avila.

In response, the government argues that the BIA and IJ applied the correct legal standard in concluding that Cantillano Cruz failed to establish the required nexus between her membership in a particular social group and persecution by Avila. According to the government, the record does not show that Cantillano Cruz was “singled out” by Avila based on her familial ties to Martinez, and that any interested party, even those outside the nuclear family of Martinez, could have investigated Martinez’s whereabouts and threatened to contact the police. The government contends that, therefore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that Avila did not threaten Cantillano Cruz based on her family relationship with Martinez. We disagree with the government’s arguments.

Under the INA, the Secretary of DHS or the United States Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to any alien who establishes eligibility for such relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). An applicant seeking asylum must show that she is unable or unwilling to return to her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of’ a protected ground, namely, “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

Membership in “a particular social group” is a protected ground if that group consists of people who “share a common, immutable characteristic.” Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, the BIA and IJ properly concluded, and the government does not dispute, that by virtue of her domestic partnership with Martinez, Cantillano Cruz was a member of a cognizable particular social group, namely, “the nuclear family of Johnny Martinez.” See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 949 (“Membership in a nuclear family qualifies as a protected ground for asylum purposes.”).

Persecution occurs “on account of’ membership in an immediate family when that relationship is “ ‘at least one central reason for’ the feared persecution.” Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)®). This statutory nexus requirement is not limited to situations in which the applicant’s proposed group membership constitutes the sole or dominant motivation for her persecution. Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 59 (4th Cir. 2015); Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009). Instead, more than one central reason may, and often does, motivate a persecutor’s actions. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950; Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 338-39 (4th Cir. 2014). However, when membership in the proposed group is merely “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason” for the persecution, the statutory nexus requirement is not satisfied. Quinteros-Mendoza, 556 F.3d at 164. After all, not “every threat that references a family member is made on account of family ties.” Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950 n.7.

When, as in the present case, the BIA “adopts the IJ’s opinion and supplements it with its own reasoning,” we consider both rulings. Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 948. We review de novo the question whether the BIA and the IJ applied the correct legal standard in assessing the applicant’s proof of the statutory nexus requirement. See Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337. In contrast, the assessment of a persecutor’s motivation presents a “classic factual question.” Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127-28; see also Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 891-92 (4th Cir. 2014) (no rational factfinder could simultaneously credit facts showing that applicant was “singled out” for his mental illness yet conclude that there is no nexus between his mental illness and his mistreatment). Thus, our review of the BIA’s and IJ’s determination of this factual question is limited to considering whether their conclusion is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2004).

We treat the IJ’s factual findings as conclusive, unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion. Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337. Accordingly, on a petition for review of a decision by the BIA and IJ holding that an applicant is ineligible for asylum, we may vacate the denial of asylum only if that decision is “manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.” See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).

Although this standard is stringent, we have been compelled to disagree with several of the BIA’s recent decisions holding that an applicant failed to meet the statutory nexus requirement for obtaining relief from removal. See Oliva, 807 F.3d at 59; Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 949-50; Temu, 740 F.3d at 892; see also Cordova, 759 F.3d at 340 (remanding for further consideration of the nexus requirement). We are compelled to do so again here.

Our decision in Hernandez-Avalos is particularly instructive in the present case. There, the BIA denied asylum to a petitioner who fled El Salvador after gang members threatened to kill her because she prevented her son from joining the gang. 784 F.3d at 946-47. The petitioner had argued that at least one central reason for her persecution was her nuclear family relationship with her son. Id. at 949. The BIA disagreed, holding that she actually was targeted because she did not consent to her son’s criminal activity. Id.

We held that this application of the nexus requirement by the BIA was “excessively narrow,” and explained that there was no meaningful distinction between the existence of a maternal relationship and a mother’s decision to forbid her son from participating in a gang. Id. at 949-50. We held that the record compelled a factual conclusion that the petitioner’s relationship with her son was a central reason for her persecution, because that relationship was the reason “why she, and not another person, was threatened.” Id. at 950.

We likewise conclude in the present case that the BIA and IJ applied an improper and excessively narrow interpretation of the evidence relevant to the statutory nexus requirement. The BIA and IJ shortsightedly focused on Avila’s articulated purpose of preventing Cantillano Cruz from contacting the police, while discounting the very relationship that prompted her to search for her husband, to confront Avila, and to express her intent to contact the police. See Oliva, 807 F.3d at 59-60 (although the applicant’s refusal to pay the gang rent was the “immediate trigger” for an assault, the applicant’s membership in the social group of individuals who left the gang led to threats, and thus the two reasons were linked). The BIA’s and IJ’s focus on the explanation Avila gave for his threats, while failing to consider the intertwined reasons for those threats, manifests a misapplication of the statutory nexus standard.

The full record before us compels a conclusion that Avila’s threats were motivated, in at least one central respect, by Cantillano Cruz’s membership in Martinez’s nuclear family. Although, as the IJ observed, any person interested in Martinez’s disappearance may have confronted Avila concerning Martinez’s whereabouts, this fact does not adequately explain the ongoing threats Avila made against Cantil-lano Cruz and her children over a period of two years at her home. See Cordova, 759 F.3d at 339-40 (although the applicant was first attacked by the persecutor to force the applicant to join the gang, the BIA failed to consider evidence showing that later attacks were motivated by family ties). Avila persisted in threatening Cantil-lano Cruz after she promised him that she would not contact the police. Avila placed threatening telephone calls to Cantillano Cruz at her home, the center of life for Martinez and his nuclear family. Also at the Martinez family’s home, Avila and his associates killed the family’s dogs, brandished and fired weapons, and threatened to harm Cantillano Cruz and her children.

In their failure to identify the nuclear family relationship as a central reason for Cantillano Cruz’s persecution, the BIA and IJ further erred by giving weight to the fact that Avila did not threaten additional family members other than Martinez’s, uncle, Isaías. Neither Isaías nor Martinez’s mother are members of Martinez’s immediate, nuclear family, the only relevant social group. And Avila in fact threatened to harm all nuclear family members of Johnny Martinez, specifically, his wife and children. Thus, the fact that other members of Martinez’s extended family were not targeted “does not undermine” Cantillano Cruz’s own fear of persecution. See Cordo-va, 759 F.3d at 339; Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127 n.6.

The record also unequivocally demonstrates that Cantillano Cruz knew about Avila’s involvement with drugs and firearms trafficking as a result of her husband’s communications with her. Although Cantillano Cruz could not verify that Avila knew that Martinez had revealed this information to her, circumstantial evidence compels a conclusion that Avila at least suspected that Cantillano Cruz had such knowledge based on her marital relationship with Martinez.

This circumstantial evidence included the suspicious timing of the events surrounding Avila’s threats. Martinez informed Cantillano Cruz just one week before he left for his last “fishing trip” that he planned to stop working for Avila because of Avila’s criminal activities. After Martinez disappeared, Avila’s threats against Cantillano Cruz began. Cantillano Cruz testified repeatedly that Avila feared she would report “him” to police, not simply that she would alert authorities about Martinez’s suspicious disappearance. Additionally, Dr. Boerman opined that Can-tillano Cruz was targeted because “Avila either knew or suspected that she had information about his criminal activities.”

Without accounting for this extensive evidence, the BIA and the IJ essentially required that Cantillano Cruz prove that Avila’s threats were based exclusively on her status as Martinez’s wife. Such a requirement defies common sense.

In view of the above analytical deficiencies in the BIA’s and IJ’s reasoning, we conclude that that the record compels a conclusion that Cantillano Cruz’s evidence satisfied the statutory nexus requirement. She conclusively has demonstrated that she was not threatened “for personal reasons or solely on general levels of crime and violence,” as the BIA held. Instead, the record compels a finding that because of Cantillano Cruz’s relationship with her husband, she was more likely than others to search for him and to contact the police based both on her knowledge of Avila’s criminal activities and her husband’s suspicious disappearance. Accordingly, we hold that any reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to conclude that Can-tillano Cruz’s membership in Martinez’s nuclear family was a central reason why she, and not another person, repeatedly was persecuted by Avila over a two-year period. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950. And, based on this determination, we further hold that the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that Cantillano Cruz failed to establish the statutory nexus requirement is manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. See id.

III.

In sum, we conclude that Cantillano Cruz established that any past persecution by Avila was “on account of’ her membership in the nuclear family of Martinez. We therefore grant Cantillano Cruz’s petition for review, reverse the BIA’s determination that she failed to meet the statutory nexus requirement, and remand the case to the BIA for further proceedings regarding Cantillano Cruz’s requests for relief from removal.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

      . Cantillano Cruz's minor son joins her petition for review. For ease of discussion, we refer to Cantillano Cruz as the petitioner in this opinion. Our conclusions, however, apply equally to her minor son’s derivative claims for relief from removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).

      . To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate the required statutory nexus between the persecution she suffered and her membership in a particular social group, but she bears a higher burden than that required to show eligibility for asylum. Tang v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 176, 183 (4th Cir. 2016). Thus, an applicant who is ineligible for asylum necessarily is ineligible for withholding of removal. Id.; Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004).

      . A “nuclear family” is "a family group consisting of a father, mother, and children.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1547 (2002).

      . The BIA here issued a non-precedential opinion by a single BIA member, which opinion is entitled only to Skidmore deference. See Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337 n.3. This level of deference allows us to “rely on the agency’s opinions as a 'body of experience and informed judgment’ to which we may 'properly resort for guidance.’ ” Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)) (citation omitted). However, the extent of our deference "depends upon ‘the thoroughness evident in [the BIA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.' ” Id. (citation omitted). As explained below, we conclude that the BIA’s analysis here is not persuasive.

      . With respect to the threats against Martinez’s children, the IJ’s findings were internally inconsistent. See Temu, 740 F.3d at 891-92. The IJ credited Cantillano Cruz’s testimony, which included her repeated assertions that Avila threatened to harm her children. However, the IJ also concluded that "the only other member” of Martinez’s family who was threatened was Isaías.

      . Based on our conclusion, we do not address the question whether Cantillano Cruz and her minor son separately have met the burden for CAT relief by demonstrating it is more likely than not they would be tortured if returned to Honduras. See Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 214 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015). If the BIA declines to grant asylum or withholding of removal on remand, the BIA should reconsider her CAT claim in a manner consistent with the conclusions set forth in this opinion. See id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES of America and the States of North Carolina, California, Illinois EX REL. Scarlett LUTZ, Kayla Webster, Dr. Michael Mayes and Chris Riedel, Plaintiff, and BlueWave Healthcare Consultants, Inc.; Floyd Calhoun Dent, III; Robert Bradford Johnson, Defendants-Appellants, and Health Diagnostic Laboratory Inc.; Singulex Inc.; Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings; Philippe J. Goix, PhD; Berkeley Heartlab, Inc.; LaTonya Mallory; Quest Diagnostics, Incorporated, Defendants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Intervenor-Appellee, and Blue Eagle Farming, LLC; Eagle Ray Investments, LLC; Forse Investments, LLC; Christina M. Dent; Lakelin Pines, LLC; Trini “D” Island, LLC; War-Horse Properties, LLLP, Parties-in-Interest. United States of America and the States of North Carolina, California, Illinois ex rel. Scarlett Lutz, Kayla Webster, Dr. Michael Mayes and Chris Riedel, Plaintiff, and Blue Eagle Farming, LLC; Eagle Ray Investments, LLC; Forse Investments, LLC; War-Horse Properties, LLLP, Parties-in-Interest-Appellants, v. United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee, and BlueWave Healthcare Consultants, Inc.; Floyd Calhoun Dent, III; Robert Bradford Johnson; Health Diagnostic Laboratory Inc.; Singulex Inc.; Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings; Philippe J. Goix, PhD; Berkeley Heartlab, Inc.; LaTonya Mallory; Quest Diagnostics, Incorporated, Defendants, and Christina M. Dent; Lakelin Pines, LLC; Trini “D” Island, LLC, Parties-in-Interest. United States of America and the States of North Carolina, California, Illinois ex rel. Scarlett Lutz, Kayla Webster, Dr. Michael Mayes and Chris Riedel, Plaintiff, and Christina M. Dent; Lakelin Pines, LLC; Trini “D” Island, LLC, Parties-in-Interest-Appellants, v. United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee, and BlueWave Healthcare Consultants, Inc.; Floyd Calhoun Dent, III; Robert Bradford Johnson; Health Diagnostic Laboratory Inc.; Singulex Inc.; Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings; Philippe J. Goix, PhD; Berkeley Heartlab, Inc.; LaTonya Mallory; Quest Diagnostics, Incorporated, Defendants, and Blue Eagle Farming, LLC; Eagle Ray Investments, LLC; Forse Investments, LLC; War-Horse Properties, LLLP, Parties-in-Interest.
    No. 16-1597
    16-1600
    16-1601
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued: January 26, 2017
    Decided: March 23, 2017

      ARGUED: Morris Dawes Cooke, Jr., BARNWELL WHALEY PATTERSON & HELMS, L.L.C., Charleston, South Carolina; Thomas Parker Gressette, Jr., PRATT-THOMAS WALKER, PA, Charleston, South Carolina; Nekki Shutt, C ALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Henry Charles Whitaker, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joseph P. Griffith, Jr., JOE GRIFFITH LAW FIRM, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina; Bradley B. Banias, BARNWELL WHALEY PATTERSON & HELMS, L.L.C., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellants BlueWave Healthcare Consultants, Inc., Floyd Calhoun Dent, III, and Robert Bradford Johnson. John P. Linton, Jr., PRATT-THOMAS WALKER, PA, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellants Blue Eagle Farming, LLC, Eagle Ray Investments, LLC,. Forse Investments, LLC, and War-Horse .Properties, LLLP. Louis H. Lang, Jacqueline M. Pav-licek, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants Christina M. Dent, Lakelin Pines, LLC, and Trini “D” Island, LLC. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Beth Drake, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
   Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Floyd joined

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their motions to quash writs of attachment against real and personal property and writs of garnishment against two bank accounts. Because we conclude that the denial is an unreviewable interlocutory order, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

A.

In 2010, Floyd Calhoun Dent III (“Dent”) and Robert Bradford Johnson (“Johnson”) founded BlueWave Healthcare Consultants, Inc. (“BlueWave”), which served as the exclusive marketing agent for two blood test laboratories, Health Diagnostic Laboratories, Inc. (“HDL”) and Singulex. BlueWave operated pursuant to substantially similar sales agreements with both labs. Under the sales agreements, HDL and Singulex agreed to pay Blue-Wave a monthly base fee as well as commissions ranging between 13.8% and 24% of all lab revenue generated in BlueWave’s sales territory. The labs would also pay a physician a “processing and handling fee” between $10 and $20 if the physician chose HDL or Singulex to process blood work. After performing the blood tests, the labs billed insurance companies — including federally funded insurance programs Medicare and TRICARE — for reimbursement.

B.

In 2014, two relators filed a qui tam action against Johnson, Dent, and Blue-Wave (collectively, “BlueWave Defendants”), and the United States intervened in April 2015. The government alleged that BlueWave Defendants violated the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (“AKS”), and False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (“FCA”)'. An AKS violation that results in a federal health care payment is a per se false claim under the FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g). According to the government’s complaint, Blue-Wave Defendants, acting as sales agents on behalf of HDL and Singulex, arranged for illegal kickbacks to physicians under the guise of the processing and handling fees.

On February 5, 2016, the United States filed an application for prejudgment remedies under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (“FDCPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. Specifically, the government sought writs of attachment against personal and real property and writs of garnishment against bank accounts totaling approximately $16.7 million. BlueWave Defendants as well as related nonparties, the Johnson and Dent entities, own the property.

The government’s application recounted its evidence that BlueWave Defendants violated the AKS and FCA through the sales agreements and alleged that, as a result of this conduct, BlueWave Defendants owe the United States at least $298 million. The government also alleged prejudgment seizure was necessary because BlueWave Defendants were actively concealing and disposing of assets. On February 10, 2016, the district court held a hearing on the FDCPA application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3101(a)(3)(A) and granted all of the writs except one.

The district court found that the government sufficiently alleged that BlueWave Defendants were debtors under the FDCPA because a person automatically incurs a debt once the government pays a fraudulent claim. The district court also concluded that, although the Johnson and Dent entities “are not parties to the underlying litigation” or “debtors within the meaning of the FDCPA,” their property was subject to attachment. J.A. 1507, 1510. With regard to the Johnson entities, the district court determined that their properties were subject to attachment pursuant to 28 § U.S.C. 3102(b) because the government had produced sufficient evidence to support a finding that Johnson has a “substantial nonexempt interest” in them. As to the Dent entities, the government argued it was entitled to prejudgment attachment under Subchapter D of the FDCPA, which governs fraudulent transfers. Id. § 3304(b)(1). If the government can establish that a debtor has made fraudulent transfers, the court can order “any other relief the circumstances may require.” Id. § 3306(a)(3). Finding that Dent had fraudulently transferred property to the Dent entities, the district court also granted writs of attachment as to them.

BlueWave Defendants, the Johnson entities, and the Dent entities (collectively, “Appellants”) each filed a motion to quash the writs. Following argument on May 5, 2016, the district court found that the government had satisfied the FDCPA’s statutory requirements and denied the motion. Appellants noticed this appeal, asserting that the denial of the motion to quash is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In response, the government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deferred ruling on that motion pending a review of the merits. Because we hold today that a party can only appeal an order denying a motion to quash writs of attachment or garnishment after final judgment, we grant the government’s motion to dismiss.

II.

Appellants assert various reasons why the government was not entitled to prejudgment writs of attachment and garnishment. We must first, however, consider the threshold issue of jurisdiction. United States v. Jefferson, 546 F.3d 300, 308 (4th Cir. 2008).

Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the authority granted by Congress and the Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Generally, a party may only appeal an order that is final, that is, nothing remains for the district court to do except execute the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Mohawk In dus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). As relevant here, however, a party may appeal an interlocutory order in two narrowly defined circumstances. The first is the collateral order doctrine, a judicially-created exception that allows appellate courts to review orders that “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

A second exception to finality is statutory. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides appellate courts with jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders of the district court, including those “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.”

Appellants assert that the order here is renewable as either a collateral order or an injunction. We discuss each basis in turn.

A.

The collateral order doctrine is a limited exception to the requirement of finality reserved for the “small class” of rulings that meet three “stringent” conditions. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (quoting Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1992)). The order must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from .a final judgment.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993)). An order must satisfy all three requirements for the collateral order doctrine to apply. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Urgent Care, LLC (In re Carefirst of Md., Inc.), 305 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2002).

Because the order here fails to resolve an important issue distinct from the merits, we focus our discussion on the second requirement, which has two prongs: (1) separability from the merits and (2) importance. The denial order here satisfies neither prong of the second requirement; therefore, it is not a collateral order.

1.

First, the denial order is completely enmeshed with the merits of the qui tam action. Appellants’ principal argument is that the government’s application did not satisfy the FDCPA’s statutory requirements. The government here applied for prejudgment remedies under Subchapters B and D. Subchapter B governs prejudgment remedies generally and allows the government to seek prejudgment remedies if it shows “reasonable cause to believe that” a debtor “has or is about to assign, dispose, remove, conceal, ill treat, waste, or destroy property with the effect of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(1)(B). To obtain prejudgment remedies under Sub-chapter B, the government must file an application and establish a “probable validity of the claim for a debt” as well as the amount of debt claimed. Id. § 3101(c). The government may also request prejudgment remedies under Subchapter D, which concerns fraudulent transfers. If the government can establish a fraudulent transfer, a court may issue “any other relief the circumstances may require,” including prejudgment attachment. Id. § 3306(a)(3).

In order to decide whether the government is entitled to prejudgment remedies under the FDCPA, we must review the underlying merits of the FCA claims. In other words, the issues Appellants ask us to resolve today — whether the government sufficiently established (1) a probable validity of the debt, (2) the amount of the debt, (3) that Appellants have concealed or disposed of assets with the effect of defrauding the government, and (4) that the nonparty assets are subject to attachment — all turn on the viability of the government’s underlying FCA litigation. Thus, whether BlueWave Defendants violated the FCA is a threshold inquiry for each of Appellants’ FDCPA challenges. Because we cannot review these issues apart from the merits, we cannot apply the collateral order doctrine to the instant appeal.

Appellants counter that our decision in Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Wilmoth (In re St. Paul A.M.E. Church Housing Corp.), 541 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), controls here. In Buckeye, a district court interpreted an indemnity agreement to require indemnitors to post a $1 million bond to protect an insurer during litigation. On appeal, the sole issue before this court was the proper interpretation of the indemnity contract, which did not involve the merits of the underlying litigation at all. We held in Buckeye that “[a]n order requiring or refusing to require the posting of security during the pendency of litigation is ‘collateral’ and is appealable under” Cohen. Id. at 464. Appellants argue that Buckeye controls because both the order here and the order in Buckeye concern prejudgment remedies. We disagree.

Buckeye is distinguishable and provides no help to Appellants. First, requiring a party to “pony up” and post security at the outset of litigation is not functionally equivalent to freezing existing assets. Second, unlike the present appeal, Buckeye typifies the kind of order that is collateral to the merits of an underlying action. We therefore conclude that the order here is not collateral because Appellants’ issues “in the main ... will substantially overlap factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988).

2.

In addition to being separate from the merits, the second collateral order condition requires that the order involve an important interest. The order here does not. “Important” in the context of the collateral order doctrine means those interests that extend beyond the parties and implicate the broader public interest or a “particular value of a high order.” See Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53, 126 S.Ct. 952. As such, the Supreme Court has allowed immediate appeal of orders denying absolute presidential immunity, qualified immunity for a former Attorney General, a claim of state sovereign immunity, and, in the criminal context, a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. See id. at 350, 126 S.Ct. 952 (collecting cases). In contrast to the broadly east concerns that usually justify invoking the collateral order exception, Appellants here assert only the narrow personal interest of the retention of their own property during the course of litigation. See Appellants’ Br. at 16 (“[T]he private interests here are significant.”). The government’s seizure of $16.7 million of Appellants’ personal and corporate assets may be significant to the parties but “[w]e routinely require litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 108-09, 130 S.Ct. 599.

The order here fails to resolve an important issue distinct from the merits. Mindful of the Supreme Court’s modern insistence that the scope of the collateral order doctrine remain limited, see Will, 546 U.S. at 350, 126 S.Ct. 952, we hold that the denial of a motion to quash a writ of attachment or garnishment is not a collateral order.

B.

Appellants alternatively argue that, even though the order was not styled as such, they can appeal it as an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because it prevents them from disposing of their property. Again, we disagree.

To determine whether an order amounts to an injunction, we first look at the practical effect of the order rather than the label ascribed to it. United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1999). Under the general definition, an injunction is a “court order commanding or preventing an action.” Black’s Law Dictionary 904 (10th ed. 2014). Most court orders are injunctions at some level of generality, but Congress did not envision that every interlocutory order restraining a party’s actions could be appealed under § 1292(a)(1). Like the collateral order doctrine, § 1292(a)(1) “was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the final-judgment rule” and, therefore, a litigant must also show “more than that the order has a practical effect” of an injunction to immediately appeal an interlocutory order. Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). An appealable order is one that (1) may have a “serious, perhaps irreparable consequence” and (2) can only be “effectually challenged” through immediate appeal. Id. (quoting Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955)). The order here meets neither requirement.

1.

First, Appellants pointed to no “serious, perhaps irreparable consequence.” Id. The writs only encumber Appellants’ property. Contrary to Appellants’ unsupported assertions, they remain free to conduct business from or live on the properties. The district court also froze two bank accounts, one in BlueWave’s name and another operated by BlueWave Defendants. But, as BlueWave no longer has any clients, Appellants fail to demonstrate the irreparable consequence in garnishing these accounts.

2.

The second requirement for an injunction — that an appellate court cannot effectively review the order after final judgment — also is not met here. “Effective review” means that an appellate court can provide the party -with complete relief. The writs here will not permanently affect Appellants’ property rights unless the government prevails and BlueWave Defendants cannot satisfy the judgment. Until final judgment on the underlying litigation, there is no harm in preserving the status quo. Indeed, that is the purpose of a prejudgment remedy. Rahman, 198 F.3d at 496. Should BlueWave Defendants prevail on the qui tam action, the court will dissolve the writs. If the government prevails, Appellants can appeal the judgment and the writs at that time. Either way, Appellants can obtain complete relief after final judgment. Absent special circumstances not present here, an order that only freezes assets during litigation and does not require any additional activity does not fall within the class of interlocutory orders Congress intended to exclude from the final-judgment rule. Therefore, we hold that the district court’s order denying the motion to quash is not an injunction.

III.

Piecemeal litigation is disfavored and permitted only in limited circumstances not present here. For the aforementioned reasons, we grant the government’s motion and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

      . BlueWave’s only clients were HDL and Sin-gulex. The HDL sales agreement terminated in January 2015 and the Singulex sales agreement terminated in October 2014.

      . Medicare is a federally subsidized health insurance program for the elderly and certain disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c. The Department of Defense provides medical care to current and retired service members and their families through the TRICARE health insurance program. 32 C.F.R. § 199.17 (2016).

      . The qui tam action also listed as defendants HDL, Singulex, HDL founder LaTonya Mallory, and Singulex CEO Philippe Goix, who are not part of this appeal.

      . A prejudgment writ of attachment or garnishment creates a secured lien on a defendant’s property in the.event that a plaintiff obtains a judgment against the defendant and the defendant is unable to satisfy the judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary 152-53, 794-95 (10th ed. 2014). Attachment applies to property in the debtor’s possession and garnishment applies to a debtor's property in the control of a third-party, such as a bank account. Id.

      . The nonparties include entities connected to Johnson and Dent: Blue Eagle Farming, LLC, Eagle Ray Investments, Forse Investments, LLC, War-Horse Properties, LLLP (collectively, "the Johnson entities”); and Christina M. Dent, Lakelin Pines, LLC, Trini "D” Island, LLC (collectively, “the Dent entities”).

      . The district court denied the government's application as to a bank account for which Johnson is the sole owner/signatory. That account is not at issue in this appeal.

      . Although our discussion of the second requirement is dispositive, we note, without the need to decide, that the order here also does not appear to satisfy the third condition — that of being effectively unreviewable on appeal. See e.g., Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 108, 130 S.Ct. 599.

      . The Johnson and Dent entities contend that their challenge is completely separate from the merits. Assuming without deciding that is correct, the order is still not immediately ap-pealable as to them because it does not conclusively determine the issue on the merits nor is it effectively unreviewable on appeal— the first and third elements of the collateral order doctrine. The district court may "at any time on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person, ... make an order ... modifying the use of any enforcement procedure” under the FDCPA. 28 U.S.C. § 3013; see also Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F.Supp. 200, 205 (D. Md. 1992) (dissolving a previously issued prejudgment writ of attachment). As discussed further infra Part II.B.2, the order can also be effectively reviewed on appeal as to the nonparties.

      . Furthermore, because the interests here are not " ‘important’ in Cohen’s sense,” Will, 511 U.S. at 880, 114 S.Ct. 1992, the third collateral order condition is also not satisfied. See, e.g., Dig. Equip., 511 U.S. at 878-79, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (noting that the third collateral order requirement "cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement”).

      . We reiterate that our decision today is premised on Appellants’ failure to show any irreparable consequence. The parties may seek relief from the court upon a satisfactory showing that the writs have hindered their ability to pay living expenses or legal fees. Cf.

        Mitsubishi Intern. Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507, 1516 (11th Cir. 1994).

      . The second account belongs to Cobalt Healthcare Consultants, Inc., a healthcare marketing company that Dent and Johnson incorporated in January 2013 after the government served BlueWave with a subpoena. Cobalt's account included over $10 million in deposits from BlueWave Defendants.