author: BROWN, Judge.

text:
    Cynthia L. SELEME, Appellant-Defendant, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, National Association, as successor by merger to Chase Home Finance, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 02A03-1205-MF-234.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Nov. 20, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 2013.

      Charles E. Davis, Davis Law, LLC, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    George T. Patton, Jr., David J. Jurkiew-icz, Bose, McKinney & Evans, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

BROWN, Judge.

Cynthia Seleme appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for relief from judgment. Seleme raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in denying her motion for relief from judgment following a complaint filed by Chase Home Finance LLC (“Chase”) to foreclose on her residential mortgage. We affirm.

The relevant facts follow. On January 13, 2010, Chase filed a Complaint on Note and to Foreclose Mortgage on Real Estate related to the real estate known as 6425 High Point Run, Fort Wayne, Indiana. On January 29, 2010, the Sheriff left a copy of the summons at Seleme’s address. On February 22, 2010, the court indicated that the cause had been assigned to Solomon Lowenstein, Jr., as facilitator, and ordered the parties and / or their attorneys to attend a telephone conference on April 1, 2010, at 2:30 p.m. This order indicated that a copy of the entry was served either by mail to the address of record or personally distributed to Seleme.

On April 28, 2010, the court entered an order indicating that the parties had participated in the telephone conference on April 1, 2010, and that the conference was continued to June 8, 2010, pursuant to a forbearance plan. The order also indicated that a copy of the entry was served either by mail to the address of record, deposited in the attorney’s distribution box, or personally distributed to Seleme. The chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicates that Seleme was notified of the April 28, 2010 order on May 3, 2010.

On July 12, 2010, the court issued an order titled “Order After Settlement Conference,” which indicated that Chase appeared by telephone on June 8, 2010, but Seleme did not appear. Appellee’s Appendix at 35. The order also indicated that “[t]he Settlement Conference was not conducted pursuant to a forbearance plan” and that “[t]he trial judge of record hereby certifies that the telephone conference did not occur.” Id. According to the CCS, Seleme was notified of the court’s July 12, 2010 order on July 14, 2010.

On September 26, 2011, Chase filed a motion for default judgment and entry of foreclosure. Chase alleged that “[t]he time within which a Defendant must appear, answer or otherwise defend has expired and has not been extended by the Court, and no Defendant has appeared or otherwise defended.” Id. at 44. That same day, the court entered a default judgment and decree of foreclosure.

On March 1, 2012, an attorney filed an appearance on behalf of Seleme. On March 5, 2012, Seleme filed a verified motion for relief from judgment. Seleme alleged that Chase advised her that the foreclosure action would be dismissed because Chase had agreed to a forbearance and Chase was working with her. Seleme also alleged that during the time that she made payments she was never advised that the lawsuit had not been dismissed. Seleme argued that the court file did not reflect a return of service for notice of judicial sale and that the only and last notice that she received on January 27, 2012, was a letter that the property had already been sold and deeded to Federal Home Loan Mortgage.

Seleme attached a letter from Chase dated April 14, 2010, indicating that Sel-eme was approved to enter into a trial period plan under the Home Affordable Modification Program. The letter indicated that Seleme needed to make payments of $610.42 by May 1, 2010, June 1, 2010, and July 1, 2010. The letter indicated that “[ajfter all trial period payments are timely made and you have submitted all the required documents, your mortgage would then be permanently modified if you qualify.” Appellant’s Appendix at 14. The letter also stated: ‘Tour existing loan and loan requirements remain in effect and unchanged during the trial period.” Id.

Chase filed a response to Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment and attached a notice of sheriffs sale indicating that service of the sale was directed to Seleme by the Sheriff. Chase also attached a letter dated August 27, 2010, from Chase to Seleme indicating that Chase was unable to offer her a “Home Affordable Modification because [she] did not make all of the required Trial Period Plan payments by the end of the trial period.” Id. at 24. The letter also stated: “[I]f your Loan was in foreclosure at the time of the Trial Period Plan Offer, the foreclosure process may resume without further notice.” Id.

Seleme filed a notice of additional documents in support of her motion for relief from judgment. Specifically, she attached a fax dated August 10, 2011, that included a “Making Home Affordable Program Request for Modification and Affidavit” signed by Seleme. Id. at 33-36. She attached letters from Chase dated August 30, 2011, September 30, 2011, October 30, 2011, and January 24, 2012, indicating that Chase needed additional documents to complete her request for loan modification. Seleme also attached correspondence from Seleme to Chase providing certain requested information.

On April 10, 2012, the court held a hearing on Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment. At the hearing, Seleme’s counsel argued in part:

[T]here was a violation of Rule 55b, regarding default, because Rule 55b specifically states that if a party has otherwise appeared. Well, even in [Chase’s] Response they indicate that she did appear pursuant to Court order to the original telephone conference that was set by the Court. So she has appeared. So she was entitled to notice of the default.

Transcript at 8. Chase’s counsel argued in part:

It seems that (inaudible) [Seleme] selectively received certain documents. There was a telephonic conference scheduled pursuant to the Court’s order on April 1, 2010. Those orders are issued sua sponte by the Court. She did participate in that telephone conference. The facilitator scheduled a follow-up one for June 8th. She did not call in for that conference. She did not return the Notice attached to the Complaint requesting a formal settlement conference. There were Notices that were issued by the Court sua sponte and not in response to her request for the settlement conference. Pursuant to 32-30-10.5-8.5 it is the return of that letter requesting settlement conference that constitutes the appearance for purposes of appearing in the matter. So I would object to the characterization that she appeared in the conference and therefore was entitled to notice of the default. The Court did not consider that an appearance, obviously, because they granted the default judgment. And, again, the law does not say that that is an appearance for purposes of a foreclosure proceeding.

Id. at 10-11. On April 24, 2012, the court denied Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment.

The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in denying Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment. Generally, upon appellate review of a refusal to set aside a default judgment, the trial court’s ruling is entitled to deference and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 747 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ind.2001). The trial court’s discretion should be exercised in light of the disfavor in which default judgments are generally held. Id.; see also Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Constr. Co. Inc., 798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind.2003) (“Indiana law strongly prefers disposition of cases on their merits.”), reh’g denied. Any doubt as to the propriety of a default judgment must be resolved in favor of the defaulted party. Watson, 747 N.E.2d at 547. “Moreover, no fixed rules or standards have been established because the circumstances of no two cases are alike.” Kmart v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332, 340 (Ind.1983)), trans. denied. “A cautious approach to the grant of motions for default judgment is warranted in ‘cases involving material issues of fact, substantial amounts of money, or weighty policy determinations.’ ” Id. (citing Green v. Karol, 168 Ind.App. 467, 473-74, 344 N.E.2d 106, 110-111 (1976)). In addition, the trial court must balance the need for an efficient judicial system with the judicial preference for deciding disputes on the merits. Id. “The burden is on the movant to establish ground for Trial Rule 60(B) relief.” In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ind.2010).

The entry of a default judgment is authorized by Ind. Trial Rule 55(A), and pursuant to Trial Rule 55(C) a judgment by default which has been entered may be set aside by the court for the grounds and in accordance with the provisions of Trial Rule 60(B). While Seleme does not delineate her arguments with respect to the various subsections of Rule 60(B), she contends that subsections (1), (8), (6), (7), and (8) of Rule 60(B) all apply. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;
* * * * *
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
⅜ ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝
(6) the judgment is void;
(7) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).
The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense. ...

With respect to subsections (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) of Rule 60(B), we observe that a meritorious defense for the purposes of Rule 60(B) is “one that would lead to a different result if the case were tried on the merits.” Butler v. State, 933 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Bunch v. Himm, 879 N.E.2d 632, 637 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). “Absolute proof of the defense is not necessary, but there must be ‘enough admissible evidence to make a pri-ma facie showing’ that ‘the judgment would change and that the defaulted party would suffer an injustice if the judgment were allowed to stand.’ ” Id. (quoting Bunch, 879 N.E.2d at 637).

To the extent that Seleme argues that the default judgment was void under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(6), we observe that “[a] void judgment is a nullity, and typically occurs where the court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction.” 22B Stephen E. ARthur, Indiana PractiCE § 60.2 (2012) (footnote omitted). “If a judgment is void, whether from faulty process or otherwise, a T.R. 60(B) claimant need not show a meritorious defense or claim.” Moore v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 582 N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), reh’g denied. “Normally, this Court employs an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment.” D.L.D. v. L.D., 911 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citing Rice v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 782 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)), reh’g denied, trans. denied. “However, when a motion for relief from judgment is made pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6), alleging that the judgment is void, discretion on the part of the trial court is not employed because either the judgment is void or it is valid.” Id.

Seleme appears to argue that: (A) the default judgment was void because she was denied due process with respect to notice; and (B) Chase’s actions constituted fraud or misrepresentation that resulted in Seleme’s excusable neglect and an accord and satisfaction.

A. Notice

Seleme argues that she was denied due process and consequently the court’s default judgment and decree of foreclosure were void. Seleme argues that the failure to send “any notice to [her] of the default, the actual judgment or the sale, must render this foreclosure judgment void.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

Chase appears to argue that Seleme waived any claim related to Rule 60(B)(6) because her motion for relief from judgment did not refer to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) or “say in words or substance that ‘the judgment is void.’ ” Appellee’s Brief at 10. Chase also argues that even if the arguments were preserved they are without merit because the record demonstrates that Seleme received service of process.

In her reply brief, Seleme argues that Chase was required to serve her in accordance with Ind. Trial Rules 3.1(B) and 55 “as she appeared pursuant to Court order, and a settlement conference was requested and scheduled at the initial telephone conference.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1. Seleme also argues that she filed an appearance pursuant to Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5(c).

To the extent that Chase suggests that Seleme waived this argument, we observe that she argued in her motion for relief from judgment that “during this entire time of making payments and submitting all documents to Chase, she was never advised that the lawsuit had not been dismissed” and that she did not receive a copy of the motion for default judgment or a copy of the actual foreclosure judgment entered by the court. Appellant’s Appendix at 11. Seleme also argued that “she never received actual notice or opportunity to object to the foreclosure equitable proceedings.” Id. At the hearing, Seleme’s counsel argued that Seleme did not receive due process of law and that the default judgment was “void.” Transcript at 7. Based upon the record, we cannot say that Seleme waived this issue.

Initially, we observe that Seleme concedes that she received the original summons and complaint from Chase. With respect to her argument that the failure to send “any notice to [her] of the default, the actual judgment or the sale, must render this foreclosure judgment void,” Appellant’s Brief at 10, we note that she does not develop a cogent argument with respect to notice of the judgment. Further, with respect to the notice of sale, in the summary of the argument section of her brief, Seleme states that “Indiana statute § 32-29-7-3 was not complied with, and jurisdiction to sell was void.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. However, she does not cite to this provision in the argument section of her brief or her reply brief. Even assuming that Seleme developed an argument under one of the notice provisions in Ind. Code § 32-29-7-3, we cannot say that reversal is required on this basis. We observe that the record reveals that in Chase’s response to Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment, Chase attached a copy of the notice of sheriff’s sale and stated that the Sheriff of Allen County gave notice of the sheriffs sale of her property to Seleme. The notice referenced the sheriffs sale of property located at 6425 High Point Run, Fort Wayne, Indiana, and also indicated that service by the Sheriff was directed to Seleme at the foregoing address.

We now turn to Seleme’s argument regarding notice of Chase’s motion for default judgment. We need not determine whether subsection (6) or subsection (8) control because, under the circumstances, neither would require Seleme to allege a meritorious defense. See Evansville Garage Builders v. Shrode, 720 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 n. 8 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (addressing an argument regarding lack of notice of a motion for default judgment, noting that generally under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), a defaulted party seeking relief from judgment must, in addition to establishing a valid ground for relief, present evidence of a meritorious defense, but observing that where a default judgment is set aside because it was entered without notice or proper service, a meritorious defense need not be shown), tram, denied; Standard Lumber Co. of St. John, Inc. v. Josevski, 706 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding that the defendants need not establish a meritorious defense because they were not provided notice of the plaintiffs motion for default judgment).

Generally, due process requires notice of certain proceedings after the initiation of a lawsuit. Moore, 582 N.E.2d at 478. With respect to notice of Chase’s motion for default judgment, Ind. Trial Rule 55(B) provides in part that “[i]f the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing by a representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three [3] days prior to the hearing on such application.” (Emphasis added). Thus, we must determine whether Seleme “appeared” for purposes of Trial Rule 55(B). Generally, a party’s appearance is governed by Ind. Trial Rule 3.1. At the time that Chase filed its complaint, Ind. Trial Rule 3.1(B) provided: “At the time the responding party or parties first appears in a case, such party or parties shall file an appearance form setting forth the information set out in Section (A) above.” Local Rule 02-TR-B.1-3 of the Allen Superi- or and Circuit Court governs appearances and provides in part:

When a party to an action appears without an attorney, the party shall give, and the Clerk shall note on the chronological case summary of the case, a name, a mailing address and phone number of the party to which notices and communications concerning the case may be delivered and mailed pursuant to T.R. 5(B).

Seleme does not argue or point to the record to suggest that she filed an appearance form, appeared in court, or provided the clerk of the trial court with her name, mailing address, and phone number, prior to her attorney filing an appearance on March 1, 2012. Rather, she appears to argue that her participation in the first telephone conference between Chase and the facilitator constituted an appearance. She also argues that “Indiana has no specific rule that says or denies that appearing at a court ordered conference is or is not an appearance justifying further legal notice.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.

. We cannot say that Seleme’s mere participation at the initial telephone conference constituted an appearance. See LaPalme v. Romero, 606 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (rejecting defendant’s claim that a telephone conversation with the plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the case constituted a constructive appearance), reh’g denied, vacated in part and adopted in relevant part by, 621 N.E.2d 1102 (Ind. 1993), reh’g denied; Cordill v. City of Indianapolis, 168 Ind.App. 685, 688-689, 345 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1976) (holding that neither appellant nor his attorney had made an appearance in any manner reasonably calculated to put the clerk on notice).

We now turn to Seleme’s argument regarding Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5(c), which provides that “[i]f the debtor requests a settlement conference under this chapter, the court shall treat the request as the entry of an appearance under Indiana Trial Rule 3.1(B).” Even assuming that Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5(c) applies, we cannot say that the record demonstrates that Seleme requested a settlement conference.

Attached to Chase’s complaint was a “Get Help — Get Hope” notice from the Indiana Housing & Community Development Authority and its Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Network. This notice stated:

Your mortgage lender has filed to foreclose on your home. According to Indiana law, you may be entitled to a court-ordered settlement conference. This provides an opportunity for you and your lender to negotiate a “foreclosure prevention agreement” that may allow you to keep your home.
If you want to take advantage of this right, you must notify the Court of your intention no more than 30 days after this Notice was served. You may, but are not required to, notify the Court by signing this Notice where indicated and mailing or delivering it to the Court at its address shown in the Summons. You should also send a copy of the signed Notice to the lender’s attorney at the address shown in the Summons.

Appellee’s Appendix at 8 (emphases in italics added).

The Indiana Supreme Court’s online resource for mortgage foreclosures provides:

How Do I Request a Settlement Conference?
If you have received a Notice of Foreclosure from your lender, you have 30 days to request a settlement conference from the court. If you request a settlement conference, it will be scheduled for between 45 to 60 days after the date of the Notice. To request a conference, simply sign and print your name and case number on the “Get Help — Get Hope”
Notice you received from your lender, and mail or deliver this Notice to the court. You must also send a signed copy of the Notice to the lender’s attorney.
* * * * *
Important — To prevent a default judgment from being entered against you, you must file a written response with the court within 20 days from the date you received the Notice of Foreclosure, or 28 days if you received the Notice by certified mail. This written response— or “Answer" — is different from the request for settlement conference.
If you do not file a written response, even if you request a settlement conference, the plaintiff may obtain a default judgment and foreclose. If you file a written response but do not request a settlement conference, the court may decide you have given up your right to a settlement conference.

Indiana Supreme Court, Help with Mortgage Foreclosures, http://www.in.gov/ judiciary/selfservice/2359.htm (last visited October 80, 2012) (emphases in italics added).

Seleme does not point to the record or argue that she signed the notice attached to the complaint and delivered it to the trial court or that she contacted the court to request a settlement conference. Rather, she appears to argue that the fact that a second telephonic conference was scheduled alone constituted a request for a settlement conference under Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5. Specifically, Seleme argues that “the scheduling of that second conference is clear evidence that the ‘debtor requested a conference’ as there is no requirement or prohibition in the statute as to the parties either individually or jointly agreeing to request that second settlement conference.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-2.

We observe that the court’s February 22, 2010 order, which indicated that the cause had been assigned to Solomon Low-enstein, Jr., as facilitator, and ordered the parties and / or their attorneys to a telephone conference on April 1, 2010, at 2:30 p.m., stated:

The Facilitator shall file a report with the Court not later than 21 days from the date of the Telephone Conference informing the Court of the status of the foreclosure proceeding, including whether a Settlement Conference was requested, who attended the Telephone Conference; the date of the Settlement Conference; and any requests made by the Facilitator.

Appellee’s Appendix at 32 (emphasis added). Based upon the emphasized language above and the record, we cannot say that the initial scheduling of a telephone conference was based upon or in response to a request by Seleme for a settlement conference.

The April 28, 2010 order titled “Order After Telephone Conference” merely indicated that the parties had appeared by telephone and that the telephone conference was continued to June 8, 2010, pursuant to a forbearance plan. Id. at 34. While the July 12, 2010 order was titled “Order After Settlement Conference,” the order did not indicate that Seleme had requested a settlement conference. Id. at 35. Rather, the order indicated that Sel-eme did not appear and that the settlement conference was not conducted, pursuant to a forbearance plan. Thus, even assuming that Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5(c) applied, we cannot say that Seleme has demonstrated that she requested a settlement conference or made an appearance in order to require notice of Chase’s motion for default judgment under Ind. Trial Rule 55.

We cannot ignore that “the law in this jurisdiction is well settled that a litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow.” Rickels v. Herr, 638 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Mindful of this principle, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in light of the facts that Seleme did not file an appearance form prior to Chase’s motion for default judgment, appear before the court, or request a settlement conference.

Based upon the record, we cannot say that the trial court erred by denying Sel-eme’s motion to set aside the default judgment on this basis. See King v. King, 610 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to notice where she did not enter a pro se appearance, did not cause a new attorney to act on her behalf, did not answer the complaint, and did not assert an interest in any possible wrongful death proceeds), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

B. Chase’s Actions

Seleme appears to argue that Chase’s actions constituted fraud or misrepresentation that resulted in her excusable neglect and an accord and satisfaction. She argues that Chase procured the judgment unfairly, that Chase informed her that the suit would be dismissed and engaged in payment arrangements, and that the mere fact that she proceeded pro se and did not enter a written appearance “should not subvert the clear intent and purpose of Trial Rule 55 or all of the remedies under Trial Rule 60(B).” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Without citation to the record, Seleme also argues that “payment was alleged and shown under the Chase Auto Pay program, and Seleme’s affidavit as well demonstrated some form of accord and satisfaction by accepting her into the HAMP program.” Id. at 10. Chase argues that Seleme failed to develop a separate fraud or constructive fraud claim argument in her appellate brief and has waived any claim. Chase also argues that Seleme did not commit fraud.

Seleme appears to argue that Chase’s actions warrant relief under subsections (1), (3), and (7) of Trial Rule 60(B). With respect to subsection (1), Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) provides in part that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons: (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; .... ” There is no general rule as to what constitutes excusable neglect under Trial Rule 60(B)(1). Kmart, 719 N.E.2d at 1254 (citing In re Marriage of Ransom, 531 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (Ind.1988)). Each case must be determined on its particular facts. Id. (citing Boles v. Weidner, 449 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Ind.1983)). The following facts have been held to constitute excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise:

(a) absence of a party’s attorney through no fault of party; (b) an agreement made with opposite party, or his attorney; (c) conduct of other persons causing party to be misled or deceived; (d) unavoidable delay in traveling; (e) faulty process, whereby party fails to receive actual notice; (f) fraud, whereby party is prevented from appearing and making a defense; (g) ignorance of the defendant; (h) insanity or infancy; (i) married women deceived or misled by conduct of husbands; (j) sickness of a party, or illness of member of a family.

Id. (citing Continental Assurance Co. v. Sickels, 145 Ind.App. 671, 675, 252 N.E.2d 439, 441 (1969)).

A party making a claim under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) and alleging fraud or misrepresentation must demonstrate that: (1) “the opposing party knew or should have known from the available information that the representation made was false,” and (2) “the misrepresentation was made with respect to a material fact which would change the trial court’s judgment.” Zwiebel v. Zwiebel, 689 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), reh’g denied, trans. denied. See also Otto v. Park Garden Assocs., 612 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

Seleme does not cite to the record for her argument that Chase advised her that the suit would be dismissed. The documents attached to the parties’ motions related to Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment indicate that Chase approved Seleme to enter into a trial period plan under the Home Affordable Modification Program in April 2010, but Chase informed Seleme in a letter dated August 27, 2010 that it was unable to offer her a “Home Affordable Modification because [she] did not make all of the required Trial Period Plan payments by the end of the trial period.” Appellant’s Appendix at 24. The letter also stated: “[I]f your Loan was in foreclosure at the time of the Trial Period Plan Offer, the foreclosure process may resume without further notice.” Id. (emphasis added). While there was further correspondence between Seleme and Chase, such correspondence related to Sel-eme’s request for a loan modification after she had already been denied a modification. Further, in a fax dated August 10, 2011, sent from Seleme to Chase, Seleme attached a “Making Home Affordable Program Request for Modification and Affidavit,” which stated in part:

Any pending foreclosure action will not be dismissed and may be immediately resumed from the point at which it was suspended if I fail to comply with the terms and conditions of the Making Home Affordable program, including any trial period plan, and no new notice of default, notice of intent to accelerate, notice of acceleration, or similar notice will be necessary to continue the foreclosure action.

Id. at 35 (emphases added). Based upon the record, we cannot say that Seleme met her burden to establish ground for relief under subsections (1) or (3) of Trial Rule 60(B).

With respect to Seleme’s argument regarding an accord and satisfaction, we observe that subsection (7) of Rule 60(B) provides that a court may relieve a party from a default judgment if “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Seleme points to Elliott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 920 N.E.2d 793 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), for the proposition that an accord and satisfaction had occurred. In Elliott, the defendants tendered evidence that the bank’s record indicated that the mortgage was fully paid in 2001 and that the bank had executed and recorded a full satisfaction of the mortgage. 920 N.E.2d at 796. Seleme does not point to such evidence. While one of Seleme’s bank statements indicates a payment to Chase on July 16, 2010, she does not point to the record and our review does not reveal that she made the other payments required pursuant to the trial period for the loan modification. We cannot say that Seleme met her burden to establish grounds for relief under subsection (7) of Trial Rule 60(B).

Moreover, a claim under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(1), (3), or (7) requires that Seleme allege a meritorious claim or defense. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). She did not allege and does not point to any evidence that she made all of the required payments under the initial loan agreement, made all of the required payments under the trial period for the modification, or that she met the requirements of any subsequent modification. Under the circumstances and based upon the record, we cannot say that Seleme has demonstrated a meritorious defense. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sel-eme’s motion for relief from default judgment on this basis.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Seleme’s motion for relief from judgment.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.

      . Seleme mentioned Ind. Trial Rule 60 but did not specify any particular subsection.

      .Seleme cites In re 2005 Tax Sale Parcel No. 24006-001-0022-01, 898 N.E.2d 349 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), and Edwards v. Neace, 898 N.E.2d 343 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). Unlike the cases cited by Seleme which involved tax sales, Seleme concedes that she received the original summons and complaint from Chase.

      . We observe that Ind. Trial Rule 5 governs service of pleading and other papers, and Ind. Trial Rule 72 governs notice of orders or judgments and the effect of lack of notice.

      . Ind.Code § 32-29-7-3(d) provides in part:
      Before selling mortgaged property, the sheriff must advertise the sale by publication once each week for three (3) successive weeks in a daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation. The sheriff shall publish the advertisement in at least one (1) newspaper published and circulated in each county where the real estate is situated. The first publication shall be made at least thirty (30) days before the date of sale. At the time of placing the first advertisement by publication, the sheriff shall also serve a copy of the written or printed notice of sale upon each owner of the real estate. Service of the written notice shall be made as provided in the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure governing service of process upon a person.

      5. At the time Chase filed its complaint, Ind. Trial Rule 3.1(A) provided in part:
      At the time an action is commenced, the party initiating the proceeding shall file with the clerk of the court an appearance form setting forth the following information:
      (1) Name, address and telephone number of the initiating party or parties filing the appearance form;
      (2) Name, address, attorney number, telephone number, FAX number, and e-mail address of any attorney representing the party, as applicable;
      (3) The case type of the proceeding [Administrative Rule 8(B)(3)];

        (4) A statement that the party will or will not accept service by FAX;
      ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
      (6) The caption and case number of all related cases;
      (7) Such additional matters specified by state or local rule required to maintain the information management system employed by the court ...

      . Ind. Trial Rule 3.1(B) was amended effective January 1, 2012, and now provides: "At the time the responding party or parties first appears in a case, the attorney representing such party or parties, or the party or parties, if not represented by an attorney, shall file an appearance form setting forth the information set out in Section (A) above.”

      . As noted in GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Dyer, 965 N.E.2d 762, 764 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), the Indiana Supreme Court has provided a resource for help with mortgage foreclosures, settlement conferences, and deeds in lieu of foreclosure. See Indiana Supreme Court, Help with Mortgage Foreclosures, http://www. in.gov/judiciary/selfservice/2359.htm (last visited October 30, 2012). This resource states:
      A settlement conference is a face-to-face meeting with your lender’s representative. It is your last chance to work out a deal with your lender before a foreclosure takes place. If a foreclosure does take place, you will lose your home and your credit rating will be damaged. However, a settlement conference is not a guaranteed workout between you and your lender!

        Id.

      .We observe that Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5 was added by Pub.L. No. 170-2011, § 9, and was effective May 10, 2011, which was after Chase filed its complaint but before the court entered default judgment on September 26, 2011. Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.5(a)( 1 )(C)(ii) provides that the statute applies when a court having jurisdiction over the action has not issued a default judgment against the debtor in the action. The parties do not address any impact that the effective date of the statute or the entry of default judgment may have in light of the proceedings in this case.

      . At the time that Chase hied its complaint, Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8 provided:
      [I]f a creditor files an action to foreclose a mortgage, the creditor shall include with the complaint served on the debtor a notice that informs the debtor of the debtor's right to participate in a settlement conference. The notice must be in a form prescribed by the Indiana housing and community development authority created by IC 5-20-1-3. The notice must inform the debtor that the debtor may schedule a settlement conference by notifying the court, not later than thirty (30) days after the notice is served, of the debtor’s intent to participate in a settlement conference.
      We observe that the current version of the "Settlement Conference Notice” posted to the Indiana Supreme Court’s online resource provides other methods of requesting a settlement conference. Specifically, the Setdement Conference Notice provides:
      YOUR MORTGAGE LENDER HAS FILED TO FORECLOSE ON YOUR HOME. HOWEVER, YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO A COURT-ORDERED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WITH YOUR LENDER TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT THAT COULD ALLOW YOU TO AVOID FORECLOSURE. THERE IS NO FINANCIAL COST TO YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
      To take advantage of this right, you must notify the Court that you desire a settlement conference within 30 days of receiving this Notice by doing any of the following:
      1.) filling out the form below and returning it to the Court at the address shown in the Summons;
      2.) calling the Court and requesting a settlement conference at the phone number shown in the Summons; or
      3.) appearing at the Court and making an in-person request for a settlement conference.
      If you notify the Court using option # 1 above, you should also send a copy of this signed form to the lender's attorney at the address shown in the Summons.
      Indiana Supreme Court, http://www.in.gov/ judiciary/selfservice/files/Settlement_C onference_Notice_(revised_5-7-10).pdf (last visited October 30, 2012).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CRONE, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Leslee ORNDORFF, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES, R. Scott Waddell, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellees-Defendants.
    No. 53A04-1206-PL-299.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Dec. 26, 2012.

      Kenneth J. Falk, ACLU of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Elizabeth Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

Leslee Orndorff committed three driving offenses that qualified her as a habitual traffic violator (“HTV”) in 2004. In 2008, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) issued Orndorff a driver’s license. In 2012, the BMV notified Orndorff that her driving privileges were to be suspended for ten years based on her HTV status. Orndorff filed a complaint against the BMV alleging that the equitable doctrine of laches prevented the BMV from suspending her driving privileges and requesting a preliminary injunction to stop the suspension. The trial court denied her request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that Orndorff did not have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of her laches defense at trial because it was unlikely that laches would apply to the government and the BMVs delay was understandable.

Orndorff appeals the trial court’s ruling, arguing that laches applies to the government because the suspension of her driving privileges now, eight years after she qualified as an HTV and four years after she obtained a valid driver’s license, will cause her to lose her job, which requires her to drive, and thrust her family into poverty, thereby threatening the public interest. She also contends that the BMVs delay is inexcusable. We conclude that under the facts of this case, there is a reasonable likelihood that Orndorff will succeed in establishing that suspending her driving privileges will threaten the public interest such that laches applies to the government. We also conclude that she has a reasonable likelihood of showing that the BMVs delay is inexcusable. Therefore, we conclude that Orndorff has a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of her laches defense. We also conclude that Orndorff has carried her burden to establish the other requirements for a preliminary injunction, and thus we reverse the trial court’s denial of her request for a preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts are undisputed. In 2002, when Orndorff was about twenty years old, she obtained her Indiana learner’s permit in Terre Haute. Orndorff s driving record shows that from 2002 to 2004, she received seventeen driving convictions and had her driving privileges suspended eighteen times. The convictions consist of failing to provide proof of insurance (6), driving while suspended (5), never receiving a valid driver’s license (3), “non-pointable violation” (2), and a “learner permit violation” (1). Appellant’s App. at 25-30. The suspensions were based on the convictions named above as well as failure to appear in court, failure to appear for driver’s safety program, and failure to pay court costs and fines following a conviction. Of particular relevance to this case, Orndorff s convictions for driving without a valid license occurred on December 12, 2002, February 25, 2003, and May 10, 2004. These three convictions qualified Orndorff as an HTV and should have resulted in the suspension of her driving privileges for ten years.

In 2008, Orndorff moved to Bloomington with her two children. On May 18, 2008, Orndorff applied for and was granted a valid Indiana driver’s license by the BMV. Shortly thereafter, she obtained employment with SICIL Home Care Services as a personal care attendant to persons living at home who have needs that they are unable to address. To perform her job, Orndorff must have a valid driver’s license. She uses her own vehicle to drive her clients to doctor’s appointments and take them shopping. Orndorff does the shopping herself for her clients who are home-bound.

In 2011, the BMV implemented new processes to identify individuals who qualified as HTVs. As a result, the BMV discovered that Orndorff qualified as an HTV based on her three convictions for driving without a valid driver’s license. On April 24, 2012, the BMV sent Orndorff an HTV notice of suspension informing her that she qualified as an HTV and that her driving privileges would be suspended for ten years, effective May 29, 2012, through May 27, 2022.

Currently, Orndorff is still employed with SICIL and earns $9.75 an hour. She is the sole supporter of her two children and receives no child support. She and her children receive food stamps due to their limited income. Orndorff has a checking account into which her paychecks are deposited, but there is little money remaining after her bills are paid. She does not have a savings account. She owns a 2002 Chevrolet Impala and has no other personal property of significant value. She owns no real estate. If Orn-dorffs driving privileges are suspended, she will not be able to perform her duties as a personal care attendant and will likely lose her job.

Orndorff and her children live in an apartment that is partially subsidized through the Bloomington Housing Authority (“BHA”). She is required to pay a portion of the rent or face eviction. Accordingly, if she loses her job and cannot find another, she will be unable to pay her rent and her family will lose its housing. Through the BHA, Orndorff is enrolled in a Family Self Sufficiency Program, which is a five-year program designed to assist individuals in establishing financial independence and home ownership. To continue participating in the program, Orndorff is required to maintain her current tenancy. Without employment, Orndorff will not be able to pay her portion of rent, will be evicted from her apartment, and will be ineligible to participate in the Family Self Sufficiency Program.

Orndorff also participates in the Circles Initiative through the South Central Community Action Program, which is a program designed to support individuals in escaping poverty. The program features weekly meetings and matches the participants with financially stable members of the community. Orndorff has been in the program since March 2010, regularly attends meetings, and is partnered with two Indiana University professors and a Christian education specialist. To continue with this program, Orndorff must be employed.

Orndorff s children have medical needs, and she drives them to doctor’s appointments. Orndorff s children will begin attending a new school in the 2012-13 school year. The school is a private religious school that they attend through the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program. Because there is no public transportation to the school, Orndorff will have to drive the children. Orndorffs younger daughter, who is entering second grade, is having some difficulties with education, and Orn-dorff and the new school’s staff believe that the new school will be beneficial for her daughter. Orndorff is enrolled at Ivy Tech and is scheduled to complete her studies in December 2012 with a degree in criminal justice. She maintains very high grades, having received a 4.0 grade-point average in the spring 2011 term.

On May 24, 2012, Orndorff filed a verified petition for judicial review and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, in which she alleged (1) that the BMV’s extreme delay in suspending her driving privileges threatens the public interest and therefore the BMV should be prevented by the equitable doctrines of laches and estop-pel from suspending her driving privileges and (2) that suspending her driving privileges after she was awarded a license by the BMV and had proven herself to be a safe driver was irrational and violated her substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Orndorff asked the trial court to find that the BMV is barred from suspending her driving privileges and to enter a preliminary injunction, later to be made permanent, enjoining the BMV from suspending her driving privileges. Orndorff also filed a verified petition for a temporary restraining order and a motion for preliminary injunction. On May 25, 2012, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the BMV from suspending Orndorffs driving privileges.

On June 4, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on Orndorffs request for a preliminary injunction. On June 8, 2012, the trial court issued an order containing findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which provides in relevant part as follows:

Findings of Fact

30. The Ivy [Tech] campus is 8-9 miles from [Orndorffs] home and she must drive back and forth to school. Although it would be theoretically possible for her to use Bloomington’s city bus service to transport herself to school, this is virtually impossible given that she must juggle her children’s schedules as well.
31. If Ms. Orndorff loses her license, she will likely lose her job. The loss of her job may cause her to lose her housing. The loss of her driving privileges may cause the loss of her ability to continue and complete her education. The loss of her driving privileges will likely make it impossible for her children to attend the new school her children are enrolled in for the next year.
32. If Ms. Orndorff is unable to obtain new employment that does not require a driver[’]s license, she will probably have to break up the family and have her children live with her mother who works at a gas station.
33. This will be devastating to Ms. Orndorff and her family and will push the family back further into poverty. This injury is irreparable and cannot be rectified through damages after the injury.
34. This injury threatens the general public interest, as thrusting a family into poverty is contrary to the public interest.
Conclusions
38. [Orndorff] has established that she will suffer irreparable harm if her license is suspended. Despite the State’s heroic efforts to characterize the effects of losing her license as mere economic injuries, it is difficult to conceive of appropriate, adequate and available monetary compensation or other legal remedy.
39. [Orndorff] has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success at trial by establishing a prima facie case, as such a case depends upon proving that laches should be attributed to the State.
47. There is no clear definition of the nature of the threat to the public interest required before laches or estoppel can apply to the government.
48. The court accepts [Orndorffs] statement that without the use of her car [her] continued employment and schooling will become almost impossible, at least as they are currently configured. [Orndorffs] ability to care for her children will become vastly more difficult. These changes do not serve the public interest. However, the public also has an interest in the impartial and evenhanded application of statutes.
49. It does not appear that the adverse effects on [Orndorffs] family from the suspension of her driving privileges is the sort of threat to the public interest that should prevent the State from suspending [Orndorffs] license as a habitual offender.
50. Without a showing that the public interest is threatened by the suspension of [Orndorffs] driving privileges, laches cannot be attributed to the State, despite the delay in suspending [Orn-dorffs] license. It is also unlikely that laches can be proven in this case, as the State’s failure to act earlier is understandable. [Orndorff] did not have a license to suspend at the time she became a habitual traffic violator. The computer system did not flag her when the license was issued to her in 2008. She had no particular right to rely on the State’s failure to catch her. She cannot justifiably rely to her detriment on the fact that she was not identified as a HTV in 2008. Since [Orndorff] is unlikely to establish laches, she cannot prevail on the merits of this case. For that reason, she has not proven entitlement to a preliminary injunction.
51.[Orndorffs] motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
This is an unusual case, because [Orn-dorff] has established that she will be irreparably harmed by the suspension of her driving privileges. She has also established a very long delay on the part of the State in taking action against her. Further, [Orndorff] has established that the adverse effects on her family do not advance the general public interest, as it is not in the public interest to make it harder for a productive parent to support her children and to better her family’s circumstances. Indiana law does not set out what public interest should be considered by a court in deciding a claim of laches against the government. The Temporary Restraining Order entered on May 25, 2012, and extended on June 5, 2012, expires on June 8, 2012. To permit [Orndorff] to seek review of this order, the Temporary Restraining Order entered on May 25, 2012 should remain in effect until July 9, 2012 to allow [her] to seek appellate review.

Appellant’s App. at 8-11. Orndorff now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

We review a trial court’s decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Thomtowr-To- masetti Engineers v. Indianapolis-Marion County Pub. Library, 851 N.E.2d 1269, 1277 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court reaches a conclusion that is against the logic and natural inferences that can be drawn, from the facts and circumstances before it. Id. “An abuse of discretion also occurs when a trial court misinterprets the law.” Id.

When determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the trial court is required to make special findings of fact and state its conclusions thereon. Bigley v. MSD of Wayne Twp. Schs., 823 N.E.2d 278, 281-82 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) trans. denied (2005). We review the special findings and conclusions for clear error. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We consider the evidence only in the light most favorable to the judgment and construe findings together liberally in favor of the judgment.

Coates v. Heat Wagons, Inc., 942 N.E.2d 905, 912 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted).

Orndorff appeals the denial of a request for a preliminary injunction.

A party appealing from the trial court’s denial of an injunction appeals from a negative judgment and must demonstrate that the trial court’s judgment is contrary to law; that is, the evidence of record and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are without conflict and lead unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. We cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of any witness. Further, while we defer substantially to the trial court’s findings of fact, we evaluate questions of law de novo.

Zimmer, Inc. v. Davis, 922 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citations omitted).

“Preliminary injunctions are generally used to preserve the status quo as it existed before a controversy, pending a full determination on the merits of the dispute.” Stoffel v. Daniels, 908 N.E.2d 1260, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the moving party’s remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive action; (2) the moving party has at least a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits at trial by establishing a prima facie case; (8) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the potential harm to the non-moving party resulting from the granting of the injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved.

Zimmer, 922 N.E.2d at 71 (citations omitted). Here, the trial court concluded that Orndorff carried her burden to show that her remedies at law are inadequate but that she failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits at trial by establishing a prima facie case. The trial court did not make any conclusions regarding the third and fourth factors.

Orndorff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she does not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of her case. She contends that she has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial on her claim of laches.

Laches is an equitable defense that may be raised to stop a person from asserting a claim that he would normally be entitled to assert. The rationale behind the doctrine of laches is that a person who, for an unreasonable length of time, has neglected to assert a claim against another waives the right to assert his claim when this delay prejudices the person against whom he would assert it.

Ind. Real Estate Comm’n v. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citations omitted). “Laches requires: ‘(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (B) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.’ ” SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cnty. Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind.2005) (quoting Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)).

The application of the doctrine of laches lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d at 1273. We will not reverse the trial court’s decision unless the trial court abused its discretion, which occurs only when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

Here, Orndorff seeks to assert laches against a government entity, which requires that she satisfy an additional requirement. Generally, equitable defenses, such as laches, may not be asserted against the government when it acts in its sovereign capacity to protect the public welfare. Id. Only under “the clearest and most compelling circumstances” will laches be applicable to the government. Id. “Under certain conditions, where extreme unfairness is shown, a court may apply equitable principles against the government.” Id. (citing U.S. v. Lindberg Corp., 882 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir.1989)). “Extreme unfairness occurs where the public interest would be threatened by the government’s conduct.” Id. (citing Hannon v. Metro. Dev. Comm’n of Marion Cnty., 685 N.E.2d 1075 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that an exception to the rule that equitable estoppel cannot be applied against governmental entities exists if the public interest would be threatened by the government’s conduct)).

The BMV seeks to suspend Orn-dorff s driving privileges due to her HTV status pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-30-10-4(b), which provides in relevant part, “A person who has accumulated at least three (3) judgments within a ten (10) year period for any of the following violations, singularly or in combination, and not arising out of the same incident, is a habitual violator.” The qualifying judgments include: (1) operation of a vehicle while intoxicated; (2) operation of a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of the blood or two hundred ten (210) liters of the breath; (3) operating a motor vehicle while the person’s license to do so has been suspended or revoked; (4) operating a motor vehicle without ever having obtained a license to do so; (5) reckless driving; (6) criminal recklessness involving the operation of a motor vehicle; (7) drag racing or engaging in a speed contest in violation of law; and (8) any felony under an Indiana motor vehicle statute or any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used. Id. Indiana Code Section 9-30-10-5(a) governs notice of suspension and provides,

If it appears from the records maintained in the bureau that a person’s driving record makes the person a habitual violator under section 4 of this chapter, the bureau shall mail a notice to the person’s last known address that informs the person that the person’s driv-mg privileges[] will be suspended in thirty (30) days because the person is a habitual violator according to the records of the bureau.

Orndorff s driving privileges are to be suspended for ten years. See Ind.Code § 9-30-10-5(b). “The primary purpose of suspending a person’s license for being an HTV is to remove from the highway those drivers who have proven themselves to be unfit to drive, and who pose a substantial threat to the safety of others.” Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. McNeil, 931 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citation omitted), trans. denied (2011). The parties do not dispute that suspending the driving privileges of a person who qualifies as an HTV is an action to protect the public welfare. Thus, for laches to be applicable in this case, Orndorff must show that suspending her driving privileges presents a threat to the public interest.

The trial court found that Orndorff will suffer adverse effects if her driving privileges are suspended, and that those adverse effects, namely that she will lose her job and her family will be thrust into poverty, threaten the public interest. Appellant’s App. at 8. The trial court concluded that Indiana law offers no clear definition of the nature of the threat to the public interest that is required to apply laches to the government. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the adverse effects that will be suffered by Orndorffs family do not appear to constitute the sort of public threat that should prevent the BMV from suspending her driving privileges. Id. at 11.

Our research reveals that the trial court correctly observed that for purposes of applying equitable defenses to the government, “[w]hat constitutes the public interest [ ] is not well defined.” Hi-Way Dispatch, Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 756 N.E.2d 587, 599 (Ind. T.C.2001) (citing Samplawski v. City of Portage, 512 N.E.2d 456, 459 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)). Although this Court has been confronted with the question whether laches should apply to the BMVs suspension of driving privileges due to HTV status, in neither case was it necessary for the Court to define what constitutes a threat to public interest. In McNeil, the appellant was convicted twice of operating while intoxicated and once of reckless driving. Two years after his third qualifying conviction, the BMV sent McNeil an HTV notice informing him of his ten-year suspension. In rejecting McNeil’s argument that the BMV was barred by laches from suspending his driving privileges, the McNeil court summarily concluded that “McNeil has not shown how the public interest would be threatened by the BMVs conduct, and therefore, the doctrine of laches is not applicable in the present case.” McNeil, 931 N.E.2d at 902 n. 2.

More recently, in Thomas v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 979 N.E.2d 169 (Ind.App.2012), another panel of this Court rejected the appellant’s argument that laches should bar the BMV from suspending his driving privileges based on his HTV status. Thomas was convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, reckless driving, and operating while intoxicated endangering a person. Three and a half years after his third qualifying offense, the BMV sent him notice of his HTV status and suspension of his driving privileges. Thomas argued that it was unfair to suspend his driving privileges because in the years since his last qualifying conviction, he had altered his behavior to effectively render himself a safe driver. The Thomas court was “unconvinced by Thomas’s self-serving statement regarding his belief that he has altered his behavior in a manner such to render him a ‘safe driver’ ” and concluded that “it falls far short of demonstrating that the public interest would be threatened by the BMV’s conduct.” Id. at 174. The Thomas court concluded that the public interest would be served, not threatened, by the ten-year suspension, and that laches was therefore inapplicable to the government in that case.

Unlike the appellants in McNeil and Thomas, Orndorff argues, and the trial court agreed, that thrusting her family into poverty is a threat to the public interest, and therefore we must consider the definition of public interest in greater depth to determine whether laches should apply to the government in this case. We find Samplawski helpful. There, the court refined the definition of the threat to public interest in considering whether equitable estoppel could be applied to the government.

In Samplawski, the City of Portage commenced eminent domain proceedings to secure a strip of land from the Sam-plawskis. The mayor of Portage informed the Samplawskis that they did not have to comply with the filing deadlines to object to the appraisers’ valuation of their property. The city sought to enforce the appraisers’ valuation, and the Samplawskis sought a declaration that the city be es-topped from asserting that the Sam-plawskis failed to file objections to the appraisers’ valuation. In determining whether laches applied, the Samplawski court reasoned as follows:

A significant factor in determining whether the exception may be applied is whether public funds are involved. Estoppel may be permitted when its application will not involve the unauthorized or unlawful use of public funds. [City of Crown Point v. Lake Cnty., 510 N.E.2d 684 (Ind.1987); Cablevision of Chicago v. Colby Cable Corp., 417 N.E.2d 348 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) ].
It has also been said that estoppel may be permitted where the limitations on governmental authority are not clear and unambiguous, or where the government attempts to take inconsistent positions at different stages of the same proceeding. [State v. Hendricks Superior Court, 250 Ind. 675, 235 N.E.2d 458 (1968); Cablevision, 417 N.E.2d 348.]
Most stressed, however, is the idea that estoppel may be allowed if the failure to allow it would result in thwarting public policy or defeating the public interest. [Crown Point, 510 N.E.2d 684; Cablevision, 417 N.E.2d 348.] Unfortunately, the decisions have done little to define when it is that public policy favors rather than opposes the application of estoppel. For instance, it would appear to favor the public interest that citizens be able to rely upon the representations made by their public officials, yet that interest is clearly outweighed in the statement of the general rule. Perhaps it is sufficient for present purposes to state that for an exception to the general rule to apply, there must be an articulable public policy reason which the court determines outweighs the pub- lie policy that supports denying estop-pel.

Samplawski, 512 N.E.2d at 459 (emphasis added). The Samplawski court concluded that the Samplawskis failed to present an articulable public policy reason to apply equitable estoppel to the City of Portage. Id.

Here, Orndorff argues that due to the BMV’s long delay in acting to suspend her driving privileges, the adverse effects of suspending her driving privileges now will threaten the public interest. The BMV does not challenge any of the trial court’s factual findings but contends that the adverse effects on Orn-dorff s family resulting from suspension of her driving privileges are personal and not a public interest. Although the adverse effects are undeniably personal, under the facts of this case, public policy interests are materially impacted. Here, government agencies have been providing financial and structural support to Orndorff and her family. The BHA provides her with partially subsidized housing. Orn-dorff participates in its Family Self Sufficiency Program. In addition, the South Central Community Action Program supports her through its Circles Initiative. These government entities and the assistance that they have been providing to Orndorff evidence a real and tangible public interest in reducing poverty. Significant government resources have been expended to enable Orndorff to become self-sufficient and free of the need to depend upon government aid. The BMV argues that Orndorff is already receiving government assistance. While that is true, it ignores the fact that if she is unable to maintain employment because her driving privileges are suspended, she and her family will become more, rather than less, dependent on government aid. Given that Orndorff’s eligibility for housing and government programs is dependent upon her gainful employment, which is in turn dependent upon her driving privileges, there is a substantial probability that the public interest in reducing poverty will be thwarted if the BMV is not barred from suspending Orndorff’s driving privileges on the basis of laches.

The BMV asserts that Orndorff would have faced the same prejudices she complains of now if it had suspended her driving privileges in 2004. We disagree. The BMV not only failed to notify Orndorff of her HTV status for eight years after she qualified as an HTV, but it also issued her a valid driver’s license that she has now held for four years. After obtaining her driver’s license, Orndorff accepted employment that requires that she be able to transport her clients or run errands on their behalf. The BMV’s assertion ignores the fact that it issued Orndorff a driver’s license and that her employment depends on her valid driving privileges. If her driving privileges had been suspended in 2004, she would have sought different employment. In addition, she would now be eligible to apply for a probationary license that would allow her to drive for employment and other special circumstances. See Ind.Code § 9 — 30—10—9(c),—(d) (providing that where a court finds that an HTV has had his or her driving privileges suspended for at least five consecutive years and certain other conditions are met, the court may place the person on probation and shall order the BMV to issue the person probationary driving privileges with restrictions). Orndorffs job is the foundation supporting nearly everything that she, with the assistance of government agencies, is doing to lift her family out of poverty. If Orndorffs driving privileges are suspended now, it will derail her efforts, and those of the government agencies that have been assisting her, to maintain steady employment, support her family, and secure stable housing. Instead of climbing out of poverty, she will be thrust back into poverty, and such an event threatens the public interest.

Under the facts of this case, laches will be applicable to the government if the public interest in reducing poverty outweighs the public interest in denying laches. Samplawski, 512 N.E.2d at 459. As previously stated, the purpose of suspending the driving privileges of an HTV is to protect the public from unsafe drivers. McNeil, 931 N.E.2d at 902. Here, all three of Orndorffs qualifying convictions are for driving without a valid driver’s license. A person who has not received a valid driver’s license is an unsafe driver because that person has not proven to the satisfaction of the BMV that he or she has mastered the rules of the road and knows how to safely operate a vehicle. That danger has been remedied in this case. Orn-dorff passed the required driving tests and was awarded a driver’s license. She has demonstrated that she knows the rules of the road and how to drive. In addition, since she received a valid driver’s license, Orndorff has not incurred any driving convictions.

Based on these circumstances, Orndorff has presented a prima facie case that she is not a substantial threat to the safety of others. As such, the public interest in keeping unsafe drivers off the road will not be served by suspending Orndorffs driving privileges. Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case, we conclude that Orndorff has established a prima facie case of an articulable public policy interest that outweighs the public policy that supports denying laches and thus that there is a reasonable likelihood that she will prevail at trial in her argument that laches is applicable to the BMV.

That is not the end of our inquiry however. The trial court also concluded that Orndorff did not have a reasonable likelihood of establishing laches because the BMVs delay was understandable. See SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 729 (laches requires “inexcusable delay in asserting a known right”). Specifically, the trial court concluded that Orndorff did not have a license to suspend at the time she became an HTV, that the BMVs computer system did not flag her when she was issued a license in 2008, and that she had no right to rely on the BMl^s failure to withhold driving privileges. Appellant’s App. at 11.

The trial court’s conclusions imply that the BMV had no obligation to recognize Orndorffs status as an HTV until after she was actually issued a valid driver’s license. Such a conclusion is contrary to Indiana Code Section 9 — 30—10—4(b), which states that when a person has accumulated three qualifying convictions within ten years, that person “is a habitual violator.” Therefore, one’s status as an HTV is not dependent upon the person’s possession of a valid driver’s license. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-30-10-4(b), Orndorffs status as an HTV was activated on May 10, 2004, when she was convicted of driving without a valid driver’s license for the third time within ten years.

Further, although Orndorff did not have a driver’s license at that time, that fact did not relieve the BMV of its duty to identify her as an HTV. The BMV is not only authorized to maintain driving records for persons who do not have a valid driver’s license, but it is also required to establish a driving record for an unlicensed driver when that driver incurs a driving conviction. See Ind.Code § 9-24-18-9(a) (“The bureau may establish a driving record for an Indiana resident who does not hold any type of valid driving license. The driving record shall be established for an unlicensed driver when an abstract of court conviction has been received by the bureau.”). The BMV has not presented any explanation as to why it took eight years to identify Orndorff as an HTV or why it issued her a driver’s license for which she should have been ineligible. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Orndorff is unlikely to succeed in showing that the BMVs delay was inexcusable. Based on our determinations that Orndorff has established a prima facie case that laches is applicable to the government under these circumstances and that the BMVs delay was inexcusable, we also conclude that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Orndorff did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits at trial.

We now turn to the remaining requirements necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction: that the moving party’s remedies at law are inadequate; that the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the potential harm to the non-moving party resulting from the granting of the injunction; and that the public interest would not be disserved. Zimmer, 922 N.E.2d at 71. The trial court concluded that Orndorff s remedies at law are inadequate. The BMV disagrees, arguing that the injuries to Orndorff are purely economic. See Ind. Family & Soc. Services Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind.2002) (“A party suffering mere economic injury is not entitled to injunc-tive relief because damages are sufficient to make the party whole.”). The BMVs argument fails to explain how, if Orndorff prevails at trial, monetary damages will compensate her if her family loses its housing or if the children are unable to attend their new school due to lack of transportation. We agree with the trial court that “it is difficult to conceive of appropriate, adequate and available monetary compensation or other legal remedy.” Appellant’s App. at 9.

As to the last two requirements for a preliminary injunction, the facts of this case permit us to address them together because the non-moving party is the BMV and any harm it incurs would constitute a harm to the public interest. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, we have concluded that suspending Orndorff s driving privileges presents a threat to the public interest and that no public interest will be served by suspending her driving privileges. It follows that the threatened injury to Orndorff outweighs the potential harm to the BMV resulting from the granting of the injunction and that the public interest would not be disserved. In sum, then, we conclude that Orndorff has carried her burden to establish each requirement for a preliminary injunction. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of her request for a preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

RILEY, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.

      . Effective July 1, 2012, "Driving privileges” are defined as “the authority granted to an individual that allows the individual to operate a vehicle of the type and in the manner for which the authority was granted.” Ind.Code § 9-13-2-48.3 (Pub. Law 125-2012, Sec. 12).

      . In Thomas, the appellant also argued that a statute of limitations period should apply to the BMV regarding suspension of driving privileges due to HTV status. The Thomas court concluded that the general ten-year limitation period in Indiana Code Section 34-11-1-2 applies to suspension of driving privileges based on HTV status. Thomas, 979 N.E.2d at 172-73. This is not at issue here as neither party in this case has raised a statute of limitations argument.

      . Despite failing to specifically challenge any of the trial court’s findings as unsupported by the evidence, the State asserts that the adverse effects are speculative and based on Orndorff's self-serving testimony. We will not address these assertions except to observe that they are merely invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Zimmer, 922 N.E.2d at 71.

      . For purposes of determining the number of judgments accumulated within a ten-year period, the dates of the offenses are used. Ind. Code § 9-30-10-4(e).

      . The BMV cites Bryant v. State ex. rel. Van Natta, 405 N.E.2d 583, 584 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), in which another panel of this Court concluded that the BMV did not waive its right to suspend Bryant's driving privileges despite issuing him a permit when he qualified as an HTV. We observe that the Bryant court summarily reached this conclusion, providing no rationale or citation for it. As such, we respectfully decline to follow Bryant.


author: PYLE, Judge.

text:
    Steven ENGELKING, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Amy ENGELKING, Appellee-Respondent.
    No. 18A02-1206-DR-495.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    Jan. 15, 2013.
    John Quirk, Muncie, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Paul E. Baylor, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
   OPINION

PYLE, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Steven Engelking (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s dissolution decree finding that he was the parent of two children born during his marriage to Amy Engelking (“Mother”) and was required to pay child support.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in determining that Father should pay child support as the parent of two children conceived through artificial insemination during his marriage to Mother.

FACTS

The facts most favorable to the judgment disclose that Father and Mother were married in 2001. Subsequently, Father and Mother had a discussion about having children, and Father responded to the discussion by consulting a doctor to determine whether a prior vasectomy could be reversed. The doctor told Father and Mother that a successful reversal was unlikely. As a result, the couple began investigating the possibility of artificial insemination.

A longtime friend of Mother’s became aware of the situation and told Mother that her husband, S.P., would provide the sperm for the artificial insemination. Mother was initially skeptical but changed her mind when Father encouraged the use of S.P.’s sperm because they looked alike and shared similar “characteristics and morals.” (Tr. 18). Father and Mother subsequently arranged for S.P. to be the sperm donor.

Father and Mother conducted an internet search of sperm banks, and Mother purchased paraphernalia from a sperm bank to facilitate the insemination process. With Father’s approval, Mother obtained a sperm sample from S.P. and used a syringe to inject the sperm into her vagina. The procedure resulted in the birth of a male child in 2004.

Father supported the child, holding the child out to the world as his own. Later, Mother discovered that Father had kept the paraphernalia from the sperm bank because he was concerned that his son would be an only child. Soon thereafter, Father and Mother discussed artificial insemination with S.P. and his wife. Mother again used a syringe to insert S.P.’s sperm into her vagina. This procedure resulted in the 2006 birth of a female child.

Again, Father supported both children and treated them as if they were his biological children. After he and Mother separated in 2009, Father exercised equal time visitation with the children. This visitation involved several overnight visits per week. Father continued to support the children by paying for daycare, clothing, and sports fees.

On October 10, 2010, Father filed a verified petition for dissolution of the marriage. In the petition, he stated that “two children were born to [Mother] during the marriage.... The children are not the biological children of [Father].” (App. 8). Nevertheless, Father continued to exercise visitation rights until February of 2012. On May 15, 2012, the trial court held a final hearing on the petition and found, among other things, that the children “were acknowledged by [Father] as his children, he supported said children, and he consented to the procedure by which they were created. That said children are, by all rights and purposes, legally the children of [Father].” (App. 29). The trial court ordered joint legal custody, naming Mother as the physical custodian and giving Father “proper visitation with a minimum of the co-parenting guidelines.” (App. 80). The court also ordered Father to pay child support.

DECISION

Father contends the trial court erred in determining that the children are products of the marriage and that he has a duty to pay child support. He questions the validity of the trial court’s findings and conclusions.

The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte. In such cases, the specific findings control as to the issues they cover, while a general judgment standard applies to any issues upon which the court has not made a finding. Harris v. Harris, 800 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. Thus, in reviewing the judgment, we must apply a two-tiered standard. Id. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we will reverse a judgment only when it is shown to be clearly erroneous. Id. In determining the validity of the findings or the judgment, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court’s determination of such questions. Id.

Father argues that neither child was a “child of the marriage” under the Dissolution of Marriage Act. See Ind.Code § 31-9-2-13(a)(2) (stating that a “child” of the marriage includes “[cjhildren born or adopted during the marriage of the parties”). He cites Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ind.1994) for the proposition that a child conceived through artificial insemination is a child of the marriage only when both parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to the artificial insemination. He maintains that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the artificial inseminations.

In Levin, the Levins, after discovering that the husband, Donald, was sterile, decided that the wife, Barbara, should be artificially inseminated. Donald supported the child and “held him out as his own” for ten years. Id. at 603. After dissolution of the marriage, Donald terminated his personal relationship with the child but continued to pay child support. Subsequently, Donald petitioned the trial court to vacate the child support order on the basis that the child was not his biological son. The trial court denied the petition, and this Court affirmed. Our Supreme Court accepted transfer, summarily affirmed this Court’s opinion, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In so doing, it stated that this Court “accurately analogized this situation to a child adopted during the marriage by agreement of the husband and wife. We thus hold that, as in the case of adoption, where the husband and wife knowingly and voluntarily consent to artificial insemination, the resulting child is a child of the marriage.” Id. at 604 (citation omitted).

Here, Mother testified that Father knew of the artificial inseminations that led to the conception of both children, helped her conduct research to determine the paraphernalia used to facilitate the first artificial insemination, talked with S.P. and his wife about the use of S.P.’s sperm as a component of both inseminations, and consented to both inseminations. She also testified that Father saved the paraphernalia for the second insemination so that the first child would not be an only child. She further testified that Father supported the children during the marriage, exercised his visitation rights during most of the lengthy period between the filing of the petition for dissolution and the final hearing, and claimed the oldest child on his tax return.

Father is asking us to disregard Mother’s testimony and credit his testimony that he did very few of the things attributed to him by Mother. Thus, he argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the artificial inseminations. Assigning credibility is not our function, and we reject Father’s invitation to do so. The trial court’s findings are supported by Mother’s testimony, and the findings support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that each child was a child of marriage. Accordingly, both Father and Mother “have an obligation to support the child[ren].” See Levin, 645 N.E.2d at 605.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.

      . Father also cites In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied, for the proposition that a procedure by which a mother is inseminated is not a true artificial insemination unless the semen transferred to the mother is first provided to a physician. In the case, the Court examined the public policy impact of a contract between a mother in a same sex relationship and a donor whereby the donor is absolved of any obligation to pay child support. The Court noted that viability of the contract depends on the manner in which insemination occurred, and it held that a physician's intermediary role acts as a safeguard against a "spur-of-the moment” contract between the mother and the sperm donor. Id. at 1261. The case is inapplicable where, as here, the issue is whether the father in a marriage may avoid supporting children bom to the father’s spouse during that marriage.