source: Caselaw Access Project

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    Christopher J. PERRY et al., Appellants, v. The DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Appellee.
    Institute for Justice, Appellant, v. The Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, Appellee.
    Docket Nos. 122349 122411 cons.
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    Opinion filed May 24, 2018
    Jeffery J. Lula, Haris Hadzimuratovic, Kyle L. Voils, and Brendan E. Ryan, of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, of Chicago, for appellant Institute for Justice.
    Gregory F. Ladle, of John L. Ladle, P.C., of Chicago, for appellants Christopher J. Perry and Perry & Associates, LLC.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Aaron T. Dozeman, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
    Jeffrey M. Schwab, Jacob H. Huebert, and James J. McQuaid, of Liberty Justice Center, of Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois Policy Institute et al.
    Andrew D. Prins (pro hac vice), Elana Nightingale Dawson, and Genevieve P. Hoffman (pro hac vice), of Latham & Watkins LLP, of Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
    Isaac Rabicoff and Kenneth Matuszewski, of Rabicoff Law LLC, of Chicago, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois et al.
   JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In separate cases, both plaintiff-appellants, (1) Christopher J. Perry and Perry & Associates, LLC (collectively, Perry), and (2) the Institute for Justice (Institute), filed causes of action under section 11 of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2012) ) seeking the disclosure of certain information from the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department). After the circuit court denied in part and granted in part Perry's motion for summary judgment, section 2105-117 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law took effect, which, if applicable, would exempt the type of information sought by Perry from disclosure. Pub. Act 99-227 (eff. Aug. 3, 2015) (adding 20 ILCS 2105/2105-117 ). Both Perry and the Department moved for reconsideration, and the circuit court applied section 2105-117 to the action, concluding that the information Perry sought was exempt from disclosure. The circuit court denied Perry's motion to reconsider, and the appellate court affirmed. Perry v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, ¶ 48, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136.

¶ 2 During the pendency of the Institute's lawsuit in the circuit court, Public Act 98-911 became effective on January 1, 2015, adding section 4-24 to the Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, Hair Braiding, and Nail Technology Act of 1985 (Barber Act), which, if applicable, would exempt the type of information sought by the Institute from disclosure. Pub Act. 98-911 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) (adding 225 ILCS 410/4-24 ). After the circuit court granted the Institute's motion for summary judgment and denied the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding in part that section 4-24 could not be applied to the Institute's action, the Department appealed. The appellate court reversed. Institute for Justice v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 2017 IL App (1st) 162141-U, ¶ 29, 2017 WL 1386827.

¶ 3 We allowed Perry's and the Institute's petitions for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) ), which have been consolidated to determine whether section 2105-117 and section 4-24 are to apply to Perry's and the Institute's pending causes of actions, respectively. We allowed the following parties to file amicus curiae briefs: the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, the Better Government Association, the Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice, the Chicago Council of Lawyers, the Citizen Advocacy Center, and the Illinois Press Association; the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; and the Illinois Policy Institute and Edgar County Watchdogs.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Perry's Request for Review and Circuit Court Proceedings

¶ 6 On January 21, 2013, Perry filed a FOIA request with the Department seeking disclosure of a complaint that had been made against his structural engineer's license. The Department denied his request on January 23, 2013. Perry sought review of the Department's denial by the Public Access Counselor (PAC). See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) (West 2012) ("A person whose request to inspect or copy a public record is denied by a public body, except the General Assembly and committees, commissions, and agencies thereof, may file a request for review with the Public Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney General."). In a nonbinding opinion letter, the PAC concluded that Perry's request was properly denied under section 7(1)(d)(iv) of the Illinois FOIA because disclosure of the complaint would "unavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential source, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, or persons who file complaints with or provide information to administrative, investigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2014).

¶ 7 Perry amended the FOIA request on August 26, 2013, requesting that the Department disclose the complaint "redacted to exclude proper names and 'confidential information' " pursuant to section 7(1) of the FOIA. See 5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2012) ("When a request is made to inspect or copy a public record that contains information that is exempt from disclosure under this Section, but also contains information that is not exempt from disclosure, the public body may elect to redact the information that is exempt."). The Department denied the amended request.

¶ 8 On November 6, 2014, Perry filed an action against the Department in the Cook County circuit court. Pursuant to section 11(d), Perry requested the circuit court to order the Department to produce the redacted complaint. 5 ILCS 140/11(d) (West 2014) ("The circuit court shall have the jurisdiction to enjoin the public body from withholding public records and to order the production of any public records improperly withheld from the person seeking access."). Pursuant to sections 11(i) and (j), respectively, Perry also sought an award of attorney fees and the imposition of a civil penalty for the Department's willful and bad-faith failure to comply with the Illinois FOIA. See 5 ILCS 140/11(i), (j) (West 2014).

¶ 9 Perry moved for summary judgment. Alternatively, Perry sought an in camera inspection of the complaint by the circuit court. 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2014). A hearing was held on July 27, 2015. After an in camera inspection, the circuit court concluded that, pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iv), the complaint was exempt from disclosure but that two of the complaint's exhibits could be disclosed, as they had already been made available to third parties. Thus, Perry's motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Both Perry and the Department moved for reconsideration, with Perry arguing that the court should have ordered the disclosure of the complaint with redaction of any names that would have revealed the complainant's identity and the Department contesting the disclosure of the exhibits because they would necessarily reveal the complainant's identity.

¶ 10 As another basis for exempting disclosure of the complaint and exhibits, regardless of redaction, the Department cited section 2105-117 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law. 20 ILCS 2105/2105-117 (West Supp. 2015). Section 2105-117 took effect on August 3, 2015, as a statutory amendment to the Department of Professional Regulation Law. Pub. Act 99-227 (eff. Aug. 3, 2015) (adding 20 ILCS 2105/2105-117 ). Perry asserted that section 2105-117 was inapplicable to the case, as it was not yet in effect at the time Perry made the FOIA request or at the time of the circuit court's ruling on Perry's summary judgment motion.

¶ 11 On January 7, 2016, at a hearing on the motions to reconsider, the circuit court observed that section 2105-117 had become effective about one week after its initial ruling on Perry's summary judgment motion and that it therefore could not have applied section 2105-117 when ruling on the motion. The circuit court also noted, however, that due to the parties' motions for reconsideration, it had retained jurisdiction over the case. As such, the circuit court determined that, per Kalven v. City of Chicago , 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, 379 Ill.Dec. 903, 7 N.E.3d 741, it was required to apply section 2105-117, the current law in effect, when ruling on the motions for reconsideration. Because under section 2105-117 Perry would not be entitled to disclosure of the redacted complaint or exhibits, the circuit court granted the Department's motion for reconsideration and dismissed Perry's cause of action.

¶ 12 Perry filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the circuit court erred in applying section 2105-117 and failing to specifically address Perry's claims for attorney fees and a civil penalty against the Department. The circuit court denied Perry's motion to reconsider, reaffirmed its dismissal of Perry's FOIA action, dismissed Perry's claim for attorney fees under section 11(i) because Perry was not the prevailing party, and dismissed Perry's claim for a civil penalty.

¶ 13 The Institute's Request for Review and Circuit Court Proceedings

¶ 14 On September 12, 2013, the Institute filed a request pursuant to the Illinois FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2012) ) seeking the disclosure of "[a]ll complaints regarding licensed cosmetologists and hair braiders received by the [Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, Hair Braiding, and Nail Technology Board] from 2011 to present." The Department denied the request on September 30, 2013, asserting that six separate FOIA exceptions exempted the requested records from disclosure. On November 22, 2013, the Institute filed a request for review of the denial with the PAC. See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) (West 2012) ("A person whose request to inspect or copy a public record is denied by a public body, except the General Assembly and committees, commissions, and agencies thereof, may file a request for review with the Public Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney General."). For over a year, the Institute's request remained pending with the PAC without resolution. Pursuant to section 11, the Institute filed a complaint in the Cook County circuit court. See 5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2012).

¶ 15 During the pendency of the lawsuit in the circuit court, Public Act 98-911 became effective on January 1, 2015. Pub. Act 98-911 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) (adding 225 ILCS 410/4-24 ). Relevant here, the law added section 4-24 to the Barber Act, providing that complaints against licensees on file with the Department are "for the confidential use of the Department and shall not be disclosed" except to law enforcement officials, other regulatory agencies, or pursuant to subpoena. Id. The Department answered the Institute's complaint on March 23, 2015, and, among other asserted reasons, added as an affirmative defense that the recent enactment of section 4-24 exempted the requested documents from disclosure.

¶ 16 The Institute and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the Institute's motion for summary judgment on November 12, 2015, denied the Department's cross-motion for summary judgment, and continued the matter for presentation of a formal order and to resolve miscellaneous issues.

¶ 17 On December 16, 2015, the circuit court issued an order, explaining that it found inapplicable the six FOIA exemptions claimed by the Department, that section 4-24 did not apply to the Institute's request because section 4-24 was enacted after the Institute's FOIA request, and that section 4-24 did not apply retroactively. On June 30, 2016, the court ordered the Department to produce the requested records by December 23, 2016, and awarded the Institute $35,000 in attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. See 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2012) ("If a person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record prevails in a proceeding under this Section, the court shall award such person reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."). In a separate order, the court denied the Department's motion for a stay of the production order. The Department appealed the orders separately, which were consolidated on appeal by the appellate court.

¶ 18 The appellate court granted the Department's motion for a stay of the production order pending appeal.

¶ 19 Appellate Court Analysis

¶ 20 In his appeal, Perry argued that the circuit court erred in applying section 2105-117 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law retroactively to his FOIA action. Citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), and section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014) ), Perry asserted that, because it is a substantive amendment and its application would have a retroactive impact on him by impairing his rights to examine the complaint and exhibits, section 2105-117 may not be retroactively applied.

¶ 21 In its appeal, the Department argued only that section 4-24 of the Barber Act applied to the Institute's request. The Institute asserted that, because section 4-24 contained no express provision regarding its temporal reach and because it is a substantive amendment that "redefines confidentiality protections and information availability," its application would have a retroactive impact upon the Institute.

¶ 22 The appellate court majority's analysis and reasoning was similar for both cases. See Perry , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136 (Delort, J., dissenting); Institute for Justice , 2017 IL App (1st) 162141 (Delort, J. dissenting). The appellate majority explained, in both decisions:

" Kalven , [2014 IL App (1st) 121846, 379 Ill.Dec. 903, 7 N.E.3d 741,] Center for Biological Diversity [v. United States Department of Agriculture , 626 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2010) ], and Wisniewski [v. Kownacki , 221 Ill. 2d 453, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006),] compel the conclusion that when a statutory amendment only affects the present or future disclosure of information (either by allowing for its disclosure or exempting it from disclosure) and does not otherwise impair anyone's rights with respect to completed transactions made in reliance on the prior law, the application of the amendment has no impermissible retroactive effect, and therefore, the amendment must be applied by the court if it is in effect at the time of the court's decision." Perry , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, ¶ 40, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136.

See also Institute for Justice , 2017 IL App (1st) 162141-U, ¶ 22.

¶ 23 Regarding Perry's case, the appellate majority stated that:

"as section 2105-117 of the [Department of Professional Regulation Law] only exempts the complaint and exhibits requested by the plaintiffs from present or future disclosure, and does not otherwise impair plaintiffs' rights with respect to any completed transactions made in reliance on any prior law, its application has no impermissible retroactive effect. Therefore, the court properly applied section 2105-117 when ruling on the reconsideration motions and dismissing plaintiffs' FOIA request." Perry , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, ¶ 41, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136.

¶ 24 The appellate majority rejected Perry's claim that the circuit court erred in dismissing Perry's claim for attorney fees under section 11(i) because section 11(i) only allows recovery of attorney fees when " 'a person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record prevails in a proceeding' " under section 11. (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 46 (quoting 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2014) ). Because Perry did not prevail in the FOIA proceeding, the appellate majority held that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the claim for attorney fees. Id. The appellate majority also rejected Perry's assertion that the matter should be remanded for a hearing on the application of civil penalties against the Department under section 11(j). The appellate majority determined that Perry had forfeited review of this issue by failing to make an adequate argument regarding the imposition of civil penalties under section 11(j).

¶ 25 As to the Institute's case, the appellate majority stated:

"[a]s section 4-24 of the Barber Act only exempts the requested records from disclosure, and does not otherwise impair the Institute's rights with respect to any completed transaction made in reliance on any prior law, its application has no impermissible retroactive effect. Therefore, the circuit court should have applied section 4-24, which was in effect at the time of its ruling, and exempted the requested records from disclosure. Accordingly, we reverse the November 12, 2015, order granting the Institute's motion for summary judgment, and the June 30, 2016, order requiring the Department to produce the subject records and awarding the Institute $35,000 in attorney fees as a prevailing requestor." Institute for Justice , 2017 IL App (1st) 162141-U, ¶ 23.

¶ 26 Citing Kalven , 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, ¶ 10, 379 Ill.Dec. 903, 7 N.E.3d 741, the appellate majority explained that, as to both cases, its holding was bolstered since Perry and the Institute had sought "injunctive relief, which is a prospective form of relief for which the circuit court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision." Perry , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, ¶ 42, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136 ; Institute for Justice , 2017 IL App (1st) 162141-U, ¶ 24.

¶ 27 The appellate majority also rejected both Perry's and the Institute's arguments that this court's decision in People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc. , 2015 IL 117193, 390 Ill.Dec. 105, 28 N.E.3d 758, compelled a different result. Further, unlike in J.T. Einoder , Inc. , the application of section 2105-117 in Perry's case and the application of section 4-24 in the Institute's case "affect[ ] present or future disclosure of information and which do[ ] not impose any new liability on past conduct" and thus have "no impermissible retroactive effect." (Emphasis in original.) Perry , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, ¶ 45, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136 ; Institute for Justice , 2017 IL App (1st) 162141-U, ¶ 28.

¶ 28 Separately, Perry and the Institute petitioned for leave to appeal to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). We granted leave to appeal and consolidated the matters for review.

¶ 29 ANALYSIS

¶ 30 We must decide whether section 2105-117 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law and section 4-24 of the Barber Act apply to Perry's and the Institute's requests for information, respectively. 20 ILCS 2105/2105-117 (West Supp. 2015) ; 225 ILCS 410/4-24 (West 2016). First, however, we must determine the proper governing analysis. The standard of review is de novo , as this appeal presents an issue of statutory construction and also because it arises from a summary judgment order. See Stern v. Wheaton-Warrenville Community Unit School District 200 , 233 Ill. 2d 396, 404, 331 Ill.Dec. 12, 910 N.E.2d 85 (2009). "Summary judgment is proper if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lazenby v. Mark's Construction, Inc. , 236 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 337 Ill.Dec. 884, 923 N.E.2d 735 (2010).

¶ 31 Section 2105-117 provides:

"Confidentiality. All information collected by the Department in the course of an examination or investigation of a licensee, registrant, or applicant, including, but not limited to, any complaint against a licensee or registrant filed with the Department and information collected to investigate any such complaint, shall be maintained for the confidential use of the Department and shall not be disclosed. The Department may not disclose the information to anyone other than law enforcement officials, other regulatory agencies that have an appropriate regulatory interest as determined by the Director, or a party presenting a lawful subpoena to the Department. Information and documents disclosed to a federal, State, county, or local law enforcement agency shall not be disclosed by the agency for any purpose to any other agency or person. A formal complaint filed against a licensee or registrant by the Department or any order issued by the Department against a licensee, registrant, or applicant shall be a public record, except as otherwise prohibited by law." 20 ILCS 2105/2105-117 (West Supp. 2015).

¶ 32 Section 4-24 provides:

"Confidentiality. All information collected by the Department in the course of an examination or investigation of a licensee or applicant, including, but not limited to, any complaint against a licensee filed with the Department and information collected to investigate any such complaint, shall be maintained for the confidential use of the Department and shall not be disclosed. The Department may not disclose the information to anyone other than law enforcement officials, other regulatory agencies that have an appropriate regulatory interest as determined by the Secretary, or a party presenting a lawful subpoena to the Department. Information and documents disclosed to a federal, State, county, or local law enforcement agency shall not be disclosed by the agency for any purpose to any other agency or person. A formal complaint filed against a licensee by the Department or any order issued by the Department against a licensee or applicant shall be a public record, except as otherwise prohibited by law." 225 ILCS 410/4-24 (West 2016).

¶ 33 Prior to the effective dates of both sections 2105-117 and 4-24, certain information collected by the Department could properly be sought and disclosed. No one contends otherwise. Both Perry and the Institute filed their respective Illinois FOIA causes of action prior to the effective dates of both sections. Thus, both Perry's and the Institute's cases were pending at the time sections 2105-117 and 4-24 went into effect. If sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are held to apply to Perry's and the Institute's pending causes of actions, then under section 7(1)(a) of the Illinois FOIA, the information sought would be exempt. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2016) ("Information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law."). By way of background, section 1 of the Illinois FOIA provides, in part:

"The General Assembly hereby declares that it is the public policy of the State of Illinois that access by all persons to public records promotes the transparency and accountability of public bodies at all levels of government. It is a fundamental obligation of government to operate openly and provide public records as expediently and efficiently as possible in compliance with this Act.
* * *
* * * This Act shall be construed to require disclosure of requested information as expediently and efficiently as possible and adherence to the deadlines established in this Act." 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2016).

¶ 34 Under the Illinois FOIA, statutory exemptions are to be construed narrowly. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University , 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 223 Ill.Dec. 641, 680 N.E.2d 374 (1997). Additionally, "public records are presumed to be open and accessible." Id. "FOIA is to be given a broad construction." Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated School District No. 65 , 128 Ill. 2d 373, 378, 131 Ill.Dec. 182, 538 N.E.2d 557 (1989).

¶ 35 Accordingly, we must decide whether sections 2105-117 and 4-24 apply to causes of action pending at the time of both sections' effective dates. We now turn to the parties' arguments regarding the proper analysis to employ to determine whether sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are to apply to Perry's and the Institute's causes of actions. Perry and the Institute assert that this court should simply apply its retroactivity analysis, which is summarized below. Were section 2105-117 and section 4-24 to be applied to Perry's and the Institute's cases, respectively, Perry and the Institute contend that application thereof would have a retroactive impact, which would result in inequitable consequences in contravention of J.T. Einoder, Inc. and strip them of their accrued causes of actions under Illinois FOIA, which they contend became vested rights, their entitlement to the requested documents and attorney fees, and their settled expectations regarding the law at the time of the requests.

¶ 36 The Department maintains that this court need not utilize a retroactivity analysis because Perry and the Institute seek declaratory and injunctive relief. According to the Department, because declaratory relief allows a court to announce the scope of a person's present right to information and injunctive relief allows it to order the public body to disclose information in the future based on present rights, the application of a statute that becomes effective during a pending FOIA action is not retroactive. A law applies if it is effective at the time the court determines, under current law, whether a public body can be ordered to disclose information in the future. Because FOIA determines present rights, not past rights, the Department maintains that there can be no vested right at issue, as prospective relief merely allows a court to declare present rights and order future compliance with those rights. Therefore, because "prospective relief is the only relief available here, the court need not engage in Illinois's modified Landgraf retroactivity analysis."

¶ 37 The Department explains that, "[u]nlike in the typical Landgraf analysis, the court is not looking back at an event and applying present law to a past moment to determine whether a right that vested should remain free from interference ... [a]nd because it is not retrospectively assessing the legality of a past event involving a vested right, no present laws are being applied retroactively." In response to the Department's prospective relief argument, Perry and the Institute claim that they are both actually seeking retrospective relief in the form of a mandatory injunction to remedy the Department's past misconduct.

¶ 38 We begin by detailing Illinois's retroactivity jurisprudence, which parties still appear to be confused by, understandably, given its convoluted and muddled evolution. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27, 33, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001) (describing First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead , 171 Ill. 2d 282, 287-88, 215 Ill.Dec. 639, 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996), as "[r]ecognizing that the principles for determining whether a statutory amendment applies to an existing controversy on appeal ha[s] 'not been consistently stated' "); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst , 193 F.3d 894, 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("Illinois law on retroactivity is in a state of some muddle"); Orlicki v. McCarthy , 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346, 122 N.E.2d 513 (1954) (acknowledging that various Illinois decisions considered the issue of retrospectivity in the context of vested or nonvested rights, jurisdiction, whether a provision is substantive or procedural, legislative intent, by statutes of construction, or by a combination thereof).

¶ 39 In Commonwealth Edison Co. , this court adopted the United States Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis as set forth in Landgraf , 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill. 2d at 39, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964. We adopted the Landgraf analysis "with its focus on legislative intent, because we believed it provided the appropriate framework for evaluating whether a new law should apply to existing controversies." Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas , 234 Ill. 2d 393, 411, 334 Ill.Dec. 649, 917 N.E.2d 475 (2009). Thus, with our adoption of the Landgraf approach, we "switched the focus of the first step of the retroactivity analysis from 'vested rights' to legislative intent." Id.

¶ 40 Under step one of Landgraf , a court first determines whether the legislature has " 'expressly prescribed' " the temporal reach of the new law. See Commonwealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill. 2d at 39-40, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (quoting Landgraf , 511 U.S at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483 ). If the legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach, then such temporal reach must be given effect unless to do so would be constitutionally prohibited. Id. at 42-43, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964.

¶ 41 However, in Caveney v. Bower , this court subsequently explained that, in light of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, Illinois courts need not go beyond step one of the Landgraf approach. 207 Ill. 2d 82, 94, 278 Ill.Dec. 1, 797 N.E.2d 596 (2003). Step two of Landgraf is triggered where the legislature's intent as to temporal reach is not clear. But, as has repeatedly been explained, if the temporal reach has not been clearly indicated within the text of the new law, then the legislature's intent as to temporal reach is provided by default in section 4. People v. Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶¶ 21-22, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 ; Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 100, 278 Ill.Dec. 1, 797 N.E.2d 596 (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, C.J., and Kilbride, J.) ("the court errs when it holds that section 4 serves as the clear expression of legislative intent that is contemplated in the first step of the Landgraf analysis").

¶ 42 Moreover, where the legislature has not expressly indicated its intent as to temporal reach, "a presumption arises that the amended statute is not to be applied retroactively." J.T. Einoder, Inc. , 2015 IL 117193, ¶ 34, 390 Ill.Dec. 105, 28 N.E.3d 758. As we noted in Hunter , section 4 of the Statute on Statutes was adopted in 1874 and has never been amended. 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 21, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 131, § 4 (Hurd 1874). Section 4 provides:

"No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether the repeal is in the act making any new provision upon the same subject or in any other act." 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016).

¶ 43 "Section 4 is a general savings clause, which this court has interpreted as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only." Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 (citing People v. Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506-07, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002) ). If a statutory change is procedural, then the change will apply retroactively, i.e. , to pending cases in the absence of a constitutional impediment to such retroactive application. Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 23, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358. As made clear in Hunter , section 4 of the Statute on Statutes "contemplates the existence of proceedings after the new or amended statute is effective to which the new procedure could apply." Id. ¶ 31 ; see also People v. Zito , 237 Ill. 434, 438, 86 N.E. 1041 (1908) (under section 4, "what remained to be done" must conform to the mode of procedure under the new act). Conversely, if a statutory change is substantive, then the change is not to be applied retroactively. J.T. Einoder, Inc. , 2015 IL 117193, ¶ 36, 390 Ill.Dec. 105, 28 N.E.3d 758 ; Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 95-96, 278 Ill.Dec. 1, 797 N.E.2d 596 ; Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d at 507, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251.

¶ 44 Thus, after determining that a change is substantive, we need not reach the issue of whether application of the substantive change would have a retroactive impact or operation. Were we to undertake this inquiry, we would essentially be engaging in step two of the Landgraf analysis, which this court does not utilize. See Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 95, 278 Ill.Dec. 1, 797 N.E.2d 596 ("Thus, for purposes of Landgraf 's first step, the legislature always will have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes." (Emphasis in original.) ).

¶ 45 To illustrate this distinction, we cite the Landgraf analysis:

"When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i. e. , whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result." Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.

¶ 46 Thus, under the Landgraf analysis, federal courts will engage in a retroactive impact inquiry if a statute's reach has not been expressly prescribed. Landgraf , 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Conversely, this court has made clear that, where our legislature has not expressly indicated the temporal reach of a change in law, we look to whether the change is procedural or substantive, at which point our focus is still upon discerning "legislative intent." Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 22, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 ; J.T. Einoder, Inc. , 2015 IL 117193, ¶¶ 31-32, 390 Ill.Dec. 105, 28 N.E.3d 758 ; Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak , 223 Ill. 2d 318, 331-32, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246 (2006) ; Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 92, 278 Ill.Dec. 1, 797 N.E.2d 596. If step two of Landgraf considers retroactive operation to discern temporal reach, a step which this court never reaches, it follows that our inquiry into legislative intent ends upon determining that a change is substantive. Before proceeding further under Illinois's retroactivity analysis, we now turn to the Department's arguments as to why a retroactivity analysis need not be applied.

¶ 47 Department's Prospective Relief Argument

¶ 48 In support of its argument that a retroactivity analysis is inapplicable where prospective relief is sought, the Department relies upon several cases. We now examine each in turn, beginning with the Illinois cases.

¶ 49 First, the Department cites Wisniewski v. Kownacki , 221 Ill. 2d 453, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006). In Wisniewski , the plaintiff sought discovery of a defendant priest's (Kownacki) mental health and alcohol-abuse counseling records in connection with the plaintiff's lawsuit alleging in part that defendant had sexually abused him. Id. at 455, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. The church, also a defendant, objected, citing two Illinois statutes that made such records not subject to disclosure. Id. at 455-56, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. Specifically, defendants claimed that the records were privileged under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) ( 740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002) ) and the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act (Dependency Act) ( 20 ILCS 301/30-5 et seq. (West 2002) ). Wisniewski , 221 Ill. 2d at 455-56, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. This court explained:

"Plaintiff argues that applying the nondisclosure provisions of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act to Kownacki's preenactment treatment records would have a retroactive impact because it would impose new duties with respect to documents and transactions completed years before the statutes' enactment. We reject this argument and conclude that the applicability of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act to Kownacki's treatment records does not hinge upon a retroactivity analysis. Disclosure, which is the act regulated by both statutes, takes place only in the present or the future . Thus, any new duties regarding disclosure or nondisclosure would likewise be imposed only in the present or the future, not in the past. In other words, applying the nondisclosure provisions of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act to preenactment treatment records and communications would not impair anyone's rights with respect to past transactions.
Neither statute impacts any actions that may have taken place in the past with regard to Kownacki's records. For these reasons, we conclude that the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act are applicable to treatment records and communications that were created pursuant to treatment given prior to the effective dates of those statutes." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 462-63, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243.

¶ 50 The Department asserts that, in Wisniewski , this court "faced the question of whether the future disclosure of information had any retroactive impact" and "correctly concluded that it did not." The Department also points to the italicized portion above for support that, because disclosure occurs only in the future, a retroactivity analysis is inapplicable.

¶ 51 We disagree. Wisniewski analyzed whether the nondisclosure provisions of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act could be applied to treatment records that were created nearly 20 years before either act's effective date. Id. at 462, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. Moreover, both the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act's effective dates predated the discovery requests and filing of the lawsuit. Id. at 455-56, 458-59, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. Specifically, the Confidentiality Act became effective on January 9, 1979, and the Dependency Act became effective on July 1, 1988. Id. at 458-59, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. It was not until October 2002, after the Confidentiality Act and Dependency Act became effective, that the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and subsequently sought disclosure of the subject documents. Id. at 455, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243. Thus, Wisniewski does not stand for the broad proposition that, in any context, disclosure of information can only occur in the present or future and therefore that a retroactivity analysis will never apply. We find Wisniewski distinguishable.

¶ 52 Second, the Department cites Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation as also standing for the proposition that a retroactivity analysis is inapplicable where only prospective relief is at issue. 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 25, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570 (citing Cox v. Hart , 260 U.S. 427, 435, 43 S.Ct. 154, 67 L.Ed. 332 (1922) ("A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.") ). Relevant here, at issue in Hayashi was section 2105-165 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law (Act) ( 20 ILCS 2105/2105-165 (West 2012) ), which mandated the permanent revocation, without a hearing, of the license of a health care worker who had been convicted of specific criminal offenses. Hayashi , 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 8, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570. After the Act went into effect, the Department sent notices to the three plaintiffs, whose cases were consolidated for review, informing each that the Department intended to revoke their licenses pursuant to the Act because each had been convicted of one of the specified crimes. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Plaintiffs filed separate actions seeking injunctive relief and a judicial declaration that the Act applied only to convictions postdating the Act's effective date. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs' licenses were revoked by administrative order. Id.

¶ 53 This court determined that "the plain language of the Act clearly indicate[d] that the legislature intended it to apply to convictions predating its effective date." Id. ¶ 17. Next, the court considered plaintiffs' argument that, even if they fell "within the plain language of the Act based on their prior convictions, the application of section 2105-165 to them is impermissibly retroactive in violation of their substantive due process rights." Id. ¶ 22. We explained:

"Applying the Landgraf test to the Act, we find that the legislature plainly indicated the temporal reach by stating that the license of a health care worker who has been convicted of one of the triggering offenses shall by operation of law be permanently revoked without a hearing. [Citation.] The Act provides that revocation of health care licenses pursuant to its provisions takes place only after its effective date. Thus, the Act is solely prospective and not retroactive in its operation. That being so, there is no need to turn to the alternative statutory sources suggested by plaintiffs in order to define the temporal reach of the Act. Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes [citation] controls by default only where the legislature has not clearly defined the temporal reach of a statute. [Citation.] If the legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach of a provision, section 4 is inapplicable. [Citation.]" Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 54 However, despite the court's conclusion regarding the plainly indicated intent as to prospective reach, plaintiffs argued that the Act was retroactive "as applied to them because their health care licenses were revoked as a consequence of their prior convictions." Id. ¶ 25. Noting that the Act relied upon antecedent facts for its operation, this court explained that the Act did not apply retroactively to plaintiffs because the Act defined "new per se eligibility requirements with which licensees must comply in order to practice their health care professions in Illinois." Id. ¶ 26. Citing Wisniewski , this court explained that "[a]n amended statute which creates new requirements to be imposed in the present or future, and not in the past, does not have a retroactive impact on the parties." Id. Because the Act affected only the present and future eligibility of plaintiffs to continue to use their health care licenses, the court stated that the impact of applying the Act to plaintiffs was thus "solely prospective and not impermissibly retroactive within the meaning of the test articulated in Landgraf ." Id.

¶ 55 Like Wisniewski , Hayashi does not support the Department's argument. First and foremost, Hayashi is distinguishable because the legislature had clearly prescribed the temporal reach of the Act, unlike in the present cases. In such cases where temporal reach is not clearly expressed, as here, the analysis is instead guided by section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Second, Hayashi did not involve the issue of whether the amended statute could properly be applied to a pending cause of action. In Hayashi , all three plaintiffs initiated suit after the amendment went into effect.

¶ 56 Finally, the Department relies upon several federal cases to support its assertion that, where prospective relief is sought, a retroactivity analysis does not govern.

¶ 57 Every federal case cited by the Department involves an analysis of the second step of Landgraf , which Illinois courts never reach. See, e.g. , Center for Biological Diversity , 626 F.3d at 1118 ; City of Chicago v. United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms , 423 F.3d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 2005) ; Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of Agriculture , 314 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).

¶ 58 In its brief, the Department asserts that Perry and the Institute "start from the misunderstanding that a right to information vested at some point before the intervening amendments became effective." Rather, the Department starts from the misunderstanding that Illinois courts will skip over section 4 of the Statute on Statutes and instead conduct a retroactive impact inquiry. See Thomas v. Guardsmark, LLC , 487 F.3d 531, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n Illinois court (and consequently, a federal court applying substantive Illinois law) need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test."). As previously mentioned, Illinois courts do not utilize the second step of Landgraf , which considers whether (1) there would be an impairment of a party's rights that such party possessed when he or she acted, (2) a party's liability for past conduct would be increased, or (3) there would be an imposition of new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Nor do we look to the point in time at which the relief sought could be effectuated to determine the legislative intent as to temporal reach. In determining whether to apply a change in law to a pending cause of action, Illinois courts simply consider the legislature's intent, moving on to constitutional prohibitions only if the legislature evinces an intent for retroactive operation.

¶ 59 Although the Department does not cite Kalven , to the extent that the appellate majority relied upon Kalven for the proposition that, "[w]hen claims are prospective, a court must apply the law that is in effect at the time of its decision," the appellate majority's reliance was misplaced. See Kalven , 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, ¶ 10, 379 Ill.Dec. 903, 7 N.E.3d 741. For this proposition, the Kalven court cited Bartlow v. Costigan , 2014 IL 115152, ¶¶ 30-31, 383 Ill.Dec. 95, 13 N.E.3d 1216, and Forest Preserve District v. City of Aurora , 151 Ill. 2d 90, 94-95, 175 Ill.Dec. 736, 600 N.E.2d 1194 (1992). Kalven , 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, ¶ 10, 379 Ill.Dec. 903, 7 N.E.3d 741. However, both Bartlow and City of Aurora were addressing the context-specific issue of whether a constitutional challenge to a statute was rendered moot by amendment. See, e.g. , Bartlow , 2014 IL 115152, 383 Ill.Dec. 95, 13 N.E.3d 1216 ; City of Aurora , 151 Ill. 2d 90, 175 Ill.Dec. 736, 600 N.E.2d 1194. Thus Bartlow and City of Aurora are inapplicable where, as here, no constitutional challenges to the enforcement of a statute have been made and therefore mootness is not at issue.

¶ 60 Accordingly, to the extent that Kalven conflicts with our decision herein, it is hereby overruled. See 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, ¶ 10, 379 Ill.Dec. 903, 7 N.E.3d 741.

¶ 61 Vested Rights

¶ 62 We note that the parties contest whether any vested rights are at issue so as to bar retroactive application of section 2105-117 and section 4-24 to Perry's and the Institute's causes of actions, respectively. For example, the Department cites Armstead for the proposition that "there is no vested right in the mere continuance of a law" and that "[t]he legislature has an ongoing right to amend a statute." 171 Ill. 2d at 291, 215 Ill.Dec. 639, 664 N.E.2d 36.

¶ 63 Under the vested rights approach, if an amendment had no retroactive impact, a court would not apply further rules of construction to determine legislative intent. Id. at 290, 215 Ill.Dec. 639, 664 N.E.2d 36 ("a reviewing court should simply apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right"). The vested rights approach is founded upon an understanding of "true retroactivity," under which a change in law is retroactive if it "takes away or impairs the vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Commonwealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill. 2d at 34, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (quoting Armstead , 171 Ill. 2d at 290, 215 Ill.Dec. 639, 664 N.E.2d 36 ). For illustration, Black's Law Dictionary contains a selected quotation referencing "true retroactivity" under its definition of "retroactivity":

" 'Retroactivity' is a term often used by lawyers but rarely defined. On analysis it soon becomes apparent, moreover, that it is used to cover at least two distinct concepts. The first, which may be called 'true retroactivity,' consists in the application of a new rule of law to an act or transaction which was completed before the rule was promulgated. The second concept, which will be referred to as 'quasi-retroactivity,' occurs when a new rule of law is applied to an act or transaction in the process of completion. ... [T]he foundation of these concepts is the distinction between completed and pending transactions ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Black's Law Dictionary 1511-12 (10th ed. 2014) (quoting Trevor C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law 129 (1981) ).

¶ 64 Illinois courts no longer utilize a vested rights analysis to determine temporal reach. See Commonwealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill. 2d at 39, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 ("[W]e hereby adopt the approach to retroactivity set forth in Landgraf ."). To consider whether a right has vested necessarily involves an inquiry into retroactive impact, which would contravene this court's repeated holding that we do not reach step two of Landgraf . Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 21, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 29, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. If a provision is a substantive change such that it is only to be applied prospectively, and not to a pending cause of action, it follows that a court would never consider if retroactive application thereof would have an impermissible retroactive impact upon a vested right. See Kopec , 193 F.3d at 906-07 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("the older approach of Illinois law to issues of retroactivity, an approach that may have retained some vitality despite Armstead ," "created a presumption * * * against the retroactive application of a statute that makes a substantive change") ). Stated differently, a lack of retroactive impact in a pending case does not somehow negate or trump the legislature's intent that a change of law is to be applied to future cases only. See Commonwealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill. 2d at 47, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (noting that, although Henrich v. Libertyville High School , 186 Ill. 2d 381, 238 Ill.Dec. 576, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1998), "was decided under the principles espoused in Armstead ," Henrich remained "relevant in this case insofar as it defines those interests that are protected from legislative interference by the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution") ). If, however, the legislature indicates that it wants a change of law to be applied retroactively, then a court must ask whether effectuating the legislature's intent would be constitutionally prohibited, which in turn would take into account vested rights, as such rights are constitutionally protected. In sum, the Department is arguing for an "impact-before-intent" analytical approach that no longer finds support in Illinois law. We now apply Illinois's retroactivity analysis.

¶ 65 Legislative Intent as to Temporal Reach

¶ 66 We first ask whether the legislature has clearly prescribed the temporal reach of sections 2105-117 and 4-24. Examining the plain language of both sections, we find that the legislature has not done so. To illustrate, we note that the legislature is undoubtedly aware of how to clearly indicate its intent that a statute apply to causes of action currently pending in the courts. Lazenby , 236 Ill. 2d at 95, 337 Ill.Dec. 884, 923 N.E.2d 735 ("Section 9(f) states that '[t]his Section applies to all causes of action that have accrued, will accrue, or are currently pending before a court of competent jurisdiction, including courts of review.' " (quoting 425 ILCS 25/9f (West 2004) ) ); Doe A. , 234 Ill. 2d at 407, 334 Ill.Dec. 649, 917 N.E.2d 475 (Section 13-202.2(e) "specifically provides that the 2003 amendment applies to actions pending when the changes took effect on July 24, 2003, as well as to 'actions commenced on or after that date.' " (quoting 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(e) (West 2006) ) ); Allegis Realty Investors , 223 Ill. 2d at 333, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246 (General Assembly expressly indicated temporal reach where new section was "specifically directed to specified Road District taxes authorized by electors at annual or special township meetings during certain years prior to Public Act 94-692's enactment"); Commonwealth Edison Co. , 196 Ill. 2d at 42, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (amendments expressly stated that the amendments' validation of taxes "applies to all cases pending on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1994" and one amendment also expressly validated levies adopted "either before, on or after the effective date of [the Act]" (internal quotation marks omitted) ).

¶ 67 We also presume that the legislature is fully aware of both section 4 and this court's case law. In re Marriage of O'Neill , 138 Ill. 2d 487, 495, 150 Ill.Dec. 607, 563 N.E.2d 494 (1990) ("It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that 'where terms used in [a] statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction * * *, they are to be understood and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court * * *." (quoting People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank , 361 Ill. 75, 78-79, 197 N.E. 537 (1935) ) ).

¶ 68 Because the legislature has not expressly prescribed its intent as to the temporal reach of either section 2105-117 or section 4-24, we now discern the legislature's intent by examining whether sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are procedural or substantive changes in law . Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 22, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 ; Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251. At the outset, we note that the Department takes no position on whether the changes made by sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are properly characterized as substantive or procedural due to its wholesale reliance upon its prospectivity argument.

¶ 69 As has previously been acknowledged by our case law, distinguishing between procedural and substantive changes can sometimes be unclear. See People v. Atkins , 217 Ill.2d 66, 71-72, 298 Ill.Dec. 50, 838 N.E.2d 943 (2005). "Procedural ramifications of a substantive amendment do not make the amendment procedural." Id. at 73, 298 Ill.Dec. 50, 838 N.E.2d 943. To aid our analysis, we turn to several dictionary definitions. Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides the following definitions: "procedural" is defined as "of or relating to procedure < ~ details>; esp : of or relating to the procedure used by courts or other bodies (as governmental agencies) in the administration of substantive law (~ due process)" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1807 (2002) ); "procedure," as relevant here, is defined as "an established way of conducting business (as of a deliberative body): as * * * (2) : the established manner of conducting judicial business and litigation including pleading, evidence, and practice" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1807 (2002) ); and "substantive law" is defined as "a branch of law that prescribes the rights, duties, and obligations of persons to one another as to their conduct or property and that determines when a cause of action for damages or other relief has arisen" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (2002) ).

¶ 70 Black's Law Dictionary defines "procedural law" as "[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014). "Substantive law" is in turn defined as "[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of the parties." Black's Law Dictionary 1658 (10th ed. 2014).

¶ 71 Because both sections 2105-117 and 4-24 alter the scope of information that is accessible, both amendments are substantive changes. The scope of accessible information necessarily determines whether a cause of action would arise or accrue under the Illinois FOIA. Certainly, sections 2105-117 and 4-24 do not speak to pleading, evidence, or steps and practice. Nor can sections 2105-117 or 4-24 be said to be changes to special remedial statutes. See Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d at 509, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 ("courts can apply retroactively statutory changes to procedural or remedial provisions"). Having determined that sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are substantive changes in law, sections 2105-117 and 4-24 may not be retroactively applied to either Perry's or the Institute's causes of actions. See Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 92, 278 Ill.Dec. 1, 797 N.E.2d 596. Fatally, the Department "has not directed our attention to anything in the United States or Illinois Constitution which would prohibit the law[s] from being applied" in this way. See People v. Brown , 225 Ill. 2d 188, 201, 310 Ill.Dec. 561, 866 N.E.2d 1163 (2007).

¶ 72 The Department asserts that both Perry and the Institute always had and still have causes of action under section 11 of the Illinois FOIA but that sections 2105-117 and 4-24 changed Perry's and the Institute's present right to information. This argument is unpersuasive, as we have already rejected the Department's prospective relief argument. Before the effective dates of sections 2105-117 and 4-24, a party could seek and potentially obtain the type of information sought by Perry and the Institute. Today, a party would not be able to do so.

¶ 73 Briefly, we note that any concern that our holding would impermissibly order a public officer to disclose documents which the legislature has dubbed confidential and therefore exempt from disclosure under section 7 of the Illinois FOIA is baseless. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2016). Such an argument would mean that a court would have to ignore the legislature's clear intent. If the legislature has made clear that a change in law is not to apply to pending causes of action, then it follows that, in select cases, a public official is not legally constrained by a new provision.

¶ 74 In a similar vein, as to the Institute's case, the Department insinuates that, because the Institute's complaint sought disclosure of documents "from 2011 to the present," that the word "present" is still operative in the future sense. However, the circuit court already determined that the word "present" meant until December 23, 2013, ordering that "[d]efendant shall provide to Plaintiff '[a]ll complaints regarding licensed cosmetologists and hair braiders received by the Board from January 1, 2011 to December 23, 2013.' " Further, the record also reveals that the Department understood "present"

to hold the same meaning. In its response to Perry's motion to establish the scope of document production, the Department contended "the scope of the FOIA request only extends from 2011 to September 12, 2013."

¶ 75 As to relief, Perry requests that the grant of summary judgment for the Department be reversed with direction to provide the documents as redacted and further that this matter be remanded for further hearings as to the application and assessment of costs as permitted under section 11(j) or other relief as this court deems just and proper. See 5 ILCS 140/11(j) (West 2016) ("If the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court shall also impose upon the public body a civil penalty of not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 for each occurrence."). We reverse the grant of summary judgment for the Department with directions that the circuit court hold a hearing to reconsider whether Perry is also entitled to disclosure of the subject complaint in a redacted form and, if Perry is the prevailing party, whether Perry is entitled to attorney fees under section 11(i). See 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2016) ("If a person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record prevails in a proceeding under this Section, the court shall award such person reasonable attorney's fees and costs.").

¶ 76 With respect to Perry's request for a hearing to be held on section 11(j) penalties, we note the Department's argument that Perry forfeited any claim for penalties and makes no argument to this court that the appellate court's forfeiture finding was an abuse of discretion. See Perry , 2017 IL App (1st) 161780, ¶ 47, 413 Ill.Dec. 329, 77 N.E.3d 1136. However, we are also mindful of the fact that the circuit court mistakenly made no finding on whether the Department willfully and intentionally violated FOIA due to its erroneous belief it need not reach the issue after concluding that Perry was not entitled to the information. Regardless, forfeiture does not serve as a jurisdictional bar to this court's ability to reach the issue. People v. Peterson , 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 67, 423 Ill.Dec. 776, 106 N.E.3d 944. Though we express no view upon whether the Department willfully and intentionally violated the Illinois FOIA, we direct the circuit court to hold a hearing on section 11(j) civil penalties, as it should have in the first instance.

¶ 77 With respect to the Institute, we reverse the appellate court's order and reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Institute.

¶ 78 CONCLUSION

¶ 79 Illinois's retroactivity analysis governs where a change of law becomes effective during the pendency of a lawsuit. Because the legislature did not clearly prescribe its intent as to whether sections 2105-117 and 4-24 should be applied to pending lawsuits, we considered whether, under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, the changes in law are procedural or substantive. As both sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are substantive changes to the law, sections 2105-117 and 4-24 are to apply prospectively only. Accordingly, as to Perry, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for the Department with directions that the circuit court hold a hearing to reconsider whether Perry is also entitled to disclosure of the subject complaint in a redacted form and, if Perry is the prevailing party, whether Perry is entitled to attorney fees under section 11(i). See 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2016). We also direct the circuit court to hold a hearing on section 11(j) civil penalties. With respect to the Institute, we reverse the appellate court's order and reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Institute.

¶ 80 No. 122349, Reversed.

¶ 81 No. 122411, Reversed and remanded with directions.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.


text:
    IN RE C.H., a Minor (People State of Illinois, respondent, v. Stephanie H., et al.)
    Joseph K., et al., petitioners.
    No. 123887
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    September 11, 2018
    Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    IN RE N.M., a Minor
    (People State of Illinois, respondent, v. N.M., petitioner).
    No. 123716
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    August 13, 2018
    Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied.


text:
    IN RE N.S., a Minor (People State of Illinois, respondent, v. Julie B., petitioner).
    123770
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    August 06, 2018
    Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied.


author: All Justices concur.

text:
    In the MATTER OF: Anna D. SAAR, Respondent
    Supreme Court Case No. 18S-DI-317
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    FILED September 21, 2018
    Published Order Approving Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline
    Pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23 (12.1)(b), the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission and Respondent have submitted for approval a "Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline" stipulating agreed facts and proposed discipline as summarized below.
    Stipulated Facts: "Client" signed a representation agreement with "Law Firm" in a personal injury matter. The agreement called for a contingent attorney fee of 35% if the case was resolved without trial and 45% plus expenses if the case was resolved with trial. The agreement also included a provision under which Law Firm, in the event it was discharged by Client prior to an eventual settlement or recovery, would be entitled to a fee of $175/hr for work performed on the case.
    Respondent was an associate with Law Firm from June 2015 until February 2017 and represented Client during that time. When Respondent departed Law Firm and began working with a new firm, Client elected to have Respondent complete his case. Respondent informed Client her representation and fees would be governed by identical terms as his agreement with Law Firm and that any fees owed to Law Firm would be deducted from any settlement award or judgment obtained in Client's case. However, Respondent failed to explicitly contract away her liability for attorney fees owed to Law Firm.
    In September 2017, an $18,000 mediated settlement of Client's case was reached. Respondent kept 35% ($6,300) as her fee and then negotiated a $2,000 settlement with Law Firm for its fee. This resulted in Client being charged a total attorney fee of 46% of the settlement amount instead of the contracted amount of 35%.
    Respondent has no prior discipline, cooperated with the disciplinary process, and refunded the $2,000 owed to Client.
    Violation: The parties agree that Respondent violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a), which prohibits collecting an unreasonable fee. Accord Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ind. 1999).
    Discipline: The parties propose the appropriate discipline is a public reprimand. The Court, having considered the submissions of the parties, now approves the agreed discipline and imposes a public reprimand for Respondent's misconduct.
    The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. With the acceptance of this agreement, the hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged.
   All Justices concur.


author: Slaughter, Justice. David, J., dissenting.

text:
    R.R., Appellant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
    Supreme Court Case No. 18S-JV-230
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Argued: May 31, 2018 FILED September 13, 2018
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Cara Schaefer Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana Andrew Kobe, Laura R. Anderson, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 47A04-1705-JV-944
   Slaughter, Justice.

At a fact-finding hearing where R.R., a juvenile, was not present, the trial court found R.R. violated his probation and adjudicated him a delinquent for auto theft and false informing. R.R. argues that (1) juveniles have a due-process right to be present at such hearings, and (2) the trial court violated this right by holding the hearing in his absence. We assume without deciding that R.R. is correct on the first issue and agree with him on the second. We thus reverse the trial court's delinquency determination and remand for further proceedings.

Factual and Procedural History

In September 2014, the State alleged R.R., then fourteen years old, committed criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor for an adult. R.R. admitted the allegations, and the court placed him on supervised probation for six months. Beginning in May 2015, the State filed multiple petitions to modify R.R.'s probation because he had violated the terms of his probation. These modifications included housing him in a residential treatment center for at-risk youth. The court ordered R.R. released from this facility in June 2016 and placed him back on probation for six months. Only six weeks later, the State again petitioned the court to modify R.R.'s probation, noting more violations. In September 2016, the State alleged R.R. committed auto theft, which would be a Level 6 felony had he been an adult, and false informing, which would be a Class B misdemeanor. In January 2017, the State filed a "Request for Taking Child Into Custody" based on that September 2016 petition.

On February 7, 2017, the court held a fact-finding hearing concerning the September 2016 petition and the January 2017 request. R.R. was not present, but his mother and counsel did appear. When asked if she knew where her son was, R.R.'s mother answered, "No. He hasn't even called me since he left." The court responded, "Well, let the record reflect that this child's whereabouts are unknown. The child's mother is here. She doesn't know where he is. Sounds like he's been gone for seven (7) or eight (8) days."

The State offered to proceed in R.R.'s absence, but R.R.'s counsel balked. When asked if she objected to proceeding, R.R.'s counsel said, "Yeah, I do object to that and I request a continuance so that [R.R.] can be present at his hearing." The court denied the motion and proceeded with the fact-finding hearing despite R.R.'s absence. After the hearing, the court found R.R. had violated the terms of his probation and committed auto theft and false informing.

Nearly two months later, on March 30, police detained R.R. under a pick-up order, and he appeared at a dispositional hearing the same day. At the hearing, the court ordered that R.R. be made a ward of the Indiana Department of Correction. R.R. appealed, arguing he had a constitutional right to appear at his fact-finding hearing, and the court violated that right by holding the hearing in his absence.

A divided Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, concluding R.R. had a right to be present at the hearing, but had waived this right because he "knowingly and intentionally refused to appear." R.R. v. State , 93 N.E.3d 768, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Adopting R.R.'s interpretation would, the court observed, allow juveniles to "hijack trial court dockets and avoid responsibility for their delinquent behavior by knowingly and voluntarily (and repeatedly) refusing to appear at factfinding hearings." 93 N.E.3d at 774-75. The dissent believed R.R. had not waived his right to appear because his conduct did not conform to the waiver requirements outlined in our juvenile-waiver statute, Indiana Code chapter 31-32-5. Id. at 775-76 (Vaidik, C.J., dissenting). We granted transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion, and now reverse.

Standard of Review

At issue here are two questions of first impression: first, whether juveniles have a due-process right to appear at a fact-finding hearing; and, second, if they have such a right, how they can waive it. Both the existence of constitutional rights and the requirements for waiving them are legal questions we review de novo. When determining whether a juvenile has a constitutional right that the Supreme Court of the United States has not expressly recognized, we will decide the question based on "our own judicial examination of the various cases, statutes, and constitutional principles pertinent thereto." Bible v. State , 253 Ind. 373, 378, 254 N.E.2d 319, 320 (1970). Also relevant here are the meaning and scope of Indiana's juvenile waiver-of-rights statute. "A statute's meaning and scope are legal questions we review de novo." Garner v. Kempf , 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. 2018). Our goal is to effectuate the statute's reasonable, commonly understood meaning. Id. "If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words and phrases in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court violated R.R.'s presumed right to be present at a fact-finding hearing by failing to comply with the juvenile waiver-of-rights statute.

A. We assume without deciding that juveniles are entitled to be present at fact-finding hearings on a delinquency charge.

R.R. claims a constitutional right, under the Due Process Clause, to appear at a fact-finding hearing on his delinquency charge, and the State does not disagree. We decline to decide authoritatively this issue of first impression in Indiana because the State does not contest R.R.'s right to appear on this record, and we prefer to decide such questions after they have been vetted fully in the adversary process. We thus assume without deciding that juveniles are entitled to be present at such hearings. We turn next to whether and how they can waive that right.

B. A juvenile can waive his right to be present at a factfinding hearing but must do so according to our juvenile waiver-of-rights statute.

In 1972, we reversed a juvenile's first-degree-murder conviction, finding the juvenile had not waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and thus the confession undergirding his conviction had been obtained improperly. Lewis v. State , 259 Ind. 431, 439-40, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142-43 (1972), superseded by statute as stated in B.A. v. State , 100 N.E.3d 225, 234 (Ind. 2018). In that landmark decision, we held that "a juvenile's statement or confession cannot be used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and his parents or guardian were informed of his rights to an attorney, and to remain silent." Lewis , 259 Ind. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142. We also held that the child "must be given an opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian or an attorney representing the juvenile as to whether or not he wishes to waive those rights." Id. Only after such a consultation may the child elect to "waive his rights if he so chooses provided of course that there are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present." Id.

The legislature later expanded these waiver protections to all constitutional and statutory rights when it enacted the juvenile waiver-of-rights statute in 1978. 1978 Ind. Acts 1232-33 (codified at Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3 (1978 Supp.) ). Later recodified, the statute today provides "only" three ways to waive rights that state or federal law confers on children-waiver by counsel; waiver by a parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem; or waiver by the child himself:

Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only :
(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;
(2) by the child's custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver; or
(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:
(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver; and
(B) the child has been emancipated under I.C. 31-34-20- 6 or I.C. 31-37-19-27, by virtue of having married, or in accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.

I.C. § 31-32-5-1 (emphasis added).

Unlike adult criminal defendants, who can waive their right to be present by "fail[ing] to appear for trial and fail[ing] to notify the trial court or provide it with an explanation of [their] absence", Jackson v. State , 868 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted), a juvenile's waiver of rights requires a heightened showing. Our analysis begins and ends with the juvenile-waiver statute, which governs "any rights" guaranteed to a juvenile. Neither R.R.'s counsel nor his parent waived his right to be present, so subsections (1) and (2) of the statute do not apply. And R.R. was not emancipated when the court held the February 2017 fact-finding hearing, so he could not have waived it himself under subsection (3). Thus, under the statute's plain meaning, there was no waiver of R.R.'s right to be present. The trial court violated that right by holding a hearing in his absence.

II. The absurdity doctrine does not apply here.

In opposing transfer, the State argues that the statute, read literally, "leads to the absurd result that a juvenile could hijack the juvenile justice system and evade responsibility indefinitely by simply refusing to appear for the fact-finding hearing." We recently called the absurdity doctrine "strong medicine" that "defeats even the plain meaning of statutes." Calvin v. State , 87 N.E.3d 474, 477 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted).

For the absurdity doctrine to apply, we require a two-part showing. First, the text must impose an outcome no reasonable person could intend. Second, a court must be able to fix the resulting absurdity by "changing or supplying a word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error". ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS at 237-38 (2012). The first requirement assures that the result truly is absurd, and not merely unwise or unsound. The second limits courts to repairing obvious errors and not rewriting substantive provisions because the drafter failed to appreciate their unintended effect. Together, these requirements set a very high bar.

When there is a clear drafter's or scrivener's error, we will apply the absurdity doctrine to give the law its obvious intended effect despite its plain text. For example, a statute requiring motorists to carry an "invalid" license or to ensure their vehicles have an "expired" plate would satisfy the doctrine. So, too, would a statute inadvertently omitting the word "not", such as: "Convicted felons shall own or possess a handgun or other firearm." These examples would qualify for the doctrine because the legislature obviously did not intend the enacted text to be interpreted as written. And the judicial fix would be easy: drop the unintended prefix so that "invalid" becomes "valid"; add the omitted prefix so that "expired" becomes "un expired"; insert the omitted word so that "shall own or possess" becomes "shall not own or possess".

Unlike these examples, the juvenile-waiver statute neither leads to an obviously unintended result nor lends itself to a clean and modest judicial fix. The statute was intended to protect children, and it is more than possible that the legislature intended the three listed ways for waiving children's rights to be exclusive. But even were we to conclude that no reasonable legislator could have intended that a no-show teenager would avoid waiver by resorting to such litigation gamesmanship, the judicial fix would not be modest. It would require courts to rewrite the statute by adding a substantive "fourth" waiver option the legislature did not enact.

The absurdity doctrine is a slippery slope. Finding absurdity on this record would risk substituting our view of the balance between protecting and waiving juvenile rights for that of the legislature.

We decline to do that here. Thus, we read the juvenile-waiver statute to require that waiver occur in one of only three ways the statute lays out expressly. Because the failure to appear is not one of the statutory grounds for finding juvenile waiver, we hold that R.R. did not waive his right to be present at his factfinding hearing.

Our dissenting colleagues urge the legislature to give trial judges discretion to find waiver where the juvenile does not appear at a scheduled hearing. We do not quarrel with the invitation but observe that the current juvenile-waiver statute ties judges' hands by authorizing a finding of waiver in "only" three circumstances not present here. Even if holding a hearing in R.R.'s absence would make for a "just outcome" here, we "interpret statutes based on their enacted text and not the justness of the outcome" in a singular case. Garner v. Kempf , 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1098 (Ind. 2018). For good or ill, the current statute does not permit waiver even when the Constitution would. In that respect, the statute affords juveniles with greater rights than the Constitution requires. Thus, the dissent's conclusion that "holding the hearing in R.R.'s absence comported with due process" is both true and beside the point. We do not conclude that finding a waiver here would violate due process, only that it would violate the current statute. The legislature can always rewrite the statute to loosen or further tighten the requirements for waiver. We hold only that the current statute does not permit a finding of waiver on this record.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Goff, J., concurs.

Rush, C.J., concurs in Parts I.B. and II. and dissents from Part I.A., with separate opinion.

Massa, J., concurs in Part I.A. and dissents from Parts I.B. and II., with separate opinion.

David, J., dissents with separate opinion which Rush, C.J., joins in part, and which Massa, J., joins in part.

Rush, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I agree with Justice David that the Court should decide-rather than assume without deciding-that R.R. has a constitutional right to be present at the fact-finding hearing. Otherwise, I concur with the majority.

Massa, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I agree with Justice Slaughter that the Court may assume without deciding that R.R. has a constitutional right to be present at the factfinding hearing. Otherwise, I concur with the dissent.

David, J., dissenting.

While I appreciate Justice Slaughter's thoughtful majority opinion, I must respectfully dissent. First, as a threshold matter, I would find that R.R. does have a constitutional right to be present at the fact-finding hearing. Second, I believe that despite the juvenile waiver of rights statute, R.R. waived his right to be present at the fact-finding hearing under the facts and circumstances of this case.

As the State observes, the plain language of the statute contemplates that the juvenile will be present to waive or not waive as the case may be, and does not address a situation where the juvenile has run away or disappeared. As the U.S. Supreme court has held: "the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings...is fundamental fairness." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1985, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). Here, I believe the facts that R.R. had presumably run away, there is a pickup order for him, he is close to 18 and has great familiarity with the system make it a just outcome that hearing be held in his absence.

Further, at least one other jurisdiction recognizes a juvenile's right (without an attorney or parent joining the waiver and without emancipation) to waive his or her presence at important proceedings. See Com. v. B.J., 241 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Ky. 2007) (Juvenile, who was brought to family court on allegations that he was a habitual truant, validly waived his right to appear at both his adjudication and disposition hearings; juvenile, at his arraignment, was informed of his future court dates, juvenile's mother made representations to counsel that juvenile was aware of hearing and chose not to attend, and no evidence was presented that juvenile's absence was involuntary).

I urge our legislature to consider amending the statute to give trial court judges some discretion in situations where the juvenile is absent. That is, the statute should allow for knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by a juvenile who is aware of upcoming proceedings but chooses to be absent with no adequate explanation. This is not to say that holding a hearing in the juvenile's absence would be best practice or even not unusual. The best practice would be to issue a pickup order and have the juvenile be present for the proceedings, but in some circumstances, it may be appropriate to hold a hearing in the juvenile's absence in order to prevent juveniles who are aware of an upcoming hearing date to get a free pass by disappearing. Our trial judges should be able to advise a juvenile that if they fail to appear at a hearing, the matter may proceed without them. Then, depending on the age of the juvenile and the circumstances, the trial court should be able to exercise its discretion about whether or not to proceed. In this case, I believe holding the hearing in R.R.'s absence comported with due process. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court.

Rush, C.J., joins in part and Massa, J., joins in part.


text:
    In the MATTER OF: Jill N. HOLTZCLAW, Respondent
    Supreme Court Case Nos. 18S-DI-373 18S-DI-382
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Filed September 21, 2018
    Published Order Suspending Respondent from the Practice of Law in Indiana for Noncooperation
   Loretta H. Rush, Chief Justice of Indiana

On July 17, 2018, in Case No. 18S-DI-373, this Court ordered Respondent to show cause why she should not be immediately suspended from the practice of law in this state for failure to cooperate with the Commission's investigation of grievance Nos. 18-1073 and 18-1328 filed against her. On July 23, 2018, in Case No. 18S-DI-382, we ordered Respondent to show cause why she should not be immediately suspended from the practice of law in this state for failure to cooperate with the Commission's investigation of grievance Nos. 18-1462 and 18-1306 filed against her. Each order required that Respondent show cause in writing within ten days of service of the order. Respondent has not submitted a response to the Court's order in either case. The Commission now has filed in each case a "Request for Ruling and to Tax Costs" asserting that Respondent still has not cooperated, to which Respondent has not responded.

Being duly advised, the Court ORDERS in DI-373 and DI-382 that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for noncooperation with the Commission, effective immediately. Pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23 (10.1)(c)(3), the suspension in each case shall continue until the Executive Director of the Disciplinary Commission certifies to the Court that Respondent has cooperated fully with the investigation or until further order of this Court, provided there are no other suspensions then in effect. Respondent already is under a suspension for continuing legal education noncompliance and is ordered to fulfill the continuing duties of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23 (10.1)(d), that Respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Commission $513.34 for the costs of prosecuting the proceeding in DI-373. The Court declines to separately order a reimbursement of costs in DI-382.

All Justices concur.


text:
    In the MATTER OF: Lindsay C. POTTHAST, Petitioner
    Supreme Court Case Nos. 49S00-1310-DI-682 49S00-1507-DI-438
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    FILED September 27, 2018
    Published Order Granting Reinstatement to the Practice of Law
   Loretta H. Rush, Chief Justice of Indiana

On September 4, 2015, this Court issued an order in DI-682 suspending Petitioner for not less than 30 days without automatic reinstatement, effective immediately. On May 6, 2016, this Court issued an order in DI-438 suspending Petitioner for not less than 90 days without automatic reinstatement, effective immediately.

Petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement on August 21, 2017, and we appointed a hearing officer. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued a report on August 6, 2018, recommending that Petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law in Indiana. Neither party has filed a petition for review.

A petition for reinstatement may be granted only if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) The petitioner desires in good faith to obtain restoration of his or her privilege to practice law;
(2) The petitioner has not practiced law in this State or attempted to do so since he or she was disciplined;
(3) The petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the order for discipline;
(4) The petitioner's attitude towards the misconduct for which he or she was disciplined is one of genuine remorse;
(5) The petitioner's conduct since the discipline was imposed has been exemplary and above reproach;
(6) The petitioner has a proper understanding of and attitude towards the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will conduct himself or herself in conformity with such standards;
(7) The petitioner can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and an officer of the Courts; and
(8) The disability has been removed, if the discipline was imposed by reason of physical or mental illness or infirmity, or for use of or addiction to intoxicants or drugs.

Admis. Disc. R. 23(18)(b)(3).

This Court, being duly advised, finds that the recommendation of the hearing officer should be accepted. The Court therefore GRANTS the petition for reinstatement and REINSTATES Petitioner as a member of the Indiana bar as of the date of this order. Petitioner shall pay any costs owing under Admis. Disc. R. 23(21)(b).

All Justices concur.