text:
    HUBER HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION et al., Appellees.
    No. 2017-0814
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted September 11, 2018 Decided October 24, 2018
    Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Dublin, and Kimberly Allison, for appellant.
    Waite, Tomb & Eberly, L.L.P., Stephen Klein, and Patrick J. Janis, for appellee Globe Products, Inc.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellee Globe Products, Inc., sought a decrease in the valuation of its property during proceedings held before appellee Montgomery County Board of Revision ("BOR"). Appellant, the Huber Heights City Schools Board of Education ("BOE"), objected to Globe's requested decrease, but aside from a minor adjustment, the BOR lowered the property's value in line with what Globe sought. The BOE then appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA"), where it presented testimony that was critical of Globe's evidence. The BTA found the BOE's testimony lacking and accordingly adopted the value determined by the BOR. The BOE has appealed, claiming that the BTA misapplied the principles delineated in Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 115 Ohio St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 913. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} The property at issue consists of two parcels covering 12.4 acres. The property is improved with a 96,000-square-foot industrial office, a 1,536-square-foot one-story residential duplex, and a 3,260-square-foot metal pole barn. For tax year 2014, the county auditor collectively valued the parcels at $1,808,130. Globe filed complaints against the valuation of each parcel, seeking a decrease in the auditor's valuation. The BOE filed countercomplaints seeking retention of the auditor's valuations.

BOR proceedings

{¶ 3} The BOR consolidated the complaints. At the hearing, Globe presented the testimony and appraisal report of Robert A. Harris, a certified appraiser. Harris performed a sales-comparison approach that evaluated six sales. Based on the sales data, Harris deemed a value of $9.30 per square foot as appropriate for the subject. He applied this figure against an area of 101,004 square feet-the area covered by the industrial office, the one-story residential duplex, and the metal pole barn-to arrive at a rounded valuation of $940,000. The BOE did not present its own evidence; instead, it cross-examined Harris.

{¶ 4} The BOR valued the two parcels at $956,630. The BOR referred to Harris's appraisal report during its deliberations, but it did not explain the reason for the difference between its assigned valuation and the valuation opined by Harris, a difference of less than 2 percent.

BTA proceedings

{¶ 5} The BOE appealed the BOR's determination to the BTA, where it presented appraisal-review testimony from Thomas D. Sprout, a certified appraiser. " 'The primary function of an appraisal reviewer is not to appraise the subject property but to examine the contents of a report and form an opinion as to its adequacy and appropriateness.' " Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 144 Ohio St.3d 421, 2015-Ohio-4522, 44 N.E.3d 274, ¶ 21, quoting Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 590 (13th Ed.2008).

{¶ 6} Sprout faulted Harris for not performing an income approach to valuation, for assigning an exposure time of five to seven years to the property, and for not providing information on the condition of the property's roof. Sprout also addressed the comparable-sales analysis contained in Harris's report. He queried whether the compared properties and the property were truly comparable, questioned the rationale behind Harris's adjustments to those sales, and criticized Harris's method for deriving a value for the property from the sales. Sprout testified that he did not have an opinion of value for the property. For its part, Globe again presented Harris, who expounded further on his approach to appraising the property.

{¶ 7} The BTA, relying on Bedford , 115 Ohio St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 913, and the line of cases following it, adopted the BOR's determination of value. In doing so, the BTA acknowledged the suggestion in Sears that a board of education could, "in a proper case," submit conflicting evidence in the form of an appraisal review. Id. at ¶ 21. The BTA nevertheless reasoned that Sears did not preclude adoption of the BOR's value. The BOE then filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 8} We will affirm a BTA decision that is reasonable and lawful. Satullo v. Wilkins , 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14. We review de novo the BTA's resolution of legal issues but will defer to the BTA's findings concerning the weight of the evidence if there is record support for them. Lunn v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision , 149 Ohio St.3d 137, 2016-Ohio-8075, 73 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 13.

DISCUSSION

The BTA's characterization of Bedford

{¶ 9} In its first proposition of law, the BOE accuses the BTA of mischaracterizing the Bedford rule. Globe rejoins that we lack jurisdiction to address this argument because it was not set forth in the BOE's notice of appeal. Globe alternatively maintains that the BTA accurately described the Bedford rule.

{¶ 10} We begin with Globe's jurisdictional argument. The case law is clear that we cannot exercise jurisdiction over an alleged BTA error if that error is not set forth in an appellant's notice of appeal. Cruz v. Testa , 144 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-3292, 41 N.E.3d 1213, ¶ 18. Hypertechnical jurisdictional objections, however, are viewed with disfavor. Id. at ¶ 21. To this end, our jurisdictional analysis must assess the words used in the notice of appeal within the case's particular context. Id.

{¶ 11} Here, the BOE's notice of appeal mentions Bedford no fewer than three times, variously asserting that the BTA erred in its understanding and application of that decision. That the BOE's exposition of the Bedford issue took on a more concrete shape in its brief is not unexpected, as precedent does not require an assignment of error in a notice of appeal to rise to the level of reasoned argumentation. That is, after all, what a brief is for. As in Cruz , it "does suffice," id. at ¶ 24, that both Globe and this court were on notice that the BTA's treatment of Bedford would be an issue here.

{¶ 12} Turning to the merits, the BOE argues that the BTA erred in concluding that the elements of Bedford were satisfied "at the BOR level." According to the BOE, the BTA erred in writing those four words because Bedford applies only at the BTA.

{¶ 13} The elements of Bedford are as follows. First, the property owner must have filed either an original complaint or a countercomplaint. Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 147 Ohio St.3d 38, 2016-Ohio-3025, 59 N.E.3d 1270, ¶ 9. Second, the board of revision must have "ordered a reduced valuation based on competent evidence offered by the property owner." Id. Third, the board of education must have appealed the board of revision's decision to the BTA. Id. And fourth, the board of revision's reduction in value must have been based on appraisal evidence, not a sale price. Id. at ¶ 11. When these elements are met, the board of education bears the burden before the BTA of "prov[ing] a new value (be that the auditor's valuation or some other value)." Id. at ¶ 7. The default value confronting the board of education in such a scenario is the board of revision's reduced valuation, not the auditor's original valuation. Id.

{¶ 14} Because the Bedford elements are all tied to what transpired at the board-of-revision level, the BTA did not err in concluding that they were satisfied "at the BOR level." Although Bedford is applied at the BTA, its applicability is determined by the course of proceedings at the board of revision.

{¶ 15} The BOE additionally asserts that Bedford "does not apply when a [board of revision] lowers value to a value different [from] that proposed by the appraisal evidence submitted unless the [board of revision] specifically states how it arrived at its value." (Emphasis sic.) But Bedford itself was a case in which an owner presented evidence to a board of revision seeking a valuation decrease, yet did not receive the full extent of its requested decrease. Id. , 115 Ohio St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 913, at ¶ 1-5. It is thus immaterial that the BOR's valuation does not precisely align with Harris's opinion of value. Further, the BOR explicitly mentioned Globe's evidence-and no other evidence-as a prelude to announcing its determination of value. And that determination differs by less than 2 percent from Harris's opined value. These circumstances fall within Bedford 's boundaries. See Dublin City Schools at ¶ 8.

The BOE's burden under Bedford

{¶ 16} In its second proposition of law, the BOE submits that it met its evidentiary burden at the BTA by furnishing appraisal-review testimony that controverted Harris's appraisal report and that it was not required to present affirmative evidence of value. The BOE points to Sears , in which we explained, "Even if a board of education elects not to commission its own appraisal, it might in a proper case offer a different type of evidence: an expert review of the owner's appraisal. * * * An appraisal review performed by an expert would make a greater claim on the BTA's attention because it would constitute conflicting evidence." 144 Ohio St.3d 421, 2015-Ohio-4522, 44 N.E.3d 274, at ¶ 21.

{¶ 17} In Sears , we did not specify what "a proper case" would look like, but the conditional nature of that passage necessarily means that appraisal-review testimony will not be appropriate in every case. We conclude that this is not a proper case for such testimony because-unlike in Sears - Bedford applies here. When Bedford applies, "the burden lies on the board of education to prove a new value." Dublin City Schools , 147 Ohio St.3d 38, 2016-Ohio-3025, 59 N.E.3d 1270, at ¶ 7. To do that, "[t]he appellant before the BTA must present competent and probative evidence to prove that the value that he or she proffers is correct." DAK, PLL v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 105 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-573, 822 N.E.2d 790, ¶ 13. Permitting a board of education to override Bedford through the use of an appraisal review that, as here, merely criticizes an owner's appraisal evidence without proving a new value is inconsistent with that directive.

{¶ 18} In any event, even if Sprout's appraisal-review testimony could be considered a proper way for the BOE to meet its burden in this case, that testimony can hardly be said to have placed much of a "claim on the BTA's attention." Sears at ¶ 21. When Sprout was asked if he had an opinion on the subject's value, he answered, "I do not." Such testimony does little, if anything, to assist the BTA in fulfilling its duty under R.C. 5717.03(B) to "determine the taxable value of the property."

{¶ 19} The BOE's last argument under this proposition of law takes aim at the probative value of Harris's appraisal. But when, as here, the property owner presents "competent and at least minimally plausible" evidence of value, Bedford instructs that a board of education cannot succeed at the BTA by faulting the evidence that the owner presented to the board of revision. Dublin City Schools , 147 Ohio St.3d 38, 2016-Ohio-3025, 59 N.E.3d 1270, at ¶ 7. That precept defeats the BOE's attack on Harris's appraisal.

The BOE's request to reinstate or default to the auditor's valuation

{¶ 20} The BOE's third and fourth propositions of law largely echo its earlier positions. It claims that the BTA should have reinstated the auditor's original valuation because of the alleged flaws in Harris's appraisal. Alternatively, the BOE submits that the auditor's valuation should be considered the default if a remand is ordered.

{¶ 21} Although there are exceptions, see Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 144 Ohio St.3d 324, 2015-Ohio-3633, 43 N.E.3d 387, ¶ 44, and South-Western City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 152 Ohio St.3d 548, 2018-Ohio-919, 98 N.E.3d 270, ¶ 16, the general rule is that "as long as the evidence of value that the owner presented to the board of revision was competent and at least minimally plausible, the board of education may not invoke the auditor's original valuation as a default." Dublin City Schools at ¶ 7. Here, Globe presented competent and at least minimally plausible evidence to the BOR, namely, Harris's testimony and appraisal report. Because no exceptions to the general rule apply here, the BOE's third and fourth propositions of law fail.

CONCLUSION

{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the BTA's decision.

Decision affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

Kennedy, J., concurs in judgment only.

      "Exposure time" is the "estimated length of time that the property being appraised would have been offered on the market prior to the hypothetical consummation of a sale at market value on the effective date of the appraisal." Appraisal Institute, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal 83 (6th Ed.2015).

      We also do not agree that the BTA failed to consider Sprout's testimony. In its decision, the BTA expressly stated: "Sprout testified that Harris's appraisal fell short of professional requirements because it failed to provide sufficient information to potential readers, failed to rely on accurate market information, and failed to provide an income approach given the subject property's income-producing nature." BTA Nos. 2015-2359 and 2015-2360, 2017 WL 2269662, at *1 (May 17, 2017).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE APPLICATION OF JONES.
    No. 2018-0498
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted May 22, 2018 Decided October 24, 2018
    Launica Elizabeth Jones, pro se.
    Omar Tarazi, Hilliard, for the Columbus Bar Association.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Applicant, Launica Elizabeth Jones, of Columbus, Ohio, is a 2017 graduate of Capital University Law School. She applied to register as a candidate for admission to the practice of law in Ohio in November 2014, and she later submitted applications to register as a candidate for the February and July 2017 bar exams. Although the admissions committee of the Columbus Bar Association ("CBA") approved Jones's character and fitness, the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness exercised its authority to investigate her applications sua sponte. See Gov.Bar R. I(10)(B)(2)(e).

{¶ 2} A panel of the board conducted a hearing on October 24, 2017, and found that Jones had violated the law school's honor code by cheating on a take-home exam and that she also engaged in a "pattern of deceit" throughout the school's investigation and ensuing character-and-fitness proceedings. The panel therefore recommended that we disapprove Jones's pending applications and that we permit her to reapply as a candidate for the February 2021 bar exam. The board adopted the panel's report and recommendation, and no objections have been filed.

{¶ 3} We adopt the board's findings of fact and disapprove Jones's pending applications. We will permit her to reapply as a candidate for the February 2021 or a later bar exam.

Findings and Recommendation of the Panel and Board

{¶ 4} Jones was enrolled in Capital's Summer Adoption Law Institute during 2016. The professor distributed a take-home exam on August 5th that was due on August 9th at 5:00 p.m. Although the exam was open book, its accompanying instructions stated that students were prohibited from "consult[ing] with any other individual" about the exam.

{¶ 5} Jones began working on the exam the morning it was due and exchanged text messages with another student in the course, LaKia Nikole Baldwin, as she worked. According to Jones, Baldwin asked her for information to answer one of the exam questions early in the day, and Jones provided it. Jones attempted to explain her conduct by claiming that the information she provided was in the course textbook-which Baldwin did not have. Then at approximately 4:30 p.m., Jones experienced computer problems and lost her exam answers. Jones testified that her computer "finally came back on" at about 4:40 p.m., and although she was able to quickly cobble together answers to 11 of the 14 essay questions, she did not have time to answer the three remaining questions and asked Baldwin for help. After using information provided by Baldwin to answer the remaining questions, Jones submitted her exam moments before the 5:00 p.m. deadline. Based on similarities between three answers submitted by Jones and Baldwin-including identical typographical errors-the law school commenced an honor-code investigation.

{¶ 6} Jones denied her misconduct when first confronted by the law school and throughout the school's investigation. She appealed the decision of the honor-code committee (which found that she and Baldwin had in fact cheated on the exam) and refused during the bar-admissions process to acknowledge her guilt until her character-and-fitness hearing. While Jones disclosed the existence of the honor-code proceeding on both of her bar-exam applications and in her December 2016 interview with the CBA admissions committee, she continued to maintain that she had not cheated on the exam. Indeed, the board noted that Jones admitted her wrongdoing only after it was suggested, during a prehearing telephone conference, that the board takes matters involving continued dishonesty very seriously.

{¶ 7} Based on findings that Jones twice cheated on the take-home exam and engaged in a pattern of deceit that spanned the school's investigation and most of the bar-admissions process, the board found that Jones failed to carry her burden of proving that she currently possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications to practice law in this state. The board therefore recommends that we disapprove Jones's pending applications and permit her to reapply as a candidate for the February 2021 bar exam.

Disposition

{¶ 8} An applicant to the Ohio bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she "possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law." Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(1). The applicant's record must justify "the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them." Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(3). "A record manifesting a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability of an applicant may constitute a basis for disapproval of the applicant." Id.

{¶ 9} Here, the board's findings demonstrate that Jones not only committed an honor-code violation during her final year of law school but also made false and deceptive statements throughout the school's investigation and the initial phases of the admissions process. See Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(3)(d), (h), and (i). Given the recency of that conduct, we agree that Jones has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she currently possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the bar.

{¶ 10} We disapprove Jones's pending applications, and in accord with the board's recommendation, we will permit her to reapply for the February 2021 or a later bar exam by filing new applications to register as a candidate for admission to the practice of law and to take the bar exam. Upon reapplication, she will be required to undergo a complete character-and-fitness investigation, including an investigation and report by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, and to demonstrate that she possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law in Ohio.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.


text:
    HARRAH'S OHIO ACQUISITION COMPANY, L.L.C., Appellee, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION et al., Appellees;
    Warrensville Heights City School District Board of Education, Appellant.
    No. 2016-0568
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted July 31, 2018 Decided October 30, 2018
    Paul M. Jones Jr., for appellee Harrah's Ohio Acquisition Company, L.L.C.
    Kolick & Kondzer, Thomas A. Kondzer, Westlake, and Joseph A. Volpe, for appellant.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is the third appeal before this court involving the real-property valuation of Thistledown, a "racino" in Cuyahoga County. In the first appeal, involving tax year 2010, we affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") valuing the real property at $13.8 million based on an appraisal submitted by the property owner.

Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 145 Ohio St.3d 115, 2016-Ohio-78, 47 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 24-26 (" Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. I "). We rejected the school board's argument that a July 2010 bankruptcy sale of the horse racetrack and related assets for $43 million established the true value of the real property, because the sale occurred at auction and was a forced sale under R.C. 5713.04. Id. at ¶ 21-23. In the second appeal, involving tax year 2012, we again rejected the 2010 sale price as evidence of the real property's value and again affirmed the BTA's appraisal-based valuation (this time at $16.3 million). Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 152 Ohio St.3d 277, 2017-Ohio-8845, 95 N.E.3d 359 (" Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. II ").

{¶ 2} This appeal involves tax year 2013. Unlike the two earlier cases, here, appellant, Warrensville Heights City School District Board of Education ("school board"), and appellee Harrah's Ohio Acquisition Company, L.L.C., Thistledown's owner, both submitted appraisal evidence. The BTA rejected the school board's appraisal and adopted that of Harrah's, valuing the property at $22 million. The school board appeals, asserting three propositions of law. Because the BTA committed legal error in assessing the school board's appraisal evidence, we vacate the BTA's decision and remand the cause to the BTA for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 3} Thistledown is a 128-acre horse-racing facility that includes a one-mile track, numerous barns and support structures, and an eight-story grandstand. Harrah's estimates that between the July 2010 sale date and the January 1, 2013 tax-lien date, it spent about $7 million improving the real property. A few months after the tax-lien date, Harrah's obtained a video-lottery-terminal ("VLT") license from the state of Ohio for $50 million. See Ohio Adm.Code 3770:2-11-01(B). "Thistledown Racino" began operating on the subject property in April 2013.

{¶ 4} The Cuyahoga County fiscal officer initially valued the subject property at $37,658,000. Harrah's asked the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision ("BOR") to decrease the valuation to $23,315,888-the sum of its expenditures for improvements to the real property and the property's tax-year-2012 valuation of $16.3 million. The school board asked the BOR to increase the total valuation to $43,000,000-the July 2010 sale price. The BOR retained the fiscal officer's original valuation, and both parties appealed to the BTA.

{¶ 5} At the BTA, the school board essentially abandoned its reliance on the July 2010 sale price in favor of the appraisal of Douglas F. Bovard, a certified appraiser. Bovard used the cost and income-capitalization approaches to value the subject property. He did not value the property under the sales-comparison approach.

{¶ 6} In Bovard's opinion, the best way to value the real property separately from the rest of the Thistledown enterprise is to assume that the property would be leased to a racino operator at market rent. He assumed that a typical lease in this market would call for percentage rent of a racino's "wagering handle." "Due to the scarcity of racetrack and casino leases," Bovard analyzed racetrack-property leases from 1986 to 1996 to estimate what those percentages would be. He concluded that market rent would be 1.5 percent of live on-track wagering handle, 0.5 percent of wagering handle from Thistledown races that are simulcast to other betting facilities, 0.5 percent of wagering handle for races simulcast to Thistledown, and 4 percent of net revenue from VLTs. Giving greater weight to this approach than to the cost approach, Bovard valued the property at $44.5 million as of January 1, 2013.

{¶ 7} For its part, Harrah's relied on an appraisal performed by certified appraiser David J. Sangree. Sangree used the income-capitalization, sales-comparison, and cost approaches to value the subject property. Like Bovard, Sangree concluded that the income-capitalization approach was most applicable. But unlike Bovard, Sangree did not value the property as if it were leased to a racino operator at market rent. Instead, his income-capitalization method valued the entire Thistledown enterprise as a going concern; then, to determine the value of just the real property, he deducted the value attributable to nonreal property. Using this approach, Sangree concluded that as of January 1, 2013, Thistledown had a going-concern value of about $107 million. From that, he deducted $50 million (the value of the VLT license), $30.7 million (the value of personal property), and about $4.5 million (to account for the fact that the racino did not open until April 2013). After reconciling his conclusions under the different valuation approaches, Sangree valued the property at $22 million as of January 1, 2013.

{¶ 8} At the BTA hearing, when asked whether determining "the lease value"-i.e., using an approach similar to Bovard's-would have been better, Sangree testified that he did not believe that casinos are commonly leased and that he was not aware of any current leases in Ohio involving a racino property. Three months after the BTA hearing, in an effort to rebut Sangree's statements, the school board filed a motion asking the BTA to take judicial notice that some casinos operate on leased real estate or in the alternative, to reopen the hearing to allow the school board to introduce evidence supporting that assertion. The BTA denied the motion.

{¶ 9} The BTA found the income-capitalization approach to be most appropriate and adopted Sangree's valuation of $22 million. In reaching its conclusion, the BTA emphasized the differences between the appraisers' income-capitalization methodologies. Noting that Bovard had hypothesized the terms under which a landlord might lease the subject property, the BTA concluded that he had determined a "leased fee value." BTA Nos. 2014-4596, 2014-4810, 2014-4818, and 2014-4896, 2016 WL 2907629, *6 (Mar. 17, 2016). This, the BTA concluded, " 'taint[ed] the validity of the entire report.' " Id. , quoting JGT Ents., Inc. v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Revision , BTA No. 00-A-890, 2002 Ohio Tax LEXIS 393, *7-8 (Mar. 8, 2002). Accordingly, the BTA stated that it "[would] not consider Mr. Bovard's conclusions to value under his leased fee analysis." Id. In contrast, the BTA explained, Sangree had provided "a fee simple opinion of value" and valued the property "as it existed"-i.e., as owner-occupied. Id. at *7.

{¶ 10} The school board has appealed to this court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Appraisal evidence

{¶ 11} As its first proposition of law, the school board argues that Sangree's appraisal contains several flaws and that Bovard's appraisal is legally sound and more reliable. We must affirm the BTA's decision if it is reasonable and lawful. R.C. 5717.04. Thus, if the BTA committed legal error in assessing the appraisals, we will not affirm its decision. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision , 145 Ohio St.3d 375, 2016-Ohio-372, 49 N.E.3d 1266, ¶ 15. We review legal issues de novo but defer to the BTA's findings concerning the weight of the evidence if there is support in the record. Lunn v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision , 149 Ohio St.3d 137, 2016-Ohio-8075, 73 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 13.

1. Sangree's appraisal

{¶ 12} The school board argues both that Sangree's appraisal is contrary to Ohio law and that it is unsupported by the facts. Its legal arguments focus on the downward adjustments that Sangree made based on the value of racing and VLT licenses. Factually, the school board contends that Sangree relied on misleading, erroneous, and unsupported data.

a. Downward adjustments of comparable-sale prices

{¶ 13} In his sales-comparison analysis, Sangree reduced the real-property values of his comparable sales by allocating 50 to 60 percent of the comparable-sale prices to the value of racing and potential VLT licenses associated with the properties. Focusing on the nontransferability of the licenses and relying on Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 128 Ohio St.3d 565, 2011-Ohio-2258, 949 N.E.2d 1, the school board argues that these adjustments are contrary to Ohio law.

{¶ 14} Hilliard City Schools involved the sale of a hotel as a going concern and the buyer's attempt to allocate $500,000 of the sale price to goodwill purportedly associated with the hotel franchise. The BTA had rejected the goodwill allocation, and in affirming the BTA's decision, we held that the buyer had not proved the propriety of the allocation, id. at ¶ 29-33. We noted that the franchise was not transferrable (and thus was not conveyed through the asset-purchase agreement), id. at ¶ 30, that the buyer's evidence did not prove that the allocation of $500,000 to goodwill was correct, id. at ¶ 31-32, and that given the nature of the business at issue-generating revenue from renting space-the buyer had not shown that any goodwill existed as an asset separate from the real property, id. at ¶ 33, citing St. Bernard Self-Storage, L.L.C. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision , 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, ¶ 24-25.

{¶ 15} The school board focuses on the first factor addressed in Hilliard City Schools -the nontransferability of the franchise-and analogizes the hotel buyer's attempt to allocate goodwill to Sangree's adjustment for the value of the licenses. But the school board misapprehends Hilliard City Schools . Significantly, the buyer in Hilliard City Schools allocated $500,000 to "goodwill" generally, not specifically to the franchise. Id. at ¶ 29-32. That allocation was improper because the buyer had not proved that goodwill existed as a separate intangible asset. The failure to prove the asset's existence necessarily foreclosed the conclusion that it had been transferred as part of the sale.

{¶ 16} Contrary to the school board's argument, Hilliard City Schools does not foreclose, as a matter of law, Sangree's view that racing and VLT licenses-or more precisely, the opportunity to acquire such licenses-are separate intangible assets. Sangree recognized that by purchasing the horse racetracks that were the subjects of his comparable sales, the buyers had acquired not just real estate but also the opportunity to obtain racing licenses from the state of Ohio. See R.C. 3769.04. The racing licenses, in turn, created an opportunity to obtain VLT licenses. See Ohio Adm.Code 3770:2-2-01(R) and 3770:2-3-01(A)(11). In its brief, the school board itself acknowledges that "the possibility of obtaining a future VLT license from the State of Ohio was critically important to Harrah's." Sangree simply placed value on an intangible asset-the opportunity to acquire valuable licenses.

{¶ 17} In Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. I , regarding an earlier appraisal, we referred to Sangree's attribution of value to Harrah's "hope of operating VLTs at the racetrack." 145 Ohio St.3d 115, 2016-Ohio-78, 47 N.E.3d 144, at ¶ 12, 25. Although we did not fully endorse Sangree's view, we concluded that the BTA had reasonably and lawfully relied on his appraisal. Id. at ¶ 25-26. Sangree's approach is similar in this case: at the BTA hearing, he stated, "For each of these sales the buyers of these properties were not just buying the real estate. They were buying an operating racetrack and they were hoping to get the racino license." As in Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. I , the school board has not shown that it was contrary to law for Sangree to attribute separate value to a property owner's opportunity to acquire racing and VLT licenses.

b. Deduction for value of VLT license

{¶ 18} In his income-capitalization analysis, Sangree deducted $50 million from the market value of the going concern, representing the value of the VLT license. The school board argues that this adjustment also is contrary to Ohio law.

{¶ 19} The school board first contends that the VLT license is indistinct from the real estate and therefore cannot be valued separately. Here, the school board compares a VLT license to zoning laws that rather than create separate personal property, expand the permissible use of real estate. We reject this argument because there are material differences between a government's exercise of the police power through zoning and its exercise of the police power through licensing.

{¶ 20} Zoning laws restrict land use. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365, 386-387, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) ; Black's Law Dictionary 1856 (10th Ed.2014) (defining "zoning" as the "legislative division of a region, esp. a municipality, into separate districts with different regulations within the districts for land use, building size, and the like"). They do not target the conduct of individuals but apply generally to the real property in a class. Union Oil Co. of California, Pure Oil Div. v. Brook Park , 26 Ohio App.2d 153, 158, 269 N.E.2d 853 (8th Dist.1971) ("Zoning ordinances must be related to the general welfare of the public and cannot be used to control the business conduct of individual members of the public at large"). In contrast, licenses authorize persons to engage in otherwise unlawful conduct. State v. Hipp , 38 Ohio St. 199, 226 (1882) ; Black's Law Dictionary at 1059 (defining "license" as a "privilege granted by a state or city upon the payment of a fee, the recipient of the privilege then being authorized to do some act or series of acts that would otherwise be impermissible"). Thus, VLT licensing depends on the licensee's qualifications, not just the location of the activity. See Ohio Adm.Code 3770:2-3-01(A) (incorporating licensing requirements for lottery-sales agents under R.C. 3770.05 and Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 3770-2). That the state imposes territorial restrictions on the conduct of VLT licensees does not make the license itself a part of the real property on which the licensees operate.

{¶ 21} The school board similarly argues that the VLT license cannot be valued separately because the license cannot be transferred or retained apart from the real estate. Here, the school board relies on St. Bernard Self-Storage , 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, a case in which we rejected a property owner's attempt to sever goodwill from the value of real estate.

{¶ 22} St. Bernard Self-Storage does not support the school board's argument. The nonreal-property asset at issue in St. Bernard Self-Storage was goodwill-i.e., "business value." Id. at ¶ 23-25. We concluded that the BTA had "correctly found no evidence in the record to support the existence of a business value that could actually be severed from the real estate and be transferred or retained separately." Id. at ¶ 25. In reaching that conclusion, we focused on the nature of the property owner's business-a self-storage facility. Id. at ¶ 24. Because the property owner's business was to lease the real estate, its revenue necessarily represented the value of real property. Id. In other words, the nature of the business foreclosed the idea of goodwill as a separate asset.

{¶ 23} From our conclusion in St. Bernard Self-Storage the school board extrapolates that no asset can exist apart from real property unless it can be freely transferred apart from real estate. But the school board provides no support for such a broad rule. Indeed, the school board fails to realize that the nontransferability of the VLT license cuts both ways: if the license cannot be transferred with the real property, it must not be part of the real property.

{¶ 24} For purposes of Sangree's income-capitalization analysis, the pertinent question is whether the VLT license is nonreal property that has value as part of Thistledown's going concern. On that question, in the public-utilities context, this court has recognized that a nontransferable license can be a valuable asset to the current holder of the license. See Harold D. Miller, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. , 10 Ohio St.2d 53, 225 N.E.2d 269 (1967) ("if such right or license cannot be transferred, it can have no value except to its holder while he has it " [emphasis added] ). Thus, the school board has not shown that a VLT license cannot have distinct value merely because Harrah's cannot transfer it. It follows that Sangree's deduction for the value of the VLT license was not contrary to law.

c. Soundness of Sangree's methods and underlying data

{¶ 25} The school board also attacks the "reliability and credibility" of Sangree's report. In general, the school board alleges that Sangree failed to verify certain facts or support his valuation with reliable evidence. These arguments address "matters that are among those consigned to the expertise of the appraiser and to the board of revision and the BTA as fact-finders." Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 147 Ohio St.3d 38, 2016-Ohio-3025, 59 N.E.3d 1270, ¶ 19. We reject the school board's invitation to interfere with the BTA's discretion in assessing these details of Sangree's appraisal.

2. Bovard's appraisal

{¶ 26} Although the subject property is owner-occupied, Bovard appraised it as if it were generating income under a hypothetical lease, under what he believes would be current market rates. Finding that owner-occupied property cannot be valued this way, the BTA declined to consider Bovard's appraisal. The BTA found that Bovard's methodology represented a leased-fee valuation that " 'taint[ed] the validity of the entire report.' " 2016 WL 2907629 at *6, quoting JGT Ents., Inc. , 2002 Ohio Tax LEXIS 393, at *7-8. Continuing, the BTA stated that "by performing a leased fee appraisal analysis of the owner occupied subject, Mr. Bovard has overstated the total value of the subject property; accordingly, we will not consider Mr. Bovard's conclusions to value under his leased fee analysis." Id.

{¶ 27} The BTA's refusal to consider Bovard's appraisal was legal error. We addressed the propriety of appraising owner-occupied property as if it were leased in Meijer Stores Ltd. Partnership v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 122 Ohio St.3d 447, 2009-Ohio-3479, 912 N.E.2d 560, ¶ 21-23. After recognizing that a property owner may be able to realize the value of its property by encumbering it with a lease, we concluded that an appraiser may take that possibility into account when valuing it. Id. at ¶ 23 ; see also Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Williams , 697 N.E.2d 164, 166-167, 91 N.Y.2d 639, 674 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1998) (approving the same approach in the valuation of a horse-racing facility). Appraising property in this way is consistent with R.C. 5713.03's directive to determine "the true value of the fee simple estate, as if unencumbered," so long as the appraisal assumes a lease that reflects the relevant real-estate market. See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 441 (14th Ed.2013) ("When the fee simple interest is valued, the presumption is that the property is available to be leased at market rates"); Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-07(D)(2) (authorizing use of income-capitalization approach in valuing real estate). Although the BTA ultimately may disagree with Bovard's factual assumptions about the lease terms, his methodology was not defective as a matter of law, and the BTA should have considered it.

{¶ 28} Aside from this legal issue, both parties devote significant parts of their briefs to the perceived strengths and weaknesses of Bovard's appraisal. For example, the school board contends that Bovard's report was reliable and well supported, while Harrah's argues that Bovard's approach is fraught with speculation. Harrah's also contends that Bovard is not a qualified expert. These are the types of questions that the BTA should have determined below. Because the BTA did not consider those questions or weigh Bovard's appraisal against the other evidence in any meaningful way, we vacate the BTA's decision and remand the case for the BTA to fully consider and address the evidence.

B. Judicial notice

{¶ 29} As its second proposition of law, the school board argues that the BTA erred by not taking judicial notice that some casinos operate on leased real estate or in the alternative, by not reopening the hearing to allow for the introduction of evidence supporting that assertion. In support of its factual claim, the school board attached to its motion four documents: (1) a 2012 lease agreement between CBAC Gaming, L.L.C., and the city of Baltimore, Maryland, (2) the minutes of a governmental board meeting at which that lease was discussed, (3) a five-year financial plan for the city of Chester, Pennsylvania, that describes a "land lease" for a racetrack and casino, and (4) a news article that refers to the Chester lease agreement. The school board contends that its motion for judicial notice, which it filed three months after the BTA hearing, was necessary to rebut Sangree's statements at the hearing that he did not believe that casinos are commonly leased and that he was not aware of any current leases involving a racino property.

{¶ 30} Evid.R. 201(B) allows an adjudicative fact to be judicially noticed if the fact is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." The school board seems to invoke the second part of this rule, claiming that the documents it attached to its judicial-notice motion come from reliable sources-namely, governmental websites and the news publication's website.

{¶ 31} The school board's argument is unpersuasive. The general rule is that "new evidence may not be submitted after a hearing." Emerson Network Power Energy Sys., N. Am., Inc. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision , 149 Ohio St.3d 369, 2016-Ohio-8392, 75 N.E.3d 178, ¶ 20. Although judicial notice of a fact "may be taken at any stage of the proceeding," Evid.R. 201(F), it is not "an exception to the rule that evidence must be timely offered in a judicial proceeding," AP Hotels of Illinois, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 118 Ohio St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 N.E.2d 115, ¶ 8, fn. 1. The school board attempted to rely on Evid.R. 201 three months after the hearing closed. Because Evid.R. 201 does not override the general rule that requires parties to present their evidence before the hearing record closes, we hold that the BTA's decision denying the school board's motion for judicial notice was reasonable and lawful.

{¶ 32} Contrary to the school board's argument, this case does not present circumstances similar to those in Emerson Network Power , a case in which we recognized an exception to the general rule that a party may not submit new evidence after a hearing. In Emerson Network Power , the property owner had presented a draft purchase agreement for a sale of the property at issue. When the transaction closed several weeks after the hearing, the property owner filed a brief attaching copies of the deed and conveyance-fee statement. We held that under the "peculiarities of the case," the property owner could supplement the record with evidence of the completed sale. Id. at ¶ 2, 21. Emerson Network Power does not help the school board here, because its new evidence existed at the time of the hearing. The school board has not shown that it was prevented from timely presenting the evidence. For this reason, the BTA correctly denied the school board's request for judicial notice and reasonably and lawfully denied its alternative request to reopen the evidentiary hearing.

C. The sale as evidence of value

{¶ 33} As its third proposition of law, the school board argues that even if the July 2010 sale was a distressed sale under R.C. 5713.04, the $43 million sale price is relevant evidence of the property's minimum value. The school board made essentially the same argument as its second proposition of law in Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. II , 152 Ohio St.3d 277, 2017-Ohio-8845, 95 N.E.3d 359. As in the prior case, the school board has not shown that a non-arm's-length sale has evidentiary value. See id. at ¶ 11-12. We therefore reject the school board's third proposition of law.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 34} For the reasons stated above, we vacate the BTA's decision and remand the case for the BTA to fully consider and address the evidence in the existing record.

Decision vacated and cause remanded.

O'Connor, C.J., and French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

O'Donnell and Kennedy, JJ., dissent.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CLARK.
    No. 2018-0808
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted June 26, 2018 Decided November 8, 2018
    Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
    Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and Larry H. James, Columbus, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, John David Clark, of Canton, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0068809, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1997. In December 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged him with improperly notarizing client signatures on multiple legal documents. The Board of Professional Conduct considered the case on the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement. See Gov.Bar R. V(16).

{¶ 2} In the agreement, the parties stipulated that in 2014, Clark's law firm conducted an unrelated review of his client files. During that review, the law firm discovered that over a seven-year period, Clark had engaged in at least eight incidents of false notarization and/or backdating of clients' legal documents. The following three incidents are representative examples of Clark's misconduct.

{¶ 3} In 2006, Clark witnessed his clients sign a general warranty deed and then notarized their signatures. However, he dated the document for five days in the future to coincide with the property's transfer date. He therefore falsely attested to the date that his clients had signed the document and acknowledged their signatures before him. In 2012, Clark e-mailed various documents to clients with instructions to sign and return them. His e-mail also stated, "[D]o not worry about the Notary Public." After the clients returned the documents, Clark notarized their signatures and thereby falsely represented that the documents had been personally acknowledged before him. In 2013, two of Clark's clients signed various trust-related documents in his presence, and he signed the documents as a witness. But Clark then backdated the documents and notarized the signatures on one of the documents using the same false date. He therefore falsely attested to the date that his clients had appeared before him to sign the documents.

{¶ 4} The parties' consent-to-discipline agreement identified five additional incidents of false notarization. After the law firm discovered Clark's misconduct, he resigned from the firm and self-reported his actions to relator. The parties also stipulated that Clark had expressed sincere remorse for his actions and apologized to his former clients, that he had not received any additional fees as a result of his misconduct, and that he believed he had engaged in the conduct for his clients' convenience.

{¶ 5} The parties stipulated that Clark violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and DR 1-102(A)(5) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). In addition, the parties agreed that as aggravating factors, Clark engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed multiple offenses. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3) and (4). Stipulated mitigating factors included the absence of prior discipline, full and free disclosures to the board and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and a reputation for good character. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (5). As a sanction, the parties jointly recommend that we impose a conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

{¶ 6} The board found that the consent-to-discipline agreement conforms to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(16) and recommends that we adopt the agreement in its entirety. In support of the recommended sanction, the board cited Disciplinary Counsel v. Roberts , 117 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-Ohio-505, 881 N.E.2d 1236, and Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Trivers , 123 Ohio St.3d 436, 2009-Ohio-5285, 917 N.E.2d 261.

{¶ 7} In Roberts , an attorney signed a settlement release for two married clients without their authority, notarized the clients' purported signatures, and asked his assistant to sign the release as a witness. In addition, the attorney changed the dates on a document previously executed by the husband and then notarized the husband's signature, although the attorney had not witnessed the husband sign the document. We noted that "[w]hen a lawyer notarizes a signature knowing that it is forged, and especially when the lawyer commits the forgery, an actual suspension is warranted." Id. at ¶ 15. However, "[f]ailing to properly notarize a document * * * may warrant a lesser sanction depending on the presence of mitigating factors," and "[a] public reprimand will issue if the lawyer does nothing improper in addition to notarizing a signature affixed outside the lawyer's presence." Id. at ¶ 17. Although the attorney in Roberts signed his clients' names without their authority and dishonored his notary jurat three times, we concluded that in consideration of the relevant mitigating factors-including the attorney's clean disciplinary record, remorse, good character, cooperation in the disciplinary process, and "good, albeit misguided, intentions" to help his clients-a conditionally stayed six-month suspension was the appropriate sanction. Id. at ¶ 18-20.

{¶ 8} In Trivers , an attorney notarized the signatures on nine documents related to several property transfers, although he had not personally witnessed any of the signatures. In addition, the attorney later participated in a meeting in which a power of attorney was fraudulently created to cover up his misconduct. We concluded that his multiple acts of fraud distinguished the case from those in which we had imposed public reprimands or fully stayed suspensions for isolated instances of notary abuse. We therefore suspended the attorney for one year, with six months conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶ 9} Here, there is no allegation that Clark notarized a forged signature or that he forged his clients' signatures. The board, however, found that because he engaged in eight instances of improper notarizations over a seven-year period, a more severe sanction than a public reprimand was warranted. The board also distinguished Clark's conduct from that of the attorney in Trivers , who participated in an effort to cover up his notary abuse and failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. Accordingly, the board recommends that we impose the same sanction as we imposed in Roberts -a conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

{¶ 10} Upon our review of the record, we agree that Clark engaged in the stipulated misconduct and that a stayed six-month suspension is appropriate. As we stated in Roberts , "authenticating a document through notarization is not a trifle" and an attorney owes "clients, the public, and the judicial system a duty to conscientiously observe his duties as a notary public." 117 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-Ohio-505, 881 N.E.2d 1236, at ¶ 14.

{¶ 11} John David Clark is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. If Clark fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the entire six-month suspension. Costs are taxed to Clark.

Judgment accordingly.

O'Connor, C.J., and O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

      Because two of the incidents occurred before February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, relator charged Clark under both the former Code of Professional Responsibility and the current Rules of Professional Conduct.


text:
    CHAGRIN REALTY, INC., Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. TESTA, Tax Commr., Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
    No. 2017-0469
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted September 25, 2018 Decided November 30, 2018.
    Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., Terry Vincent, and Anastasia J. Wade, Cleveland, for appellant and cross-appellee.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sophia Hussain and Barton Hubbard, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee and cross-appellant.
   Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In this case, appellant and cross-appellee, property owner Chagrin Realty, Inc., challenges a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") affirming appellee and cross-appellant tax commissioner's denial of a charitable-use property-tax exemption for the subject property. The BTA found that Chagrin Realty did not qualify for that exemption under R.C. 5709.12 or 5709.121, because Chagrin Realty's sole purpose is to own and lease the subject property. We affirm the decision of the BTA.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Chagrin Realty is an Ohio nonprofit corporation exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(2) (granting exemption to "[c]orporations organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the entire amount thereof, less expenses, to an organization which itself is exempt under this section"). Chagrin Realty leases the property at issue to a single nonprofit tenant, the Community Dialysis Center ("CDC"). The CDC operates a hemodialysis facility on the property and is the sole member of the Leonard C. Rosenberg Foundation ("Foundation"). The Foundation enjoys section 501(c)(3) status and is the sole member of Chagrin Realty. See 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (granting federal-income-tax exemption to "[c]orporations * * * organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes").

{¶ 3} The Centers for Dialysis Care, Inc., is a for-profit management company that contracts with the CDC and employs all personnel who work for the CDC. The CDC wholly owns this for-profit management company.

{¶ 4} Chagrin Realty disburses the rental income from the property lease, less expenses, to the Foundation; the monthly base rental payment is approximately $24,959.52, which equals $299,514.24 annually.

{¶ 5} Chagrin Realty filed an application for real-property-tax exemption relating to the subject property for tax years 2003, 2004, and 2005. The tax commissioner determined that Chagrin Realty did not satisfy the requirements for exemption under R.C. 5709.12 or 5709.121 and denied the application. Chagrin Realty appealed to the BTA.

{¶ 6} The BTA rejected Chagrin Realty's contention that its 501(c)(2) federal tax status and its reliance on vicarious-exemption theories qualified it as a "charitable" institution. Because Chagrin Realty's use of the property consisted of only leasing it, the BTA determined that Chagrin Realty did not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 5709.12 or 5709.121 and affirmed the tax commissioner's final determination denying the exemption.

{¶ 7} The BTA issued its decision in April 2014. Nearly three years later, in March 2017, Chagrin Realty filed a motion asking the BTA to reissue its April 2014 decision, alleging that its counsel had recently discovered that the BTA had sent its decision to Chagrin Realty at an incorrect address. The BTA granted the motion.

{¶ 8} Chagrin Realty appealed to this court from the reissued decision. The tax commissioner cross-appealed, challenging the BTA's authority to reissue its decision. On July 24, 2017, we ordered Chagrin Realty to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed on those grounds. See 150 Ohio St.3d 1402, 2017-Ohio-6912, 78 N.E.3d 904. On November 1, 2017, we determined that Chagrin Realty had shown cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. 151 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2017-Ohio-8371, 84 N.E.3d 1061. Thus, we have already resolved the jurisdictional issue raised in the tax commissioner's cross-appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 9} The central issue before us is whether Chagrin Realty qualifies for the charitable-use property-tax exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B) and 5709.121(A) because it is a 501(c)(2) organization that holds and leases property and distributes the lease proceeds to a separate corporation that itself is exempt from federal taxation.

{¶ 10} On appeal, we must determine whether the BTA's decision is both "reasonable and lawful." R.C. 5717.04. We defer to the BTA's factual findings "if they are supported by reliable and probative evidence, and we afford deference to the BTA's determination of the credibility of witnesses and its weighing of evidence subject only to an abuse-of-discretion review on appeal." HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa , 132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, 969 N.E.2d 232, ¶ 10 ; see also Rural Health Collaborative of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Testa , 145 Ohio St.3d 430, 2016-Ohio-508, 50 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 24, citing Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Levin , 127 Ohio St.3d 215, 2010-Ohio-5071, 938 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 31-35 (affirming BTA's determination of property owner's charitable status after concluding that that determination was "reasonable and lawful"). But we "will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion." Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino , 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789 (2001).

A. The scope of the charitable-use exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B) and 5709.121(A)

{¶ 11} R.C. 5709.12(B) provides that "[r]eal and tangible personal property belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation." Under R.C. 5709.12(B), any institution, whether charitable or not, "may qualify for a tax exemption if it is making exclusive charitable use of its property." Cincinnati Community Kollel v. Testa , 135 Ohio St.3d 219, 2013-Ohio-396, 985 N.E.2d 1236, ¶ 23.

{¶ 12} R.C. 5709.121(A) expands the meaning of R.C. 5709.12(B)'s phrase "used exclusively for charitable purposes" to include situations in which property ownership and property use do not coincide. ShadoArt Prods., Inc. v. Testa , 146 Ohio St.3d 263, 2016-Ohio-511, 55 N.E.3d 1065, ¶ 36. R.C. 5709.121(A) provides that "[r]eal property and tangible personal property belonging to a charitable or educational institution * * * shall be considered as used exclusively for charitable or public purposes * * * if it meets" one of the requirements specified by that statute. Thus, although R.C. 5709.121(A) itself does not create any exemption, ShadoArt Prods. at ¶ 41, it links certain property uses to R.C. 5709.12(B)'s exclusive-charitable-use exemption, id. at ¶ 36.

{¶ 13} "Special treatment under R.C. 5709.121 depends on the owner's qualifying as a 'charitable or educational' institution." Dialysis Clinic , 127 Ohio St.3d 215, 2010-Ohio-5071, 938 N.E.2d 329, at ¶ 22. To determine whether a property owner qualifies as a charitable institution, we must examine the owner's " 'core activity.' " Rural Health , 145 Ohio St.3d 430, 2016-Ohio-508, 50 N.E.3d 486, at ¶ 23, quoting Dialysis Clinic at ¶ 30. And the activity we review must relate to the property owner's actions; an owner cannot establish its status as a charitable institution by relying on the activities of a lessee or another related institution. Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. v. Levin , 121 Ohio St.3d 292, 2009-Ohio-583, 903 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 11 ; see also First Baptist Church of Milford, Inc. v. Wilkins , 110 Ohio St.3d 496, 2006-Ohio-4966, 854 N.E.2d 494, ¶ 15.

{¶ 14} Because Chagrin Realty admits that its sole use of the property is leasing it and leasing has not been found to constitute a use that is "exclusively for charitable purposes," the property does not qualify for exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B). See Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. at ¶ 11, 14-15. Thus, Chagrin Realty must qualify for the charitable-use exemption, if at all, under R.C. 5709.121(A). See Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. at ¶ 11, 14-15 ; First Baptist Church of Milford at ¶ 15-16 ; Community Health Professionals, Inc. v. Levin , 113 Ohio St.3d 432, 2007-Ohio-2336, 866 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 17-18.

B. The BTA reasonably and lawfully found that Chagrin Realty is not a charitable institution

{¶ 15} As its sole proposition of law, Chagrin Realty argues that the BTA erred in finding that it is not a charitable institution under R.C. 5709.12 and 5709.121. Chagrin Realty emphasizes that it was organized for the sole purpose of holding title to property and collecting rental income for the benefit of the Foundation, without a view toward profit. Chagrin Realty urges us to put substance over form and focus on its relationship with its parent (the Foundation) and the support that it provides to the Foundation.

1. We must examine Chagrin Realty's "core activities"

{¶ 16} "The determination whether a property owner qualifies as a charitable institution under R.C. 5709.121 requires examination of the 'core activity' of the institution and determining whether that activity qualifies as charitable for property-tax purposes." Rural Health , 145 Ohio St.3d 430, 2016-Ohio-508, 50 N.E.3d 486, at ¶ 23, quoting Dialysis Clinic , 127 Ohio St.3d 215, 2010-Ohio-5071, 938 N.E.2d 329, at ¶ 30. Chagrin Realty argues that its activities should be viewed in conjunction with the activities of the Foundation, because Chagrin Realty was organized for the sole purpose of holding title to property and collecting rental income for the benefit of the Foundation.

{¶ 17} Under the caselaw we discussed above, Chagrin Realty cannot establish its charitable status by relying on the activities of related entities. See also OCLC Online Computer Library Ctr., Inc. v. Kinney , 11 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 464 N.E.2d 572 (1984). The BTA acknowledged the close relationships among Chagrin Realty, the CDC, and the Foundation but found that Chagrin Realty is itself a separate legal entity and that Chagrin Realty may not rely on vicarious exemption to establish its charitable status. See Agley v. Tracy , 87 Ohio St.3d 265, 268, 719 N.E.2d 951 (1999) ("A corporation is an entity separate and apart from the individuals who compose it; it is a legal fiction for the purpose of doing business [emphasis sic]"); Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. , 121 Ohio St.3d 292, 2009-Ohio-583, 903 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 14. The BTA acted both reasonably and lawfully in determining that Chagrin Realty did not qualify for the charitable-use exemption "based on its own activities and use of the property," BTA No. 2011-2523, 2014 WL 2708168, *2 (Apr. 29, 2014).

{¶ 18} Chagrin Realty also argues that its income-producing lease, the proceeds of which inure to the benefit of the Foundation, supports its claimed charitable status. But this fact does not establish Chagrin Realty's status as a charitable institution because " '[i]t is only the use of property in charitable pursuits that qualifies for tax exemption, not the utilization of receipts or proceeds that does so' " (emphasis added), Dialysis Clinic at ¶ 33, quoting Hubbard Press v. Tracy , 67 Ohio St.3d 564, 566, 621 N.E.2d 396 (1993) ; see also Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. at ¶ 16.

{¶ 19} In this regard, Chagrin Realty's reliance on Akron Golf Charities, Inc. v. Limbach , 34 Ohio St.3d 11, 516 N.E.2d 222 (1987), is misplaced. Akron Golf Charities involved a claim of sales-and-use-tax exemption under former R.C. 5739.02(B)(12) and did not involve a claim of real-property-tax exemption as in the instant appeal. Further, the sole purpose of Akron Golf Charities was to raise funds for local charitable organizations by staging golf tournaments. By contrast, Chagrin Realty engages in the ongoing business activity of leasing real property, an activity that generates substantial revenue and has not been found in other cases to be charitable in nature. See Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. at ¶ 14, 16-17 ; Dialysis Clinic , 127 Ohio St.3d 215, 2010-Ohio-5071, 938 N.E.2d 329, at ¶ 33.

{¶ 20} Chagrin Realty also relies on Rural Health , 145 Ohio St.3d 430, 2016-Ohio-508, 50 N.E.3d 486, as support for its claimed status as a charitable institution. However, that case is materially distinguishable.

{¶ 21} In Rural Health , the property owner was engaged in a range of charitable activities, such as obtaining grants for tobacco cessation and pregnancy care and education, in addition to the ownership and leasing of a dialysis clinic. Id. at ¶ 25, 28. In contrast, the record here contains no indication that Chagrin Realty engaged in other activities; rather, Chagrin Realty admits that its "only purpose is to own property, collect income from the property, and distribute that income to the Foundation." Therefore, Chagrin Realty's reliance on Rural Health is unpersuasive.

2. Chagrin Realty's status as a 501(c)(2) organization does not qualify it as a charitable institution under R.C. 5709.121

{¶ 22} Chagrin Realty also contends that it is a charitable institution based on limitations imposed on it as a 501(c)(2) organization. Relying on our precedents, the BTA reasonably and lawfully rejected this argument. Our precedents predicate entitlement to the charitable-use exemption on providing services "on a nonprofit basis to those in need, without regard to race, creed, or ability to pay. " (Emphasis added.) Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Levin , 124 Ohio St.3d 36, 2009-Ohio-5939, 918 N.E.2d 981, ¶ 19, citing Vick v. Cleveland Mem. Med. Found. , 2 Ohio St.2d 30, 206 N.E.2d 2 (1965), paragraph two of the syllabus. Federal tax laws, in contrast, provide for a charitable-use exemption on a less restrictive basis. Dialysis Clinic , 127 Ohio St.3d 215, 2010-Ohio-5071, 938 N.E.2d 329, at ¶ 26, quoting M. Hall & J. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption , 66 Wash.L.Rev. 307, 320-321 (1991), quoting Rev.Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (the Internal Revenue Service " 'abandoned the charity care requirement' " and " 'adopted a "per se" rule' " that " 'an entity engaged in the "promotion of health" for the general benefit of the community is pursuing a charitable purpose, even though a portion of the community, such as indigents, are [sic] excluded from participation ' " [emphasis added in Dialysis Clinic ] ).

{¶ 23} Chagrin Realty's reliance on its 501(c)(2) federal status in support of its claimed charitable status is unavailing because it conflates Ohio's property-tax exemption with inapplicable federal standards for tax-exempt charities. Indeed, we have specifically rejected "a reading of R.C. 5709.121 that essentially substitutes [the] more lenient federal-law standards for the well-developed Ohio law of charitable use." Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 24} Moreover, we are not persuaded by Chagrin Realty's references to out-of-state decisions analyzing other states' tax-exemption statutes and allowing exemption under those statutes based on an entity's federal-tax-exemption status and that entity's relationship to its parent corporation. As we have stated, " 'tying charitable use so tightly to Congress's policy goals is wrong because Congress does not define the scope of charitable use under Ohio law.' " Id. at ¶ 25, quoting NBC-USA Hous., Inc.-Five v. Levin , 125 Ohio St.3d 394, 2010-Ohio-1553, 928 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 20.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 25} Chagrin Realty's expansive construction of the charitable-use exemption is inconsistent with our precedents interpreting R.C. 5709.121(A). Because the BTA's factual findings are supported by the record in this case, they merit our deference. See HealthSouth Corp. , 132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, 969 N.E.2d 232, at ¶ 10. Accordingly, we reject Chagrin Realty's sole proposition of law and affirm the decision of the BTA.

Decision affirmed.

O'Connor, C.J., and French, Fischer, and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.

O'Donnell, Kennedy, and DeWine, JJ., concur in judgment only.


text:
    IN RE Resignation of CHUPARKOFF.
    No. 2018-1135
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    Submitted August 9, 2018 Decided September 20, 2018
    {¶ 1} Mark Andrew Chuparkoff, Attorney Registration No. 0071982, last known business address in Akron, Ohio, who was admitted to the bar of this state on May 22, 2000, submitted an application for retirement or resignation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11). The application was referred to disciplinary counsel pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B). On August 9, 2018, the Office of Attorney Services filed disciplinary counsel's report, under seal, with this court in accordance with Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(B)(2).
    {¶ 2} On consideration thereof, it is ordered by the court that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C), the resignation as an attorney and counselor at law is accepted as a resignation with disciplinary action pending.
    {¶ 3} It is further ordered and adjudged that from and after this date all rights and privileges extended to respondent to practice law in the state of Ohio be withdrawn, that henceforth respondent shall cease to hold himself forth as an attorney authorized to appear in the courts of this state, and that respondent shall not attempt, either directly or indirectly, to render services as an attorney or counselor at law to or for any individuals, corporation, or society, or in any way perform or seek to perform services for anyone, no matter how constituted, that must by law be executed by a duly appointed and qualified attorney within the state of Ohio.
    {¶ 4} It is further ordered that respondent desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent or clerk or employee of another, and hereby is forbidden to appear in the state of Ohio as an attorney and counselor at law before any court, judge, board, commission, or other public authority, and hereby is forbidden to give another an opinion as to the law or its application or advise with relation thereto.
    {¶ 5} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent shall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(C). If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(23), respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(23)(A)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any client trust funds or property.
    {¶ 6} It is further ordered that respondent shall not enter into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with an attorney or law firm with which respondent was associated as a partner, shareholder, member, or employee at the time respondent engaged in the misconduct that resulted in this acceptance of respondent's resignation with discipline pending.
    {¶ 7} It is further ordered that respondent shall surrender respondent's certificate of admission to practice to the clerk of the court on or before 30 days from the date of this order and that respondent's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys maintained by this court.
    {¶ 8} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against respondent by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered by the court that if after the date of this order the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection awards any amount against respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection within 90 days of the notice of that award.
    {¶ 9} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall do the following:
    {¶ 10} 1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of respondent's resignation and consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal services elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in respondent's place;
    {¶ 11} 2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;
    {¶ 12} 3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or property in the possession or control of respondent;
    {¶ 13} 4. Notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties in pending litigation of respondent's disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;
   {¶ 14} 5. Send all notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;

{¶ 15} 6. File with the clerk of this court and disciplinary counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of the notices required herein, and setting forth the address where respondent may receive communications; and

{¶ 16} 7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.

{¶ 17} It is further ordered that until such time as respondent fully complies with this order, respondent shall keep the clerk and disciplinary counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.

{¶ 18} It is further ordered that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings. All case documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47, which govern access to court records.

{¶ 19} It is further ordered that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order and all other orders in this case to respondent's last known address.

{¶ 20} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).

O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

O'Donnell and DeGenaro, JJ., dissent.


author: O'Donnell, J., dissents.

text:
    IN RE M.W.
    2018-1404
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. TAYLOR
    2018-0797
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   Sua sponte, cause no longer held for the decisions in State v. Dunson, case No. 2017-0186, and State v. Braden, case Nos. 2017-1579 and 2017-1609, and stay of briefing schedule lifted. The clerk shall issue an order for the transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, and the parties shall brief this case in accordance with the rules of practice of this court.


author: DeGenaro, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE v. BROWNLEE
    2018-1558
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., dissent.

DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. SNUGGS
    2018-1581
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. ERVIN
    2018-1388
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. HOLDER
    2018-1206
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   Sua sponte, cause no longer held for the decisions in State v. Dunson, case No. 2017-0186, and State v. Braden, case Nos. 2017-1579 and 2017-1609. The case is now held for the decision in State v. Taylor, case No. 2018-0797, and the briefing schedule remains stayed.


text:
    STATE EX REL. SWANSON v. DEPT. OF REHAB. & CORR.
    2018-1492
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellee's motion to correct counsel of record. Motion denied as moot.


text:
    STATE v. SMITH
    2018-1534
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion granted. Appellant shall file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction within 30 days.

O'Connor, C.J., and French and DeWine, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. MCCLURG
    2018-1410
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Appeal accepted and cause held for State v. Howard, case No. 2018-0376, and briefing scheduled stayed. Appellant's motion to amend cover pages granted.
    Kennedy and O'Donnell, JJ., dissent and would not accept the appeal.


author: O'Connor, C.J., not participating.

text:
    LUNSFORD v. STERILITE OF OHIO, L.L.C.
    2018-1431
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    First and second appeals accepted.
    DeWine and DeGenaro, JJ., dissent.
   O'Connor, C.J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. HEINEY
    2018-1326
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Fischer, J., dissents and would accept the appeal on proposition of law No. V.
   DeGenaro, J., dissents, and would accept the appeal on proposition of law No. II and hold the cause for the decision in State v. Boaston, 2018-0364.


text:
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    2018-1403
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell and Fischer, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. MARTIN
    2018-1373
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. AUSTIN
    2018-1401
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    TAYLOR v. MIZER
    2018-1456
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


author: French, J., dissents.

text:
    STATE v. JONES
    2018-1464
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   French, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. BLEVINS
    2018-1470
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. CALLAHAN
    2018-1471
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. WALLS
    2018-1476
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. WILSON
    2018-1533
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. SMITH
    2018-1551
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    Fischer and DeWine, JJ., not participating.


author: Fischer, J., not participating.

text:
    IN RE T.C.
    2018-1569
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    IN RE ESTATE OF GERMALIC
    2018-1444
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. TRIMBLE
    2018-1448
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. CHANDLER
    2018-1406
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. CANTREL
    2018-1473
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   French, J., dissents.


text:
    LOWDER v. KANTAK
    2018-1474
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell and French, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. GREEN
    2018-1481
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. ELLINGTON
    2018-1557
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


author: Kennedy, J., dissents.

text:
    STATE EX REL. HUTH v. BOLIVAR
    2018-1455
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Kennedy, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. MARTIN
    2018-1463
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    FERRARA v. LIBERTY TWP. ZONING BD. OF APPEALS
    2018-1498
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell, J., dissents and would accept the appeal on proposition of law No. I.
   Kennedy, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. TRUESDALE
    2018-1511
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. BENNETT
    2018-1525
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. SHELTON
    2018-1535
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. SCHEE
    2018-1412
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    2018-1565
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    BP METALS, L.L.C. v. GLASS
    2018-1460
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. DUNLAP
    2018-1520
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. ROCK
    2018-1552
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. HOUSTON
    2018-1414
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    COVELL v. COVELL
    2018-1443
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Kennedy, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. FREEMAN
    2018-1472
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. BROWN
    2018-1413
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    HILLS & HOLLERS, L.L.C. v. OHIO GATHERING CO., L.L.C.
    2018-1419
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    DUBLIN v. BEATLEY
    2018-1422
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Kennedy, J., dissents.

Fischer, J., dissents and would accept the appeal on proposition of law No. III.


text:
    BONKOSKI v. LORAIN CTY.
    2018-1429
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    O'Donnell, Kennedy, and French, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. SINCLAIR
    2018-1430
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   DeGenaro, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. MCRAE
    2018-1441
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. HERRINGTON
    2018-1452
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    French, J., dissents and would accept the appeal on proposition of law No. II.


text:
    STATE EX REL. MCBROOM v. GERTMENIAN
    2018-1163
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied. Relator's amended motion to remand trial cases denied.


text:
    IN RE A.P.
    2018-1587
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    HCP EMOH, L.L.C. v. WASHINGTON CTY. BD. OF REVISION
    2016-1712
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
    French, DeWine, and DeGenaro, JJ., dissent.
   Susan D. Brown, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for Fischer, J.


text:
    STATE EX REL. WHITE v. NUSBAUM
    2018-0477
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    N. RIDGEVILLE v. ROTH
    2018-0991
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    AM. WATER MGT. SERVS., L.L.C. v. DIV. OF OIL & GAS RESOURCES MGT.
    2018-1286
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   Kennedy, J., dissents.


text:
    IN RE A.T.
    2018-1578
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   French, J., dissents.

Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE EX REL. KEITH v. ADULT PAROLE AUTH.
    2018-0247
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    DAHL v. CLEVELAND STATE UNIV.
    2018-1239
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE v. HAMMOCK
    2018-1316
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. MORRISSETTE
    2018-1583
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. BARNES
    2018-1627
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.

Fischer, J., dissents and would accept the cause on proposition of law No. II.


text:
    STATE EX REL. WELLSTON CITY SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF EDN. v. OHIO FACILITIES CONSTR. COMM.
    2017-1709
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
    O'Connor, C.J., and French, J., dissent.


text:
    STATE v. JOHNSON
    2018-1192
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied. Appellant's motion for order of relief pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01(A) denied.


author: O'Donnell, J., not participating.

text:
    STATE v. WADE
    2018-1580
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
    DeGenaro, J., dissents and would accept the cause on proposition of law No. I.
   O'Donnell, J., not participating.


text:
    RRL HOLDING CO. OF OHIO, L.L.C. v. STEWART
    2018-1618
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW


text:
    STATE v. MINCEY
    2018-1619
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE EX REL. CANNON v. MOHR
    2017-1640
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for leave to file and motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MARSHALL
    2018-0809
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS v. PIASER
    2018-1142
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE v. GWYNNE
    2017-1506
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 31, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On motion to participate in oral argument scheduled for January 8, 2019, of amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Motion granted. Amicus curiae shall share the time allotted to appellee.


author: DeWine, J., dissents.

text:
    EMBASSY HEALTHCARE v. BELL
    2017-1031
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 31, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration.
    Motion denied.
   DeWine, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE EX REL. CANNON v. MOHR
    2017-1640
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 28, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellant's motion for leave to file motion for stay without prejudice. Motion denied as moot.


text:
    STATE v. APANOVITCH
    2016-0696
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   O'Donnell, J., dissents, with an opinion.

O'DONNELL, J., dissenting.

{¶ 1} Respectfully, I dissent from the court's decision to deny reconsideration thereby leaving in place its decision to remand the case to the trial court.

{¶ 2} I would grant reconsideration of the decision to remand. The case should not be remanded. This case is over. Because the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the fourth petition for postconviction relief, there is nothing pending in the trial court at this time, and therefore, there is no reason to remand the case.

{¶ 3} The trial court cannot act any further on matters involved in this appeal because they are res judicata. Accordingly, the case should be finalized by this court, not remanded.


text:
    HAMMOCK v. BRUCE
    2018-1317
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 26, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
   Fischer, J., not participating.


text:
    STATE v. RAMIREZ
    2018-0900
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    January 4, 2019
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   On appellee's motion to appoint the Office of the Ohio Public Defender as counsel. Motion granted.


text:
    CLEVELAND METRO. BAR ASSN. v. MOODY
    2017-1738
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    January 2, 2019
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On Certified Report by the Board of Professional Conduct, No. 2017-008. Steven Jerome Moody, Attorney Registration No. 0074731, last known address in Cleveland, Ohio, found in contempt for failure to surrender his attorney-registration card and failure to file an affidavit of compliance on or before November 13, 2018.


text:
    TRUMBULL CTY. BAR ASSN. v. LARGE
    2018-0250
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    January 2, 2019
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On Certified Report by the Board of Professional Conduct, No. 2016-045. John Harold Large, Attorney Registration No. 0068732, last known address in Warren, Ohio, found in contempt for failure to surrender his attorney-registration card, failure to surrender his certificate of admission, and failure to file an affidavit of compliance on or before November 13, 2018.


text:
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. STOVELL
    2018-1231
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    January 2, 2019
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On Certified Order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, No. 18-BG-115. Leicester Bryce Stovell, Attorney Registration No. 0038060, last known business address in Washington, District of Columbia, found in contempt for failure to file an affidavit of compliance on or before November 13, 2018.


text:
    STATE EX REL. ABERNATHY v. LUCAS CTY. BD. OF ELECTIONS
    2018-1824
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 31, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS
   In Prohibition. On motion for leave to intervene as respondents of Julian C. Mack, Sean M. Nester, and Brian Twitchell. Motion granted.


text:
    STATE v. SMITH
    2018-1346
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 31, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS
    On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. ADOPTION LINK, INC. v. DIXON
    2018-1728
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    December 31, 2018
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    In Prohibition. On relator's application for dismissal. Application granted. Cause dismissed.


text:
    IN RE Resignation of SCUDDER
    2018-1138
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    January 10, 2019
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    DISCIPLINARY CASES
    On respondent's motion to purge contempt. Motion granted.


text:
    STATE v. FISHER
    2018-1832
    Supreme Court of Ohio.
    January 9, 2019
    CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS
    Appellant has not filed a memorandum in support of jurisdiction, due January 7, 2019, and therefore has failed to prosecute this cause with the requisite diligence. Cause dismissed. Appellant's motion for stay denied as moot.