text:
    AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. AMAZON.COM INC., Amazon Digital Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees
    2015-2080
    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: September 23, 2016
    Cyrüs AloorN Morton, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, MN, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by RoNald James Sohutz, PatRick M. AeeNZ, Beenda L. Joly, Benjamen Linden.
    J. David Hadden, Fenwick & West, LLP, Mountain View, CA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by Todd RiohaRD Gregorian, Saína S. Shami-lov; Ravi Ragavendra Ranganath, Adam Miohael Lewin, San Francisco, CA; Gabriel Bell, Gregory G. Garre, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC; Jeffrey H. Dean, Amazon.com, Inc., Seattle, WA.
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
   BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is related to the appeal in Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DirecTV et al., No. 2015-1845, 838 F.3d 1253, 2016 WL 5335501 (Fed. Cir. 2016), decided today. Although the patents at issue to the two cases are different, they share a similar specification. Because the legal issues presented in the two cases are closely related, our discussion of the governing legal principles in that case will not be repeated here, except to the extent that the difference between the claims in the two cases calls for a somewhat different legal analysis.

I ,

The patent to suit, U.S. Patent No. 8,688,085 (“the ’085 patent”), is entitled “System and Method to Communicate Targeted Information.” The abstract describes the patent as directed to a “method for targeted advertising” in which an advertisement is selected for delivery, to the user of a portable device based on at least one piece of demographic information about the user.

Despite the title of the patent and the description in the abstract, only three sentences in the specification and only one of the 20 claims deal with targeted advertising. The rest of the specification and claims are directed to media systems that deliver content to a handheld wireless electronic device.

Claim 14 of the ’085 patent is representative and provides as follows:

A media system, comprising:
a network based media managing system that maintains a library of content that a given user has a right to access and a customized user interface page for the given user;
a collection of instructions stored in a non-transitory storage medium and configured for execution by a processor of a handheld wireless device, the collection of instructions operable when executed: (1) to initiate presentation of a graphical user interface for'the network based media managing system; (2) to facilitate a user selection of content included in the library; and (3) to send a request for a streaming delivery of the content; and a network based delivery resource maintaining a list of network locations for at least a portion of the content, the network based delivery resource configured to respond to the request by retrieving the portion from an appropriate network location and streaming a representation of the portion to the handheld wireless device.

Stated more succinctly, claim 14 is directed to a network-based media system with a customized user interface, in which the system delivers streaming content from a network-based resource upon demand to a handheld wireless electronic device having a graphical user interface.

Affinity sued Amazon.com Inc. and Amazon Digital Services, Inc., alleging that they infringed the ’085 patent by marketing the Amazon Music system, which allows customers to stream music from a customized library. The Amazon entities moved for the entry of judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the asserted claims were not directed to patentable subject matter.

The magistrate judge recommended that judgment be entered in .the Amazon entities’ favor. Following the two-stage inquiry for patent eligibility set forth by the Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,- — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014), the magistrate judge found -that the ’085 patent is directed to an abstract idea—“delivering selectable media content and subsequently playing the selected content on a portable device.”

Turning to the next step of the eligibility analysis, the magistrate judge found that the claims of the ’085 patent do not contain an “inventive concept.” Instead, he concluded, the claims are directed to applying the abstract idea “to the Internet and a generic, electronic device—in this case, a wireless handheld device operating as a ‘ubiquitous information-transmitting medium, not a novel machine’ ” (citing Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716-17 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The magistrate judge also found that the components recited in the claims are generic. He explained that the “network based media managing system” is a generic database and that the “non-transitory storage medium” could be any kind of memory.

The magistrate judge rejected Affinity’s argument that the customized user .interface supplies the inventive concept to the claimed invention. The user interface limitation, the magistrate judge explained, does not identify “any specific technology or instructions that explain how the device can do what it purports to do or direct the practitioner how to carry out the claims.”

The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s recommendation and entered judgment against Affinity. The court agreed with the magistrate judge that the ’085 patent claims are directed to the abstract.idea of “delivering selectable media content and subsequently playing the selected content on a portable device.” The court also agreed that the claims do not supply an inventive concept as “[t]he ’085 Patent solves no problems, includes no implementation software, designs no system. The mere statement that the method is performed by computer does not satisfy the test of inventive concept.”

II

A

We begin by addressing the first step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry: whether the claims of the ’085 patent are directed to an “abstract idea.” Like the district court, we hold that the concept of delivering user-selected media content to portable devices is an abstract idea, as that term is used in the section 101 context.

The district court’s conclusion is consistent with our approach to the' “abstract idea” step in prior cases. For example, In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016), involved a patent on a method for uploading digital images from a cellular telephone to a server, which would then classify and store the images.

Although the claim at issue in that ease recited physical components such as a telephone unit and a server, the court noted that “not every claim that recites concrete, tangible components’ escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry,” and it pointed out that the specification made clear that the recited physical components “merely provide a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner.” Id. at 611. The court added that “the specification’s emphasis that the present invention ‘relates to a method for recording, communicating and administering [a] digital image’ underscores that ¡ [the claim at issue] is directed to an abstract concept.” Id. The TLI court concluded that, as in this case, the claims were directed to “the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known environment, without any claim that the invention reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by combining the two.” Id. at 612.

Similarly, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 112, F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we found the process, of allowing a consumer to receive copyrighted media in exchange for watching a selected advertisement-was an abstract idea. The idea in this caséis even broader and more abstract than the idea in Ultramercial: The ’085 patent covers streaming content generally, not even including an additional feature such as exchanging the consumer’s access to the streaming content for the consumer’s viewing of an advertisement.

Affinity contends that the ’085 patent embodied a concrete technological innovation because) as of its priority date (March 28, 2000), wireless streaming of media was not “routine, conventional, or well-known.” The patent, however, does not disclose any particular mechanism for wirelessly streaming content to a 'handheld device. The specification describes the function of streaming content to a wireless device, but not a specific means for performing that function. Claim 14, in turn, recites (1) a “media managing system” that maintains a library of content, (2) a “collection of instructions” that are “operable when executed” by a handheld wireless device to request streaming delivery of the content, and (3) a “network based delivery resource” that retrieves and streams the requested content to the handheld device/ At that level of generality, the claims do no more than describe a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the claim to a particular solution to an.identified problem. The purely functional- nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., No. 2015-1778, op. at 1356 (“[T]he essentially result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101.”).

In addressing the first step of the section 101 inquiry, as applied to a computer-implemented ■ invention, it is often helpful to ask whether the claims are directed to “an improvement in the functioning of a computer,” or merely “adding conventional computer components to well-known business practices.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims of the ’085 patent fall into the latter category.

Affinity contends that the magistrate judge improperly engaged in fact-finding when he stated that the idea of delivering media content to a wireless portable device is one of long standing. It is not debatable, however, that the delivery of media content to electro,nic devices was well known long before the priority date of the ’085 patent, and Affinity does not. argue otherwise, The magistrate judge cited transistor radios and portable televisions as commonplace examples of the delivery, of audio media to portable electronic devices. An example of technology that is even closer to the idea underlying the ’085 patent is the delivery of selectable prerecorded messages to callers on demand in services such as dial-a-prayer and dial-arjoke, which were, available long before the invention of cellular telephones or the Internet.

While- Affinity criticizes the magistrate’s making factual findings on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the practice of taking note of fundamental economic concepts and technological developments in this context is well supported by our precedents. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s finding on a motion to dismiss that “offer-based price optimization” is a fundamental economic concept and that the claimed computer-based implementation of that idea is routine and conventional); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s finding on a motion to dismiss that the claims were directed to the well-known abstract idea of “1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory”).

Affinity also objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the claims merely set forth “routine and generic processing and storing capabilities of computers generally.” Yet the claim terms to which the magistrate judge referred, such as a “network based media management system” and a “graphical user interface,” are simply generic descriptions of well-known computer components. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d at 611 (physical components such as a telephone and a server “merely provide a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea”); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims reciting an “interface,” “network,” and “database” are directed to an abstract idea). Affinity makes no claim that it invented any of those components or their basic functions, nor does it suggest that those components, at that level of generality, were unknown in the art as of the priority date of the ’085 patent.

In an effort to show that claim 14 is not directed to an abstract idea, Affinity focus-és in particular on the recitation of a “customized user interface” in that claim. For support, Affinity cites passages in the specification that describe embodiments in which a user may elect to have a customized interface such as a radio dial, a play-list, or targeted advertising based on demographic information provided by the user. See ’085 patent, col. 10,11. 10-26; col. 11, 11. 5-35. This court, however, has held that “customizing information based on ... information known about the user” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The court in the Intellectual Ventures I case explained that tailoring of content based on information about the user—such as where the user lives or what time of day the user views the content—is an abstract idea that is as old as providing different newspaper inserts for different neighborhoods. Id.

The term “customized user interface,” as used in the ’085 patent, is not limited to any particular form of customization, but covers the general idea of customizing a user interface. Like the basic concept of tailoring content to a user, as in Intellectual Ventures I, the basic concept of customizing a user interface is an abstract idea.

B

Turning to the second step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry, we conclude that there is nothing in the claims or the specification of the ’085 patent that constitutes a concrete implementation of the abstract idea in the form of an “inventive concept.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355; Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294.

As noted, representative claim 14 is written in largely functional terms, claiming “a collection of instructions” that perform the functions of displaying a selection of available content on a graphical user interface and allowing the user to request streaming of that content. The claims thus do not go beyond “stating [the relevant] functions in general terms, without limiting them to technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional computer and network technology.” Elec. Power Grp., op. at 1351.

Features such as network streaming and a customized user interface do not convert the abstract idea of delivering media content to a handheld electronic device into a concrete solution to a problem. The features set forth in the claims are described and claimed generically rather than with the specificity necessary to show how those components provide a concrete solution to the problem addressed by the patent.

In particular, claim 14 requires a “network based delivery resource,” but that does not make the claim a patent-eligible implementation of an abstract idea. The specification makes clear that any technology capable of wireless communication of audio information to the device would be covered. See ’085 patent, col. 4, 11. 41-45 (“The present invention advantageously allows for several different embodiments of wirelessly communicating selected audio information to [an] electronic device ... and is not limited to any specific configuration described below.”).

The only putatively narrowing limitation in that result-focused claim is the limitation requiring that the “network based media managing system” have “a customized user interface page for the given user.” But neither the, claim nor the specification reveals any concrete way of employing a customized user interface. The specification simply states that a user interface can be customized “in a plurality of ways” by allowing users to select and receive “on-demand customized audio information.” Id., col. 16,11. 21-22, 25-26, That disclosure and the accompanying “customized user interface” limitation in the claim do not constitute a concrete application of the abstract idea of delivering content to a wireless device and thus do not embody an “inventive concept,” as that term has been used in the Mayo/Alice line of cases.

In sum, the patent in this case is not directed to the solution of a “technological problem,” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358, nor is it directed to an improvement in computer or network functionality, see In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d at 612. It claims the general concept of streaming user-selected content to a portable device. The addition of basic user customization features to the interface does not alter the abstract nature of the claims and does not add an inventive component that renders- the claims patentable. We therefore uphold the district court’s judgment that the claims cif the ’085 patent are not eligible for patenting.

AFFIRMED

      . The only portion of the specification that deals with targeted advertising reads: "A user may also provide demographic information allowing advertisers to access the demographic information and provide advertisements based upon the demographic information. For example, an advertiser may want to target Hispanic females in the 21-25 year old age group. Through providing demographic information to advertisers; when a user logs into [the depicted homepage] selective advertising can be 'targeted' for a group of users.” '085 patent, col. 10,11. 18-26. The only claim dealing with targeted advertising is claim 5, which is directed to the media system of claim 1, "further comprising a targeted advertising component configured to communicate an advertisement to the given user based at least in part on a demographic of the given user.”

      . The district court treated claim 14 as representative. Although Affinity has not conceded that claim 14 is representative of the remaining claims, it has not shown how independent claims 1 and 8 differ materially from claim 14. Moreover, while Affinity refers in passing to several of the dependent claims, it presents no substantive argument as to the separate patentability of those claims. Because Affinity has failed to present “any meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations” other than those in claim 14, Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., No. 2015-1778, 830 F.3d 1350, 1352, 2016 WL 4073318, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2016), we treat claim 14 as representative of all the claims for purposes of this appeal.

      . Affinity argues that the district court erred in disregarding the statement of its expert that streaming content to a portable device was novel as of the priority date of the '085 patent. But the eligibility finding does not turn on the lack of novelty of the claim; it turns on the fact that the claim is drawn to any embodiment of an abstract idea. The district court therefore properly disregarded the expert's statement.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DYK, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SIGMA-TAU HEALTHSCIENCE, INC., aka Sigma-Tau HealthScience, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee
    2016-1125
    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: September 26, 2016

      John C. Monica, Jr., Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, Washington, DC, argued for Plaintiff-Appellant. Also represented by Leslie Alan Glick, ChRistopher Yook.
    Alexander J. Vanderweide, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, argued for Defendanb-Appellee. Also represented by Amy M. Rubin; Benjamin C. Mizer, Jeanne E. Davidson, Washington, DC; Yelena Slepak, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland Security, New York, NY.
    Before NEWMAN, DYK, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
   DYK, Circuit Judge.

This Customs case concerns the classification of two chemical products, both stabilized forms of the compound carnitine, which were imported into the United Státes by Sigma-Tau HealthScience, Inc., a.k.a. Sigma-Tau HealthScience, LLC (“Sigma-Tau”). United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or “the government”) initially classified these products under a subheading of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) that carries a duty. Sigma-Tau protested, arguing that the products should be classified under HTSUS heading 2936 (which encompasses “provita-mins and vitamins”), subheading 2936.29.50, a duty-free classification.

The Court of International Trade (“CIT”) concluded that Sigma-Tau’s products should be classified under a different subheading, 2923.90.00, making them ineligible for duty-free treatment. Sigma-Tau HealthScience, Inc. v. United, States (“Sigma-Tau ”), 98 F.Supp.3d 1365, 1377-78 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015). On appeal, the parties agree that the only issue is whether Sigma-Tau’s products are properly classified as vitamins under HTSUS heading 2936. We agree with Sigma-Tau that its carnitine products are properly classified under that heading, because carnitine is a vitamin in neonates. We therefore reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Customs classifications according to the headings and subheadings of the HTSUS determine the duties that importers must pay to the United States. The question here is the appropriate classification of Sigma-Tau’s carnitine products.

Carnitine is a naturally occurring amino acid derivative and an important nutrient in the human body, where it serves to transport long-chain fatty acids into mitochondria, the centers for energy production within each cell. Our bodies obtain carnitine exogenously, from food, and also produce it endogenously, by breaking down and reforming protein. (According to the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, an “exogenous” compound originates outside the organism, while an “endogenous” compound is one originating or produced internally. See Exogenous, Webster Comprehensive Dictionary (Int’l ed. 2001); Endogenous, id) Stabilized forms of carni-tine are formulated into tablets or capsules and sold as nutritional supplements; they can also be incorporated into drinks, protein bars, and other products for human consumption. Carnitine is sometimes referred to as “vitamin Bt”; for example, the online version of Merriam Webster’s Medical Dictionary identifies “vitamin Bt” as a synonym of “carnitine.” J.A. 1279. While carnitine is an organic compound, it is not listed by name in any heading or subheading of HTSUS Chapter 29, which covers “Organic Chemicals.”

Sigma-Tau imports carnitine products into the United States. The two carnitine products at issue are acetyl L-Carnitine taurinate hydrochloride with 1.5% silica, which Sigma-Tau sells under the brand name “L-Tauro,” and glycine propionyl L-Carnitine hydrochloride USP with 1.5% silica, which Sigma-Tau sells under the brand name “GlycoCarn.” These products, white powders manufactured in Italy, were imported in bulk. In 2010, Customs classified these products under HTSUS subheading 3824.90.92, which covers “Prepared binders for foundry molds or cores; chemical products and preparations of the chemical or allied industries (including those consisting of mixtures of natural products), not elsewhere specified or included: Other: Other: Other: Other.” That subheading carries a 5% duty. Sigma-Tau timely protested this classification, arguing that the products qualify as vitamins under HTSUS subheading 2936.29.50, which covers “Provitamins and vitamins, natural or reproduced by synthesis (including natural concentrates), derivatives thereof used primarily as vitamins, and intermixtures of the foregoing, whether or not in any solvent: Vitamins and their derivatives, unmixed: Other vitamins and their derivatives: Other: Other.” That subheading is duty-free.

■ Sigma-Tau brought suit in the CIT, requesting that the court set aside Customs’ classification decision and hold that the L-Tauro and GlycoCarn products are properly classified as vitamins under HTSUS subheading 2936.29.50 (and, therefore, deserving of duty-free treatment). Sigma-Tau also requested that the CIT instruct Customs to re-liquidate the entries for these products and to award damages for alleged overpayment of duties. Sigma-Tau moved for ■ summary judgment. The government cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that Customs’ initial classification of the merchandise under HTSUS heading 3824- was erroneous but that HTSUS subheading 2923.90.00 (covering “Quaternary ammonium salts and hydroxides; lecithins and other phosphoaminoli-pids, whether or not chemically defined: Other”), not 2936.29.50, was in fact the proper classification.

The CIT found that Sigma-Tau’s products were prima facie classifiable both as vitamins under HTSUS heading 2936 and as quaternary ammonium salts under heading 2923.Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1374-76. Where an item is prima facie classifiable under more than one heading, the General Rules of Interpretation provide guidance as to which heading should be used. See Dell Prods. LP v. United States, 642 F.3d 1055, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Relying on HTSUS General. Rule of Interpretation 3 (“GRI 3”), which specifies that when “goods are, prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings” “[t]he heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description,” HTSUS, General Notes, at 1, the CIT concluded that “the term‘quaternary ammonium salts’ more' specifically describes L-Carnitine than ‘vitamins’ ” and thus that Sigma-Tau’s products were properly classified as quaternary ammonium salts under subheading 2923.90.00, Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1377.

The CIT consequently granted summary judgment in favor of the government and denied Sigma-Tau’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1378. Sigma-Tau appeals, asking us to hold that the proper classification of its merchandise is under HTSUS subheading 2936.29.50, as a vitamin. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

Discussion

“The interpretation of the headings and subheadings of the HTSUS is a question of law, which we review without deference.” Deckers Corp. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “A classification decision involves two underlying steps: (1) determining the proper meaning of the tariff provisions, which is a question of law; and (2) determining which heading the particular mer chandise falls within, which is a question of fact.” Deckers, 532 F.3d at 1314-15. “We review questions of law de novo, including the interpretation- of the terms of the HTSUS, whereas factual findings of the Court of International Trade are reviewed for clear error.” Id. at 1315; see also La Crosse Tech., Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). However, “if there is no genuine dispute over the nature of the merchandise, ... the proper classification under which it falls [⅛]-⅛⅜ ultimate question in every classification case and one that has always been treated as a question of law.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Gen. Elec. Co.-Med. Sys. Grp. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1231, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The government concedes that the CIT erred when it applied the rule of relative specificity of GRI 3 to classify Sigma-Tau’s products. The government acknowledges that Note 3 to Chapter 29 of the HTSUS (“Chapter Note 3”) is instead applicable. Chapter Note 3 specifies that “[g]oods which could be included in two or more of the headings of this chapter are to be classified in that one of those headings which occurs last in numerical order.” HTSUS, Ch. 29, Note 3, at 29-1. We have held that “[t]he Section and Chapter Notes [of the HTSUS] are not optional interpretive rules, but are statutory law.” BenQ Am. Corp. v. United States, 646 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, if Sigma-Tau’s merchandise is prima facie classifiable as both a quaternary ámmonium salt (HTSUS heading 2923) and as a vitamin (HTSUS heading 2936), Chapter Note 3 dictates that it be classified as the latter, as 2936 “occurs last in numerical order.”

Thus, the only issue before us is whether Sigma-Tau’s L-Tauro and GlycoCarn products are prima facie classifiable as vitamins under HTSUS heading 2936. If they are, that heading applies; if they are not, heading 2923 applies, as both sides agree that the products are prima facie classifiable as quaternary ammonium salts.

I

We first address the government’s contention that the products are not vitamins because they contain stabilizers. The two products at issue are stabilized forms of carnitine: acetyl L-Carnitine taurinate hydrochloride with 1.5% silica (L-Tauro) and glycine propionyl L-Carnitine hydrochloride, USP with 1.5% silica (GlycoCarn). The CIT treated the products as equivalent to carnitine itself. At the CIT, the parties agreed that this was the correct approach. “The parties agree that the proper classification of the two products at issue hinges upon the primary and only active component of the products, L-Car-nitine.” Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1370. In its briefing at the CIT, the government described “L-Carnitine (or carnitine)” as “the only biologically active component of the two products at issue” and indicated that the other chemical components serve merely as stabilizers, which “render the two carnitine-based products at issue chemically neutral and stable.” J.A. 336.

On appeal, the government agrees that carnitine is “the sole biologically active component of L-Tauro and GlycoCarn” but now argues, apparently for the first time, that “the court erred when it undertook a classification análysis of L-Carni-tine only, and not the actual products in their imported condition,” i.e., carnitine combined with stabilizing ingredients. Ap-pellee’s Br. at 28. The government does not articulate a theory as to how the presence of any particular stabilizing component of L-Tauro or GlycoCarn (e.g., taurine, glycine, or silica) renders the products nori-vitamins.

The government’s argument comes too late and is therefore waived. “Our precedent generally counsels against entertaining arguments not presented to the district court.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 527 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). Furthermore, even if the government had- properly raised the argument, the HTSUS forecloses it. HTSUS heading 2936. explicitly encompasses “[p]rovitamins and vitamins” and “derivatives thereof used primarily as vitamins,” and Note 1(f) to Chapter 29 of the HTSUS expressly states that the headings of the chapter cover “[compounds] with an added stabilizer (including an anticaking agent) necessary for their preservation or transport.” HTSUS, Ch. 29, Note 1(f), at 29-1.

We thus agree with the CIT that Sigma-Tau’s imported products, L-Tauro and GlycoCarn, should be viewed as equivalents of carnitine. The proper classification of carnitine itself determines the proper classification of Sigma-Tau’s merchandise.

II

Chapter 29. of the HTSUS covers “Organic Chemicals.” Heading 2936 more specifically covers “Provitamins and vitamins, natural or reproduced by synthesis (including natural concentrates), derivatives thereof used primarily as vitamins, and intermixtures of the foregoing, whether or not in any solvent.” The terms “carnitine” and “vitamin Bt” do not appear anywhere under heading 2936 or, indeed, anywhere in Chapter 29. Thus, if carnitine is classifiable as a vitamin under heading 2936, it must be because it falls within a residual subheading, 2936.29.50 (“Vitamins and their derivatives, unmixed: Other vitamins and their derivatives: Other: Other”).

The CIT construed HTSUS heading 2936 as, in relevant part, an eo nomine provision—i.e., a provision that describes an article by a specific name, not by use, see Len-Ron Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1376-77. We agree with the CIT that HTSUS heading 2936 should be treated as an eo nomine provision for purposes of this case: the operative question here is whether car-nitine qualifies as a “[p]rovitamin[ ]” or “vitamin[ ],” items that are expressly named and covered by HTSUS heading 2936. Neither party disputes this interpretation. Because we conclude that HTSUS heading 2936 is an eo nomine provision with respect to “vitamins,” we need not consider the Carborundum factors, which pertain only to certain use provisions of the HTSUS. See Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2012); cf. GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States, 761 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

“The first step in properly construing a tariff classification term is to determine whether Congress clearly defined that term in either the HTSUS or its legislative history.” Airflow Tech., 524 F.3d at 1290-91 (quoting Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1044, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In this instance, there is no clear definition of “vitamin” within Chapter 29 or its legislative history. We have held that,

[w]hen, as here, a tariff term is not defined in either the HTSUS or its legislative history, the term’s correct meaning is its common or dictionary meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary. We have explained that, to determine the common meaning of a tariff term, a court may rely upon its own understanding of terms used, and may consult standard lexicographic and scientific authorities.

Id. at 1291 (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). “To discern the common meaning of a tariff term, we may consult dictionaries, scientific authorities, and other reliable information sources.” Kahrs Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 713 F.3d 640, 644 (Fed. Cir. 2013). To the extent that dictionaries or other extrinsic references disagree with one another, a court may “properly rel[y] on the definition most commonly found in the lexicographical sources to derive the common meaning of this term.” Len-Ron, 334 F.3d at 1310.

Here the CIT’s decision that carnitine is prima facie classifiable as a vitamin rested on' thé fact that carnitine is alternatively known as “vitamin Bt.” “[T]he Court finds that since L-Carnitine is commonly known as vitamin Bt it is prima facie classifiable in HTSUS heading 2936.” Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1376. Similarly, the government argues in support of the opposite result that carnitine cannot be a vitamin because, many respected scientific sources do not include carnitine in listings of commonly accepted vitamins. The government notes, for example, that a National Import Specialist for Customs testified with regard to Sigma-Tau’s carnitine products that “the FDA does not indicate they’re vitamins,” ñor did the scientific literature he had reviewed. J.A. 750.

Whether a substance is commonly referred to as a “vitamin” may be pertinent, but only if there is a consensus as to the use of that terminology. See Len-Ron, 334 F.3d at 1310 (holding that the common meaning of the HTSUS term “vanity case” should not be limited to cases that include mirrors, as the record showed that the public uses the term to refer to a variety of cases, with no consensus that the term “requires that the case be fitted with a mirror”); Nippon Kogaku (USA), Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 380, 382, 384 (CCPA 1982) (holding that a certain type of optical microscope should be classified under a particular tariff heading because, inter alia, the CIT had found that “without contradiction, industry, as well as ophthalmologists and optometrists, principal users of the merchandise, refer to it as a slit-lamp microscope or a slit-lamp, not as a compound microscope”); see also CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that “how the subject articles are regarded in commerce” and “how the subject articles are described in sales and marketing literature” can “guide the court’s assessment of whether articles fall within the scope of an eo nomine provision”). There is no such consensus here. We must, therefore, determine whether carnitine is a “vitamin” under HTSUS heading 2936, applying the commonly accepted definition of the term “vitamin.”

Indeed, HTSUS heading 2936 -contemplates such an inquiry. By its very terms the heading covers not only approximately one dozen expressly named vitamins but also open-ended categories of further “Vitamins and their derivatives,” including “Other vitamins and their derivatives: Other: Aromatic or modified aromatic” (HTSUS subheading 2936.29.20) and “Other vitamins and their derivatives: -Other: Other” (HTSUS subheading 2936.29.50). While .Explanatory Notes to HTSUS headings are non-binding (see infra) the Explanatory Note to heading 2936 states in its “List of products which are to be classified as provitamins or vitamins within the meaning of heading 29.36” that “[t]he list of products in each of the following groups is not exhaustive” and that “[t]he products listed are examples only.” Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 29.36 (5th ed. 2012) (“EN 29.36”). Explanatory Note 29.36 also includes a list of “Exclusions,” products “which, though sometimes called vitamins, have no vitamin activity or have a vitamin activity which is of secondary importance in relation to their other uses” and thus are not classifiable under HTSUS 2936. Id. Among the excluded products are various compounds whose names include the word “vitamin,” such as “Vitamin H1(” “Vitamin B4,” and “Vitamin F.” Id. (Carni-tine (or vitamin Bt) is not included among the “Exclusions.” Id.) The note thus makes clear that the mere use of the term “vitamin” to refer to a particular compound is not conclusive. At the same time, the universe of compounds prima facie classifiable as vitamins under heading 2936 cannot be limited to only those compounds that are explicitly listed under the heading.

We thus look to the definition of “vitamin” and ask whether carnitine falls within the definition. “Determining the proper classification requires first construing the relevant provisions of the schedule and then deciding which provision encompasses the merchandise at issue.” Del Monte Corp. v. United States, 730 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Airflow Tech., 524 F.3d at 1291. Before the CIT, the government urged that the court apply the definition of “vitamin” in the Explanatory Note:

Vitamins are active agents, usually of complex chemical composition, which are obtained from outside sources and are essential for the proper functioning of human or other animal organisms. They cannot be synthesised by the human body and must therefore be obtained in final or nearly final form (provitamins) from outside sources. They are effective in relatively minute amounts and may be regarded as exogenous biocatalysts, their absence or deficiency giving rise to metabolic disturbances or “deficiency diseases.”

EN 29.36 (emphasis added). The government contended at the CIT that because carnitine can be synthesized in the human body, it is not a vitamin under the definition of EN 29.36. But Explanatory Notes are not Chapter Notes or Section Notes and are not binding. Explanatory Notes “may be generally useful as guides to the scope of unclear HTSUS headings, [but] they are not legally binding.” Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United States, 561 F.3d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also E.T. Horn Co. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Explanatory Notes are “not controlling” but “provide interpretive guidance”). “Although the examples in the Explanatory Notes are probative and sometimes illuminating, we shall not employ their limiting characteristics, to the extent there are any, to narrow the language of the classification heading itself.” Rubie’s Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Explanatory Note 29.36, in defining vitamins as compounds that “cannot be syn-thesised by the human body,” cannot be correct, since vitamin D is unambiguously included under the heading: subheading 2936.29.50.20 expressly names “Vitamins D and their derivatives.” And undisputed evidence establishes that vitamin D can be synthesized, in limited and generally inadequate amounts, by the human body. See Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1375-76. This portion of the definition of “vitamin” in EN 29.36 thus contradicts the express inclusion of vitamin D under HTSUS heading 2936 and must be disregarded, as the CIT correctly held. Id. at 1376. Explanatory Note 29.36 is also inconsistent with the prevailing definitions of “vitamin” in . various scientific, references cited by the parties, all of which define a vitamin as a compound that is not produced by the human body in amounts “sufficient” or “adequate” for healthy function. The parties indeed agree that the definition of EN 29.36 is too restrictive in this’ respect. For example, the government proposes defining “vitamins” as “those organic compounds which are essential for human health, but must be provided or supplemented from an exogenous source because the human body cannot normally synthesize the compounds, either sufficiently or at all.” Appellee’s Br. at 14 (emphasis added). Moreover, the definitions provided by both parties are consistent with each other. We therefore adopt, as the definition of “vitamin,” the following: vitamins are organic chemical substances that are essential micronutrients because, in general, the body cannot produce them or produce sufficient amounts of them.

While agreeing to this general definition, the parties still differ as to the proper scope of this definition in certain respects. First, Sigma-Tau argues that “vitamin” should not be limited to compounds that are required by individuals with normal function but should also encompass those required by individuals with abnormal function. We reject this argument. Literature definitions introduced by both parties emphasize the fact that a vitamin is a substance required for normal physiological function. See J.A. 291 (The Vitamins', “essential ... for normal physiological function”; “not synthesized by the host in amounts adequate to meet normal physiological needs” (emphasis added)); J.A. 292 (Nutrition Now: “essential nutrients because, in general, the body cannot produce them or produce sufficient amounts of them” (emphasis added)); J.A. 778 (Concise Encyclopedia of Chem. Tech.: “specific organic compounds that are essential, for normal metabolism” (emphasis added)). The correct definition of “vitamin” thus leaves out compounds that might be essential to individuals with abnormal physiological function, e.g., those suffering from rare genetic disorders or organ failure.

Second, the government appears to argue that the proper definition of “vitamin” refers only to compounds that cannot be synthesized in sufficient amounts by human adults. On the contrary, Sigma-Tau argues that the proper definition of “vitamin” must not be limited to compounds essential to adults but should also include compounds that children and infants require for normal, healthy function. We agree with Sigma-Tau that there is no reason to limit “vitamin” to compounds required by adults rather than children. Neither the definition of EN 29.36 nor any of the literature definitions presented by either party is expressly limited to adults. Moreover, the definition in The Vitamins describes “vitamins” as compounds “essential” for “maintenance, growth, development, and/or production,” J.A. 291 (emphasis added); the inclusion of “growth” and “development” suggests that compounds required by children—i.e., those who are “growing” and “developing”—should be included even if not required by adults.

Ill

Having defined “vitamin,” we turn to whether carnitine is prima facie classifiable as such under HTSUS heading 2936. We hold, based on the undisputed evidence of record, that the CIT’s conclusion on this point was correct: carnitine is prima facie classifiable as a vitamin.

Sigma-Tau argues that the evidence shows that “certain human populations, including children and neonates, require an exogenous source of L-Carnitine.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14. Sigma-Tau introduced uncontroverted evidence establishing that infants, including neonates (infants less than four weeks old), require exogenous' sources of carnitine for healthy growth and cannot synthesize adequate quantities endogenously. One scientific article states that “[n]eonates rely on an exogenous supply of L-Camitine because their capacity for endogenous synthesis is still poorly developed.” J.A. 1089 (J. Har-meyer, The Physiological Role of L-Car-nitine, 27 Lohmann Info. 1, 7 (2002)). A second article states that “certain pediatric populations, specifically neonates and infants, have decreased biosynthetic capacity and are at risk of developing carni-tine deficiency, particularly when receiving PN [ (parenteral nutrition) ]” and that “[although carnitine is considered a nonessential nutrient in adults, it may be considered a conditionally essential nutrient in pediatric populations, particularly neonates receiving PN.” J.A. 1091, 1094 (Catherine M. Grill & Richard A. Helms, The Use of Carnitine in Pediatric Nutrition, 22 Nutrition in Clinical Practice 204, 207 (2007)).

The scientific authorities cited by the government do not directly address the question of whether carnitine qualifies as a vitamin with respect to infants. They merely state that carnitine is not recognized as a vitamin in adults, as adults are able to synthesize adequate quantities of carnitine from other components of their diet. For example, the book Recommended Dietary Allowances, a publication of the National Research Council introduced by the government, states' that “[carnitine] has not been demonstrated to be a vitamin for the healthy adult human” but adds that “the newborn infant appears to have reduced stores of carnitine as well as a low capacity for synthesizing it” and that “[s]everal laboratories are investigating the possibility that carnitine may be an essential nutrient for the newborn, especially for those born prematurely.” J.A. 789, 790 (Recommended Dietary Allowances 265, 266 (10th ed. 1989)). At argument the government conceded that the evidence shows that infants, and neonates in particular, require exogenous sources of carnitine for normal, healthy function.

In view of this evidence, the CIT correctly held that carnitine is prima facie classifiable as a vitamin. Undisputed evidence in the record shows that carnitine is an organic compound essential for neonates (infants less than four weeks old). They rely on. an exogenous supply of L-Carnitine because their -ability to synthesize it endogenously is still poorly developed.

Conclusion

For the, foregoing reasons, carnitine and Sigma-Tau’s imported merchandise are prima facie classifiable as a vitamin under HTSUS heading 2936. As noted above, under Chapter Note 3, “[g]oods which could be included in two or more of the headings of this chapter are to be classified in that one of those headings which occurs last in numerical order.” We thus hold that carnitine, and Sigma-Tau’s products, are properly classified as a'vitamin under HTSUS heading 2936, in residual subheading 2936.29.50, rather than as a quaternary ammonium salt under HTSUS heading 2923., We conclude that the CIT erred in denying Sigma-Tau’s motion for summary judgment and in granting summary judgment to'the 'government. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Costs .

No costs.

      . Carnitine is a chiral compound and exists in two distinct stereoisomeric forms: the biologically active L-Carnitine enantiomer and the inactive D-carnitine enantiomer. Sigma-Tau’s products specifically contain L-Carnitine, and the parties agree that L-Carnitine is the biologically and commercially significant enan-tiomer at issue in this case. For simplicity, we refer hereinafter to L-Carnitine simply as “carnitine.”

      . Before the CIT, Sigma-Tau argued that even if classified as quaternary ammonium salts under HTSUS heading 2923, its L-Tauro and GlycoCarn products should nonetheless qualify for "K designation” and thereby be granted duty-free treatment because "carni-tine” is listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix to the HTSUS. "General Note 13 [of the HTSUS] permits duty free treatment of certain pharmaceutical products if three requirements are met....” Forest Labs., Inc. v. United States, 476 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2007). One requirement of General Note 13 is that "the merchandise is listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix of the tariff schedule.” Id.

      The CIT concluded that while carnitine itself is indeed listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix, the taurine and glycine components of L-Tauro and GlycoCarn, respectively, are not listed, making L-Tauro and Glyco-Carn ineligible for K designation and thus ineligible for duty-free treatment under General Note 13. Sigma-Tau, 98 F.Supp.3d at 1377. Sigma-Tau does not appeal this aspect of the CIT’s judgment. The inclusion of carni-tine in the Pharmaceutical Appendix is unrelated to the question of whether carnitine is prima facie classifiable as a "vitamin” under HTSUS heading 2936.

      . HTSUS heading 2936 also encompasses "derivatives [of provitamins and vitamins] used primarily as vitamins”; this separate portion of heading 2936 is properly read as a use provision.

      . This is not a case in which Customs or the ■ importer contends that the term in question has a special commercial meaning distinct from its common meaning. See Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("One who argues that a tariff term should not be given its common or . dictionary meaning must prove that it has a different commercial meaning that is definite, uniform, and general throughout the trade.”);
        see also Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306, 13 S.Ct. 881, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893) (“There being no evidence that the words ‘fruit’ and ‘vegetables’ have acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning.”)

      . The individual vitamins expressly included under HTSUS subheading 2936 are vitamin A (2936.21.00), vitamin Bj (2936.22.00), vitamin B2 (2936.23,00), D- or DL-pantothenic acid (vitamin Bs or vitamin B5, 2936.24.00), vitamin B6 (2936.25.00), vitamin B12 (2936.26.00), vitamin C (2936.27,00), vitamin E (2936.28.00), folic acid (2936.29.10), niacin and niacinamide (2936.29.15), vitamin D (2936.29.50,20), and biotin (2936.29,50.30).

      . The definitions of “vitamin” presented by the parties are as follows. Sigma-Tau’s expert submitted a report presenting definitions from two textbooks:
      (From The Vitamins:) A vitamin: (i) is an organic compound distinct from fats, carbohydrates, and proteins; (ii) is a natural component of foods in which it is usually present in minute amounts; (iii) is essential, usually in minute amounts, for normal physiological function (i.e., maintenance, growth, development, and/or production); (iv) causes, by its absence or underutilization, a specific deficiency syndrome; and (v) is not synthesized by the host in amounts adequate to meet ■ normal physiological needs.
      (From Nutrition Now:) Vitamins are chemical’substances that perform specific functions in the body. They are essential nutrients because, in general, the body cannot produce them or [cannot] produce sufficient amounts of them.
      J.A. 288 (Expert Report of Yesu T. Das, quoting Gerald F. Combs, Jr., The Vitamins 4 (4th ed. 2012) (J.A. 291) and Judith E. Brown, Nutrition Now 20-2 (7th ed. 2014) (J.A. 292)) (alteration and emphasis in original, underscoring added).
      The government introduced definitions from two chemical encyclopedias:
      Vitamins are specific organic compounds that are essential for normal metabolism. These micronutrients are not synthesized by humans, either at all or in sufficient quantity, and must be obtained from the diet or as synthetic supplements. '
      J.A. 778 (reproducing the Concise Encyclopedia of Chem. Tech. 2092 (4th ed. 1999)) (emphasis added).
      Vitamins are essential, organic compounds which are either not synthesized in the human and animal organism or formed only in insufficient amounts. Therefore, they must be regularly consumed with the diet either as such or as a precursor (provitamin) that can be converted. to the vitamin in the body_Vitamins are classified not chemically but by their activity,
      J.A. 780 (reproducing Utlmann’s Encyclopedia of Indus. Chemistry vol. 38, 112 (6th ed. 2003)) (emphasis added).'