author: HOWARD; Chief Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Angel Rudiel CRUZ-VÁZQUEZ, Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 15-1289
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    November 10, 2016

      Isabelle C. Oria-Calaf, San Juan, PR, on brief for appellant.
    Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Francisco A, Besosa-Mahtinez,, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    Before HOWARD, Chief Judge, SELYA and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   HOWARD; Chief Judge.

This case concerns a challenge to' the sentence imposed on Angel Rudiel Cruz-Vázquez (“Cruz”) for unlawful possession of a fully-automatic firearm. Cruz challenges the reasonableness of his 36-month prison sentence. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. Background

Cruz pleaded guilty to possession'of a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) after law enforcement agents, conducting a traffic stop, recovered from his car a dock pistol modified to shoot automatically. Although agents also found a bag containing drug paraphernalia and marijuana residue in the trunk of Cruz’s vehicle, this detail was omitted from the plea agreement’s stipulated version of the facts, and the drug evidence also went unmentioned in the PSR.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that Cruz’s Base Offense Level-under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 was 18 and that, after applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his Total Offense Level was 15. The parties estimated that this Total Offense Level, coupled with a Criminal History Category of I, would provide for a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months. The parties agreed not to seek any further guideline adjustments, departures, enhancements, reductions, or variances. Finally, the parties stipulated that while Cruz could request a sentence at the lower end of the applicable guideline range, the government reserved the right to argue for a sentence at the higher end.

Prior :to the sentencing hearing, the government submitted a sentencing memorandum to the district court that, among other things, discussed the drug paraphernalia retrieved from Cruz’s car and noted that “[t]he items recovered are consistent with what drug traffickers usually keep and use.” When the judge mentioned the bag of drug paraphernalia at the sentencing hearing, Cruz objected, as he had not admitted to owning, possessing, or previously seeing the bag. Ultimately, the district court stated that it would not consider the bag of drug paraphernalia when determining Cruz’s sentence.

The sentencing court went on to make detailed and specific findings as to each of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. While acknowledging potentially mitigating factors emphasized by Cruz, the district court also raised concerns about Cruz’s offense, saying:

[I]n Puerto Rico ... [w]e have a record of shootings that is greater th[a]n the ones in the City of New York and Chicago.... [I]t is very clear why these types of guns ... have been prohibited and it is because of the potential to cause real and huge damages to innocent bystanders. I think this type of offense is having a dramatic effect on the community. You cannot argue that this [gun] can be used for personal defense ... it is not a regular weapon, it is a machine gun.

The judge concluded, “I think that because of this, these factors per se will allow for a variance.” The district court subsequently imposed a 36-month incarcerative sentence.

' This appeal timely followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Cruz alleges both that the government violated the spirit of the plea agreement by bringing the bag of drug paraphernalia to the district court’s attention and that the district court abused its discretion in deviating from the guideline range and imposing a 36-month incarcera-tive sentence. We take these claims in turn.

A. Breach of the Plea Agreement

Cruz argues, in effect, that the government violated the plea agreement by seeking an upward variance from the jointly-stipulated Base Offense Level. Specifically, he accuses the government of implicitly “arguing for a four level increase as prescribed in [U.S.S.G. § ] 2K2.1(b)(6)(B),” which applies if a defendant used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense, by. including the information about drug paraphernalia in its sentencing memorandum.

Whether the government has breached its plea agreement with Cruz presents a question of law, and our review is de novo. See United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining are held to “meticulous standards of both promise and performance” because such bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 2002). We prohibit not only explicit repudiation of the government’s assurances but also end-runs around those assurances. Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d at 57; United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 1992).

Other cases may raise difficult questions about how to reconcile the prosecution’s obligation to uphold any bargain made in a plea agreement with its duty to disclose information material to the district court’s sentencing determinations. See United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). Admittedly, these responsibilities can pull in different directions. Id. This case, however, does not implicate that tension. The district court expressly stated that it would disregard the drug paraphernalia in calculating Cruz’s sentence. In other words, any potential tension that the prosecution may have experienced in choosing to disclose the drug-paraphernalia information to the district court had no bearing on the sentence that Cruz received.

The plea agreement expressly provided that the government could recommend a sentence at the high end of the guideline range. And this the government did. In both its sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, the government specifically asked the district court to impose “[a] sentence of twenty-four (24) months imprisonment,” one at “the upper end of the applicable guideline in this case.” The record makes plain that the prosecution never explicitly or implicitly sought a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

Having unequivocally stated that it was recommending a sentence at the higher end of the guideline range, the government was free to offer reasons supporting its recommendation. See Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d at 58 (finding no error where the government told the court that there were quantities of cocaine beyond the -stipulated-to amount in the plea agreement). By statute, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Thus, the sentencing court has a right to expect that the prosecutor will share all relevant facts. See Saxena, 229 F.3d at 6 (finding no error where the prosecutor shared information about the defendant’s post-plea activities with the district court).

The government’s obligation to provide relevant information to a sentencing court does not dissipate merely because the government assumes an obligation to adhere to commitments made under a plea agreement. Id. at 6. Rather, the obligations coexist and must both be discharged conscientiously. Id. Here, because the prosecutor adhered to the terms of the agreement with Cruz, we see no basis to vacate his sentence based on the alleged breach.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Claims of sentencing error trigger a two-step inquiry: “we first determine whether the sentence imposed is procedurally reasonable and then determine whether it is substantively reasonable.” United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 2011). As Cruz objects only to his sentence’s substantive reasonableness, our review hews to the formula set out for substantive challenges.

“The substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence is [typically] reviewed for abuse of discretion, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Zavala-Marti, 715 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2013). Although Cruz did not object in the district court, for purposes of this appeal, we will assume, favorably to him, that our review is for abuse of discretion rather than for plain error. Cf. United States v. Nunez, 840 F.3d 1, 6-7, 2016 WL 6092692, at *4 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2016) (assuming without deciding that review is for abuse of discretion). Nevertheless, his claim fails.

Cruz denigrates the district court’s rationale because (in his view) the court inappropriately premised its sentencing determination on community-based factors, viz., gun violence in Puerto Rico. Although Cruz concedes that this is a permissible consideration at sentencing, he submits that the court erred by relying on it excessively, Thus, Cruz’s argument amounts to a disagreement with the district court’s weighing of the different sentencing factors.

We discern no abuse of the sentencing court’s broad discretion. Cf. United States v. Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 201 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no error where the defendant sought to substitute his judgment for that of the sentencing court). We have repeatedly recognized that deterrence is an important factor in the sentencing calculus. United States v. Diaz-Arroyo, 797 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, as was done here, a sentencing court may consider the pervasiveness of similar crimes in the community when formulating its sentence. See id. Moreover, in determining Cruz’s sentence, the district court considered all sentencing factors, adequately explained its sentence, and imposed a reasonable sentence in the totality of the circumstances. See Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d at 201; see also Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592 (“There is no one reasonable- sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes.”). Accordingly, the imposition of a 36-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the district court’s sentence is affirmed.

      . Because Cruz pleaded guilty, our discussion of the facts is drawn from the plea agreement, the change-of-plea colloquy, the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSR”), and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 196 (1st Cir. 2015).

      . Although we have sometimes stated that a failure to object on substantive reasonableness grounds engenders plain error review on appeal, several of our recent cases have questioned the application of this standard. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Arroyo, 797 F.3d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir. 2015).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BARRON, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Edythe L. DYER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., d/b/a America’s Servicing Company; U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee for CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Defendants, Appellees.
    No. 15-2421
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    November 14, 2016

      Glenn F. Russell, Jr., with whom Glenn F. Russell Jr„ & Associates, P.C. was on brief, for appellant.
    David E. Fialkow, with whom Jeffrey S. Patterson, Michael R, Stanley, and K&L Gates LLP were on brief, for appellees.
    Before TORRUELLA, KAYATTA, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.
   BARRON, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Edythe Dyer, brought this suit against U.S. Bank, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”) and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), arising out of a foreclosure sale on her property. The suit was dismissed, and we now affirm.

I.

In 2004, Dyer executed a promissory note to Dreamhouse Mortgage Corporation (“Dreamhouse”) and granted a mortgage on her property at 41 Commonwealth Avenue, Unit #9, in Boston, Massachusetts (the “Property”). She granted the mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the “nominee” for Dreamhouse and its successors and assigns. In 2008, MERS executed a document entitled “Assignment of Mortgage,” which transferred the mortgage to U.S. Bank, as trustee. The document was recorded with the Registry of Deeds for Suffolk County, Massachusetts. MERS also executed an assignment of the mortgage to U.S. Bank in 2011. In 2012, MERS published a “Confirmatory Assignment” confirming the 2008 assignment. That document explained that the 2011 assignment was a nullity because, in 2011, MERS did not have standing to assign the mortgage, given that it had already transferred the mortgage to U.S. Bank in 2008. In 2013, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank’s servicer of the loan, recorded an affidavit in the registry of deeds attesting that, as of that time, U.S. Bank held the note secured by Dyer’s mortgage.

In April 2015, U.S. Bank notified Dyer that it intended to foreclose on the Property by utilizing the statutory power of sale provided for in Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 183 § 21. That provision permits a proper party to execute a foreclosure sale without prior judicial authorization. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 462 Mass. 569, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1127 (2012). The requirements for exercising that statutory power of sale are laid out in Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 244 § 14. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 50 N.E.3d 419, 422-23 (2016).

Dyer filed suit in Massachusetts state court on May 26, 2015. Dyer named U.S. Bank as one of the defendants. She sought a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank is not a proper party under Section 14 to utilize the statutory power of sale, and she also sought damages against U.S. Bank for slander of title based on that same allegation about the status of U.S. Bank under Section 14. Dyer also named Wells Fargo, the servicer of the loan, as a defendant in the suit. In her claim against Wells Fargo, Dyer sought damages under Massachusetts’ catch-all consumer protection statute, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A.

The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In federal court, the parties consented to proceeding before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Dyer then filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure sale.. The Magistrate Judge denied that motion. The defendants thereafter filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

After a full round of briefing, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. In so doing, the Magistrate Judge dismissed all of Dyer’s claims. Dyer now appeals.

II.

We start with the aspect of this appeal that concerns U.S. Bank. Dyer does not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s ruling that Dyer’s slander of title claim rests on the same contention as her request for a declaratory judgment: that U.S. Bank was not authorized to exercise the statutory power of sale. Thus, we fully resolve the U.S. Bank-related portion of Dyer’s appeal so long as we conclude that U.S. Bank was authorized to exercise the statutory power of sale.

In contending that Ü.S. Bank was not authorized to exercise the statutory power of sale, Dyer chiefly argues that U.S. Bank was not the holder of the mortgage when it purported to exercise the statutory power of sale and that, in consequence of the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) in Eaton, U.S. Bank was not entitled to exercise that power. See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1131 (holding that, in order to foreclose under Section 14, an entity must both hold the mortgage and either hold the note or act as an agent of the noteholder). In so contending, Dyer acknowledges that there was a purported 2008 assignment of the mortgage from MERS to U.S. Bank. Dyer acknowledges as well that U.S. Bank referenced this assignment in the statutorily required notice. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244 § 14. But, Dyer contends, that 2008 assignment was void for a number of reasons. We do not agree.

Dyer first argues that the assignment was void because MERS, when it made the 2008 assignment, was neither the noteholder nor the agent of the noteholder, instead, MERS held the mortgage only as a “nominee” for the lender, Dreamhouse, and its successors and assigns. But we held in Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013), that a mortgage contract that names “MERS .,. as nominee for [Lender] and [Lender’s] successors and assigns” does suffice to make MERS the mortgage holder and then authorize MERS to assign the mortgage on behalf of the lender to the lender’s successors and assigns. Id at 293. And here, Dyer’s 2004 mortgage contract contains the same language regarding MERS, and its status as nominee'(in this case for Dreamhouse), as the one that we addressed in Culhane.

Dyer responds that Culhane is not controlling. She contends that Culhane relied on a construction of Section 14 that predated the SJC’s decision in Eaton and that Eaton renders that construction impermissible. While Eaton did expressly reserve the question of whether a “nominee” is an “agent” of the noteholder, it did so only in connection with its discussion of whether MERS’s status as a “nominee” of the lender empowered it to execute the statutory power of sale. See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1134 n.29. Eaton in no way suggested that MERS’s status as a nominee was insufficient to permit it to hold or assign a mortgage to a successor or assign of the lender. And, in Culhane, in which we expressly applied Eaton, Culhane, 708 F.3d at 288 n.4, we concluded that MERS’s status as a nominee was sufficient to permit it to hold a mortgage and to make such an assignment. Id. at 293. Thus, Dyer’s first ground for contending that the 2008 assignment is void is without merit in consequence of the language of the 2004 contract naming MERS as Dreamhousé’s nominee.

Moving past the terms of the 2004 mortgage contact, Dyer goes on to contend that the 2008 assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank is void for an independent reason. She contends that MERS assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank in violation of a trust agreement between U.S. Bank and the investors in the loan, which empowered U.S. Bank to act on behalf of the investors, and that the breach of the trust agreement rendered the assignment void. But in Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 748 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir. 2014), we held that an assignment made in contravention of such a trust agreement is at most voidable at the option of the parties to the trust agreement, not void as á matter of law. Therefore, the alleged violation of the trust agreement does not void the 2008 assignment and thereby strip U.S. Bank of its status as a holder of the mortgage. Thus, this argument, too, fails. •

Dyer next argues that the 2008 assignment is void for yet another reason: the 2012 Confirmatory Assignment states that MERS lacked “standing” to assign the mortgage. That document, however, makes clear that MERS lacked “standing” to assign the mortgage in 2011, because MERS had validly assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank in 2008. The Confirmatory Assignment thus hardly casts doubt on the validity of the 2008 assignment to U.S. Bank; in fact, it appears to confirm it. We therefore reject this argument as well.

Finally, we reject Dyer’s separate argument that U.S. Bank was. not a proper party to exercise the statutory power of sale because the notice of sale that Section 14 required U.S. Bank to publish did not comply with. Section 14’s requirements. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244 § 14 (stating that “in the event a mortgagee holds a mortgage pursuant to an assignment, no notice under this section shall be valid unless (i) at the time such notice is mailed, an assignment, or a chain of assignments, evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the foreclosing mortgagee has been duly recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district where the land lies and (ii) the recording information for all re-corded assignments is referenced in the notice of sale required in this section.”). Specifically, she contends that notice failed to refer to what Dyer identifies as various “intermediate transfers.”

Dyer’s complaint is less than clear as to precisely what she contends was being assigned in these “intermediate transfers,” and her briefing does not do much to help clarify matters. The premise of this argument appears to be, however, that MERS, as the nominee of Dreamhouse, never properly held the mortgage. From this premise, she contends that the notice published by U.S. Bank had to set forth a chain of title that ran from Dreamhouse, the original lender, to the various parties the complaint identifies as being involved in “intermediate transfers” to U.S. Bank.

The problem with this argument stems from its mistaken premise. As we have explained, per our decision in Culhane, MERS’s status as nominee did not bar it from holding the mortgage. See Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291-92. Thus, MERS was the record holder of the mortgage in consequence of the mortgage that Dyer granted to MERS as nominee for Dreamhouse in 2004. Moreover, Dyer does not allege that MERS subsequently assigned the mortgage back to Dreamhouse or to any other entity prior to MERS’s 2008 assignment of the mortgage to U.S. Bank.

Thus, even accepting as we must the factual allegations in Dyer’s complaint that there were what she calls “intermediate transfers,” she provides no basis for concluding that MERS did not remain the sole record holder of the mortgage up until the time it assigned that mortgage to U.S. Bank in 2008. In fact, because MERS continued to hold the mortgage all along, in keeping with the way in which the MERS system -operates, Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1122 n,5, it appears that the intermediate transfers Dyer identifies in her complaint were merely transfers of the “beneficial ownership interest ]” in the mortgage among MERS members. Id.

Against this background, the notice published by U.S. Bank complied with Section 14 for a simple reason. The notice referenced the assignment (in 2008) from the record holder of the mortgage, MERS, to U.S. Bank. The notice thus did just what it needed to do: it referenced “an assignment of the mortgage to the foreclosing mortgagee” that “has been duly recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district where the land lies” and for which “the recording information ... [was] referenced in the notice of sale required in this section.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244 § 14; cf. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (2011) (“A foreclosing entity may provide a complete chain of assignments linking it to the record holder of the mortgage, or a single assignment from the record holder of the mortgage.”).

In sum, none of Dyer’s arguments as to why U.S. Bank was not authorized to exercise the statutory power of sale under Section 14 have merit. We thus affirm the order dismissing her slander of title claim.

III.

In addition to Dyer’s two claims against U.S. Bank, Dyer also brought a claim against Wells - Fargo. In that claim, Dyer ■ sought damages under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A. That statute prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 2(a). The statute also requires that, thirty days before filing a claim under Chapter 93A, a claimant must, as a general matter, send a “written demand for relief’ to the defendant, outlining the unfair or deceptive act or practice and the injury suffered. Id. § 9(3).

Dyer alleged in her complaint that the suit itself served as the demand letter required by Chapter 93A. The Magistrate Judge rightly held that the suit could not serve to fulfill the demand letter requirement, because the demand letter must be sent prior to filing suit. See id.; Rodi v. S. New England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge ruled that the claim must be dismissed.

On appeal, Dyer contends for the first time that she was not required to send a demand letter at all. She relies on the exception to the demand letter requirement set forth in section 9(3) of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A. The exception provides that “[tjhe demand requirements of this paragraph shall not apply if , the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the [Cjommon-wealth.”

Dyer contends that Moronta v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 621, 41 N.E.3d 311, 315 n.11 (2015), makes clear that this exception applies so long as the putative defendant does not maintain both a place of business and assets within the Commonwealth. And she contends that Wells Fargo has no assets in the Commonwealth. The defendants respond that Mo-ronta sets forth that proposition about the exception’s disjunctive nature only in dicta and that this dicta is in conflict with our prior decision in McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 218 (1st Cir. 2012).

Dyer did not argue below, however, that she did not need to comply with the demand letter requirement. We thus treat as waived her newly raised argument about whether the exception to the demand letter requirement applies. See Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 222 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[Ejxcept in the most extraordinary circumstances (not present here), matters not raised in the trial court cannot be hawked for the first time on appeal.”). And, given that Dyer does not dispute that her complaint failed to plead that she had sent a demand letter prior to filing suit, we affirm the order dismissing Dyer’s Chapter 93A claim.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Dyer’s claims.

      . Following the Magistrate Judge's order dismissing Dyer’s claims, the foreclosure sale occurred. Accordingly, we issued an order requesting supplemental briefing as to whether Dyer’s appeal of the denial of her request for declaratory relief had been rendered moot by that sale. Because that request for relief relies on the same claim regarding U.S. Bank's status under Section 14 as her request for damages for her slander of title claim, this appeal is not moot, McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 210 n.2 (1st Cir. 2012).

      . Eaton holds that, even if the mortgage and the note had previously been separated, a party may only exercise Section 14's power of sale if at the time of the sale it holds both tire mortgage and the note. Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1129. In addition to contesting U.S. Bank's status as the mortgage holder in consequence of the 2008 assignment from MERS, Dyer , separately challenges the Magistrate Judge’s finding that U.S. Bank also held the note. The Magistrate Judge based that finding on both a copy of the note endorsed in blank that U.S. Bank produced and a copy of the 2013 affidavit by Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank’s agent and servicer of the loan, stating that U.S. Bank held the note. Dyer provides no basis for rejecting that finding beyond her conclusory contrary assertion and a reference to an al-longe, which she does not develop into an argument that would warrant reversal of the Magistrate Judge’s finding. We thus treat as waived any argument that U.S. Bank was not ’ a proper party to execute the sale because, even if U.S. Bank held the mortgage via the 2008 assignment from MERS; it did not also hold the note. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

      . The SJC explained that MERS is the “mortgagee of record for mortgage loans registered on the MERS electronic registration system, which tracks servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in those loans; the system allows these servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests to be traded electronically between members without the need to record publicly each mortgage assignment.” Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1122 n.5.


author: SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judge:

text:
    UPSTATE CITIZENS FOR EQUALITY, INC., David Brown Vickers, Richard Tallcot, Scott Peterman, Daniel T. Warren, Town of Vernon, New York, Town of Verona, Abraham Acee, Arthur Strife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, individually, and as trustee of the goods, credits and chattels of the federally recognized Indian nations and tribes situated in the State of New York, Sally M.R. Jewell, in her official capacity as secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Michael L. Connor, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior and exercising his delegated authority as assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, Elizabeth J. Klein, in her official capacity as Associate Deputy Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior, Defendants-Appellees.

    Docket Nos. 15-1688, 15-1726
    August Term, 2016
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Argued: May 3, 2016
    Decided: November 9, 2016

      David BROwn VickeRS, Fayetteville, NY, for Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc;, David Brown Vickers, Richard Tallcot, Scott Peterman and Daniel T. Warren.
    Cornelius D. Murray, O’Connell and Aronowitz, Albany, NY, for Town of Vernon, Town of Verona, Abraham Acee and Arthur Strife.
    J. David Gunter II (John C. Crudén, Steven Miskims, Jennifer Turner, on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United. States of America, individually, and as trustee of the goods, credits and chattels of the federally recognized Indian nations and tribes situated in the State of New York, Sally M.R. Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Michael L. Connor, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior and exercising his delegated authority as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, Elizabeth J. Klein, in her official capacity as Associate Deputy Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior.
    Before: LIVINGSTON, CHIN, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

         The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as shown above.

   SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judge:

This case is the latest in a long line of lawsuits in our Circuit regarding the efforts of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (“the Tribe”) to assert tribal jurisdiction over a portion of its indigenous homeland in central New York State. After the Supreme Court rejected the Tribe’s claim to existing, historically-rooted jurisdiction over a portion of the homeland, see City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 125 S.Ct. 1478, 161 L.Ed.2d 386 (2005), the Tribe requested that the United States take approximately 17,000 acres of Tribe-owned land into trust on its behalf in procedures prescribed by § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The entrustment that the federal government approved in 2008 gave the Tribe jurisdiction over approximately 13,000 acres of land in central New York, allowing the Tribe, among other things, to continue to operate its Turning Stone casino in Verona, New York.

Plaintiffs-Appellants—two towns, a civic organization, and several residents of the area near the trust land—filed these lawsuits in an attempt to reverse the land-into-trust decisions. They now appeal from judgments of the Northern District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, /.), granting the summary judgment motions of Defendants-Appellants, the United States and several federal officials. The District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ claims that the land-into-trust procedures are unconstitutional and that certain provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (“ILCA”), adopted in 1983, bar the United States from taking land into trust for the Tribe.

We agree with the District Court that the entrustment procedure generally, and this entrustment in particular, lie within the federal government’s long-recognized “plenary” power over Indian tribes: Neither principles of state sovereignty nor the Constitution’s Enclave Clause—which requires state consent for the broadest federal assertions of jurisdiction over land within a state—prevents the federal government from conferring on the Tribe jurisdiction over these trust lands. We further hold that the Oneida Nation of New York is eligible as a “tribe” within the meaning of 25 U.S.C. §§ 465 and 2201(1) for land to be taken into trust on its behalf. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the District Court.

BACKGROUND

I. Land-into-Trust Procedures (§ 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act)

The origins of this dispute lie in the evolution of federal Indian policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Beginning in the late 19th century, Congress began to partition tribal lands and allocate parcels to individual Indians in a policy known as “allotment.” Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992). As the Supreme Court has described, “[t]he objectives of allotment were simple and clear cut: to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into -the society at large.” Id. at 254, 112 S.Ct. 683. In the years in which the allotment policy was followed, Congress also stripped tribes of their authority to govern themselves, instead providing that Indians residing on allotted lands would eventually be subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 254-55, 112 S.Ct. 683.

Because Indians could still sell their allotted lands to non-Indians, however, “many of the early allottees quickly lost their land through transactions that were unwise or even procured by fraud.” Id. at 254, 112 S.Ct. 683. For this- and other reasons, the allotment policy “came to an abrupt end in 1934.” Id. at 255, 112 S.Ct. 683. The Indian Reorganization Aqt of 1934 (“IRA”)—including its § 5, originally codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465—“fundamen-tally restructured the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, reversing the Nineteenth Century goal of assimilation and embodying ‘principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance.’ ” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Connecticut”) (quoting Cty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 255, 112 S.Ct. 683). The IRA repudiated the allotment policy and aimed to restore to tribes, or replace, the lands and related economic opportunities that had been lost to them under it. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal .Indian Law § 15.07[l][a] (2012) (“Cohen, Handbook”).

The IRA therefore authorized the Secretary of the Interior, in her discretion, to acquire land and other property interests “within or without existing reservations ... for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465). “Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act,” it provides, “shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired.” Id. Land held by the federal government in trust for Indians under this provision “is generally not subject to (1) state or local taxation; (2) local zoning and regulatory requirements; or, (3) state criminal and civil jurisdiction [over Indians], unless the tribe consents to such jurisdiction.” Connecticut, 228 F.3d at 85-86 (citations omitted). Under the IRA as passed in 1934, tribes were entitled to opt out of its provisions, including the land-into-trust provisions of § 5, by majority vote. See Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 18, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 478).

The IRA’s implementing regulations, promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Interior, create a process by which tribes and individual Indians can request that the Department take land into trust on their behalf. See 25 C.F.R. § 151:9. Upon receiving such a request, the Secretary must provide notice to state and local governments whose rights would be affected by the acquisition and give them an opportunity to respond. See § 151.10. In making her final decision, the Secretary is to consider enumerated criteria, including the tribe’s need for land “to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or Indian housing,” § 151.3(a)(3), and “the impact on the State and its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land from the tax rolls,” § 151.10(e). The Secretary is also directed to consider jurisdictional problems and conflicts of land use that would be created by an entrustment. Id.

II. Factual Background

For more than four decades, the Tribe has clashed with state and local governments and residents in upstate New York over its efforts to regain governmental authority with respect to a portion of its extensive indigenous homeland. Prior opinions of this Court and the Supreme Court have detailed the complex history of the relationship between New York and the Tribe, and in particular their disputes regarding the Tribe’s jurisdiction over its reservation in central New York. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 663-65, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (“Oneida I”); Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 230-32, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985) (“Oneida II”); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 203-11, 125 S.Ct. 1478, 161 L.Ed.2d 386 (2005) (“Sherrill”); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 146-52 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Oneida III”), rev’d, Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478. We offer only a brief summary of that history here, to provide context for our decision.

The Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe and “a direct descendant of the [Oneida Nation], ‘one of the six nations of the Iroquois, the most powerful Indian Tribe in the Northeast at the time of the American Revolution.’” Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 230, 105 S.Ct. 1245). The “aboriginal homeland” of the Oneida Nation “comprised some six million acres in what is now central New York.” Id. But under the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, the Oneida Nation ceded “all their lands”— save for a reservation of about 300,000 acres—to New York State in exchange for payments in money and in kind. Id.

In a pivotal development, “[w]ith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations came exclusively under federal authority.” Oneida III, 337 F.3d at 146. In the 1790 Nonintercourse Act, Congress prohibited selling tribal land without the acquiescence of the federal government. Id. at 146-47; see also 25 U.S.C. § 177 (restricting alienability of Indian land). Then, in 1794, the federal government entered into the Treaty of Canandaigua with the Six Iroquois Nations. The Treaty “acknowledge[d] the Oneida Reservation as established by the Treaty of Fort Schuyler and guaranteed the Oneidas’ free use and enjoyment” of the reservation. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 204-05, 125 S.Ct. 1478.

Notwithstanding the Nonintercourse Act and the Canandaigua Treaty, however, New York State continued to purchase land from the Oneidas, largely without federal interference. Id. at 205, 125 S.Ct. 1478. Beginning in 1888, the federal government for a while encouraged the Oneidas to relocate to a new reservation in Kansas. Although the Tribe never completely relocated to that site, id. at 206, 125 S.Ct. 1478, the Oneidas who remained in New York by 1920 owned only 32 acres of the reservation’s original 300,000. Id. at 207,125 S.Ct. 1478. Nonetheless, the Oneidas’ original reservation was never officially “disestablished.” See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cty., 665 F.3d 408, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2011).

In the 1990s, the Tribe began to repurchase New York reservation land in open-market transactions and to use those lands for various commercial enterprises. In those years, the Tribe took the position that because the purchased, parcels lay within the boundaries of the reservation originally occupied by the Oneidas, the properties were exempt from local property taxes. The Tribe opened and operated the Turning Stone Resort Casino on a portion of the newly-purchased land.

The Town of Sherrill eventually moved to evict the Tribe from land within the Town’s boundaries for nonpayment of property taxes. In response, the Tribe sought an injunction bamng both the eviction and the assessment of property taxes. The District Court held, and our Circuit agreed, that the Tribe’s land was exempt from property taxes because it lay within the boundaries of the reservation established for it by the Fort Schuyler and Canandaigua treaties. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, New York, 145 F.Supp.2d 226, 266 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd by Oneida III, 337 F.3d at 167.

But the Supreme Court rejected the Tribe’s claim, reasoning that the Oneidas had as a practical matter lost rights to their land more than two hundred years earlier., See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216-17, 125 S.Ct. 1478. During those two centuries, state and local governments continuously exercised sovereignty over the putative reservation land, and the character of the land changed dramatically. Id. As a result, the Court held, equitable considerations precluded restoration of the Tribe’s sovereign rights over land since purchased on the market. Id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478. The Court pointed out, however, that an alternative was available to the Tribe: “Congress has provided a-mechanism for the acquisition of lands for tribal communities that takes account of the interests of others with stakes in the area’s governance and well-being.” Id. at 220, 125 S.Ct. 1478. Describing the land-into-trust provisions enacted in § 5 of the IRA, the Court suggested that § 5 offered “the proper avenue for [the Tribe] to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.” Id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478.

On April 4, 2005, almost immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sherrill and in accordance with the Court’s suggestion, the Tribe requested that the Secretary of the Interior take more than 17,000 acres of land in central New York into trust for the Tribe. All of the land was already owned by the Tribe. Its government, health, educational, and cultural facilities were located in the tract, as were tribal housing, businesses, and hunting lands, .and the Tribe-operated Turning Stone casino.

Three years later, in May 2008, and over the objection of state and local governments, the Department of the Interior announced its decision to accept into trust for the Tribe approximately 13,000 of the 17,-000 acres requested. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Record of Decision: Oneida Indian Nation of New York Fee-to-Trust Request (May 2008) (“Record of Decision”), Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 550-621. The Secretary found that the entrustment was necessary to support tribal self-determination, tribal housing, and economic development. Record of Decision, J.A. 551, 585. It acknowledged that the acquisition “may negatively impact the ability of state and local governments to provide cohesive and consistent governance,” id., J.A 570, and would incrementally increase the demand for local government services, id., J.A. 573. But it concluded that those negative effects did not warrant denying the entrustment. Id.

III. Procedural History

Plaintiffs-Appellants moved quickly in 2008 to challenge the Secretary’s land-into-trust decision in federal district court. See Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-633, 2008 WL 2841386 (N.D.N.Y., filed June 16, 2008); Town of Verona v. Salazar, No. 6:08-cv-647 (N.D.N.Y., filed June 19, 2008). Invoking federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, Plaintiffs contended that the statutory land-into-trust mechanism exceeds the federal government’s constitutional authority and unlawfully infringes on state sovereignty. The Verona and Vernon Plaintiffs also argued that the Department’s statutory authority does not extend to taking land into trust for the Tribe.

In the following year, while the challenges were still pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009). In Carderi, the Court held that only tribes “under federal jurisdiction” when the land-into-trust law was passed in 1934 are eligible to avail themselves of the entrustment procedures. Id. at 381, 129 S.Ct. 1058. The District Court in the litigation now before us accordingly remanded these cases to the Department for an initial determination of whether the Oneidas were “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. New York v. Salazar, No. 6:08-cv-644, 2012 WL 4364452, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012). And, in December 2013, the agency issued an addendum to its Record of Decision on the Tribe’s entrustment request, ruling that the Oneidas were indeed “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. J.A. at 810.

The government moved for summary judgment in both cases, asserting the legality of the land-into-trust decision under both the Constitution and the applicable statutes, and its availability with respect to the Tribe. The District Court granted the motions. Town of Verona v. Salazar, No. 6:08-cv-647, 2009 WL 3165556, at *2-4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009); Upstate Citizens for Equality v. Jewell, No. 5:08-ev-0633, 2015 WL 1399366, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. March 26, 2015). The court ruled that Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause encompassed taking the land into trust for the Tribe, and that principles of state sovereignty did not prevent the action. The court farther held that New York’s consent to the entrustment was not needed because the federal government did not fully oust the state of jurisdiction over the entrusted lands, and therefore the Constitution’s Enclave Clause was not implicated. Jewell, 2015 WL 1399366, at *8-9. The court rejected the Verona Plaintiffs’ argument that the federal government could not take land into trust for the Tribe because the Oneidas had opted out of qualifying for that remedy in 1936. Salazar, 2009 WL 3165556, at *9-11. And the court held that Plaintiff Upstate Citizens for Equality (“UCE”) lacked standing to dispute the legitimacy of the Tribe’s leadership in the context of its legal attack on the land-into-trust decision. Jewell, 2015 WL 1399366, at *9.

The instant appeals followed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs challenge the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust on behalf of the Oneida Tribe of New York as violative of the Constitution, the Indian Removal Act, and the Indian Land Consolidation Act. We review de novo the District Court’s rejection of those legal arguments on summary judgment. See Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cty. v. Chaudhuri, 802 F.3d 267, 279 (2d Cir. 2015).

I. Standing

As a threshold matter, the government contends that Plaintiff UCE lacks standing to challenge the land-into-trust decision on appeal because it has dropped some of the claims it pursued before the District Court, where its standing was - undisputed.

Standing is an “irreducible constitutional minimum” that must be satisfied for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a case. Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) that it “suffered an injury in fact,” (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). An “injury in fact” consists of “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

UCE asserts that it has standing to challenge the Secretary’s action based on harms that it contends are or will be caused to its members by the Tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction over the entrusted land. Among other harms, its complaint asserts that the casino’s continued operation on the entrusted land will cause its members “loss of enjoyment of the aesthetic and environmental qualities of the agricultural land surrounding the casino site,” “loss of tax revenue currently generated by the agricultural land that comprises the casino site,” and “the loss of business and recreational opportunities, such as retail stores and restaurants, that will be forced out by the casino.” UCE First Am. Compl. ¶ III.18, J.A. 292. As relief it seeks, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the government to “take enforcement action” against unlawfully operating casinos—presumably including Turning Stone. Id. ¶ VI.18, J.A. 343.

The government argues that these alleged injuries no longer confer standing on UCE because the- group has now abandoned its claim that the Turning Stone casino operates in violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). On appeal, UCE challenges only the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust on behalf of the Tribe. The casino’s operation will be lawful regardless of whether the underlying land is taken into trust, the government argues,, and therefore UCE lacks standing to pursue this appeal: The casino’s operation—on which UCE’s asserted harms rest—will be undisturbed no matter how the entrustment decision is resolved.

We disagree with the government that the lawfulness of the casino’s operations will not be affected by the result in this case. Under the IGRA, Turning Stone is a Class III casino, meaning that it may offer a wide range of gaming activities. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). The IGRA allows Class III gaming activities to be conducted “on Indian lands,” however, only if the activities are authorized by “the governing body of the Indian tribe having jurisdiction over ■ such lands” ■ 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A)® (emphasis added). Thus, as we recently observed, “[A]ny tribe seeking to conduct gaming on land must have jurisdiction over that land.” Chaudhuri, 802 F.3d at 279. “Jurisdiction,” in .this context, means “tribal jurisdiction”—“a combination of tribal and federal jurisdiction over land,” to the exclusion (with some exceptions) of state jurisdiction. Id. at 279-80; see infra 571-72 n.19.

The Supreme Court has already rejected the Tribe’s claim that it may exercise tribal jurisdiction over the Turning Stone land without the Department first taking the land into trust on the Tribe’s behalf. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220-21, 125 S.Ct. 1478. Indeed, among the stated purposes of the Department’s land-into-trust decision is to “provid[e] a tribal land base and homeland that ... is subject to tribal sovereignty.” Record of Decision, J.A. 557. If the land-into-trust decision is reversed, the Tribe will be stripped of tribal jurisdiction over the Turning Stone casino site, and the Tribe’s operation of the casino may become unlawful.

Because UCE’s attack on the land-into-trust decision will have repercussions for the lawfulness of the Turning Stone casino’s operations, and because the organization has plausibly alleged that the casino’s operations cause them injury-in-fact (allegations that the government does not dispute), we conclude that UCE has standing to pursue this appeal, and we turn to the merits of the. parties’ substantive arguments.

11. Constitutionality of Land-into-Trust Procedures

A. Scope of Constitutional Authority

UCE contends that the federal government lacks authority under the Constitution to take this land into trust for the Tribe pursuant to § 5 of the- IRA. Their position is, primarily, that the Indian Commerce Clause does not .permit the federal government to take action with respect to tribes when that action would take place entirely within a single state.

UCE’s argument is at odds with the Supreme Court’s longstanding general view that the federal government’s power under the Constitution to legislate with respect to Indian tribes is exceptionally broad. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’” (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979))); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62,116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (“[T]he States ... have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.”). This expansive power has been understood to originate in two Constitutional provisions: the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I § 8, cl. 3, and the treaty power, Art. II § 2, cl. 2. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628. Thus, the “central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192, 109 S.Ct. 1698, 104 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989) (emphasis added). The treaty power, pursuant to which the executive branch entered into treaties with Indian tribes—until 1878, when Congress prohibited the practice— has been construed to give Congress the related authority to legislate in further-anee of those treaties that were lawfully consummated. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201, 124 S.Ct. 1628. Congress has long used the powers arising under these provisions to legislate extensively in the matter of Indian affairs, including with respect to tribal property rights. See, e.g., id. at 202, 124 S.Ct. 1628; see also Cohen, Handbook § 5.01.

UCE urges us to disregard that lengthy line of authority, however, and instead to import restrictions developed with respect to the Interstate Commerce Clause into the Indian Commerce Clause context. In particular, UCE contends that Congress’s “plenary” authority to legislate with respect to Indian tribes—analogous to Congress’s power vis-a-vis interstate commerce—is limited to the regulation of trading activities that cross state borders. Under UCE’s theory, if an Indian tribe’s lands are (like the Tribe’s) located entirely within the boundaries of a single state, then that tribe is subject to state legislation only.

This argument has some superficial appeal. The two commerce-related provisions are tightly intertwined in the constitutional text:

The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

U.S. Const, art. I § 8, cl. 1, 3. And some historical research suggests that the contemporaneous understanding may have been that Congressional authority over Indian affairs was not so expansive as the word “plenary” suggests. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2569-70, 186 L.Ed.2d 729 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that ratifiers of Constitution understood Indian Commerce Clause to regulate only “trade with Indian tribes living beyond state borders”); Robert Natelson, Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 201, 243-44 (2007) (arguing that Indian Commerce Clause confers power only to regulate trade with Indian tribes).

But the Supreme Court has already rejected the proposed correspondence between the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses. In its 1989 decision in Cotton Petroleum Carp., the Court observed that the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Clause was to “maintain[ ] free trade among the States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation,” whereas the purpose of the Indian Commerce Clause was to “provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.” 490 U.S. at 192, 109 S.Ct. 1698. Consistent with those purposes, the Court explained, Interstate Commerce Clause case law “is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause.” Id. On this reasoning, the Court concluded that the Indian Commerce Clause does not contain an implicit “interstate” limitation. Although Justice Thomas has urged a more restrictive reading of the Clause in recent concurrences, see, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2569-70 (Thomas, /., concurring); Lara, 541 U.S. at 224-26, 124 S.Ct. 1628 (Thomas, J., concurring), the Supreme Court majority has continued to adhere to the view that the Indian Commerce Clause vests Congress with plenary power over Indian tribes and that this power is not delimited by state boundaries.

UCE argues in the alternative that § 5 is unconstitutional because the acquisition of land for Indian use is not a “regulation] [of] commerce” within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause. Again, however, precedent deprives this argument of any traction. The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may purchase or exercise eminent domain over land within state boundaries as an exercise of its general constitutional power to regulate commerce. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 335-37, 13 S.Ct. 622, 37 L.Ed. 463 (1893); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 656-59, 10 S.Ct. 965, 34 L.Ed. 295 (1890). Further, the Court has established that, when exercising Indian Commerce Clause powers, the federal government may, by acquiring land for a tribe, divest a state of important aspects of its jurisdiction, even if a state previously exercised wholesale jurisdiction over the land and even if “federal supervision over [a tribe] has not been continuous.” United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 57 L.Ed.2d 489 (1978) (limiting state criminal jurisdiction over reservation land); see also Cohen, Handbook §§ 5.02[4], 15.03. We therefore reject this alternative argument as well.

B. State Sovereignty

Both groups of Plaintiffs contend that, even if permitted under Congress’s broad Indian Commerce Clause powers, the land-into-trust procedures violate underlying principles of state sovereignty. When the federal government takes land into trust for an Indian tribe, the state that previously exercised jurisdiction over the land cedes some of its authority to the federal and tribal governments. The parties disagree about whether, by implicitly requiring that cession, the entrustment unconstitutionally infringes on New York’s sovereign rights.

Principles of state sovereignty do impose some limits on Congress’s power, otherwise plenary, over Indian affairs. Thus, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the Supreme Court considered whether Congress could permit Indian tribes to sue a state and its officials in federal court to enforce the state’s duty to negotiate with the tribe “in good faith” regarding a tribal-state gambling compact. Id. at 50, 116 S.Ct. 1114. The state maintained that to allow such a federal-court remedy would violate the Eleventh Amendment’s directive that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U;S. Const, amend. XI. The Court agreed: “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress com-píete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, 116 S.Ct. 1114.

The linchpin of the decision in Seminole' Tribe, however, was the Eleventh Amendment’s express protection of the states from the unconsented-to exercise of federal judicial power. No equivalent constitutional provision shields the states’ exercise of jurisdiction over Indian land within their borders. To the contrary, “[t]he States’ inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of course be stripped by Congress.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 365, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (citing Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242-43, 17 S.Ct. 107, 41 L.Ed. 419 (1896)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (creating exclusive federal and Indian jurisdiction for criminal offenses committed in “Indian country”).

The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in United States v. John is instructive in this regard. John concerned whether the federal government, the Mississippi state government, or both, had jurisdiction to prosecute a Choctaw man for a violent crime committed against a non-Indian on a Choctaw reservation in Mississippi. John, 437 U.S. at 635-38, 98 S.Ct. 2541. The dispute arose because the federal government had in the 19th century removed many—although not all—of the Choctaws from their traditional homeland in Mississippi. Id. at 639-41, 98 S.Ct. 2541. Following the removals, the state of Mississippi exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribe’s former territory and those Choctaws who remained there. Id. at 639-40, 98 S.Ct. 2541. Decades later, in the 1920s, the federal government began to purchase land in Mississippi for use by those remaining Choctaws, eventually declaring that the land thus acquired would be held “in the United States in trust for” the tribe and proclaiming the land to be a “reservation.” Id. at 644-46, 98 S.Ct. 2541. Despite the federal proclamation, Mississippi claimed continuing criminal jurisdiction over the Choctaw lands. Id. at 651-52, 98 S.Ct. 2541.

In an argument similar to that made by Plaintiffs here—although not framed precisely in terms of state “sovereignty”— Mississippi asserted that the federal government lacked the power to displace state criminal law authority over the new reservation lands. It contended that “since 1830 the Choctaws residing in Mississippi have become fully assimilated into the political and social life of the State, and ... the Federal Government long ago abandoned its supervisory authority over these Indians.” Id. at 652, 98 S.Ct. 2541. As a result, Mississippi urged, the state had established an irrevocable right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the tribe’s former territory. Id.

The Supreme Court conclusively rejected this argument. “[T]he fact that federal supervision over [the Choctaws]' has not been continuous” does not “destroy[] the federal power to deal with them,” it de-dared. Id. at 653, 98 S.Ct. 2541. Because the land had once been “set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government,” id. at 649, 98 S.Ct. 2541, the federal government retained the power (the Court held) to oust the state of criminal jurisdiction over the territory and to assert federal criminal jurisdiction there. Id. at 654, 98 S.Ct. 2541.

The Court’s reasoning in United States v. John comports with its later favorable assessment—albeit in dicta—of the land-into-trust procedure and the procedure’s “sensitiv[ity] to the complex inter-jurisdictional concerns that arise” when land is transferred from state to tribal authority, Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220-21, 125 S.Ct. 1478. We therefore conclude that underlying principles of state sovereignty do not impair the federal government’s power under the IRA to acquire land on behalf of the Tribe even if, by doing so, New York’s governmental power over that land is diminished.

C. The Enclave Clause

Plaintiffs’ final constitutional challenge rests on text that is known as the Enclave Clause. This rarely invoked constitutional provision provides that Congress has the following power:

[to] exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as may .... become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings.

U.S. Const, art I § 8, cl. 17. The clause is intended to ensure that “places on which the security of the entire Union may depend” are not “in any degree dependent on a particular member -of it.” Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 530, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885) (quoting The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison)). Plaintiffs argue that, in its essence, the clause requires Congress to obtain the state legislature’s express consent—as it typically does when establishing a military base in a state, for example—before it can take state land into trust for Indians. Although in deciding whether to take land into trust, the Department of the Interior must take into account the effects of the entrustment on state and local government, see 25 C.F.R. § 151.10, neither the IRA nor its associated regulations currently require the state’s express consent to the entrustment.

Case law construing the clause instructs that state consent is needed only when the federal government takes “exclusive” jurisdiction over land within a state. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963). “Exclusive” jurisdiction for Enclave Clause purposes is equivalent to the sweeping power that Congress exerts over the District of Columbia, the first subject- of the clause. Id. After exclusive jurisdiction is assumed, newly-enacted state laws have no effect on the federal enclave. See Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric. of Cal., 318 U.S. 285, 294, 63 S.Ct. 628, 87 L.Ed. 761 (1943). But federal control is not exclusive—and state consent is not needed— when the state in which the federal property sits is, for instance, “free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976).

When land is taken into trust by the federal government for Indian tribes, the federal government does not obtain such categorically exclusive jurisdiction over the entrusted lands. See Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650-51, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) (Indian reservation-is not federal enclave because state civil and criminal laws still apply to non-Indians); see also Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 40 (1st Cir. 2007) (Enclave Clause does not bar application of IRA land-into-trust procedures), rev’d on other grounds, Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395-96, 129 S.Ct. 1058. States retain some civil and criminal authority on reservations, subject to the caveat, that in exercising that authority they may not “infringe[ ] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 386, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) (per curiam). States may, for instance, require Indians to collect state sales taxes on goods sold on the reservation to nonmembers. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 159-60, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980). Also, their agents may enter the reservation to execute a search warrant related to off-reservation conduct. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65, 121 S.Ct. 2304.

State jurisdiction is thus only reduced, and not eliminated, when the federal government takes land into trust for a tribe. Because federal and Indian authority do not wholly displace state authority over land taken into trust pursuant to § 5 of the IRA, the Enclave Clause poses no barrier to the entrustment that occurred here.

III. Tribe’s Eligibility for Land-into-Trust Procedures

Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments challenge the government’s interpretation of the terms “Indians” and “tribe” in the IRA and related statutes. In their view, the Oneida Indians of New York are not a “tribe” eligible to be the beneficiary of land taken into trust by the United States, both because they are excluded from the benefits of the IRA by the terms of that 1934 statute, and because the language of the 1983 Indian Land Consolidation Act does not reach them.

A. Definitions of “Tribe”

We begin by reviewing the applicable statutes. As noted above, § 5 of the IRA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land in trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. The statute defines “Indians” for purposes of this section as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction”; it defines “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. At the time of its enactment, tribes could opt out of the IRA’s provisions, including § 5, by vote at a special election. See 25 U.S.C, § 478. As we have mentioned, the Oneidas did so in 1936 by a tribal vote.

In 1983, however, acting in response to requests by tribes that had earlier opted out but since changed their views, Congress overrode the tribes’ opt-out votes with the Indian Land Consolidation Act (“ILCA”), Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2517 (1983) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq.). The ILCA directs that § 5 of the IRA “shall apply to all tribes notwithstanding the [opt-out] provisions of section 478.” 25 U.S.C. § 2202 (emphasis added). The ILCA further defines “tribes” as “any Indian tribe, band, group, pueblo, or community for which, or for the members of which, the United States holds lands in trust.” § 2201(1).

B. Applicability of the 1934 IRA to New York Indians

In Plaintiffs’ view, Congress did not intend in 1934 to make the New York Indian tribes eligible for the § 5 land-into-trust procedures established by the IRA. Those procedures, they assert, were intended to remedy the specific effects of the 19th-century allotment policy—and in particular, the Dawes Act of 1887. The Dawes Act authorized the President to transfer ownership of Indian tribal lands from the tribes to individual Indians in “allotments,” in furtherance of the policy we described above. See 24 Stat. 388 § 1 (1887). In 1934, responding to the ill effects of the Act, Congress repudiated the allotment policy by adopting the IRA and creating the land-into-trust procedures, giving the federal government a tool with which to reestablish tribal land holdings. See Cohen, Handbook § 16.03[2][c].

The Oneidas lost their land not through the Dawes Act or the allotment policy, but rather through repeated land sales made by the tribe to New York State in violation of federal law. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 206-07, 125 S.Ct. 1478. But nothing in the IRA’s text limits its remedial reach to tribes affected by the Dawes Act. Indeed, the IRA’s definition of “Indians” is notably far-reaching: It covers “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. When Congress intended to exclude a geographic area or a particular tribe from the statute’s reach, it did so explicitly. For example, the IRA land-into-trust procedures by their terms do not apply to land in “the Territories, colonies, [and] insular possessions of the United States,” except for the then-territory of Alaska. 25 U.S.C. § 473. It also excludes certain named Indian tribes (not including the Oneidas) from some of its provisions. Id. That, in contrast, Congress excluded neither New York nor any of its tribes from the statute’s reach implies that Congress in fact intended the IRA—including § 5—to embrace New York and tribes located there, including the Oneidas. See Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction in declining to read additional exceptions into statute). We comfortably conclude that the IRA unambiguously permits the United States to take land into trust for tribes unaffected by the Dawes Act, including tribes in New York.

In reaching this conclusion, we do-not rely on the IRA’s legislative history, but we note that so much of it as is available provides further confirmation of our conclusion. As UCE points out in its brief, the New York Indians were shut out of the IRA’s land-into-trust provisions in an early draft of the bill. See Hearings Before the Committee on Indian, Affairs on H.R. 7902, 73rd Cong. 133 (1934) (statement of John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs). Commissioner Collier testified that the New York Indians were omitted from the draft because they “[did] not want [land reform] and their condition [was] entirely peculiar.” Id. But that provision was removed from the bill as “unnecessary and inadvisable” later in the legislative process and replaced with the voluntary opt-out procedure of 25 U.S.C. § 478, which was made available to all tribes. Id. at 198. The legislative record is thus consistent with our conclusion, based on the text and scheme of the IRA, see Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2011), that the IRA contains no implicit exclusion of the New York tribes. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622-23, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004).

C. Effect of the ILCA

Even if the IRA as passed applied to the Oneidas, Plaintiffs argue, the ILCA does not override opt-out votes except as to “tribes” “for which, or for the members of which, the United States holds lands in trust.” 25 U.S.C, § 2201(1). Observing that the United States did not hold land in trust for the Tribe in 2008 when the Secretary made the ’ land-into-trust decision, Plaintiffs contend that the Oneidas’ 1936 opt-out vote is still valid and that the Tribe is therefore not eligible for the IRA’s land-into-trust procedures.

The United States interprets the IRA and the ILCA differently. The government first contends that the “tribes” referred to in § 2202 of the ILCA (overriding past opt-out votes) should not be limited to groups meeting the narrowest definition of “tribes” presented in § 2201(1) because that reading would incongruously undermine the ILCA’s broad remedial purpose. Section 2201, it says, should instead be governed by the definition of “tribes” set forth in § 479. It further asserts that its view is embraced by agency interpretations that are entitled to this Court’s deference. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(b); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, The Meaning of “Under Federal Jurisdiction” for Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act, at 21 (March 12, 2014); New York v. Acting E. Reg’l Dir., Bd. of Indian Affairs, 58 I.B.I.A. 323, 331-34 (2014) (applying broader definition in context of related land-into-trust decision). The government argues second and in the alternative that construing § 2202 in light of a broader reading of § 2201(1) would similarly restore the Tribe’s eligibility for the land-into-trust procedures of § 465- It rejects Plaintiffs’ reading of § 2201(1) and instead construes the last clause of § 2201(1) to apply only to the word “community.”

i. Deference to Agency Interpretations

We first consider what, if any, deference we owe to the agency pronouncements presented in support of the first argument. We may defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers only if the statute is ambiguous in relevant part. Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2009). If, however, the statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). An interpretive regulation “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Estate of Landers, 545 F.3d at 105.

The agency interpretations identified by the government as bearing on the question do not, upon closer examination, • actually address the interplay of the definitions at issue here, even were we to consider them ambiguous. First, the United States contends that it has promulgated its view— that § 2201(l)’s definition of “tribe” does not limit the effect of § 2202—in a regulation adopted pursuant to statute and through notice-and-comment rulemaking, see 45 Fed. Reg. 62,034 (Sept, 18, 1980), and therefore that the interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(b) (defining “tribe” for purposes of land-into-trust regulation as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, community, ranchería, colony, or other group of Indians ... which is recognized by the Secretary as eligible for the special programs and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs”). This definition does not, however, purport to define the scope -of the agency’s ■ land-into-trust authority; indeed, the next section of the agency’s regulations acknowledges that “[l]and not held in trust or restricted status'may only be acquired for an individual Indian or a tribe in trust status token such acquisition is authorized by an act of Congress,” 25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (emphasis added).

The origins of the regulation further support our understanding that § 151.2(b) does not interpret the effect of § 2201(1) on the scope of the agency’s land-into-trust authority. The regulatory definition of “tribe” set forth in § 151.2(b) has not changed since it was promulgated in-1980, before the ILCA’s passage in 1983. See 45 Fed. Reg. 62,034, 62,036 (Sept. 18, 1980). Moreover, although the DOI has amended the C.F.R. Part 151 “Land Acquisition” regulations on one occasion, in 1995, that amendment did not affect § 151.2(b), and the DOI has not revisited Part 151 regulations in light of § 2202, See Land Acquisitions, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,034 (Sept. 18, 1980); 60 Fed. Reg. 32,874 (June 23, 1995). Tellingly, in the Record of Decision, the DOI seemed to rely on the language of § 2202 itself, rather than on any regulation. No one disputes that, in 1980, the government could not take land into trust for tribes that, like, the Oneidas, had opted out of the IRA. Accordingly, we decline to treat § 151.2(b) as reflecting a statutory interpretation to which we owe deference.

Second, we find similarly inapt the Solicitor’s legal opinion of March 2014 and the decision of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals to which the government also points. Both of these analyses focus on the meaning of “under Federal jurisdiction” in the IRA’s definitional provision and the effect of Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009), on the agency’s authority to take land into trust. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, The Meaning of “Under Federal Jurisdiction” at-16-20; State of New York, 58 I.B.I.A. at 331-34. The analyses presented in these documents simply do not address the ILCA’s definition of “tribe” in § 2201(1) or whether that definition might cabin the effect of the ILCA .on the IRA’s entrustment procedures.

ii. Interpreting “Tribe”

Because the agency’s proffered interpretations do not- answer the question before us in this litigation, we interpret the statutes de novo.

In general, “statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words,” Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the ILCA, therefore, absent any indication that this general rule does not hold, see Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201, 69 S.Ct. 503, 93 L.Ed. 611 (1949), § 2201(1) defines “tribe” for purposes of § 2202, cf. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 394 n.9, 129 S.Ct. 1058 (“[Section] 2201 is, by its express terms, applicable only to Chapter 24 of Title 25 of the United States Code [ie., the ILCA].”). Thus, a group that lost its eligibility for the land-into-trust procedures of § 465 through its § 478 vote has its land-into-trust eligibility restored by § 2202—which states that § 465 “shall apply to all tribes notwithstanding” § 478—if and only if the group meets the definition of “tribe” in § 2201(1).

As noted above, Plaintiffs argue that the ILCA’s definition of “tribe” in § 2101(1)— “any Indian tribe, band, group, pueblo, or community for which, or for the members of which, the United States holds lands in trust”—should be read so that “for which ... holds land into trust” applies to “tribe, band, group, [and] pueblo,” not just “community.” Under this reading, a purported tribe would only have its land-into-trust eligibility restored if, at the time the group is seeking to have the United States take land into trust on its behalf, the United States already holds land in trust for that group.

We agree with the government that Plaintiffs’ reading of § 2201(1) is inconsistent with the ILCA scheme and would produce anomalous results. As the Supreme Court has explained, § 2202, “by its terms[,] simply ensures that tribes may benefit from § 465 even if they opted out of the IRA pursuant to § 478, which allowed tribal members to reject the application of the IRA to their tribe.” See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 393-94, 129 S.Ct. 1058. Limiting the ILCA’s remedial effect to groups for which the United States already held land in trust would be a very strange outcome in light of the ILCA’s restorative aim. Plaintiffs’ interpretation would mean that the ILCA restores land-into-trust eligibility only to those tribes that, despite having voted under § 478 to reject land-into-trust eligibility, somehow did have land held in trust by the government on their behalf.

Instead, we read “for which, or for the members of which, the United States holds lands in trust” in § 2201(1) to apply only to “community.” This reading is supported by the last-antecedent rule, most recently reaffirmed in Lockhart v. United States, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 958, 962, 194 L.Ed.2d 48 (2016). The District Court relied on this rule to reach the same reading—correctly, we believe. To hold otherwise would both give inadequate weight to the apparent grammar of the sentence, with a serial comma separating “community” from “Indian tribe, band, group, [and] pueblo,” and undercut the ILCA’s intended effect of restoring land-into-trust eligibility.

To be sure, a tribe that opted out of the IRA must satisfy both the requirements of § 2201(1) and § 465 to have its land-into-trust eligibility restored. And, under our preferred reading, § 2201(1) affords a broader definition of “tribe” than does its counterpart in the IRA, § 479. Section 479 defines “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or Indians residing on one reservation,” but limits the term “Indian” to “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” This definition . of “Indian” restricts § 465’s application. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388, 129 S.Ct. 1058 (“The parties are in agreement, as are we, that the Secretary’s authority to take the parcel in question into trust [pursuant to § 465] depends on whether the Narragansetts are members of a ‘recognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.’”). Section 2201(1) does not repeated this date-sensitive federal jurisdiction requirement. In § 2202, however, Congress took care to note that “nothing in this section is intended to supersede any other provision of Federal law which authorizes, prohibits, - or restricts the acquisition of land for Indians with respect to any specific tribe, reservation, or state(s).” Id. § 2202. Accordingly, the Secretary must also apply § 479 in determining whether a tribe that has opted out, with that opt-out effectively nullified pursuant to § 2202, is eligible for a land-into-trust arrangement pursuant to § 465. Because the ILCA defines “tribe” and “Indian” more broadly than does the IRA, however, this two-step analysis should not prevent any otherwise eligible tribe, ie., any recognized tribe under federal jurisdiction at the time of the IRA’s enactment, from requesting a land-into-trust arrangement pursuant to § 465.

We therefore conclude that the United States did not exceed its statutory authority by taking land into trust for the Tribe— a tribe that indisputably qualifies as a “tribe” within our reading of § 2201(1) and, since it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, within the meaning of § 465 as well.

IV. Authority of Tribal Leadership

Finally, we reject UCE’s cursory argument that the United States may not take land into trust on behalf of the Tribe because of what Plaintiffs allege to be the Tribe’s illegitimate leadership. According to UCE, tribal leader Arthur Raymond Halbritter has improperly restructured tribal governance to protect .his power base. Plaintiffs do not, however, detail how this assertion bears on .their claim that the United States may not take land into trust for the Tribe. They do not, for example, question the validity of the Tribe’s request that land be entrusted on its behalf. Moreover, even if the legitimacy of the tribal government were somehow related to Plaintiffs’ current claims regarding the en-trustment, federal courts “lack authority to resolve internal disputes about tribal law.” Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321, 327-28 (2d Cir.2016). When there is such a dispute, we will “defer to the BIA’s recognition of an individual as authorized to act on behalf of the Nation.” Id. at 330. Here, the agency received and acted on the Tribe’s request that it take land into trust, implicitly recognizing—at least for these purposes—the legitimacy of tribal leadership. That ends our inquiry.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that the federal government’s plenary power over Indian affairs extends to taking historic reservation land into trust for a tribe. That the entrustment deprives state government of certain aspects of jurisdiction over that land does not run afoul of general principles of state sovereignty, the Indian Commerce Clause, or the specific guarantees of the Enclave Clause. The Tribe became eligible for such an entrustment in 1983, when Congress invalidated the Oneidas’ earlier decision to opt out of the land-into-trust regime, and the Department of the Interior’s 2008 decision (reaffirmed in 2013) to take the land into trust for the Tribe lies within that agency’s statutory authority. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgments of the District Court.

      . We will use the term "Tribe” in this Opinion to refer only to the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the federally-recognized tribe based in central New York. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 144 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478, 161 L.Ed.2d 386 (2005). We use "Oneidas” or "the Oneida Nation” to refer to the historic tribe of which the present-day Tribe is a descendant. Id. at 146.

      , The Tribe is not a party to either of these cases. It moved, however, for leave to file an amicus brief in this consolidated appeal. Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States, No. 15-1688, Doc. 124 (filed Jan. 29, 2016). The motion is hereby granted.

      . Effective September 1, 2016, certain provisions from Chapter 14 of Title 25 of the United States Code have been reorganized and transferred to three new chapters at the end of the Title. See Office of the Law Revision Counsel, Editorial Reclassification Title 25, United States Code, http://uscode.house.gov/ editorialreclassification/t25/index.html. Consistent with the parties’ briefs, the District Court’s opinions, and prior opinions in this area, we use the original numbering of the Chapter 14 subsections. For the reader’s reference, 25 U.S.C. § 465 is now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5108; 25 U.S.C. § 478 is now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5125; and 25 U.S.C. § 479 is now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5129.

      . Early uses of the term "reservation” in the field of Indian law referred to land reserved for Indian use from an Indian cession to the federal or state government. Cohen, Handbook § 3.04[2][c][ii]. The term’s use later grew to encompass federally protected Indian tribal lands without regard to their legal origins. Id. Tribal jurisdiction—that is, the rights of the tribe and the federal government to assert jurisdiction over territory, largely displacing state government—generally follows from the land’s reservation status. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 526-27 & n.1, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998). But the legal implications of the term vary: The Supreme Court has held that a state’s long-standing exercise of jurisdiction over reservation land can preclude a tribe from reasserting its right to exercise tribal jurisdiction on that reservation land. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216-19, 125 S.Ct. 1478.

      . As we will discuss below, in T 936 the Oneidas elected to opt out of the IRA by a tribal vote.

      . The relevant facts of this case are undisputed, and the appeal presents only questions of law. We draw this account of the Oneidas' history largely from prior opinions of the Supreme Court and our Court.

      . Congress may "disestablish” a reservation by enacting a law that makes designated tribal land fully alienable. See Alaska, 522 U.S. at 532-33, 118 S.Ct, 948.

      . New York State and Madison and Oneida Counties filed a similar challenge to the agency’s decision. That lawsuit was settled in 2014. See New York v. Jewell, No. 6:08-cv-644, 2014 WL 841764, at *8-12 (N.D.N.Y. March 4, 2014) (approving settlement). Plaintiffs in this case unsuccessfully sued in state court to invalidate the Jewell settlement, see Town of Verona v. Cuomo, 22 N.Y.S.3d 241, 246, 136 A.D.3d 36 (2015), leave to appeal denied by Town of Verona v. Cuomo, 27 N.Y.3d 908, 36 N.Y.S.3d 622, 56 N.E.3d 902 (2016).

      . Plaintiffs contested that determination before the District Court, but do not press the challenge on appeal.

      . The government makes no challenge to the standing of the Towns or the individual Plaintiffs-Appellants.

      . In the District Court, UCE raised a number of claims under the IGRA, see Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-633, Doc. 35 at 41-49 (N.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 2009) (amended complaint). On appeal, it has not pursued arguments related to those claims.

      . In this context, we understand “tribal sovereignty” to imply "tribal jurisdiction” over the land. See Record of Decision, J.A. 570, 604 (discussing effects of restoring tribal jurisdiction over trust land).

      . The Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate “Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const, art. I § 8, cl. 3.

      . UCE makes a related argument that, even if the Indian Commerce Clause permits land to be taken into trust in some states, it does not apply in New York because of the nature of New York’s pre-Constitution dealings with Iroquois tribes. UCE Br. at 33. This position was rejected by the Supreme Court in Oneida I, however. Oneida I made clear that, for Indian Commerce Clause purposes, the Court will draw no distinction between the federal government’s power vis-á-vis the original states (and New York in particular) and all other states. See Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 670, 94 S.Ct. 772; see also New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 771-72, 18 L.Ed. 708 (1866) (voiding New York’s taxation of Seneca reservation land).

      . As noted above, New York State has settled its own challenge to the lawfulness of the land-into-trust decision and no longer contends that the entrustment violates its sovereignty. See New York v. Jewell, 2014 WL 841764, at *8-12. This development does not eliminate Plaintiffs’ standing to raise these arguments, however, because "an individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011).

      . As used in § 1152, the phrase "Indian country” means, in sum: all land on any Indian reservation that is under federal jurisdiction, whether or not the fee owner is an Indian; dependent Indian communities; and Indian allotments whose Indian titles have not been extinguished. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining "Indian country” for certain criminal law purposes); Cty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 260, 112 S.Ct. 683.

      . Although the clause speaks of land to be “purchased” by the federal government, the clause's reach is not cabined to land that is "purchased ... in the narrow trading sense of the term,” Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 372, 84 S.Ct. 857, 11 L.Ed.2d 782 (1964). Instead, "the crucial question” in assessing the legality of such an acquisition is whether the state freely ceded its jurisdiction over the land. Id,

      . State laws in place at the time of the federal government’s acquisition of the land may remain in effect, however, as long as they do not interfere with “the carrying out of a national purpose.” James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 103-04, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596 (1940). This saving principle ensures "that no area however small'will be left without a developed legal system for private rights.” Id. at 100, 60 S.Ct. 431,

      . Plaintiffs assert that our recent decision in Citizens Against Casino Gambling v. Chaudhuri, 802 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2015), holds that the state retains no jurisdiction at all over land taken into trust, and thereby means that the consent requirement of the Enclave Clause must apply to the taking of land into trust. Verona Reply Br. at 8-9. In Chaudhuri, quoting language from the Cohen Handbook, we observed that ‘‘[b]ecause of plenary federal authority in Indian affairs, there is no room for state regulation.” Id. at 280 (quoting Cohen, Handbook § 6.03[l][a]). Although read literally this declaration appears to be unqualified, the Handbook makes clear that it is in fact subject to exceptions, including that states may continue to regulate the activities of nonmembers on tribal land, and that states may demand assistance from tribal members in the exercise of that regulatory authority. See Cohen, Handbook § 6.03[1][b]; see also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976) (upholding state regulation requiring smoke shops located on Indian reservation to collect cigarette tax from sales to non-Indians). We do not read Chaudhuri to suggest otherwise. The relevant portion of our decision in Chaudhuri concerned whether a particular piece of land was subject to tribal jurisdiction at all, not the extent or existence of the state’s authority on tribal land. For that reason, we decline to treat the quoted portion of Chaudhuri as dis-positive of the Enclave Clause question at issue here.

      . The requirement that a tribe be "now under federal jurisdiction” refers to its status in 1934, when Congress enacted that language as part of the IRA. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395, 129 S.Ct. 1058.

      . The law was formally entitled, "An act to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various reservations, and to extend the protection of the laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, and for other purposes.” 24 Stat. 388 (1887).

      . The government also urges us to affirm the District Court’s decision on the basis that, . between 2008 (when this lawsuit was filed) and 2013 (when the Department issued its Amended Record of Decision (see J.A. 1571)), the United States took land into trust for the Tribe under the "excess real property” provisions of 40 U.S.C. § 523. See Gov't Br. 62-65. Thus, the government submits, even under Plaintiffs' interpretation of § 2201(1), by 2013 the Tribe was eligible for additional land to be taken into .trust pursuant to § 5 of the IRA. Although we are free to affirm on grounds "not relied upon by the district court,” Olsen v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 136 F.3d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), we elect not to do so here, and we express no view on the merits of this .alternative argument. .