text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dieuseul BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal No. 3-15-0070
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.
    Opinion filed July 23, 2018
    Michael J. Pelletier, Peter A. Carusona, and Jay Wiegman, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
    Jerry Brady, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Jasmine Morton, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Dieuseul Brown was convicted after a bench trial of armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced him to an 18-year term on the armed violence count and an 8-year term on the weapon charge and found the unlawful possession of a controlled substance conviction merged with the other judgments. Brown appealed, challenging his convictions on one-act, one-crime principles. We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Defendant Dieuseul Brown was charged with armed violence (count I), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (count II), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, cocaine (count III). Count I alleged that Brown committed armed violence by committing unlawful possession of a controlled substance while armed with a handgun. Count II alleged Brown committed unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon by possessing a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony. Count III alleged Brown possessed less than 15 grams of cocaine.

¶ 4 Brown moved to quash the indictment, pointing to the inconsistencies in a detective's grand jury testimony that the cocaine was discovered on Brown when he was arrested. Discovery revealed that the drugs were not found until several hours after Brown's arrest when he was searched again at the police station prior to transport to the county jail. The State reindicted Brown and corrected the misstatements to the grand jury. In the supplemental indictment, the armed violence count became count IV and the cocaine possession charge became count V. The trial court denied Brown's motion to quash.

¶ 5 The cause proceeded to a bench trial. Two Peoria County detectives testified that Brown had a gun on his person when they arrested him for an unrelated first degree murder. An officer patted down Brown prior to bringing him to the police station and conducted another pat down search before uncuffing Brown at the station. Brown was interviewed, used the bathroom, and was again searched prior to transport to the county jail. During this search, a small baggie of cocaine was found in the watchpocket in Brown's jeans.

¶ 6 On the State's motion, the trial court accepted into evidence portions of the transcripts from Brown's murder trial where he admitted that he was a drug dealer, he owned the gun discovered on his person, and he kept a gun on him at all times. Also admitted into evidence was a certified copy of Brown's prior conviction. The parties stipulated to descriptions of the physical layout of the police station and a timeline of Brown's arrival, interview, and departure. Brown argued in closing arguments that the police searches were sloppy and that he could have found the cocaine at the police station. The State argued that the drugs were not discovered in the earlier searches because the package was small and soft and the police were looking for weapons and that it proved Brown possessed both the gun and the cocaine simultaneously.

¶ 7 The trial court found that the State proved Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all three counts, that he possessed the cocaine and drugs at the same time, and that it could be reasonably inferred that Brown did not find the cocaine at the police station. Brown moved for a new trial, which motion was heard and denied.

¶ 8 A sentencing hearing took place. The State sought a 44-year sentence and agreed that the unlawful possession of a controlled substance conviction would merge with the other judgments. It argued that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon would not merge because it has the "separate element being the felony conviction which would be the separate act." Brown agreed that the weapon conviction would not merge with the armed violence conviction because it was not a lesser included offense and sought concurrent sentences.

¶ 9 The trial court imposed an 18-year term of imprisonment for the armed violence conviction and an 8-year term for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felony with the sentences to be served consecutively to each other and at 85%. The trial court merged the conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance into the other judgments. Brown filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was heard and granted, with the trial court finding Brown was eligible for day-for-day good time credit. Brown appealed. This court vacated Brown's conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon under one-act, one-crime principles, finding it was based on the same physical act of gun possession as used in his armed violence conviction. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition and, in its supervisory authority, vacated this court's judgment. People v. Brown , No. 122507, 420 Ill.Dec. 30, 95 N.E.3d 493 (Ill. Mar. 21, 2018) (supervisory order). It ordered this court to reconsider in light of its decision in People v. Coats , 2018 IL 121926, 423 Ill.Dec. 13, 104 N.E.3d 1102, whether Brown's convictions violated one-act, one-crime principles.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The issue on appeal is whether the trial court's sentencing determination violated one-act, one-crime principles. Brown argues that his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon must be vacated under one-act, one-crime principles because it was based on the same physical act of gun possession as used in his armed violence conviction.

¶ 12 Brown did not raise this issue below, but violation of one-act, one-crime principles "affects the integrity of the judicial process" and is appropriate for plain error review under doctrine's substantial rights prong. In re Samantha V. , 234 Ill. 2d 359, 378-79, 334 Ill.Dec. 661, 917 N.E.2d 487 (2009). To employ a plain error analysis, a plain or obvious error must have occurred. People v. Thompson , 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613, 345 Ill.Dec. 560, 939 N.E.2d 403 (2010).

¶ 13 Courts employ a two-step analysis in applying one-act, one-crime principles. See People v. King , 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977). First, the court decides whether the defendant's conduct was a single physical act or multiple acts. People v. Rodriguez , 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186, 214 Ill.Dec. 451, 661 N.E.2d 305 (1996). If a single act, multiple convictions based on the act are prohibited. Id. Second, where the conduct consisted of multiple acts, the court must determine whether any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses. Id. This court reviews whether a conviction violates one-act, one-crime principles de novo .

People v. Boyd , 307 Ill. App. 3d 991, 998, 241 Ill.Dec. 445, 719 N.E.2d 306 (1999).

¶ 14 We first decide whether Brown's conduct constituted a single act or multiple acts. In People v. Coats , 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 1, 423 Ill.Dec. 13, 104 N.E.3d 1102, the defendant was convicted of multiple offenses, including armed habitual criminal and armed violence. He appealed his convictions, arguing they violated one-act, one-crime principals. Id. The appellate court affirmed and Coats appealed. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The Coats court first acknowledged that plain error review was appropriate because a one-act, one-crime violation is an obvious error that challenges the integrity of the justice system. Id. ¶ 10. It then considered whether a one-act, one-crime error occurred. Id. ¶ 11. The court found that the conduct of the defendant consisted of two physical acts: possession of a handgun and possession of drugs. Id. ¶ 17. The court recognized that although possession of a handgun was a common act shared by both offenses, the armed violence conviction included the separate act of drug possession. Id.

¶ 15 The Coats court resolved the conflict between the Second District case of People v. Williams , 302 Ill. App. 3d 975, 236 Ill.Dec. 642, 707 N.E.2d 980 (1999), and the Fourth District decision in People v. White , 311 Ill. App. 3d 374, 243 Ill.Dec. 973, 724 N.E.2d 572 (2000). Coats , 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 26, 423 Ill.Dec. 13, 104 N.E.3d 1102. In Williams , the defendant was convicted of armed violence based on possession of a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced on the armed violence and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon convictions. Williams , 302 Ill. App. 3d at 976, 236 Ill.Dec. 642, 707 N.E.2d 980. He appealed on one-act, one-crime principles. Id. at 977, 236 Ill.Dec. 642, 707 N.E.2d 980. The reviewing court determined that there were no separate acts and that the "common act is a felon possessing a gun and drugs simultaneously." Id. at 978, 236 Ill.Dec. 642, 707 N.E.2d 980.

¶ 16 In White , the defendant was convicted, in part, of one count each of aggravated discharge of a firearm, armed violence, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and sentenced on all three convictions. White , 311 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 243 Ill.Dec. 973, 724 N.E.2d 572. When he appealed on one-act, one-crime grounds, the reviewing court determined that, although the defendant simultaneously possessed both the gun and drugs, they were distinct acts. Id. at 385, 243 Ill.Dec. 973, 724 N.E.2d 572. The White court rejected Williams , finding it was wrongly decided. Id. The court concluded that the defendant's convictions for armed violence and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon were based on separate acts and held that multiple convictions did not violate one-act, one-crime principles. Id. at 386, 243 Ill.Dec. 973, 724 N.E.2d 572. The White court found that despite the commonality of the gun, armed violence required an additional act of drug possession and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon required an additional element of the defendant's felon status. Id.

¶ 17 The Coats court found that Williams misapplied the one-act, one-crime rule and expressly overruled it. Coats , 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 26, 423 Ill.Dec. 13, 104 N.E.3d 1102. It also recognized that White "created some confusion" regarding what constitutes an act. Id. ¶ 27. The King court defined "act" as "any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense." King , 66 Ill. 2d at 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838. Brown's felon status is not an "overt or outward manifestation" but "a state of being." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Coats , 2018 IL 121926, ¶¶ 15, 27, 423 Ill.Dec. 13, 104 N.E.3d 1102. Nevertheless, per Coats , we find that Brown's acts of armed violence based on drug possession and possession of a weapon by a felon are separate acts. Despite that both offenses involve possession of a gun, the armed violence count also includes the separate act of simultaneously possessing drugs. See Rodriguez , 169 Ill. 2d at 188, 214 Ill.Dec. 451, 661 N.E.2d 305 (citing People v. Lobdell , 121 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252, 76 Ill.Dec. 623, 459 N.E.2d 260 (1983) (where there is an additional act that can support an additional offense defendant may be convicted on both offenses even if they share a common act) ). We find that Brown's conduct consisted of separate acts.

¶ 18 Having determined that Brown's convictions were not based on a single act, we must address the second step in the King analysis, whether any of the offenses are lesser included. A lesser-included offense is an offense "established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged." 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (West 2016). To determine that question, we apply the abstract elements approach. See People v. Miller , 238 Ill. 2d 161, 173, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498 (2010). The abstract elements approach compares the statutory elements of the two offenses, and if all of the elements of the first offense are included in the second offense and do not contain any elements not included in the second offense, the first offense is a lesser-included offense. Id. at 166, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498.

¶ 19 To sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a weapon or any firearm and has been convicted of a prior felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2016). To sustain a conviction for armed violence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a firearm while he committed a felony offense, that being unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Id. § 33A-2(a). To sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed less than 15 grams of a controlled substance, cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016).

¶ 20 Unlawful possession of a gun by a felon is not a lesser-included offense of armed violence. Both counts include the possession of a weapon. The possession of a weapon count contains the additional element of felon status. The armed violence count includes the additional element of drug possession. We find entry of judgment on both convictions did not violate one-act, one-crime principles and was not error. Because there was no error, we conclude plain error review is not applicable and affirm Brown's convictions.

¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE MARRIAGE OF Jessica MILNE, Petitioner-Appellee, and David Milne, Respondent-Appellant.
    No. 2-18-0091
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 2, 2018
    Rebecca W. Zarzecki and Jason W. Jochum, of Zarzecki Law Group, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
    Myra A. Foutris, of Berger Schatz, of Chicago, for appellee
   JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), respondent David Milne appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss petitioner Jessica Milne's petition for dissolution of the parties' marriage. David argues that (1) the trial court erred in determining that Illinois is the parties' children's home state under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) ( 750 ILCS 36/101 et seq. (West 2016) ), (2) he was deprived of due process when the court temporarily allocated parental responsibilities to Jessica without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and (3) Jessica's unclean hands precluded a remedy in her favor. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties were married in Lake County on July 3, 2014. David is a Canadian citizen and attended college in the United States under several visas. Jessica, a United States citizen, had a child from a previous marriage (M.N.M., born in July 2009), whom David adopted in July 2014. The parties initially lived in and rented a house in Lake County, and M.N.M. attended preschool there from 2011 through August 2015.

¶ 4 In June 2015, Jessica applied for permanent residency in Canada for herself and M.N.M. Also that month, the parties purchased a home in East Gwillimbury (Newmarket), Ontario. In July 2015, in Lake County, the parties had a second child (L.T.M.), who has dual citizenship.

¶ 5 In August 2015, the parties relocated to Canada, and David worked as a hockey referee and as an agent for Allstate. Jessica began work as a sales representative for Beauty Counter, and M.N.M. was enrolled in first grade. The parties moved their assets to Canada and opened bank accounts there. In December 2015, Jessica's and M.N.M.'s applications for permanent residency in Canada were approved, and they were granted permanent residency in February 2016. They received Ontario health care cards and social insurance numbers. Also, L.T.M. received an Ontario health care card (as a natural born child of a Canadian citizen).

6 A. 2016 Dissolution Petition and Consent Order

¶ 7 On July 31, 2016, the parties and their children traveled from Ontario to Lake Forest, Illinois. They had purchased tickets for all of them to return to Canada on August 14, 2016. However, while in Lake County, Jessica informed David that she and the children would not return to Canada and, on August 22, 2016, she petitioned for dissolution of the parties' marriage (case No. 16-D-1536). David returned to Canada, and, on September 7, 2016, he petitioned in the Northern District of Illinois to return the children to Canada (case No. 1:16-cv-8716).

¶ 8 On November 2, 2016, a consent order was entered in the federal case. The parties, who were each represented by counsel, agreed that the children "shall return on a temporary basis to Ontario, Canada" (emphasis added), with the parties within two days before the start of school in January 2017. Both parties "shall accompany the minor children back" to their home in Ontario, and the children shall reside there "until the beginning of July 2018 , and the [parties] shall have equal access to the minor children." (Emphasis added.) David agreed to vacate the home, unless Jessica obtained a new residence, and the parties agreed to participate in marriage counseling in Canada, starting in January 2017. Also, the order provided that, "by agreement of the parties, the children's habitual residence is the United States of America ." (Emphasis added.) The parties agreed that Jessica could "take reasonable vacations and holidays" to the United States with the children and that, upon the children's return to Canada, Jessica "shall promptly file a notice" in the federal court that the children have returned. Further, "upon the filing of [Jessica's] notice[,] this matter shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE," and Jessica will dismiss with prejudice, by November 9, 2016, any claims filed in Lake County. David agreed to dismiss with prejudice by the same date all claims filed in the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario.

¶ 9 The consent order further provided that Jessica would support David's application to become a permanent resident of the United States. The parties also agreed that David "shall not have sexual relations with any third parties from the entry of" the order "through the period of the temporary relocation to Canada." (Emphasis added.) If he did have such sexual relations, Jessica "shall be permitted to return to Illinois immediately with the minor children." Finally, the order provided that it was "not a determination of the merits of any custody issues within the meaning of Article 19 of the Hague Convention."

¶ 10 Between July 2016 and January 2017, Jessica and the children remained in Lake County, and then they returned to Canada. On November 8, 2016, Jessica's dissolution petition was voluntarily dismissed.

11 B. 2017 Dissolution Petition

¶ 12 On July 11, 2017, while Jessica and the children were in Lake County for a two-week vacation (according to David), Jessica petitioned there for dissolution of the marriage. David was served in Canada on July 14, 2017, and Jessica returned to Canada with the children on July 20, 2017.

¶ 13 On August 11, 2017, David moved to strike and dismiss the dissolution petition for lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens . 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016). He asserted that Illinois was not the children's home state under the UCCJEA and that the court had no personal jurisdiction over him because he had no contact with Illinois except for Jessica's temporary presence in the state. He also asserted that Jessica could not meet the residency requirements of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) ( 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2016) ). Finally, David asserted that the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction, based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens , because the parties, their children, and their assets were in Canada, not Lake County.

¶ 14 On September 18, 2017, David filed an application for dissolution of marriage in Canada, and Jessica was served.

¶ 15 On January 9, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to strike and dismiss, consisting solely of the attorneys' arguments, and it took the matter under advisement and set it for ruling on January 30, 2018.

¶ 16 On January 12, 2018, Jessica filed in Lake County an emergency motion for temporary jurisdiction and to enforce the November 2, 2016, consent order, permitting her to return to Illinois (due to David's alleged violation of the infidelity provision ). Jessica asserted that she reasonably feared that David would seek to have the children returned to Canada and that, if she and the children returned to Canada, David would not allow them to return to Illinois despite the consent order's terms. The trial court entered an accelerated briefing schedule and it accelerated its ruling to January 18, 2018. On January 16, 2018, Jessica also filed in Lake County a verified petition for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction, enjoining David from seeking the children's return during the trial court's home-state determination.

¶ 17 On January 17, 2018, David filed in Lake County an emergency motion for the immediate return of the children to Canada and for other relief, asserting that Jessica had withheld parenting time and had absconded to Illinois with the children on January 10, 2018. He noted that the parties had lived in Ontario since August 2015 with the exception of five months in 2016 after Jessica filed her first dissolution petition.

¶ 18 On January 18, 2018, after a pretrial hearing with counsel (but no evidentiary hearing), the trial court issued its ruling on the pending matters. The court ruled that, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances and considering the consent order, the children's presence in Canada was temporary and their home state under the UCCJEA was Illinois. It specifically found that, although the consent order's habitual-residence provision was not conclusive on the home-state issue, it "cannot be ignored." Habitual residence, the court noted, "goes to establishing a last shared intent of the parties," but it is not the same as the home state. Further, strict physical presence was not the sole consideration for the home-state determination. Rather, the court "must consider whether and to what extent there was a temporary absence," a factual determination. The court found that the consent order "confirmed the [United States] as the children's habitual residence, but also clarified the return to Canada as temporary." The court noted that, "in determining the nature of the absence from Illinois," it placed great weight on the consent order's use of the term "temporary." The court rejected David's argument that the consent order's failure to include language addressing the home state was fatal to Jessica's argument. The court determined that the fact that lack of such language did not limit the court's ability to consider the language that was included in the consent order. "This Court rejects the argument that these minor children have lost their roots in Illinois, established their identity in Canada[,] and that a return to Illinois would be damaging and not in their best interests because there is no evidence to support it." It further found that it had personal jurisdiction over David on the bases that he engaged in conduct that resulted in the conception of a child in Illinois and that he entered into a contract (i.e. , the consent order) in Illinois.

¶ 19 In its written order, the court first denied David's motion to strike and dismiss Jessica's dissolution petition, finding that Illinois had asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA and that the court had personal jurisdiction over David. Second, the court ordered that M.N.M. be immediately enrolled in school in Lake County and that David be entitled to parenting time there every other weekend. It also ordered Jessica to transport the children to Canada during all three-day United States holiday weekends and that David have the weekend immediately following the end of the school year, the first week immediately thereafter, and the week of spring break. It also ordered that each party may Skype or FaceTime with the children while they are in the other's care, every day by 8 p.m. for up to 20 minutes. Third, the court denied both parties' emergency motions for temporary jurisdiction and it noted that Jessica's verified petition for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction was resolved elsewhere in its ruling.

¶ 20 Jessica moved to clarify the trial court's order concerning parenting time and to set parenting-exchange parameters. On February 15, 2018, the trial court clarified certain aspects of the parties' parenting time and set exchange parameters. David subsequently petitioned for leave to appeal to this court ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(5) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) ), and on February 22, 2018, we granted his petition.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 David argues that (1) the trial court erred in determining that Illinois is the parties' children's home state under the UCCJEA, (2) he was deprived of due process when the court temporarily allocated parental responsibilities to Jessica without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and (3) Jessica's unclean hands precluded a remedy in her favor. He requests that we reverse the trial court's determination that Illinois is the children's home state or, alternatively, deem that Illinois should decline to exercise jurisdiction. David also requests that, because he was denied due process, we vacate the trial court's January 18, 2018, order with respect to the children and we order that they be returned to Canada on a date certain. For the following reasons, we reject his arguments.

¶ 23 A. Home State

¶ 24 David argues first that the trial court erred in finding that Illinois is the children's home state. He asserts that, for the six months preceding the filing of Jessica's dissolution petition (i.e. , January to July 2017), the children resided entirely in Canada. David contends that the objective facts in the record (not the parties' subjective intent), including the consent order, reflect that Jessica moved to Canada shortly after the birth of L.T.M. (in August 2015) and filed for (and was granted) permanent residency there. The parties bought a home in Canada and moved their bank accounts and furniture there, and Jessica and M.N.M. received social insurance numbers and Ontario health care cards. Further, both David and Jessica obtained employment in Canada, Jessica received child tax benefits there, M.N.M. attended Canadian schools, and the children saw Canadian healthcare providers.

Even after the consent order (in November 2016), David notes, Jessica returned to Canada with the children, leased property there, and resided there. Thus, according to David, before Jessica commenced court proceedings (in his view, they were commenced in August 2016 when Jessica filed her first dissolution petition), the parties' intent was to leave the United States and permanently reside in Canada. David notes that, although in the consent order the parties agreed that the children's "habitual residence" was the United States, they never defined their "home state." The "habitual residence" designation was for purposes of resolving David's petition for the children's return. The reference to Illinois in the consent order relates only to the infidelity provision. He proposes that the trial court should have looked back to the parties' last prelitigation action, namely, when they moved to Canada in 2015 and (allegedly) intended to permanently locate there. Further, in David's view, the parties and the children were required to reside in Canada until at least July 2018. The trial court, he urges, should have determined that Ontario was the children's home state and declined to exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we reject David's arguments.

¶ 25 We review de novo questions of statutory construction, as well as a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Fleckles v. Diamond , 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 30, 393 Ill.Dec. 784, 35 N.E.3d 176.

¶ 26 Turning first, for context, to the Hague Convention, we note that it is not intended to settle custody disputes but is designed to ensure that such disputes are presumptively litigated in the child's country of habitual residence. Ortiz v. Martinez , 789 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit has explained:

" 'The Hague Convention is an anti-abduction treaty.' Redmond v. Redmond , 724 F.3d 729, 739 (7th Cir.[ ]2013). It was designed 'to deter parents from absconding with their children and crossing international borders in the hopes of obtaining a favorable custody determination in a friendlier jurisdiction.' Walker v. Walker , 701 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir.[ ]2012). To this end, the Convention employs a 'remedy of return,' Khan v. Fatima , 680 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir.[ ]2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), which 'entitles a person whose child has wrongfully been removed to the United States in violation of the Convention to petition for return of the child to the child's country of "habitual residence," ' [ Norinder v. Fuentes , 657 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011) ]. A court's role in enforcing the Convention is not to settle a custody dispute between the parties, 'but rather to restore the status quo prior to any wrongful removal or retention.' Redmond , 724 F.3d at 739." Id.

The Hague Convention does not define "habitual residence," and courts have "understood the inquiry to be a 'practical, flexible, factual' one that 'accounts for all available relevant evidence and considers the individual circumstances of each case.' " Martinez v. Cahue , 826 F.3d 983, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Redmond v. Redmond , 724 F.3d 729, 732 (2013) ). The focus is on the place where the child has made a home and "identifies the country whose courts should be entrusted with determinations such as custody and support." Id. at 990. The two most important factors are parental intent and the child's acclimatization to the proposed home jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 27 The UCCJEA, in turn, which is at issue here and became effective in Illinois on January 1, 2004, " 'was promulgated to end custody jurisdictional disputes between states, to promote cooperation between states in determining custody issues, and to enhance the ability of states to enforce custody orders expeditiously.' " Fleckles , 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 32, 393 Ill.Dec. 784, 35 N.E.3d 176 (quoting In re Joseph V.D. , 373 Ill. App. 3d 559, 561, 311 Ill.Dec. 415, 868 N.E.2d 1076 (2007) ). Once a state makes an initial child custody determination, the statute gives the state exclusive continuing jurisdiction. Id. ; see 750 ILCS 36/202(a) (West 2016). "As used in the [UCCJEA], * * * 'jurisdiction' must be understood as simply a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters, not a precondition to the exercise of the court's inherent authority," which "emanates solely from article VI, section 9, of our constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 )." McCormick v. Robertson , 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 27, 390 Ill.Dec. 142, 28 N.E.3d 795.

¶ 28 Section 201 of the UCCJEA states, in part:

"(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204 [i.e. , temporary emergency jurisdiction], a court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if:
(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum under Section 207 or 208, and:
(A) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than mere physical presence; and
(B) substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 207 or 208; or
(4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child-custody determination by a court of this State.
(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination." 750 ILCS 36/201 (West 2016).

¶ 29 Section 102(7) of the UCCJEA contains the definition of "home state":

" 'Home state' means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period ." (Emphasis added.) Id. § 102(7).

The statute defines "Commencement" as "the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding." Id. § 102(5). It also treats a foreign country as a "state." Id. § 105(a).

¶ 30 The UCCJEA does not define "temporary absence," but the comment to section 102 of the uniform act states that "[t]he definition of 'home State' has been reworded slightly. No substantive change is intended from the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) (the prior uniform act) ( 750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2002), repealed by Pub. Act 93-108, § 404 (eff. Jan. 1, 2004) ) ]." Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 102 cmt. (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws 1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf. Thus, we find helpful case law interpreting the prior uniform act.

¶ 31 Illinois cases that have addressed temporary absences under the UCCJA are split on the proper analysis. The First, Third, and Fifth Districts adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. See Richardson v. Richardson , 255 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1102-04, 193 Ill.Dec. 1, 625 N.E.2d 1122 (1993) (Third District case under prior uniform act; rejecting the strict physical-presence test because an agreement for extended out-of-state visits under that scenario "would be discouraged because of the potential legal consequences to the custodial parent" and "such agreements should be encouraged as a matter of public policy"; noting that absence intended to last a limited time can be temporary absence regardless of length of time; to determine whether a state is the home state, court must examine child's physical presence in the state and "under what circumstances the child came to and remained in the State"; holding that 11-month consensual visit to Illinois did not establish home-state jurisdiction); see also In re Marriage of Howard , 291 Ill. App. 3d 675, 681, 225 Ill.Dec. 703, 684 N.E.2d 178 (1997) (Fifth District case under prior uniform act; following Richardson and holding that a temporary absence can be many months; court must examine circumstances under which the child came to reside in the state); In re Parentage of Frost , 289 Ill. App. 3d 95, 102-04, 224 Ill.Dec. 409, 681 N.E.2d 1030 (1997) (First District case under prior uniform act; adopting Richardson 's approach to allow a court to consider the parents' agreement and intent in determining whether a child's out-of-state absence was temporary; holding that trial court on remand may consider parties' agreement and intent in determining whether out-of-state visit of greater than six months was sufficient to confer homestate jurisdiction in that state). The Fourth District, in contrast, adopted a strict physical-presence test. See In re Marriage of Schoeffel , 268 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842-43, 206 Ill.Dec. 59, 644 N.E.2d 827 (1994) (under prior uniform act, rejecting the relevance of a parent's intent to the temporary-absence issue; noting error in incorporating nuances of the concept of "domicile" into the definition of home state; stating that "whether a State is a child's 'home state' is primarily a question of time": specifically, "where has the child lived with a person acting as a parent for the last six months?"; noting that it is "a mistake to allow parties to make agreements [that] control the operation of the Act"; only absences of less than six months within the relevant six-month period can be temporary; nine-month stay in New York was not temporary); see also In re Marriage of Arulpragasam , 304 Ill. App. 3d 139, 148-49, 237 Ill.Dec. 470, 709 N.E.2d 725 (1999) (Fourth District case under prior uniform act; following Schoeffel and applying strict physical-presence test).

¶ 32 The Frost court addressed the conflict within the districts of the appellate court, noting that the strict physical-presence test was likely "propelled more as a matter of policy preference than as a matter of literal or contextual statutory compulsion." Frost , 289 Ill. App. 3d at 101, 224 Ill.Dec. 409, 681 N.E.2d 1030. The statute does not define "temporary absence," and the strict physical-presence test, the court noted, discourages agreements between parties and can result in certain inequities. Id. at 101-02, 224 Ill.Dec. 409, 681 N.E.2d 1030. "The freedom to reach such agreements should not be hampered by fear that jurisdiction would vest in another state if the out-of-state absence extends beyond six months. Any such fear would have a chilling effect on the formation of any such agreements, and family bonds would suffer." Id. at 102, 224 Ill.Dec. 409, 681 N.E.2d 1030. The court adopted the Richardson analysis "because it encourages settlement of visitation issues and because it offers protection when the promise to return the child is breached either because it was falsely made at the outset or because the parent decides at a later time not to return the child." Id.

¶ 33 We follow Richardson . We agree with Frost that agreements concerning custody should be encouraged and that a strict reading of the statutory six-month period can lead to harsh results, thereby discouraging family ties. We also agree with Richardson and the other cases that hold that a temporary absence is not limited to a period of six months or less. Such a limit, again, can lead to harsh results, most significantly in cases where a child temporarily moves to another state to attend school, which, in most cases, encompasses nine months. Richardson presented such a scenario and is otherwise factually analogous to this case. In Richardson , a California dissolution judgment awarded the parties joint custody of their daughter and further provided that her primary residence would be with her father in California. The mother then moved to Illinois, and, under a written agreement between the parties, the father allowed the daughter to go to Illinois to live with her mother in order to attend fifth grade the following school year. While the child lived in Illinois, the father moved to Arizona. Pursuant to the agreement, the child was returned to the father at the end of the school year and continued to reside with him. The mother then sought to enroll the California dissolution judgment in Illinois, and the father asserted that Illinois lacked jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the Third District affirmed, holding that, when the child came to Illinois, the parties' understanding was that she would not remain in Illinois; her 11-month stay here was a temporary absence from California. Richardson , 255 Ill. App. 3d at 1102-04, 193 Ill.Dec. 1, 625 N.E.2d 1122 (rejecting the strict physical-presence test and the concurring opinion's position that a temporary absence cannot exceed six months).

¶ 34 This case presents similar facts. Jessica filed her dissolution petition on July 11, 2017, in Lake County. David's assertion that the proceedings commenced at an earlier time is incorrect because the first dissolution petition was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the consent order. Jessica and the children had returned to Canada in January 2017 and the parties remained there until she filed her second petition. Thus, they physically resided in Canada during the relevant six-month period (January to July 2017). Turning to the nature of the parties' Canadian residence during that period, the consent order memorialized their shared intent that their Canadian residence was temporary and would last only until July 2018. Any intent otherwise prior to the consent order is irrelevant because the order superseded it. Further, there is no evidence that, after the order, the parties changed their intent that their residence would be temporary.

¶ 35 David maintains that the trial court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test incorrectly, where it considered solely the consent order rather than objective evidence that the parties' move to Canada in August 2015 was intended to be permanent. He points again to the fact that the parties purchased real estate in Canada, moved their belongings there, applied for and received permanent residency for Jessica and the children, paid taxes in Canada, and relocated their bank accounts there. Also, David notes that L.T.M. has essentially spent his entire life in Canada and that M.N.M., by the parties' agreement, was to attend Canadian schools for first through third grades. Finally, David notes that the trial court did not consider that the parties were already involved in litigation in Lake County and Canada when the consent order was entered. In his view, the trial court, which cited no case deeming an extended absence temporary, erroneously relied on the fact that Jessica was free to leave Canada and return to Illinois should David violate the consent order. He points out that the consent order required that Jessica remain in Canada and keep the children enrolled in school there until at least July 2018 and did not mention where Jessica or the children should reside thereafter.

¶ 36 We disagree with David's contention that the trial court focused exclusively on the consent order. This assertion is clearly belied by the court's explicit finding that the consent order's habitual-residence provision was not conclusive but was merely a relevant consideration. The court also stated that the habitual residence "goes to establishing the shared intent of the parties" but was not the same as the home state. The court determined that the consent order "clarified that the return to Canada [was] temporary." The order further provided that the children would reside in Canada "until the beginning of July 2018" and that Jessica would support David's application to become a permanent resident of the United States. The order specified that it was not a custody determination, and the court did not err in interpreting its terms for purposes of ascertaining the parties' intent. David's suggestion that the court should have looked further back in time, specifically to 2015, to find that their move to Canada was permanent is not well taken. Even if that were their intent then, the parties later, in the consent order, memorialized their (changed) intent that the return to Canada was temporary. We also reject David's argument that the three-year absence from Illinois was too long to constitute a temporary absence under any reading of the UCCJEA. Richardson and the cases that follow it reject this view. Again, the question is the parties' intent and the objective circumstances during the relevant period, January to July 2017. One indication of the parties' intent was their agreement in the consent order that the children "shall return on a temporary basis to Ontario Canada" with the parties in January 2017, that the children would reside in Ontario "until the beginning of July 2018," and that Jessica would support David's application for permanent residency in the United States. Nothing occurred afterward to reflect that the parties agreed that their Canadian residency would be anything other than temporary. We also find David's reliance on foreign cases to be misplaced, because they do not involve written agreements concerning the parties' temporary residence. See Baxter v. Baxter , 2015-0085 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/15), 171 So.3d 1159 ; Chick v. Chick , 164 N.C.App. 444, 596 S.E.2d 303 (2004).

¶ 37 We also reject David's argument that the trial court ignored substantial objective evidence that the parties' Canadian residency was intended to be permanent. He notes that certain objective factors under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, such as driver's license registration, receipt of government benefits, payment of taxes, and home ownership, point to Ontario as the home state. See Andrea Charlow, There's No Place Like Home: Temporary Absences in the UCCJEA Home State , 28 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 25, 34-35(II) (B)(3) (2015) (noting that "[t]he 'totality of the circumstances' test is commonly used to determine if an absence is temporary" and that courts will consider the following: intent, duration, nature, and purpose of presence outside of state, applications for driver's licenses and public benefits, payment of taxes, home ownership or lease, school registration, presence as related to the receipt of medical care, and presence for parental educational or job opportunities). We cannot quarrel with this general proposition. However, here, the parties memorialized their intent in an objective piece of evidence, namely, the consent order. Thus, under these circumstances, the trial court correctly placed the most significant weight on this objective factor.

¶ 38 We also find unavailing David's assertion that the trial court's ruling must be reversed because the court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. In our view, the trial court correctly found that "[t]he facts are generally undisputed" and that, therefore, no hearing was required. Cf. Frost , 289 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 224 Ill.Dec. 409, 681 N.E.2d 1030 ("an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine whether the parties had agreed that Michael would return to Illinois at the conclusion of his visit to California and whether the petitioner knew more than six months before he filed his petition that Michael's residence in California was permanent").

¶ 39 Because we conclude that Illinois is the children's home state, we need not reach David's alternative argument that, even if Canada is not the children's home state, Illinois is not their home state either and the trial court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction after conducting a proper statutory analysis. See 750 ILCS 36/201(a)(2) (West 2016) (Illinois has jurisdiction where a court of another state does not have jurisdiction and the child and at least one parent have a significant connection to Illinois other than mere physical presence and there is substantial evidence in Illinois concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships).

¶ 40 B. Due Process

¶ 41 Next, David argues that he was denied due process, where the trial court, sua sponte and without a hearing, temporarily allocated parental responsibilities to Jessica. He concedes that the trial court did not rule on Jessica's emergency motion to enforce the consent order, but he contends that its ruling essentially granted her every part of the relief she sought in that motion. Implicit in its ruling, David argues, was that Jessica was allowed to remain in Illinois with the children, choose the school in which to enroll L.T.M., and make all daily decisions concerning the children's care, and that David's parenting time (as compared to the "equal access" he enjoyed under the consent order) was dramatically reduced. He maintains that the trial court enforced a clause barred by public policy and stripped David of his parental rights without notice and a hearing. See 750 ILCS 5/603.5(a) (West 2016) (a temporary allocation of parental responsibilities "shall be made in accordance with the standards set forth in Sections 602.5 and 602.7 [of the Dissolution Act]: (i) after a hearing"); see also In re Custody of G.L. , 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶¶ 24-25, 414 Ill.Dec. 493, 80 N.E.3d 636 (deferential standard applies to findings concerning allocation of parental responsibilities); In re Marriage of Heindl , 2014 IL App (2d) 130198, ¶ 21, 381 Ill.Dec. 915, 11 N.E.3d 851 (due process violation presents legal question, subject to de novo review). David requests that we vacate the January 18, 2018, order and that the children be returned to Canada.

¶ 42 Jessica responds that David's constitutional rights were not violated by the court's temporary allocation of parental responsibilities and setting of a temporary parenting-time schedule, where his parental rights remain intact and the court simply acted to ensure a reasonable status quo for the short term. On the last point, she notes that the transcript of the January 18, 2018, hearing reflects that the court, "sua sponte without prejudice pending resolution of any appeals," simply ensured that M.N.M. would attend school and that David would have regular parenting time in both Illinois and Canada. The court also, Jessica notes, set a very prompt status date, for less than six weeks hence. Thus, contrary to David's claims, the court did not make any substantive custody determinations. We agree with Jessica and find no error with the court's order maintaining the status quo pending appeal. The transcript of the January 18, 2018, hearing reflects that David suggested imposing a stay on any substantive issues pending appeal. The court then ordered that M.N.M. be immediately enrolled in the school she had previously attended, noting that the order would be without prejudice and temporary. The court further noted that it was "extremely concerned about parenting time for David while this litigation is pending and during the course of the appeal, so I will be entering a specific order in regard to [a] parenting time schedule for David." David did not object or request a hearing. Next, Jessica requested that the order allow her to enroll L.T.M. in preschool, so long as she provided David with prior notice, and the court agreed. David voiced no objection.

¶ 43 David next focuses on the consent-order clause that allows Jessica to leave Canada if David has sexual relations with a third party. He argues that the clause is against public policy and unenforceable. Thus, in his view, Jessica's removal of herself and the children without notice violated the consent order. Jessica responds first that the trial court did not grant her emergency motion and did not even hear the motion on January 18, 2018; the motion was merely discussed in a pretrial conference. Thus, she reasons, because the court did not enforce the infidelity provision in the consent order, David cannot now claim that his due process rights were violated. Second, she contends that, even if the infidelity provision is properly before this court, the provision is not against public policy. She notes that the consent order does not grant her custody upon David's infidelity, but, rather, allows an earlier return to Illinois than the previously agreed-to July 2018 return date.

¶ 44 We reject David's argument. Contrary to his assertion, the trial court made no findings concerning the infidelity clause, and we need not reach it. Further, we find unavailing his argument that the only means by which the trial court could have determined on January 18, 2018, that Jessica should remain in Illinois was by determining that the infidelity clause had been violated. The trial court's findings (on David's motion to dismiss for lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction) were based on its analysis of home-state jurisdiction; it did not rule on the infidelity clause.

¶ 45 C. Unclean Hands

¶ 46 David's final argument is that, due to Jessica's unclean hands in removing the children from Canada, this court should vacate the trial court's order asserting jurisdiction over the children. He asserts that Jessica provided false itineraries during the winter holiday, claiming that she would return the children to Canada in January 2018. In fact, he urges, she was seeking to gain advantage in the Lake County litigation. The trial court, he asserts, failed to consider Jessica's bad faith in absconding with the children.

¶ 47 "In Illinois, misconduct on the part of a plaintiff that will defeat recovery in a court of equity under the doctrine of unclean hands must have been conduct in connection with the very transaction being considered or complained of and must have been misconduct, fraud[,] or bad faith toward the defendant making the contention. [Citation.] The doctrine is not a judicial strait-jacket that will prevent a court of equity from doing justice[,] and its application is not favored by the courts." Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt , 140 Ill. App. 3d 512, 521-22, 94 Ill.Dec. 815, 488 N.E.2d 1062 (1986). Application of the doctrine is within the trial court's discretion. La Salle National Bank v. 53rd-Ellis Currency Exchange, Inc. , 249 Ill. App. 3d 415, 437, 188 Ill.Dec. 533, 618 N.E.2d 1103 (1993).

¶ 48 We reject David's argument. He asserts that Jessica was due to return to Canada from Florida with the children on January 7, 2018, but, instead, texted him from Lake Forest on January 10, 2018, to ask if his attorneys had received her emergency motion filed that day. In our view, the trial court could have reasonably declined to invoke the unclean-hands doctrine. David's position is that Jessica returned to Illinois with the children in order to establish jurisdiction for the dissolution petition that she had filed here. We agree that this is the type of conduct that the statute is designed to prevent. Even so, Jessica alleged in her emergency motion for temporary jurisdiction that David violated the consent order's infidelity provision, which, if true, would have allowed her to immediately return to Illinois. Although we do not reach the issues of the provision's validity or the truthfulness of Jessica's allegation, we believe that the court could have reasonably declined to find that she had unclean hands where she asserted a potentially valid reason for returning to Illinois.

¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.

¶ 51 Affirmed.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      The trial court found that L.T.M. was born in November 2014. This appears to be incorrect but has no bearing on our analysis.

      The order specifies that it was entered pursuant to article 7c of the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the "Hague Convention") and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. 9001 et seq. (Supp. II 2015), along with the parties' express consent and agreement.

      She alleged that she attached to her motion an "investigative report of Haywood Hunt & Associates dated January 9, 2018." The report is not contained in the record on appeal.

      We also decline David's request to strike Jessica's statement of additional facts, which, he asserts, contains argument and misstates the record, thereby violating Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). When an appellant's brief improperly includes argument, conclusions, or inappropriate record citations, we may, in our discretion, strike those portions of the brief. Hubert v. Consolidated Medical Laboratories , 306 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1120, 240 Ill.Dec. 196, 716 N.E.2d 329 (1999). However, where the violations are not "so flagrant as to hinder or preclude review," striking a brief in whole or in part may be "unwarranted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Here, to the extent that Jessica's statement of additional facts is improperly argumentative or provides improper citations, it is nevertheless not so misleading as to hinder our analysis. The properly asserted facts are sufficient to permit our review of this appeal. We will not strike the statement of additional facts, but we will simply disregard any portions that we believe violate Rule 341.


text:
    Brittany N. HAGE and Joann M. Blackmore, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Shane M. KOSSIER, Trisha L. Pannkuk, Penny M. Ludwig, John W. Cline, and Anthony J. Miatke, Defendants
    (Trisha L. Pannkuk, Defendant-Appellee).
    No. 2-17-0901
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
    Opinion filed August 8, 2018
    H. Kent Heller, of Heller, Holmes & Associates, P.C., of Mattoon, for appellants.
    Raymond J. Melton, Michael Resis, and Ellen L. Green, of SmithAmundsen LLC, of Rockford, for appellee.
   JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Brittany N. Hage and Joann M. Blackmore, appeal the dismissal of count VI of Hage's fourth amended complaint, which added Blackmore as a plaintiff in Hage's action against defendant Trisha L. Pannkuk. Because the allegations in count VI did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as Hage's original complaint, count VI was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Stephenson County.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The following facts are taken from the record. On February 1, 2011, during a winter snowstorm, a 13-vehicle accident occurred on Route 72 in Ogle County. The weather conditions included snow on the roadway and blowing snow that greatly reduced visibility. Drivers reported that immediately before the accident their speeds were limited to between 20 and 35 miles per hour, in a 55 mile-per-hour speed zone. Several lawsuits sprang from this incident, two of which are relevant to this appeal.

¶ 4 On April 5, 2012, Hage filed a five-count complaint against defendants, Shane M. Kossier, Pannkuk, Penny M. Ludwig, John W. Cline, and Anthony J. Miatke. In her complaint, Hage alleged that she suffered serious injuries as a passenger in a car driven by Kossier when that car slid into vehicles driven by Ludwig and Cline. Hage further alleged that Kossier's car was then hit from the rear by a car driven by Pannkuk. According to Hage's complaint, the combination of cars was then hit by a vehicle driven by Miatke.

¶ 5 On January 24, 2013, one week before the limitations period would have expired, Blackmore, who was also involved in the accident, filed a single-count complaint against Cline. No other parties were named in that action. Blackmore alleged that she stopped her car in the roadway when she approached another car in the road that was already stopped. She alleged that, when she exited her car to speak with the driver of the car that was stopped in front of her, Cline's car struck her car from behind. Her car was thrust forward, hitting her, running over her foot, and slamming her into a snow bank, causing injuries.

¶ 6 On August 23, 2013, the trial court consolidated the Hage and Blackmore actions for the purposes of discovery only. Between November 2013 and August 2014, the parties deposed Ludwig, Pannkuk, Cline, Blackmore, and Eric Miller, who was involved in the accident but not a party in either of these cases.

¶ 7 On December 7, 2015, Hage sought leave to file a fourth amended complaint. She proposed adding Blackmore as a plaintiff in the claims against Pannkuk, Ludwig, and Cline. Count VI of the proposed fourth amended complaint was directed against Pannkuk. In it, Blackmore alleged that Pannkuk's car collided with Ludwig's and Cline's, which had already collided and struck Blackmore. In other words, the proposed fourth amended complaint included a count by Hage alleging that Pannkuk's car struck the car in which she was riding, as well as a separate count by Blackmore alleging that Pannkuk's car struck Ludwig's and Cline's cars.

¶ 8 On January 25, 2016, Pannkuk objected to Hage's motion to amend, arguing that the proposed fourth amended complaint was outside the statute of limitations. Moreover, Pannkuk argued, count VI did not relate back to Hage's original complaint, because it alleged a new cause of action with different injuries. The trial court granted Hage leave to amend, without commenting on the substance of the relation-back argument. On June 23, 2016, Hage filed her fourth amended complaint.

¶ 9 On August 10, 2016, Pannkuk filed a motion to dismiss count VI of the fourth amended complaint, arguing again that Blackmore's claim did not relate back to Hage's original complaint because it did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Specifically, Pannkuk maintained that count VI was for different injuries and required different proofs to defend. Hage and Blackmore countered that both lawsuits involved "identical facts as well as similar issues of liability and damages" and that the numerous counterclaims for contribution put all defendants on notice that each defendant thought that the others were responsible for the accident. On October 28, 2016, the court denied Pannkuk's motion to dismiss.

¶ 10 On February 28, 2017, Pannkuk filed a motion to reconsider the order denying her motion to dismiss. Pannkuk asserted that Hage suffered whiplash-type injuries to her neck and back inside the car she was riding in when it collided with a car in front of her and then was struck twice from behind by other vehicles. By contrast, Blackmore exited her car uninjured and was then struck by her own car when it was hit by another car, injuring her left foot, neck, and back. Pannkuk argued that these different injuries necessarily involved different treating physicians and different evidence. Pannkuk further argued that she did not depose Blackmore on her injuries, because Blackmore had not brought any claims against Pannkuk at that time and the limitations period had expired more than a year earlier. Pannkuk cited McGinnis v. A.R. Abrams, Inc. , 141 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422, 95 Ill.Dec. 642, 490 N.E.2d 115 (1986), where the Fourth District refused to allow a wife to add a new claim to her husband's claim, stating: "[S]ection 2-616(b) [of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2016) ) ] was not designed to allow new parties to hitch their wagons to timely filed complaints." According to Pannkuk, adding Blackmore as a plaintiff in the fourth amended complaint was nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the statute of limitations. Hage and Blackmore argued that all defendants had been involved in this case from the beginning and should have known from the original facts alleged that new claims could arise.

¶ 11 On September 21, 2017, the court ruled on the motion to reconsider. The court found that Hage was injured inside Kossier's vehicle during the chain reaction, while Blackmore had exited her car and was standing in the roadway and was struck as a pedestrian. The court ruled that a jury hearing the Hage and Blackmore cases together would, in essence, be hearing two separate trials. The court found that the proofs would be different and that trying the cases together would lead to "great confusion." While the court recognized that there was "an inextricable connection between the injury to Ms. Blackmore and Ms. Hage," it granted the motion to reconsider and dismissed count VI of the fourth amended complaint, based on McGinnis . Hage and Blackmore timely appealed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that count VI of the fourth amended complaint did not relate back, pursuant to section 2-616(b) of the Code, to the date that Hage filed her original pleading. Pannkuk responds that count VI did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original complaint and that the court properly dismissed it.

¶ 14 Section 2-616(b) of the Code defines the relation-back doctrine, the purpose of which is to "preserve causes of action against loss by reason of technical default unrelated to the merits." Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital , 227 Ill. 2d 343, 355, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583 (2008). Section 2-616(b) instructs that an amended pleading otherwise barred by a statute of limitations shall be held to "relate back" to the date of the original pleading when (1) the original pleading was timely filed and (2) the amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2016). The principal element in determining whether an amended complaint grew out of the same transaction or occurrence is whether the defendant was put on notice of the matter covered in the amended complaint by the facts alleged in the original complaint. Porter , 227 Ill. 2d at 354, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583. The rationale behind the same-transaction-or-occurrence rule is that a defendant will not be prejudiced by an amendment so long as "his attention was directed, within the time prescribed or limited, to the facts that form the basis of the claim asserted against him." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Porter , 227 Ill. 2d at 355, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583 (quoting Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Direct Lines, Inc. , 167 Ill. 2d 88, 102, 212 Ill.Dec. 267, 656 N.E.2d 1101 (1995) ). A statute of limitations and section 2-616(b) are meant to give a defendant a fair opportunity to investigate the circumstances upon which his liability is based while the facts are still accessible. Porter , 227 Ill. 2d at 355, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583. In determining whether an amendment relates back to the original pleading under section 2-616(b), a court should consider the entire record to establish whether, before the limitations period expired, the defendant was put on clear notice of the occurrence alleged. Porter , 227 Ill. 2d at 355, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583 ; see also Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc. , 143 Ill. 2d 44, 47-48, 155 Ill.Dec. 814, 570 N.E.2d 327 (1991). We review de novo a trial court's decision as to whether a new claim related back to the original complaint under section 2-616(b). Porter , 227 Ill. 2d at 353, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583.

¶ 15 Plaintiffs assert, and Pannkuk concedes, that Hage timely filed her original complaint. As the first element for triggering the relation-back doctrine under section 2-616(b) is met, this case turns on whether the new claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence alleged in the original complaint.

¶ 16 Plaintiffs contend that Hage's original complaint provided Pannkuk sufficient notice of Blackmore's claim in count VI, because the same negligent conduct alleged in the original complaint formed the basis of Blackmore's claim. They cite Zeh v. Wheeler , 111 Ill. 2d 266, 279, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342 (1986), where our supreme court opined that, "if the defendant has been made aware of the occurrence or transaction which is the basis for the claim, he can prepare to meet the plaintiff's claim, whatever theory it may be based on." Plaintiffs argue that Hage's allegations of negligence in count II of her original complaint were the basis of Blackmore's claim in count VI and that Pannkuk should have been prepared to meet the claim. In response to objections to her motion to amend, Hage argued, "[I]t is absolutely clear that the claims of the two Plaintiffs arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts."

¶ 17 Zeh involved a single plaintiff who brought a claim of negligence against a landlord for failing to maintain a common stairway. Zeh , 111 Ill. 2d at 268, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342. After the expiration of the limitations period, the plaintiff amended her complaint to change the address of the property where the injury occurred. Zeh , 111 Ill. 2d at 269, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342. Our supreme court considered whether the facts in the original complaint gave the defendant notice of the occurrence that was the basis of the amended claim. See Zeh , 111 Ill. 2d at 280-81, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342. The court found that nothing in the record indicated that the defendant knew or had any notice that the plaintiff's original complaint was making a claim for an injury at the correct location. Zeh , 111 Ill. 2d at 281-82, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342. Moreover, the location was significant because it gave the defendant notice of the occurrence against which it was called to defend. Zeh , 111 Ill. 2d at 280, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342. Consequently, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint. Zeh , 111 Ill. 2d at 283, 95 Ill.Dec. 478, 489 N.E.2d 1342.

¶ 18 Plaintiffs also cite Cassidy v. Derek Bryant Insurance Brokers, Ltd. , 244 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1061, 184 Ill.Dec. 609, 613 N.E.2d 1201 (1993), to support their argument that a new plaintiff may be added in an amended complaint under section 2-616(b). Although the court in Cassidy addressed the circumstances under which a new plaintiff may be added in an amended complaint, the gist of Cassidy was whether the new plaintiff's claim grew out of the same occurrence alleged in the original complaint: "[T]he claim of a new plaintiff does not grow out of the occurrence alleged in the original complaint unless the original complaint states facts showing that the misconduct which caused the original plaintiff's harm also caused the new plaintiff's harm * * *." Cassidy , 244 Ill. App. 3d at 1061, 184 Ill.Dec. 609, 613 N.E.2d 1201. Accordingly, plaintiffs here needed to demonstrate that Blackmore's injuries were caused by the same occurrence that caused Hage's injuries. As discussed below, plaintiffs failed to construct this nexus.

¶ 19 Plaintiffs additionally cite Sompolski v. Miller , 239 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 180 Ill.Dec. 932, 608 N.E.2d 54 (1992), Castro v. Bellucci , 338 Ill. App. 3d 386, 273 Ill.Dec. 610, 789 N.E.2d 784 (2003), Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank , 55 Ill. 2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64 (1973), and Marek v. O.B. Gyne Specialists II, S.C. , 319 Ill. App. 3d 690, 253 Ill.Dec. 759, 746 N.E.2d 1 (2001). Simply stated, all of these cases analyzed whether, before the expiration of the limitations period, the defendants were put on notice of the facts alleged in the amended complaints. They relied on reasoning similar to that our supreme court outlined in Porter and Zeh . Plaintiffs argue that these cases favor finding that Pannkuk was on notice: "[W]henever an amendment to a complaint is based on the very same actions that formed the original complaint, the newly amended portions to the Complaint successfully relate back to the original claim." Plaintiffs support this contention by asserting that the relevant counts in the original and amended complaints contained identical language. They offer for comparison the two counts, beginning with count II of the original complaint:

"2. That at all times relevant herein [Pannkuk] was operat[ing] her vehicle in a westerly direction on Route 72 in Forreston Township, Ogle County, Illinois.
3. At said time and place, [Pannkuk] committed one or more or a combination of the following negligent acts and omissions, to wit:
a) negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to keep a good and sufficient lookout;
b) negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to keep [her] vehicle under control;
c) negligently and carelessly drove at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper in violation of § 11-601(a) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code given the weather conditions;
d) negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to reduce speed to avoid a collision in violation of § 11-601(a) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code;
e) negligently and carelessly followed too close for conditions;
f) negligently and carelessly came to a sudden stop on the roadway;
g) negligently and carelessly failed to use that degree of care required to keep [her] vehicle from colliding with other vehicles on the roadway."

Plaintiffs then quoted count VI of the fourth amended complaint:

"2. That at all times relevant herein [Pannkuk] was operating her vehicle in a westerly direction on Route 72 in Forreston Township, Ogle County, Illinois.
3. At said time and place, [Pannkuk] committed one or more or a combination of the following negligent acts and omissions, to wit:
a) negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to keep a good and sufficient lookout;
b) negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to keep her vehicle under control;
c) negligently and carelessly drove at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper in violation of § 11-601(a) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code given the weather conditions;
d) negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to reduce speed to avoid a collision in violation of § 11-601(a) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code;
e) [n]egligently and carelessly followed too close for conditions;
f) negligently and carelessly came to a sudden stop on the roadway;
g) negligently and carelessly failed to use that degree of care required to keep [her] vehicle from colliding with other vehicles on the roadway."

Plaintiffs conclude that, because count VI of the fourth amended complaint relied on the exact same acts as count II of the original complaint, Pannkuk possessed the necessary information to build a defense to the amended complaint and it should therefore relate back to the original.

¶ 20 Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge, however, that these conclusions of negligence actually arose from different alleged acts. Although the above-quoted paragraphs were identical, the paragraphs that followed alleged different actions by Pannkuk. Paragraph four of count II of the original complaint read: "[T]he car in which [Hage] was riding * * * was hit in the rear by the vehicle driven by Defendant Pannkuk * * *." Paragraph four of count VI of the fourth amended complaint read: "[Pannkuk's] car collided with Defendants Ludwig and Cline * * *." Count II alleged that Pannkuk struck Hage, and count VI alleged that Pannkuk struck Ludwig and Cline. Far from identical, these allegations of Pannkuk's actions were in direct conflict.

¶ 21 On the face of the complaints, the injuries arose from different occurrences. As Pannkuk asserts, the mechanism of each injury was separate and distinct. Hage claimed that her whiplash-type injuries were sustained while she was riding in Kossier's car. Blackmore alleged that her injuries occurred when her own car struck her while she was standing in the roadway. Plaintiffs suffered different injuries that occurred at different times and required different providers to treat, and therefore their claims would have required different proofs to defend. There is nothing in the record to indicate that, before the limitations period expired, Pannkuk knew or had any notice that Hage's original complaint, alleging injuries from Pannkuk's car striking the car Hage was riding in, would give rise to the new claim that Pannkuk's car instead struck Ludwig's and Cline's vehicles. Like the plaintiff in Zeh , plaintiffs in this case attempted to add significant factual allegations when the original complaint had not put Pannkuk on notice of those potential allegations. Under Cassidy , the misconduct that Hage alleged in her original complaint was not the same misconduct that Blackmore alleged caused her injuries, and therefore Blackmore's claim could not have grown out of the same occurrence.

¶ 22 At oral argument, plaintiffs asserted that the "permutations or combinations of what could have happened or what did happen are almost infinite." They argued that section 2-616(b) clearly contemplates adding a new plaintiff and that a new plaintiff would necessarily have a different claim. But that argument does not address the notice issue. This court asked how Pannkuk was put on notice that she might be sued for striking the cars of Ludwig and Cline when the original complaint alleged only that she struck Kossier's vehicle. Plaintiffs answered that the numerous counterclaims for contribution and the depositions put all defendants, including Pannkuk, on notice that they might be at least partially liable for others' injuries. Even accepting that assertion as true, Pannkuk still would not have been put on notice before the limitations period expired. See Porter , 227 Ill. 2d at 354-55, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583. The limitations period for these claims expired on February 1, 2013. On May 16, 2013, more than three months later, Kossier filed the first counterclaim for contribution. The first deposition in the record was that of Ludwig, on November 11, 2013. No amount of information that emerged from the counterclaims or depositions could have put Pannkuk on notice within the limitations period that she might have to defend against the allegations in count VI of the fourth amended complaint. Without notice, there can be no relation-back.

¶ 23 In McGinnis , the Fourth District considered whether a new plaintiff's claim related back to the original filing. The original plaintiff was a worker who was injured when he tripped over a door casing at his place of employment. McGinnis , 141 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 95 Ill.Dec. 642, 490 N.E.2d 115. After the limitations period had expired, the worker's wife sought to add a consortium claim, asserting that it related back to the original transaction or occurrence that caused her husband's injuries. McGinnis , 141 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 95 Ill.Dec. 642, 490 N.E.2d 115. The court held that section 2-616(b) was not designed "to allow new parties to hitch their wagons to timely filed complaints." McGinnis , 141 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 95 Ill.Dec. 642, 490 N.E.2d 115. While the wife's cause of action was inextricably connected to her husband's, she was still a new party with a separate complaint that did not relate back to the original pleading. McGinnis , 141 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 95 Ill.Dec. 642, 490 N.E.2d 115. Similarly, here, Blackmore is a new party with a new cause of action. She would have been barred from adding Pannkuk to her own complaint against Cline, because the limitations period had long since expired. She cannot now circumvent the statute of limitations by hitching her wagon to Hage's timely filed complaint.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Stephenson County is affirmed.

Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      The parties differ as to whether the complaint at issue is the third or fourth amended complaint, because a previous amended complaint was served but never filed. For the purpose of this disposition, we refer to the complaint at issue as the fourth amended complaint.

      Sometime between October 2016 and February 2017, the original judge in the case, Hon. David L. Jeffrey, retired, and was replaced by Hon. Glenn R. Schorsch.

      At oral argument, plaintiffs referred to an Illinois Bar Journal article not cited in their briefs (Amelia S. Buragas, Proximate Cause: Limiting Liability Along the Chain of Causation , 102 Ill. B.J. 88 (2014) ), asserting that "it's pretty clear that the law considers this type of an incident a single incident unless there is so much time between collisions." In fact, the article focused on the determination of proximate cause in Illinois tort cases generally. The author of the article used automobile accidents as models to illustrate the issues in determining proximate cause, including one case where an accident that occurred four hours prior to a second accident was found not to be the proximate cause of the second accident. The author acknowledged the difficulties in such determinations, concluding, "it is the unique facts of each case that drive the court's ultimate decision." Buragas, supra , at 91. We do not find this article apposite, let alone persuasive, for the point that Illinois law favors a finding that the events that took place in this case were a single transaction or occurrence under section 2-616(b) of the Code.