author: GANTS, C.J.

text:
    BUFFALO-WATER 1, LLC v. FIDELITY REAL ESTATE COMPANY, LLC.
    SJC-12487
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..
    Argued October 4, 2018 Decided November 26, 2018
    Richard E. Briansky, Boston, for the plaintiff.
    David J. Apfel, Boston, for the defendant.
    Timothy P. Burke & Nathaniel P. Bruhn, Boston, for Greater Boston Real Estate Board, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
    Dawn Mertineit & Katherine E. Perrelli, Boston, for Appraisal Institute & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
    Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
   GANTS, C.J.

In Eliot v. Coulter, 322 Mass. 86, 91, 76 N.E.2d 19 (1947), this court held that, where parties agree that the fair value of a property shall be determined by an appraiser, "the correctness of the principles and methods of valuation adopted by [an] appraiser[ ] cannot be inquired into by the courts, in the absence of fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith." Under this common-law rule, a judge may not invalidate "the determination of appraisers selected by agreement to resolve a dispute" unless the appraisal process or decision was tainted on one of these four grounds. Nelson v. Maiorana, 395 Mass. 87, 89, 478 N.E.2d 945 (1985). The issue on appeal is whether we should modify this common-law rule and allow a judge to invalidate an appraisal intended by the parties to provide a final, binding valuation of a property where there is the appearance of bias, not on the part of the individual who conducted the appraisal, but on the part of the entity that employed the individual appraiser. We conclude that the common-law rule established in Eliot properly balances the need for fair valuations with the need for finality in the appraisal process, and that an appearance of bias alone is insufficient to invalidate an appraisal. Because the allegations in the complaint, if proved, do not warrant a finding of any violation of the agreements setting forth the terms of the appraisal, or a finding of fraud, corruption, dishonesty, or bad faith by the individual appraiser, or a finding of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the defendant, we affirm the Superior Court judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Background. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept as true all facts alleged in the plaintiff's verified complaint and accompanying exhibits. See Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 595, 71 N.E.3d 457 (2017). The following facts are drawn from that complaint and those documents.

In October 2004, the defendant, Fidelity Real Estate Company, LLC (Fidelity), sold the Winthrop Building, a commercial property located in Boston (property), to the plaintiff, Buffalo-Water 1, LLC (Buffalo-Water), a subsidiary of a national real estate company.

Buffalo-Water then leased the property back to Fidelity, and the parties entered into an option to purchase agreement (option agreement) granting Fidelity the option to buy the building back in the final year of its lease. The option agreement stated that, if Fidelity chose to exercise its option, the purchase price would be $16,275,000 or ninety-five percent of the property's fair market value, whichever is greater. The fair market value would be determined by agreement of the parties, or by the following appraisal process outlined in the option agreement: (1) each party appoints an appraiser who has at least ten years of experience appraising Greater Boston property and is an MAI-designated member of the Appraisal Institute or a member of the American Society of Real Estate Counselors (or their successor organizations); (2) if the two appointed appraisers cannot agree on the fair market value but their appraisals fall within five percent of one another, the fair market value shall be deemed to be the average of the two appraisals; (3) if the difference between the appraisals is greater than five percent, the two appraisers shall appoint a third appraiser to decide the fair market value. The option agreement provides that this final valuation may not be greater than the higher or less than the lower of the two previous appraisals.

In August 2016, Fidelity exercised its right under the option agreement to purchase the property. Fidelity and Buffalo-Water were unable to agree upon the property's fair market value, and each retained an independent appraiser to determine the appropriate purchase price. Buffalo-Water's appraiser valued the property at $36 million; Fidelity's appraiser valued it at $17 million. Because the two appraisals differed by more than five percent, the parties agreed to retain Cushman & Wakefield (Cushman), a real estate services company, as a third appraiser.

Cushman outlined the terms of its appraisal services in a letter of engagement (engagement agreement) signed by the parties and by Robert Skinner, the Cushman professional selected to perform the independent appraisal. On April 18, 2017, Skinner submitted an appraisal valuing the property at $22.9 million. The valuation was accompanied by a "Certification of Appraisal" signed by Skinner, which stated, "We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report, ... no personal interest with respect to the parties involved," and "no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this report or to the parties involved with this assignment."

Soon after receiving the valuation, Buffalo-Water asked Skinner to reconsider the appraisal in light of certain "factual errors." In response, Cushman offered to meet with Buffalo-Water and Fidelity to discuss the appraisal. Fidelity declined this offer to meet in a letter that noted that neither the option agreement nor the engagement agreement "contemplates reconsideration of the appraisal at any time." Fidelity also stated that Buffalo-Water was obliged under the option agreement to honor the third appraiser's valuation and deed the property to Fidelity.

After receiving Fidelity's letter, Buffalo-Water learned that in December 2016, before Cushman was engaged to conduct the appraisal, Fidelity had retained Cushman for a national representation contract. Buffalo-Water communicated this information to Fidelity, claiming that Fidelity's preexisting relationship with Cushman created an impermissible conflict of interest. Fidelity declined to retain a new appraiser or to extend the closing date in light of this alleged conflict.

The following week, Buffalo-Water filed a two-count verified complaint against Fidelity in the Superior Court. The first count seeks a judgment declaring that the appraisal is invalid and nonbinding; the second count alleges a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Fidelity moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The judge allowed Fidelity's motion and dismissed the complaint, concluding that the facts alleged by Buffalo-Water did "not amount to the kind of bad faith, fraud or corruption required for a court to invalidate an independent appraisal agreed to by the parties." Buffalo-Water appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo. Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164, 4 N.E.3d 270 (2014). In considering whether a count in a complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), we accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and the attached exhibits, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and determine whether the allegations "plausibly suggest" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief on that legal claim (citation omitted). Id. The allegations must be more than "mere labels and conclusions," and must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" (quotations and citations omitted). Id. at 165, 4 N.E.3d 270.

Buffalo-Water raises three arguments on appeal. First, it claims that the judge improperly dismissed its claim for declaratory judgment under rule 12 (b) (6) because courts are obligated to declare the rights of the parties in every properly brought action for declaratory relief. Second, it claims that the appraisal should be invalidated due to Cushman's failure to disclose its preexisting contractual relationship with Fidelity. Third, Buffalo-Water claims that Fidelity committed a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by taking advantage of an appraisal process it knew to be biased. We address each of these arguments in turn.

1. Declaratory relief. Buffalo-Water contends that the judge erred in dismissing its claim for declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A, § 1, because, where the claim was properly brought, Buffalo-Water is entitled to a declaration of the rights of the parties. We hold that, where a party moves to dismiss a properly brought declaratory judgment claim under rule 12 (b) (6) and where the judge concludes that the facts alleged in the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the judge has the option of dismissing the claim or of declaring that, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaratory relief sought.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory relief under rule 12 (b) (6), a judge must proceed in two steps. First, the judge must determine whether the claim was "properly brought." See Mscisz v. Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp., 446 Mass. 1008, 1010, 844 N.E.2d 614 (2006). A claim for declaratory relief is "properly brought" where the plaintiff demonstrates that an actual controversy exists, see G. L. c. 231A, § 1 (courts may issue declaratory judgments where "an actual controversy has arisen and is specifically set forth in the pleadings"); that the plaintiff has legal standing to sue, see Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292-293, 367 N.E.2d 796 (1977) (explaining standing requirement); and that all necessary parties have been joined, see G. L. c. 231A, § 8 ("When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration ..."); Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 338, 14 N.E.3d 216 (2014) (failure to join necessary parties under G. L. c. 231A, § 8, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 19, 365 Mass. 765 [1974] "may be jurisdictional in a declaratory judgment action, thereby precluding the court's consideration of the issue").

Where the claim is "properly brought," as it is here, the judge must proceed to the second step: determining whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff in the complaint, if true, state a claim for declaratory relief that can survive a defendant's motion to dismiss.

Buffalo-Water contends that, even if the facts alleged in its complaint fail to state a claim for declaratory relief, the judge may not dismiss its properly brought claim but must instead declare the rights of the parties. Buffalo-Water's contention has considerable support in our case law. See Lynn v. Lynn Police Ass'n, 455 Mass. 590, 599, 919 N.E.2d 158 (2010) ("In a properly brought action for declaratory relief, there must be a declaration of the rights of the parties even though relief is denied to a plaintiff");

Cherkes v. Westport, 393 Mass. 9, 12, 468 N.E.2d 269 (1984) (same); Attorney Gen. v. Kenco Optics, Inc., 369 Mass. 412, 418, 340 N.E.2d 868 (1976) ("When an action for declaratory relief is properly brought and relief is denied on the merits, the action should not be dismissed. ... The rights of the parties should be declared" [citation omitted] ); Jewel Cos. v. Burlington, 365 Mass. 274, 277, 311 N.E.2d 539 (1974) ("a demurrer will not be sustained ... merely because the court is convinced the plaintiff will fail on the merits but only where the bill on its face fails to state a controversy proper for determination under the declaratory procedure" [quotation and citation omitted] );

Connery v. Commissioner of Correction, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 253, 254 n.4, 598 N.E.2d 1135 (1992), S.C., 414 Mass. 1009, 610 N.E.2d 896 (1993) ("Irrespective of the merits of the case, dismissal of the case under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [6] was not a correct disposition" because "[i]n an action for declaratory relief ... the court ought to declare the rights of the parties"). But Massachusetts appellate courts have also affirmed orders allowing motions to dismiss in properly brought claims for declaratory relief. See State Room, Inc. v. MA-60 State Assocs., L.L.C., 84 Mass.App.Ct. 244, 252, 995 N.E.2d 807 (2013) (affirming judgment dismissing claim for declaratory relief under rule 12 [b] [6] ). See also Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 840 N.E.2d 518 (2006) ; Wallerstein v. Board of Bar Examiners, 414 Mass. 1008, 610 N.E.2d 891 (1993). Our case law regarding whether courts may dismiss properly brought claims for declaratory relief under rule 12 (b) (6) therefore requires clarification.

Where a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss and the judge concludes that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the claim is ripe for disposition. If the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaratory judgment sought even if all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true, there can be no justification for allowing the claim to proceed or for permitting further discovery. If the judge were to declare the rights of the parties, the declaration should simply be that the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaratory relief sought based on the allegations in the complaint. Such a declaration, however, is implicit in a judge's order to dismiss a declaratory judgment claim under rule 12 (b) (6). Here, for instance, the judge's allowance of the motion to dismiss implicitly declares that, based on the allegations in its complaint, Buffalo-Water is not entitled to the declaration that Skinner's appraisal is invalid. Therefore, we see no convincing reason to prohibit a judge from dismissing a properly brought declaratory judgment count where it fails to state a claim under rule 12 (b) (6). We also see no convincing reason to prohibit a judge from making explicit through a declaration of rights what would be implicit in a dismissal. To the extent that previous cases have held that a judge may not dismiss a properly brought declaratory judgment claim where it fails to state a claim under rule 12 (b) (6), those cases are overruled.

2. Validity of appraisal. Parties that agree to be bound by an appraisal are free to set forth contractual terms regarding the appraiser's obligations and the grounds for invalidating the appraisal. Therefore, in deciding whether to invalidate an appraisal, we look first to determine whether there are allegations that would support a finding of a material breach of the contract terms governing the appraisal. Where there is no such material breach, we then look to the common law to determine whether the appraisal is invalid due to "fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith." Eliot, 322 Mass. at 91, 76 N.E.2d 19.

a. Contract terms. Because the engagement agreement retaining Cushman to perform an appraisal for Buffalo-Water and Fidelity sets forth the terms of the appraisal at issue here, we look to its contents to determine whether the appraiser was contractually obligated to disclose Cushman's contract with Fidelity. Three provisions of the engagement agreement are relevant: the discussion of conflicts of interest, the requirement that the appraiser's prior services be disclosed, and the commitment to "develop an appraisal in accordance with [the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) ] and the Code of Ethics and Certification Standards of the Appraisal Institute."

i. Conflicts of interest. The "Conflicts of Interest" section of the engagement agreement states that "[Cushman] adheres to a strict internal conflict of interest policy. If we discover in the preparation of our appraisal a conflict with this assignment we reserve the right to withdraw from the assignment without penalty." This provision does not obligate Cushman or its appraisers to disclose any conflicts or relationships. Instead, it exists to protect Cushman should it choose to withdraw from an assignment to perform an appraisal because of a conflict of interest. The provision is therefore not applicable where, as here, the appraiser completed a valuation without exercising the right to withdraw.

ii. Disclosure requirement. In a section entitled "Prior Services Disclosure," the engagement agreement states that the "USPAP requires disclosure of prior services performed by the individual appraiser within the three years prior to this assignment." The section goes on to affirm that the "undersigned appraiser has not provided prior services within the designated time frame." The relevant USPAP section is an "Ethics Rule" explaining that "[i]f known prior to accepting an assignment, and/or if discovered at any time during the assignment, an appraiser must disclose to the client ... any current or prospective interest in the subject property or parties involved; and any services regarding the subject property performed by the appraiser within the three year period immediately preceding acceptance of the assignment, as an appraiser or in any other capacity." Appraisal Foundation, USPAP 9 (2016-2017) (USPAP).

The relevant appraiser for the purposes of the contract is Skinner, who signed the engagement agreement and went on to perform the valuation at issue. Buffalo-Water's argument -- that Cushman is the relevant appraiser -- is belied not only by the text of the engagement agreement, which clearly refers to the "individual" and "undersigned" appraiser, but also by an Ethics Rule comment clarifying that the Ethics Rule "specifies the personal obligations and responsibilities of the individual appraiser." Id. at 8. This is consistent with the "Assumptions and Limiting Conditions" section of Skinner's completed appraisal report, which explicitly defines "[a]ppraiser(s)" to mean "the employee(s) of [Cushman] who prepared and signed the Report" (emphasis added). Buffalo-Water's focus on Skinner's employer is further refuted by the answer to one of the "Frequently Asked Questions" that provide guidance regarding the interpretation of the USPAP. The relevant question asks, "If the firm that employs me as an appraiser has provided leasing or property management services in the past three years for the subject property, must this be disclosed?" Id. at 219. The Appraisal Foundation responds, "[n]ot necessarily," as the Ethics Rule only "requires disclosure of services provided by the appraiser. However, if an appraiser believes that the provision of a service by the appraiser's firm or other related entity may be relevant, he or she should disclose that information to a potential client" (quotation omitted). Id.

Buffalo-Water's complaint alleges no facts suggesting that Skinner had any interest in the Winthrop Building or that he had performed an appraisal of the Winthrop Building in the three years prior to his acceptance of the assignment (or at any other time). Nor does the complaint allege that Skinner even knew of Fidelity's national representation contract with Cushman. Without such knowledge, Skinner cannot be expected to have disclosed that information to Buffalo-Water. Nor, for that matter, could he have been influenced in his valuation of the property by a Cushman contract with Fidelity that he is not alleged to have known anything about. The "Prior Services Disclosure" section of the engagement agreement therefore did not require the disclosure of Cushman's contract with Fidelity.

iii. Incorporation of USPAP and Code of Ethics. In an engagement agreement section entitled "USPAP Compliance," Skinner agreed to "develop an appraisal in accordance with USPAP and the Code of Ethics and Certification Standards of the Appraisal Institute." Here, the relevant incorporated standard is rule 3-6 of the Code of Ethics, which provides that in the absence of disclosure, "[i]t is unethical to provide a Service if a valuer has any direct or indirect, current, or prospective personal interest in the subject or outcome of the Service or with respect to the parties involved in the Service."

The Code of Ethics specifically defines a "valuer" as "[o]ne who is expected to provide Services in an unbiased and competent manner" (emphasis added). Appraisal Institute, Code of Professional Ethics and Explanatory Comments 6 (2015). In this case, where Skinner was the "valuer," the relevant inquiry is whether Skinner's actions violated rule 3-6 of the Code of Ethics. The complaint alleges no facts tending to show that Skinner had any personal interest in the Winthrop Building or in the outcome of his valuation, or knew of the national representation contract between Fidelity and Cushman. Code of Ethics rule 3-6, as incorporated by the engagement agreement, therefore created no obligation to disclose the existence of that contract.

b. Common law. Finding no contractual breach, we move on to consider whether the appraisal was invalid under Massachusetts common law. Our common law has recognized that, when parties enter into a contract providing that the valuation established by an independent appraiser shall determine the value of a property or business, they express their "shared desire for finality" through a means other than adjudication by a court or an arbitrator. State Room, Inc., 84 Mass.App.Ct. at 249, 995 N.E.2d 807. See Eliot, 322 Mass. at 89, 76 N.E.2d 19 (parties agreed to valuation "that would in the future prevent a resort to the courts or to technical arbitration"). The common law also recognizes that the need for finality does not override the need for the appraisal process to be untainted by "fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith." See Eliot, supra at 91, 76 N.E.2d 19. By allowing courts to invalidate appraisals only in these narrow circumstances, the common-law test established in Eliot balances the desire for finality with the need for integrity in the appraisal process.

Buffalo-Water claims that the appearance of bias arising from Cushman's national representation contract with Fidelity suffices to invalidate Skinner's appraisal. In evaluating this claim, we first consider whether the appearance of bias falls within the existing rubric of "fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith." Because we find that it does not, we then consider whether we should revise our common law to include it.

We begin by noting that, in determining whether to invalidate an appraisal, we look to the conduct of the individual appraiser or appraisers responsible for the valuation, not to the conduct of their employer. This rule is in keeping with the USPAP and the Code of Ethics. See USPAP, supra at 1 (defining "appraiser" as "one who is expected to perform valuation services competently and in a manner that is independent, impartial, and objective" [emphasis added] ); id. at 8 ("This [Ethics] Rule specifies the personal obligations and responsibilities of the individual appraiser");

Appraisal Institute, Code of Professional Ethics and Explanatory Comments 6 (2015) (defining "valuer" as "[o]ne who is expected to provide Services in an unbiased and competent manner" [emphasis added] ).

In arguing for the adoption of an "appearance of bias" standard, Buffalo-Water relies in large part on the statement in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968) that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, "any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias." Putting aside that this decision involved an arbitration rather than an appraisal and that it interpreted a Federal arbitration statute, the appearance of bias in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. arose from the fact that the "third arbitrator, the supposedly neutral member of the panel, conducted a large business ... in which he served as an engineering consultant" and one of the "regular customers" of that business was a litigant in the arbitration. Id. at 146, 89 S.Ct. 337. Thus, "the appearance of bias" arose from his personal, "repeated and significant" business relationship with the defendant, not simply the business relationship of his employer. Id. Even the cases from other jurisdictions that were cited by Buffalo-Water in its discussion of appraiser bias focus on the bias of individual appraisers, not their employer. See, e.g., Gebers v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 38 Cal.App.4th 1648, 1652, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 (1995) (appraiser was separately retained by party as expert witness in two pending court cases); Central Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 466 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Iowa 1991) ("appraiser was interested because he had a direct financial interest in the dispute").

Buffalo-Water alleges that there is an appearance of bias in Skinner's appraisal because of a business relationship that his employer, Cushman, has with Fidelity. Skinner is not alleged to have known about this business relationship when he made the valuation. The alleged appearance of bias does not qualify as "fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith." Eliot, 322 Mass. at 91, 76 N.E.2d 19.

At a minimum, a claim of fraud sufficient to invalidate an appraisal must allege a misrepresentation, and there are no allegations in the complaint tending to show that Skinner made, or was even aware of, a false representation to Buffalo-Water. See Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 573, 70 N.E.3d 905 (2017) (describing elements of fraud). To the extent that Buffalo-Water alleges that Cushman committed fraud by omission because Buffalo-Water relied to its detriment upon a "material omission by Cushman (i.e. its failure to disclose its relationship with Fidelity)," this allegation also fails. To show fraud by omission, the plaintiff must allege "both concealment of material information and a duty requiring disclosure." Sahin v. Sahin, 435 Mass. 396, 402 n.9, 758 N.E.2d 132 (2001). Here, Buffalo-Water has not shown that Skinner concealed (or even knew of) the national contract between Fidelity and Cushman, nor has it shown any duty to disclose that contract.

"Dishonesty" is a broader term than fraud, encompassing all "behavior that deceives or cheats people," "untruthfulness," and "untrustworthiness." Black's Law Dictionary 568 (10th ed. 2014). We need not decide here whether a dishonest act that falls short of fraud will suffice under our common law to invalidate an appraisal, because an appearance of bias alone cannot reasonably be deemed an act of dishonesty where, as here, the appearance of bias arises from a business relationship of Cushman that Skinner is not alleged to have known existed.

A finding of "corruption" might be warranted where the individual appraiser had an undisclosed personal interest -- financial or otherwise -- in the outcome of his or her valuation. As earlier noted, rule 3-6 of the Code of Ethics provides that it is unethical to provide services without disclosure if the valuer has any "personal interest" in the subject or outcome of the service or "with respect to the parties involved." But we decline to characterize as "corruption" the mere appearance of bias based on a business relationship of the appraisal company rather than of the individual appraiser, especially where there is no allegation that the individual appraiser knew of that relationship.

Bad faith is a "general and somewhat indefinite term" that goes beyond "bad judgment" or "negligence," suggesting "a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity," a "conscious doing of wrong," or a "breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will." Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 416, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937). See Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 441, 939 N.E.2d 709 (2010). Bad faith is not a statutory ground for invalidating arbitrations under the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes, G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a ) (MAA), but the MAA does require courts to vacate arbitration awards where "there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral." G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a ) (2). "[E]vident partiality means a situation in which a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to an arbitration" (quotation and citation omitted). JCI Communications, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2003). We recognize that partiality, where it exists, is more likely to be evident in an arbitration than in an appraisal because an arbitrator generally conducts a hearing where evidence is offered, while an appraiser generally renders a valuation without a hearing or the presentation of evidence. See Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373, 389 (1871) (appraisal decision, unlike arbitration decision, "may be made without notice to or hearing of the parties"). But if evident partiality were proved in the context of an appraisal, it would be sufficient to establish bad faith and to invalidate an appraisal under our common law, much as it would invalidate an arbitration award under the MAA. Evident partiality, however, means "more than just the appearance of possible bias," JCI Communications, Inc., supra, and therefore cannot be established based on the allegations in Buffalo-Water's complaint.

Arguably, an appraiser may also act in "bad faith" where he or she acts in any other way that would justify vacating an arbitration award under the MAA. See, e.g., G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a ) (1) (arbitration award shall be vacated if procured by undue means); G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a ) (2) (arbitration award shall be vacated if there was "misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party"). Buffalo-Water, however, has alleged no facts showing that Skinner's actions, if committed in an arbitral context, might have been impermissible under the MAA. We therefore need not address here to what extent "bad faith" under our common law might encompass the various grounds for invalidating an arbitration award under the MAA.

Having determined that the appearance of bias alone does not support a finding of "fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith," Eliot, 322 Mass. at 91, 76 N.E.2d 19, we consider whether to add "appearance of bias" as a separate common-law ground for invalidating an appraisal. We decline to do so. For more than seventy years, the common-law standard established in Eliot has provided an appropriate balance between parties' desire for finality and the need for integrity in the appraisal process. Allowing appraisals to be invalidated based on the appearance of bias alone would considerably diminish the finality of appraisals without significantly improving their over-all integrity. Cf. Katz, Nannis & Solomon, P.C. v. Levine, 473 Mass. 784, 794, 46 N.E.3d 541 (2016) ("[a]llowing parties to expand the grounds for judicial review would undermine the predictability, certainty, and effectiveness of the arbitral forum that has been voluntarily chosen by the parties" [quotation and citation omitted] ).

When parties negotiate a contract that provides for a binding appraisal, they are free to include provisions that establish more stringent impartiality requirements than those in our common law and specify that the appraisal will be invalid where those requirements are not met. Here, just as the parties required that the individual appraisers have at least ten years of experience valuing Greater Boston property, they could have required disclosure of any information concerning Cushman's business dealings with Buffalo-Water or Fidelity that might create an "appearance of bias," and agreed to invalidate the appraisal if such a disclosure was not made. Where they did not, we decline to expand our common law to require invalidation on this ground alone.

Because the allegations in Buffalo-Water's verified complaint, taken as true, do not "plausibly suggest" that the appraisal was tainted by fraud, corruption, dishonesty, or bad faith, and because the appearance of bias alone is not sufficient to invalidate an appraisal, the motion to dismiss the count of the complaint seeking invalidation of the appraisal was properly allowed under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6).

3. Covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In a separate count of the complaint, Buffalo-Water alleges that the defendant violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by insisting that Buffalo-Water sell the Winthrop Building despite knowing that the valuation was tainted by Cushman's potential conflict of interest with Fidelity.

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing "requires that neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to the fruits of the contract" (quotation and citation omitted). T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 456 Mass. 562, 570, 924 N.E.2d 696 (2010). Although "[e]very contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it," the "scope of the covenant is only as broad as the contract that governs the particular relationship" (quotations and citations omitted). Id. at 569-570, 924 N.E.2d 696. In other words, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing "cannot create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the existing contractual relationship" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 570, 924 N.E.2d 696.

Nothing in the contractual agreements entered into by Buffalo-Water and Fidelity prohibits Fidelity from demanding a sale based on the price established in Skinner's appraisal. The option agreement clearly states that the property's value would be determined through an appraisal process, every step of which was followed here. It does not require the parties to refrain from selecting an appraiser whose company had previously contracted with one of the parties. Nor does the option agreement or the engagement agreement require disclosure of potential conflicts of interest that could create the appearance of bias. Buffalo-Water may not insert these conditions into its contract with Fidelity through the side door of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because Buffalo-Water has alleged no facts tending to show that Fidelity injured its rights under the option agreement or the engagement agreement, we conclude that the judge properly dismissed the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

So ordered.

      We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Appraisal Institute and Massachusetts Board of Real Estate Appraisers, and by the Greater Boston Real Estate Board.

      The Appraisal Institute, a professional association of real estate appraisers, designates certain qualified professionals as MAI-designated members. "MAI" is not technically an acronym, but one of several designations used to identify certain professionals as members of the Appraisal Institute. To become an MAI-designated member, an appraiser must have good moral character, receive credit for specialized experience, pass an examination, and meet various other requirements.

      The Counselors of Real Estate is an international organization of property professionals. It was formerly known as the American Society of Real Estate Counselors. An individual may become a member by invitation, or may apply for membership after meeting certain experience requirements.

      According to the complaint, Buffalo-Water's appraiser evaluated the fair market value of the property as occupied, but Fidelity's appraiser evaluated it as vacant. Because neither party disputes the validity of these two initial appraisals, we do not address this discrepancy here.

      Robert Skinner may have had assistance in valuing the property -- the engagement agreement retaining Cushman to conduct the valuation lists a $475 hourly fee for Skinner, and a $250 hourly fee for "Analysts/Appraisers." Skinner alone, however, signed the engagement agreement and the certification of appraisal attached to the final appraisal report.

      In an electronic mail message sent on April 21, 2017, Stephen Scalione -- Buffalo-Water's executive director of finance -- summarized the alleged factual errors. Scalione claimed that Skinner had misreported the purchase price and net rentable area of the property, that a certain deduction was improper, that the building should not have been valued as vacant, and that the over-all valuation was inaccurate.

      Fidelity asserts that the national representation contract was with Cushman & Wakefield U.S., Inc., not Cushman & Wakefield of Massachusetts, Inc., which employed the appraiser who performed the valuation. Because the complaint identifies only one Cushman entity, and because our decision does not rest on the distinction, we refer to Cushman as a single entity.

      Where the relief sought through a declaratory judgment claim involves administrative action, we further require the plaintiff to show that all available administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Villages Dev. Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 410 Mass. 100, 106, 571 N.E.2d 361 (1991).

      In Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 748 n.5, 840 N.E.2d 518 (2006), and Wallerstein v. Board of Bar Examiners, 414 Mass. 1008, 1009, 610 N.E.2d 891 (1993), this court acknowledged that when "an action for declaratory relief is properly brought and relief is denied on the merits, the action should not be dismissed" (citation omitted) and the rights of the parties should be declared. In both cases, however, the court went on to affirm judgments granting motions to dismiss, on the ground that dismissal of a complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), is not a decision on the merits. See Harvard Crimson, Inc., supra ; Wallerstein, supra. At least for res judicata purposes, however, a dismissal under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) is considered an adjudication on the merits. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3), as amended, 454 Mass. 1403 (2009) ("any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits"); Mestek, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 729, 731, 667 N.E.2d 292 (1996) ("under Massachusetts law, as elsewhere, a dismissal for failure to state a claim ... operates as a dismissal on the merits" [citation and alteration omitted] ). See also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) (dismissal for failure to state claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [6], which is identical to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [6], is judgment on merits). We therefore find the reasoning in support of the dismissals in the HarvardCrimson, Inc. and Wallerstein cases to be unpersuasive.

      The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) are published by the Appraisal Foundation, which sets standards and qualifications for real estate appraisers.

      We note that there is no allegation in the complaint that Cushman provided any services for the Winthrop Building.

      We note that the two concurring Justices sought to limit the breadth of the holding, stating that "it is enough for present purposes to hold, as the Court does, that where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-152, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968) (White, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).

      In view of this conclusion, we need not decide whether a complaint seeking to invalidate an appraisal on the ground of fraud must plead the allegation of fraud with "particularity." See Mass. R. Civ. P. 9 (b), 365 Mass. 751 (1974).

      Buffalo-Water contends that it was error for the judge to dismiss its claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing without specifically referencing this claim or providing a basis for the dismissal. "Findings of facts and conclusions of law," however, "are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule[ ] 12 ...." Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996). Furthermore, because we review decisions on motions to dismiss de novo, our analysis is not affected by the judge's lack of explanation. See Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686, 610 N.E.2d 321 (1993) ("on appeal, we may consider any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the lower court").


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Antonio GARCIA v. COMMONWEALTH.
    SJC-12579
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bail..
    November 26, 2018
    Antonio Garcia, pro se.
    Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
    Antonio Garcia appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Garcia has been indicted for trafficking of a person for sexual services, deriving support from prostitution, and, most recently, witness intimidation. On the Commonwealth's motion, and after a dangerousness hearing in the witness intimidation case, a judge in the Superior Court ordered that Garcia be held without bail for a period of not more than 120 days pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A. At the same time, the judge set bail in the sex trafficking cases at $20,000 each, a reduction of amounts that had been set previously. Sometime later, Garcia sought a bail hearing, but the Commonwealth objected on the ground that 120 days had not yet run on his § 58A detention. No bail hearing was held at that time. Garcia subsequently filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, arguing that the judge wrongly denied him release on his personal recognizance. We affirm the judgment denying relief.
    After considering the indictments, grand jury minutes, threatening text messages, a portion of a search warrant affidavit, dockets for the sex trafficking cases, and Garcia's own criminal record, the judge found by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure the safety of persons in the community. This finding was based on evidence of Garcia's use of violence and threats to control women for his own financial gain and of his failure to abide by court orders and conditions of bail. Garcia has not shown that any of the judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous or that the judge otherwise erred or abused his discretion. Contrary to Garcia's argument, it is clear that the Commonwealth may rely on hearsay at a § 58A hearing. G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4) ("rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials shall not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing and the judge shall consider hearsay contained in a police report or the statement of an alleged victim or witness"). See Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 35-36, 933 N.E.2d 936 (2010) (Commonwealth's reliance solely on hearsay bearing substantial indicia of reliability at § 58A hearing did not violate right to cross-examine witnesses). Garcia also argues that one of the witnesses testified before the grand jury without making a valid waiver of her constitutional rights. Garcia "lacks standing to assert the witness's right[s] in this regard." Commonwealth v. Lopez, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 649, 34 N.E.3d 750 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 960, 961 n.1, 572 N.E.2d 568 (1991). Finally, Garcia argues that his counsel failed to present evidence of an attack on him committed by a grand jury witness; the Commonwealth represents that such evidence was in fact before the judge. In any event, the fact that another person may have attacked Garcia does not detract from the judge's ultimate finding that Garcia cannot be released under any conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of the community. The single justice properly denied relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.
    Judgment affirmed.

      We emphasize that nothing we say today is intended to prejudge any issue in Garcia's upcoming criminal trial.

      In addition to its arguments that relief was properly denied on the merits, the Commonwealth argues that Garcia's request for a bail hearing was premature, as the 120-day detention period had not expired due to excludable time. See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3) (excluding "any period of delay as defined in Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 36 [b] [2]"). We need not decide this issue due to our disposition of the case.


text:
    COLUMBIA PLAZA ASSOCIATES & others v. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.
   Mr. Chief Justice Gants did not participate.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Franklin ABERNATHY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Walter CRAYTON
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Levins FRANCOIS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Jose HERNANDEZ
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Radelle E. HUBBARD
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. John M. HUTCHINSON, Jr.
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Mark ANDREWS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Alex BAEZ
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Anthony D. BATES
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Corey BENOIT
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Lawrence J. BRADLEY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Phillip E. CARRINGTON
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
   Mr. Justice Gaziano did not participate.

Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Kathryn CHRISTOPHER
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Henry COAKLEY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Omar DEJESUS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. David S. DURLING
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Kevin J. FAHERTY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Wayne FRANKLIN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


author: Mr. Justice Lowy did not participate.

text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Sandra Santana GARCIA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
   Mr. Justice Lowy did not participate.

Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Tyrone GARDEN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Michael S. GILL
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Peter HURLEY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Lesley JURCZUK
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Kevin KIMBALL
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Matthew ALDEN, Jr.
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Bandali F. DAHDAH
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Stanley JEANNIS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    ADOPTION OF WANDA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Michelle BROWN v. SAVINGS BANK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MASSACHUSSETTS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


author: Mr. Justice Kafker did not participate.

text:
    27 RAMSDELL AVENUE, LLC v. Fitzroy L. BROWN & another
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.
   Mr. Justice Kafker did not participate.


text:
    ADOPTION OF CASSIUS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Zachariah J. LAROSE
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review granted.


text:
    ADOPTION OF XARINA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Mauro T. LOBO
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Paulo N. MONTEIRO
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Jose A. ROSARIO
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Michael J. WHITE
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Brian S. HICKEY & another v. Ernie OLIVEIRA & another
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    James F. O'LEARY v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., trustee
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Francis RICARD v. Deborah DUTTON
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Beth SHEA v. Benjamin O. DELANEY, Third, & another
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. David KUILAN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Reginald LAFONDRIE
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Lee V. LAM
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Lyndsay J. MARQUES
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Leonardo MENDOZA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Paulino MIRANDA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Marcus MUNIZ
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Salvador R. RECINOS-GUERRA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Juan RODRIGUEZ
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Michael L. STALLINGS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Fernan STYLIANOPOLOUS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
   Mr. Justice Lowy did not participate.

Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Curtis O. SULLIVAN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Dmytro TARANOVSKY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Leonard WARD
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    John DOE, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 523281 v. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    TOWN OF FRAMINGHAM v. FRAMINGHAM POLICE OFFICERS UNION
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Robert J. HADGE v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    J.F. v. N.F.
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Ryan JORDAN v. Kaye MULVEY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    K.B. v. J.B.
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    MRH SUB I, LLC v. Jackeline CUCUFATE & another.
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    REVERE RETIREMENT BOARD v. ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Emmett MULDOON
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. George A. OTERO
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Sean WELENC
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Tony B. GASKINS & another v. Michael RODRIGUES & others
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 13, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Paul C. BROWN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    SIEW-MEY TAM v. John DESJARDINS & others
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Leonides BONES
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Charles A. BROWN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Jeremy GRAFTON
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Brendan RAY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Steven R. WALSH
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Charles NORTHRUP & others v. Chantha CHAU & others
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Jessica RICKER & others v. 3353 WASHINGTON LLC & another
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Melisa Washington PAPAJANI v. Dhimeter PAPAJANI
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Alex M. BRITO
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Ivan DAVILA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Jimmy DIAZ
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Patrick A. GADWAH
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Daniel R. GAUVIN
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Steven GULLEY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Glaciris HIDALGO
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Ian HOLNESS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Shaun G. HUNTER
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Jonathan W. KARDAS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Dwayne J. RICHARDSON
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Omid K. WHITE
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    FASHIONHAUS, LLC v. T & C MAIN STREET, INC., & others
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    John R. LOISELLE & others v. Brian S. HICKEY & others
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


author: Mme. Justice Budd did not participate.

text:
    Gerald T. MACCURTAIN v. Leonard Y. NASON & another
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.
   Mme. Justice Budd did not participate.


text:
    Jane F. MACDONALD v. Gary D. ENGLE & others
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Denise MCGRATH, administratrix, v. Richard T. TAVARES & another
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Robert SARVIS v. Lynn TUCKER
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Richard A. CAMPOS v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    Joel COLEMAN v. David NORRIS
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. BASIL B., a juvenile
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. Tevon NGOMBA
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    September 27, 2018
    Appellate review denied.


author: WOLOHOJIAN, J.

text:
    COMMONWEALTH v. DEMETRIUS D., a juvenile.
    No. 17-P-793
    Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk..
    Argued March 8, 2018. Decided September 14, 2018.
    Elizabeth Caddick for the juvenile.
    Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
    Present: Wolohojian, Milkey, & Englander, JJ.

      A pseudonym.

   WOLOHOJIAN, J.

The juvenile was convicted, as a youthful offender ( G. L. c. 119, § 54 ), on two indictments for aggravated rape of a child with force ( G. L. c. 265, § 22B [a ] ), and one indictment each for kidnapping ( G. L. c. 265, § 26 ), indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen ( G. L. c. 265, § 13B ), intimidation of a witness ( G. L. c. 268, § 13B ), and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, to wit, a shod foot ( G. L. c. 265, § 15A [b ] ), all arising from his attack on an eleven year old boy. At the time of the incident, the juvenile was in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (department) and living in foster care. He now appeals, raising several arguments.

First, the juvenile argues that evidence seized from his bedroom at a foster home where he had been placed should have been suppressed because the department should not have disclosed his address to the police. Second, he argues that defense counsel should have been allowed to comment to the jury about the absence of any identification, even though the exclusion of in-court identifications was the result of his successful opposition to the Commonwealth's motion in limine to permit certain witnesses to make such identifications, and there had been no out-of-court identifications. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the charge of kidnapping and the admission of expert fingerprint testimony. We affirm.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following. On October 31, 2013, the juvenile was fifteen years old, approximately five feet, three inches tall, on the thin side, and had "brownish" hair and a light brown complexion. He lived with a foster family in a town south of Boston. So that the juvenile could participate in Halloween, employees of the department had bought him a costume consisting of a black vest with the word "SWAT" written on it in white lettering, a black SWAT or military-type hat, and a black "North Face" brand jacket. Wearing this costume, a pair of black "Air Jordan" sneakers, and carrying a black "Michael Jordan" backpack, the juvenile left his foster home to go trick-or-treating.

At the same time, eleven year old Jason was trick-or-treating nearby with four female schoolmates. When they were near the local high school, they were approached by the juvenile, who asked if he could join them. None of them knew the juvenile, who said his name was "Devon" or "Deron." Jason felt sorry that the juvenile was all alone and agreed to let him join the group. Shortly thereafter, however, the girls, who were scared and uncomfortable being in the company of the juvenile, decided to break off on their own. They urged Jason to come with them, but he declined because he did not want to leave the juvenile by himself. Jason and the juvenile, therefore, continued trick-or-treating on their own for approximately the next two hours. At some point during the evening, the juvenile told Jason that he was going to move to a different town.

Each boy carried a drink: the juvenile, a can of "Monster" energy drink; Jason, a bottle of "Brisk" iced tea. At one point, while on a side street, the juvenile left his drink in the middle of the road. The can, which was later recovered, bore a latent fingerprint that matched the juvenile's right thumb. After some time, the two boys turned down another side street, a short cul-de-sac. The street was not well lit and, while it was lined with houses, there was no one about. As they neared the dead end, the juvenile abruptly grabbed Jason's bag of candy and started to walk away. Jason, unsure of the juvenile's intentions, began to cry. At that, the juvenile turned around, came back, and returned the bag. However, he then placed Jason in a choke hold and punched his head and face, causing Jason's nose to bleed. The juvenile then pushed Jason to the ground, kicked him in the head and body, and then instructed Jason to strip. Jason, having unsuccessfully tried to escape and in fear for his life, did as he was directed. The juvenile then pulled down the front of his own pants and forced Jason to perform fellatio. He then told Jason to bend over, and proceeded to anally penetrate the younger boy with his penis. Eventually, the juvenile stopped; he then resumed kicking Jason while threatening to kill Jason's family if he told anyone what had occurred. The juvenile instructed Jason to stay on the ground and not to move or else he would return to beat him again. He urinated on Jason and then doused him with his (Jason's) iced tea. Finally, the juvenile walked away, leaving Jason lying in the street.

Jason remained in the street, afraid to move lest the juvenile make good on his threat to return. From that position, Jason called 911 twice (the first call was disconnected). Although the recordings of those calls show Jason to be filled with fear, he nonetheless managed to provide a good description of his assailant (i.e., dressed all in black and wearing a SWAT vest and a black hat as a costume) as well as many of the details of the attack. When police arrived, Jason's costume, clothes, sneakers, candy, and iced tea bottle were strewn about, and the area smelled of urine. There was also a blood stain on the pavement. Jason himself smelled of urine and had visible injuries to his nose, upper lip, cheeks, head, wrist, and elbow.

After interviewing Jason and the four girls, the police released a dispatch looking for a "[l]ight skin, Cape Verdean, black or Hispanic male, thin, light-colored hair, between 5' 3? and 5' 5? in height, wearing a SWAT costume, a SWAT vest with the letters 'SWAT' in white lettering across the front, black or dark-colored pants, dark-colored sneakers, and also a black Michael Jordan backpack." No one matching the description was located that night. The following afternoon, however, two clerks at a nearby convenience store stated that they had earlier that day observed a boy at a house across the street, carrying bags and other items out of the house and placing them in a car, as if in the process of moving. One of the items was a black vest with the word "SWAT" written on it. The house belonged to the juvenile's foster family.

From the foster father, the police learned that the boy they were looking for was the juvenile and that he was in the custody of the department. They also learned that, earlier that afternoon, the department had moved the juvenile to a new foster home in another town. The foster father knew the name of the town, but not the street address. The police, therefore, contacted the department, which disclosed the address to them.

At the second foster home, the juvenile's new foster father confirmed that the juvenile had moved in and that he had placed his belongings in a bedroom. After inviting the police into the home, the foster father led them to the bedroom, where they observed several bags, a black Michael Jordan backpack, and a black vest with the word "SWAT" in white lettering across the front. The police seized these items, and subsequently obtained a warrant to search them. In the bags, they found a pair of black "Air Jordan" sneakers, a black "North Face" brand jacket, and a black SWAT or military-type hat. The backpack was full of Halloween candy.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. The juvenile argues that the items seized from his bedroom at the second foster home should have been suppressed because the seizure resulted from the department's disclosure of his address, which he contends the department was required to hold confidential. Specifically, he maintains that, under 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 12.00 (2008) and related statutes, his address, to the extent that it was in the possession of the department, was confidential and could not be disclosed to the police as it was here. Although we set out below the details of the statutory and regulatory framework upon which he relies, we conclude it did not require application of the exclusionary rule.

"Access to ... Department[ ] records is governed by several sources of law." 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.02. While the juvenile generally refers to several of those sources, his argument centers on G. L. c. 119, § 51F, which requires that the department maintain a "central registry of information" sufficient to identify children who have been reported to it because they are believed to be victims of abuse or neglect, and further provides:

"Data and information relating to individual cases in the central registry shall be confidential and shall be made available only with the approval of the commissioner or upon court order; provided, however, that the department, upon request, may release this data and information to a child welfare agency of another state for the purpose of assisting that agency in determining whether to approve a prospective foster or adoptive parent. The commissioner shall establish rules and regulations governing the availability of such data and information."

G. L. c. 119, § 51F.

To fulfil this mandate, the department promulgated 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 12.00 et seq., which, according to its stated purpose, "enumerates the rules for access to information kept in the [central registry ... and] sets forth rules for access to other Department files or information." 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.01. The regulation provides that the central registry "shall contain, but need not be limited to, all identifying data that is known ('identifying data' shall mean name, date of birth, sex, ethnicity, and address ) for each child who is the subject of a report pursuant to ... G. L. c. 119, § 51A" (emphasis added). 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.03. From this, the juvenile argues that his address amounted to confidential "identifying data" that could only be released if, and as, permitted by the rules set forth in the regulation.

The regulation provides for the release of information by the department under certain specific circumstances. See, e.g., 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.06 (to "providers"), § 12.07 (in response to compulsory legal process in a civil proceeding), § 12.09 (in litigation in which either the department or one of its contracting providers is a party), § 12.10 (to the person the records are about or the child's parents), § 12.14 (to the bureau of special investigations), and § 12.15 (to the department of youth services). None of those circumstances involves a criminal investigation or proceeding, particularly, as the juvenile notes, one where a child in the department's custody is a possible or known suspect. The juvenile relies on this omission to argue that the department is not free to release identifying data under those circumstances absent either a court order, as referenced in G. L. c. 119, § 51F, or consent by a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the child, as is suggested in a separate regulation governing requests from a police officer or representative of a district attorney's office to interview a child in the department's custody who is a "possible or known defendant in a criminal action." 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.34(1)(a) (2009).

The Commonwealth for its part argues that the department's release of the juvenile's address was not only authorized, but required under G. L. c. 119, § 51B (k ), and 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 4.50 - 4.51 (2009). That statute and related regulations address when and how the department is required to refer a matter to a district attorney and local law enforcement. A referral is "[m]andatory" when the department receives a report of abuse or neglect of a child, see 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.51 (2009), and, after investigation or based on "early evidence," see G. L. c. 119, § 51B (k ), has reasonable cause to believe that certain enumerated conditions have resulted from the abuse or neglect. Those conditions include where "a child has been sexually assaulted" or there is "any other disclosure of physical abuse involving physical evidence which may be destroyed." G. L. c. 119, § 51B (k ) (2) ; § 51B (k ) (4) ; 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.51(2)(b) and (2)(e)(3) (2009). According to the Commonwealth, the police made a report of abuse of a child, namely, Jason, when they called the department on November 1, 2013, seeking the juvenile's address. Since the reported abuse resulted in sexual assault or physical abuse involving evidence that was in danger of being destroyed, the department was required to release the juvenile's address.

We suppress evidence resulting from the government's violation of a statute only where the statute is both "closely associated with constitutional rights, rights grounded in fundamental fairness," Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 407 Mass. 70, 75, 551 N.E.2d 906 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 397 Mass. 644, 647, 492 N.E.2d 1142 (1986), and where "an exclusionary rule [is] inherent in the purpose of [the] statute." Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 367 n.4, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), and cases collected therein. We do not see the statutory scheme at issue here to be of this sort. To begin with, we note that the juvenile has not identified, nor do we know of, any constitutionally based interest in keeping his address confidential. Thus, whatever confidentiality the statute may provide to children within the department's purview, that protection cannot be said to be "closely associated" with a constitutional right. The juvenile has not cited, nor have we found, any authority for the proposition that either the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or arts. 12 and 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights restrict police authority to locate a criminal suspect by asking knowledgeable people for his address or whereabouts.

Nor are we persuaded that an exclusionary rule is inherent in the purpose of the statute. To the contrary, the statute provides its own remedy, see G. L. c. 119, § 51F, and therefore there is no need to graft an exclusionary rule to it "to make the statute an effective piece of legislation." Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 502, 287 N.E.2d 599 (1972). Compare id. at 503, 287 N.E.2d 599 (suppressing evidence of identification made at police station after defendant was intentionally denied his statutory right to use telephone); Commonwealth v. Alicea, 428 Mass. 711, 716, 705 N.E.2d 233 (1999) ("To make the statute an effective piece of legislation in the absence of [a prescribed penalty for a violation], we have grafted an exclusionary rule to it" [quotation omitted] ).

We note further that our view of the statute is consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is "to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity by dissociating courts from unlawful conduct." Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 571, 953 N.E.2d 164 (2011). There was no police misconduct here. Instead, good police work and investigation led the police to the juvenile, confirmed many details of the attack and his role as its perpetrator, established his possession of the identifying costume, and led them to the town to which he had moved and taken that important evidence. In these circumstances, the police cannot be said to have done anything wrong when they contacted the department to learn the address of the juvenile's new foster home -- information that, as we noted above, does not enjoy constitutional protection.

2. Identification issues. Two months before trial, the Commonwealth moved in limine, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 21 N.E.3d 157 (2014), for leave to have Jason and the four girls attempt to identify the juvenile in court. Crayton was not decided until approximately one year after the crimes at issue, and none of these witnesses had been asked to identify the juvenile out of court. The juvenile opposed the motion, and the trial judge denied it, concluding, based on Crayton, that the in-court identifications would be "inherently suggestive" and that there was not "good reason" for allowing them. The juvenile argues that the judge subsequently erred when, at the request of the Commonwealth, she precluded the juvenile from mentioning the absence of in-court identifications to the jury. We disagree.

It is established that "[c]ounsel may not, in closing, exploit the absence of evidence that had been excluded at his request. ... Such exploitation of absent, excluded evidence is fundamentally unfair and reprehensible" (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 732, 825 N.E.2d 58 (2005). See Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(A) (2018). The juvenile argues, however, that this general proposition does not apply because he did not affirmatively move to exclude the evidence, but only opposed the Commonwealth's motion to introduce it. This, we think, is a distinction without a difference where, as here, the Supreme Judicial Court has deliberately placed on the Commonwealth the burden to move to admit in-court identifications where there has been no out-of-court identification, rather than saddling defendants with the burden of moving to exclude them, while leaving the burden of showing undue suggestiveness on the defendant. Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. at 243, 21 N.E.3d 157. If a defendant meets that burden then he "prevail[s] in suppressing the in-court identification as unnecessarily suggestive," id. -- the same outcome as had he been the initial movant.

The juvenile also argues that the judge erred in precluding him from making a " Bowden argument" with respect to the lack of out-of-court identification. Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980). Even were we to accept the juvenile's contention that he raised and preserved this issue during the charge conference (despite the fact that the juvenile did not mention Bowden to the judge), we discern no error. To begin, the evidentiary predicate for such an argument did not exist; despite the fact that the juvenile was never prevented from questioning witnesses, including the police, about the lack of out-of-court identification procedures, he did not do so. And this sensible strategic decision was no doubt the result of counsel's successful opposition to the Commonwealth's motion in limine.

3. Kidnapping. The juvenile next argues that his conviction of kidnapping cannot stand because the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the element of "secret confinement." In particular, he notes that the incident took place on a public street, in the vicinity of several residential houses, and that Jason was left with his cellular telephone. "Within the context of the crime of kidnapping, the concept of 'confinement' has been broadly interpreted to mean any restraint of a person's movement," Commonwealth v. Lent, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 710, 709 N.E.2d 444 (1999), and can be either secret or forcible. See G. L. c. 265, § 26. The evidence clearly permitted such a finding here. Compare Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242, 846 N.E.2d 782 (2006) (confinement established where defendant threw victim to the ground under a bridge and forcefully removed her clothing, threatened to kill her if she told anyone what he had done, constrained her movements by poking her with a sharp stick, "told her she could not leave, and she remained because he had scared her and she was too frightened to attempt to leave").

4. Fingerprint testimony. Finally, the juvenile argues that the examiner from the State police crime lab who testified to matching the latent fingerprint found on the can of Monster energy drink to the known print of the juvenile's right thumb, did so with overstated certainty and improperly bolstered his testimony by noting that, in accordance with the lab's protocol, his findings had been verified by two other examiners who were not present in court and therefore could not be subject to cross-examination. The juvenile did not object or move to strike any of this testimony, so we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845-846, 926 N.E.2d 1143 (2010). See also Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 721-722, 54 N.E.3d 22 (2016). We discern none here because trial counsel elicited on cross-examination that the examiner's view was only his opinion, based on personal observations, that the two fingerprints matched. As such, it is unlikely that the jury took the fingerprint match to be established as a matter of certainty. As for the testimony regarding the verifying opinions of the other two examiners, that testimony was invited by trial counsel in his cross-examination of the examiner. And, while the fingerprint evidence was meaningful, it was only one small piece of the wealth of evidence tying the juvenile to the crime.

Judgments affirmed.

Adjudication of delinquency by reason of assault and battery affirmed.

      He was also found delinquent on one charge of assault and battery (G. L. c. 265, § 13A [a ] ).

      A pseudonym.

      Later that evening, the children provided police with descriptions of the juvenile's physical appearance, clothing, and costume that, along with other evidence, were sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the boy who approached them near the high school was the juvenile.

      En route, the juvenile and Jason stopped at the house of one of the four girls. The girl's mother provided police with a description of the stranger accompanying Jason that matched the juvenile.

      Although samples of blood, seminal fluid, and urine were recovered and tested, none were conclusively tied to the juvenile.

      On appeal, the juvenile does not press several other arguments he raised below in support of his motion to suppress.

      The statutes cited in 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.02 include G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth; G. L. c. 30, § 42 ; G. L. c. 66; G. L. c. 66A; G. L. c. 112, § 135 ; G. L. c. 119, §§ 51E and 51F ; and G. L. c. 210, §§ 5C and 5D.

      The department's primary duty is to protect children from abuse or neglect by their "caretaker[s]." 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.21 (commentary) (2009). See 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00 (2008) (defining "caretaker," "abuse," and "neglect"). The criminal justice system has primary responsibility for investigating acts of "child abuse" committed by noncaretakers. 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.21 (commentary).

      Title 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.35 identifies specific parties who may have access to the central registry and for what purpose. It further provides:
      "No other individual, group, agency or department, including law enforcement... may have access to the Central Registry without the written approval of the Commissioner, an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as authorized by ... G. L. c. 119, § 51F" (emphasis added).
      110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.35(4) (2009).

      While the juvenile dismisses the option in this case, G. L. c. 119, § 51F, also provides for the release of data and information in the central registry "with the approval of the commissioner."

      In 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.07, there is a cross reference to § 4.53 "for criminal proceedings." Title 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.53 (2009) details the procedures the department must follow after it has made a "mandatory" or "discretionary" referral to a district attorney or local law enforcement, as required under G. L. c. 119, § 51B (k ), and 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 4.50 -4.52, as well as when documents from department files are subpoenaed in a criminal matter to which the department is not a party.

      The record does not disclose what the police said during the call to the department on November 1, 2013.

      The juvenile also argues that the disclosure violated constitutional and statutory rights to privacy. Having failed to raise those arguments in connection with the motion to suppress below, however, they are waived. See Commonwealth v. Quint Q., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 507, 514, 998 N.E.2d 363 (2013).

      General Laws c. 119, § 51F, provides, in pertinent part:
      "Any person employed in the central registry who permits the data and information stored in the registry to be released without authorization to persons other than those specified in the rules and regulations shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 2 1/2 years, or both."
      General Laws c. 119, § 51E, which provides for the confidentiality of written reports prepared by the department under §§ 51A -51D, also provides a penalty for a violation.

      In Crayton, the court stated:
      "Although we generally place the burden on the defendant to move to suppress an identification, that makes little sense where there is no out-of-court identification of the defendant by a witness and only the prosecutor knows whether he or she intends to elicit an in-court identification from the witness. If the burden were on the defendant to move to suppress an identification in these circumstances, a defendant would need to file motions to suppress the in-court identification of witnesses whom the prosecutor might not intend to ask to make such an identification. To avoid the filing of needless motions, we place the burden on the prosecutor to move in limine to admit the in-court identification of the defendant by a witness where there has been no out-of-court identification."
      470 Mass. at 243, 21 N.E.3d 157. The court continued, "Once the motion is filed, the defendant would continue to bear the burden of showing that the in-court identification would be unnecessarily suggestive and that there is not 'good reason' for it." Id.

      The juvenile requested a Bowden instruction, but only for purposes of arguing to the jury about "testing of materials of certain biologicals" and the Commonwealth's failure to test the iced tea bottle for fingerprints. The trial judge declined to give the instruction, but permitted counsel to argue those alleged investigative deficiencies to the jury.