author: BROWN, Judge.

text:
    EAST PORTER COUNTY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. GOUGH, INC., Appellee, and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, Appellee.
    No. 64A04-1109-PL-471.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    March 29, 2012.
    Kevin E. Steele, Burke Costanza & Car-berry LLP, Valparaiso, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
    Anne M. Coatsolonia, Woodward, Buis, Blaskovich & King, LLP, Merrillville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
   OPINION

BROWN, Judge.

East Porter County School Corporation (the “School”) appeals the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of Gough, Inc. (“Gough”) and Travelers Casualty Surety Company of America (“Travelers”) and against the School. The School raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Gough and Travelers and against the School. We affirm.

The relevant facts follow. The School solicited bids for certain additions and renovations in several categories. The School provided notice to bidders that bids would be received until February 5, 2008, at 2:00 p.m. and that the bids would be publicly opened at 2:00 p.m. Gough submitted a bid to complete certain construction work with respect to bid category # 1 (general trades) in the base bid amount of $2,997,000 and a bid bond issued by Travelers in the amount of ten percent of the bid amount. After submitting the bid, Gough called the School shortly after 2:00 p.m. to say that its bid was based upon a mistake and to ask that it be withdrawn.

On or about March 10, 2008, Gough was awarded the contract by the School for bid category # 1. On March 17, 2008, Gough’s president, Joseph Gent, sent a letter to The Skillman Corporation, a representative of the School, stating that “[t]he contract is made out in an amount that is based upon an incorrect base-bid figure,” that “[t]his incorrect bid figure is the result of an in advertent [sic] clerical error that occurred at bid time,” and that “Gough will not accept this contract; Gough informed the [School] in a timely manner that a mistake was made that resulted in an incorrect bid figure; prior to the bid being opened Gough made every effort to contact ... the [School] to withdraw the bid immediately and to inform them that the bid amount was a mistake.” Appellant’s Appendix at 93-94. According to the letter, Gough returned the contract for the construction work to the School unsigned.

On March 24, 2008, the School approved the bid award for the project to the second lowest bidder, contingent upon Gough not responding by 12:00 p.m. on March 25, 2008, to agree to honor its bid, and the hiring of a law office to represent the School in the matter. The School submitted a claim on the bid bond to Travelers on or about April 24, 2008, and Travelers denied the claim on or about July 17, 2008.

On March 25, 2008, Gough filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the School seeking that its bid be rescinded and its bid bond released. In its complaint, Gough cites to Bd. of Sch. Commr’s of City of Indianapolis v. Bender, 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N.E. 154 (1904), and states that “a contractor may be excused from a mistaken bid.” Appellant’s Appendix at 12. The School filed a counterclaim alleging that it had awarded the bid to Gough, that Gough returned the contract unsigned and refused to perform the work for its bid amount, that Gough was obligated to execute the contract to perform the work, that Gough’s failure to execute and perform the contract was a breach of its obligations, and that the School sustained damages as a consequence of Gough’s breach. The School also filed a third-party complaint against Travelers alleging that the School had submitted a claim to Travelers requesting payment of the bid bond, that Travelers denied the School’s claim, that the School sustained damages as a consequence of Travelers’ breach of contract, and that Travelers’ denial of the School’s claim constitutes bad faith. Gough filed a reply and affirmative defenses to counterclaim, and Travelers filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the third-party complaint in September 2008.

On August 20, 2010, the School filed a motion for summary judgment, memorandum of law, and designation of evidence. On December 20, 2010, Gough and Travelers filed a motion in opposition to the School’s motion for summary judgment and a cross motion for summary judgment, memorandum in opposition, and affidavits. On March 22, 2011, the court held a hearing at which the parties presented arguments on the summary judgment motions, and on August 12, 2011, the court issued an order citing to Bd. of Sch. Commr’s of City of Indianapolis v. Bender, 36 Ind.App. 164, 72 N.E. 154 (1904), trains, denied, and entering summary judgment in favor of Gough and Travelers and against the School.

The issue is whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Gough and Travelers and against the School. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(c); Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmov-ant. Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 973. Our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. Id. We must carefully review a decision on summary judgment to ensure that a party was not improperly denied its day in court. Id. at 974. Any doubt as to the existence of an issue of material fact, or an inference to be drawn from the facts, must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Cowe v. Forum Grp., Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind.1991).

A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 975 (Ind.2005). If the movant fails to make this prima facie showing, then summary judgment is precluded regardless of whether the non-mov-ant designates facts and evidence in response to the movant’s motion. Id. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the Indiana Trial Rule 56 materials. Catt v. Bd. of Commr’s of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.2002).

The fact that the parties make cross motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. Instead, we must consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The entry of specific findings and conclusions does not alter the nature of a summary judgment which is a judgment entered when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind.1996). In the summary judgment context, we are not bound by the trial court’s specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. They merely aid our review by providing us with a statement of reasons for the trial court’s actions. Id.

The School contends that “Indiana law dictates that Gough, as the lowest bidder on a public works project, cannot rescind its bid.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. The School cites to Bender, 36 Ind.App. 164, 72 N.E. 154, and argues that the opinion is not applicable due to its age, the fact that it pre-dated the current public bidding statute, “the relief offered is equitable,” and that the case is distinguishable because it concerned a mathematical error and not “procrastination and carelessness.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. The School asserts that “[t]he court must decide who should pay for the mistake: the bidder that made the error or the taxpayers.” Id. at 13. The School further argues that persuasive law from other jurisdictions and public policy dictate that Gough cannot rescind its bid. The School also argues that the court erred in failing to apply the bid bond statute and “instead, misapplied equity.” Id. at 19.

Gough and Travelers maintain that Indiana law permits the withdrawal of a bid based upon the bidder’s error and notes that this court cited to Bender with approval in Mid-States Gen. and Meek Contracting Corp. v. Town of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), and that public bidding statutes have existed in Indiana since “the late 1800’s.” Appellees’ Brief at 6. Gough and Travelers further argue that “[contrary to the contention of [the School], a mathematical error is what occurred in this case,” that “Gough did not misinterpret part of the specifications for the project; rather it made a mistake in the final calculation of the bid total,” that “Gough made a mistake in the presentation of its bid to [the School],” and that “[d]uring the rush to complete the bid, Gough misreported the bid amount to its representative at the bid opening.” Id. at 6-7. Gough and Travelers further argue that law from other jurisdictions supports their position and that public policy does not dictate a different result. Gough and Travelers also argue that the court did not err in finding that Travelers cannot be bound if its principal Gough is released from its bid.

In its reply brief, the School argues that the court’s reliance on Bender and grant of equitable relief was in error, that the public bidding statutes at the time of Bender did not dictate detailed procedures including the mandatory bid bond provision, that the instructions to bidders here provided unambiguous language regarding the withdrawal of bids and support forfeiture of the bid bond, and that this court must rectify the trial court’s holding regarding the bid security.

In Mid-States Gen., this court summarized the facts of Bender:

In Bender, the school board advertised for bids for an addition to a school building. [36 Ind.App.] at 165, 72 N.E. at 155. Bender obtained the specifications for the work and was informed that his bid had to be submitted by 4:00 p.m. on February 25, 1902. Id. at 166, 72 N.E. at 155. Two subcontractors did not provide Bender with them estimates until 3:30 p.m., and in hastily finalizing his bid, Bender miscalculated. Id. at 167, 72 N.E. at 155. Bender bid $11,337 to perform the work, but he would have bid $15,750 if he had made an accurate calculation. Id. at 168, 72 N.E. at 156. After submitting his bid, Bender learned that he had been misinformed and bids were not required to be submitted until 8:00 p.m. Id. at 168, 72 N.E. at 155. Bender’s bid was the lowest, and the school board accepted the bid. Id. at 168-169, 72 N.E. at 155. The next day, Bender realized his miscalculation and informed the school board that he could not enter into a contract for his bid amount. Id. at 169, 72 N.E. at 155.
On appeal, this court held:
There is one thing clear, and that is that in his own mind and judgment [Bender] did not agree to enter into a contract to furnish the material and do the work according to the plans and specifications furnished him by the architect, for the amount designated by his bid. According to the facts pleaded, [Bender] was not negligent and careless in submitting his bid as he did.
Id. at 172, 72 N.E. at 157. This court noted that Bender’s error appeared to be an excusable mistake and added that:
“But where the mistake is of so fundamental a character that the minds of the parties have never in fact met, or where an unconscionable advantage has been gained by mere mistakes or misapprehension, and there was no gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff, either in falling into the error or in not sooner making redress, and no intervening rights have accrued, and the parties may still be placed in statu (sic) quo, equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to prevent intolerable injustice.” In line with the above it is declared to be the rule “that no contract of sale is reciprocally obligatory upon parties thereto, if it be founded upon an injurious mistake of a material fact forming the basis of the contract.”
Id. at 173, 72 N.E. at 157 (internal citations omitted). Consequently, this court held that it was “evident that the minds of the parties never met” and that the school board “acquired no rights under [Bender’s] erroneous or mistaken bid.” Id. at 173-174, 72 N.E. 154, [Union Traction Co. of Indiana v. Buckland,] 34 Ind.App. 420, 72 N.E. 158 [ (1904) ].

811 N.E.2d at 434.

In Mid-States Gen., we found Bender distinguishable because, unlike Bender, Mid-States did not argue that it miscalculated in preparing its bid, and that thus the reasoning behind Bender was inapplicable. Id. Rather, Mid-States argued that the bid documents were ambiguous and that it reasonably interpreted the bid documents, and we concluded that the documents were not ambiguous and that Mid-States’ interpretation was not reasonable. Id. This court also found that equity did not intervene to rescind Mid-States’ bid and bid bond because Mid-States did not argue and the designated evidence did not suggest that mutual mistake was applicable and Mid-States did not allege fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the Town. Id. at 435. This court further noted the treatment of bid mistakes in other jurisdictions and stated that the general rule is that “[b]id errors that result from clear cut clerical or arithmetic errors or a misreading of the specifications are the kind of excusable mistake that allows relief.” Id. (citing Liebherr Crane Corp. v. United States, 810 F.2d 1153, 1157 (Fed.Cir.1987)). “Mistakes of judgment, on the other hand, do not qualify for such relief.” Id. This court further stated that generally the misinterpretation of an unambiguous contract has been held to be a mistake of judgment. Id.

Here, the School provided notice to bidders that bids would be received until February 5, 2008, at 2:00 p.m. and that the bids would be publicly opened at 2:00 p.m. In his affidavit, Joseph Gent, Gough’s president, stated that “Gough was working on its bid numbers in the hours immediately preceding the bid opening,” that “[bjids were solicited from necessary subcontractors and material suppliers,” that “Gough prepared an in-house price for work categories performed by its employees and equipment,” that “[a] bid summary sheet was prepared and the best bids in each category were entered into the sheet in the appropriate row,” that “[tjhis summary was continuously updated as bids were received,” that “[s]ueh bids were being received right up to the bid deadline,” and that “[a]s is often the case, it was a very chaotic time at Gough.” Appellant’s Appendix at 97. Gent further stated that, at approximately 1:30 p.m., he and two other individuals, Buzz Gough and Ken Akey, met “to decide what Gough’s bid would be for the project,” that “[p]rior to this meeting, a Gough employee, Ross Martin, was sent to the bid opening location,” and that “[a]s is Gough’s normal procedure, the final bid number would be telephoned to [Martin] as close to the bid time as possible.” Id. at 97-98.

Gent further stated in his affidavit that the final total in the summary sheet prepared by Gough was $3,331,763.00, and that, after the individuals at the meeting agreed that $30,000.00 “could be cut from the bid” due to a previous discussion with the excavation estimator, “the mental adjustment to the price was made, leaving the bid at $3,301,763.00.” Id. at 98. Gent stated that the individuals “then discussed the bid amount being $3,300,000.00 as a threshold number that we would like to get below for psychological reasons,” that Gough “was under extreme pressure to complete the calculation of its bid amount immediately,” that “[t]he discussion continued at the meeting as to getting the bid below $3,300,000.00.” Id. at 98-99. Gent “stated that Gough needed to be at ‘299,’ ” that he “made no reference to thousands, just used the number ‘299,’ ” that the “comment was made at the meeting that $1,000.00 should be cut off to get below the threshold,” and that at that time he said “let’s make the bid ‘2998.’ ” Id. at 99. Gent stated that Akey “then wrote down the bid as $2,998,000.00,” that he said “Gough should knock another $100.00 off the bid for good measure,” and that Akey “wrote down an adjusted bid of $2,997,900.00.” Id. Akey then “immediately gave [ ] Martin the figure of $2,997,900.00 as Gough’s bid.” Id. Gent stated that “[t]his entire process occurred within a very short time frame, probably less than two minutes” and that “[t]he discussion took place very quickly with all of the calculations being performed mentally.” Id.

Gent also stated that Martin wrote down the bid number on the bid submission package and submitted it to the School’s representative at 1:53 p.m. and that “Meanwhile, after [Buzz] Gough and [Gent] had left his office, [] Akey was reviewing the bid numbers” and “realized that too much had been cut off the bid and immediately attempted to contact [ ] Martin to pull the bid.” Id. Akey called Gent and Buzz Gough back into the room and explained what had happened, they realized “that this would result in over a $200,000 loss on the project,” and “[t]hereafter, Gough immediately started trying to contact [] Martin, the [School] and its representative, Skillman Corporation, to inform them that Gough’s bid was based upon a serious mistake and the bid should be withdrawn because Gough could not complete the project for the quoted price.” Id. at 100. Martin stepped out of the bid meeting and called the Gough office, and a Gough employee “told [ ] Martin to tell Joe Sparks of Skillman to call Ken Akey in Gough’s office right away.” Id. Upon conclusion of the bid opening meeting, Martin approached Sparks and “asked him to call Gough’s office immediately” and “[i]n the meantime, Gough was attempting to contact the [School] and Skillman” but “Unfortunately, no one answered at either [of] these entities.” Id. Gent stated that “[u]pon being contacted by [the School’s] representative, Gough informed it of the error and asked that its bid be withdrawn” and “[i]nstead, [the School] and its representative tried to force Gough to enter into a contract.” Id.

Gent’s deposition testimony regarding what had occurred at the meeting prior to the submission of Gough’s bid and how he, Buzz Gough, and Akey arrived at the bid amount later communicated to Martin is consistent with the statements in his affidavit. Also in his deposition, Gent testified “we made the mental mistake, mental calculation or mental misplacement of the digit and ma[d]e the mistake in writing [the bid amount] down.” Id. at 104. With respect to the bid summary sheet prepared by Gough, when asked “is there any mathematical error on that spread sheet,” Gent stated “[n]ot that I’m aware of, no.” Id. at 106. When asked “the figure of 2,997,900 submitted as the base bid, that was the number that was actually told to the Gough employee at the bid to write in,” Gent testified:

This is the number that [Akey] had given to our employee in the field after he mistakenly misplaced where he was going to do the cut on the number, and he wrote down on his paper instead of 3,298,000, he wrote down $2,998,000, and then he ... sent that number on to [Martin] after he had made the mistake on his paper....

Id. at 107. When asked “[s]o there was not an addition or subtraction error or any miscomputation, is that a fair statement, on this bid,” Gent testified:

There was an error ... in as much as we intended to knock off $32,000 and we knocked off $332,000 on the bid. Call it what you want. It’s an error. It’s a mistake. We were trying to adjust our price to just below ... 3,300,000, and ended up sliding over and adjusting it to below 2,998,000. It’s stupid. It was careless. It was a mistake. It was a mistake made at the time that we were trying to get the bid submitted and in a short period of time in which we had to make adjustments.

Id. at 108-109. With respect to the phone calls made by Gough in an attempt to withdraw the bid, Gent testified that “[a] lot was going on and we all thought that we made the calls ... right before 2:00. But, yes, the reality of it is, after having the phone records, the calls were made shortly after 2:00.” Id. at 114. The affidavit of Rod Gardin, the superintendent of the School, in the record does not contradict Gent’s testimony.

We find that, like in Bender, where the court found that it was clear that the bidder did not agree to enter into a contract to furnish the material and do the work according to the plans and specifications for the amount designated by his bid, see Bender, 36 Ind.App. at 172, 72 N.E. at 157, the affidavits and materials included in the record here demonstrate that Gough did not at any time intend to enter an agreement or contract -with the School to complete the work contemplated for bid category # 1 for the amount specified by its bid.

The implication of the mistake or error by Gough when Akey reduced to writing a verbal statement by Gent regarding the ultimate base bid amount, resulting in an unintended bid amount being communicated to Martin, which differed substantially from the intended bid amount, is that the minds of the parties never in fact met and that one of the parties, namely, the School, would obtain an unconscionable advantage gained by the mistake or error. See id. at 173, 72 N.E. at 157 (noting that “[b]ut where the mistake is of so fundamental a character that the minds of the parties have never in fact met, or where an unconscionable advantage has been gained by mere mistakes ... and the parties may still be placed in statu[s] quo, equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to prevent intolerable injustice”) (internal citations omitted); see also Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 812-813 (Ind.2009) (noting that the “basic requirements for a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties”).

Further, we observe that, like in Bender, where the bidder realized his mistake and informed the school board that he could not enter into a contract for his bid amount on the day following the bid, see 36 Ind.App. at 169, 72 N.E. at 155, Gough informed the School and its representative Skillman within a short time after the bid meeting concluded that it had submitted a bid proposal which was based upon a mistake and that Gough could not complete the project for the quoted price. The School does not point to evidence to show that it relied upon Gough’s erroneous bid amount in a manner which would cause the withdrawal of the bid a short time later and on the same day to be inequitable, unconscionable, or unjust.

In addition, this court has observed that “[t]he general rule is that [b]id errors that result from clear cut clerical or arithmetic errors ... are the kind of excusable mistake that allows relief’ and that “[m]is-takes of judgment, on the other hand, do not qualify for such relief.” Mid-States Gen., 811 N.E.2d at 435 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot conclude that the mistake made when Akey reduced a verbal statement by Gent to writing (which was later communicated to Martin) regarding the reduction of the base bid amount constituted a mistake in judgment which would prevent Gough from withdrawing its bid or that the bid amount that Gough had decided to submit and communicated to Martin was its intended bid amount. See Harrison, David B., Annotation, Right of Bidder for State or Municipal Contract to Rescind Bid on Ground that Bid was Based upon His Own Mistake or that of His Employee, 2 A.L.R.4th 991, § 3 (1980) (reviewing cases where courts have granted a request to rescind a bid on a public contract where a mistake was material to the transaction and the public body was informed of the mistake promptly upon its discovery); Powder Horn Constructors, Inc. v. City of Florence, 754 P.2d 356, 359-361 (Colo.1988) (observing the substantial body of law which in effect concludes “that where a bidder submits a bid containing a material mistake of fact and the bid is apparently accepted there has not been any meeting of the minds because the bid accepted by the public entity is not the bid intended by the bidder” and that “many courts, commentators and legislative bodies have either explicitly or implicitly recognized that a mathematical or clerical error yields an unintended bid, while an error in judgment, such as an error in estimating the number of hours of work necessary to complete a project, yields precisely the bid intended and is not deemed a mistaken bid,” and discussing the various competing policy concerns involved in permitting a bidder for a public construction project to rescind its bid based upon a mistake) (citations omitted); Miss. State Bldg. Comm’n v. Becknell Const., Inc., 329 So.2d 57, 62 (Miss.1976) (observing that the record supported the finding that the bidder made an honest mistake in its bid and promptly notified the public body of the character of the mistake and affirming the trial court’s order permitting the bidder to withdraw its bid without penalty); cf. Liebherr Crane Corp., 810 F.2d at 1157 (noting that there was “no difference ... between Lie-bherr’s intended bid and the bid Liebherr actually submitted,” that “[o]n behalf of Liebherr[,] Schiller bid exactly what he had decided to bid,” and that “[i]n other words, he did not establish that he committed any clerical or arithmetical errors in preparing Liebherr’s bid”).

Based upon the record and under the circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that it is evident that there was not a meeting of the minds regarding the bid amount and thus that the School did not acquire the right to enforce Gough’s erroneous or mistaken bid.

Further, we agree with the trial court that “Travelers should be released from its Bid Bond because its principal does not have any liability on the underlying contract.” Appellant’s Appendix at 9. See Jobeo, Inc. v. Nassau Cnty., 129 A.D.2d 614, 615, 514 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1987) (noting that the trial court had granted rescission, finding that a clerical error was material and occurred despite the exercise of ordinary care by the bidder, and holding that “[t]he trial court properly determined that the bid bond, which, by the terms of the bid documents, was required as assurance that the bid is made in good faith’, should not be forfeited by the [bidder], the no plea of mistake’ provision of the bid documents notwithstanding, since rescission having been granted, the bidder was legally excused from entering into the contract and, thus, the absence of the underlying obligation vitiated any contractual obligations arising therefrom”); Miss. State Bldg. Comm’n, 329 So.2d at 59 (affirming the trial court’s finding that the bid bond be cancelled as the bid was permitted to be withdrawn without penalty).

Accordingly, the court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Gough and Travelers and against the School. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court’s August 12, 2011 ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.

      .The appellant’s appendix filed by the School contains various documents, affidavits, and a portion of a deposition without indication of whether this evidence was designated to the trial court in connection with the parties' motions for summary judgment. We remind the parties that when reviewing summary judgment rulings, we must review only the evidence properly designated to the trial court. See Tony v. Elkhart Cnty., 918 N.E.2d 363, 365 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). To assist this review, parties should include in their appendices the designations of evidence that were filed with the trial court. Id. (citing Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind.2008) (noting Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) does not specify how or where evidence is to be designated), reh’g denied). Because the parties do not claim that undesignated material has been included in the appendix, however, we will presume for purposes of this appeal that all of the material in the appendix was properly designated.

      . The record includes “Instructions to Bidders” which contained the following provisions:
      1.12 Modification or Withdrawal of Bid Proposal
      A. A Bidder may withdraw his bid prior to the scheduled time for the receipt of bids, without forfeiture of bid security....
      B. Bids may be modified prior to bid opening time.
      C. After commencement of the opening of bids, no Bidder may recall his bid.
      Appellant's Appendix at 67-68.

      . In his affidavit, the president of Gough, Joseph Gent, stated that "we all thought that we made the calls ... right before 2:00. But, yes, the reality of it is, after having the phone records, the calls were made shortly after 2:00.” Appellant’s Appendix at 114.

      . Gough's complaint was initially filed in Lake County but the case was later transferred to Porter County.

      . The summary judgment pleadings filed with the trial court by the parties are not included in the record.

      . See also Harrison, David B., Right of Bidder for State or Municipal Contract to Rescind Bid on Ground that Bid was Based upon His Own Mistake or that of His Employee, 2 A.L.R.4th 991 (discussing the right to rescind a bid for a mistake of fact, such as a mathematical error).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROBB, Chief Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    DeLAGE LANDEN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, INC., Appellee-Defendant.
    No. 15A05-1107-CC-366.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    March 29, 2012.

      Peter A. Velde, Kightlinger & Gray, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Crystal G. Rowe, Kightlinger & Gray LLP, New Albany, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
    Jeffrey E. Stratman, Aurora, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
   OPINION

ROBB, Chief Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

DeLage Landen Financial Services (“DLL”) filed a complaint for breach of contract against Community Mental Health Center, Inc. (“CMHC”), and subsequently sought summary judgment in its favor. DLL appeals the trial court’s denial of its motions to strike CMHC’s response to DLL’s motion for summary judgment and the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Concluding the trial court abused its discretion in considering CMHC’s late-filed response on summary judgment and that, considering only the properly designated evidence, summary judgment should be granted to DLL, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

CMHC leased seven copy machines and related accessories pursuant to a written lease agreement with Pitney Bowes Credit Corporation (“Pitney Bowes”). On December 6, 2010, DLL, as assignee-lessor, filed a complaint against CMHC seeking contract damages and other relief. CMHC filed an answer and asserted certain affirmative defenses.

On March 15, 2011, DLL filed a motion for summary judgment and designation of evidence. Pursuant to Trial Rule 56(C), CMHC had thirty days — or until April 18, 2011 including the three-day extension for service by mail — to file a response. On April 15, 2011, the trial court set DLL’s motion for a hearing on May 27, 2011. On May 27, 2011, CMHC filed a motion to continue the hearing, alleging counsel had a family emergency. That motion was granted. Also on May 27, 2011, CMHC filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, simultaneously filing the Response. In the Motion for Enlargement of Time, CMHC’s counsel relied on Trial Rule 6(B)(2), allowing a trial court to permit an act to be done upon motion made after the expiration of the time period for doing so if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. CMHC’s counsel stated that he had an inexperienced scheduling secretary who did not properly calendar the due date for the Response, and that he did not notice the failure to file a response until he reviewed his calendar for the week of May 27, 2011, and discovered the summary judgment hearing. DLL objected to the enlargement of time, citing the Indiana Supreme Court case of HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Ind.2008), in support of the proposition that because CMHC failed to respond to the summary judgment motion in any way within thirty days of its filing the trial court could not consider any filings made thereafter. On June 3, 2011, the trial court denied the Motion for Enlargement of Time.

Following the trial court’s order denying CMHC an enlargement of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment, DLL filed a motion to strike CMHC’s response to summary judgment as untimely and CMHC requested Trial Rule 60(B) relief from the trial court’s June 3, 2011, order. On June 24, 2011, the trial court denied DLL’s motion to strike, allowing CMHC’s response to stand and therefore, effectively granting CMHC’s requested Trial Rule 60(B) relief. DLL filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s June 24, 2011, order. The trial court vacated its June 24, 2011, order and set DLL’s motion to reconsider for a hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied DLL’s motion to strike CMHC’s response to summary judgment, granted CMHC permission to file its belated response, and denied DLL’s motion for summary judgment:

Plaintiff, [DLL], having filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court, having considered said motion and being duly advised in the premises, hereby denies the same.
The Court further vacates the June 24, 2011 Order denying [DLL’s] Strike Motion, however the court now reinstates said order after having held a full hearing on said issue on July 8, 2011. Further the Court grants [CMHC] permission to file the summary judgment response pleadings which were filed on or about June 6, 2011.

Appellant’s Appendix at 7. DLL now appeals. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Motion for Relief from Judgment

DLL first contends the trial court erred in granting CMHC’s Rule 60(B) motion for relief from the June 3, 2011, order denying an enlargement of time to file its summary judgment response and allowing CMHC to file a belated response to summary judgment.

A. Standard of Review

Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect ....
... A movant filing a motion for reason[ ](1) ... must allege a meritorious claim or defense.

The burden is on the movant for relief from judgment to demonstrate that the relief is both necessary and just. In re Paternity of M.W., 949 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). Trial Rule 60(B) “affords relief in extraordinary circumstances which are not the result of any fault or negligence on the part of the movant.” Goldsmith v. Jones, 761 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

Our review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 950 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. TacCo Falcon Point, Inc. v. Atlantic Ltd. P’ship XII, 937 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).

B. Relief from Judgment

The propriety of the trial court’s grant of relief from judgment ultimately relates back to whether the trial court should consider CMHC’s response to DLL’s motion for summary judgment. Trial Rule 56 states, in pertinent part:

(C) The motion and any supporting affidavits shall be served in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5. An adverse party shall have thirty (30) days after service of the motion to serve a response and any opposing affidavits ....
(F) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
* * *
(I) For cause found, the Court may alter any time limit set forth in this rule upon motion made within the applicable time limit.

In Seufert v. RWB Med. Income Props. I Ltd. P’ship, 649 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), this court held that a trial court has discretion to order a continuance pursuant to Trial Rule 56(F) or alter time limits pursuant to Trial Rule 56(1) only where the non-movant has responded or sought an extension of time in which to respond within thirty days of the motion for summary judgment being filed. In Desai v. Croy, 805 N.E.2d 844 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, this court noted that our cases had consistently followed the Seufert rule until Farm Credit Servs. v. Tucker, 792 N.E.2d 565 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), in which this court held the trial court had discretion under Trial Rule 56(1) to consider the non-movant’s designated evidence even when the non-movant had failed to respond within thirty days. Id. at 848-49 (citing Farm Credit Serv., 792 N.E.2d at 569-70). Nonetheless, Desai followed Seufert and again held that “a trial court may exercise discretion and alter time limits under 56(1) only if the nonmoving party has responded or sought an extension within thirty days from the date the moving party filed for summary judgment.” 805 N.E.2d at 850.

In HomEq, our supreme court considered whether the trial court erred in declining to consider the non-movants’ joint affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, filed over one year after the motion for summary judgment. The non-movants argued on appeal that the trial court has discretion to consider late-filed responses and should have done so in this case. Our supreme court acknowledged the then-recent inconsistent authority, but characterized the Desai decision as providing a bright line rule precluding late filing. Id. at 98. The court also stated that “[a]ny residual uncertainty was resolved ... when we cited Desai with approval” in a 2005 case. Id. (citing Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.2005)). In Borsuk, the court stated:

When a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(1), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period.

820 N.E.2d at 124 n. 5. Pursuant to this authority, DLL argues the trial court had no discretion to grant relief and allow the consideration of CMHC’s late-filed response.

CMHC contends that HomEq can be distinguished by its facts and procedural history. In HomEq, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2004. Although the defendants sought a series of continuances of the summary judgment hearing, at no time within thirty days after service of the motion for summary judgment did they request alteration of the time limits imposed by Trial Rule 56. A summary judgment hearing was ultimately held on May 9, 2005, on which date the defendants filed a joint affidavit in opposition to summary judgment. The trial court declined to consider the affidavit and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Our supreme court concluded, based on the rule discussed above, that the trial court did not err in refusing to consider the affidavit and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. HomEq, 883 N.E.2d at 99.

CMHC distinguishes this case from Ho-mEq by noting first, the non-movant in HomEq never requested an enlargement of time under the Indiana Trial Rules whereas CMHC requested an enlargement of time pursuant to Trial Rule 6(B)(2), and second, the affidavit in HomEq was filed thirteen months after the motion for summary judgment (and one year after a response was due) whereas CMHC’s materials were submitted approximately two months after DLL’s motion for summary judgment (or slightly over one month after they were due).

As to CMHC’s reliance on its request for an enlargement of time to distinguish this case from HomEq, Trial Rule 6(B)(2) provides:

When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specific time by these rules, the court may at any time for cause shown:
(1) order the period enlarged, with or without motion or notice, if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or extended by a previous order; or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specific period, permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but, the court may not extend the time for taking any action for judgment on the evidence under Rule 50(A), amendment of findings and judgment under Rule 52(B), to correct errors under Rule 59(C), statement in opposition to motion to correct error under Rule 59(E), or to obtain relief from final judgment under Rule 60(B), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.

CMHC argues that, despite the holding in HomEq with respect to Trial Rule 56, Trial Rule 6(B)(2) “on its face allows the trial court discretion to allow an enlargement of time as long as the court finds excusable neglect....” Brief of Appellee at 24. CMHC notes that Trial Rule 56(1) restates Trial Rule 6(B)(1), and that because Trial Rule 56 is not one of the rules specifically exempted from the operation of Trial Rule 6(B)(2), an enlargement of time is allowed.

When trial rules conflict, we apply the principles of statutory construction under which rules are to be construed together and in harmony when possible. Carter-McMahon v. McMahon, 815 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Thus, when two rules cover the same subject matter and one does so generally where the other does so specifically, the more specific rule prevails. Daugherty v. Robinson Farms, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. The parties disagree over which rule-Trial Rule 6 or Trial Rule 56-is more specific. We recognize, as CMHC has pointed out, that Trial Rule 56 is not one of the rules Trial Rule 6(B)(2) specifically exempts from its operation. However, none of the rules that are specifically exempted from Trial Rule 6(B)(2) have their own enlargement of time provision and would thus be subject to Trial Rule 6(B)(2) without the exemption. Because Trial Rule 56 has its own enlargement of time provision, which applies only to Trial Rule 56 and is therefore the more specific of the two rules, it does not need to be exempted from Trial Rule 6(B)(2) because it is not subject to Trial Rule 6(B)(2) in the first instance. Thus, the fact that CMHC filed a motion for enlargement of time pursuant to Trial Rule 6(B)(2) and the non-movant in Ho-mEq did not is not a pertinent distinction because Trial Rule 6(B)(2) does not apply to summary judgment materials.

CMHC also points out that the non-movant in HomEq tried to file its response one year after it was due, whereas CMHC attempted to file its response only approximately one month after it was due. Given that the rule announced in HomEq is not a substantial compliance rule, the length of time that passes between the date a response to a motion for summary judgment is due and the date a response is filed is immaterial. In Thayer v. Gohil, 740 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, the non-movant timely requested and was granted two extensions of time to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The second extension allowed her until November 29, 1999, to file her response. The nonmovant filed her response and accompanying affidavits on December 1, 1999, and also filed a motion for leave to file her response belatedly, alleging she had good cause for not meeting the deadline. The trial court ultimately struck her response and granted summary judgment to the movant. On appeal, we held the non-movant’s failure to show cause for alteration of time before the November 29, 1999, deadline “must result in a striking of her untimely response.” Id. at 1268. In so holding, we specifically noted that the non-movant, filing her response only two days after the deadline, had come “closer to complying with T.R. 56” than in other cases reaching the same result. Id. Nonetheless, “it is essential that the non[-]mov-ant timely comply with the dictates of T.R. 56.” Id.; see also Borsuk, 820 N.E.2d at 124 n. 5 (noting that because non-movant filed affidavit two months after motion for summary judgment was filed without requesting relief within thirty day period allowed to respond, trial court should not have admitted the affidavit); Desai, 805 N.E.2d at 850 (non-movant failed to respond to motion for summary judgment for approximately three and one-half months and trial court therefore erred in allowing non-movant to file opposing affidavits at that time); Seufert, 649 N.E.2d at 1073 (non-movant failed to respond to motion for summary judgment in the three months between its filing and a hearing thereon and trial court therefore appropriately found there was no evidence raising an issue of fact and properly granted summary judgment).

Because CMHC failed to file a response or request an extension within the prescribed time, the trial court had no discretion to alter the time limits in Trial Rule 56. CMHC’s belated response should have been stricken and the trial court abused its discretion when it granted CMHC relief from its earlier judgment and allowed CMHC’s response to be filed and considered on summary judgment.

II. Summary Judgment

DLL also contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo, standing in the same position as the trial court and considering only the properly designated evidence in evaluating the summary judgment motion. Liberty Country Club v. Landowners, 950 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). A party seeking summary judgment has the burden to make a prima facie showing through its designated evidence that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 522, 526 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. The non-moving party may not then rest on the allegations of its pleadings to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, but must designate specific facts so showing. Id. The court must accept as true those facts alleged by the non-moving party, construe the evidence in favor of the non-movant, and resolve all doubts against the moving party. Id. This means, however, that “only those facts alleged by the respondent/nonmovant and supported by affidavit or other evidence ‘must be taken as true.’ ” McDonald v. Lattire, 844 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). We have determined the trial court erred when it allowed CMHC to respond and designate evidence in opposition to DLL’s motion. Accordingly, we will look only to the evidence designated by DLL in reviewing the trial court’s denial of summary judgment.

DLL sued CMHC for monthly rental payments due and not paid, for possession of the equipment, and for attorney fees. On summary judgment, DLL designated CMHC’s answer to DLL’s complaint, and the affidavits of Charles McAllister, a DLL employee, and Peter Velde, DLL’s attorney. In its answer, CMHC admitted that in 2005, it entered into a lease and maintenance agreement with Pitney Bowes, agreeing to make monthly rental payments for the lease of certain equipment. CMHC also asserted as affirmative defenses that Pitney Bowes breached the lease and that CMHC had terminated the lease prior to the time it ceased making payments.

McAllister avers in his affidavit that he has been a Litigation Recovery Specialist at DLL since 2008 and that he has personal knowledge of the facts asserted therein. He further avers that:

5. Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, CMHC agreed to lease seven (7) IM3511 copy machines and related accessories from Pitney (collectively referred to as the “Equipment”). In exchange for the Equipment, CMHC agreed to 'pay $1,933.00 per month to Pitney for sixty (60) consecutive months.
6. Shortly after CMHC’s execution of the Lease and Maintenance Agreement, Pitney assigned and sold all of its rights, title and interest in and to the Lease to DLL.
7. In February 2009, CMHC discontinued paying the monthly rent required to be paid pursuant to the terms of the Lease.
8. CMHC is currently in default under the terms of the Lease.
9. Under the Lease, CMHC agreed to pay a late payment fee on any untimely monthly payments along with all costs, expenses and attorney fees in-eurred by DLL in enforcing the terms of the Lease....
13. The Lease entitles DLL to the possession of the Equipment leased by CMHC upon CMHC’s default and allows DLL to dispose of the Equipment by sale....
14. The Lease is unconditional and absolute and cannot be terminated by CMHC....

Appellant’s App. at 21-22. Attached as exhibits to McAllister’s affidavit are copies of the lease and maintenance agreement, seven statements of account, and the written demand letter from DLL to CMHC for payment. The lease shows that CMHC is to lease equipment described as seven model “IM3511” copiers and accessories described as “1-4510, 3-3510, 9-DL185, and 5-DL250,” and make sixty monthly payments of $1,933. Id. at 26. The “terms and conditions” of the lease provide:

this lease cannot be cancelled or terminated for any reason, all payments under this lease [ ] unconditional and absolute and you shall pay them regardless of whether the equipment is damaged, destroy[ ], defective, unusable or becomes obsolete, and regardless of any dispute with, or claims against, [Pitney Bowes], vendor or any other party. Your o[ ]gations under this lease are not subject to defense, setoff, counterclaim, abatement, or reduction for any reason.

Appellant’s App. at 26. “All Payments due under this Lease shall be payable only to [Pitney Bowes] at ... Louisville, KY ... until we direct you otherwise in writing.” Id. at 27. The lease also allows Pitney Bowes to “sell, assign or transfer all or any part of this Lease and/or the Equipment. The new owner will have the same rights that we have.... You also agree and acknowledge that any Assignment by us will not materially change your obligations hereunder.” Id. The seven statements of account for equipment of type “IM 3510” with various serial numbers each show a date of last payment of February 27, 2009, and various amounts due, totaling $53,185.08. Id. at 30-36. Velde avers in his affidavit, supported by a billing information memo, that DLL has incurred or will incur attorney fees of $7,000 in pursuing this action.

DLL asserts this designated evidence— as we have determined above, the only properly-designated evidence to be considered — shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, in the form of a judgment for the outstanding balance, attorney fees, and an order for possession of the equipment. CMHC contends that even considering only DLL’s evidence, there remain questions of fact precluding summary judgment.

CMHC first argues that the lease was between it and Pitney Bowes, and although the lease provides Pitney Bowes can assign its rights, the only designated evidence indicating Pitney Bowes had in fact assigned its rights to DLL is the “vague assertion” in McAllister’s affidavit that the lease had been assigned. Brief of Appellee at 16. Trial Rule 56(E) provides, in pertinent part:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

Mere assertions in an affidavit of conclusions of law or opinions will not suffice. City of Indianapolis v. Duffitt, 929 N.E.2d 231, 239 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). “An affidavit need not contain an explicit recital of personal knowledge when it can be reasonably inferred from its contents that the material parts thereof are within the affiant’s personal knowledge.” Decker v. Zengler, 883 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. However, CMHC cannot meet its burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial simply by attempting to discredit McAllister’s affidavit on appeal. McAllister’s affidavit includes a specific recitation that he has personal knowledge of the facts related therein. That he is familiar with the CMHC lease and the corresponding accounts can also be inferred from his position with DLL as a Litigation Recovery Specialist. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Merchants Retail Credit Ass’n, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (averments that affiant was employed by phone company and responsible for customer billing and collections sufficient to conclude recital of payments and credits made by phone service customer were based on personal knowledge). This is all that is required by Trial Rule 56(E).

CMHC admitted in its answer— which was designated by DLL as evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment — that it entered into the lease and was obligated to make monthly rental payments. CMHC has designated no evidence to refute McAllister’s affidavit stating that an assignment of the lease was made from Pitney Bowes to DLL or that CMHC stopped making payments thereon. And CMHC has designated no evidence supporting its affirmative defenses of breach or termination of the lease excusing lack of payment.

McAllister’s affidavit, together with CMHC’s answer, is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that DLL, as Pitney Bowes assignee, has a lease agreement with CMHC, that CMHC has failed to make the rental payments it was obligated pursuant to the lease to make, and that pursuant to the lease DLL is entitled to past due rent amounts, possession of the equipment, costs and fees.

CMHC also argues that the statements of account that purport to show the balance CMHC allegedly owes DLL are not linked to and in fact contradict the lease. CMHC points out that the lease is for seven model “IM 3511” copiers, but the statements of account are for model “IM 3510” copiers and two of the statements of account show the same serial number. These discrepancies were not designated as specific facts precluding summary judgment, and even if they had been, do not rise to the level of a genuine issue of material fact when it is undisputed that CMHC leased seven copiers and owed monthly rent thereon. McAllister averred that CMHC owed DLL $53,185.08 for the rental of the equipment, specifically incorporating the statements of account “for each copy machine leased by CMHC pursuant to the Lease.” Appellant’s App. at 22. In short, DLL alleged there was no issue of material fact, designating evidence making a prima facie case that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and CMHC has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating an issue of fact. DLL was entitled to entry of summary judgment in its favor.

Conclusion

The trial court abused its discretion in considering CMHC’s late-filed response to DLL’s motion for summary judgment, and considering only the properly designated evidence, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to DLL. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

NAJAM, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.

      . See Ind. Trial Rule 6(E).

      . The copy of the lease included in the Appellant's Appendix is cut off along the right margin and is not entirely legible. The omissions in this quote reflect only what is actually shown on the copy.

      . DLL alleges it is entitled, under the terms of the lease, to appellate attorney fees. In entering summary judgment for DLL on remand, the trial court should determine a reasonable fee to which DLL is entitled under the lease, including those for pursuing this successful appeal. Accordingly, we need not address DLL’s claim that it is also entitled to appellate attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).


author: BAKER, Judge.

text:
    Buck GLEASON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
    No. 48A02-1106-CR-630.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana.
    March 29, 2012.

      John T. Wilson, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
    Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Aaron J. Spolarich, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
   OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

In this case, while we recognize that brass knuckles may be considered a deadly weapon under our statutes, we revise the defendant’s aggregate sentence from eleven years to six years following his several convictions for battery, criminal recklessness, and the failure to stop after an accident that resulted in injury.

Appellant-defendant Buck Gleason appeals his convictions for Battery with a Deadly Weapon, a class C felony, Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor, Criminal Recklessness while Armed with a Deadly Weapon, a class D felony, and Failure to Stop After an Accident Resulting in Injury, a class A misdemeanor, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Gleason maintains that the State failed to prove that he possessed or used a deadly weapon, and that he failed to stop after hitting a victim with his vehicle.

Gleason also challenges the propriety of the aggregate eleven-year sentence that was imposed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion because the sentencing statement did not adequately identify any aggravating circumstances, that the trial court improperly identified the nature of the offense as an aggravating factor, that consecutive sentences should not have been imposed in light of the improper ag-gravator, and that the sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Although we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Gleason’s convictions, we remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it revise Gleason’s sentence to an aggregate term of six years.

FACTS

On April 8, 2009, Amber-Ball Kilgore was in her home with her fiance, Mark Goodman, and four children. While the children were upstairs watching television, Amber heard a knock on the door. When she opened the door, Gleason, whom she had never met, was standing there. Goodman then walked up to the door and Gleason informed him that he was there to pick up some money that was owed to him by Goodman’s former boss, Matt Wallace. Wallace apparently owed Gleason some money for some repair work on a roof. However, Goodman had not seen Wallace for nearly two weeks. Gleason then announced that he was there “for money or blood” and showed Goodman something that “looked like brass knuckles.” Tr. p. 62, 63. Gleason then put the item on his hand the way that “a person would wear brass knuckles.” Id. Goodman and Amber both remembered that the weapon was metal and “looked like a knife.” Id. at 14, 54.

After Gleason put the weapon on his hand, Goodman turned around. Gleason then struck Goodman in the back of the head with the hand that was holding the metal weapon. Goodman fell to the floor, and Amber picked up a frying pan and began swinging it at Gleason. In response, Gleason hit Amber in the left arm with the weapon. Gleason’s attack on Amber left her with bruising and pain in her arm, and Goodman had laceration and bleeding from his head that required four stitches.

Goodman got up, grabbed a hammer, and Gleason began to walk outside. However, when Gleason subsequently turned around as if he was going to reenter the residence, Goodman threw the hammer at him but missed. Gleason was walking toward his vehicle and Goodman’s parents, who lived across the street, began to approach Amber’s house. Goodman’s father, Donald, walked up to the scene and heard Gleason yelling at his son. In response, Donald raised a cane above his head and told Gleason to leave. Gleason got into his vehicle and drove it toward Donald. Gleason’s passenger side view mirror and door of his vehicle struck Donald, knocking him to the ground. Immediately following this incident, Goodman threw four gallons of spoiled chili onto Gleason’s vehicle because he thought it “would be easier for the police to find him with the chili all over it.” Tr. p. 66-67.

Gleason was arrested and the State charged him with:

Count I — Battery by means of a deadly weapon, a class C felony, for injuring Goodman “by means of a deadly weapon, to wit: knife encased in brass knuckles.”
Count II — Battery resulting in bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor, regarding the injuries that Amber sustained.
Count III — Battery by means of a deadly weapon, a class C felony, for the injuries that Donald Goodman sustained when Gleason struck him with his vehicle.
Count IV — Failure to stop after an accident resulting in injury, a class A misdemeanor, regarding the incident with Donald Goodman.

Appellant’s App. p. 9-10.

Following a bench trial on April 29, 2011, Gleason was convicted of Counts I, II, and IV, and guilty of the lesser-included offense of criminal recklessness while armed with a deadly weapon, a class D felony, under Count III.

On June 1, 2011, the trial court sentenced Gleason to eight years on Count I, one year on Count II, to run concurrently with the sentence on Count I, three years on Count III, to run consecutively to the sentence for Count I, and six months on Count IV, to run concurrently with the sentence for Count I. As a result, Gleason was sentenced to an aggregate term of eleven years. Gleason now appeals.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when a reasonable trier of fact would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.

B. Battery With a Deadly Weapon

Gleason claims that the State failed to prove that he used a deadly weapon when he committed battery on Goodman. Specifically, Gleason argues that there is no evidence establishing that Gleason displayed any brass knuckles or used a knife in the attack.

To convict Gleason of the charged offense, the State must prove that Gleason (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) touched Goodman in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; (3) by means of a deadly weapon. See I.C. § 35-42-2-l(a)(3).

Our General Assembly has defined a “deadly weapon” as a weapon “that in the manner it is used; or could ordinarily be used, or is intended to be used, is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.” Ind.Code § 35-41-1-8(2). Serious bodily injury is defined as an injury causing serious permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness, or extreme pain. Ind.Code § 35-41-1-25.

The question of whether a weapon is “deadly” is determined from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and the circumstances of the case. Merriweather v. State, 778 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Whether an object is a deadly weapon based on these factors is a question of fact. Miller v. State, 500 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind.1986). The original purpose of the object is not considered. Rather, the manner in which the defendant actually used the object is examined. Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind.1994). Also, it does not matter if actual injuries were sustained by the crime victim, provided the defendant had the apparent ability to injure the victim seriously through his use of the object during the crime. Miller, 500 N.E.2d at 196-97.

In this case, both Amber and Goodman described the item that was used to batter them. More specifically, Amber testified that Gleason’s weapon “looked like a knifelike a brass knuckle thing.” Tr. p. 14. Goodman testified that the object Gleason used “looked like some brass knuckles. It has a little, funky, little curl around this edge and around that edge.” Id. at 63. Mark also testified that Gleason placed the object on his hand the same way a person would wear brass knuckles. Id. Both Mark and Amber testified that the object was made of metal. Id. at 14, 56, 63. Although Gleason claims that it is only speculation as to whether Goodman and Amber actually saw brass knuckles, such a contention amounts to an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. That said, the trial court, as the finder of fact, could reasonably conclude from the circumstances, that Gleason used brass knuckles when battering Amber and Goodman.

Finally, we note that the manner in which Gleason used the object and the circumstances of this case also show that the object was a deadly weapon. As discussed above, Gleason put the weapon on his hand after telling Goodman that “he was there for money or blood.” Tr. p. 62. Gleason then hit Goodman in the back of the head with the weapon, resulting in significant lacerations causing Goodman to fall to the floor. Id. at 15-16, 64. Defendant also used the weapon to strike Amber in the arm, causing pain and bruising. Id. at 18, 30. Gleason inflicted serious injury on both Goodman and Amber with the weapon. And the use of the weapon demonstrates that the object was a deadly weapon within the meaning of the statute. In short, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Gleason’s conviction for battery with a deadly weapon, a class C felony.

C. Criminal Recklessness

Gleason next argues that the criminal recklessness conviction must be set aside because the State failed to show that he acted recklessly. More specifically, Gleason claims that there was no evidence demonstrating that he was driving the vehicle in a reckless manner when he struck Donald with it.

To convict a person of criminal recklessness as a Class D felony, the State must show that the defendant (1) recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally (2) performed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person (3) while armed with a deadly weapon. I.C. § 35-42 — 2—2(c)(2)(A). A companion statute, Indiana Code section 35-41-2-2(c), provides that “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.”

In this case, the record demonstrates that Donald stood by Gleason’s SUV and argued with him. Tr. p. 94. Gleason then entered his SUV, shut the door, backed up slightly, and accelerated at a “frantic” pace. Id. at 27, 94. Gleason’s rapid acceleration resulted in his vehicle striking Donald with the side view mirror and passenger door. Id. at 95. The impact knocked Donald to the ground, where he remained until he was taken to the hospital. Id. at 28, 94. Moreover, while Gleason was driving away, he nearly struck a neighbor who was walking his dog and almost collided with other traffic. Because of the high rate of acceleration, Gleason left skid marks on Goodman’s driveway and on the street in front of their home. Id. at 27, 68,112.

In light of this evidence, it is apparent that Gleason drove without any regard to the potential harm that could result to Donald Goodman. Moreover, Gleason’s acceleration to the point of leaving tire marks on the driveway and the street amounts to a substantial deviation from the acceptable standard of driving a vehicle. As a result, the State proved that Gleason acted recklessly, and we decline to set the conviction aside.

D. Failure to Stop After an Accident Resulting in Injury

Gleason next claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he failed to stop after the accident that resulted in injury. More particularly, Gleason maintains that the State failed to show that he failed to stop his SUV knowing he had struck Donald.

Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1 requires drivers who are involved in an accident resulting in the injury, death, or entrapment of a person must immediately stop their vehicle at the scene and remain there until he or she provides identifying information. Although the defendant must have knowledge of the injury or accident, the State is not required to prove actual knowledge. Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 152-58 (Ind.1986). The fact finder may infer that a defendant knew that an accident occurred or that people were injured from an examination of the circumstances of the event. Id. at 153. The duties that the statute imposes upon a driver are triggered regardless of whether the driver’s vehicle struck anyone or anything. Armstrong v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ind.2006).

In this case, while the State did not elicit testimony from Gleason that he knew he struck Donald with the SUV, sufficient facts were presented from which the trial court could find that Gleason knew that he had struck him. As stated above, Gleason recklessly accelerated his SUV while Donald stood nearby. Tr. p. 94-95. Gleason struck Donald with the side view mirror, causing the mirror to break. The force of the impact knocked Donald to the ground, and he remained there as Gleason sped away. Id. at 28, 94-95. Donald remained on the ground while Gleason sped away from the home. From this evidence, the trial court could reasonably infer that Gleason knew about the incident. The record shows that Gleason fled from the scene and is guilty of failing to stop following an accident resulting in an injury. Thus, we decline to set aside the conviction.

II. Sentencing

A. Sentencing Statement and Aggravating Factors

Gleason argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a total of eleven years. More particularly, Gleason maintains that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not articulate any aggravating circumstances when imposing the sentence, but subsequently improperly identified the nature of the offense as an aggravating factor. As a result, Gleason claims that consecutive sentences should not have been ordered. Gleason also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

We initially observe that sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. The trial court can abuse its discretion by (1) issuing an inadequate sentencing statement, (2) finding aggravating or mitigating factors that are not supported by the record, (3) omitting factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, (4) or by finding factors that are improper as a matter of law. Laster v. State, 956 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

Our trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing a sentence for a felony offense. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. The statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. If the trial court includes aggravating or mitigating circumstances in its sentencing statement, it must identify all of the significant circumstances and “explain why each circumstance has been determined to be aggravating or mitigating.” Id. When reviewing the sufficiency of the sentencing statement, we examine both the trial court’s written and oral statements. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind.2007).

In this case, while the trial court did not list the aggravating and mitigating factors in its written sentencing statement, it set forth the following factors during the sentencing hearing:

So it’s crime that was committed by [Defendant] and the mitigating circumstances where it didn’t — allegedly didn’t cause serious harm. I was trying to write these down as [defense counsel] was articulating them. It did cause serious harm. I mean, when people’s homes are invaded and [they are] beat up, that’s serious. Not only is it physical but it’s emotional.... And also the thing about prison would result — would be an undue hardship to the — [Defendant] and his family, especially his family and there was really no evidence of that other than argument. So that’s not a very strong mitigating circumstance. The prior — the aggravating circumstances are the defendant’s prior criminal history, which shows serious disdain in the law.... The nature of the offense. Basically a home invasion taking into his hands matters that should have been reduced.... So the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

Tr. p. 243-44.

As set forth above, the trial court set forth the aggravating and mitigating factors in its oral sentencing statement and discussed the facts that supported each factor. In our view, the trial court’s statement was sufficiently detailed to support the imposition of the sentence. See Webb v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1082, 1088 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (finding the sentencing statement sufficient when it was determined that at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court discussed the evidence concerning Webb’s mental health and rejected it as a mitigating factor. The court then identified four aggravating factors and mentioned the evidence that supported each one), trans. denied.

Gleason also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it improperly identified the nature of the offense as an aggravating factor. While we acknowledge that a material element of a crime cannot be an aggravating circumstance, the nature and circumstances of the crime can be an aggravator. Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). If the nature of the offense is identified as an aggravating factor, the trial court must discuss facts that go beyond the statutory requirements of the crime. McElroy, 865 N.E.2d at 589-90.

The trial court described Gleason’s actions as being “[b]asically a home invasion.” Tr. p. 243^4. In fact, the trial court discussed how Gleason violated the sanctity of the Goodman’s home. Id. The statutory requirements for Gleason’s four offenses do not require any entrance into the victim’s home or dwelling. In short, the trial court provided facts demonstrating how Gleason’s actions exceeded the statutory requirements for conviction.

In our view, this is not a case where the trial court insufficiently explained how Gleason’s actions were worse than the requisite elements of the offense. To illustrate, in Smith v. State, 872 N.E.2d 169 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), the trial court found that “the offense itself, it’s a very aggravating offense what the defendant did in this case whether he was the shooter or not.” Id. at 178. Unlike the circumstances in Smith, the trial court’s finding that a home invasion occurred went beyond the statutory requirements for the offense.

And even assuming solely for the sake of argument that the trial court erred in identifying the nature of the offense as an aggravating factor, we note that Gleason has not challenged the remaining aggravating factors, including his lengthy criminal history. Indeed, a single aggravating circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences. See Bennett v. State, 787 N.E.2d 938, 947 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (observing that even if the trial court erred in considering either of the two challenged aggravating circumstances, the trial court could still enhance the defendant’s sentence through the single aggravating circumstance of his criminal history).

To order a consecutive sentence, “the trial court must find at least one aggravating circumstance.” Hoeppner v. State, 918 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). One valid aggravator alone is enough to enhance a sentence or to impose it consecutive to another. Moreover, the same factor may be used both to enhance a presumptive sentence and to justify consecutive sentences. Dixon v. State, 825 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

Here, the trial court found that two aggravating circumstances existed. As noted above, Gleason does not challenge his criminal history as an aggravating factor. Tr. p. 243. The severity of this ag-gravator alone is sufficient to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. Thus, Gleason’s claim fails with respect to this issue.

D. Inappropriate Sentence

Gleason next claims that the aggregate eleven-year sentence is inappropriate. Specifically, Gleason argues that the nature of the offenses and his character warrant a reduced sentence.

We may revise a sentence authorized by statute if the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). We exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give due consideration to that decision and because we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).

In determining the appropriateness of a sentence, we examine the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.2006). Our review of the sentence should focus on the forest — the aggregate sentence — rather than the trees — consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count. Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind.2011). The defendant bears the burden of proving that the sentence is inappropriate. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1080.

As for the nature of the offense, Gleason injured three members of the Goodman family, two of whom required medical attention. Tr. p. 28, 76. The three victims had never met Gleason, and he attacked Amber and Goodman without provocation while four children were at the residence. Id. at 12-13. In fact, Goodman was turning away from Gleason in an attempt to disengage from the altercation when Gleason struck Goodman in the back of the head. Id. at 15-16. Gleason also used brass knuckles in the attack and then drove his SUV into Donald.

As for Gleason’s character, the record demonstrates that he has repeatedly violated our laws since 1989. However, we note that Gleason’s criminal activity is not particularly egregious. And the significance of a criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense. Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 (Ind.1999).

Gleason has no prior felony convictions and four misdemeanor convictions. Tr. p. 54, 56. Most of the other charges were infractions, dismissed, or withheld. Appellant’s App. p. 52-58. Gleason never served any time in prison for any offense.

Although we agree that the aggravating weight of Gleason’s criminal history justifies the imposition of consecutive sentences, we do not find it sufficiently aggravating to justify enhancing the class C felony to the maximum term of eight years. In short, we believe that the total executed term is excessive and should be revised pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Thus, we revise Gleason’s sentence on Count I, battery by means of a deadly weapon, a class C felony, to the advisory term of four years, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-6, and the offense under Count III to a term of one and one-half years that shall be ordered to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count I. Additionally, the six month sentence imposed under Count IV shall be ordered to run consecutively to the sentences imposed under Counts I and III. Finally, we order the one-year sentence that the trial court imposed in Count II to run concurrently to the sentence imposed in Count I. Thus, Gleason’s sentence is revised to an aggregate term of six years of incarceration.

CONCLUSION

In light of our discussion above, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Gleason’s convictions with regard to the charged offenses. Although we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Gleason, we find that the eleven-year aggregate sentence that was imposed is inappropriate when considering the nature of the offenses and Gleason’s character. Thus, we revise Gleason’s aggregate sentence to a term of six years of incarceration in accordance with the instructions set forth above.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court with instructions that it revise Gleason’s sentence.

DARDEN, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.

      . Ind.Code§ 35-42-2-1 (a)(3).

      . I.C. § 35-42-2-l(a)(l)(A).

      . I.C. § 35-42-2-2(c)(2).

      . Ind.Code § 9-26-1-1; I.C. § 9-26-l-8(a).