author: BAUER, Circuit Judge.

text:
    CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION FUND, a pension trust, and Howard McDougall, one of the present trustees, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INCORPORATED, a corporation and Central Cartage, Incorporated, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 95-2055.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued Jan. 10, 1996.
    Decided June 7, 1996.

      Albert M. Madden, Robert A. Coco, James P. Condon (argued), Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Area Pension Fund, Rosemont, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    George N. Leighton (argued), Grady B. Murdock, Jr., Neal & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before BAUER, FLAUM, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
   BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Successful litigation strategy requires crafting a viable theory of liability against a reasonably affluent defendant. The plaintiff-appellant in this case, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (“Central States”), accomplished the former when it filed suit against D & S Leasing, Genessee Cartage Co., and Michiana Trucking, Inc. (collectively the “Rogers Group”) for pension withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C. § 1381. In June 1990, Central States obtained a judgment against the Rogers Group jointly and severally for $957,246.37. Two years later, Central States obtained a judgment against George Rogers, the proprietor who owned the Rogers Group companies at the time they withdrew from the pension fund. By this time, the liability, including interest, exceeded $1.2 million. However, with the exception of $33,554.84 that George Rogers has paid personally, these judgments remain unsatisfied.

In their efforts to find a collectible defendant, Central States brought this action against Central Transport, Inc. (“Transport”) and Central Cartage Co. (“Cartage”), claiming that these two companies were the “alter-egos” of the Rogers Group companies, and that they too should be liable for the unpaid pension contributions. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Transport and Cartage. We affirm.

This case turns on the control of various current and former subsidiaries of CenTra, Inc., a Michigan corporation engaged in the cartage and over-the-road trucking industries. We begin with a review of the relevant cast of corporate characters:

CenTra, Inc.: A holding company and corporate parent of the defendants, Transport and Cartage. CenTra’s annual gross income exceeds $300,000,000.

GLS Leaseco, Inc.: A wholly owned subsidiary of CenTra, Inc., GLS Leaseco is a Michigan corporation engaged in the employee leasing business. GLS Leaseco also was the corporate parent of Genessee Cartage (“Genessee”) and Michiana Trucking (“Michiana”), two subsidiaries which Transport and Cartage organized to haul steel on behalf of General Motors. In May 1980, GLS Leaseco sold Genessee Cartage to Florence Voree. In January 1981, it sold Michiana Trucking to Edward Dowgiert. Both Vorce and Dowgiert had previous affiliations with Transport and Cartage.

D & S Leasing: Incorporated in Michigan in July 1981, D & S Leasing provided dock workers and other employees for one of Cartage and Transport’s facilities in Cleveland, Ohio. This arrangement lasted from 1982 until May 1986.

“Rogers Group Companies”: A collective reference to Genessee, Michiana, and D & S Leasing. By the end of August 1984, George W. Rogers, a former employee of a Transport and Cartage affiliate, owned and controlled all three corporations. Rogers was the original owner of D & S Leasing. He acquired Genessee from Vorce, and Michiana from Dowgiert in August 1984.

Background

As early as December 1973, Genessee Cartage and Michiana Trucking leased union truck drivers to Transport to haul steel for General Motors in the Flint, Michigan area. Since its incorporation in 1981, D & S Leasing has provided a similar service, leasing dock workers and other employees to one of Transport’s facilities in Cleveland, Ohio. Under each of these arrangements, the Rogers Group paid the union employees at rates determined under “white paper” agreements that each company negotiated with the local unions of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The wage rates were lower than those provided in the Teamsters National Master Freight Agreement, but Central States reviewed, approved, and accepted the terms and conditions of all of the white paper agreements.

Throughout the terms of the leases, Transport and Cartage employees played central roles in the preparation and maintenance of payroll records, and in the recruitment, hiring, supervising, disciplining, and firing of Rogers Group employees. This involvement notwithstanding, George Rogers established a separate office for the three Rogers Group companies, and he hired and supervised his own office staff. The Rogers Group also controlled its own bank accounts from which it fulfilled all of its obligations to Central States.

The leasing arrangements continued until May 1986, when Transport ceased utilizing D & S Leasing to hire employees for their Cleveland site, and the Rogers Group ceased contributing to Central States. After notifying the Rogers Group companies of unpaid pension contributions, Central States filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Central States sued the Rogers Group in 1989, and George Rogers personally in 1990. See Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Rogers, 843 F.Supp. 1135 (E.D.Mich.1992), aff'd. without opinion, 14 F.3d 600 (6th Cir.1993).

Central States prevailed in both suits but, unable to collect either judgment, filed this action under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”), the amendment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), which imposes liability on employers who withdraw from multiemployer pension funds for their proportionate share of unfunded vested benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et. seq. See also Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Ind.) Pension Fund v. Leaseway Transportation Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir.1996). Central States’ theory is that the defendants so dominated and controlled the Rogers Group companies that they were essentially the Rogers Group’s “alter-egos” for the pension obligations.

Analysis

The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and conducted a four-day bench trial. After finding that Central States had failed to prove that Transport and Cartage “completely dominated” the Rogers Group, the district court entered judgment for the defendants on April 5, 1995. We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Wisconsin v. Lutz, 71 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir.1995).

Before turning to the merits of Central States’ claim, we pause to consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Peacock v. Thomas, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996). Peacock generally precludes both ERISA jurisdiction and ancillary federal jurisdiction over suits to enforce previously obtained ERISA judgments. Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 866-67. While the lawsuit in Peacock is similar to Central States’ suit against Central Transport, the two are distinguishable.

In Peacock, Thomas brought suit under ERISA against his corporate employer and against an individual officer and shareholder, Peacock, for benefits due under the corporation’s pension benefits plan. After ruling that Peacock was not a fiduciary, and thus not a proper defendant under ERISA, the district court entered judgment against the corporation only. See Thomas v. Tru-Tech, Inc., No. 87-2243-3, 1988 WL 212511 (D.S.C.), aff'd. without opinion, 900 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.1990). Thomas tried and failed to collect the judgment from the corporation, and then filed another suit against Peacock, asserting a claim for “Piercing the Corporate Veil Under ERISA and Applicable Federal Law.” Peacock, — U.S. at - - -, 116 S.Ct. at 865-66. This latter suit ultimately wound its way to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that Thomas’ veil-piercing claim did not state a cause of action under ERISA and could not independently support federal question jurisdiction. Id. In the Court’s view, Thomas’ lawsuit was an attempt to use ancillary jurisdiction “to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment.” Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 868, citing H.C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497, 30 S.Ct. 601, 54 L.Ed. 855 (1910). Thomas did not claim that Peacock was liable for the underlying ERISA violation. Indeed, after the district court’s initial judgment, he was precluded from doing so.

Central States, however, has styled its theory of liability somewhat differently, alleging that Central Transport and Central Cartage so dominated and controlled the Rogers Group Companies that they were the “true employers” for purposes of ERISA liability. Under this theory, Central States is not pursuing the defendant corporations merely to enforce a judgment. Rather, Central States is claiming that Central Transport and Central Cartage played a part in the initial ERISA violation. This theory is different from Peacock’s, where Thomas pursued Peacock solely in his capacity as an officer and shareholder of the liable corporation. Thomas’ lawsuit attempted to “pierce the corporate veil.” By contrast, Central States claims that the defendants exercised “common control.” The former can be characterized more generically as a suit to enforce a judgment, while the latter is a specific claim for relief under ERISA.

This distinction between “common control” and “veil-piercing” is consistent with the approach we recently have taken in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Art Pape Transfer, Inc., 79 F.3d 651 (7th Cir.1996). The facts of Art Pape Transfer, which begin with an employer’s withdrawal from a pension fund, are similar to those in the instant lawsuit. After Ringle Express withdrew from the Central States Pension Fund, Central States brought suit under ERISA and under the MPPAA against McGriff Corporation, Ringle’s parent at the time it withdrew, and other related defendants to recover the unpaid benefit contributions. Id. at 652. In the course of the litigation, however, Central States reached a settlement with some of the potentially liable defendants. The settlement released from ERISA liability “the MeGriffs and all members of any group of trades or businesses under common control with Ringle.” Id. A separate clause of the settlement agreement noted that the release inured not only to the benefit of the parties, but also to “related corporations.” Id.

In Art Pape Transfer, we began our analysis by inquiring whether common control existed among the respective defendants. Id. at 652-653. This analysis created an obvious problem for Central States in that case, because if common control existed, “there may be liability but the release blocks recovery.” But, if there were no “ ‘common control’, then there is no release, but also no liability.” Id. As we pointed out, Art Pape Transfer would win either way. To avoid this insurmountable hurdle, the Art Pape plaintiffs crafted a theory of alter-ego (i.e. veil-piercing) liability under state law. However, this approach ran directly into the jurisdictional wall raised by Peacock.

The resulting legal landscape distinguishes “common control,” a theory that may have supported liability in Art Pape Transfer but for the release, and “veil-piercing,” which is dead after Peacock. Central States’ claim in the instant lawsuit alleges common control, and the district court therefore properly assumed subject matter jurisdiction.

We now turn to the issue of the defendants’ liability, if any, arising under section 1381 of MPPAA which provides:

If an employer withdraws from a multiemployer plan in a complete withdrawal or a partial withdrawal, then the employer is liable to the plan in the amount determined under this part to be the withdrawal liability.

29 U.S.C. § 1381(a).

The statute does not define the term “employer.” Several circuits have confronted this question, and define an employer for purposes of MPPAA as “a person who is obligated to contribute to a plan either as a direct employer or in the interest of an employer of the plan’s participants.” Seaway Port Authority v. Duluth-Superior ILA Marine Ass’n. Restated Pension Plan, 920 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2827, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991); see also Carriers Container Council, Inc. v. Mobile Steamship Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO Pension Plan & Trust, 896 F.2d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 308, 112 L.Ed.2d 261 (1990); Korea Shipping Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass’n—Int'l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension Trust Fund, 880 F.2d 1531, 1537 (2nd Cir.1989). Therefore, the appropriate inquiry is whether the alleged employer had an obligation to contribute as well as the nature of that obligation. Seaway, 920 F.2d at 508.

The Eighth Circuit recently applied this definition in a situation similar to that in this case in Rheem Manufacturing Co. v. Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 63 F.3d 703 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1016, 134 L.Ed.2d 96 (1996). In Rheem, an equipment manufacturer had leased truck drivers from an employee leasing company to distribute its products. The manufacturer selected and supervised the drivers, and negotiated the terms and conditions of the drivers’ employment with the appropriate unions. These functions notwithstanding, the leasing company was the signatory to the collective bargaining agreement with the union. While the manufacturer paid the leasing company for the total number of drivers and the miles driven, the leasing company kept the payroll records, provided the drivers’ benefits, and contributed to the multiemployer pension fund. When the leasing company withdrew from the fund, the manufacturer sought a declaratory judgment excusing it from withdrawal liability. Holding that the manufacturer was not an employer for the purposes of MPPAA, the Eighth Circuit noted that the nature of the obligation to contribute was contractual, and therefore the party “who is signatory to a contract creating the obligation to contribute is the ‘employer’ for purposes of establishing withdrawal liability.” Rheem, 63 F.3d at 707.

This analysis would excuse Cartage and Transport from withdrawal liability. However, Rheem left open the question of whether, in the case of an insolvent shell agent and a potentially fraudulent arrangement, a court would look behind the contractual obligor to the “true employer.” Id. at 707 n. 5. That situation is precisely the claim that Central States has made against the defendants in the instant ease.

The district court set forth the proper standard for when to disregard the corporate form to allow recovery of unpaid pension contributions. The factors a court should consider are 1) the amount of respect given to the separate identity of the corporation by its shareholders; 2) the fraudulent intent of the incorporators; and 3) the degree of injustice visited on the litigants by respecting the corporate entity. Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939, 112 S.Ct. 373, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991), citing Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Service, Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir.1984).

In their effort to portray Transport, Cartage, arid the Rogers Group as one entity, Central States relies on proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board involving CenTra. See NLRB v. CenTra, Inc., 299 NLRB 658 (1990), enforcement granted, 954 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 462, 130 L.Ed.2d 370 (1994). In these proceedings, the Board concluded that Transport, Cartage, and D & S Leasing were joint employers of the leased workers at the Cleveland facility. Although this finding occurred in the context of adjudicating an unfair labor practice, Central States contends that it should be preclusive. However, because the Board did not examine the overall corporate relationship among the employers or the underlying purposes of the lease arrangements, its findings do not resolve the issue of respect for corporate form.

Central States argues that Cartage and Transport’s direct control over the Rogers Group’s hiring, recruiting, supervising, and maintenance of payroll records was sufficient to create “alter-ego” liability for the unpaid pension contributions. The extent of the interrelationship among the Rogers Group and the two defendants suggests a lack of respect for the separate identity of the corporations. However, it says nothing about the fraudulent intent of the incorporators. Essential to the application of the alter-ego doctrine is a finding of a disguised continuance of a former business entity or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective bargaining agreement, such as a sham transfer of assets. Trustees of Pension Funds of Local 701 v. Favia, 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993). In sum, unlawful motive or intent are critical inquiries in an alter-ego analysis. Id., citing Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Centor Contractors, Inc., 831 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.1987).

Central States essentially makes a policy argument that the standard for disregarding corporate form should be lower in this type of ease than in a typical contract dispute. We acknowledge that the underlying congressional policy behind ERISA favors the disregard of the corporate entity in cases where employees are denied their pension benefits. Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 461. However, such policy interests are not at stake here. This suit does not involve an individual pensioner’s claim for benefits. Rather, it involves a multiemployer pension fund’s attempt to collect a share of unpaid contributions. Congress enacted the amendments creating partial withdrawal liability in order to insulate an ERISA plan from major and sustained reductions in its contribution base. See Central States Pension Fund v. Robinson Cartage, 55 F.3d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir.1995). The requirement of showing some fraudulent intent on the part of Transport or Cartage applies here, and Central States has failed to do so.

As an alternative to arguing that no fraud is required to create alter-ego liability, Central States claims that Transport and Cartage orchestrated several sham transactions by selling off the Rogers Group companies to former employees. The district court found that Central States failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Transport or Cartage sold its subsidiaries to Florence Vorce or Edward Dowgiert as a part of a fraudulent plan to avoid paying higher wages or benefits to its employees. The district court made similar findings with respect to the incorporation of D & S Leasing, and George Rogers’ subsequent purchases of Genessee and Miehiana.

Central States was well aware of the relationship among Transport, Cartage, and the Rogers Group companies, and there is no indication that any of the employers withheld or disguised its corporate identity. Moreover, Central States reviewed and approved each of the white paper agreements with the respective Rogers Group companies. Perhaps the most telling evidence of its awareness is the fact that Central States did not name Transport or Cartage as defendants in either of its first two lawsuits. Rather, Central States waited. Now that the Rogers Group and George Rogers are unable to pay, Central States has decided to challenge the corporate form.

This last point is a reminder that while Central States’ allegations seem viable in the abstract, its arguments on appeal are in large part a recitation of what Central States was unable to prove before the district court. The allegations were sufficient to defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but after hearing the testimony, reviewing the evidence, and evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, the district court found that Central States had failed to meet its burden of proof. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support these findings, and under a clearly erroneous standard, we see no need to disturb them.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of Transport and Cartage is

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ARCH OF ILLINOIS, A DIVISION OF APOGEE COAL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DISTRICT 12, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA and Local Union No. 1392, United Mine Workers of America, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 95-3233.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued Feb. 23, 1996.
    Decided June 13, 1996.

      James W. Morris, Barrett, Twomey, Morris, Broom & Hughes, Carbondale, IL, Ronald E. Meisburg (argued), Christopher Slaughter, Washington, DC, for Arch of Illinois.
    Patrick J. O’Hara (argued), Cavanagh & O’Hara, Springfield, IL, for United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 and Local 1392, United Mine Workers of America.
    Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
   FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Arch of Illinois (“AOI”), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, District 12 and Local Union No. 1392 of the United Mine Workers of America (“the Union”). AOI filed- this action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate an arbitrator’s decision that AOI had violated a collective bargaining agreement between the parties by discharging a unionized employee. The Union moved for summary judgment, seeking to enforce the arbitration award. The district court upheld the arbitration award, finding that the award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. We agree with the district court and therefore affirm its decision.

I.

The relevant facts in this appeal are essentially undisputed. AOI operates a bituminous coal mine located in Perry County, Illinois and employs mine workers represented by the Union. AOI and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“the Agreement”) that was in effect at all times relevant to this action. At approximately 6:00 a.m. on January 25, 1995, AOI managers discovered John Pierce, a worker covered by the Agreement, asleep in his bulldozer. At the time of the discovery it was still dark, and the bulldozer was in a busy area of the mine with its lights off and its engine running. Pierce’s conduct violated a policy implemented at the mine by AOI, which provided that:

So that the occasions for discipline or discharge might be minimized, each employee should avoid conduct which violates reasonable standards of a good working relationship. Violation of any of the following rules may result in discipline or discharge.
1. Failure to observe safety rules and regulations (including Federal, State, or Company safety rules).
2. Sleeping, gambling, or playing cards on Company premises.

As a result of his conduct, AOI suspended Pierce with the intent to discharge him.

The Agreement contains various provisions regarding the termination of mine employees. Article IA broadly provides that “[t]he management of the mine, the direction of the working force and the right to hire and discharge are vested exclusively in the Employer.” Article XXIV, entitled “Discharge Procedure,” grants mine employees specific procedural and substantive rights relating to disciplinary measures taken by AOI. Section (a) of this Article states that “[n]o Employee covered by this Agreement may be disciplined or discharged except for just cause. The burden shall be on the Employer to establish grounds for discharge in all proceedings under this Agreement.” Section (d) of this Article provides for the immediate arbitration of disputed discharges, with the following limitations on the arbitrator’s discretion:

If the arbitrator determines that the Employer has failed to establish just cause for the Employee’s discharge, the Employee shall be immediately reinstated to his job. If the arbitrator determines that there was just cause for the discharge, the discharge shall become effective upon the date of the arbitrator’s decision.

After AOI gave Pierce notice of its decision to discharge him, Pierce filed a grievance with AOI, demanding to be reinstated and claiming that AOI lacked just cause for the discharge. AOI denied Pierce’s grievance, and the Union then arranged for the immediate arbitration of the discharge pursuant to Article XXIV, Section (d) of the Agreement.

A full hearing was held before arbitrator Marvin J. Feldman on February 3, 1995. Five days later the arbitrator issued an award reinstating Pierce effective March 15, 1995. In its opinion, the arbitrator first examined the evidence in favor of AOI’s position:

It might be noted that the contract demands just cause for termination. It is apparent that sleeping is sufficient just cause to trigger a discharge. That is true especially in this case because the engine was running, the grievant was described as being in a busy area, and all of the grievant’s lights were not operative in the night season. Thus, it appears that the grievant not only was sleeping but he did it in such a manner so as to provide an unsafe shroud around his behavior. For all of those reasons therefore the grievant should be terminated.

The arbitrator then immediately turned to what it viewed as the crucial flaw in AOI’s ease:

[T]he grievant in this case was an employee with some twenty years of service.... [I]t is apparent that the company did not take into account the grievant’s seniority of some twenty years.
The company must give some credence to seniority .... seniority is an extremely important facet of the makeup of an employee. It shows loyalty, it shows recognized ability, it shows efficiency.... The company however failed to take that into account when it terminated this particular grievant.
I am giving due understanding to the word seniority as uttered in the contract. While a senior person has no greater rights that [sic] the junior person, the senior person’s length of service must be recognized when that individual is dealt with by way of termination. It is further noted in that regard that even the rules do not mandate discharge for sleeping.
As a result of all of this discussion, it is imperative to understand that the grievant should be given a last chance at this mine because of his seniority involved in this particular matter and I am willing to accomplish something in that regard.

The arbitrator therefore concluded that Pierce was entitled to relief.

On March 22,1995, AOI filed this action in district court to vacate the arbitration award, claiming that the arbitrator contravened the plain language of the Agreement by finding that there was just cause to discharge Pierce and yet refusing to direct his termination. Both AOI and the Union moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the Union’s motion, thereby upholding the arbitration award. The court found that the award reflected a determination by the arbitrator that, while sleeping on the job could, be just cause for discharge, AOI lacked just cause to discharge Pierce because it failed to examine his work record and length of employment. On appeal, AOI once again argues that the arbitrator, in rendering the award, ignored the plain language of the Agreement.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as that employed by the district court. Jasper Cabinet Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 77 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir.1996). Summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings and supporting documents “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the party opposing a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of proof on an issue, he must go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

It has long been established that judicial review of arbitration awards under collective bargaining agreements is extremely narrow. See, e.g., Jasper Cabinet Co., 77 F.3d at 1028; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The Supreme Court has stated that federal courts must enforce an arbitration award unless it fails to “draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” and instead represents the arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice.” Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361. So long as the award is even arguably based on the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement, it draws its essence from the agreement, even if the reviewing court is convinced that the arbitrator’s interpretation is plainly wrong. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370-71, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir.1991). Because the parties bargained for the arbitration of disputes regarding the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, they implicitly committed to abide by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement. Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1505. Our role is therefore limited to determining whether the arbitrator “exceeded the powers delegated to him by the parties,” i.e., whether he failed to arbitrate the dispute in accord with the agreement. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 1184, 89 L.Ed.2d 300 (1986). Given this limitation on our authority, and the principle that we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of enforcing the arbitration award, Polk Bros. v. Chicago Truck Drivers Union, 973 F.2d 593, 597 (7th Cir.1992), “[i]t is only when the arbitrator must have based his award on some body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the contract ... that the award can be said not to ‘draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.’ ” Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 184-85 (emphasis added). AOI has failed to clear this high hurdle of demonstrating that the arbitrator must have based his award on something outside the Agreement.

Both the language of the arbitrator’s opinion and the award itself can establish that the arbitrator failed to interpret the agreement and instead applied his own sense of equity. See, e.g., Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1506. We will refuse to enforce an arbitrator’s award if his own words manifest an infidelity to his obligation to interpret the collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361; see also Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1505-06; Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 185. However, “a mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.” Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361; see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.Ct. at 370-71. Thus, before we reject an award because of language in the arbitrator’s opinion, the opinion must unambiguously reflect that the arbitrator based his decision on non-contractual grounds. AOI argues that the arbitrator clearly flouted the plain language of the Agreement by refusing to order Pierce’s termination despite finding that AOI had just cause to discharge him. Under AOI’s view of the opinion, the arbitrator first determined that there was just cause for the discharge and then decided to modify the penalty, thereby ignoring the following mandatory language of the Agreement: “If the arbitrator determines that there was just cause for the discharge, the discharge shall become effective upon the date of the arbitrator’s decision.”

Undeniably, if the arbitrator had specifically found that AOI had just cause to discharge Pierce, but then stated something to the effect of “fairness dictates that Pierce shouldn’t have been discharged,” we would conclude that the arbitrator exceeded his proper role and refuse to enforce the award. We do not believe, however, that the arbitrator’s opinion unambiguously found that AOI had just cause to discharge Pierce. AOI’s interpretation of the arbitrator’s opinion is a reasonable one. The arbitrator stated that “sleeping is sufficient just cause to trigger a discharge,” he did not directly integrate his discussion of seniority with his analysis of just cause, and nowhere in the opinion did he explicitly find that AOI lacked just cause to discharge Pierce. Yet AOI must do more than merely show that its interpretation of the opinion is reasonable; it must demonstrate that the opinion cannot reasonably be interpreted in any other way. See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597-98, 80 S.Ct. at 1361-62. This AOI has failed to do. The basic obstacle to AOI’s position is that the arbitrator did not explicitly find that AOI had just cause to discharge Pierce. The arbitrator’s failure to make a clear finding in this regard created ambiguity in his opinion. Because of this ambiguity, we cannot say with certainty that the arbitrator’s own words demonstrate that he failed to interpret the Agreement.

The arbitrator, of course, cannot simply pay lip service to his obligation to follow the collective bargaining agreement. We will set aside an arbitration award if “there is no possible interpretive route to the award, so a noncontractual basis can be in-ferred.” Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1506. Thus, although the arbitrator in his opinion may purport to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, if we determine that the award itself cannot logically follow from the agreement, we will refuse to enforce the award. The interpretive route in this case, however, is not difficult to discern. Under the Agreement, AOI could discharge Pierce only for “just cause.” The Agreement explicitly leaves the determination of just cause to the arbitrator. Just cause is a flexible concept, embodying notions of equity and fairness, and is certainly open to interpretation by the arbitrator. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Independent Assoc. of East Chicago, Inc., 790 F.2d 611, 614-15 (7th Cir.) (finding that arbitrator could consider notions of fault and procedures afforded to grievant in determining just cause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 186, 93 L.Ed.2d 120 (1986). A finding that AOI lacked just cause to discharge Pierce because of its failure to consider his seniority is not so far-fetched as to lead us to deduce that the arbitrator relied on a noncontractual basis for the award.

Arch also argues in its reply brief that Article XXIV(d) required the arbitrator to order either the immediate discharge (upon finding just cause) or the immediate reinstatement (upon finding no just cause) of Pierce. Arch asserts that, because the arbitrator granted neither of these circumscribed remedies, but rather reinstated Pierce effective approximately a month after his decision, there is no possible interpretive route to his award. However, since this argument was not clearly presented in Arch’s initial brief to this Court, it could be deemed waived. See Maher v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 75 F.3d 1182, 1191 (7th Cir.1996); Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir.1990) (“All arguments for reversal must appear in the opening brief, so that the appellee may address them.”) In any event, contrary to Arch’s position, we believe that the arbitrator’s award “can be rationally derived from some plausible theory of the general framework or intent of the agreement.” Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 186 (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 679 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.1982)). In effect, the arbitrator determined that Pierce’s discharge was unjustified, but then disciplined Pierce by imposing a thirty day suspension without pay. Article XXIII(c)(4) of the Agreement states that “[t]he parties agree that the expeditious processing of grievances is a major function of this Article, and that consolidation of eases before a single arbitrator can aid in achieving that goal, and where applicable, this procedure should be given serious consideration.” Given this provision, it is certainly possible that the arbitrator’s imposition of a thirty day suspension, which obviated the need for a separate disciplinary hearing against Pierce, followed from a plausible theory of the general framework of the Agreement.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the arbitration award draws its essence from the Agreement and does not represent the arbitrator’s own brand of industrial justice. We therefore AffiRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Union. Since we do not believe this appeal was frivolous, the parties shall bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees in this Court.

      . We have noted in this respect that:
      It would be a serious practical mistake ... to subject the reasoning in arbitrators’ opinions to beady-eyed scrutiny. It might discourage them from writing opinions at all (a point made in Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 598, 80 S.Ct. at 1361). Arbitrators are not required to write opinions any more than juries are. It is a good thing when they do, because writing disciplines thought. We should not create disincentives to their doing so. The more basic point, however, is that since arbitrators' interpretations must be accepted even when erroneous, it cannot be correct that arbitrators are required to write good opinions.

        Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1506.

      . The district court believed that a careful reading of the opinion demonstrates that the arbitrator found that, while sleeping could trigger just cause for discharge, it did not in Pierce’s case because of his seniority. In the district court’s view, the arbitrator held that AOI failed to establish just cause for discharge but did establish just cause for discipline. This reading by the district court, although not compelled by the arbitrator’s opinion, is certainly reasonable.

      . AOI's reliance on Morgan Services, Inc. v. Local 323, Chicago & Central States Joint Bd., 724 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir.1984), is misplaced. The agreement in Morgan Services provided that "any employee may be discharged without [redress] if proven guilty of ... insubordination.” Id. at 1220. The employee was obviously guilty of insubordination. The arbitrator found as much, but ordered .reinstatement of the employee. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that, once the employee was proven guilly of insubordination, the "without redress” language unambiguously meant that the employer’s decision to discharge was not open to review by the arbitrator. Id. at 1223. The court therefore concluded that the award did not draw its essence from the agreement. Id. at 1223. In contrast to Morgan Services, the arbitrator in this case did not make a clear finding that AOI had just cause to discharge Pierce. The parties agree that if the arbitrator had made such a finding, the plain language of the Agreement would have required the discharge of Pierce.

      . Article XXIV is entitled "Discharge Procedure," while Article XXIII is entitled "Settlement of Disputes” and contains general procedures applicable to disciplinary proceedings. These two Articles are poorly drafted, and the extent to which Article XXIII applies to cases where the employer seeks to discharge an employee is unclear. What is clear, however, is that we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of enforcing the arbitrator's award. Polk Bros., 973 F.2d at 597.


author: RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge. WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,

text:
    Jeffrey MAUSOLF; William Kullberg; Arlys Strehlo; and Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Appellees, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary, Department of the Interior; Roger Kennedy, Director, National Park Service; Mollie Beattie, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; and Ben Clary, Superintendent, Voyageurs National Park, Appellees. Appeal of Voyageurs Region National Park Association; Sierra Club, North Star Chapter; Humane Society of the United States; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; National Park and Conservation Association; and Izaak Walton League of America, Appellants.
    No. 95-1201MN.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 20, 1995.
    Decided June 3, 1996.
    Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 5, 1996.

      Brian B. O’Neill, Minneapolis, argued (Richard A. Duncan and Michael A. Ponto, on the brief), for appellants.
    Corey John Ayling, Minneapolis, argued, for appellees.
    Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

       Judge McMillian would grant the suggestion; Judge Loken took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

   RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs — three snowmobile enthusiasts and the Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association (collectively, “the Snowmobilers”) — sued the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants (“the Government”), seeking to enjoin the enforcement of restrictions on snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park. The Voyageurs Region National Park Association and other conservation groups (collectively, “the Association”) moved to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. The Association claimed an interest in the vigorous enforcement of the restrictions and expressed concern that the Government might settle with the Snowmobilers or back away from the rules. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that the Government adequately represented the Association’s interests. Mausolf v. Babbitt (“Mausolf I”), 158 F.R.D. 143 (D.Minn.1994) (opinion of Magistrate Judge), approved, Order of November 15, 1994 (order of District Judge). We reverse.

During the pendency of this appeal, the District Court granted the Snowmobilers’ motion for summary judgment, and held that the Government’s explanation for the restrictions was inadequate under the Endangered Species Act. The Court remanded the case to the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service to supplement the administrative record, and enjoined enforcement of the restrictions on snowmobiling, “[pjending a sufficient explanation ....” Mausolf v. Babbitt (“Mausolf II”), 913 F.Supp. 1334, 1344 (D.Minn.1996). We think, however, that the question of intervention is not moot, because the Association has appealed this judgment. Jeffrey Mausolf v. Voyageurs Region National Park Ass’n, No. 96-1856 (8th Cir., notice of appeal filed March 25, 1996).

I.

Voyageurs National Park is a watery maze of over 30 lakes and 900 islands along the border between northern Minnesota and Canada. The Park’s name pays tribute to the fur traders and explorers who travelled by canoe from Montreal deep into northwestern Canada. The Park’s four largest lakes — Rainy, Kabetogama, Namakan, and Sand Point — surround the Kabetogama Peninsula (about one-half the Park’s land area) and are themselves linked by smaller lakes, rivers, and bogs. Most of the Park is quite remote, and accessible only by water. Voyageurs is renowned for its fishing and boating, and visitors often see bald eagles and grey wolves in the wild. Voyageurs has also long been a popular destination for snowmobilers, who have, over the years, used both the Park’s frozen lake surfaces and — more controversially — certain overland trails. This case is the latest in a series of disputes over the use and management of the Park.

Some background information will make this case easier to understand. In 1991, after several years of study, the National Park Service issued final regulations, based on a series of environmental- and wildlife-impact reports, allowing snowmobiling on practically all the Park’s lake surfaces and also on certain trails and portage routes. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b) (1991). The Association then sued, claiming that the regulations, and the Department of the Interior’s failure to submit a “wilderness recommendation” for the Park to the President, were illegal. The District Court ordered the Secretary of the Interior to make a “wilderness recommendation” within a year, but refused to enjoin snowmobiling in the Park’s Kabetogama Peninsula. See VRNPA, 1991 WL 343370 at *11-14.

Accordingly, in August 1991, the National Park Service proposed a wilderness plan which would have significantly reduced overland snowmobiling, but allowed it on major lakes, a few designated portage trails, and the Chain of Lakes Trail. The Park Service then asked the Fish and Wildlife Service for its “biological opinion” about the effect, if any, snowmobiling could have on grey wolves, bald eagles, and other animals in the Park. In March 1992, Fish and Wildlife concluded that the Park Service’s plan would not threaten animals’ survival or habitats. Nonetheless, Fish and Wildlife directed the Park Service to close specified trails, lake-shores, and lakes to snowmobiles and other motor vehicles. So, in December 1992, Park officials issued an order, without giving notice or inviting interested parties to comment, closing 16 of the Park’s lake bays and certain shoreline areas to winter motorized access. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b)(3) (1993) (authorizing temporary closure of lake surfaces for wildlife-management purposes). This order, which was renewed in 1993 and 1994, dramatically reduced the area available for snowmobiling.

These new regulations angered many past and potential Park visitors, including the Snowmobilers, who could no longer enjoy some of the Park’s more beautiful and remote areas. The Snowmobilers sued the Government in January 1994, claiming that Fish and Wildlife’s biological opinion did not support closing so much of the Park, and that the regulations were therefore arbitrary and capricious. According to the Snowmobilers, not only had the Government turned an abrupt and unexplained “about face,” it had also failed to consider the best available scientific and commercial information before imposing the new restrictions. See Mausolf II, 913 F.Supp. at 1335-36; Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 144-45. The Association then moved to intervene so it could vindicate its interest in restricting snowmobiling in the Park and in making sure the new regulations were strictly enforced. The Association contended that for years the Government illegally — and over the Association’s objections— permitted unrestricted snowmobiling in the Park and refused to implement proper wilderness-protection measures. The Association asserts that the Government cannot be trusted to protect the Association’s interests because of its alleged history of siding with the Snowmobilers. See Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 147.

The, District Court conceded that the Association had a recognized interest which might be impaired by the disposition of the case. The Court noted, however, that, under the parens patriae doctrine, government entities are presumed to represent the interests of all their citizens. Would-be intervenors can rebut this “presumption of adequate representation” only by identifying their “local and individual interests not shared by the general citizenry.” Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 147-48 (citing Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1001 (8th Cir.1993)). The District Court was not persuaded that the Government would unduly subordinate the Association’s interests to more general, national interests, and, therefore, denied intervention as of right under Rule 24(a). The District Court also refused to exercise its discretion to allow permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), fearing that the Association might delay the case with additional discovery and further joinder of issues and parties. Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 148. However, recognizing the potential benefits of the Association’s collective knowledge and perspective, the Court allowed the Association to participate as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum addressing the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Ibid. The District Court confirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, and the Association appealed. We reverse.

II.

The Snowmobilers contend that the Association may not intervene as of right because it lacks Article III standing. The Magistrate Judge concluded, and the District Judge agreed, that “[t]he question of standing ... is irrelevant to our determination of whether the Association may intervene as of right.” Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 146. The District Court said that even if the Association did not have standing to sue, it could still intervene under Rule 24(a) if it had a “recognized interest in the subject of the litigation.” Id. at 146 n. 4 (citing Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997).

A.

Rule 24(a) says nothing about standing. To intervene as of right, an applicant must (1) have a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation that (2) might be impaired by the disposition of the case and that (3) will not be adequately protected by the existing parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. As the District Court observed, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a would-be intervenor must have Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 & n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 & n. 21, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (an intervenor may not appeal, or continue a suit, without the party on whose side intervention was permitted, unless intervenor has Article III standing).

The courts of appeals have taken diverse, sometimes “anomalous,” id. at 68, 106 S.Ct. at 1706-07, approaches. By way of illustration, at least one circuit has held that Article III standing is required to intervene, see, e.g., Building and Const. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1994); another has stated that, while Article III standing is not required, it is “relevant” to identifying the “interest” required for intervention under Rule 24, see, e.g., Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir.1989); others have concluded that standing is not required for intervention, see, e.g., United States Postal Service v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir.1978); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.1994); Yniguez v. State of Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991); and still another has suggested that Rule 24 requires an interest even “greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement.” See, e.g., United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1956, 90 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). Our Court has not yet taken a firm position in this debate, although we have, in some eases, decided intervention issues without discussing Article III standing.

The Association urges us to adopt the “majority view,” and to hold that standing is not required for intervention. It contends that “[intervention is not a means for beginning a lawsuit, but a mechanism that allows all parties with an interest to participate in an existing lawsuit.” Because the lawsuit’s original parties have created the “case” or “controversy” required by Article III, the Association argues, there is no reason to require a would-be intervenor, who satisfies Rule 24(a)’s requirements, to have standing. In support, the Association points to the following language from Chiles, supra:

The standing doctrine ensures that a justiciable case and controversy exists between the parties. Intervention under Rule 24 presumes that there is a justiciable case into which an individual wants to intervene.... [A] party seeking to intervene need not demonstrate that he has standing in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 24 as long as there exists a justiciable case and controversy between the parties already in the lawsuit.

Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212-13.

We are not so sure as the Association that there is a “majority view” on this question — indeed, our survey of the eases reveals considerable diversity of views, not consensus. But even if the Association’s position did represent the majority view, we would still disagree with it. We conclude that the Constitution requires that prospective intervenors have Article III standing to litigate their claims in federal court.

B.

Our Constitution is a charter for limited government. Article III limits the “judicial power” to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const., art. III., § 2, cl. 1. From this “bedrock requirement,” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), flow several doctrines- — e.g., standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question— which “state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Article Ill’s standing requirement is a restraint on the “judicial power” as unyielding as that placed on Congress by, for example, the First Amendment.

Rule 24(a) speaks to practical concerns by requiring that intervenors have a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation which might be impaired by the disposition of the case and which will not be adequately protected by the existing parties. See New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir.) (analogizing intervention requirements to prudential standing rules), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984). The Rule promotes the efficient and orderly use of judicial resources by allowing persons, who might otherwise have to bring a lawsuit on their own to protect their interests or vindicate their rights, to join an ongoing lawsuit instead. But, judicial economy and the Rules of Civil Procedure notwithstanding, Congress cannot circumvent Article Ill’s limits on the judicial power. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1128, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (it is “fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III”); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-75, 102 S.Ct. at 757-60 (“... [N]either the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the ‘case or controversy’ requirement should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. Ill requirements themselves.”); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (“In no event ... may Congress abrogate the Art. Ill minima ....”) (emphasis added). Congress could no more use Rule 24 to abrogate the Article III standing requirements than it could expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction by statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

The Association’s position is that once an Article III ease or controversy is underway, anybody who satisfies Rule 24’s requirements may then join in. As long as the original parties are involved, the Association insists, the lawsuit remains within the scope of the federal “judicial power.” We disagree. In our view, an Article III case or controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack standing, is — put bluntly — no longer an Article III case or controversy. An Article III ease or controversy is one where all parties have standing, and a would-be intervenor, because he seeks to participate as a party, must have standing as well. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that “[tjhose who do not possess Art. Ill standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475-76, 102 S.Ct. at 760-61; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51, 104 S.Ct. at 3324-25 (“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”) (citation omitted). Because an intervenor seeks to become a “suitor,” and asks the court to “decide the merits of the dispute,” he must not only satisfy the requirements of Rule 24, he must also have Article III standing. See Building and Const. Trades, 40 F.3d at 1282 (“[Bjecause an intervenor participates on an equal footing with the original parties to a suit, a movant for leave to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) must satisfy the same Article III standing requirements as the original parties.”).

The standing requirement is, at its core, a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for federal jurisdiction, and “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-eontroversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (elements of standing doctrine are not “mere pleading requirements” but are “indispensable part” of case). The Supreme Court has often emphasized that a lawsuit in federal court is not a forum for the airing of interested onlookers’ concerns, nor an arena for public-policy debates. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473, 102 S.Ct. at 759 (Article III “forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating forums.”). While Rule 24 promotes judicial economy by facilitating, where constitutionally permissible, the participation of interested parties in others’ lawsuits, the fact remains that a federal case is a limited affair, and not everyone with an opinion is invited to attend.

III.

Having decided that those wishing to intervene in federal court must have Article 111 standing, we must now determine whether the Association passes this test. We think it does. In Lujan, the Supreme Court held that the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” required by Article III has three elements: First, the would-be litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact”; that is, an “invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical....” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, the would-be litigant must establish a causal connection between the alleged injury and the conduct being challenged. Ibid. Third, he must show that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2137; see Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir.1995) (standing requires (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability).

As we noted in Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir.1994), “[c]om-plaints of environmental and aesthetic harms are sufficient to lay the basis for standing.” See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38 (“[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”). The injuries alleged, however, must be imminent and direct, not hypothetical or fantastic. In Lujan, the Court emphasized that vague expressions of a hope to observe animals, in remote countries half-way around the world, “someday,” could not establish the constitutionally required “actual or imminent injury.” Id. at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38. For example, one member of the environmental group in Lujan said that she hoped to visit Sri Lanka someday and see leopards and elephants. When pressed, however, she admitted that her “hope” was not and could not be a “plan,” because of a civil war. Id. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138.

The alleged injuries in Lujan were far more speculative than those alleged here. In this case, the Association has submitted affidavits from several of its members stating that they have visited the Park in the past, that they plan to do so in the near and identifiable future, and that they will be injured directly if the restrictions on snowmobiling are lifted. Jennifer Hunt, Executive Director of the Voyageurs Region National Park Association, swore that she visits the Park at least twice a year, and described specific, imminent, future trips she had planned. She described her activities in the Park and how she thinks she would be affected if the restrictions on snowmobiling were lifted. Joe Kotnik, another member, submitted a similarly detailed affidavit. These members claim that snowmobiling will threaten the Park’s eagles and wolves and detract from their enjoyment of the Park’s tranquility and beauty. The Association has alleged concrete, imminent, and redressable injuries in fact, which are neither “conjectural” nor “hypothetical.” Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 567, 112 S.Ct. at 2140 (rejecting environmental group’s claims of injury as “pure speculation and fantasy”); Sierra Club, 28 F.3d at 758-60 (asserted injuries were only potential, not imminent; challenged forest plan was merely a general planning tool).

In fact, the Association’s case for Article III standing is basically the same as the Snowmobilers’. The District Court held that the Snowmobilers have standing because they have shown that

they have used and wish to continue using the Park’s now-restricted areas for snowmobiling and wildlife observation. Plaintiffs claim they have been harmed by the closures because they are prevented from observing wolves in their natural habitat. Plaintiffs also contend they have been injured because the closures were imposed without a proper basis....

Mausolf II, 913 F.Supp. at 1341. Thus, the District Court held, the Snowmobilers had alleged concrete, particularized, and immediate injuries, which were caused by the restrictions on snowmobiling and which could be redressed by the relief the Snowmobilers seek. Ibid. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for the Association.

This case is a lot like Friends of the Boundary Waters, supra. There, an environmental group challenged certain portions of the Superior National Forest’s management plan. The plan would have allowed motorized portages in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness and would have increased below-cost timber sales. 53 F.3d at 883-84. The environmental group’s members filed affidavits “replete with allegations of the injuries that would result from the Plan’s proposed increase in below-cost timber sales.” Id. at 886. The district court had found that the planned timber sales would damage certain tree species and reduce tree diversity, and that the group’s alleged injuries would likely be redressed by returning to the pre-plan levels of below-cost timber sales. Therefore, we held that the environmental group had Article III standing. Id. at 886-87. We distinguished Sierra Club, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.1994), noting that the forest plan in that case was a general planning tool for the future, while the plan at issue in Friends of the Boundary Waters explicitly identified the area to be harvested. Friends, 53 F.3d at 887. The snowmobiling restrictions at issue in this case are similarly definite and imminent. We therefore hold that the Association has the Article III standing required for intervention in this lawsuit.

IV.

Because the Association has standing, the District Court could have granted the motion to intervene. We must now decide whether it should have. The District Court denied the motion for intervention as of right and for permissive intervention, and instead permitted the Association to participate as amicus curiae. Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 148. The District Court reasoned that the Association’s interests were adequately protected by the government, id. at 147-48, and that, if permitted to intervene, the Association would likely prejudice the rights of the original parties by delaying the case with additional discovery. Id. at 148. We review the District Court’s denial of the Association’s motion to intervene as of right de novo, Sierra Club v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir.1992). Because we conclude that the Association should have been allowed to intervene as of right, we need not discuss whether the District Court abused its discretion by not granting permissive intervention.

We agree with the District Court that the Association has an interest in preventing unrestricted snowmobiling and in vindicating a conservationist vision for the Park. The Association has consistently demonstrated its interest in the Park’s well-being (as it sees it) and has worked hard over the years, in various proceedings, to protect that interest. See Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 146-47. We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the Association’s interests might suffer if the Government were to lose this ease, or to settle it against the Association’s interests. Id. at 147. The only question left for us to consider, then, is whether the District Court correctly held that Association’s interests were adequately protected by the Government.

Usually, Rule 24(a)’s third criterion is easy to satisfy, and the would-be intervenor faces a “minimal burden” of showing that its interests are not adequately represented by the parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 999. But when one of the parties is an arm or agency of the government, and the ease concerns a matter of “sovereign interest,” the bar is raised, because in such cases the government is “presumed to represent the interests of all its citizens.” Id. at 1000 (citation omitted); United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1168-69 (8th Cir.1995). We emphasize that the parens patriae presumption applies “in such cases” because it does not necessarily apply in all cases to which the government is a party. After all, when the proposed intervenors’ concern is not a matter of “sovereign interest,” there is no reason to think the government will represent it. See Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1001 (;parens patriae doctrine did not apply because “[t]he counties’ interests in land are narrower interests not subsumed in the general interest Minnesota asserts in protecting fish and game”); Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1170 (holding that EPA did not adequately represent proposed intervenors’ “parochial” interest in avoiding liability).

Here, however, we agree with the District Court that the Association’s conservation interests are concerns that the Government, as parens patriae, is charged with protecting, and that the presumption of adequate representation therefore applies in this case. See Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 147. This presumption may be rebutted, though, when a would-be intervenor makes a strong showing of inadequate representation. See 7C Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1909 (2d ed. 1986). That is, the presumption of adequate representation may be “rebutted by a showing that the applicant’s interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens....” Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1169.

The Association has rebutted the parens patriae presumption in this case. Its concerns about the Government’s enthusiasm for defending the snowmobiling restrictions are not grounded, as the Snowmobilers charge, in a nebulous and paranoid “distrust of government,” but in the well-documented history of this particular case and controversy. The Association sued the Government in an earlier ease concerning snowmobiling in the Park precisely because it thought the Government was not adequately representing the Association’s interests. See VRNPA, supra. In fact, this earlier lawsuit is probably the reason for the current regulations. It is unquestioned that, in the past, the Government has waived and failed to enforce regulations against snowmobile use in the Park. Id. at *8. The Government also “breached [its] obligation under the Voyageurs National Park Act to make a wilderness recommendation within four years of ... the park’s establishment.” Id. at *11.

The Snowmobilers insist that the Government, like the Association, is interested in protecting wildlife and in upholding environmental regulations. See Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 147 (“The Defendants represent the citizenry on matters of wildlife and wilderness preservation....”) This is true; it does not, however, answer the Association’s objection that this interest is not adequately represented by the Government in this case. Unlike the Association, the Government is “obliged to represent ... all of its citizens.” Sierra Club, 960 F.2d at 86; see also In re Sierra Club, 945 F.2d 776, 780 (4th Cir.1991) (noting that “[although the interests of the Sierra Club and [the Government] may converge ... they may [also] diverge.... ”). When managing and regulating public lands, to avoid what economists call the “tragedy of the commons,” the Government must inevitably favor certain uses over others. The Park was established for both recreational and conservationist purposes. Voyageurs National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. These purposes will sometimes, unavoidably, conflict, and even the Government cannot always adequately represent conflicting interests at the same time. See Sierra Club, 960 F.2d at 86 (contrasting State of Arkansas’s many competing interests with those of environmental group); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 419 (D.Minn.1972) (“The United States is charged with representing a broad public interest and ... must represent varying interests], industry as well as individuals.”). In this case, the Government’s interest in promoting recreational activity and tourism in the Park, an interest many citizens share, may be adverse to the Association’s conservation interests, interests also shared by many.

V.

In conclusion: The Constitution requires that Rule 24 intervenors have Article III standing; the Association has standing; and it has rebutted any presumption that the Government will adequately represent its interests in this litigation. Therefore, the District Court should have allowed the Association to intervene as of right. The District Court’s order denying intervention is reversed. The District Court is directed to enter an order granting the Association’s motion for leave to intervene as of right.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge,

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in all of the court’s opinion except the holding that a party seeking to intervene must have Article III standing. On that issue, I agree with the arguments advanced by the Association, as so well restated in the court’s opinion.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I concur in all of the court’s opinion except the holding that the presumption that the government is acting as parens patriae has been rebutted.

In order to qualify as one of the “very rare cases in which a member of the public is allowed to intervene in an action in which the United States ... represents the public interest,” the Association must make “a very strong showing of inadequate representation.” 7C Wright et al., supra, § 1909 at 342-43. The Association asserts that the government’s prior failures to embrace its view of the proper emphasis to place on conservation suffice to make that showing, but I do not think that they do. Although the Association and the government have differed over the issues relevant to this case in the past, the government has more recently demonstrated a strong inclination to champion the Association’s environmental concerns. In fact, as the court itself observes, the Snowmobilers initiated this case because the government’s snowmobiling limitations were more restrictive than those proposed in the 1991 wilderness plan, even though the Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that the wilderness plan posed no threat whatever to Park wildlife. The Association points to no specific evidence that the government has not diligently defended the relevant restrictions, or that it is likely to become irresolute in this respect in the future. In such circumstances, I cannot conclude that the Association has made a showing, much less a “very strong showing,” id., of inadequate representation by the government.

In fact, the present interests of the government and the Association are essentially identical, both tactically and substantively. See Sierra Club, 960 F.2d at 86. Both seek the continued enforcement of the snowmobiling restrictions. By doing so, both seek to prevent snowmobiling in large 'areas of the Park, thereby preserving the Park’s tranquility and going the extra mile to protect Park wildlife. It is true that conservation is but one of a panoply of interests that the government is obliged to represent. Id. But the fact that government is charged with representing the interests of all citizens, and that some citizens do not share the Association’s zeal for conservation, is not enough to overcome the presumption of adequate representation. If it were, the parens patriae doctrine would serve no useful purpose, because it would be rebutted in virtually every ease. It is important to understand that the government is not obliged to be as zealous about conservation as the Association is. It is merely obliged to be properly solicitous of conservation as one use among the many competing uses to which parks can be put. There is simply insufficient evidence in this record to rebut the presumption of proper governmental solicitousness.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

      . In 1971, Congress authorized the establishment of the Park
      ... to preserve, for the inspiration and enjoyment of present and future generations, the outstanding scenery, geological conditions, and waterway system which constituted a part of the historic route of the Voyageurs who contributed significantly to the opening of the Northwestern United States.
      Voyageurs National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 160 et seq.

      . For more on the litigation surrounding the Park, see, e.g., Voyageurs Regional National Park Association v. Lujan ("VRNPA ”), 1991 WL 343370 (D.Minn., April 15, 1991), aff'd, 966 F.2d 424 (8th Cir.1992).

      . The Voyageurs National Park Act, recognizing the Park’s longstanding appeal to snowmobilers, provided that "[t]he Secretary may, when planning development of the park, include appropriate provisions for (1) winter sports, including the use of snowmobiles,....” 16 U.S.C. § 160h. After the Park was established, snowmobiling continued relatively unregulated, pending the results of wildlife-impact studies. See Mausolf II, 913 F.Supp. at 1338.

      .The Association argued that the Voyageurs National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 160 et seq., and the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq., required the Secretary of the Interior to submit a "wilderness recommendation” for the Park to the President within four years of the Park's establishment, and that the Secretary had not complied with this requirement. VRNPA, 1991 WL 343370 at *1-2. The Association also contended that the Wilderness Act, the Voyageurs National Park Act, and Department of the Interi- or regulations, see 36 C.F.R. § 2.18(c), prohibited the Park from allowing widespread snowmobiling in potential wilderness areas. VRNPA, 1991 WL 343370 at *1-3.

      . The Court observed that
      the precise relationship between the interest required to satisfy [Rule 24] and the interest required to confer standing ... has led to anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals. We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.
      476 U.S. at 68-69 (footnote omitted).

      . See, e.g., United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158-70 (8th Cir.1995); Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997; Sierra Club v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir.1992); County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 162 F.R.D. 583, 586 n. 9 (D.Minn.1995) ("|T|he Eighth Circuit resolves questions of intervention without reference to the standing doctrine.”); but see United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 883 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir.1989) (noting that proposed intervenors' allegations were “sufficient to give [them] constitutional standing”).

      . See also City of Cleveland, Ohio v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1516-1517 (D.C.Cir.1994); Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1470 (D.C.Cir.1985) ("[A]n intervenor of right, just like an ordinary plaintiff, must have standing.”); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Article III requires that Rule 24 "interest” requirement be interpreted to refer only to "legally protectable interests”).