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    Debbie J. SCHUSTER and Alan M. Schuster, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lynn M. RICHARDS; Outerwall, Inc., d/b/a Coinstar; and Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 1-17-1558
    Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.
    Opinion filed April 11, 2018
    Daniel E. Compton, of Compton Law Group, of Elgin, for appellants.
    Richard M. Johnson Jr., of Stone & Johnson, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellees.
   JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following the trial court's grant of a motion to transfer venue pursuant to forum non conveniens filed by defendants-appellees Lynn M. Richards, Outerwall, Inc., d/b/a Coinstar and Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, plaintiffs-appellants Debbie J. Schuster and Alan M. Schuster petitioned for leave to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2014). This court granted their petition. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants' motion to transfer venue because it conducted an unequal balancing of the relevant factors at issue in favor of transfer. They ask that we reverse the trial court's order and, accordingly, restore the matter to the venue they initially chose. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties agree to the relevant facts of this cause.

¶ 4 Plaintiff Debbie Schuster, while a pedestrian, was struck by defendant Richards, who was driving a vehicle in the course of her employment. At that time, defendant Richards was employed by defendant Redbox Automated Retail, LLC (Redbox), and the vehicle she was driving was leased to defendant Outerwall, Inc., d/b/a Coinstar (Coinstar). Plaintiff Debbie Schuster, as well as her husband plaintiff Alan Schuster, who joined her in filing suit against defendants with respect to the accident, are both residents of Kane County, Illinois. Defendant Richards is a resident of Du Page County, Illinois. Defendants Redbox and Coinstar are Delaware corporations that have ties to several counties in Illinois. Relevant to the instant cause, Redbox , for example, has offices and warehouses in Cook and Du Page Counties and also does business in Kane County. Its agent for process is located in Cook County. By all agreement, it does more business, transactionally and monetarily, in Cook County as opposed to Kane County. Similarly, Coinstar does business in both Cook and Kane Counties, but more substantially (again, transactionally and monetarily) in the former as opposed to the latter. Its agent for process is also located in Cook County. The accident between plaintiff Debbie Schuster and defendant Richards occurred in East Dundee, Illinois, which is located in Kane County.

¶ 5 Members of the East Dundee Police Department and the East Dundee/Countryside Fire Protection District, both in Kane County, responded to, and investigated, the accident. Plaintiff Debbie Schuster was first taken to Advocate Sherman Hospital (Sherman) in Kane County. She was immediately transferred to Advocate Lutheran General Hospital (Lutheran General) in Cook County and later transferred to Presence Holy Family Medical Center (Holy Family) in Cook County. Subsequently, she was transferred to Presence St. Joseph Hospital (St. Joseph) in Kane County, and finally to Rosewood Care Center (Rosewood) in Kane County.

¶ 6 Plaintiffs filed suit against all defendants in Cook County. They asserted negligence and loss of consortium against defendant Richards. As against defendants Redbox and Coinstar, they asserted solely claims of respondeat superior and nothing with respect to direct negligence. That is, against Redbox, plaintiffs claimed that defendant Richards was its agent, that she was operating a vehicle owned by it, and that, as principal, it was responsible for her acts and omissions. Similarly, against Coinstar, plaintiffs claimed that defendant Richards was its agent and that, as principal, it was responsible for her negligent acts and omissions.

¶ 7 Defendants filed a motion to transfer venue pursuant to forum non conveniens seeking to move the cause from Cook County to Kane County. As the parties briefed the matter, defendants argued that the relevant private and public interest factors to be considered when deciding such a motion strongly favored transfer. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, argued that they did not and that their choice of forum, which is their substantial right, should prevail. Within the parties' briefing, plaintiffs disclosed a list of some 18 potential witnesses, in addition to themselves, who they believed "may" be called on the issues of liability and damages. Some of these witnesses provided information regarding their testimony should the matter proceed to trial. For example, it was disclosed that there were three potential witnesses to the accident: Ray Clark, Michael Tangorra and Blake Johnson. Each submitted an affidavit with respect to the convenience of testifying. Clark stated he is a resident of McHenry County and that it was "more convenient" for him to travel to Kane County rather than Cook County to testify, Tangorra similarly stated he is a resident of McHenry County and that it was "more convenient" for him to travel to Kane County rather than Cook County to testify, and Johnson stated he is a resident of Kane County but that it was "not inconvenient" for him to travel to Cook County to testify, if necessary. Another listed witness was police officer Jessica Michelini of the East Dundee Police Department, who had responded to the scene and investigated the accident. In a discovery deposition, she stated that she is a resident of McHenry County and that traveling to either McHenry or Kane Counties to testify in this matter was "preferred" over Cook County.

¶ 8 Plaintiffs also presented the affidavits of two treating physicians, Drs. Shawn Palmer and Ted Jagielo, who were also listed as potential witnesses. Dr. Palmer stated that he works at the Midwest Bone and Joint Institute, which has offices in McHenry, Lake and Kane Counties, and that he is a resident of Lake County. He attested that it "is convenient" for him to testify in Cook County. Dr. Jagielo stated that he works at Lutheran General and Holy Family, both in Cook County, and he attested that it would be "far more convenient" for him to testify in Cook County than Kane County.

¶ 9 Additionally, the record reveals that plaintiffs' counsel is located in Kane County while defendants' counsel is located in Cook County.

¶ 10 After considering the parties' briefs and argument, the trial court granted defendants' motion to transfer venue. In its written order, the court began by providing a lengthy statement regarding the applicable standard of review and the amount of deference to be afforded to plaintiffs' choice of forum. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs undoubtedly have a substantial interest in their choice that, generally, should not be disrupted. However, the court recognized that plaintiffs' choice was neither where they reside nor where the accident occurred and, thus, their choice was to receive less deference.

¶ 11 The court then analyzed each of the relevant private and public interest factors involved in forum non conveniens determinations. With respect to the private interest factors, it concluded that the first of these, the convenience of the parties, was "neutral" because, although defendants cannot assert that plaintiffs' choice of forum is inconvenient to plaintiffs, Cook and Kane Counties border each other and defendant Richards, as well as defendants Redbox and Coinstar, would not be inconvenienced in traveling to either county. Next, the court found that the ease of access to sources of evidence weighed in favor of transfer because the accident occurred in Kane County, two of the occurrence witnesses attested it was more convenient them to attend court in Kane County, the remaining occurrence witness lives in Kane County, police and fire personnel involved were located in Kane County, and plaintiff received treatment in both Kane and Cook Counties. The factors of availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses and the cost to obtain the attendance of willing witnesses also weighed in favor of transfer since "[s]everal occurrence witnesses are more accessible in Kane County" and, again, the counties at issue border each other so that any cost to obtain witness attendance "would be minimal." It further noted that, although plaintiff received medical care in both counties, "most healthcare providers will probably not testify in person at trial." And, as to the factor of the possibility of viewing the premises, the court found that it weighed in favor of transfer since, again, the accident occurred in Kane, not Cook, County. After analyzing all the private interest factors, the court stated that, even after affording plaintiffs "some deference in their choice," these factors weighed in favor of transfer.

¶ 12 Acknowledging that its consideration was not yet complete, the court next examined each of the public interest factors involved. First, it found that administrative concerns, including the congestion of court dockets, weighed "slightly in favor of transfer," noting various statistics showing that, while Cook County has significantly more of these types of cases on its docket, it decides them in a similar period of time (457 cases in 40.1 months in Cook versus 6 cases in 41.7 months in Kane). Next, the court noted that the unfairness of jury duty upon Cook County residents weighed "strongly in favor of transfer" for two reasons: because the accident occurred in and involved residents of Kane County and because, while defendants Redbox and Coinstar do business in Cook County, plaintiffs only sought to impose vicarious liability upon them for the alleged negligence of defendant Richards and never made any allegation of direct negligence against them. As to the final public interest factor, the court found that the interest of having local controversies decided locally weighed "strongly in favor of transfer" since, again, the alleged negligence occurred in Kane County and involved Kane County plaintiffs; Kane County, therefore, had a local interest in the matter.

¶ 13 Ultimately, in reviewing its entire analysis, the court held that "the relevant factors for consideration, when viewed in their totality, favor the forum suggested by the movant." Accordingly, it transferred the cause from Cook County to Kane County.

¶ 14 As noted, plaintiffs then appeared in our Court seeking leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2014). We granted their petition and now address their appeal.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants' motion and moving their cause to Kane County. They assert that, not only did the court ignore the cause's connections to Cook County, but it also erred in balancing the public and private forum non conveniens factors in favor of transfer rather than in favor of plaintiffs' choice of venue, as it was required to do. We disagree.

¶ 17 As a threshold matter, we wish to comment on the applicable standard of review, as plaintiffs highlight this both in their opening brief on appeal and again in their reply brief, insisting that defendants' citation to a general abuse of discretion standard is, for lack of a better word, insufficient. The parties agree, as do we, that our Court reviews a trial court's decision with respect to a forum non conveniens motion pursuant to abuse of discretion, which occurs only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See Fennell v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355; accord Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. , 219 Ill. 2d 430, 442, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 (2006) ; Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 (2003) ; Susman v. North Star Trust Co. , 2015 IL App (1st) 142789, ¶ 18, 391 Ill.Dec. 352, 30 N.E.3d 622. Plaintiffs, however, go on to quote the following passage from First National Bank v. Guerine , an Illinois Supreme Court case reversing a trial court's decision to transfer venue:

"[W]e hold that a trial court abuses its discretion in granting an intrastate forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue where, as here, the potential trial witnesses are scattered among several counties, including the plaintiff's chosen forum, and no single county enjoys a predominant connection to the litigation. The balance of factors must strongly favor transfer of the case before the plaintiff can be deprived of his chosen forum. [Citation.] This is not such a case." 198 Ill. 2d 511, 526, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54 (2002).

¶ 18 This portion of Guerine appears at the very end of that case, not at the beginning of its analysis wherein its court outlines the parameters for review, and it clearly forms the holding of that case, not necessarily general commentary on the applicable standard of review. This is not to say that the sentiments found in the quotation are incorrect; they are not by any means, and many of them indeed are very relevant to the instant cause, as we will discuss shortly. However, while we, too, recognize the factual similarity between the instant cause and Guerine in that potential trial witness are scattered among various counties herein, plaintiffs use the cited quotation to jump ahead of any analysis and affirmatively state, without question, that defendants' sought-after forum of "Kane County does not enjoy a predominant connection to this litigation such that transfer is strongly favored."

¶ 19 Yet, whether this is true is precisely the question that is part and parcel of the larger issue we have been called upon to determine in this cause. Yes, the Guerine court concluded that the sought-after forum by the defendant did not enjoy a predominant connection, but it did so only after a lengthy analysis of all the relevant private and public interest factors, as it was required to do. The conclusion reached, however, was not part of the initial standard of review employed by our supreme court. By jumping to Guerine 's conclusion before our analysis has even begun, plaintiffs attempt at the outset of this cause to skew the applicable standard into something more than it is and then weave that thread throughout their arguments on appeal. The fact remains that, among all the legal principles and considerations that are to be kept in mind in evaluating a trial court's decision with respect to a forum non conveniens motion (which we are mindful of and, again, will discuss shortly), we are to review that decision pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard and, as is well established, an abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See Susman , 2015 IL App (1st) 142789, ¶ 18, 391 Ill.Dec. 352, 30 N.E.3d 622 (stating that, in reviewing a forum non conveniens decision, " 'The issue, then, is not what decision we would have reached if we were reviewing the facts on a clean slate, but whether the trial court acted in a way that no reasonable person would.' " (quoting Vivas v. Boeing Co. , 392 Ill. App. 3d 644, 657, 331 Ill.Dec. 827, 911 N.E.2d 1057 (2009) ) ); accord Ruch v. Padgett , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶¶ 36, 38-40, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 (explaining that standard of review for a forum non conveniens decision is abuse of discretion, that this means reversal may only occur if the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the relevant factors, that an abuse in balancing occurs only where no reasonable person would take the view of the trial court, and that a reviewing court "may affirm a trial court's forum non conveniens order on any basis found in the record").

¶ 20 Having clarified this, we now turn to the settled legal principles and considerations surrounding forum non conveniens motions. These motions rest in the equitable doctrine, which considers fundamental fairness with respect to the sensible and effective administration of justice. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 12, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 ; Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 37, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448. Essentially, it allows a trial court, which otherwise has proper jurisdiction over a cause, to decline jurisdiction and transfer it to another forum after a determination that the other forum would be better suited to hear it. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 12, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 ; Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 37, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448.

¶ 21 Such a determination involves the evaluation of several types of factors. First among these is the deference to afford the plaintiff's choice of forum. See Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 37, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 (this consideration is primary before the evaluation of any other relevant factors). The plaintiff has a substantial interest in choosing the forum, and generally, her choice "should rarely be disturbed." Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 442, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. Accordingly, it has been said that "the battle over forum begins with the plaintiff's choice already in the lead." Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 521, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54. This is particularly true when the plaintiff chooses a forum that is her home residence or the site of the accident or injury that is the subject of the litigation. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 442, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. However, the plaintiff's choice is not always entitled to the same weight or consideration in all cases. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 18, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 (citing Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 173, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 ). For example, when she chooses a foreign forum-one that is not her residence nor the location of the accident or injury-her choice is afforded only some deference. See Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 43, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 ; see also Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 18, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 (citing Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 173, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 ). While this is not the same as no deference, it is considerably less than if she had chosen her home forum or the site of accident. See Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 45, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 (citing Glass v. DOT Transportation, Inc. , 393 Ill. App. 3d 829, 834, 332 Ill.Dec. 275, 912 N.E.2d 762 (2009) ); see also Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 12, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 (in such a case her choice of forum is afforded far less deference). Thus, " '[i]n most instances, the plaintiff's initial choice of forum will prevail, provided venue is proper and the inconvenience factors attached to such forum do not greatly outweigh the plaintiff's substantial right to try the case in the chosen forum .' " (Emphasis in original.) Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 443, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 (quoting Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 520, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54 ).

¶ 22 Said inconvenience factors, which form the next consideration in evaluating a forum non conveniens motion, are divided into two groups: private interest factors and public interest factors. The private interest factors include the convenience of the parties; the relative ease of access to testimonial, documentary, and real evidence; the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses; the costs to secure the attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of viewing the site where the accident occurred, if appropriate; and all other practical considerations that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355. The public interest factors include the interest in deciding controversies locally, the unfairness of imposing the burden of jury duty on residents of a forum with little connection to the litigation, and the administrative difficulties caused by adding litigation to already congested court dockets rather than resolving the case at its origin. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355. In deciding a forum non conveniens motion, a court must consider all of these private and public interest factors. See Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 48, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 ; accord Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 17, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355. It must not place too much emphasis on any one factor, nor is it to weigh them against each other. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 443-44, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 ; accord Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 175-76, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687. Rather, it must balance them all together and view them within the totality of the circumstances presented, as each forum non conveniens case is unique on its own facts. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 443-44, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 ("court must evaluate the total circumstances of the case"); accord Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 24, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355.

¶ 23 Ultimately, the burden is on the defendant to show that the relevant private and public interest factors " 'strongly favor' " his choice of forum and merit disturbing the plaintiff's initial choice. Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 444, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 (quoting Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. , 136 Ill. 2d 101, 107, 143 Ill.Dec. 274, 554 N.E.2d 209 (1990) ); accord Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 17, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355. In other words, the defendant must prove that the balance of factors strongly favors transfer, i.e. , that the plaintiff's chosen forum is inconvenient to him and that another forum is more convenient to all parties. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 20, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 ; Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 444, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. "Although this is a difficult standard for a defendant to meet, 'it does not foreclose legitimate transfers when the balance of factors strongly favors litigation in another forum.' " (Emphasis in original.) Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 443, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 (quoting Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 521, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54 ).

¶ 24 With these principles in mind, plaintiffs in the instant cause contend that the trial court abdicated its duty to place their original choice of forum (Cook County) in the lead, as it were, in its balancing of the applicable factors. They assert that instead, the court favored transfer at the outset and ignored any connection the cause had to their original choice of forum. Yet, upon our thorough review of the record and upon our consideration of all the particular facts of this cause, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's balancing of factors and its resulting decision to grant defendants' motion for forum non conveniens . To the contrary, we find that the trial court employed all the required legal considerations, balanced all the factors properly, and conducted a well-reasoned analysis in determining that transfer to Kane County was appropriate.

¶ 25 The trial court began, as it should have, with the first consideration related to forum non conveniens : the amount of deference to give plaintiffs' choice of forum. Here, as the trial court correctly noted, it "is afforded less deference." Plaintiffs' choice is not their home forum. Both plaintiffs live in Kane County and the accident at issue occurred in Kane County. They do not reside in Cook County nor did the accident occur in Cook County. Clearly, by filing their complaint in Cook County, they chose to have their cause heard in a foreign forum. As we have discussed, while this does not mean that no deference will be given to their choice, it does mean that the deference to be given is far less than it would have been had they chosen their home forum. Accordingly, although their choice is still in the lead, it is not as far ahead as it could have been.

¶ 26 First, plaintiffs assert that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the private interest factors were equally balanced or favored transfer. Specifically, they attack the court for "ignoring" the substantial business defendants Coinstar and Redbox do in Cook County as opposed to Kane County, the fact that virtually all of plaintiff Debbie Schuster's medical care and proof thereof comes from Cook County sources, and the affidavits of doctors Palmer and Jagielo and occurrence witness Johnson which all indicated that Cook County was a more convenient forum for them. However, as we review the trial court's assessment of each of the private interest factors, we do not find any abuse of discretion.

¶ 27 The trial court determined that the first private interest factor, convenience of the parties, was "neutral" and did not weigh strongly either for or against transfer. This was because, although defendants could not assert that plaintiffs' choice was inconvenient to plaintiffs, the court noted defendant Richards was from Du Page County and would not be inconvenienced traveling to either Kane or Cook Counties, and defendants Coinstar and Redbox do business in both Kane and Cook Counties. We agree. Du Page County borders both Kane and Cook Counties, and the record is clear that the corporate defendants do business in both. This factor, then, is essentially neutral.

¶ 28 We do not believe, as plaintiffs assert, that the trial court ignored the business ties defendants Coinstar and Redbox have to Cook County. Plaintiffs spend much of their brief pointing out facts and figures to show that these defendants conduct "substantially" more business in Cook County, rather than Kane County, and have registered agents there. While this may be true, our courts have made clear that "merely conducting business" in a county does not necessarily affect the issue of forum non conveniens , nor does the presence of a corporate defendant's registered agent. See Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 182, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 (these are assumed since, if a defendant did no business in a county or had no registered agent there, that county would not be a proper venue for the case to begin with; thus, this "is not a dispositive factor" and a court is "to look beyond the criteria of venue when it considers the relative convenience of a forum"); accord Smith v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. , 374 Ill. App. 3d 31, 34-35, 312 Ill.Dec. 526, 870 N.E.2d 970 (2007). These are considerations, surely, but not outcome determinative ones. Plaintiffs counter that our supreme court in Boner v. Peabody Coal Co. , 142 Ill. 2d 523, 540, 154 Ill.Dec. 662, 568 N.E.2d 883 (1991), mentioned the "extent and type of business" conducted in a forum "are appropriate considerations" and, thus, the trial court here should have disfavored transfer based on defendants' stronger business ties to Cook County. Yes, the Boner court did use these phrases, but plaintiffs myopically isolate that quotation. As the Boner court was analyzing this private interest factor, it was discussing that, where a defendant company has offices and conducts active operations in a county, its activities in that county are "by no means marginal" and thus, based on the facts in that cause, more than one forum could be considered. See Boner , 142 Ill. 2d at 540, 154 Ill.Dec. 662, 568 N.E.2d 883. It did not state or even infer, as plaintiffs claim, that a court is to weigh a defendant corporation's activities or review fiscal statistics to determine whether its business is more substantial in one county over another. As the trial court here found, defendants Coinstar and Redbox have registered agents in Cook County and do business there but also do business in Kane County-the site of the accident. Incidentally, the record also shows that defendant Redbox has regional offices and operational warehouses in Du Page County. These facts, when taken together, do not propel the forum non conveniens issue strongly either way. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court's determination that this private interest factor was neutral is unreasonable.

¶ 29 With respect to the second private interest factor of ease of access to sources of evidence, the trial court found that it weighed in favor of transfer. It based its determination on the location of the accident and the affidavits of the three occurrence witnesses. Two of them, Clark and Tangorra, both stated they were residents of McHenry County and that it was more convenient for them to travel to Kane as opposed to Cook County to testify, and the third, Johnson, was a resident of Kane County. The court further noted that first responders to the accident are from Kane County, and plaintiff received medical treatment in both Kane and Cook Counties. The affidavits of these witnesses, all essential sources of evidence for trial, renders this factor favorable for transfer.

¶ 30 Plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly ignored that portion of Johnson's affidavit wherein he stated that it was "not inconvenient" for him to travel to Cook County to testify, if necessary. We do not believed that the court ignored this portion of Johnson's affidavit as much as it simply found more critical the facts that Johnson attested he was a resident of Kane County (plaintiffs' home forum and the forum of the accident) and that he never stated testifying in Kane County would be inconvenient for him. Additionally, in this vein, we note the affidavit of Officer Michelini, who responded to and investigated the scene and who was the only police personnel specifically listed among plaintiffs' potential witnesses. Although the trial court did not mention her affidavit in its order, Officer Michelini stated that she is a resident of McHenry County and that traveling to either McHenry or Kane Counties to testify was "preferred" over Cook County. Based on all this, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find that the second private interest factor favored transfer.

¶ 31 Next, the trial court determined that the third and fourth private interest factors of the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses and the cost to obtain the attendance of willing witnesses both weighed in favor of transfer. The court again noted the several occurrence witnesses who were more accessible in Kane County. Additionally, it commented that plaintiff Debbie Schuster received medical care in both Kane and Cook Counties and that, regardless, "most healthcare providers will probably not testify in person during trial." And, it stated that, again, because the counties border each other, the cost to obtain the attendance of witnesses would be minimal. We find no abuse in this determination.

¶ 32 Plaintiffs take issue with the trial court's statement about healthcare providers not testifying in person, especially since they had provided the affidavits of Drs. Palmer and Jagielo with respect to the forum in which they preferred to testify. Plaintiffs declare that a trial court may not arbitrarily decide that witnesses in a chosen forum will or will not testify in person. While this is obviously true, there are many more considerations at play here. For example, Dr. Palmer attested that he is a Lake County resident and that his offices at the Midwest Bone and Joint Institute where he treated plaintiff Debbie Schuster are in McHenry, Lake, and Kane Counties. He stated it "is convenient" for him to testify in Cook County, but he never attested that it would be inconvenient to testify elsewhere, such as Kane County, which is not far from his forum of residence and is actually the forum of one of his offices. Dr. Jagielo, who treated plaintiff Debbie Schuster at Lutheran General and Holy Family hospitals in Cook County, did attest that it would be "far more convenient" for him to testify in Cook County than Kane County (though, again, he did not state that Kane County would be inconvenient for him). Yet, while the fact that a plaintiff's expert or treating physician has an office in the plaintiff's chosen forum is relevant to the determination of a forum non conveniens motion, it is only one of many considerations with respect to the availability and costs related to witnesses. See Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 56, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 (citing Ammerman v. Raymond Corp. , 379 Ill. App. 3d 878, 890, 318 Ill.Dec. 950, 884 N.E.2d 1221 (2008) ). Rather, our case law explicitly declares that " 'courts "should be cautious * * * not to give undue weight to the fact that plaintiff's treating physician or expert has an office in the plaintiff's chosen forum." ' " (Emphasis in original.) Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 56, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 (quoting Ammerman , 379 Ill. App. 3d at 890, 318 Ill.Dec. 950, 884 N.E.2d 1221, quoting Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. , 116 Ill. 2d 217, 227, 107 Ill.Dec. 236, 506 N.E.2d 1291 (1987) ). The sound reasoning behind this is to prevent plaintiffs from easily frustrating this forum non conveniens principle by selecting a treating physician or expert in what would actually be an inconvenient forum. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 33, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 ; accord Griffith , 136 Ill. 2d at 112, 143 Ill.Dec. 274, 554 N.E.2d 209 (affording too much significance to location of a plaintiff's expert witness frustrates principles of forum non conveniens ).

¶ 33 Ultimately, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion with its comments that most of the healthcare providers involved in the instant cause will probably not testify in person, if a trial ensues. This is an undeniable truth in our personal injury jurisprudence of today. See, e.g. , Walsh v. Ramada Inns, Inc. , 194 Ill. App. 3d 945, 949, 141 Ill.Dec. 256, 551 N.E.2d 249 (1989) (use of evidence depositions obviate need for doctors to testify at trial). Moreover, plaintiffs admit that plaintiff Debbie Schuster received medical treatment in Kane County and not solely in Cook County; in fact, while she was treated at two hospitals in Cook County (Lutheran General and Holy Family), she was also treated at two hospitals in Kane County (Sherman and St. Joseph) and spent time at a recovery center there (Rosewood). Thus, the treatment she received simply does not establish the overwhelming connection to Cook County that plaintiffs insist. See also Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 61, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448 (location of documents, records, and photographs is a less significant factor today in forum analysis due to advent of e-mail, Internet, telefax, copy machines, and delivery services). Additionally, we would be remiss if we again were not to note, as the trial court did, that the two counties at issue here are adjacent to each other, with the difference in cost to secure witnesses in either forum minimal. And, while Cook County may be "far more convenient" for Dr. Jagielo, he is but one witness. Not only, as the experienced trial court aptly pointed out, have times changed with the advent of video depositions, telecommunications, and the overall shrinking of our world (see Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 450, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 (citing Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 525, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54 ) ), but it must also be remembered that Dr. Jagielo is an expert witness who, presumably, would be compensated for any inconvenience in travel (see Eads v. Consolidated Rail Corp ., 365 Ill. App. 3d 19, 31-32, 301 Ill.Dec. 591, 847 N.E.2d 601 (2006) (location of expert witness therefore should be "given minimal weight") ). And, of course, he would only be testifying as to plaintiff Debbie Schuster's medical treatment. On the flipside, of the three lay occurrence witnesses-those who witnessed the accident at issue, will not be compensated in any manner for their time or testimony, and will provide crucial evidence regarding the primary issue of negligence (which must be found before damages may even be determined)-two have attested that Kane County is more convenient for them and the third actually lives there. All this, along with investigating Officer Michelini's affidavit specifically renouncing Cook County's convenience for her to testify, shows that the trial court's consideration of these two private interest factors regarding the procurement of witnesses, and its finding that these factors support transfer, were inherently reasonable.

¶ 34 The penultimate private interest factor is the possibility of viewing the site where the accident occurred. The trial court commented on this factor, and plaintiffs do not challenge its determination on appeal. Suffice to say, the trial court found that this factor, which concerns the possibility of viewing the site if appropriate and not the necessity to do so (see Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 178, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 ), weighed in favor of transfer, and there is no abuse in its determination. In this cause, the accident occurred in Kane County, and there is no mention in the record that its location, features, or environment have changed in any substantial manner. Therefore, while it may be too early at this point in the litigation to determine the necessity of having a jury view the site, a visit, if eventually deemed appropriate by the trial court, would clearly be more possible and more expeditiously accomplished if trial were held in Kane County.

¶ 35 The final private interest factor concerns all other practical considerations that make a trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. The trial court in the instant cause did not specifically identify in its order any additional considerations, other than to restate that even "affording the plaintiffs some deference in their choice of forum" as is due to them, the private interest factors weighed in favor of transfer. Clearly, and again contrary to plaintiffs' insistence, the trial court did conduct this balance test unequally in their favor, with their choice of forum placed ahead of any consideration in favor of transfer. However, it found that these private interest factors outweighed even this "lead" they had which, in its discretion, it had every right to do. Based on the evidence, we cannot find that this was unreasonable.

¶ 36 We now turn to the public interest factors. Comprising plaintiffs' next major challenge on appeal, they contend that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that these were equally balanced or favored transfer and in determining that the citizens of Cook County have no interest in deciding the instant cause. Specifically, they again highlight the "substantial business" defendants Coinstar and Redbox do in Cook County and the fact that they have registered agents for service there; they also argue that court congestion in the resolution of matters is "a relatively insignificant factor" and that the court ignored the scope of defendant Richards' employment. However, similar to the private interest factors, our review of the trial court's assessment of each of the public interest factors demonstrates no abuse of discretion.

¶ 37 The first public interest factor is having local controversies decided locally. In its examination, the trial court here correctly noted that the alleged negligence at issue (the accident) occurred in Kane County, that plaintiffs alleging this negligence are both Kane County residents, and thus that this factor "strongly" favored transfer. This is not unreasonable. Although potential witnesses from other counties may be involved and although some evidence regarding potential damages may be found in other counties, this litigation is, at its core, a controversy local to Kane County. Significantly, our state supreme court has made clear that the location of the accident resulting in the litigation is the most substantial factor in giving any county a local interest. Se Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 183, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 ; accord Peile v. Skelgas, Inc. , 163 Ill. 2d 323, 343, 206 Ill.Dec. 179, 645 N.E.2d 184 (1994) (" '[A]ny county to which [defendant] provides service has an interest in the outcome of the case, [but] the interest of none of these counties is greater than *** where the accident occurred.' " (quoting Washington v. Illinois Power Co. , 144 Ill. 2d 395, 403, 163 Ill.Dec. 490, 581 N.E.2d 644 (1991) ) ). Here, the accident occurred in Kane County, it involves a Kane County resident suing on her behalf and another Kane County resident suing for the effects the accident had on him as her husband, and it is based on claims of negligence concerning the specific actions of defendant Richards, as the driver, while she was driving in Kane County, where one occurrence witness lives, two others stated was convenient for them to travel to, and the investigating officer stated the same. Undeniably, this is a Kane County-centric cause.

¶ 38 With this in mind, the trial court found that the next public interest factor, the unfairness of imposing the burden of jury duty on residents of a forum with little connection to the litigation, also weighed "strongly in favor of transfer." In light of the above, again, this determination was not unreasonable. The court supported its finding by repeating that plaintiffs are Kane County residents involved in an accident in Kane County. It also noted that while defendants Coinstar and Redbox certainly do business in Cook County, plaintiffs' complaint as against them was based only on vicarious liability. In other words, the court made clear that plaintiffs were suing defendants Coinstar and Redbox only in their capacities as principals, whereas plaintiffs' actual claims of negligence were solely directed against defendant Richards, the driver, whose actions or inactions, which took place in Kane County, are the prime focus of the accident and, ultimately, of the litigation.

¶ 39 Plaintiffs take great issue with the trial court's comments on vicarious liability and cite Guerine for the proposition that this should have no effect upon a consideration of jury duty concerns. Plaintiffs are incorrect. Guerine involved a suit, filed in Cook County, against an individual defendant for the negligent operation of his vehicle/trailer and against an Indiana corporate defendant for the defective design and manufacture of the trailer; the traffic accident occurred in De Kalb County. See Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 512, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54. The corporate defendant filed a forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue to De Kalb County and the trial court agreed, but our state supreme court reversed and kept the cause in Cook County. See Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 513-14, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54. However, this was not because, as plaintiffs here insist, it did not consider vicarious liability as a relevant concern. Rather, the Guerine court did look at the different types of claims and recognized that, while the claim against the individual defendant for his negligence in driving occurred in De Kalb County and thus "ha[d] a local flavor," the claim against the corporate defendant sounding in products liability was "less localized." Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 525, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54. Yet, what turned the tide in Guerine was that the individual defendant lived in Cook County and, thus, "presumably drove his trailer on Cook County roads," thereby making this an interest for Cook County residents and, in turn, for a potential jury there. Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 525, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54.

¶ 40 The difference in this cause is that the individual defendant, whose alleged negligence is at issue, is not a resident of the forum plaintiffs chose; defendant Richards is a resident of Du Page County, not Cook County. And, although she worked for defendants Coinstar and Redbox, which do business in Cook County and have registered agents for service there, we cannot presume, as was the case in Guerine , that she drove their corporate vehicle on Cook County roads. She may well have, but defendants Coinstar and Redbox have already been shown to do business in many counties within our state. Guerine , accordingly, is not on point here. Compare Smith , 374 Ill. App. 3d 31, 312 Ill.Dec. 526, 870 N.E.2d 970 (where the plaintiff sued individual and corporate defendants in Cook County, transfer to Kendall County was appropriate because, although the corporate defendant did substantial business and had its corporate headquarters in Cook County, the fairness of jury duty fell to the citizens of Kendall County since Cook County otherwise had "little connection" to the accident); see also Czarnecki v. Uno-Ven Co. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 504, 509, 274 Ill.Dec. 368, 791 N.E.2d 164 (2003) (presence of corporate defendants' registered agents in Cook County and their conducting of business there were found to be unrelated to the cause at issue and "not significant factors for forum non conveniens purposes" since, while these contacts may be sufficient to fix venue, they did not necessarily establish Cook County's significant connection with or interest in the cause at issue so as to burden a jury there).

¶ 41 The fact remains that, while plaintiff Debbie Schuster sued defendant Richards for her alleged negligence that specifically occurred in Kane County, and plaintiff Alan Schuster sued defendant Richards for loss of consortium due to her alleged negligence that specifically occurred in Kane County, both plaintiffs sued defendants Coinstar and Redbox upon respondeat superior . That is, plaintiffs sued these defendants not for their actions or inactions which might directly impact Cook County residents but, rather, simply because defendant Richards was their agent, regardless of where she was employed. Plaintiffs did not, for example, allege that defendants Coinstar and Redbox failed to directly supervise defendant Richards that day in Kane County or failed to ensure that she was driving properly or with proper equipment. Plaintiffs alleged only that, as her principal, these corporate defendants were responsible for her negligent and omissions-while she was in Kane County. Without more, we fail to see how Cook County is significantly connected to this litigation so as to impose the burden of jury duty on its residents as opposed to those of Kane County.

¶ 42 The final public interest factor is the administrative difficulties caused by adding litigation to already congested court dockets rather than resolving the case at its origin. Obviously, the latter is preferred. While plaintiffs are correct that this factor, by itself, is relatively insignificant, it is still a factor to be considered. See Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 43, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355. In examining this factor, the trial court in the instant cause found that it weighed "slightly in favor of transfer," citing case statistics from 2015 showing that, while Cook County had some 457 cases with jury verdicts over $50,000 compared to Kane County's 6, the period of time from filing to verdict was essentially the same: 40.1 months in Cook County and 41.7 months in Kane County. Again, based on all the facts herein, the trial court's determination with respect to this factor cannot be said to be unreasonable. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 451, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 (trial court is in best position to assess burdens on its own docket).

¶ 43 Accordingly, with the trial court having found, via thorough and proper examination, that the public interest factors each supported transfer, some even "strongly," we cannot conclude, in light of the record before us, that no reasonable person would adopt the same reasoning. Just as with the private interest factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Rather, the trial court properly conducted the balance test of private and public interest factors while clearly affording plaintiffs' choice of forum some deference and placing it ahead of any consideration in favor of transfer. The pendulum of that test simply swung in a manner plaintiffs were not expecting.

¶ 44 Before we end our discussion of this matter, we would note one final contention raised by plaintiffs. That is, at the end of their brief, they assert that, regardless of the factors, the trial court abused its discretion in transferring venue because defendants never proved that Cook County was inconvenient for them. They devote much time to a comparison of the seminal forum non conveniens cases of Langenhorst , wherein our state supreme court affirmed the denial of a transfer motion, and Dawdy , wherein the same court reversed the denial of a transfer motion, declaring that facts of the instant cause are "almost identical" to the former and merit the same decision. We disagree and conclude that Dawdy is actually more applicable here.

¶ 45 In Langenhorst , the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in St. Clair County for claims arising out of a train and vehicle accident. This county, however, was not the plaintiff's home forum nor the site of the accident. The corporate defendant moved to transfer the cause to Clinton County where the accident occurred, but the trial court denied the motion. Our state supreme court affirmed, finding that, in weighing the private and public interest factors, the totality of the circumstances did not strongly favor transfer. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 448, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. That court highlighted, for example, that a view of the accident site was not appropriate because it had significantly changed; the only eyewitness did not reside in the county of the accident; the majority of relevant trial witnesses did not reside in the county of the accident; no witness attested that the plaintiff's chosen forum was inconvenient; and the plaintiff's attorney, investigator, and treating doctor all lived in the chosen forum. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 449-50, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. The Langenhorst court concluded that the defendants failed to meet their burden for transfer. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 452, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927.

¶ 46 In Dawdy , meanwhile, the same court held in the opposite manner based on the totality of the circumstances in that particular case. There, similar to Langenhorst , the plaintiff in a tractor versus train-truck accident filed suit in Madison County, which was not his home forum nor the site of the accident, and the individual and corporate defendants filed a motion to transfer to Macoupin County, where the accident occurred. The trial court denied the motion, but our state supreme court reversed, finding that this time, in weighing the private and public interest factors, the totality of the circumstances did strongly favor transfer. See Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 177, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687. The court highlighted, for example, that the corporate defendant did business in the county of transfer, the individual defendant was a resident of the county of transfer, most of the witnesses lived in or near the county of transfer, and none of them lived in the chosen forum. See Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 178-79, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687. It also noted that the accident occurred in the county of transfer, a jury could more easily view the scene of the accident there, court congestion was an issue in the chosen forum, and the chosen forum otherwise had no connection to the cause. See Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 181-83, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687. Concluding that the defendants met their burden, our supreme court transferred venue out of the plaintiff's chosen forum. See Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 185, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687.

¶ 47 Plaintiffs here, in likening the instant cause to Langenhorst , declare that Langenhorst stands for the proposition that a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a forum non conveniens motion to transfer the case to an adjacent county when most of the potential trial witnesses are scattered and no single county enjoys a predominant connection to the litigation. They are correct; this is what Langenhorst holds-based on its particular facts and following a lengthy evaluation of the applicable factors. And, we do acknowledge that factually, on its face, the instant cause is similar to Langenhorst in that potential witnesses are scattered over several adjacent counties. But, just as with their proposition of the standard of review, plaintiffs take a tremendous leap in logic by declaring that no single county here enjoys a predominant connection to this litigation. To the contrary, the trial court, after conducting the same evaluation as our state supreme court did in Langenhorst , found that one did-one that was not the county in which plaintiffs chose to file their cause of action. Having found no abuse of discretion in its determination, this is where the instant cause's path diverges from Langenhorst and instead follows Dawdy .

¶ 48 Moreover, when all the underlying facts of Langenhorst are actually analyzed, that case becomes even more distinguishable from the instant cause. For example, a predominant consideration in Langenhorst was that the site of the accident had substantially changed. The plaintiff had sued the defendant based, in considerable part, on its failure to maintain the railroad crossing in a proper manner, including, for example, cutting the vegetation around it and incorporating several construction features in violation of several codes. The record revealed that those changes were made soon after the accident, but before trial; thus, any viewing of the accident site by a jury was not only irrelevant but inappropriate. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 449, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. There is no indication in the instant record that the accident site in Kane County has been altered in any way, thereby making its viewing inappropriate for a jury which, again, would be more expeditious if the forum here were Kane County. Additionally, the only eyewitness to the accident in Langenhorst lived in another state. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 449, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927. By contrast, in the instant cause, we have already discussed at length that the occurrence witnesses, as well as the investigating police officer, have provided affidavits stating that it is more convenient for them to travel to Kane County to testify. Notably, then, the instant cause is more closely related to Dawdy than Langenhorst , where the transferee venue is the site of the accident, the occurrence witnesses have declared that venue to be more convenient, a viewing of the scene would be more easily accomplished there, plaintiffs' own attorneys have offices there, and the cause otherwise has very little connection to the chosen forum. See, e.g. , Smith , 374 Ill. App. 3d at 38, 312 Ill.Dec. 526, 870 N.E.2d 970 (distinguishing Langenhorst ).

¶ 49 Ultimately, any case comparison is essentially futile here. This is because our case law has moved far beyond both Langenhorst and Dawdy in discussing forum non conveniens and its relevant factors. Both of those cases remain good law, as they should. The critical lesson of both of them, as well as their progeny, which we have cited throughout our decision here, is the primary principle that, even with a plaintiff's substantial interest in choosing the forum where her rights will be vindicated, even with the unequal balancing test skewed in her favor, and even with the difficult burden a defendant must meet to effectuate transfer, the evaluation of forum non conveniens for any case is unique on the facts of each case. See Langenhorst , 219 Ill. 2d at 443, 302 Ill.Dec. 363, 848 N.E.2d 927 ; accord Fennell , 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355 ("each forum non conveniens case is unique and must be considered on its own facts"); Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 217 Ill. 2d 158, 168, 298 Ill.Dec. 499, 840 N.E.2d 269 (2005) ("[e]very request for transfer based upon forum non conveniens must be decided pursuant to an 'individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness' " (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack , 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) ); Ammerman , 379 Ill. App. 3d at 885, 318 Ill.Dec. 950, 884 N.E.2d 1221 ("forum non conveniens claims are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis with the results heavily dependent upon the facts of each case"). And the facts unique to the instant cause strongly favor its transfer to Kane County.

¶ 50 We are mindful, in light of plaintiffs' final assertion on appeal, of the fact that a defendant is not relieved of his burden to show that the chosen forum is inconvenient to him and another is more convenient to all the parties simply because the chosen venue has little or no connection to the cause. See Dykstra v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc. , 326 Ill. App. 3d 489, 496, 260 Ill.Dec. 261, 760 N.E.2d 1034 (2001). But we believe, just as the trial court did, that defendants here did make this showing based on the evidence presented, which we have already discussed at length. See Koss Corp. , 2012 IL App (1st) 120379, ¶¶ 106-07, 363 Ill.Dec. 434, 975 N.E.2d 236 (trial court may make inferences in this regard based on evidence presented). In the end, when all of the relevant private and public interest factors are viewed in their totality, they strongly favor transfer to Kane County, which can better serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice with respect to the instant cause. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants' motion to transfer pursuant to forum non conveniens .

¶ 51 CONCLUSION

¶ 52 Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 53 Affirmed.

Justices Howse and Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      The court examined case statistics in these courts from the year 2015 for jury verdicts over $50,000.

      Incidentally, the quoted portion actually appears amid the Guerine court's discussion that "Illinois forum non conveniens law is admittedly less than clear," and that its reversal carried "no pejorative connotations" upon the trial court judge, who was otherwise "conscientious" in his decision to grant the change of forum. Guerine , 198 Ill. 2d at 526, 261 Ill.Dec. 763, 764 N.E.2d 54.

      Even though the trial court did not mention any specific findings with respect to this final private interest factor, we may do so, as we may affirm on any basis in the record. See Ruch , 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 40, 396 Ill.Dec. 795, 40 N.E.3d 448. In addition to all the considerations we, and the trial court, have already examined, we would find that this factor clearly favors transfer as well. Among those considerations, which we will not detail extensively here (because we feel this has already been done), we would like to note the irony that plaintiffs' counsel is located in Kane County while defendants' counsel is located in Cook County. Although it has been said that little weight is to be afforded to this, it is nonetheless a factor a court may consider in a forum non conveniens analysis. See Koss Corp. v. Sachdeva , 2012 IL App (1st) 120379, ¶ 129, 363 Ill.Dec. 434, 975 N.E.2d 236 (citing Dawdy , 207 Ill. 2d at 179, 278 Ill.Dec. 92, 797 N.E.2d 687 ).

      The parties most briefly allude on appeal to affidavits from defendants that were attached to a reply in support of their motion for transfer, affidavits from defendant Richards, Ms. Thanh-Le from defendant Redbox, Mr. Lines from defendant Coinstar, and Max Vandewalle, concerning the inconvenience of the chosen forum. Plaintiffs moved to strike defendants' reply brief, arguing that these affidavits were conclusory and not part of defendants' original brief. The trial court did not rule on plaintiffs' motion and, in its order, specifically declared that it did not consider any of defendants' affidavits in its ruling. While defendants urge us to consider them now as part of the record, we choose to follow the trial court, finding that there is no reason or need to do so. See Koss Corp ., 2012 IL App (1st) 120379, ¶ 100, 363 Ill.Dec. 434, 975 N.E.2d 236 (stating that a defendant seeking forum non conveniens dismissal is not obligated to submit affidavits of identifying witnesses they would call and testimony they would provide if trial were held in alternative forum (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235, 258, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) ) ).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    IN RE COMMITMENT OF Lawrence LINGLE
    (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lawrence Lingle, Respondent-Appellant).
    NO. 4-17-0404
    Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
    FILED April 16, 2018
    Rick Verticchio, of Verticchio Law Office, of Gillespie, for appellant.
    Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Daniel B. Lewin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 1966, respondent, Lawrence Lingle, was convicted of rape. In 1982, respondent was convicted of rape and deviate sexual assault. In February 2004, shortly before respondent's prison term ended, the State filed a sexually violent person petition against respondent. See 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 2004). From February 2004 to April 2015, this matter did not proceed to trial because of delays that were caused or approved by respondent.

¶ 2 In April 2015, respondent filed a motion seeking the appointment of a second expert witness. Respondent argued that a second expert witness was necessary because the State would be using two expert witnesses . In May 2015, the trial court denied this motion.

¶ 3 In April 2017, respondent filed a motion in limine . Because respondent conceded that he was convicted of a sexually violent offense, he sought to prevent the State from mentioning the underlying facts of his convictions during opening statements. Later that month, the trial court denied this motion.

¶ 4 Later in April 2017, the jury found respondent to be a sexually violent person. In May 2017, the trial court ordered that respondent remain in the custody of the Department of Human Services until he is no longer a sexually violent person.

¶ 5 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his request for an additional expert witness and (2) denying his motion in limine . Respondent also argues that the jury's verdict was "against the manifest weight of the evidence." We disagree and affirm.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 A. The Sexually Violent Person Petition

¶ 8 In 1966, respondent was convicted of rape. In that case, respondent broke into a residence, threatened a woman with a knife, and raped her. The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 to 30 years in prison.

¶ 9 In 1982, respondent was convicted of rape and deviate sexual assault. In that case, respondent broke into a family's home, threatened the family with a knife, tied them up, raped the mother, raped her 16-year-old daughter, and raped a developmentally disabled adult. The trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.

¶ 10 In August 2002, respondent was placed on mandatory supervised release. Less than a month later, respondent's supervised release was revoked because he sexually assaulted his elderly and blind relative.

¶ 11 In February 2004, shortly before respondent's prison term ended, the State filed a sexually violent person petition against respondent. See id. From February 2004 to April 2015, this matter did not proceed to trial because of delays that were caused or approved by respondent.

¶ 12 B. The Relevant Procedural History

¶ 13 1. The Motion for a Second Expert Witness

¶ 14 In April 2015, respondent filed a motion seeking the appointment of a second expert witness, contending that a second expert witness was required because the State would be using two expert witnesses. In May 2015, the trial court denied this motion.

¶ 15 2. The Motion in Limine

¶ 16 In April 2017, respondent filed a motion in limine that sought to prevent the State from mentioning the underlying facts of his convictions during opening statements. Respondent noted that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he was convicted of a sexually violent offense, (2) he has a mental disorder, and (3) the mental disorder makes it substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2016). Respondent conceded that he was convicted of a sexually violent offense and argued that, because he conceded this first element, the only purpose of mentioning the underlying facts would be to inflame the passions of the jury and deny him a fair trial. In April 2017, the trial court denied his motion.

¶ 17 C. The Jury Trial

¶ 18 In April 2017, respondent's case proceeded to a jury trial. During opening statements, the State previewed the expected testimony of its two expert witnesses. This preview included an in-depth discussion of the underlying facts of respondent's criminal convictions.

¶ 19 1. The State's Evidence

¶ 20 The State introduced into evidence respondent's convictions for deviate sexual assault and rape. The State also introduced the expert testimony of Dr. Melissa Weldon-Padera and Dr. David Suire.

¶ 21 Weldon-Padera, a clinical psychologist and sex offender evaluator, testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that respondent was a sexually violent person. She diagnosed respondent with the mental disorder of being sexually aroused by nonconsenting persons. She further testified that this condition made it substantially probable that respondent would commit future acts of sexual violence. Weldon-Padera testified there was no medical evidence supporting respondent's claim that he was unable to maintain an erection.

¶ 22 She based her conclusions on respondent's offense history, police reports, court records, medical records, victim statements, and other government records. Weldon-Padera especially relied upon the violent nature of respondent's previous crimes. For example, Weldon-Padera testified that she relied upon respondent's 1966 conviction for rape in which he "broke into the victim's home, confined or held her against her will, threatened her with a knife, struck and beat her on the head and body, tied her up, tied her to the bed, cut off her clothing and raped her." She also relied on his 1982 convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault in which he broke into a home, confined three women against their will, gagged them, threatened them with a knife, and raped them. Weldon-Padera further relied upon respondent's admission to deviate sexual assault where he choked and raped a fellow inmate. Weldon-Padera testified that she relied upon respondent's violent sexual history "[b]ecause research shows that a history of sex offending is an important factor in sexual recidivism, and also shows [an] overall pattern of sex offending behavior over time."

¶ 23 The State then introduced the expert testimony of Suire, a clinical psychologist and a sex offender evaluator. Suire testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that respondent was substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence. Suire diagnosed respondent with (1) "specified paraphilic disorder, sexually attracted to non-consenting males and females in a controlled setting" and (2) antisocial personality disorder. Suire testified that these disorders made it substantially probable that respondent would engage in future acts of sexual violence.

¶ 24 In forming his opinion, Suire especially relied upon respondent's criminal and medical history. Suire took particular notice that respondent committed several violent offenses at a young age, was accused of raping individuals while in jail, and sexually assaulted individuals while on supervised release. For example, Suire testified that he relied upon respondent's 1966 conviction where he "apparently picked a home at random, entered the home with a knife, tied the woman in the home up, *** and proceeded to sexually assault her." Suire also considered respondent's 1982 conviction where he broke into a family's home, raped the mother, raped a 16-year-old girl, and raped a 21-year-old disabled adult. Suire found it particularly relevant that respondent tied up his victims and threatened them with a knife. Suire further testified that he also considered other events such as respondent's rape of a fellow prisoner.

¶ 25 Suire further testified that respondent's advanced age and physical health were not protective factors because of his history of seeking vulnerable victims. He testified that respondent's claim that he could no longer maintain an erection was not a mitigating factor.

¶ 26 2. The Respondent's Evidence

¶ 27 Respondent introduced the expert testimony of Dr. Luis Rosell, a forensic psychologist. Rosell testified that he did not diagnose respondent with a mental disorder. Rosell further testified that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person. In reaching this conclusion, Rosell relied upon respondent's advanced age and his claim that he could no longer maintain an erection.

¶ 28 D. The Jury's Verdict

¶ 29 In April 2017, the jury found respondent to be a sexually violent person, and in May 2017, the trial court ordered that respondent remain in the custody of the Department of Human Services until he is no longer a sexually violent person.

¶ 30 This appeal followed.

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his request for an additional expert witness and (2) denying his motion in limine . Respondent also argues that the jury's verdict was "against the manifest weight of the evidence." We address these arguments in turn.

¶ 33 A. The Number of Expert Witnesses

¶ 34 Respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a second expert witness. Respondent argues a second expert witness was necessary because the State had two expert witnesses. We disagree.

¶ 35 1. The Applicable Statute

¶ 36 The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) states that "[w]henever the person who is the subject of the petition is required to submit to an examination under this Act, he or she may retain experts or professional persons to perform an examination." 725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 2016). The Act further provides as follows:

"If the person is indigent, the court shall, upon the person's request, appoint a qualified and available expert or professional person to perform an examination. Upon the order of the circuit court, the county shall pay, as part of the costs of the action, the costs of a court-appointed expert or professional person to perform an examination and participate in the trial on behalf of an indigent person." Id.

¶ 37 2. The Right to an Expert Witness

¶ 38 A denial of funds for an indigent respondent to secure an expert witness may violate constitutional protections in certain circumstances. People v. Lawson , 163 Ill. 2d 187, 220, 206 Ill.Dec. 119, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1187-88 (1994). These protections are triggered when the expertise sought goes "to the heart of the defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Keene , 169 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1995). For a respondent to be entitled to an expert witness, he must show that the requested expert assistance is necessary in proving a crucial issue in the case and that the lack of funds for the expert will therefore prejudice him. Lawson , 163 Ill. 2d at 221, 206 Ill.Dec. 119, 644 N.E.2d 1172. An indigent respondent is not entitled to an expert merely because the expert would be useful, helpful, valuable, or important to the defense. People v. Shelton , 401 Ill. App. 3d 564, 575, 340 Ill.Dec. 840, 929 N.E.2d 144, 156 (2010).

¶ 39 A respondent is not entitled to the same number of expert witnesses as the State. In re Commitment of Brown , 2012 IL App (2d) 110116, ¶ 17, 361 Ill.Dec. 510, 971 N.E.2d 612. This court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for an expert witness for an abuse of discretion. People v. Page , 193 Ill. 2d 120, 153, 249 Ill.Dec. 874, 737 N.E.2d 264, 282 (2000).

¶ 40 3. The Facts of this Case

¶ 41 In this case, the trial court appointed one expert witness for respondent. Doing so was in compliance with the Act. 725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 2016). This expert, Rossell, testified about the key issues of the case. See Lawson , 163 Ill. 2d at 221, 206 Ill.Dec. 119, 644 N.E.2d 1172. For example, Rosell testified that he did not diagnose respondent with a mental disorder and that respondent was not substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence. Additionally, Rosell questioned the reasoning of Weldon-Padera and Suire. Rosell's testimony was consistent with respondent's cross-examination of the State's experts. If the jury believed Rosell's testimony, it would not have found respondent to be a sexually violent person.

¶ 42 Although an additional expert witness may have been helpful, the State was not required to finance this assistance. In re Detention of Allen , 331 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1004, 265 Ill.Dec. 316, 772 N.E.2d 354, 361 (2002) ; In re Ottinger , 333 Ill. App. 3d 114, 123, 266 Ill.Dec. 641, 775 N.E.2d 203, 211 (2002) (sex offender filing petition for conditional release from his civil commitment was not denied due process when the State had two expert witnesses and petitioner was only provided one expert witness); see also Hon. Ron Spears, What Price [is] Justice? The County Board Wants To Know , 99 Ill. B.J. 260, 260-61 (2011) (discussing factors that trial judges consider when presented with requests from the parties that will lead to county expenses). As earlier noted, the State is not required to provide an indigent respondent with the same number of expert witnesses as the State intends to use at trial. Brown , 2012 IL App (2d) 110116, ¶ 17, 361 Ill.Dec. 510, 971 N.E.2d 612.

¶ 43 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's denial of respondent's request for a second expert witness was not an abuse of discretion. Page , 193 Ill. 2d at 153, 249 Ill.Dec. 874, 737 N.E.2d 264.

¶ 44 B. The Motion In Limine

¶ 45 Respondent argues the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine seeking to bar the State from mentioning the underlying facts of his criminal convictions during opening statements. Respondent argues these underlying facts were unfairly prejudicial because he conceded that he was convicted of a sexually violent offense. Further, respondent argues that the "only purpose " of mentioning the underlying facts of his convictions was to inflame the passions of the jury. (Emphasis added.) We disagree.

¶ 46 1. The Standard of Review

¶ 47 A motion in limine is addressed to a trial court's power to admit or exclude evidence or argument. People v. Stevenson , 2014 IL App (4th) 130313, ¶ 26, 382 Ill.Dec. 179, 12 N.E.3d 179. These motions bring to the trial court's attention potentially irrelevant, inadmissible, or prejudicial evidence and seek a pretrial order excluding or permitting the evidence. Id. The trial court's evidentiary ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Pikes , 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 12, 376 Ill.Dec. 314, 998 N.E.2d 1247. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or such that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Commitment of Kelley , 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶ 33, 361 Ill.Dec. 874, 972 N.E.2d 667.

¶ 48 2. The Applicable Case Law

¶ 49 In People v. Walker , 211 Ill. 2d 317, 328, 285 Ill.Dec. 519, 812 N.E.2d 339, 345 (2004), the State charged defendant with possession of a weapon by a felon. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence of the name and nature of defendant's prior conviction when a stipulation was available. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that

"when proving felon status is the only purpose for admitting evidence of a defendant's prior convictions, and the defendant offers to stipulate or admit to his prior felon status, a trial court abuses its discretion when it admits the defendant's record of conviction, thus informing the jury of the name and nature of the defendant's prior convictions." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 338, 285 Ill.Dec. 519, 812 N.E.2d 339.

¶ 50 In Kelley , the respondent appealed the jury's finding that he was a sexually violent person under the Act, arguing that "the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to stipulate to his prior convictions for sexually violent offenses and to preclude the State from referring to the name of those convictions." Kelley , 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶ 32, 361 Ill.Dec. 874, 972 N.E.2d 667. The respondent argued that his case was analogous to the facts of Walker and that he was unfairly prejudiced by allowing the State to discuss and elicit testimony regarding the names and nature of his prior convictions. See id. ¶ 34.

¶ 51 The First District concluded that Walker was distinguishable, noting that "the State had multiple purposes for eliciting this testimony," such as (1) proving that respondent had been convicted of one or more specifically listed offenses and (2) allowing its expert witnesses to explain the basis of their opinions. (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 38. Accordingly, the court concluded that "the stipulation defendant sought in his motion in limine would not have served the same purpose as testimony regarding his prior convictions, and we find nothing improper in the testimony of the State's expert witnesses in this regard." Id.

¶ 52 3. The Facts of this Case

¶ 53 We agree with the First District's analysis in Kelley and deem it applicable to the facts of this case. Id. ¶¶ 32-39. Opening statements are intended to explain to the jury what the parties intend to prove at trial, outline the expected evidence, and discuss reasonable inferences from the expected evidence. Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin , 2013 IL App (1st) 112412, ¶ 29, 368 Ill.Dec. 291, 983 N.E.2d 1095 ; People v. Arroyo , 339 Ill. App. 3d 137, 149, 274 Ill.Dec. 170, 790 N.E.2d 943, 954 (2003). The primary function of opening statements is to provide notice to the jury, to explain the factual context of a case, and to assist them in their fact-finding role. See Arroyo , 339 Ill. App. 3d at 149, 274 Ill.Dec. 170, 790 N.E.2d 943.

¶ 54 At trial, the State's expert witnesses concluded that it was substantially probable that respondent would engage in future acts of sexual violence. In so concluding, both experts relied upon the underlying facts of respondent's prior convictions. It is well settled that expert witnesses may "properly testify to facts upon which [their] opinion is based." In re Detention of Lieberman , 379 Ill. App. 3d 585, 604-05, 318 Ill.Dec. 605, 884 N.E.2d 160, 179 (2007). Moreover, details of a respondent's prior sexual offenses are probative of (1) the diagnosis of a mental disorder and (2) the determination that it is substantially probable that the respondent will commit further acts of sexual violence. In re Detention of Hardin , 391 Ill. App. 3d 211, 219-20, 330 Ill.Dec. 101, 907 N.E.2d 914, 921 (2009) ; Allen , 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1005, 265 Ill.Dec. 316, 772 N.E.2d 354 ; In re Detention of Bailey , 317 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1089-90, 251 Ill.Dec. 575, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1159 (2000).

¶ 55 During opening statements, the State may outline the expected testimony of its expert witnesses. People v. Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850, 874 (1998). This outline may include a preview of the underlying facts of a respondent's sexually violent offenses so that the jurors are provided proper context.

¶ 56 Accordingly, the State had multiple purposes for discussing the underlying facts of respondent's convictions during opening statements. These purposes included (1) previewing the testimony of its expert witnesses, (2) providing context to the jury, and (3) suggesting reasonable inferences to draw from this expected evidence. See Kelley , 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶ 38, 361 Ill.Dec. 874, 972 N.E.2d 667. Respondent's concession that he committed a sexually violent offense would not have served the same purpose as discussing the underlying facts of his sexually violent offenses during opening statements. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying respondent's motion in limine seeking to bar these statements. Id. ¶¶ 32-39.

¶ 57 As a last matter on this issue, we note the peculiarity of respondent's complaint (first to the trial court and then on appeal) about an opening statement that (he concedes) is consistent with the evidence the State intends to present and-in fact-later does present. We are aware of no case that has ever provided any support to respondent's claim that he somehow is entitled to have the jury hear about this evidence first from the witness stand and not from the opening statement.

¶ 58 C. The Jury's Verdict

¶ 59 Respondent further argues that the jury's verdict was "against the manifest weight of the evidence." We disagree.

¶ 60 1. The Applicable Law and the Standard of Review

¶ 61 To prove that an individual is a sexually violent person, the State must prove that (1) an individual was convicted of a sexually violent offense, (2) the individual has a mental disorder, and (3) the mental disorder makes it substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2016).

¶ 62 We first note that respondent has set forth an improper standard of review. See In re Detention of Sveda , 354 Ill. App. 3d 373, 380, 289 Ill.Dec. 912, 820 N.E.2d 987, 993 (2004) (concluding that "manifest weight of the evidence" was the improper standard of review under the Act). When a respondent appeals a finding that he is a sexually violent person, a reviewing court considers whether any rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the Act beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Commitment of Hardin , 2013 IL App (2d) 120977, ¶ 22, 375 Ill.Dec. 344, 997 N.E.2d 655 ; Sveda , 354 Ill. App. 3d at 380, 289 Ill.Dec. 912, 820 N.E.2d 987. We defer to the fact finder's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and reasonable inferences from the evidence. In re Detention of Welsh , 393 Ill. App. 3d 431, 455, 332 Ill.Dec. 819, 913 N.E.2d 1109, 1129 (2009).

¶ 63 2. This Case

¶ 64 In this case, the State introduced respondent's prior convictions for sexually violent offenses, and respondent conceded he had committed those crimes. The State then introduced the expert testimony of Weldon-Padera and Suire. Weldon-Padera testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that respondent was a sexually violent person. She based this conclusion on respondent's offense history, police reports, court records, prior evaluations, victim statements, and other government records. She especially relied upon the violent nature of respondent's previous crimes.

¶ 65 Weldon-Padera diagnosed respondent as being sexually aroused by nonconsenting persons and stated that this condition made it substantially probable that respondent would commit future acts of sexual violence. Weldon-Padera further testified that there was no medical evidence supporting respondent's claim that he was unable to maintain an erection.

¶ 66 Suire testified that he reviewed respondent's criminal history, medical history, and prior evaluations. In forming his opinion, Suire took particular notice that respondent committed several violent offenses at a young age, was accused of raping individuals while in jail, and sexually assaulted individuals while on supervised release. Suire testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that respondent was substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence. He testified that respondent's advanced age and physical health was not a protective factor because of his history of seeking vulnerable victims. He testified that respondent's claim that he could no longer maintain an erection was not a mitigating factor.

¶ 67 Respondent presented the expert testimony of Rosell, who testified that he did not diagnose respondent with a mental disorder and that respondent was not a sexually violent person. In reaching this conclusion, Rosell relied upon respondent's advanced age and respondent's claim that he could no longer maintain an erection.

¶ 68 The jury, rather than this court, was called upon to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Id. When viewing all of evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find the elements of the Act beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hardin , 2013 IL App (2d) 120977, ¶ 22, 375 Ill.Dec. 344, 997 N.E.2d 655.

¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 70 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 71 Affirmed.

Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion.