author: FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

text:
    UNITED STATES EX REL. Eric UHLIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLUOR CORP., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-2815
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued September 8, 2016
    Decided October 11, 2016

      Gabriel Adam Hawkins, COHEN <& MA-LAD, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Clark Steven Tomashefsky, STEIN RAY LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
   FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Eric Uhlig brought False Claims Act and retaliation claims against his former employer, Fluor Corporation, and related entities (collectively, “Fluor”). Fluor contracted with the United States Army to provide, among other services, electrical engineering work in Afghanistan.

Uhlig says Fluor violated the False Claims Act when it knowingly breached the terms of its Army contract by using unlicensed electricians as journeymen and billing the government for the services. Uhlig also contends Fluor wrongfully terminated Uhlig as a whistleblower in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).

The district court granted summary judgment for Fluor. We affirm.

I. Background

The United States Army uses umbrella agreements known as “indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity” (“IDIQ”) contracts with private companies to provide support for military personnel. IDIQ contracts provide the general terms under which a contractor is to work but do not delineate specific conditions. The Army then uses “Task Orders” to assign jobs to a contractor.

In 2007, the Army and Fluor entered into an IDIQ contract known as Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV (“LOGCAP IV’). LOGCAP IV provided a framework for construction, maintenance, and other services in support of military personnel around the world.

LOGCAP IV originally contained no specific provisions governing personnel qualifications. In August 2008, the Army issued LOGCAP IV Contract Modification 4, which provided:

The Contractor shall ensure that Contractor personnel ... possess a license, certification, training, and/or education commensurate with the level of duties to which they are assigned. Contractor will comply with the terms of this provision if Contractor develops and reasonably implements a Trades Certification and Validation Plan, as approved by the Government, utilizing the master, journeyman, or apprentice model.

Fluor submitted a Trades Certification and Validation Plan as required by Modification 4. The Plan divided craft workers into four categories using “a combination of licenses held, education, training, and experience.”

The Plan defined a “helper” as an apprentice who works under constant supervision and a “journeyman” as a skilled craftsperson who may work with minimal supervision and possesses “verifiable minimum experience and/or holds a universally accepted certification, license and/or degree.” The Plan also stated that electricians “[m]ay be required to hold a license.”

In January 2009, the government approved the Plan, making it the contractual standard by which Fluor employees’ qualifications were to be established.

In July 2009, Fluor was awarded Task Order 5, which authorized Fluor to perform a variety of services, including electrical work, at military bases in northern Afghanistan. Before Fluor, a different contractor, KBR, Inc., had been performing this work. To avoid major disruptions in service, the government requested that Fluor attempt to hire KBR employees who were already in Afghanistan. Fluor hired American and British former KBR employees, as well as employees from Bosnia, Macedonia, India, and Pakistan. The employees who were not citizens of the United States or Great Britain were referred to as “other-country nationals.”

Uhlig was one of the KBR employees that Fluor hired. Fluor gave Uhlig a one-year foreperson position starting January 23, 2010.

In early 2010, Fluor reviewed its procedures for establishing journeyman electricians’ qualifications and decided to require that these electricians hold a state-issued United States license or a Great Britain-issued license. Fluor says that it imposed this requirement not because it was obligated to do so under Modification 4, but rather because- it wanted to streamline its qualification process and promote uniformity.

Uhlig had graduated from an apprenticeship program but did not have an electrician’s license because his home state of Missouri—like several other states—did not issue electrician’s licenses.

By mid-2010, Fluor had implemented its licensing requirement for journeyman electricians being hired in the United States for deployment to Afghanistan. However, the situation was more complicated for electricians like Uhlig, who had already been hired in Afghanistan as “foremen” but lacked state-issued electrician’s licenses. .No one disputed that the unlicensed foremen were qualified to do journeyman work; nevertheless, Fluor decided to apply its licensing requirement to existing employees.

On November 16, 2010, Fluor emailed its foremen working under Task Order 5, including Uhlig, explaining that, licensed foremen would be reclassified as “journeymen” and unlicensed foremen would be reclassified as “helpers.” Fluor stated that this change was meant to “bring Fluor into better alignment with our contractual requirements.” Accordingly, of the hundreds of Fluor electricians working under Task Order 5, approximately thirty-one, including Uhlig, became “helpers.” The others simply changed titles from “foremen” to “journeymen.”

Other-country nationals were not eligible for licensing by a state in the United States. Thus, under Fluor’s self-imposed licensing procedure, all such employees became helpers, even if, by virtue of their education and experience, they were qualified to perform journeyman work. However, Fluor did not plan to terminate unlicensed other-country nationals in the same way Fluor terminated Uhlig. Fluor says that it was more affordable to retain those employees as helpers because they did not get the same overseas benefits as American helpers.

On November 17, 2010, Fluor offered Uhlig an additional year’s employment. However, on November 19 Fluor informed Uhlig that because he did not have a license, he was being reclassified as a helper. Fluor further informed Uhlig that unless he obtained a license before January 23, 2011, the end of his one-year employment, he would be terminated.

Unfortunately for Uhlig, he was out of vacation days and had no opportunity to return to the United States to get an electrician’s license by January 2011. Uhlig asked human-resources supervisor Thomas Rizzo for help, but Fluor would not change its position. Uhlig was upset that he would be terminated while the unlicensed other-country nationals—also now all helpers— would stay on.

Uhlig says that after imposing the licensing requirement, Fluor directed helpers to perform unsupervised journeyman work. Uhlig was particularly frustrated after one assignment at a camp called “NKC” and sent an email to Rizzo and Defense Contract Management Agency officer. Billy Porter. In it, Uhlig said he was given an assignment he did hot think he should be given as an unlicensed helper. Uhlig further stated: “I am a U[S] tax payer losing my job at the end of January because .... this company is using my US tax dollars having OCN/A[fg]hans [as] unlicensed electricians going against government compliance.” Uhlig had not read Modification 4 or the language of the Trades Certification and Validation Plan at that point,

Rizzo asked Uhlig why he had contacted the government directly instead of pursuing available channels through Fluor. Uh-lig responded in a December 4, 2010 email: “I am just following a US taxpayer’s obligation to report fraud waste and abuse from stiffing the US government.” Uhlig again copied Porter on the email, but also sent the email to mdoyle@doyleraizner. com, stating that Mr. Doyle was his attorney, and to mssparky@msspai’ky.com. Ms. Sparky was a website hosted by a former KBR employee, the stated purpose of which was “exposing ... corporate greed among [defense] contractors.” Uhlig admits that when he sent the email, he had neither retained Doyle as his attorney nor previously been in contact with him. Uhlig had simply found Doyle’s name and email address on the Ms. Sparky website.

One week later, Fluor terminated Uhlig. Fluor says Uhlig’s email to Ms.- Sparky was unacceptable not only because it was inflammatory but also because it contained Thomas Rizzo’s name, email address, and phone numbers, which were not publicly available. Sending this information to the Ms. Sparky email address violated Fluor’s computer-use policy.

On February 15, 2011, Uhlig filed False Claims Act and retaliatory-discharge claims against Fluor. The government declined to intervene as the plaintiff on its own behalf under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).

Fluor moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted Fluor’s motion on August 6, 2014. In dismissing the False Claims Act claim, the district court held that Fluor’s contract with the Army did not require that journeyman electricians be licensed and therefore that Fluor had not breached the contract. The court dismissed Uhlig’s retaliation claim because Uhlig had no objective basis for asserting that Fluor had defrauded the government, thus his complaint was not “protected activity” under the False Claims Act. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A, False, Claims

The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., makes it unlawful to (1) knowingly present a “false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the. United States government, or (2) knowingly make, use, or cause to be made or.used a “false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim,” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).

Under the Act, private individuals such as Uhlig—referred to as “rela-tors”—may file qui tarn civil actions on behalf of the United States. To establish civil liability under the False Claims Act, a relator - generally must show that (1) the defendant made a statement in order to receive money from the government; (2) the statement was false; (3) the defendant knew the statement was false; and (4) the false statement was material to the government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim, United States ex rel. Yannaco-poulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

Uhlig says Fluor violated the False Claims Act by knowingly employing unlicensed electricians in breach of its contract and 'submitting invoices for the unlicensed services to the government for payment. However, the contract did not require licensing. Modification 4 to the LOGCAP IV contract required craft employees to “possess1 a license, certification, training, and/or education commensurate with the level of duties to which they are assigned” (emphasis added). Further, the Trades Certification and Validation Plan, which was the contractual standard by which the employees’ qualifications were to be established, also did not require licensing. Rather, the Plan defined “journeyman” as a “[s]killed craftsman ... having verifiable minimum experience and/or hold[ing] a universally accepted certification, license and/or degree” (emphases added).

The contract language clearly provided a set of options for establishing an employee’s qualifications, and licensing was not the exclusive method for doing so. Though Fluor independently decided to phase in a self-imposed requirement that journeymen must hold a license, this internal requirement did not change the plain terms of the contract. See Yannacopoulos, 652 F.3d at 826. As a result, Fluor was not in breach of its contract with the government when it submitted invoices for electrical work performed by unlicensed electricians.

Uhlig also argues that Modification 4 is an “alternative contract.” As a result, he concludes, once Fluor elected one of the four listed means of verifying its electricians’ qualifications, Fluor was required to abide by its choice, or else be in breach of the contract. See Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Seneca Ins. Co., No. 94 CIV. 9106 (JFK), 1995 WL 733642, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1995).

We disagree. Eagle Star describes an alternative contract as:

one in which a party promises to render some one of two or more alternative performances, either one of which is mutually agreed upon as the bargained-for equivalent given in exchange for the return performance by the other party. Once a party elects its method of performance, the contract ceases to be an alternative contract and the electing party is obligated to perform in accordance with the method of performance elected by him.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Letter Agreement in Eagle Star contemplated mutually exclusive performance options. See id. at *4. Here, however, the language in Modification 4 and the Trades Certification and Validation Plan contemplates compatible choices, as indicated by the repeated use of “and/or” in describing the qualification options.

Indeed, a plain reading of Modification 4 and the Trades Certification Validation Plan is that Fluor needed to ensure that its electricians were qualified for the duties to which they were assigned by virtue of at least one of the following: license, certification, training, or education. Nothing in the contract suggests that Fluor was required to elect one method of verifying its electricians’ qualification and that Fluor would then be limited to that method. In other words, under the contract, Fluor could ensure that one electrician was qualified via education, another via certification, and a third through licen-sure, so long as each was qualified. Further, the contract did not forbid Fluor from applying higher internal licensure policies to American electricians relative to other-country national electricians. The contract at issue, therefore, is not an “alternative contract.”

Finally, Uhlig cites to emails from Fluor employees allegedly interpreting the contract to prohibit unlicensed other-country nationals from performing electrical work. However, these messages do not change the contract’s plain terms. See Yannacopoulos, 652 F.3d at 826 (when “[t]he language of [the contract] is clear on its face, ... the intent of the parties is to be derived only from the express language of the contract”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Fluor did not breach its contract. Therefore, there was no false statement under the False Claims Act, and we affirm the district court’s decision.

B. Retaliation

Uhlig next argues that the district court erred in dismissing his retaliation claim. An employee can pursue a claim for unlawful retaliation if he was discharged “because of lawful acts done by the employee ... in furtherance of an action under” the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). In other words, a plaintiff must prove that he was engaged in protected conduct and was fired “because of’ that conduct. Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

To determine whether an employee’s conduct was protected, we look at whether “(1) the employee in good faith believes, and (2) a reasonable employee in the same or similar circumstances might believe, that the employer is committing fraud against the government.” Fanslow v. Chi Mfg. Ctr., Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). In assessing the second, “objective” prong, we look to the facts known to the employee at the time of the alleged protected activity. See id. at 479-80; Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., 630 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2010).

Uhlig’s retaliation claim cannot proceed because he did not show that, at the time he sent the December 4, 2010 email, a reasonable employee in Uhlig’s position would have believed Fluor was defrauding the government. As a result, his conduct was not protected activity that could give rise to a retaliation claim.

Uhlig admits he did not read Modification 4, the Trades Certification and Validation Plan, or any other relevant contract language before he sent the December 2010 email. He therefore did not have any firsthand knowledge of Fluor’s contract obligations to the Army.

Further, his secondhand knowledge— from two November 2010 emails—was not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to suspect fraud on the part of Fluor. The November 16, 2010 email explained Fluor’s decision to reclassify unlicensed electricians as “bringing] Fluor into better alignment with [its] contractual requirements.” The November 19,2010 email stated that because Uhlig did not have a license, he was being reclassified as a helper “to align [Fluor’s] job titles and basic job responsibilities with the appropriate license, in accordance with our contract with the client.”

Neither of these messages stated that Fluor’s contract with the government required all electrical work to be performed by licensed journeymen or that there was no role for unlicensed helpers. The emails do not state Fluor’s contractual obligations to the government. Thus, these emails were not enough to cause someone in Uh-lig’s position to believe that Fluor was defrauding the government.

Even if Uhlig subjectively believed Fluor was breaching its contract, he lacked a sufficient basis on which to satisfy the objective component of the protected-activity test. Uhlig’s emails attempting to blow the whistle on Fluor’s alleged noncompliance were therefore not protected activity. As a result, even if the December 2010 email was the reason for Uhlig’s termination, it cannot be the basis for a retaliation claim.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the judgment of the district court.

      . At KBR, Uhlig and other workers were "journeymen.” Uhlig and other KBR journeymen were hired by Fluor as "foremen” because Fluor did not yet have a job classification named "journeymen,” though KBR’s pay scale for journeymen matched Fluor’s pay scale for its foremen.

      . Uhlig's email accusations eventually prompted two members of the Defense Contract Management Agency’s quality-assurance staff to investigate the tasks that Fluor's electricians were performing. The staff did not find any problems. On-site Defense Contract Management Agency Commander Colonel Cameron Holt said he was not concerned about Uhlig’s allegations. Fluor received no written feedback from .the Defense Contract Management Agency regarding the investigation, and Fluor was never asked to change its practices or procedures with respect to the assignment of electrical tasks.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: POSNER, Circuit Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 439, Intervenor.
    Nos. 16-1360
    16-1395
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued September 16, 2016
    Decided October 12, 2016
    Ivan Rich, Jr., Attorney, Memphis, TN, for Petitioner.
    Linda Dreeben, Attorney, Jill A. Griffin, Attorney, Milakshmi V. Rajapakse, Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Costa Kerestenzis, Attorney, BEESON, TAYER & BODINE, Sacramento, CA, for Intervening Respondent.
    Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
   POSNER, Circuit Judge.

The petitioner, FedEx Freight, Inc., a subsidiary of FedEx Corporation, uses trucks rather than planes to transport freight. This case concerns the workers at its terminal in Stockton, California, an inland seaport, at which the company employs 50 truck drivers and 27 dockworkers—the latter use forklifts to load and unload the trucks that use the terminal. A Teamsters Local petitioned the Labor Board to be permitted to organize the drivers. Rejecting the company’s contention that the local should represent the dockworkers as well on the ground asserted by the company that the drivers and the dockworkers share a community of interest, the Board concluded that a drivers-only unit -was proper and submitted the issue to -a secret-ballot election of the drivers, who .voted to be represented by the local union in collective bargaining. The company asks us to overrule the Board, and the Board asks us to enforce its order.

At the oral argument the company’s lawyer said that the reason there should’be a single union for both the drivers and the dockworkers is that if the latter were included in the vote on whether to unionize “we [FedEx Freight] think we’d have a better chance of winning the election”—it’s a win for the company if the employees don’t unionize. That however is not a reason recognized in the National Labor Relations Act for rejecting the certification of a union for collective bargaining, and is tangential to whether or not different worker groups have a community of interest.

The company also argues, however, that there should be a single union because the drivers and the dockworkers have the same employment interests and concerns, and on that ground as well it asks us to set aside the Board’s approval of a drivers-only union at the Stockton terminal. The Board and the Teamsters local of course disagree.

The statutory criterion for whether a union can represent a unit of workers is whether the unit is “appropriate” for collective bargaining, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), which as a practical matter requires a determination that the members of the unit have common employment concerns— a “community of interest”—different from the concerns of the company’s other employees (if there are other employees). If the drivers in this case had a community of interest because they did the same work, were paid the same, and received the same benefits, yet the dockworkers did similar work (it could not be identical work, however, because their work consists of moving freight loads by forklift rather than by truck), worked the same number of hours, were paid the same as the truck drivers, and received the same benefits, they might welj. be , thought to be part of the same community of interest as the truck drivers. The focus of analysis should be on the similarity or, dissimilarity in working conditions across different groups of workers at the Stockton terminal rather, than on the similarity or dissimilarity of the employment conditions of just ope of the groups, the drivers.

But while by clinging to the unhelpful term “community of interest” (unhelpful except when modified by the adjective “distinct,” which clarifies it considerably) the Board muddied the waters a bit, it also took pains to compare the two groups and found on the basis of compelling evidence that they differ significantly. The drivers work full time, the dockworkers only part time. And the drivers are paid about twice as much as the dockworkers though they have less physically strenuous, and probably safer, work, because maneuvering a forklift is quite difficult and potentially quite dangerous. According to Wikipedia, “Forklift,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Forklift (visited Oct. 11,2016),

An important aspect of forklift operation is that most [forklifts] have rear-wheel steering. While this increases maneuverability in tight cornering situations, it differs from a driver’s traditional experience with other wheeled vehicles. ... [A] critical characteristic of the forklift is its instability. The forklift and load must be considered a unit with a continually varying center of gravity with every movement of the load. A forklift must never negotiate a turn at speed with a raised load, where centrifugal and gravitational forces may combine to cause a disastrous tip-over accident.

The company’s truck drivers spend most of their workday outside the terminal, while the dockworkers remain inside it. The truck drivers have two or more weeks of paid vacation time plus seven paid holidays and half a dozen “personal days,” while the dockworkers must use their personal days to cover illness, family emergencies, vacations, and holidays. The two groups can sign up for the same health insurance plan and contribute to a 401(k) plan, but the record says nothing about dental insurance or whether benefits become available to both part-time and full-time workers after the same amount of time with the company. FedEx Freight’s lawyer told us at oral argument that the drivers and dockworkers have identical benefits; they don’t.

Granted, the Board remarked some differences between the two worker groups that seem marginal, such as that the company requires the drivers but not the dockworkers to take meal breaks and to wear uniforms and that the drivers require li-censure and the dockworkers do not. These differences may help explain the wage differences, but it is the existence of substantial wage and benefits differences that count and they are documented in the record.

The record is clear that the dockworkers are second-class citizens of the employment force at the Stockton terminal when all benefits and costs are toted up, and this suggests a potential for serious discord should the dockworkers be placed in the same union as the drivers. They would be pushing for equality of compensation and of conditions of work generally. There would it is true be expectation of such strife if the dockworkers were to form their own union to bargain separately with their employer, but there is no indication that they seek to do that or that if they did any union would be interested in representing so small and, more to the point, so impecunious a group—a group that might not be able to pay union dues adequate to induce a union to engage in collective bargaining for them. And consistent with 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5), which states that “in determining whether a unit is appropriate ... the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling,” the Board did not give controlling weight to the fact that the union had already organized the drivers.

The company takes issue with the Board’s ruling in Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile (Specialty Healthcare), 357 N.L.R.B. 934, 934 (2011), that “in cases in which a party contends that a petitioned-or unit containing employees readily identifiable as a group who share a community of interest is nevertheless inappropriate because it does not contain additional employees, the burden is on the party so contending to demonstrate that the excluded employees share an overwhelming community of interest with the included employees.” The word that we’ve italicized is the focus of the company’s criticism; it argues that the word imposes too heavy a burden of proof on the employer in a labor dispute. But “overwhelming community interest” is not the invention of the Specialty Healthcare case; one can find it in two 40-year-old NLRB cases: Jewish Hospital Association of Cincinnati, 223 N.L.R.B. 614, 617 (1976), and Chatham Towing Co, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 502, 502 (1976); and in Blue Man Vegas v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Moreover, “overwhelming” appears to be treated by the NLRB as a synonym for “inappropriate,” Country Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000), for “truly inappropriate,” id. and for “clearly inappropriate,” Dunbar Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 186 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1999)—terms that pull the sting of “overwhelming.”

Enough; whatever the precise force of “overwhelming” in Specialty Healthcare, it is evident that the community of interest between the truck drivers and the dockworkers not only is in no sense overwhelming but in fact is slight, owing to the differences in working conditions and benefits between the two types of worker and the undeniable danger of strife between the drivers and the dockworkers should they be placed in the same bargaining unit.

FedEx Freight’s petition to decertify the union is denied and the Labor Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its certification order is granted.


author: BLAKEY, District Judge.

text:
    James BLASIUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANGEL AUTOMOTIVE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-2994
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued February 19, 2016
    Decided October 12, 2016

      Brandon J. Wilson, Attorney, Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Royal Oak, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Linda A. Polley, Andrew S. Williams, Attorneys, Hunt Suedhoff Kalamoros LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
    Before MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and BLAKEY, District Judge.

       Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

   BLAKEY, District Judge.

In July 2009, Appellant James Blasius purchased a used 2005 Ford Excursion. In June 2012, Blasius entrusted Appellee Angel Automotive, Inc. (“AAI”) with upgrading the vehicle to make it “safe” and “reliable.” Blasius alleges that AAI negligently betrayed that trust when, one day and about 200 miles after pick up, the vehicle caught fire and was destroyed. The district court granted summary judgment for AAI after concluding that: (1) Blasius failed to present evidence that AAI’s work proximately caused the fire; and (2) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. Blasius appealed. For the reasons explained below, the decision of the district court is REVERSED.

Background & Procedural History

In July 2009, Blasius, a resident of Michigan, purchased a used 2005 Ford Excursion for towing his motorcycle racing trailer. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 1; Blasius Dep. 19:1-7. Over the next three years, Blasius invested in approximately $70,000 worth of parts, accessories, and modifications to the vehicle. PL’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 4.

In the summer of 2012, Blasius next contacted AAI, an automotive repair shop located in Elkhart, Indiana, to further improve the Excursion’s performance. Blasi-us outlined several components he wanted inspected and improved and gave AAI an “open checkbook” for the repairs. PL’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 8; Blasius Dep. 37:19-22. These components included, among others, the vehicle’s engine, suspension, turbocharger, intake and exhaust manifolds, exhaust, transmission, brakes, spark plugs, and oil pump. PL’s Resp. Defi’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 8. AAI not only agreed to Blasius’ requests, but also “gave the truck a complete once-over” and recommended additional modifications, which Blasius approved. Angel Dep: 14:2-3, 44:11-15.

In June 2012, AAI mechanics Thomas Angel and Daniel Fine performed the desired work. Id. at 11:10—13; Fine Dep. 62:20-22. Due to the extent of Blasius’ requested modifications, AAI first removed the Excursion’s body from its chassis. Angel Dep. 14:2-22; Fine Dep. 43:14— 15. This process involved disconnecting (and eventually reconnecting) the vehicle’s various fluid transfer lines, including coolant lines, brake lines, and power steering hoses. Angel Dep. 15:11-15.

After removing the‘vehicle body, AAI’s overhaul included replacing the Excursion’s fuel pump, auxiliary fuel filter, and fuel lines. Id. at 19:6-9, 19:23-20:3, 27:2-4, 43:11-20; Fine Dep. 23:18-20, 29:6-11, 36:22-37:2, 39:20-40:5. The new fuel lines ran from the fuel tank at the rear of the vehicle to the newly installed fuel pump, to an auxiliary fuel filter, and then finally to the topside of the driver’s side of the engine. Angel Dep. 22:9-23:20. A return line was run out of the engine back to the fuel tank. Id. at 24:1-6.

AAI originally promised to complete work by Thursday, June 21, 2012. Id. at 44:20^16:2; Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 12. On June 20, 2012, however, AAI informed Blasius that the Excursion was not ready for pick up. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No, 53, Ex. 12. Aware that Blasius desired to take the truck on an upcoming trip to northern Michigan, Angel promised Blasius that the vehicle would be available the following Thursday, June 28, 2012. Angel Dep. 45:1-3, 47:3-10. At his deposition, Angel testified that these circumstances created a “heightened sense of urgency” within AAI to complete the repairs. Id. at 48:9-16. Angel testified that, by the time AAI finished working on the Excursion, there was little additional work that could have been done to the vehicle. Id. at 46:24-47:2.

On June 28, 2012, Blasius picked up his Excursion and drove approximately 200 miles back to his Michigan home. Id. at 48:17-19; Blasius Dep. 44:17-19. Upon arrival, Blasius ¿mailed AAI and complained of new or persisting issues with the vehicle’s performance. PL’s Resp. Defi’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 13. Blasius described “limited pull off the line,” heavy exhaust smoke, and a “rattling or pinging or knocking” at low rpm’s. Angel responded on the morning of June 29, 2012 and promised to resolve the issues, but did not discourage Blasius from driving the truck in the interim. Id.; Angel Dep. 51:12-18.

Later on June 29, 2012, Blasius left his home in the Excursion with his motorcycle trailer in tow. Blasius Dep. 46:12-21. Blasi-us’ adult son and his son’s friend were passengers. Id. at 5:13-17. At his deposition, Blasius testified that, after traveling approximately 12 miles, Blasius’ son observed smoke emanating from the vehicle’s interior vents. Id. at 47:1-7. As a result, after approximately 30 seconds, Blasius began to pull over to the shoulder. Id. at 47:15-17. As Blasius looked in his review mirror, he observed additional smoke behind the vehicle. Id. at 47:18-23. Blasius also discovered that his parking, emergency, and trailer brakes were non-responsive. Id. at 48:6-49:15. Smoke billowed into the vehicle cabin as Blasius swerved on and off the shoulder in an attempt to slow the vehicle. Id. at 49:16-23.

The Excursion eventually came to a stop after approximately three-quarters of a mile. Id. at 50:1-3. After escaping the vehicle, Blasius specifically observed burning diesel fuel running along the bottom and sides of the vehicle. Id. at 50:14-52:1. Bla-sius unsuccessfully attempted to subdue the fire with multiple fire extinguishers. Id. at 52:23-55:14. Sadly, by the time firefighters arrived, the vehicle was destroyed and the motorcycle trailer was damaged. Id. at 68:13-14; Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 14.

. After the fire was finally extinguished, the Excursion was loaded onto a flatbed wrecker and taken to a nearby storage facility. Blasius Dep. 66:3-6. When Blasius notified Angel of the situation, Angel admitted to Blasius that he believed a fuel leak may have caused the fire. Id. at 55:1-5.

Shortly thereafter, James Raad, a certified vehicle fire investigator, conducted an inspection of the vehicle remnants. Raad Aff. 1. Raad determined that the fire originated under the vehicle, but could not ascertain conclusive evidence of its exact cause. Id.

On January 22, 2013, Blasius filed suit against AAI in the Northern District of Indiana for negligence and breach of contract. CompL, EOF No. 1. In July 2013, Blasius’ own expert, Adam Hooker, inspected the disassembled remains of the vehicle, and rendered various conclusions about the cause of the fire. PL’s Resp. Defl’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 1. Among the conclusions in his report, Hooker found that the diesel and brake fluid systems (worked on during AAI’s overhaul) were “more likely related to the cause of the fire” and the “diesel fuel or brake fluid” was the “first fuel(s) ignited during the progression of the fire.” Id.

On March 4, 2015, the district court granted AAI’s motion for summary judgment. Op. and Order, ECF No. 68. In its ruling, the court found that Blasius “failed to present evidence showing that [AiAI’s] modification to the [Excursion] caused the fire.” Id. at 5. Additionally, the court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. Id. at 6-7. Blasius challenges both aspects of the district court’s ruling.

Discussion

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat’l Ret. Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to, and derive all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is warranted only if, after doing so, we determine that no jury could reasonably find in the nonmoving party’s favor. McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016).

A. Proximate Cause

Under Indiana law, proximate cause “is an essential element of a negligence action.” Carson v. ALL Erection & Crane Rental Corp., 811 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hassan v. Begley, 836 N.E.2d 303, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

Proximate cause in Indiana negligence law has two aspects. The first—causation in fact—is a factual inquiry for the jury. If the injury would not have occurred without the defendant’s negligent act or omission, there is causation in fact. A second component of proximate cause is the scope of liability. That issue, which is also for the trier of fact,‘turns largely on whether the injury is a natural and probable consequence, which in the light of the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated. Under this doctrine, liability may not be imposed on an original negligent actor who sets into motion a chain of events if the ultimate injury was not reasonably foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission.

City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1243-44 (Ind. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Proximate cause “must be based.upon provable facts and cannot be based upon mere guess, conjecture, surmise, possibility or speculation.” Collins v. Am. Optometric Ass’n, 693 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1982). In other words, the factual evidence supplied must reflect some “reasonable certainty or probability.” Mr. Bults, Inc. v. Orlando, 990 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

In support of its summary judgment ruling, the district court cited the “dearth of evidence” connecting Blasius’ vehicle fire with AAI’s repair work, and stated that “[hjypothesis alone is not enough to subject [AAI] to liability.” Op. and Order 6, ECF No. 68. Our review of the record, however, demands a different conclusion.

Hooker’s written report—which accompanied Blasius’ response to AAI’s summary judgment motion—noted the “extent of the disassembly work that Angel Automotive had to perform in order to install various upgraded components and to replace the fuel lines.” Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.,- ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 1. According to Hooker,’to achieve this.requisite level of disassembly, numerous connections “had to be disconnected and reconnected.” Id. Hooker’s observations were confirmed by both Angel and Fine. Angel Dep. 14:2-22, 15:11-15; Fine .Dep. 43:14-15. Hooker further noted that these connections “were located within numerous fluid moving, systems within the vehicle” and that the fluids contained therein—diesel fuel, power steering fluid, brake fluid, motor oil, window washer fluid, and anti-freeze—“can all be ignited via hot engine and exhaust components.” Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 1.

Hooker opined that these fluid systems “were all interacted with during the process of Angel Automotive completing their work,” and that the misalignment, forcing, cross-threading, over torqueing, or under torqueing of any fluid system connections “could lead to a leak that under the proper conditions ... would produce a fire.” Id. Hooker concluded that, absent “documentation that the proper torque values were applied to all connections within the vehicle, the potential of a leak in one of these systems cannot be eliminated as a possible cause of this fire.” Id. at 2.

Hooker’s report further concluded that the fire originated “in an area that encompasses the left rear portion of the engine compartment, the bulkhead area, and the area in between the transmission and the left side body and dpor panels.” Id. at 2. The report highlighted that “the fuel lines leading from the fuel tank to the fuel injection pump are located in this area,” as are the “brake system master cylinder and reservoir”—all of which were “manipulated and/or removed and reinstalled” during AAI’s work on the vehicle. Id. According to Hooker, as noted above, these systems were “more likely related to the cause of the fire” and “diesel fuel or brake fluid” was the “first fuel(s) ignited during the progression of the fire.” Id.

The district court’s ruling failed to address any portion of this written report. Instead, the court highlighted a selective, two-page portion of Hooker’s 59-page deposition transcript in which Hooker did not pronounce, in response to certain questions, that the fire was “more likely than not” caused by AAI’s repair work. Op. and Order 5, EOF No. 68. This under-inclusive analysis misconstrues Hooker’s overall assessment.-

A comprehensive reading of Hooker’s deposition, on the other hand, confirms that, time and again, his testimony reinforced the expert opinions set forth in his written report. During questioning, Hooker maintained that a fluid system leak constituted the “most likely scenario” for the June 29, 2012 fire. Hooker Dep. 45:13-46:1. He further agreed that “[b]ut for the removal and the manipulation and disas-sembly” of fluid , transfer lines by AAI, the fire would not have occurred. Id. at 53:24r-54:3.

Admittedly, Hooker also noted some limits to his overall assessment. Hooker acknowledged, for example, that due to the delayed nature of his examination, he did not possess definitive proof of causation:

Q. In your expert opinion, what caused this fire?
A. I feel that this fire was caused by a possible leak in the fluid system that came in contact with a heated portion of the exhaust system.
Q. So is it your testimony that you were able to determine a cause of this fire?
A. No, I was not. I have no proof of that and that’s why I did not.
Q. So it is not your expert opinion that the fire was caused by a leak in the fluid system?-
A. I feel it’s potentially caused by that, but I don’t know that because I didn’t see any of this for myself.
Q. I’m just trying to determine whether or not your report is just listing a possible cause of the fire or it’s your expert opinion based on your experience that this is the cause of the fire in your opinion.
A. This is my opinion of what potentially may have taken place. I don’t know what took place and I don’t know what it looked like because there was nothing for me to really look at. Does that, does that help?
Q. Yeah, I believe so. So just so we’re clear, you believe that it is possible that a fuel leak caused the fire but you were unable to determine whether or not that actually occurred in this case.
A. I believe a fluid leak, not a fuel. A fluid leak. One of them.
Q. Possibly caused’ the fire.
A. Correct.

Hooker Dep. 45:13-46:1, 46:14-47:4 (emphasis added). Upon further questioning, however, Hooker clarified both the scope and basis of his position:

Q. Is it fair to say that something that Angel did was not done properly to cause this fire?
A. That’s my, that’s my thoughts on this, is that some of the work that Angel did led to this event taking place.
Q. “This event” being the fire.
A. Yes.
Q. But because you didn’t have an opportunity to actually inspect the vehicle intact, you can’t say 100 percent what it was.
A. No.
Q. So what, what would you say your opinion is as to the- cause of the fire in this case?
A. My, my opinion of what may have caused this is a leak in one of the fluid systems that were involved in Angel Automotive’s disassembly, replacement, and reassembly of those fluid moving systems causing a leak. Not causing a leak; having a leak. And finding an ignition source within that vehicle. My, my [sic] thought is is [sic] that there’s a portion of the exhaust that I saw in one of, those are Angel Automotive’s photos I think, of the work done that shows a portion of the exhaust that wasn’t insulated? So that, also coupled with what kind of damage I could see on some of Mr. Raad’s photos kind of, of [sic] gave me that very broad area where I felt the fire may have come from.
Q. Is it true in speaking with Mr. Bla-sius that he told you he saw diesel fuel leaking from the engine?
A. Yes, and that also—I should have said that. And also that Mr. Blasius’ conversation with me, it also plays to leading me back into that area which helps me find kind of increased damage in that area, plus that one portion of exposed exhaust system in there.
Q. So just to be clear, is it your opinion that if diesel fuel or one of the other liquids, whether it be coolant or brake fluid or oil, if one of those fluids leaked ... that those fluids could be ignited by the exhaust, the exposed exhaust?
A. Yes, I think that is possible.
Q. And is it your opinion that that is more than likely what occurred in this case?
A. Yes, that’s my most likely thought on what led this fire to happen.
Q. If Angel had not done the work on this vehicle that it did, do you believe that this vehicle would have caught fire as it did where it did?
A. Yeah, I don’t know that but it, in the chain of events it, with all of that stuff being manipulated by them and then shortly after this fire taking place, when I look at that as a whole, yes. I think that if that work hadn’t had been done, this exact thing probably would not have happened.

Hooker Dep. 53:24-56:4 (emphasis added).

When Hooker’s deposition testimony is considered in its entirety, his reluctance to use the exact phrase “more likely than not” better reflects confusion regarding the adverse questioning (and the legal nuance of burdens of proof) rather than any meaningful hesitancy on the reasonable probability of causation:

Q. So in your opinion is it more likely than not that Angel Automotive’s work caused the subject fire?
A. I think it’s possible, yes.
Q. So your testimony is it’s possible that they were the cause of the subject fire, not that it’s more likely than not. Is that correct?
A. I didn’t understand that question. Is it possible versus more likely than not? What’s the difference?
Q. Possible means it’s a possibility.
A. It absolutely is a possibility.
Q. And that’s your testimony. It’s a possibility. Or is it more likely than not the cause?
A. I, I don’t see—I’m struggling with the two. They kind of seem very close to me. “More likely than not” is a “possibility.” I don’t, I don’t understand the question, I guess. I absolutely think it’s possible, if that’s what you’re asking. I absolutely think it’s possible.
Q. More likely than not simply means that it’s more than 50 percent likely that that occurred. Or is it still your testimony that—
A. Can I think it’s possible and more likely than not?
[Blasius’ attorney]: I don’t think he understands the question.
[Hooker]: I don’t. I do not understand that. I absolutely think it’s possible. Are we going to put a percentage on how [confident] I am in thinking it’s possible?
Q. I’m just trying to determine whether or not you believe it’s a possibility that their work caused it.
A. I absolutely believe that.
Q. Or that it’s your expert opinion that their work did cause it.
A. I don’t know if it caused it.
Q. It’s just that it’s possible based on the timeline that it caused the fire?
A. More than just the timeline. The timeline and the extent of the work that’s been done, yes. I, yes. I absolutely think it’s possible.

Hooker Dep. 57:1-58:15. In assessing the above testimony, we must remember that Hooker’s expertise lies in the field of fire investigation, not law. As such, it is improper to reject the fair import of his testimony based upon an apparent inability to decipher legal intricacies with which trained attorneys so often struggle.

Moreover, we must remain cognizant of the proper purpose for which Blasi-us offers Hooker’s expert opinions regarding causation. At the summary judgment phase, Hooker merely helps Blasius get to a fact finder; Hooker does not, however, serve as the fact finder. To achieve the former, a plaintiff need only produce evidence sufficient to potentially persuade any reasonable jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“[Summary judgment will not lie ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”) (emphasis added). In essence, Appellee asks us to raise this standard and require that a plaintiff, at the summary judgment stage, show actual persuasion of a particular person to a particular degree of certainty. Obviously, we decline that invitation here.

At summary judgment, Hooker’s expert opinions regarding causation remain sufficient, especially since they find further support in the record, including Angel’s own admission to Blasius that Angel thought a fuel leak may have caused the fire (a conclusion based upon Angel’s personal involvement in working on the vehicle). Angel Dep. 55:1-5. Such evidence, in conjunction with Hooker’s written report and Blasius’ personal observations of the fire on scene, goes well beyond the district court’s characterization of Blasius’ evidence of causation as only “speculation” or mere “hypothesis.” See Newell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 36 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A probability of negligence may be supported by expert testimony or common sense inference.”). Construing all reasonable inferences in Blasius’ favor, as we must, such evidence furnishes a sufficient factual basis from which a reasonable jury could find in favor of Blasius on the causation element of his negligence action.

Appellee’s contrary reliance on Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) is misplaced. In Kincade, a store clerk sued the designers, manufacturers, and installers of a trash compactor system for injuries she received from a fall on a set of access stairs. Id. at 911. At the summary judgment stage, defects in the clerk’s case were two-fold. First, the clerk admitted that she did not know what caused her feet to slip out from under her, and even worse, presented conflicting testimony regarding possible culprits. Id. at 912. Second, the clerk’s theories narrowed responsibility to the platform and access stairs leading to the trash compactor, not the compactor itself. Id. The defendants at issue, however, only had personal involvement in the latter. Id. As a result, no question of material fact existed as to whether the clerk’s injuries were proximately caused “by any action or inaction on the part of any of the three defendants.” Id. at 913.

Here, unlike the store clerk, Blasius provided a specific, consistent theory— supported by expert testimony and other evidence—regarding the cause of his vehicle fire: a leak in the Excursion’s fluid systems that came in contact with a heated portion of the exhaust system. Hooker Dep. 45:14-16. Furthermore, Blasius tied the source of his injury directly to AAI. The record shows that, to complete the extensive' upgrades to ' Blasius’ vehicle, AAI disconnected and' reconnected the fluid moving systems. Angel Dep. 15:11— 15. Although uncertainty remains as to which fluid first ignited, such ambiguity is immaterial since AAI interacted with all of them immediately preceding the fire. '

Appellee’s reference to our decision in Trask-Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2008), is equally unavailing. In Trask-Morton, the plaintiff checked into an Indianapolis Motel 6 alone. Id. at 674. Once inside, she took a dose of muscle relaxant and fell asleep. Id. The plaintiff had no memory of what occurred between the time she fell asleep and when she regained consciousness the following evening. Id. -Nevertheless, two days later, the plaintiff reported that she had been sexually assaulted. Id. at 676. The plaintiff' filed suit against Motel 6, alleging that the hotel failed to provide adequate security. Id. Due to the plaintiffs lack of direct memory and the absence of other circumstantial evidence, however, the district court found there was insufficient proof for a reasonable jury to conclude that a sex crime had actually been committed. According to the court, without “facts to support [the plaintiffs] allegation that an assault occurred in the first place,” the plaintiff “could not connect the injuries she alleged occurred as the result of the assault to any breach of duty by Motel 6.” Id. Affirming the lower court’s decision, we held that “a jury could not find that Morton was sexually assaulted ... without resorting to impermissible speculation.” Id. at 679.

This case is not Trask-Morton. There, plaintiff was unable to prove that an injury actually occurred, and, without a predicate injury, there can be no proximate cause. Here, AAI does not contest that Blasius’ Excursion was destroyed by fire. Thus, while a genuine issue of material fact remains concerning causation, the undisputed presence of an actual injury places the current controversy beyond the import of Trask-Morton.

B. Res Ipsa Loquitur

Cases such as Kincade highlight that “negligence may not be inferred from the mere fact that an injury occurred.” Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, negligence “may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the injury.” Id. (emphasis added). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur— translated, “the thing speaks for itself’— recognizes that “certain accidents are so unusual that' the party shown' to be in exclusive control of the injuring object ought to be held responsible unless that party can offer a reasonable explanation.” Newell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 36 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1994).

In other words, res ipsa loqui-tur “is a shortcut to a negligence claim.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 642. It, “does not require a plaintiff to submit evidence of causation” because it is “a doctrine of common sense. It allows a trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence when evidence of causation is lacking.” Id. at 644. As we said in Maroules,

[t]o establish this inference of negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the injuring instrumentality was within the exclusive management and control of the defendant, and (2) that the accident is of the type that does not ordinarily happen if those who have the management and control exercise proper care ... Once the plaintiff has met the burden of demonstrating the control and due care prongs of res ipsa loquitur, the doctrine operates to permit an inference of negligence based upon the circumstantial evidence.

Id. at 642. Satisfying the prima facie elements, however, does not automatically “hand victory” to the plaintiff. Id. at 643.

The inference ... is just that—a plaintiff does not win [his] case merely because [he] has met the res ipsa loquitur requirements. A successful res ipsa lo-quitur showing simply creates an inference which the trier of fact may choose to accept or not.

Id. at 642-43 (internal citations omitted); Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240, 33 S.Ct. 416, 418, 67 L.Ed. 816 (1913) (“In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict.”).

In the end, whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies is a mixed question of law and fact. Maroules, 462 F.3d at 643. The question of law is whether the plaintiffs evidence includes all of the underlying elements of res ipsa loquitur; the ultimate determination for the trier of fact at trial “is whether the permissible inference is to be drawn.” Id.

1. Exclusive Management and Control

Here, the district court held that res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the Excursion was in Blasius’ possession on June 29, 2012 and thus not “under the exclusive control of [AAI] at the time of the fire[.f Op. and Order 7, ECF No. 68. Such a holding misinterprets the first prong of the res ipsa loquitur test.

The “concept of control under Indiana’s res ipsa loquitur case law is expansive.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 643. To prove “exclusive control,” a plaintiff “simply is required to show either that a specific instrument caused the injury and that the defendant had control over that instrument or that any reasonably probable causes for the injury were under the control of the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added).

Notably, when “used in the res ipsa loquitur context, the term ‘control’ does not require actual physical dominion over an object.” Newell, 36 F.3d at 680. Thus, “a defendant need not be in control of the causative instrumentality at the exact moment of injury, provided the defendant was the last person in control.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 643 (emphasis added). A “product which explodes long after its shipment from the manufacturer may still be, for purposes of res ipsa loquitur, in the control of the manufacturer if the probability of other causes is small.” Newell, 36 F.3d at 580.

In Newell, the plaintiff filed suit against Westinghouse Electric Corporation, an elevator maintenance company, after a malfunctioning elevator in the Indiana Bell Telephone Building slammed shut on her. Id. at 577. Westinghouse argued that, because several Indiana Bell employees maintained access to the elevator control room between the defendant’s maintenance calls, the plaintiff could not establish that Westinghouse “was in sole control of the elevators” at the time of her accident. Id. at 580. According to Westinghouse, such joint control raised “the possibility of negligence by another party,” and thereby barred an inference :of negligence on the part of the defendant. Id.

Rejecting this argument, we held that Westinghouse’s negligence constituted the “most probable cause” of the plaintiffs injuries. Id. Although Indiana Bell employees possessed access to the elevator control room, only Westinghouse conducted service and maintenance on the elevator. Id. Because the accident derived from a mechanical failure, access alone was “of little significance” absent evidence that that the employees “in fact engaged in any repair or maintenance themselves.” Id.

Here, as in Newell, AAI was the sole provider of service and maintenance of the Excursion within the relevant time frame. Although Blasius held possession of (and thus access to) the vehicle at the time it ignited, the record is devoid of any evidence that anyone other than AAI performed any material repair or maintenance work of their own between the time Blasi-us picked up the Excursion on June 28, 2012 and the moment it burst into flames. Moreover, while the parties dispute the precise cause of the ignition, there is no evidence indicating that the failure, and resulting fire, were anything but mechanical in nature.

Regardless, “the possibility of multiple causes or multiple defendants does not automatically defeat the application of res ipsa loquitur.” Maroules, 452 F.3d at 643 (emphasis added). In Mar-oules, a motorist brought suit against the owner of a trucking company and its driver after a wheel broke free from a truck trailer and crashed through the front passenger side of the plaintiffs car. Id. at 641. The defendants denied that they possessed exclusive control of the injuring instrumentality and contended 'that they “had no role in manufacturing the trailer or its wheel studs”; “had no control over the inspection and maintenance of the trailer or its wheel studs prior to the time that [the. defendants] purchased the trailer”; and “did not maintain, service, or repair its trailers and their parts, but instead relinquished] control every time it sen[t] its trailers to an outside third party maintenance company to do this work.” Id.

We conceded that these facts presented “any number of alternative theories for the accident: the stud manufacturer could have negligently or knowingly manufactured defective studs, the maintenance business could have used a faulty power tool to tighten the bolts, or a vandal could have sabotaged the truck wheels.” Id. Nonetheless, we held that “the possibility that a third party may have negligently manufactured, installed, or maintained the studs does not preclude a finding that [the defendant] had control over the injuring instrumentality.” Id. at 644. We stated that res ipsa loquitur does not demand that the plaintiff “exclude every other possibility other than the defendant’s negligence as a cause of the injury.” Id. Instead, “a plaintiff may point to several alternative causes of injury and allow the jury to determine which, if any, instrumentality caused the injury.” Id.

Ultimately, at trial, a plaintiff “must show only that the likelihood of other causes is so reduced ‘that the great-. er probability lies at the defendant’s door.’” Newell, 36 F.3d at 580 (quoting Fowler V. Harper, The Law of Torts § 19.7, at 46 (2d ed.,1986)). Indeed, to hold otherwise “would emasculate” the res ipsa loquitur ■ doctrine. Id. at 681 (quotations omitted). It is only when a plaintiff cannot “identify any potential causes and show that they were in the exclusive control of the defendant” that res ipsa loquitur fails to apply. Maroules, 452 F.3d at 644 (emphasis added).

In this case, Hooker stated in his written report that the Excursion’s fuel and brake systems were “more likely” the cause of the fire. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11 at 2. During his deposition, Hooker reiterated that a fluid system leak constituted the “most likely scenario” for the June 29, 2012 blaze, and agreed that “[b]ut for the removal and the manipulation and disassem-bly” of fluid transfer lines by AAI, the fire would not have occurred. Hooker Dep. 45:13-46:1, 53:24-54:3. Hooker deemed this the “most likely” cause of the fire and opined that, had AAI’s repair work not been done, the accident “probably would not have happened.” 55:17-56:4. For the purposes of summary judgment, the record in this case clearly satisfies the requirements outlined in Maroules and New-ell.

Appellee’s reliance upon Slease v. Hughbanks, 684 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), is also misplaced. In Slease, the plaintiff, a steelworker, underwent ankle surgery after a workplace fall. Id. at 498. The next evening, the plaintiff noticed a burn on his left thigh. Id. Believing that the burn occurred during the surgery, the plaintiff filed a suit against the hospital for medical malpractice. Id. The Court of Appeals of Indiana granted summary judgment to the hospital because the plaintiff failed to “point to an instrument in the control of the defendant which was a probable cause of his burn.” Id. at 500. Although the plaintiff pointed to a “bovie pad” as a potential culprit, the court found that “there [was] nothing in the designated evidence to. show, that this instrument [had] the potential to cause a burn such as [the plaintiff] received.” Id.

The record before this Court succeeds where the record in Slease failed. Here, unlike in Slease, Blasius offered several sources of evidence indicating that a “leak in the [Excursion’s] fluid system that came in contact with a heated portion of the exhaust system” was the cause of the vehicle fire. Hooker Dep. 45:14-16. For example, Hooker’s report stated that fluids within the Excursion’s fluid system could “all be ignited via hot engine and exhaust components.” Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 11-at 1. Moreover, Hooker concluded that the fire originated in the area of the engine compartment where “the fuel lines leading from the fuel tank to the fuel injection pump” as well as the “brake system master cylinder and reservoir” were located—all of which were “manipulated and/or removed and reinstalled” during AAI’s work on the vehicle. Id. at 2. Hooker also pointed to photographs of the vehicle’s exhaust “that show[ed] a portion of the exhaust that wasn’t insulated” in that area. Hooker Dep. 54:23-24. In light of the record here, Slease is irrelevant.

2. Nature of Accident

Because the district court held that Blasius failed to meet the first prong of the res ipsa loquitur inquiry, it did not address whether the fire at issue ordinarily occurs absent the exercise of proper care. Based upon the record, we find this prong, satisfied as well.

It should go without saying that vehicle fires of the kind seen here do not occur as a matter of course. We are unconvinced by Appellee’s arguments to the contrary. Appellee claims that “[p]arts wear down. Road hazards loosen connections, bend parts and can create leaks and openings. The outdoor elements also affect the operation of the vehicle.” Appellee’s Br. 15. Appellee ignores that,, in this case, the parts were new, and the record presents no evidence of road hazards or inclement weather.

Rather, the record indicates that Blasius drove little more than 200 miles before his newly overhauled Excursion burst into flames. It cannot be reasonably said that such an event constitutes an ordinary occurrence of automotive self-combustion. If such were the case, the automobile would cease to serve as society’s fundamental mode of transportation. The Government has a significant interest “in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.” Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 1591, 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995). As a result, the design, manufacture, production, use, and maintenance of vehicles are among America’s most heavily regulated industries. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq.-, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571, et seq. Government agencies at the federal, state, and local level sponsor and secure automobile safety. Given this pervasive level of public use and attention, we reject AAI’s suggestion that the accident in this case is a mere fact of everyday life...,

Conclusion

Our ruling,- of course, takes no position regarding Appellant’s ability to link his vehicle fire to AAI’s conduct by a preponderance of the evidence at trial, nor do we opine upon the strength of Appellant’s negligence claim as a whole. Such a determination rightfully belongs in the hands of the fact finder at trial. At present, it is enough to say that a genuine issue of material fact- exists ■ as to the proximate cause of the fire that -consumed Blasius’ vehicle, and that, for the purpose of settling that dispute, Appellant is entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. .

      . These improvements included, among others, a new sound system, tires, suspension, fuel system, batteries, transmission, and turbocharger. Blasius Dep. 15:1-36:25. These initial modifications were completed by the end of May 2012. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53, Ex. 8.

      . Angel testified that, prior to transferring the Excursion back to Blasius, he and Fine also test drove the vehicle. Angel Dep. 47:15-25.

      . See, e.g. Alfa Romeo, Inc. v. S.S. Torinita, 499 F.Supp. 1272, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("A car spontaneously starting to burn may give rise to a permissible inference that it was defective, and that a defect existed when it left the hands of the defendant.”); Eversole v. Woods Acquisition, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“Common life experience ... suggests it would be extraordinary for fuel lines to leak and cause a major fire in a three-year old vehicle, even with 52,000 miles of use, without an intervening act of manipulation.”); Lee v. Hollywood Car & Truck Rental, Inc., 485 So.2d 843, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Hinckley v. La Mesa R.V. Ctr., Inc., 158 Cal.App.3d 630, 205 Cal.Rptr. 22, 27 (1984) ("[RJelatively new motor vehicles are usually not destroyed by fire in the absence of negligence.”); Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal.App.2d 639, 55 Cal.Rptr. 94, 99 (1966) ("We think it is a matter of common knowledge that new automobiles which have been properly driven for only about 1,600 miles do not suddenly develop a fire in the engine compartment without someone’s negligence.”); Seneca Ins. Co. v. Vogt Auto Serv., 61 Ohio Misc.2d 36, 573 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1991); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. 2004).


text:
    SUN LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF CANADA, Defendant-Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Securities Intermediary, Plaintiff-Appellee.
    No. 16-1049
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Argued September 20, 2016
    Decided October 12, 2016

      Eric John Wilson, Mark Warren Hancock, Attorneys, Godfrey & Kahn S.C., Madison, WI, John Failla, Mark David Harris, Nathan Lander, Attorneys, Pros-kauer Rose LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    John Michael Bloor, Dorothy Alicia Hickok, Jason P. Gosselin, John Michael Moore, Attorneys, Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Terri Lynn Ahrens, Attorney, Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
   POSNER, Circuit Judge.

A common law principle that so far as we know is in force in every state of the United States forbids a person to own an insurance policy that insures someone else’s life unless the policy owner has an insurable interest in that life. Ohio National Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis, 803 F.3d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir. 2015). So you are allowed to own an insurance policy on your spouse’s life because the death of the spouse is likely to impose costs on you, but you cannot own an insurance policy on the life of a stranger who you happen to know is in poor health and likely to die soon; for cashing in such an insurance policy would give you a pure windfall. (It would also, see id. at 906, hurt the insurance company by shortening the period in which it would be receiving premiums.) As the Supreme Court long ago sensibly remarked, “It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life, and in that of his wife and children; a woman in the life of her husband; and the creditor in the life of his debtor. ... The essential thing is, that the policy shall be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest.” Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460, 24 L.Ed. 251 (1876).

And there is the further concern, which figured largely in the creation of the common law principle, that insuring a stranger’s life gives the policy holder an incentive to shorten that life. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154-55, 32 S.Ct. 58, 56 L.Ed. 133 (1911) (Holmes, J.).

The common law remedy for buying a life insurance policy without having an insurable interest in the life of the insured was to invalidate the policy. But in 1975 the Wisconsin legislature, while retaining the common law principle forbidding the purchase of a life insurance policy by one who lacked an insurable interest, changed the remedy from cancelling the policy to requiring the insurer to honor its promise. The revised statute provides that “no insurance policy is invalid merely because the policyholder lacks insurable interest ... but a court with appropriate jurisdiction may order the proceeds to be paid to someone other than the person to whom the policy is designated to be payable, who is equitably entitled thereto.” Wis. Stat. § 631.07(4). The legislature reasoned that “the best way to discourage insurers from issuing insurance policies to persons without insurable interest is to make them [the life insurance companies] pay if they do, not to permit them freely to issue such policies knowing that they have a good public policy defense [the unenforceability of gambling contracts] that lets them off the hook whenever a loss occurs.” Wis. Stat. § 631.07(4), comment.

In 2007 an insurance company named Sun Life (the defendant in this case and the appellant in this court) issued a $6 million policy on the life of a wealthy 81-year-old named Charles Margolin. He died in 2014. U.S. Bank (the plaintiff in this suit and the appellee in this court) had bought the policy three years before Margolin’s death, becoming the policy’s beneficiary. U.S. Bank is designated in the caption as a securities intermediary, however, because Margolin’s policy either is a security or has been bundled together with other life insurance policies to create a security or securities, and because U.S. Bank bought the policy as an intermediary on behalf of another investor. See Jenny Anderson, “Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance,” New York Times, Sept. 5, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/ business/06insurance.html?_r=1 (visited Oct. 11, 2016).

Sun Life declared that it would refuse to pay U.S. Bank the policy proceeds until it investigated the policy’s validity. That refusal, should it ripen from tentative to definitive upon completion of the investigation, would be profitable because during the seven years that the policy was in force Sun Life had collected and retained almost $2.5 million in premiums paid by the successive owners of the policy. And even if Sun Life was ordered to return the premiums, see Venisek v. Draski, 35 Wis.2d 38, 150 N.W.2d 347, 353-54 (1967), it would save $6 million if it didn’t have to pay U.S. Bank the policy proceeds. Reacting to Sun Life’s declaration and armed by Wisconsin’s requirement that insurers in Wisconsin pay claims within 30 days, Wis. Stat. § 628.46, U.S. Bank brought this diversity suit against Sun Life, and prevailed in the district court; the district judge ruled that the bank was entitled to the policy proceeds—the $6 million—plus statutory interest and “bad faith” damages for Sun Life’s foot dragging.

U.S. Bank insists that Wis. Stat. § 631.07(4) requires Sun Life to pay the death benefit to the beneficiary of the policy, namely U.S. Bank. It is true that the statute authorizes the court to order the death benefit paid to someone else, but only to a someone else who is equitably entitled to it. And no one who is equitably entitled to the proceeds of the Sun Life policy has stepped forward to claim them; therefore the beneficiary, U.S. Bank, is entitled to them.

Against this Sun Life makes three arguments. One is that its refusal to pay the death benefit is authorized and in fact compelled by another Wisconsin statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.055, .which with immaterial exceptions voids all gambling contracts. But still another statutory provision, Wis. Stat. § 600.12(2), provides that if a section of the state’s insurance code conflicts with a section of another code, the section in the insurance code governs. Wis. Stat. § 631.07(4), the section under which U.S. Bank is suing, is a provision of that code, as the code encompasses chapters 600 to 655 of the Wisconsin statute book, and sections 600.12(2) and 631.07(4) are both within that range. Sun Life argues that the two statutes don’t actually conflict, but the distinction it tries to draw, between insurance policies that are wagers and insurance policies in which the policyholder lacks an insurable interest, does not exist. As explained in Grigsby v. Russell, supra, 222 U.S. at 154, 32 S.Ct. 58, “a contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured has no interest is a pure wager.” Nevertheless Wis. Stat. § 631.07(4) makes clear that as the beneficiary of the policy U.S. Bank is entitled to the proceeds of it.

Sun Life’s second argument is grounded in Article IV, section 24, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states that “except as provided in this section, the [Wisconsin] legislature may not authorize gambling in any form.” But the legislature has hot done that in Wis. Stat. § 631.07(4), or anywhere else for that matter. Gambling contracts, including life insurance policies that lack an insurable interest, are still forbidden. The statute changed only the remedy for violation, from invalidation of the policy to requiring the insurer to cough .up the proceeds rather than—as Sun Life claims entitlement to—being allowed to keep all the premiums and pay nothing to the policy holder because the latter had no insurable interest in the policy.

Sun Life’s third argument is limited to the district judge’s award of statutory interest, and of damages for acting in bad faith. The statute we cited earlier that requires payment of insurance proceeds within 30 days requires interest on delayed payments at the rate of 12 percent a year unless the insurer has “reasonable proof,” lacking here, that it does not have to pay the claim. Wis. Stat. § 628.46. And bad faith, which requires showing that the insurer lacked a “reasonable basis” for the delay and acted with “knowledge or reckless disregard” of the lack, Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978), has been proved as well.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.